absence of evidence regarding recovery of used pellets, blood stained clothes etc. cannot be taken or construed as no such occurrence had taken place. As a matter of fact, we have already pointed out that the gun shot injuries tallied with medical evidence.

                                                             REPORTABLE 


                                                                 


               IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA




             CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION




          CRIMINAL APPEAL NOs. 552-554 OF 2003








State of Rajasthan                                        .... Appellant(s)






            Versus






Arjun Singh & Ors. etc.                                     .... Respondent(s)






                                   WITH




          CRIMINAL APPEAL NOs. 555-557 OF 2003




                                      AND 





              CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 558 OF 2003










                           J U D G M E N T




P.Sathasivam,J.




1)    These   appeals   are   filed   against   the   common   final 






judgment   and   order   dated   26.04.2002   passed   by   the   High 






Court   of   Judicature   for   Rajasthan,   Jaipur   Bench,   Jaipur   in 






D.B. Criminal Appeal Nos. 504, 533 and 673 of 1995 whereby 






the   High   Court   disposed   of   the   appeals   acquitting   Karan 










                                                                               1



Singh,   Laxman   Raigar,   Bahadur   Singh,   Smt.   Swaroop   Bai, 






Smt.   Gyan   Kanwar   and   Smt.   Bhagwan   Kanwar   of   all   the 






charges   and   altered   the   conviction   and   sentence   of   Shivraj 






Singh, Banney Singh and Arjun Singh from Sections 302/149 






IPC   and   307/149   IPC   to   Section   302/34   and   307/34   IPC 






passed by the trial Court.   




2)     Brief facts:




(a)    On 24.12.1991, at about 09:30 a.m., an information was 






received   by   the   In-charge,   Police   Out-post   Anwa   that   cross 






firing   had   taken   place   between   the   Rajputs   of   that   village. 






After   recording   the   said   information   in   Rojnamcha   (Ex.   P31), 






immediately   the   police   proceeded   towards   the   spot   and 






recorded Parchabayan of injured Himmat Raj Singh (Ex. P32) 






at about 11.40 a.m.  It was stated by Himmat Raj Singh (since 






deceased) that at 9.30 a.m., when he was standing outside his 






house,   Arjun   Singh   fired   at   him   from   a   muzzle   loaded   gun 






from   the   roof   of   Karan   Singh   thereby   2-3   bullets   hit   him   on 






the left hand and another 2-3 hit his abdomen and left thigh. 






On   hearing   his   cries,   two   of   his   brothers,   namely,   Raghuraj 






Singh   (since   deceased)   and  Raj  Singh   (PW-2)   came   there   and 








                                                                                2



took   him  inside   the   house   and   after   leaving  him  there,   when 






they were going to inform the police at Police out-post, Anwa, 






Bheem Singh and Gajender Singh (who are now absconding), 






Banney Singh, Karan Singh and Shivraj Singh fired gunshots 






at them,  as a result  of which, both of them  received  injuries. 






Thereafter,   accused   Bahadur   Singh   came   with   a   gandassa. 






The   other   accused,   Laxman   Raigar   also   jumped   into   their 






house.   It was also stated that Smt. Swaroop Bai, Smt. Gyan 






Kanwar  and Smt. Bhagwan  Kanwar were also  present on the 






roof   of   Karan   Singh   and   they   tried   to   kill   the   other   family 






members of the deceased with deadly weapons.  






(b)      The   moment   Raghuraj   Singh   and   Raj   Singh   (PW-2) 






received injuries, Roop Singh, their father immediately rushed 






to the Police Out-post to inform the Police about the incident. 






The police officials reached at the spot and on the basis of the 






statement of Himmat Raj Singh, a First Information Report (in 






short `the FIR') being No. 228/1991 was registered against the 






accused   persons   for   the   offences   punishable   under   Sections 






307, 147, 148 and 149 IPC.       The injured persons, Raghuraj 










                                                                                3



Singh,   Himmat   Raj   Singh,   Dhiraj   Raj   Singh   and   Raj   Singh 






were taken to the M.B.S. Hospital at Kota for treatment.  






