matrimonial disputes = divorce, custody of children = the custody of the two children.= We, accordingly, make the following interim arrangement: (i) The respondent-husband is directed to bring both daughters, namely, Kirti Bhalla and Ridhi Bhalla, to the Supreme Court Mediation Centre at 10 a.m. on Saturday of every fortnight and hand over both of them to the petitioner-wife. The mother is free to interact with them and take them out and keep them in her house for overnight stay. On the next day, i.e., Sunday at 10 a.m. the petitioner-wife is directed to hand over the children at the residence of the respondent-husband. The above arrangement shall commence from 17.12.2011 and continue till the end of January, 2012. (ii) The respondent-husbad is directed to inform the mobile number of elder daughter (in the course of hearing, we were informed that she is having separate

                                                              REPORTABLE


      


                  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA




                   CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION




 SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) Nos. 35468-35469 OF 2009










Gaytri Bajaj                                              .... Petitioner (s)






               Versus






Jiten Bhalla                                              .... Respondent(s)










                                  O R D E R  






1)        The   petitioner-wife   and   the   respondent-husband   were 






married   on   10.12.1992   and   two   daughters   were   born   out   of 






the said wedlock.  The elder daughter was born on 20.08.1995 






and the younger daughter on 19.04.2000.   It is the grievance 






of   the   petitioner-wife   that   the   Additional   District   Judge   by 






order dated 03.06.2003 passed a decree of divorce within eight 






days   from   the   presentation   of   the   first   and   second   Motions 






under   Section   13-B(1)   of   the   Hindu   Marriage   Act,   1955 






(hereinafter   referred   to   as   "the   Act").     The   petitioner-wife   has 








                                                                                 1



filed a suit for declaration on 01.02.2006 seeking a declaratory 






decree that the respondent has obtained a decree by fraud.






2)    On 10.10.2007, the respondent-husband filed an appeal 






under Section 28 of the Act in the High Court of Delhi at New 






Delhi.     The   petitioner-wife   filed   cross-objections   to   the   said 






appeal  on  07.11.2007.     The  learned  single   Judge   of  the   High 






Court, by order dated 08.09.2008, allowed the appeal filed by 






the respondent-husband without deciding and adjudicating on 






the   cross-objections   filed   by   the   petitioner-wife.     Being 






aggrieved   by   the   order   of   the   learned   single   Judge,   the 






respondent-wife   filed   a   review   petition   on   13.10.2008.     The 






said review petition was also dismissed on 10.07.2009 by the 






learned single Judge of the High Court.   Both the said orders 






were impugned in the present special leave petitions.






3)    By   order   dated   14.12.2009,   this   Court   issued   notice   to 






the respondent-husband.






4)    The short question which falls for consideration in these 






SLPs  for   the  present  is  with  regard  to  the   custody   of  the  two 






children.










                                                                            2



5)    During   the   course   of   hearing,   at   one   stage,   considering 






the   issue   raised,   namely,   relating   to   the   custody   of   children, 






both being daughters, at the request of counsel for both sides, 






we   decided   to   interact   with   the   children   as   well   as   their 






parents,   namely,   petitioner-wife   and   respondent-husband   in 






our Chambers to find out the actual friction in order to arrive 






at the possibility of any amicable settlement.   Pursuant to the 






same, both parties including their children were present before 






us  and  a   detailed   interaction   was  held   with   the  children   and 






their parents separately.  In the course of interaction, we were 






able to ascertain the following facts:






a)    The   date   of   birth   of   first   daughter   is   20.08.1995   and 






presently   she   is   aged   about   17   years.     The   date   of   birth   of 






second   daughter   is   19.04.2000   and   presently   she   is   aged 






about 11 years.  Both of them were living with their father and 






are in his custody and the petitioner-wife had no access to the 






children or even a brief meeting with them.






b)    After interacting with the children separately and putting 






several questions about their age, education, their future and 






importance   of   company   of   mother   as   of   now,   both   of   them 










                                                                                3



were very clear and firm that they want to continue to live with 






their father and they do not want to go with their mother.  






6)     In   the   aforesaid   facts   and   circumstances,   we   feel  that   if 






the   children   are   forcibly   taken   away   from   the   father   and 






handed   over   to   the   mother,   undoubtedly,   it   will   affect   their 






mental condition and it will not be desirable in the interest of 






their  betterment and studies.   In such a situation,  the better 






course   would   be   that   the   mother   should   first   be   allowed   to 






make     initial     contact     with     the     children,   build   up 






relationship   with   them   and   gradually   restore   her   position   as 






their mother.






