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Tuesday, September 13, 2011

y this wonderful judgement, the apex court clearly differentiated what is monitoring and what is investigating



By this wonderful judgement the apex court clearly differentiated what is monitoring and what is investigating monitoring = in cases monitored by this Court, it is concerned with ensuring proper and honest performance of its duty by the investigating agency and not with the merits of the accusations in investigation, which are to be determined at the trial on the filing of the charge-sheet in the competent Court, according to the ordinary procedure prescribed by law.

posted 29 minutes ago by MURALI MOHAN ,MANDAGADDI   [ updated 3 minutes ago ]
monitoring = Having paused to reflect on whether your intended destination is the right one and how well you are progressing towards it, the last element required is to consider whether the way in which you are travelling is still fit for purpose. What is therefore required is a constant review of the effectiveness of the measures you have put in place to achieve your strategic objectives.

monitoring = in cases monitored by this Court, 
 it   is   concerned   with   ensuring   proper   and   honest   performance   of   its 
  duty   by   the   investigating   agency   and   not   with   the   merits   of   the 
   accusations in investigation, which are to be determined at the trial on 
  the filing of the charge-sheet in the competent Court, according to the 
  ordinary procedure prescribed by law.  


By this wonderful judgement, the apex court clearly differentiated what is monitoring and what is investigating


 The appellant lost her husband, a former Member of Parliament, in the 


   calamitous   events   which   took   place   on   28th  February,   2002,   in   the 


   surroundings   of   Gulberg   Society,   Ahmedabad,   where   the   appellant 


   resided   along   with   her   family.     An   FIR   relating   to   the   incident   was 


   registered   by   the   Police   with   Meghaninagar   Police   Station, 


   Ahmedabad. After investigation, on the filing of the charge-sheet, the 


   case was committed to the Court of Sessions, Ahmedabad. It was the 


   case  of  the  appellant  that  subsequently  she  received  certain  material 


   which  showed that  the incidents  which  took place  during  the  period 


   between                 27th  February, 2002 and 10th  May, 2002, were aided, 


   abetted     and   conspired   by   some   responsible   persons   in   power,   in 


   connivance   with   the   State   Administration,   including   the   Police.   The 


   appellant   thus   sought   registration   of   another   FIR   against   certain 


   persons   named   in   the   complaint,   dated   8th  June,   2006,   for   offences 


   punishable   under  Section   302  read   with  Section   120B  as   also  under 


   Section   193   read   with   Sections   114,   186   &   153A,   186,   187   of   the 


   Indian   Penal   Code,   1860.   However,   as   the   police   declined   to   take 


   cognizance   of   her   complaint,   the   appellant   filed   the   aforementioned 


   petition  before  the High Court.   Having failed  to convince  the High 


   Court that it was a fit case for investigation by an independent agency, 


   the appellant-complainant, supported by an NGO, is before us in this 


   appeal.




4. On   3rd  March,   2008   while   issuing   notice   to   the   Union   of   India   and 


   State of Gujarat, an Amicus Curiae was appointed to assist the Court. 


   Vide order dated 27th April, 2009, the Special Investigation Team (for 


   short   "the   SIT"),   which   had   been   constituted   vide   order   dated   26th 


   March, 2008 to carry out further investigations in nine cases, subject 





                                                                                       3

.
   matter of Writ Petition No. 109 of 2003, was directed `to look into', 


   the   complaint   submitted   by   the   appellant   on   8th  June,   2006   to   the 


   Director   General   of   Police,   Gujarat.     Pursuant   to   the   said   direction 


   Shri A.K. Malhotra, former D.I.G. (C.B.I.) and one of the members of 


   the   SIT,   examined   a   number   of   witnesses   and   looked   into   a   large 


   number   of   documents   made   available   to   him.     A   report,   dated   12th 


   May,   2010,   was   submitted   to   this   Court   by   the   Chairman,   SIT, 


   concurring with the findings of Shri A.K. Malhotra. 




5. In   his   report   dated   12th  May,   2010,   Shri   A.K.   Malhotra,  inter   alia  


   recommended further investigation under Section 173(8) of the Code 


   against   certain   Police   officials   and   a   Minister   in   the   State   Cabinet. 


   Consequently, further investigation was conducted and a report dated 


   17th  November, 2010, was submitted by the SIT.   On 23rd  November, 


   2010,   Shri   Raju   Ramachandran,   Senior   Advocate   and   Shri   Gaurav 


   Agarwal,   Advocate,   replaced   the   previous   Amicus   Curiae,   who   had 


   expressed his unwillingness to continue. 