(c)    Shri   Ajay   Kumar   Gupta,   (PW-18),   Munsif   and   Judicial 






Magistrate   (North),   Kota   recorded   the   statements   of   Himmat 






Raj   Singh   and   Raj   Singh   (PW-2).     Since   Raghuraj   Singh   was 






not medically  fit to  make  a statement,  his  statement  was  not 






recorded.       On   the   same   day,   Raghuraj   Singh   died   in   the 






Hospital, therefore, offence punishable under Section 302 IPC 






was   added.     On   29.01.1992,   Himmat   Raj   Singh   also   died   in 






the   Hospital.     After   due   investigation,   the   police   submitted 






four   charge   sheets   at   different   stages   against   Arjun   Singh, 






Banney   Singh,   Shivraj   Singh,   Bahadur   Singh,   Smt.   Swaroop 






Bai, Smt. Gyan Kanwar, Smt. Bhagwan Kanwar, Karan Singh 






and Laxman Raigar.  






(d)    On   07.09.1995,   the   Additional   Sessions   Judge,   Kota, 






after   examining   30   prosecution   witnesses   and   8   defence 






witnesses   convicted   Karan   Singh   under   Sections   148, 






302/149,   307/149   IPC   and   Section   3/27   of   the   Arms   Act, 






1959,   Shivraj   Singh,   Banney   Singh   and   Arjun   Singh   under 






Sections   148,   302/149,  307/149  IPC  and  Smt.   Swaroop  Bai, 








                                                                           4



Smt.   Gyan   Kanwar,   Smt.   Bhagwan   Kanwar,   Laxman   Raigar 






and   Bahadur   Singh   under   Sections   148,   302/149,   307/149 






and   452   IPC   and   sentenced   all   of   them   to   undergo   rigorous 






imprisonment.  






(e)     Aggrieved   by   the   judgment   of   the   trial   Court,   Arjun 






Singh,   Banney   Singh,   Shivraj   Singh,   Bahadur   Singh,   Smt. 






Swaroop  Bai,  Smt.   Gyan   Kanwar   and  Smt.   Bhagwan  Kanwar 






filed   D.B.   Criminal   Appeal   No.   504   of   1995,   Laxman   Raigar 






filed D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 673 of 1995, Karan Singh filed 






D.B.   Criminal   Appeal   No.   533   of   1995   and   Roop   Singh-the 






complainant,   filed   D.B.   Criminal   Revision   Petition   No.   250   of 






1996   before   the   High   Court   of   Judicature   for   Rajasthan, 






Jaipur Bench at Jaipur.  






(f)     On 26.04.2002, the High Court, by a common impugned 






judgment,   set   aside   the   order   of   conviction   and   sentence 






passed   by   the   trial   Judge   against   Karan   Singh,   Laxman 






Raigar, Bahadur Singh, Smt. Swaroop Bai, Smt. Gyan Kanwar 






and   Smt.   Bhagwan   Kanwar   and   acquitted   them   of   all   the 






charges.     As  regards   Arjun   Singh,   Banney   Singh   and   Shivraj 






Singh, their conviction and sentences under Sections 302/149 








                                                                            5



and 307/149 IPC were altered to Sections 302/34 and 307/34 






IPC. 






(g)      Against   the   acquitted   persons,   the   State   of   Rajasthan 






filed Criminal Appeal Nos. 552-554 of 2003, Raj Singh, son of 






the Complainant-Roop Singh, who died during the pendency of 






the case, filed Criminal Appeal Nos. 555-557 of 2003.   Against 






the   order   of   conviction   and   sentence,   accused   Arjun   Singh, 






Banney Singh and Shivraj Singh filed Criminal Appeal No. 558 






of 2003 before this Court by way of special leave petitions.      






3)       Heard   Mr.   S.R.   Bajwa,   learned   senior   counsel   for   the 






convicted   appellants,   Dr.   Manish   Singhvi,   learned   Additional 






Advocate   General   for   the   State   of   Rajasthan   and   Ms. 






Aishwarya   Bhatti,   learned   counsel   for   the   son   of   the 






complainant.