7)     In   a   matter   relating   to   the   custody   of   children   the   first 






and the paramount consideration is the welfare and interest of 






the   child   and   not   the   rights   of   the   parents   under   a   statute. 






Even   the   statues,   namely,   the   Guardianship   and   Wards   Act, 






1890 and Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 make it 






clear   that   the   welfare   of   the   child   is   a   predominant 






consideration.     In  a   matter   of   this  nature,   particularly,   when 






father and mother fighting their case without reference to the 






welfare   of   the   child,   a   heavy   duty   is   cast   upon   the   Court   to 










                                                                                  4



exercise its discretion judiciously bearing in mind the welfare 






of the child as paramount consideration.






8)    In   the   relevant   facts   and   circumstances   of   the   case,   we 






are convinced that the interest and welfare of the children will 






be   best   served   if   they   continue   to   be   in   the   custody   of   the 






father.  In our opinion, at present, it is not desirable to disturb 






the   custody   with   the   father.     However,   we   feel   that   ends   of 






justice   would   be   met   by   providing   visitation   rights   to   the 






mother.   In fact, during the hearing on 12.12.2011, Ms. Indu 






Malhotra,   learned   senior   counsel   for   the   petitioner-wife 






represented that if such visitation rights, namely, visiting her 






children   once   in   a   fortnight   is   ordered  that   would   satisfy   the 






petitioner-wife.     Learned  senior  counsel   also represented that 






if the said method materializes, the petitioner-wife is willing to 






withdraw   all   civil   and   criminal   cases   filed   against   the 






respondent-husband which are pending in various courts.  










9)    Mr.   Ranjit   Kumar,   learned   senior   counsel   for   the 






respondent-husband   made   it   clear   that   this   Court   is   free   to 






pass   appropriate   interim   arrangement   if   the   same   is   feasible 










                                                                                 5



and in the interest of the children.          Since both are residing at 






Delhi,   it   is   desirable   to   pass   appropriate   direction   for   the 






meeting   of   the   petitioner-wife   either   in   the   house   of   the 






respondent-husband   or   in   a   common   place   like   Mediation 






Centre of this Court or the High Court. 






10)    We, accordingly, make the following interim arrangement:






       (i)     The   respondent-husband   is   directed   to   bring   both 






       daughters, namely, Kirti Bhalla and Ridhi Bhalla, to the 






       Supreme Court Mediation Centre at 10 a.m. on Saturday 






       of   every   fortnight   and   hand   over   both   of   them   to   the 






       petitioner-wife.   The mother is free to interact with them 






       and   take   them   out   and   keep   them   in   her   house   for 






       overnight stay.   On the next day, i.e., Sunday at 10 a.m. 






       the petitioner-wife is directed to hand over the children at 






       the   residence   of   the   respondent-husband.     The   above 






       arrangement   shall   commence   from   17.12.2011   and 






       continue till the end of January, 2012.






       (ii)    The   respondent-husbad   is   directed   to   inform   the 






       mobile   number   of   elder   daughter   (in   the   course   of 






       hearing,   we   were   informed   that   she   is   having   separate 










                                                                              6



       mobile   phone)   and   also   landline   number   to   enable   the 






       petitioner-wife to interact with the children.






11)    Inasmuch as the petitioner-wife is willing to withdraw all 






civil   and   criminal   proceedings   filed   against   the   respondent-






husband, in view of the interim visitation rights being granted 






to   her,   we   hope   and   trust   that   the   respondent-husband   will 






cooperate and persuade the children to spend time with their 






mother as directed above.  










                                                                           7



12)    It   is   also   made   clear   that   for   any   reason   if   the   said 






visitation   is   not   workable   due   to   the   attitude   of   any   of   the 






parties or due to the children, counsel appearing for them are 






free to mention before this Court for the next course of action.






13)    Put up on 03.02.2012.   










                                   .................................................J. 


                                   (P. SATHASIVAM)   
                                                                                           










                                  ..................................................J. 


                                   (J. CHELAMESWAR) 




NEW DELHI;


DECEMBER 16, 2011.