6. On 20th January, 2011, a preliminary note was submitted by Shri Raju 


   Ramachandran, the learned Amicus Curiae; whereon, vide order dated 


   15th  March,   2011,   the   SIT   was   directed   to   submit   its   report,   and   if 


   necessary carry out   further investigation in light of the observations 


   made in the said note. The SIT conducted further investigation under 




                                                                                         4

.
   Section   173(8)   of   the   Code   in   Meghaninagar   Police   Station   Crime 


   Report No.67 of 2002--Gulberg Society case, and submitted a report 


   on   24th  April,   2011.     After   examining   the   said   report,   on   5th  May, 


   2011, the following order was passed :




              "Pursuant to our order dated 15th March, 2011, the 

              Chairman,   Special   Investigation   Team   (SIT)   has 

              filed report on the further investigations carried out 

              by   his   team   along   with   his   remarks   thereon. 

              Statements   of   witnesses   as   also   the   documents 

              have   been   placed   on   record   in   separate   volumes. 

              Let  a copy of all these  documents  along with the 

              report   of   the   Chairman   be   supplied   to   Mr.   Raju 

              Ramachandran, the learned Amicus Curiae.


              The   learned   Amicus   Curiae   shall   examine   the 

              report;   analyze   and   have   his   own   independent 

              assessment   of   the   statements   of   the   witnesses 

              recorded   by   the   SIT   and   submit   his   comments 

              thereon.   It   will   be   open   to   the   learned   Amicus 

              Curiae  to interact  with any of the witnesses,  who 

              have   been   examined   by   the   SIT,   including   the 

              police officers, as he may deem fit.


              If the learned Amicus Curiae forms an opinion that 

              on the basis of the material on record, any offence 

              is   made   out   against   any   person,   he   shall   mention 

              the same in his report."




7. The learned Amicus Curiae has now submitted his final report dated 


   25th July, 2011.  In light of the above conspectus and the report of the 


   learned   Amicus   Curiae,   the   question   for   determination   is   the   future 


   course of action in the matter.





                                                                                      5

.
8. We are of the opinion that bearing in mind the scheme of Chapter XII 


   of the Code, once the investigation has been conducted and completed 


   by the SIT, in terms of the orders passed by this Court from time to 


   time, there is no course available in law, save and except to forward 


   the   final   report   under   Section   173   (2)   of   the   Code   to   the   Court 


   empowered to take cognizance of the offence alleged.  As observed by 


   a   three-Judge   Bench   of   this   Court   in  M.C.   Mehta   (Taj   Corridor  


   Scam)  Vs. Union of India & Ors.1, in cases monitored by this Court, 


   it   is   concerned   with   ensuring   proper   and   honest   performance   of   its 


   duty   by   the   investigating   agency   and   not   with   the   merits   of   the 


   accusations in investigation, which are to be determined at the trial on 


   the filing of the charge-sheet in the competent Court, according to the 


   ordinary procedure prescribed by law.  




9. Accordingly, we direct  the Chairman, SIT to  forward a final report, 


   along with the entire material collected by the SIT, to the Court which 


   had   taken   cognizance   of   Crime   Report   No.67   of   2002,   as   required 


   under Section 173(2) of the Code.   Before submission of its report, it 


   will be open to the SIT to obtain from the Amicus Curiae copies of his 


   reports   submitted   to   this   Court.   The   said   Court   will   deal   with   the 


   matter   in   accordance   with   law   relating   to   the   trial   of   the   accused, 


   named in the report/charge-sheet, including matters falling within the 


1 (2007) 1 SCC 110




                                                                                        6

.
   ambit   and   scope   of   Section   173(8)   of   the   Code.   However,   at   this 


   juncture,   we   deem   it   necessary   to   emphasise   that   if   for   any   stated 


   reason   the   SIT   opines   in   its   report,   to   be   submitted   in   terms   of   this 


   order,   that   there   is   no   sufficient   evidence   or   reasonable   grounds   for 


   proceeding against any person named in the complaint, dated 8th June 


   2006,     before   taking   a   final   decision   on   such   `closure'   report,   the 


   Court shall issue notice to the complainant and make available to her 


   copies of the statements of the witnesses, other related  documents and 


   the investigation report strictly in accordance with law as enunciated 


   by   this   Court   in    Bhagwant   Singh  Vs.  Commissioner   of   Police   &  


   Anr.2.    For the sake of ready reference, we may note that  in the said 


   decision, it has been held that in a case where the Magistrate to whom 


   a report is forwarded under Section 173(2)(i) of the Code, decides not 


   to take cognizance of the offence and to drop the proceedings or takes 


   a view that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against some 


   of the persons mentioned in the FIR, the Magistrate must give notice 


   to the informant and provide  him an opportunity  to be heard   at the 


   time of consideration of the report.