Issues for consideration:




4)       The   question   for   consideration   in   these   appeals   is 






whether   the   High   Court   was   justified   in   acquitting   Bahadur 






Singh,   Laxman   Raigar,   Karan   Singh,   Smt   Swaroop   Bai,   Smt 






Gyan Kanwar and Smt Bhagwan Kanwar and also altering the 






conviction from 302/149 and 307/149 IPC to Sections 302/34 








                                                                            6



and 307/34 insofar as Arjun Singh, Banney Singh and Shivraj 






Singh.  






5)    Since   the   issues,   allegations   and   overt   acts   are   inter-






connected,   let   us   consider   all   the   available   materials   and 






ascertain whether the prosecution had established its case as 






initiated at the first instance.  




Discussion:




6)    As   mentioned   earlier,   on   24.12.1991,   at   about   09:30 






a.m.,   all   the   accused   gathered   on   the   roof   of   Karan   Singh. 






Accused-   Arjun   Singh   fired   at   Himmat   Raj   Singh   (since 






deceased)   from   the   roof   of   Karan   Singh   from   a   capped   gun 






thereby   few   bullets   hit   the   deceased   on   the   left   hand   and 






another   2-3   hit   his   abdomen   and   left   thigh.     On   hearing   his 






cries, brothers of the deceased, Raghuraj Singh and Raj Singh 






(PW-2) came there and took injured Himmat Raj Singh inside 






their   house   and   after   leaving   him   there,   when   both   of   them 






were   going   to   police   out-post   to   lodge   a   complaint,   at   that 






time,   Bheem   Singh,   Gajendra   Singh,   Banney   Singh,   Karan 






Singh and Shivraj Singh fired on them resulting in the death 






of   Raghuraj   Singh.     Other   accused   Bahadur   Singh,   Laxman 








                                                                               7



Raigar,   Smt   Swaroop   Bai,   Smt.   Gyan   Kanwar   and   Smt 






Bhagwan Kanwar were also present on the roof of Karan Singh 






and   they   tried   to   kill   other   family   members   with   deadly 






weapons.     It   is   also   the   claim   of   the   prosecution   that   the 






accused persons attempted on the life of Dhiraj Raj Singh - the 






brother   of   the   deceased.     The   injured   persons,   namely, 






Raghuraj Singh, Himmat Raj Singh, Raj Singh and Dhiraj Raj 






Singh   were   taken   to   Kota   Hospital.     Raghuraj   Singh   died   on 






the   same   day   and   Himmat   Raj   Singh   died   on   29.01.1992   in 






the   hospital,   however,   Raj   Singh   survived.     According   to   the 






High   Court,   there   is   complete   consistency   and   credible 






evidence   as   far   as   three   accused   persons,   namely,   Arjun 






Singh,   Banney   Singh   and   Shivraj   Singh   are   concerned, 






however, in respect of other six, there is no direct evidence and 






the   case   pleaded   by   the   prosecution   is   unacceptable   and 






acquitted them of all the charges.  






7)    The   prosecution   examined   as   many   as   30   witnesses   in 






support of its case.  In the statements recorded under Section 






313   of   the   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure,   1973   (hereinafter 






called   as   "the   Code"),   all   the   accused   denied   the   prosecution 








                                                                              8



evidence   and   informed   the   Court   that   they   were   falsely 






implicated.   In addition to their statements, 8 witnesses were 






examined in their defence.






8)    Before   considering   the   evidence   of   eye-witnesses,   let   us 






analyse   the   evidence   of   the   Dr.   Manmohan   Sharma   (PW-1), 






Medical   Jurist   in   M.B.S.   Hospital,   Kota,   who   examined 






Raghuraj   Singh,   Himmat   Raj   Singh   and   Raj   Singh   on 






24.12.1991 and Dhiraj Raj Singh on 28.12.1991.  The injuries 






noted   by   Dr.   Manmohan   Sharma   (PW-1)   in   Exs.   P1-P4   are 






relevant, they are as follows:-






      "Raghuraj Singh (Ex. P1)




      1.   Gunshot   wound   1/2"   x   3/4"   oval   with   inverted   margins 


      blackening and tattooing on left shoulder outside.




      2. Gunshot wound 3/4" x 1/2" oval with blackening on outer 


      side lt. iliac crust posteriolateral aspect upper quadrant of lt. 


      buttock.