                                                                                               8

senior civil judge courts of A.P. has got jurisdiction to entertain the cases under Indian succession act=This Court in R.O.C.No.40/So/72.2 – under the provision of Section 19 (1) of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 1972 (Act 19 of 1972) and in super cession of the previous Notification on the subject, authorized all Subordinate Judges (including the Additional Judges in the City Civil Courts) to take cognizance of any proceedings under the Indian Succession Act, 1925, (Act 39 of 1925) which cannot be disposed of by the District Delegates. 3. Therefore, in view of the above proceedings, this Court authorized all the Subordinate Judges to take cognizance of the proceedings under Indian Succession Act. Hence, the impugned order is not in accordance with law and the same is liable to be set aside.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH
AT HYDERABAD

(Special Original Jurisdiction)

 

WEDNESDAY, THE TENTH DAY OF MARCH
TWO THOUSAND AND TEN

 

PRESENT

 

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE K.C. BHANU

 

CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL No.46 OF 2010

 

Between:

Ambadipudi Nagaratnamma

..... APPELLANT

AND

 

To whom so ever it may concern

....RESPONDENT

The Court made the following: 

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE K.C. BHANU

 

CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL No.46 OF 2010

JUDGMENT:

This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal, under Section 384 (1) of the India Succession Act, 1925 (for short, “the Act”), is directed against the order, dated 28.10.2009, in S.O.P.No.32 of 2009, on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Sathupalli, whereunder and whereby, the petition, filed for issuance of the succession certificate, was dismissed on the ground that there was no notification or order, which specifically authorize the Senior Civil Judges to take cognizance of the proceedings under the Act.

2.   This Court in R.O.C.No.40/So/72.2 – under the provision of Section 19 (1) of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 1972 (Act 19 of 1972) and in super cession of the previous Notification on the subject, authorized all Subordinate Judges (including the Additional Judges in the City Civil Courts) to take cognizance of any proceedings under the Indian Succession Act, 1925, (Act 39 of 1925) which cannot be disposed of by the District Delegates.

3.      Therefore, in view of the above proceedings, this Court authorized all the Subordinate Judges to take cognizance of the proceedings under Indian Succession Act.  Hence, the impugned order is not in accordance with law and the same is liable to be set aside.

4.      Accordingly, the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is allowed setting aside the impugned order, and the trial Court shall take cognizance of the proceedings under the Act.  There shall be no order as to costs.

_______________

K.C. BHANU, J

March 10, 2010

Note: Issue C.C. of the order within four days.

B/O.MD/YVL

the transferee court must put the parties to the notice: pecuniary jurisdiction is to be consider in the insolvency proceedings also= there is nothing on record to show that after transfer of the said I.P. from the District Court, Vizianagaram to the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Parvathipuram, there was any notice to the appellant i.e., the appellant had no information about transfer of the said I.P. from the District Court, Vizianagaram to Court of Senior Civil Judge, Parvathipuram and also the date of hearing and hence, the appellant cannot be put to any blame nor can the case be dismissed as such, that too, for default Hence, C.M.A.No.296 of 2001 is allowed and the order, dated 29.12.2000, passed by the Senior Civil Judge, Parvathipuram, Vizianagaram District, in I.P.No.1 of 1999 is set aside.=On perusal of the material on record, we find that there is no dispute as regards the valuation of the Insolvency Petition i.e., Rs.11,68,657/-. Hence, necessarily the matter has to be disposed of only by the District Court as per Section 3 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920.

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE B.PRAKASH RAO

AND

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE R.KANTHA RAO

CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL Nos.296 of 2001

and 453 of 2010

COMMON JUDGMENT: (per the Hon’ble Sri JusticeB.Prakash Rao)

          Since both the appeals are between the same parties and relate to the same matter, they are heard together and are being disposed of by a common judgment.

C.M.A.No.296 of 2001 is filed against the order, dated 29.12.2000, passed by the Senior Civil Judge, Parvathipuram, Vizianagaram District, in I.P.No.1 of 1999, whereunder the said I.P. was dismissed for default.

C.M.A.No.453 of 2010 is filed against the order, dated 11.10.2000, passed by the District Judge, Vizianagaram District, in I.P.No.1 of 1999, whereunder the said I.P. was made over to the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Parvathipuram, for disposal in accordance with law.

In C.M.A.No.296 of 2001, the grievance of the appellant, who filed the Insolvency Petition, is to the effect that originally, the said I.P. was filed before the District Judge, Vizianagaram. However, the same was made over by the District Judge, Vizianagaram to the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Parvathipuram, Vizianagaram District. Subsequent to the said transfer, the appellant had no notice of the same, yet the matter was taken up and the case was dismissed for default, which is not correct.

Heard learned counsel appearing on either side and perused the material available on record.

We are of the view that admittedly, there is nothing on record to show that after transfer of the said I.P. from the District Court, Vizianagaram to the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Parvathipuram, there was any notice to the appellant i.e., the appellant had no information about transfer of the said I.P. from the District Court, Vizianagaram to Court of Senior Civil Judge, Parvathipuram and also the date of hearing and hence, the appellant cannot be put to any blame nor can the case be dismissed as such, that too, for default  Hence, C.M.A.No.296 of 2001 is allowed and the order, dated 29.12.2000, passed by the Senior Civil Judge, Parvathipuram, Vizianagaram District, in I.P.No.1 of 1999 is set aside.