10.Having   so   directed,   the   next   question   is   whether   this   Court   should 


   continue   to  monitor   the   case   any   further.    The   legal   position  on   the 


   point is made clear by this Court in Union of India & Ors. Vs.  Sushil  


2 (1985) 2 SCC 537




                                                                                              7

.
   Kumar   Modi   &   Ors.3,  wherein,   relying   on   the   decision   in  Vineet  


   Narain & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Anr.4, a Bench of three learned 


   Judges had observed thus :




               "...that   once   a   charge-sheet   is   filed   in   the 

               competent   court   after   completion   of   the 

               investigation,   the   process   of   monitoring   by   this 

               Court for the purpose of making the CBI and other 

               investigative   agencies   concerned   perform   their 

               function   of   investigating   into   the     offences 

               concerned   comes   to   an   end;   and   thereafter   it   is 

               only   the   court   in   which   the   charge-sheet   is   filed 

               which is to deal with all matters relating to the trial 

               of the accused, including matters falling within the 

               scope   of   Section   173(8)   of   the   Code   of   Criminal 

               Procedure.     We   make   this   observation   only   to 

               reiterate this clear position in law so that no doubts 

               in any quarter may survive."




11.In  M.C. Mehta  Vs.  Union of India & Ors.5,  a question arose as to 


   whether   after   the   submission   of   the   final   report   by   the   CBI   in   the 


   Court of Special Judge, pursuant to this Court's directions, this Court 


   should examine the legality and validity of CBI's action in seeking a 


   sanction under Section 197 of the Code for the prosecution of some of 


   the   persons   named   in   the   final   report.     Dismissing   the   application 


   moved by the learned Amicus Curiae seeking directions in this behalf, 


   a three-Judge Bench, of which one of us (D.K. Jain, J.) was a member, 


   observed thus:



3 (1998) 8 SCC 661

4 (1996) 2 SCC 199

5 (2008) 1 SCC 407




                                                                                         8

.
 

                 "The   jurisdiction   of   the   Court   to   issue   a   writ   of 

                 continuous   mandamus   is   only   to   see   that   proper 

                 investigation   is   carried   out.   Once   the   Court 

                 satisfies itself that a proper investigation has been 

                 carried   out,  it  would  not  venture  to  take   over  the 

                 functions   of   the   Magistrate   or   pass   any   order 

                 which  would  interfere   with  his   judicial   functions. 

                 Constitutional   scheme   of   this   country   envisages 

                 dispute   resolution   mechanism   by   an   independent 

                 and   impartial   tribunal.   No   authority,   save   and 

                 except   a   superior   court   in   the   hierarchy   of 

                 judiciary, can issue any direction which otherwise 

                 takes   away   the   discretionary   jurisdiction   of   any 

                 court of law. Once a final report has been filed in 

                 terms of sub-section (1) of Section 173 of the Code 

                 of   Criminal   Procedure,   it   is   the   Magistrate   and 

                 Magistrate   alone   who   can   take   appropriate 

                 decision in the matter one way or the other. If he 

                 errs while passing a judicial  order,  the same  may 

                 be   a   subject-matter   of   appeal   or   judicial   review. 

                 There   may   be   a   possibility   of   the   prosecuting 

                 agencies not approaching the higher forum against 

                 an order passed by the learned Magistrate, but the 

                 same   by   itself   would   not   confer   a   jurisdiction   on 

                 this Court to step in." 




12.Recently, similar views have been echoed by this Court in Narmada  


     Bai  Vs.  State   of   Gujarat   &   Ors.6.    In   that   case,   dealing   with   the 


     question of further monitoring in a case upon submission of a report 


     by   the   C.B.I.   to   this   Court,   on   the   conclusion   of   the   investigation, 


     referring   to   the   earlier   decisions   in  Vineet   Narain  (supra),  Sushil  


     Kumar Modi  (supra) and  M.C. Mehta (Taj Corridor Scam)  (supra), 





6 (2011) 5 SCC 79




                                                                                           9

.
   speaking for the Bench, one of us, (P. Sathasivam, J.) has observed as 


   under :




               "70. The above decisions make it clear that though 

               this Court is competent to entrust the investigation 

               to any independent agency, once the investigating 

               agency   complete   their   function   of   investigating 

               into   the   offences,   it   is   the   court   in   which   the 

               charge-sheet   is   filed   which   is   to   deal   with   all 

               matters   relating   to   the   trial   of   the   accused 

               including   matters   falling   within   the   scope   of 

               Section 173(8) of the Code.   Thus, generally, this 

               Court   may   not   require   further   monitoring   of   the 

               case/investigation.  However, we make it clear that 

               if   any   of   the   parties   including   CBI   require   any 

               further   direction,   they   are   free   to   approach   this 

               Court by way of an application."




13.  Deferentially   concurring   with   the   dictum   of   this   Court   in   the 


   aforenoted decisions, we are of the opinion that in the instant case we 


   have reached a stage where the process of monitoring of the case must 


   come to an end. It would neither be desirable nor advisable to retain 


   further seisin over this case.  We dispose of this appeal accordingly.  