      3. Gunshot wound 1/2" x 1/2" on lt. lip 4" medial to No. 1.




      4. Gunshot wound 1/4" x 3/4" upper quadrant of lt. buttock 


      5" below No. 1.




      5.   Gun   shot   wound   1/2"   x   3/4",   2"   medial   to   No.   1   on   lt. 


      buttock.




      6.     Gunshot   wound   1/3"   x   1/3"   on   sacral   gorder   of   lt. 


      buttock 3" away from middle.




      7.     Gun   shot   wound   1/3"   x   1/3"   1"   below   No.   6,   3   &   1/2" 


      away from middle.




      8.     Gun   shot   wound   1/3"   x   1/3"   1/2"   below   No.   6,   3  &   2" 


      away from middle.










                                                                                             9



      Himmat Raj Singh (Ex. P2)




      1. Gun shot wound 1/2" x 1/2 circular with inverted margin 


      with blackish.




      2. Gun shot wound 1/2" x 3/4" oval with blackening on the 


      side of the abdomen.




      3. Gun shot wound 3/4" x 3/4" oval iliac with blackening.




      4.   Gun   shot   wound   1/2"   x   1/2"   circular   on   left   arm   upper 


      outer side with bleeding.




      5. Gun shot wound 1/2" x 3/4" oval 2" below slight medial to 


      forearm.




      6. Gun shot wound 1/2" x 3/4" oval with inverted margin on 


      left forearm innerside.  




      7. Gun shot wound 1/2" x 1/2" on the left hand. 




      Raj Singh (Ex. P4)




      1. Eight gun shot wounds about 1/2" x 1/2" size to 1" x 3/4" 


      scattered   in   front   of   left   thigh   blackening   tattooing   margin 


      inverted.




      Dhiraj Raj (Ex. P3)




      1. Contusion 2" x 1" abrasion on left arm.




      2. Contusion 3" x 1 and 1/2" with abrasion on left forearm.




      3.   Lacerated   wound   1"   x   1/3"   x   1/3"   abdomen   right   side 


      outside in auxiliary 3" below knee joint."


       


9)    With reference to the specific question about the injuries, 






Dr. Manmohan Sharma (PW-1) has explained to the Court that 






all the injuries referred to above were caused by gun shots.  It 






was   further   revealed   that   Raj   Singh   had   also   sustained 






injuries.     It   is   seen   from   the   X-ray   Report   (Ex.P5)   that   Raj 






Singh   had   fracture   of   femur   bone   and   according   to   Dr. 










                                                                                         10



Manmohan   Sharma   (PW-1),   the   injuries   were   serious   in 






nature.  He also opined that the injuries of Himmat Raj Singh 






and   Raghuraj   Singh   were   sufficient   to   cause   death   in   the 






ordinary course of nature.   In his evidence, he also explained 






that   the   death   of   Himmat   Raj   Singh   was   caused   due   to 






septicemia shock as a result of multiple ante-mortem injuries 






to abdomen.  With reference to a suggestion, PW-1 had denied 






that   blackening   and   tattooing   marks   can   be   possible   only 






when gun shots were fired  from a distance of  3  or 4 feet.   In 






respect of the same, Dr. Sharma, (PW-1), explained in detail in 






his cross-examination that the same marks are possible even 






in   the   case   of   gun   shots   which   are   fired   from   a   distance   of 






more than 3 or 4 feet and it depends upon the nature of gun, 






gun powder, cartridges etc.  Raj Singh, (PW-2), in his evidence, 






has stated that the accused Arjun Singh was standing on the 






roof of the house of Karan Singh and fired from muzzle loaded 






gun at Himmat Raj Singh.   Though there is little discrepancy 






as to the distance from the upper portion of the house and the 






actual   scene   of   occurrence,   it   cannot   be   concluded   that   the 






injuries on Raghuraj Singh, Himmat Raj Singh and Raj Singh 








                                                                                11



were not caused by fire arms.   In this regard, it is relevant to 






point   out   the   description   of   injuries   as   noted   by   Dr.   Sharma 






(PW-1)   in   Exs.   P1-P4   which   we   have   extracted   earlier.     In 






addition to the same, it is seen from the evidence of PW-1 that 






the blackening marks found around the wounds and the dead 






body confirmed that the deceased were within a distance of 6 






feet from the assailants when they received the injuries. 