In C.M.A.No.453 of 2010, the grievance of the appellant is as regards the transfer of the said I.P. from the District Court, Vizianagaram to the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Parvathipuram.

The objection raised by the appellant is to the effect that having regard to the valuation of the very Insolvency Petition i.e., a sum of Rs.11,68,657/-, the question of making over the said I.P. to the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Parvathipuram by the District Judge, Vizianagaram, does not arise and the order is wholly unsustainable.

On perusal of the material on record, we find that there is no dispute as regards the valuation of the Insolvency Petition i.e., Rs.11,68,657/-. Hence, necessarily the matter has to be disposed of only by the District Court as per Section 3 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920.

For the foregoing reasons, C.M.A.No.453 of 2010 is allowed and the order, dated 11.10.2000, passed by the District Judge, Vizianagaram District, in I.P.No.1 of 1999 is set aside and the matter is remanded to the District Court, Vizianagaram, for fresh disposal on merits and in accordance with law, after giving notice and opportunity to both the parties.

Accordingly, both the appeals are allowed and the impugned orders therein are set aside. However, there shall be no order as to costs.

_________________________

JUSTICE B.PRAKJASH RAO

_______________________

JUSTICE R.KANTHA RAO

10^th June 2010

dr

Mr. K.K. Venugopal, learned counsel for the applicant, submitted that an apology has been given by the contemnors pursuant to the orders passed by this Court in Criminal Appeal No.968 of 2009 (arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No.5593 of 2006) and this apology is in force. He further submitted that the facts stated in the Contempt Petition would show that the contemnors are repeatedly intimidating the 9 applicant and his family members and for this reason the applicant has made a prayer to the Court to pass an order commanding the contemnors not to enter within 100 metres of the premises of Santosh Medical College and its administrative block, hospital, hostel and the residence of the applicant.

                                                                                      1




                                                                        Reportable


                 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA




                CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION




           CONTEMPT PETITION (CRL.) No.7 of 2010 


(In Criminal Appeal No.2323 of 2011 (Arising out of Special 


               Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 666 of 2010)




P. Mahalingam                                                        ...... Applicant




                                         Versus




Monica Kumar & Anr.                                                   ...... 


Respondents




                                         WITH




               CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2323 OF 2011


(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 666 of 2010)




Monica Kumar & Anr.                                                          ...... 


Appellants




                                         Versus




State of U. P. & Ors.                                             ...... 


Respondents








                                  O R D E R




A.K. PATNAIK, J.






Criminal Appeal No.2323 of 2011 (Arising out of Special 


Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 666 of 2010)




      Leave granted.




2.    This is an appeal by way of special leave under Article 136 




of   the   Constitution   against   the   order   dated   05.12.2009   of   the 




Division   Bench   of   the   Allahabad   High   Court   dismissing   the 



                                                                                      2




Criminal   Misc.   Writ   Petition   No.23839   of   2009   of   the 




appellants.




3.    The   relevant   facts   as  stated   in  the   Special   Leave   Petition 




briefly   are   that   the   appellants   studied   M.B.B.S.   course   in   the 




Santosh   Medical   College   at   Ghaziabad   in   Uttar   Pradesh   and 




respondent   No.2   is  the  Chairman   of  the  Maharaji  Educational 




Trust which has established the medical college.  The appellant 




No.1   filed   Writ   Petition   No.33   of   2009   in   this   Court   under 




Article   32   of   the   Constitution   complaining   of   harassment   by 




respondent   No.2   and   by   the   police   and   on   13.05.2009,   this 




Court   passed   orders   directing   issue   of   notice   in   the   writ 




petition.     On   22.05.2009,   the   Registrar   of   this   Court   directed 




that   the   notice   be   served   by   way   of   dasti   on   the   unserved 




respondents in the writ petition.   When the appellants went to 




serve   the   respondent   No.   4,   who   was   then   the   SHO   of   Police 




Station   Sector   39,   NOIDA,   Gautam   Budh   Nagar,   U.P.,   on 




28.05.2009  at about  10.30 A.M., the respondent No.4 and his 




subordinates   started   brutally   assaulting   them   with  lathis, 




shoes   and   fists   and   caused   numerous   injuries   on   all   parts   of 




their   bodies.     Thereafter,   the   appellants   got   themselves 




examined   at   Lok   Nayak   Government   Hospital,   New   Delhi,   and 




an   x-ray   of   the   hand   of   appellant   No.1   was   also   taken   which 




disclosed a fracture and thus her left hand was put in plaster. 