Monday, September 12, 2011

Partition of ancestral property and business-One of the parties a minor at the time of partition-Partition-If could be re-opened when minor became a major. « advocatemmmohan

The plaintiff's father and the fifth defendant were
brothers. During his minority, the plaintiff filed a suit
alleging that the business which his father and uncle were
doing was ancestral in that it was being carried on with the
capital given by his grandfather, that on the death of his
grandfather his uncle proposed to his father for a nominal
partition of the business and other family assets to avoid
income tax, that in so doing he took two-thirds share in the
business as well as in other assets but gave only one-third
to his father and that lastly the partition, even if true,
was "unequal, unfair and unconscionable." He further alleged
that the partition did not bind the interest of the minor
plaintiff and his minor brothers.
During the pendency of the suit a reference was made to
arbitration. The arbitrators gave an award. But that award
was impugned by the defendants alleging that it was given
without any enquiry and without giving the parties a chance
to adduce evidence and that the arbitrators had no
jurisdiction to reopen the partition. The trial court set
aside the award. The plaintiff's appeal against this
decision of the trial court was dismissed by the High Court
holding that there was an error of law on the face of the
award because the arbitrators had found that there was
neither fraud nor misrepresentation and that unequal shares
had been accepted voluntarily and yet had reopened the
partition.
After remand the trial judge found that the business
was not ancestral but was only a joint business and that
there was a complete partition of the joint family property,
and that there was neither fraud nor misrepresentation in
bringing about the partition. The trial court however
observed that though the plaintiff's father voluntarily
agreed to accept one-third share, the partition of the
business was "unequal and unconscionable." It, however,
dismissed the suit on the ground that the business was not
ancestral and therefore the plaintiff had no right to reopen
the partition.
On appeal by the plaintiff the High Court found that
the business being ancestral the sons of the two brothers
acquired interest by birth and that so far as the partition
was concerned there was no fraud or undue influence
vitiating the partition. It, however, affirmed the trial
court's view that one-third share given to the plaintiff's
father was unfair and prejudicial to the interests of the
minors.
In appeal to this Court the defendants contended that
the partition could not be reopened by the plaintiff because
he and his brothers were represented in the partition by
their father and there was no allegation of fraud or
misrepresentation.
672
Dismissing the appeal, the Court,
^
HELD : 1. It is not the practice of this Court to
interfere with findings of fact arrived at by the High Court
except to prevent gross miscarriage of justice. [676 B]
In the instant case there is no justifiable ground to
go behind the findings of fact. [676 C]
2. It is well established that simply because a matter
has been decided at an earlier stage by interlocutory order
and no appeal has been taken therefrom or no appeal did lie,
a higher court is not precluded from considering the matter
again at a later stage of the same litigation. The
correctness of an order of remand passed by the High Court
which was not questioned at that time by filing an appeal in
the Supreme Court can nevertheless be challenged later in
the Supreme Court in the appeal arising out of the final
judgment pronounced in the action. [676 E-F]
Satyadhan Ghosal & Ors. v. Smt. Deo Rajan Debi & Anr.
[1960] 3 SCR 590, Jasraj Indusingh v. Hemraj Multan Chand
[1972] 2 SCR 973, Margaret Lalita v. Indo Commercial Bank
Ltd., AIR 1979 S.C. 102, Arjan Singh v. Mohindra Kumar &
Ors. [1964] 5 SCR 946; referred to.
Where an application under Order IX, r. 7 was dismissed
and an appeal was filed against the decree in the suit in
which the application was made, the propriety of the order
rejecting the reopening of the proceeding might, without
doubt, be canvassed in the appeal and dealt with by the
appellate court. [676 G]
In the present case the same principle applies and the
parties could challenge in this Court in the appeal against
the final judgment in the suit any finding given by the High
Court at the earlier stage in the suit when the award made
by the arbitrators was set aside and the suit thrown open
for trial. [676H, 677A]
3. Even though there was no fraud, misrepresentation or
undue influence a partition could be reopened at the
instance of a minor coparcener, despite the fact that his
branch was represented by his father at the partition, if
the partition was unfair or prejudicial to the interest of
the minor. The entire partition need not be reopened if the
partition was unfair in regard to a distinct and separable
part of the scheme of partition. In such an event the
reopening of the partition could be suitably circumscribed.
[677 G-H, 678 A]
Ratnam Chettiar & Ors. S. M. Kuppuswami Chettiar & Ors.
Air 1976 S.C. 1 applied.







Partition of ancestral property and business-One of the parties a minor at the time of partition-Partition-If could be re-opened when minor became a major. « advocatemmmohan

Customary law, Punjab-Sidhu Jats of Muktsar Tahsil of Ferozepore District-5th degree callaterals, of deceased landowner whether take precedence over his married daughters in succession to his non-ancestral property-General custom in Rattigan’s Digest or special custom in Riwaj-i-am-Which to prevail. « advocatemmmohan