10)    Learned   senior   counsel   for   the   accused   persons 






contended   that  in   the  absence   of  recovery   of  pellets  from   the 






scene of occurrence or from the body of the injured persons, it 






is  highly  doubtful as  to  the  scene  of  occurrence and  whether 






such  incident   did   take  place  in  the  manner   suggested   by  the 






prosecution.     Learned   counsel   appearing   for   the   complainant 






pointed   out   that   though   there   was   an   entry   in   Malkhana 






Register (Ex. P31A) wherein it was stated that a sealed packet 






containing pellets was deposited but prosecution failed to lead 






any   evidence   on   this   point.     It   was   also   pointed   out   that 






though   a   report   was   received   from   the   Forensic   Science 






Laboratory,   no  evidence   regarding   recovery   of   the   pellets  was 






produced.     As   rightly   pointed   out   by   the   learned   Additional 








                                                                             12



Advocate   General   appearing   for   the   State   that   mere   non-






recovery of pistol or cartridge does not detract the case of the 






prosecution where clinching and direct evidence is acceptable. 






Likewise,   absence   of   evidence   regarding   recovery   of   used 






pellets,   blood   stained   clothes   etc.   cannot   be   taken   or 






construed   as   no   such   occurrence   had   taken   place.     As   a 






matter of fact, we have already pointed out that the gun shot 






injuries   tallied   with   medical   evidence.     It   is   also   seen   that 






Raghuraj   Singh   and   Himmat   Raj   Singh,   who   had   died, 






received 8 and 7 gun shot wounds respectively while Raj Singh 






(PW-2) also received 8 gun shots scattered in front of left thigh. 






All these injuries have been noted by the Doctor (PW-1) in his 






reports Exs. P1-P4.  






11)    If   we   analyze   the   evidence   of   Dr.   Manmohan   Sharma 






(PW-1),   his   reports,   Exs.P1-P4   and   the   evidence   of  Raj   Singh 






(PW-2),   it   leads   to   a  conclusion   that  gun   shot   injuries   tallied 






with the medical evidence and both the deceased persons died 






due to the same reason.   Similar conclusion arrived at by the 






High Court cannot be doubted.  










                                                                              13



12)    Coming to the contention relating to the motive, it is not 






in   dispute   that   Raghuraj   Singh   and   Himmat   Raj   Singh   died 






due   to   gun   shot   injuries.     The   reliable   eye-witnesses   have 






stated   that   there   was   previous   enmity   between   them   and 






litigation was going on between the accused-Karan Singh and 






the complainant.  Even in the absence of motive, in view of the 






assertion   of   eye-witnesses,   particularly,   Raj   Singh,   (PW-2), 






coupled with the medical evidence as seen from Exs. P1-P4, by 






the   Doctor   (PW-1),   the   case   of   the   prosecution   cannot   be 






thrown out.  In a catena of decisions, this Court has held that 






motive for doing a criminal act is generally a difficult area for 






the   prosecution   to   prove   since   one   cannot   normally   be   seen 






into the mind of another.   Motive is the emotion which impels 






a man to do a particular act.   Even in the absence of specific 






evidence   as  to   motive,   in  view  of  the   fact  that  in   the   case  on 






hand, two persons have been killed and one sustained injuries 






due to fire arms, the case of the prosecution cannot be thrown 






out on this ground.






13)    Now,   let   us   consider   the   oral   evidence   led   in   by   the 






prosecution.     We   have   already   pointed   out   that   though   the 








                                                                              14



prosecution   has   examined   as   many   as   30   witnesses,   they 






heavily relied only on 6 witnesses and out of these, Raj Singh 






(PW-2), Dhiraj Raj Singh (PW-3) and Brij Raj Singh (PW-4)  are 






brothers,   Roop   Singh   (PW-6)   is   their   father   and   Durga 






Shankar   (PW-5)   and   Satya   Narain   (PW-9)   were   working   as 






labourers   in   the   house   of   Roop   Singh   at   the   time   of 






occurrence.   It is true that the names of PWs 3, 4 and 6 were 






not   mentioned   either   in   parchabayan   (Ex.   P32)   or   in   the 






statements, Exs. P22-23, recorded by the Judicial Magistrate, 






(PW-18) on the day of the occurrence.