                                                                                   3




The   appellants   made   a   written   complaint   to   the   Senior 




Superintendent of Police, NOIDA, on 29.05.2009 but he refused 




to accept the complaint.  




4.      The appellants then filed Criminal Misc. Petition No.9226 




of 2009 in Writ Petition (Criminal) No.33 of 2009 complaining of 




the aforesaid assault and on 07.07.2009, this Court passed an 




order that the Criminal Misc. Petition be placed along with the 




main   matter   and   in   the   meanwhile   directed   the   appellants   to 




approach   the   District   Magistrate,   NOIDA,   regarding   the 




grievances.  The appellants approached the District Magistrate, 




NOIDA, but they were informed that he was on vacation.   The 




City Magistrate, however, called the appellants to his office and 




took the video recorded statements but did not do anything in 




the   matter.     On   20.07.2009,   this   Court   dismissed   the   Writ 




Petition   (Criminal)   No.33   of   2009   and   granted   liberty   to   the 




appellants to approach the High Court under Article 226 of the 




Constitution, if so advised.  Thereafter, the appellants filed Writ 




Petition   (Criminal)   No.23839   of   2009   before   the   High   Court 




praying inter alia for a CBI inquiry into the incident which took 




place on 28.05.2009 when the appellant had gone to serve dasti 




summons on respondent No.4.   The High Court, however, held 




in  the   impugned   order  that  in  this case  the  FIR  had  not  been 




registered and there was no question for considering any prayer 



                                                                                     4




for   CBI   inquiry   at   this   stage   and   instead   directed   that   the 




appellants  may   file   an  application   under   Section   156(3)   of  the 




Criminal   Procedure   Code,   1973   (for   short   `the   Cr.P.C.')   and   in 




case   any   such   application   is   filed,   the   Magistrate   may   pass 




appropriate   orders   thereon.     With   the   aforesaid   observations, 




the High Court dismissed the writ petition.




5.    The respondent No.4 has filed an affidavit stating that the 




appellants   were   not   assaulted   in   the   police   station   on 




28.05.2009   as   alleged   by   the   appellants.     In   the   affidavit, 




however,   the   respondent   No.4   has   stated   that   on   28.05.2009 




when the appellant had gone to the Police Station to serve the 




dasti   summons,   it   was   noticed   that   they   were   video   recording 




with a sting camera and this was objected to and articles were 




seized from them in the presence of three public witnesses and 




the appellants gave an apology later.  




6.      The appellants have filed a rejoinder reiterating that they 




were   assaulted   on   28.05.2009   at   10.30   A.M.   and   they   were 




detained in the Police Station of Section Sector 39, NOIDA, for 4 




to   5   hours   and   during   this   period   the   appellants   were 




repeatedly   assaulted   and   abused   and   the   appellant   No.1   was 




molested by respondent No.4 and they were released only after 




the  mother   of  the  appellants  called  the   Senior   Superintendent 




of Police of NOIDA, who thereafter called the respondent No.4 to 



                                                                                   5




release the appellants at about 4.00 P.M.




7.    After   hearing   learned   counsel   for   the   parties,   we   passed 




orders   on   11.05.2010   directing   the   District   and   Sessions 




Judge, Gautam Budh Nagar, U.P., to enquire into the incident 




of 28.05.2009 when the appellants had gone to serve the dasti 




summons   of   this   Court   and   pursuant   to   the   aforesaid   order 




dated   11.05.2010,   the   District   and   Sessions   Judge,   Gautam 




Budh Nagar, U.P., assigned the inquiry to the Additional Chief 




Judicial Magistrate  III of Gautam Budh Nagar, U.P., who after 




conducting   the   enquiry   has   submitted   the   report   dated 




16.11.2010.     We   have   considered   the   objections   to   the   report 




and heard learned counsel for the parties.   The conclusions in 




the   report   dated   16.11.2010   of   the   Additional   Chief   Judicial 




Magistrate   III   of   Gautam   Budh   Nagar,   U.P.,   are   extracted 




hereinbelow:




      "1. Ms. Monica Kumar and Shri Manish Kumar had 


      gone   to   Sector   39   Police   Station   in   NOIDA   on 


      28.05.2009   for   serving   a   dasti   notice   of   Hon'ble 


      Supreme   Court   upon   Shri   Anil   Samania,   Station 


      House Officer, Sector 39 Police Station in NOIDA.