D, a Sidhu Jat of Muktsar Tahsil, Ferozepore District,
Punjab was tile last male holder of certain land in that
area. He was succeeded by his widow after whose death, the
land was mutated in favour of D's collaterals in the 5th
degree. D's daughter filed a suit for a declaration that
she was the legal heir of .he land and was entitled to
inherit to the exclusion of the collaterals. The trial
court held that the land was not ancestral but the
defendants were preferential heirs under the custom of the
district. The decree was affirmed by the first appellate
court. In second appeal, however, the High Court decided in
favour of the plaintiff holding that the general custom
recorded in Rattigan's Digest had not been shown to be
displaced by any special custom in the Riwaj-i-am, The
defendants appealed.
HELD : The entries in the Riwaj-i-am on which the appellants
relied, did not refer at all to non-ancestral property and
were therefore not relevant evidence to establish a special
custom among the Sidhu jats of Muktsar Tahsil of Ferozepore
District entitling collaterals for succession to non-
ancestral property in preference to daughters. The
appellants had not discharged the onus which lay upon them
of proving that the general custom had been varied by a
special custom enabling the collaterals to exclude the
daughters. It was manifest therefore that the customary law
among the Sidhu Jats of Muktsar Tahsil of Ferozepore
district -Is regards non-ancestral property was the same as
recorded generally for the State of Punjab in Paragraph 23
of Rattigan's Digest i.e. a daughter is preferred to
collaterals. [657 G-H]
Mst. Rai Kaur v. Talok Singh, A.I.R. 1916 Lab. 343, Budhi
Prakash v. Chandra Bhan, A.I.R. 1918 Lab. 225, Narain v.
Mst. Gaindo, A.I.R. 1918 Lab. 304, Fatima Bibi v. Shah
Nawaz. A.I.R. 1921 Lab. 180, Abdul Rahiman v. Mst. Natho,
I.L.R. [1932] 13 Lab. 458, Mst. Hurmate v. Hoshiaru, I.L.R.
25 Lab. 228 and Mst. Subhani v. Nawab and Ors., 68 I.A. 1,
referred to.
(ii) Even on the assumption that the Riwaj-i-am entries
referred to the non-ancestral property of the last male
holder the appellants could not succeed. For though the
entries in the Riwaj-i-am are entitled to an initial
presumption in favour of their correctness, the quantum of
evidence necessary to rebut this presumption would vary with
the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Where,
for instance, the Riwaj-i-am laid down a custom in
consonance with the general agricultural custom of the
State, very strong proof would be required to displace this
presumption, but where, on the &-her hand, this was not the
case, and the custom as recorded in the Riwaj-i-am was
opposed to the rules generally
652
prevalent the presumption would be considerably weakened.
Likewise, when the Riwaj-i-am affected adversely the rights
of females who had no opportunity whatever of appearing
before the revenue authorities, the presumption would be
weaker still, and very little evidence would suffice to
rebut it. [658 B-D]
Har Narain v. Mst. Deoki, (1893) 24. P.R. 124. Sayad
Rahim Shah v. Sayad Hussain Shah, (1901) 102 P. R. 353,
Bholi v. Man Singh, ( 1908) 86 P. R. 402 and Mahant Salig
Ram v. Mst. Maya Devi [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1191, referred to.
(iii)In. the present case the High Court bid mentioned three
instances in its judgment which showed that the presumption
attaching to Riwaj-i-am had been rebutted in this case. The
appellant's-defendants had not relied upon any instances in
support of their case. The High Court therefore rightly
decided in favour of the plaintiffs. [660 C-D]
Mst. Rai Kaur v. Talok Singh, A.I.R. 1916 Lah. 343, Ratta
v. Mst Jai Kaur, (1934) P.L.R. 69 and R.F.A. No. 220 of 1954
decided by the Punjab High Court on April 11 1961, referred
to.





Customary law, Punjab-Sidhu Jats of Muktsar Tahsil of Ferozepore District-5th degree callaterals, of deceased landowner whether take precedence over his married daughters in succession to his non-ancestral property-General custom in Rattigan’s Digest or special custom in Riwaj-i-am-Which to prevail. « advocatemmmohan

The appellant lost her husband, a former Member of Parliament, in the calamitous events which took place on 28th February, 2002, in the surroundings of Gulberg Society, Ahmedabad, where the appellant resided along with her family. An FIR relating to the incident was registered by the Police with Meghaninagar Police Station, Ahmedabad. After investigation, on the filing of the charge-sheet, the 2


                                                                            REPORTABLE




                    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA




                  CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION








            CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.   1765                    OF 2011


             (ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (CRL.) NO. 1088 OF 2008)










JAKIA NASIM AHESAN & ANR.                                   --               APPELLANTS








                                         VERSUS








STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.                                     --             RESPONDENTS










                                      O R D E R










1. Leave granted. 






2. This   appeal   by   special   leave,   arises   out   of   the   judgment   dated   2nd 




   November,   2007,   delivered   by   the   High   Court   of   Gujarat   at 




   Ahmedabad   in   Special   Criminal   Application   No.   421   of   2007, 




   dismissing the writ petition preferred by one of the hapless victims of 




   the   abominable   and   woeful   events   which   took   place   in   the   State   of 




   Gujarat   between   February,   2002   and   May,   2002   after   the   abhorrent 




   Godhra   incident   on   27th  February,   2002.   By   the   said   petition   under 