14)    It   was   also   pointed   out   that   all   the   eye-witnesses, 






particularly, PWs 3, 4 and 6 being brothers and father of the 






deceased, they  are interested  in their version and no reliance 






need   to   be   placed   on   their   statements.     We   are   unable   to 






accept   the   said   contention.     This   Court,   in   a   series   of 






decisions,   has   held   that   the   testimony   of   such   eye-witnesses 






should not be rejected merely because witnesses are related to 






the deceased.  This Court has held that their testimonies have 






to be carefully analysed because of their relationship and if the 






same are cogent and if there is no discrepancy, the same are 








                                                                           15



acceptable vide  Abdul Rashid Abdul Rahiman Patel & Ors. 






vs.  State   of   Maharashtra  (2007)   9  SCC   1.     Likewise,   minor 






discrepancies   in   the   evidence   of   eye-witnesses   are   also 






immaterial.     However,   as   rightly   pointed   out,   if   Dhiraj   Raj 






Singh   (PW-3)   had   sustained   some   injuries,   his   name   could 






have   been   mentioned   in   Exs.   P22,   P23   and   P32   which   were 






earliest versions.  In those documents, the names of Raghuraj 






Singh, who died on the same day and Himmat Raj Singh, who 






died later and Raj Singh, who received gun shot injuries alone 






were   mentioned   and   none   else.     Another   aspect,   as   rightly 






pointed   out   is   that   when   the   injured   persons   were   examined 






by   the   Doctor   on   the   same   day,   admittedly,   PW-3   was 






examined   only   on   the   fourth   day   of   the   incident   and   it   was 






seen that he did not receive any gun shot injury.  Considering 






all   these   aspects   including   the   fact   that   there   is   no   proof   of 






receiving gun shot injury to PW-3 and also taking note of the 






fact that he was 13 years of age at the time of occurrence, as 






rightly   pointed   out   by   the   High   Court,   his   presence   itself   is 






doubtful.










                                                                                 16



15)    The   remaining   eye-witnesses,   as   per   the   prosecution 






version, are PWs 2, 4 and 6.  It was demonstrated before us by 






the learned  senior counsel for the accused  that the  names  of 






PWs 4 and 6 did not occur in parchabayan (Ex. P 32) as well 






as in the statements (Exs. P22 and P23) recorded by Shri Ajay 






Kumar   Gupta,   (PW-18),   Judicial   Magistrate,   on   the   day   of 






occurence.     The   statement   in   Ex.  P32   was   recorded   at   11:40 






a.m. and the incident took place at about 09:30 a.m.  Though 






it was recorded within two hours, as rightly pointed out, while 






mentioning   the   details   of   the   occurrence,   names   of   the 






assailants,   eye-witnesses,   the   presence   of   Dhiraj   Raj   Singh 






(PW-3), Brij Raj Singh (PW-4) and Roop Singh (PW-6) was not 






mentioned.   We have already noted that even in Exs. P22-23, 






the   names   of   PWs   3,   4   and   6   were   not   noted   and   no 






explanation   has   been   offered   for   their   absence.             The 






verification   of   those   documents   clearly   show   that   only   the 






names   of   Raghuraj   Singh   and   Himmat   Raj   Singh   (both   died 






due   to   gun   shot   injuries)   and   Raj   Singh   (PW-2)   who   also 






received gun shot injuries were noted and except these names, 






none else was noted.  Another important factor is that Himmat 








                                                                          17



Raj   Singh,   Raghuraj   Singh   and   Raj   Singh   (PW-2)   alone   were 






medically examined on the same day whereas Dhiraj Raj Singh 






(PW-3) was examined after 4 days of the incident and that too 






by the very same Doctor (PW-1).  There is no explanation at all 






for   non-examination   of   PW-3   by   the   Doctor   along   with   other 






injured witnesses.  In these circumstances, as rightly observed 






by the High Court, the presence of eye-witnesses, namely, PWs 






3, 4 and 6 at the place of occurrence on the date and time as 






pleaded by the prosecution is highly doubtful.   We agree with 






the said conclusion.