      2. Ms. Monica Kumar and Shri Manish Kumar were 


      subjected   to   brutality   in   Sector   39   Police   Station, 


      NOIDA   by   Shri   Anil   Samania,   Inspector,   Shri   J.K. 


      Gangwar, Sub Inspector and few Constables.




      3.   Tailored   entries   have   been   made   on   28.05.2009 


      in  the   General   Diary  of  the   Police  Station  for  cover 


      up.



                                                                                     6




      4.   The   complaint   in   the   matter   was   made   with 


      serious   allegations   against   Shri   Anil   Samania   but 


      the   complaint   was   not   dealt   with   properly   and   the 


      matter was given a decent burial.




      5.   The   Sub-Inspector,   In-Charge   of   the   Complaint 


      Cell   in   the   office   of   the   Senior   Superintendent   of 


      Police,   Gautam   Budh   Nagar,   Shri   Rishi   Pal   Singh, 


      failed in his duty to place the complaint before the 


      higher authorities for proper action in the matter.




      6.   The   Superintendent   of   Police   (Traffic),   Gautam 


      Budh   Nagara,   Shri   Ajay   Sahdav,   failed   in   his 


      supervisory  duty  in as much as without perusal  of 


      the   accusations   in   the   complaint   and   the   action 


      taken/required thereon, allowed entombment of the 


      grievance in the complaint.




      7.   The   Senior   Superintendent   of   Police,   Gautam 


      Budh   Bagar   Shri   Ashok   Kumar   Singh   appears   to 


      have   shut   his   eyes   to   what   had   happened   in   the 


      Police Station on 28.05.2009.




      8. Involvement of Dr. P. Mahalingam in the incident 


      on   28.05.2009   could   not   be   established.     Thus,   it 


      cannot   be   said   that   the   complainants   were   packed 


      down   at   the   will   of   the   Chairman   of   Santosh 


      Medical College, Ghaziabad, Shri P. Mahalingam."








8.    Thus,   the   conclusions   in   the   report   dated   16.11.2010   of 




the Additional  Chief  Judicial  Magistrate  quoted above are  that 




the   appellants   were   subjected   to   brutality   in   Sector   39   Police 




Station, NOIDA, by Inspector Anil Samania (Respondent No.4), 




Shri   J.K.   Gangwar,   Sub-Inspector   and   few   constables   and 




tailored entries were made on 28.05.2009 in the General Diary 




of the Police Station for a cover up and when a complaint was 




made   to   the   Senior   Superintendent   of   Police,   Gautam   Budh 



                                                                                      7




Nagar, U.P., the Sub-Inspector, In-charge of the Complaint Cell 




Shri   Rishipal   Singh   failed   in   his   duty   to   place   the   complaint 




before   the   higher   authorities   for   proper   action   in   the   matter. 




The   further   conclusion   in   the   report   dated   16.11.2010   of   the 




Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate is that the Superintendent 




of   Police   (Traffic),   Gautam   Budh   Nagar,   U.P.,   Ajay   Sahdav, 




failed   in   his   supervisory   duty   and   allowed   entombment   of   the 




grievance   in   the   complaint   and   the   Senior   Superintendent   of 




Police,   Gautam   Budh   Nagar,   Ashok   Kumar   Singh   appears   to 




have shut his eyes to what had happened in the Police Station 




on   28.05.2009.          The   conclusions   in   the   report   dated 




16.11.2010   of   the   Additional   Chief   Judicial   Magistrate  prima  




facie  establish   acts   and/or   omissions   of   the   various   police 




personnel which were committed when the appellants had gone 




to the police station to serve the dasti summons issued by this 




Court and which amount to misconduct of serious nature.  We, 




therefore,   direct  the   respondent   No.1   to   treat   the   report   dated 




16.11.2010   of   the   Additional   Chief   Judicial   Magistrate   III   of 




Gautam Budh Nagar, U.P., as a preliminary report and initiate 




disciplinary proceedings against the police personnel named in 




the   conclusions   thereof   and   conduct   the   disciplinary 




proceedings in accordance with the relevant rules, giving to the 




police   personnel   reasonable   opportunity   of   being   heard   in 



                                                                                         8




respect   of   the   charges   as   provided   in   the   Rules   and   in   Article 




311(2)   of   the   Constitution   and   complete   the   disciplinary 




proceedings within one year from today.




9.     It   will   also   be   open   for   the   appellants   to   file   criminal 




complaint under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. on the basis of the 




conclusions   in   the   report   dated   16.11.2010   of   the   Additional 




Chief   Judicial   Magistrate   III   of   Gautam   Budh   Nagar,   U.P., 




before   the   appropriate   Magistrate   for   prosecuting   only   those 




police personnel who are alleged to have committed any offence, 




and if such a complaint is filed, the same will be dealt with in 




accordance with law.