   Article 226 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482 of the 




   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure,   1973   (for   short   "the   Code"),   the 




   appellant had sought for a direction to the Director General of Police, 




   State of Gujarat, to register her private complaint dated 8th June, 2006 




   as   a   First   Information   Report   and   direct   investigation   therein   by   an 




   independent agency.  By the impugned judgment, the High Court has 




   come   to   the   conclusion   that   since   a   remedy  under   Section   190   read 




   with Section 200 of the Code was available to the appellant, the writ 




   petition was not tenable.  The writ petition was accordingly dismissed 




   by the High Court with the observation that if the appellant  had got 




   certain   additional   material   against   some   persons   accused   in   her 




   complaint,   it   was   open   to   her   to   approach   the   investigating   agency, 




   requesting     further   investigation,   or,   alternatively   she   could   herself 




   approach   the   Court   concerned   for   further   investigation   in   terms   of 




   Section 173(8) of the Code.








3. The appellant lost her husband, a former Member of Parliament, in the 




   calamitous   events   which   took   place   on   28th  February,   2002,   in   the 




   surroundings   of   Gulberg   Society,   Ahmedabad,   where   the   appellant 




   resided   along   with   her   family.     An   FIR   relating   to   the   incident   was 




   registered   by   the   Police   with   Meghaninagar   Police   Station, 




   Ahmedabad. After investigation, on the filing of the charge-sheet, the 










                                                                                         2



   case was committed to the Court of Sessions, Ahmedabad. It was the 




   case  of  the  appellant  that  subsequently  she  received  certain  material 




   which  showed that  the incidents  which  took place  during  the  period 




   between                 27th  February, 2002 and 10th  May, 2002, were aided, 




   abetted     and   conspired   by   some   responsible   persons   in   power,   in 




   connivance   with   the   State   Administration,   including   the   Police.   The 




   appellant   thus   sought   registration   of   another   FIR   against   certain 




   persons   named   in   the   complaint,   dated   8th  June,   2006,   for   offences 




   punishable   under  Section   302  read   with  Section   120B  as   also  under 




   Section   193   read   with   Sections   114,   186   &   153A,   186,   187   of   the 




   Indian   Penal   Code,   1860.   However,   as   the   police   declined   to   take 




   cognizance   of   her   complaint,   the   appellant   filed   the   aforementioned 




   petition  before  the High Court.   Having failed  to convince  the High 




   Court that it was a fit case for investigation by an independent agency, 




   the appellant-complainant, supported by an NGO, is before us in this 




   appeal.








4. On   3rd  March,   2008   while   issuing   notice   to   the   Union   of   India   and 




   State of Gujarat, an Amicus Curiae was appointed to assist the Court. 




   Vide order dated 27th April, 2009, the Special Investigation Team (for 




   short   "the   SIT"),   which   had   been   constituted   vide   order   dated   26th 




   March, 2008 to carry out further investigations in nine cases, subject 










                                                                                       3



   matter of Writ Petition No. 109 of 2003, was directed `to look into', 




   the   complaint   submitted   by   the   appellant   on   8th  June,   2006   to   the 




   Director   General   of   Police,   Gujarat.     Pursuant   to   the   said   direction 




   Shri A.K. Malhotra, former D.I.G. (C.B.I.) and one of the members of 




   the   SIT,   examined   a   number   of   witnesses   and   looked   into   a   large 




   number   of   documents   made   available   to   him.     A   report,   dated   12th 




   May,   2010,   was   submitted   to   this   Court   by   the   Chairman,   SIT, 




   concurring with the findings of Shri A.K. Malhotra. 








5. In   his   report   dated   12th  May,   2010,   Shri   A.K.   Malhotra,  inter   alia  




   recommended further investigation under Section 173(8) of the Code 




   against   certain   Police   officials   and   a   Minister   in   the   State   Cabinet. 




   Consequently, further investigation was conducted and a report dated 




   17th  November, 2010, was submitted by the SIT.   On 23rd  November, 




   2010,   Shri   Raju   Ramachandran,   Senior   Advocate   and   Shri   Gaurav 




   Agarwal,   Advocate,   replaced   the   previous   Amicus   Curiae,   who   had 




   expressed his unwillingness to continue. 








6. On 20th January, 2011, a preliminary note was submitted by Shri Raju 




   Ramachandran, the learned Amicus Curiae; whereon, vide order dated 




   15th  March,   2011,   the   SIT   was   directed   to   submit   its   report,   and   if 




   necessary carry out   further investigation in light of the observations 




   made in the said note. The SIT conducted further investigation under 








                                                                                         4



   Section   173(8)   of   the   Code   in   Meghaninagar   Police   Station   Crime 




   Report No.67 of 2002--Gulberg Society case, and submitted a report 




   on   24th  April,   2011.     After   examining   the   said   report,   on   5th  May, 




   2011, the following order was passed :








              "Pursuant to our order dated 15th March, 2011, the 


              Chairman,   Special   Investigation   Team   (SIT)   has 


              filed report on the further investigations carried out 


              by   his   team   along   with   his   remarks   thereon. 