10.    The impugned order of the High Court is set aside and the 




appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above.  No costs.




Contempt   Petition   (Crl.)   No.7   of   2010   in   Criminal   Appeal 


No.2323 of 2011 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) 


No. 666 of 2010)


       When this Contempt Petition was heard along with S.L.P. 




(Crl.) No.666 of 2010, Mr. K.K. Venugopal, learned counsel for 




the applicant, submitted that an apology has been given by the 




contemnors   pursuant   to   the   orders   passed   by   this   Court   in 




Criminal   Appeal   No.968   of   2009   (arising   out   of   S.L.P.   (Crl.) 




No.5593   of   2006)   and   this   apology   is   in   force.     He   further 




submitted that the facts stated in the Contempt Petition would 




show   that   the   contemnors   are   repeatedly   intimidating   the 



                                                                                     9




applicant   and   his   family   members   and   for   this   reason   the 




applicant   has   made   a   prayer   to   the   Court   to   pass   an   order 




commanding the contemnors not to enter within 100 metres of 




the premises of Santosh Medical College and its administrative 




block, hospital, hostel and the residence of the applicant.




   2.     In   reply,   Mr.   Prashant   Bhushan,   learned   counsel   for 




          the   contemnors,   relying   upon   the   averments   in   the 




          reply,   submitted   that   Santosh   Medical   College   is   next 




          to   the   residence   of   the   contemnors   and   that   the 




          Medical   College   is   on   the   main   public   road,   which   is 




          the   only   road   that   leads   to   the   city   and   shopping 




          complex   from   the   residence   of   the   contemnors.     He 




          submitted   that  the   bank  and  the   public   transport   are 




          also   next   to   the   office   of   the   Medical   College.     He 




          submitted   that   if   any   order   as   prayed   for   by   the 




          applicant is passed by this Court then the contemnors 




          will be deprived of access to the city and the shopping 




          complex as well as the bank and the public transport.




   3.     We cannot possibly direct the contemnors not to go to 




          any   public   place   such   as   the   public   road,   bank, 




          shopping   complex   but   considering   all   aspects   of   the 




          matter,   we   direct   that   the   two   contemnors   will   not 




          enter into the premises of Santosh Medical College, its 



                                                                                          10




            administrative   block,   its   hospital,   its   hostel   and   the 




            residence   of   the   applicant.     The   Contempt   Petition   is 




            disposed of accordingly.   










                                                           ..........................J.


                                                                             (Dalveer 


Bhandari)








                                                           ..........................J.


                                                                              (A. K.  


Patnaik)


New Delhi,


December 16, 2011.    

international arbitration= we are inclined to agree with Mr. Rautray that the corrections and clarifications sought for have to be allowed. In particular, the observations made in paragraphs 35 and 37, if read together, indicate that, although, when the seat of arbitration was in Singapore, the SIAC Rules would apply, the same included Rule 32 which provides that it is the International Arbitration Act, 2002, which would be the law of the arbitration. Accordingly, it is clarified that while mention had been made in paragraph 35 that the Curial law of the arbitration would be the SIAC Rules, what has been subsequently indicated in paragraph 37 of the judgment is that International Arbitration Act of Singapore would be the law of the arbitration. 9. The judgment and order dated 1st September, 2011, be read and understood on the basis of the corrections and clarifications hereby made in this order.

                                          REPORTABLE








                  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA






                   CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION






             INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATION NO.3 OF 2011






                                  IN






                   CIVIL APPEAL NO.7562 OF 2011










YOGRAJ INFRASTRUCTURE LTD.              ...     APPELLANT  










          Vs.










SSANGYONG ENGINEERING & 


CONSTRUCTION CO. LTD.                   ...     RESPONDENT










                             O R D E R










ALTAMAS KABIR, J.








1.    Interlocutory Application No.3 of 2011 has been filed by 






SSANGYONG   Engineering   &   Construction   Company   Limited   in 






disposed   of   Civil   Appeal   No.7562   of   2011,   seeking 






clarification   and   correction   of   certain   clerical   errors   in 



the   judgment   passed   by   this   Court   on   1st  September,   2011, 






under Order XIII Rule 3 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966.  