              Statements   of   witnesses   as   also   the   documents 


              have   been   placed   on   record   in   separate   volumes. 


              Let  a copy of all these  documents  along with the 


              report   of   the   Chairman   be   supplied   to   Mr.   Raju 


              Ramachandran, the learned Amicus Curiae.




              The   learned   Amicus   Curiae   shall   examine   the 


              report;   analyze   and   have   his   own   independent 


              assessment   of   the   statements   of   the   witnesses 


              recorded   by   the   SIT   and   submit   his   comments 


              thereon.   It   will   be   open   to   the   learned   Amicus 


              Curiae  to interact  with any of the witnesses,  who 


              have   been   examined   by   the   SIT,   including   the 


              police officers, as he may deem fit.




              If the learned Amicus Curiae forms an opinion that 


              on the basis of the material on record, any offence 


              is   made   out   against   any   person,   he   shall   mention 


              the same in his report."








7. The learned Amicus Curiae has now submitted his final report dated 




   25th July, 2011.  In light of the above conspectus and the report of the 




   learned   Amicus   Curiae,   the   question   for   determination   is   the   future 




   course of action in the matter.










                                                                                      5



8. We are of the opinion that bearing in mind the scheme of Chapter XII 




   of the Code, once the investigation has been conducted and completed 




   by the SIT, in terms of the orders passed by this Court from time to 




   time, there is no course available in law, save and except to forward 




   the   final   report   under   Section   173   (2)   of   the   Code   to   the   Court 




   empowered to take cognizance of the offence alleged.  As observed by 




   a   three-Judge   Bench   of   this   Court   in  M.C.   Mehta   (Taj   Corridor  




   Scam)  Vs. Union of India & Ors.1, in cases monitored by this Court, 




   it   is   concerned   with   ensuring   proper   and   honest   performance   of   its 




   duty   by   the   investigating   agency   and   not   with   the   merits   of   the 




   accusations in investigation, which are to be determined at the trial on 




   the filing of the charge-sheet in the competent Court, according to the 




   ordinary procedure prescribed by law.  








9. Accordingly, we direct  the Chairman, SIT to  forward a final report, 




   along with the entire material collected by the SIT, to the Court which 




   had   taken   cognizance   of   Crime   Report   No.67   of   2002,   as   required 




   under Section 173(2) of the Code.   Before submission of its report, it 




   will be open to the SIT to obtain from the Amicus Curiae copies of his 




   reports   submitted   to   this   Court.   The   said   Court   will   deal   with   the 




   matter   in   accordance   with   law   relating   to   the   trial   of   the   accused, 




   named in the report/charge-sheet, including matters falling within the 




1 (2007) 1 SCC 110








                                                                                        6



   ambit   and   scope   of   Section   173(8)   of   the   Code.   However,   at   this 




   juncture,   we   deem   it   necessary   to   emphasise   that   if   for   any   stated 




   reason   the   SIT   opines   in   its   report,   to   be   submitted   in   terms   of   this 




   order,   that   there   is   no   sufficient   evidence   or   reasonable   grounds   for 




   proceeding against any person named in the complaint, dated 8th June 




   2006,     before   taking   a   final   decision   on   such   `closure'   report,   the 




   Court shall issue notice to the complainant and make available to her 




   copies of the statements of the witnesses, other related  documents and 




   the investigation report strictly in accordance with law as enunciated 




   by   this   Court   in    Bhagwant   Singh  Vs.  Commissioner   of   Police   &  




   Anr.2.    For the sake of ready reference, we may note that  in the said 




   decision, it has been held that in a case where the Magistrate to whom 




   a report is forwarded under Section 173(2)(i) of the Code, decides not 




   to take cognizance of the offence and to drop the proceedings or takes 




   a view that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against some 




   of the persons mentioned in the FIR, the Magistrate must give notice 




   to the informant and provide  him an opportunity  to be heard   at the 




   time of consideration of the report.








10.Having   so   directed,   the   next   question   is   whether   this   Court   should 




   continue   to  monitor   the   case   any   further.    The   legal   position  on   the 




   point is made clear by this Court in Union of India & Ors. Vs.  Sushil  




2 (1985) 2 SCC 537








                                                                                              7



   Kumar   Modi   &   Ors.3,  wherein,   relying   on   the   decision   in  Vineet  




   Narain & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Anr.4, a Bench of three learned 




   Judges had observed thus :








               "...that   once   a   charge-sheet   is   filed   in   the 


               competent   court   after   completion   of   the 


               investigation,   the   process   of   monitoring   by   this 


               Court for the purpose of making the CBI and other 


               investigative   agencies   concerned   perform   their 


               function   of   investigating   into   the     offences 


               concerned   comes   to   an   end;   and   thereafter   it   is 


               only   the   court   in   which   the   charge-sheet   is   filed 


               which is to deal with all matters relating to the trial 


               of the accused, including matters falling within the 


               scope   of   Section   173(8)   of   the   Code   of   Criminal 


               Procedure.     We   make   this   observation   only   to 


               reiterate this clear position in law so that no doubts 


               in any quarter may survive."








11.In  M.C. Mehta  Vs.  Union of India & Ors.5,  a question arose as to 




   whether   after   the   submission   of   the   final   report   by   the   CBI   in   the 




   Court of Special Judge, pursuant to this Court's directions, this Court 




   should examine the legality and validity of CBI's action in seeking a 




   sanction under Section 197 of the Code for the prosecution of some of 




   the   persons   named   in   the   final   report.     Dismissing   the   application 




   moved by the learned Amicus Curiae seeking directions in this behalf, 




   a three-Judge Bench, of which one of us (D.K. Jain, J.) was a member, 




   observed thus:






3 (1998) 8 SCC 661


4 (1996) 2 SCC 199


5 (2008) 1 SCC 407








                                                                                         8






                 "The   jurisdiction   of   the   Court   to   issue   a   writ   of 


                 continuous   mandamus   is   only   to   see   that   proper 


                 investigation   is   carried   out.   Once   the   Court 


                 satisfies itself that a proper investigation has been 


                 carried   out,  it  would  not  venture  to  take   over  the 


                 functions   of   the   Magistrate   or   pass   any   order 


                 which  would  interfere   with  his   judicial   functions. 


                 Constitutional   scheme   of   this   country   envisages 


                 dispute   resolution   mechanism   by   an   independent 


                 and   impartial   tribunal.   No   authority,   save   and 


                 except   a   superior   court   in   the   hierarchy   of 


                 judiciary, can issue any direction which otherwise 


                 takes   away   the   discretionary   jurisdiction   of   any 


                 court of law. Once a final report has been filed in 


                 terms of sub-section (1) of Section 173 of the Code 


                 of   Criminal   Procedure,   it   is   the   Magistrate   and 


                 Magistrate   alone   who   can   take   appropriate 


                 decision in the matter one way or the other. If he 


                 errs while passing a judicial  order,  the same  may 


                 be   a   subject-matter   of   appeal   or   judicial   review. 


                 There   may   be   a   possibility   of   the   prosecuting 


                 agencies not approaching the higher forum against 


                 an order passed by the learned Magistrate, but the 


                 same   by   itself   would   not   confer   a   jurisdiction   on 


                 this Court to step in." 








12.Recently, similar views have been echoed by this Court in Narmada  




     Bai  Vs.  State   of   Gujarat   &   Ors.6.    In   that   case,   dealing   with   the 




     question of further monitoring in a case upon submission of a report 




     by   the   C.B.I.   to   this   Court,   on   the   conclusion   of   the   investigation, 




     referring   to   the   earlier   decisions   in  Vineet   Narain  (supra),  Sushil  




     Kumar Modi  (supra) and  M.C. Mehta (Taj Corridor Scam)  (supra), 










6 (2011) 5 SCC 79








                                                                                           9



   speaking for the Bench, one of us, (P. Sathasivam, J.) has observed as 




   under :








               "70. The above decisions make it clear that though 


               this Court is competent to entrust the investigation 


               to any independent agency, once the investigating 


               agency   complete   their   function   of   investigating 


               into   the   offences,   it   is   the   court   in   which   the 


               charge-sheet   is   filed   which   is   to   deal   with   all 


               matters   relating   to   the   trial   of   the   accused 


               including   matters   falling   within   the   scope   of 


               Section 173(8) of the Code.   Thus, generally, this 


               Court   may   not   require   further   monitoring   of   the 


               case/investigation.  However, we make it clear that 


               if   any   of   the   parties   including   CBI   require   any 


               further   direction,   they   are   free   to   approach   this 


               Court by way of an application."








13.  Deferentially   concurring   with   the   dictum   of   this   Court   in   the 




   aforenoted decisions, we are of the opinion that in the instant case we 




   have reached a stage where the process of monitoring of the case must 




   come to an end. It would neither be desirable nor advisable to retain 




   further seisin over this case.  We dispose of this appeal accordingly.  








14.Before   parting,   we   direct   the   State   of   Gujarat   to   reimburse   to   Shri 




   Raju   Ramachandran,   all   the   expenses   borne   by   him   for   travel   from 




   Delhi   to   Ahmedabad   and   back.   We   also   place   on   record   our   deep 




   appreciation   for   the   able   assistance   rendered   to   us   by   Shri   Raju 




   Ramachandran and Shri Gaurav Agarwal, the learned Amicus Curiae.










                                                                                        1



                                  ...........................................


                                      (D.K. JAIN, J.) 








                                              ............................................


                                      (P. SATHASIVAM, J.)


                             




                                   ............................................. 


                                     (AFTAB ALAM, J.)










NEW DELHI;


SEPTEMBER 12,  2011.


ARS










                                                             1