2.     Mr.   Dharmendra   Rautray,   learned   Advocate-on-Record,   who 






had         earlier         appeared         for         SSANGYONG         Engineering         & 






Construction   Company   Limited,   submitted   that   in   paragraph   5 






of   the   aforesaid   judgment   it   had   been   mentioned   that   his 






clients   had   filed   an   application   before   the   Sole   Arbitrator 






on 5th June, 2010, for interim relief under Section 17 of the 






Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.   Mr. Rautray pointed 






out   that   the   said   application   had   been   made   not   under 






Section   17   of   the   above   Act,   but   under   Rule   24   of   the   SIAC 






Rules   and   the   same   would   be   evident   from   the   application 






made before the sole Arbitrator in SIAC Arbitration No.37 of 






2010,   by   the   Respondent,   being   Annexure-B   to   the   present 






application.










3.     Mr. Rautray then submitted that through inadvertence, in 






paragraph   35   of   the   judgment,   it   has   been   indicated   that 






there   was   no   ambiguity   that   the   SIAC   Rules   would   be   the 






Curial   law   of   the   arbitration   proceedings   and   that   the   same 



had   been   subsequently   clarified   in   paragraph   37,   wherein 






while   indicating   that   the   arbitration   proceedings   would   be 






governed by the SIAC Rules as the Curial law, which included 






Rule   32,   which   made   it   clear   that   where   the   seat   of 






arbitration   is   Singapore,   the   law   of   the   arbitration   under 






the   SIAC   Rules   would   be   the   International   Arbitration   Act 






(Cap. 143A, 2002 Ed, Statutes of the Republic of Singapore). 






Mr.   Rautray   submitted   that   it   was   a   clear   case   of 






inadvertence   in   paragraph   35   that   needs   to   be   clarified   by 






indicating   that   the   Curial   law   is   the   International 






Arbitration law of Singapore and not the SIAC rules.  










4.    It   was   also   pointed   out   that   in   paragraph   36   of   the 






judgment in the sentence beginning with the words "In Bhatia 






International   (supra)...",   it   had   been   indicated   that   while 






considering   the   applicability   of   Part   I   of   the   1996   Act   to 






arbitral   proceedings   where   the   seat   of   arbitration   was   in 






India, this Court was of the view that Part I of the Act did 






not   automatically   exclude   all   foreign   arbitral   proceedings 






or   awards.     Mr.   Rautray   submitted   that   as   would   be   evident 






from   reading   the   judgment   as   a   whole,   this   Court   had 



intended   to   indicate   that   where   the   seat   of   arbitration   was 






"outside"   and   not   "in"   India,   the   said   portion   of   the 






sentence   should   read   "where   the   seat   of   arbitration   was 






outside India".  










5.    It was lastly submitted by Mr. Rautray that in paragraph 






4   of  the   judgment  it   had  been   mentioned  that   an  application 






had been filed by the Appellant under Section 9 of the 1996 






Act   before   the   District   and   Sessions   Judge,   Narsinghpur, 






Madhya Pradesh, whereas such an application had been made by 






the Respondent.  










6.    Mr.   Rautray   submitted   that   the   aforesaid   clarification 






and   corrections   are   required   to   be   made   in   the   final 






judgment.  










7.    However,   on   behalf   of   Yograj   Infrastructure   Limited   it 






was   urged   that   except   for   the   clarification   sought   for   with 






regard   to   the   Rules   applicable   to   the   arbitral   proceedings, 






the other clarifications could be made.  



8.    Having   regard   to   the   submissions   made   on   behalf   of   the 






respective   parties,   we   are   inclined   to   agree   with   Mr. 






Rautray   that   the   corrections   and   clarifications   sought   for 






have to be allowed.  In particular, the observations made in 






paragraphs   35   and   37,   if   read   together,   indicate   that, 






although, when the seat of arbitration was in Singapore, the 






SIAC   Rules   would   apply,   the   same   included   Rule   32   which 






provides that it is the International Arbitration Act, 2002, 






which   would  be   the  law   of  the   arbitration.    Accordingly,  it 






is   clarified   that   while   mention   had   been   made   in   paragraph 






35 that the Curial law of the arbitration would be the SIAC 






Rules,   what   has   been   subsequently   indicated   in   paragraph   37 






of   the   judgment   is   that   International   Arbitration   Act   of 






Singapore would be the law of the arbitration.  










9.    The judgment and order dated 1st September, 2011, be read 






and   understood   on   the   basis   of   the   corrections   and 






clarifications hereby made in this order.  



10.    The   interlocutory   application   filed   on   behalf   of 






SSANGYONG   Engineering   &   Construction   Company   Limited,   is 






allowed and disposed of accordingly.










                                               ................................................J.


                                          (ALTAMAS KABIR)










                                               ................................................J.


                                          (CYRIAC JOSEPH)


New Delhi


Dated: 15.12.2011