16)    In   the   light   of   the   above   conclusion,   the   only   witness 






available   to   support   the   case   of   the   prosecution   is   Raj   Singh 






(PW-2).   Let us consider his evidentiary value and how far he 






supported   the   case   of   the   prosecution.     Mr.   Bajwa,   learned 






senior   counsel   for   the   accused,   by   pointing   out   certain 






contradictions,   submitted   that   it   is   not   safe   to   convict   the 






accused based on his evidence.  It is also pointed out that Raj 






Singh (PW-2) is highly interested witness and closely related to 






eye-witnesses.   It was further pointed out that in the absence 






of any neighbour,  conviction based on the testimony  of PW-2 








                                                                              18



alone   is   not   sustainable.             In   the   light   of   the   above 






submissions, we have carefully scrutinized the evidence of PW-






2.    First   of   all,   merely   because   the   witness   is   related   to   eye-






witnesses   or   the   family   of   the   deceased   is   not   a   ground   for 






rejection vide  Kuldip Yadav vs.  State of Bihar (2011) 5 SCC 






324. It was also held that merely because the prosecution has 






not examined neighbours, it cannot be claimed that it is fatal 






to their case, when the evidence of eye-witnesses examined on 






their   side   is   found   to   be   acceptable   and   reliable.    Raj   Singh, 






(PW-2), in his evidence, in categorical terms has asserted that 






he saw five to seven persons standing on the roof of the house 






of  Karan   Singh.     He   had   specifically   mentioned  the   names   of 






those   persons   as   Bahadur   Singh,   Shivraj   Singh,   Banney 






Singh,   Smt   Swaroop   Bai,   Smt   Gyan   Kanwar,   Smt   Bhagwan 






Kanwar,   Gajendra   Singh   and   Karan   Singh.     Inasmuch   as   in 






the parchabayan (Ex. P32), only the name of Arjun Singh and 






as   per   Ex.   P22   the   names   of   Arjun   Singh   and   Banney   Singh 






was  mentioned,  who  were  present  on  the  roof  at  the  relevant 






time,   as  rightly   observed  by  the   High  Court,   the   claim   of  Raj 






Singh   (PW-2)   that   all   the   accused   persons   were   standing   on 








                                                                                  19



the   roof   is   not   believable,   however,   his   assertion   that   two 






persons   Arjun   Singh   and   Banney   Singh   were   on   the   roof 






cannot be denied.   Even if we eschew certain portion from the 






evidence   of   PW-2,   his   assertion   and   the   statement   regarding 






the   involvement   of   Arjun   Singh,   Shivraj   Singh   and   Banney 






Singh cannot be disputed.   In categorical terms, he explained 






the role played by these persons.  It is clear from his evidence 






that he received gun shot injuries which is also supported by 






medical   evidence.     In   view   of   the   same,   his   presence   at   the 






time   of   occurrence   cannot   be   disputed   and   is   found   to   be 






proved.     This   is   also   strengthened   from   his   statement   in 






parchabayan   (Ex.   P32)   and   Ex.   P22   statement   given   to 






Judicial   Magistrate   (PW-18).     A   perusal   of   Ex.   P32   makes   it 






clear   that   it   was   Arjun   Singh   who   first   fired   a   gun   shot   at 






Himmat  Raj Singh  and subsequently  Bheem Singh, Gajendra 






Singh (both absconding) Banney Singh and Shivraj Singh also 






fired at Raghuraj Singh and Raj Singh causing injury to them. 






Ex. P32 also clearly shows that there are specific allegations of 






causing  gun  shot   injuries  against   Shivraj  Singh,  Arjun   Singh 






and   Banney   Singh.     In   the   same   manner,   verification   of   Ex. 








                                                                                20



P22   shows   that   Arjun   Singh   and   Banney   Singh   fired   at   the 






deceased Himmat Raj Singh and, thereafter, Bheem Singh and 






Shivraj Singh fired at the brothers of Himmat Raj Singh when 






they   were   going   to   inform   the   police.     Though   Mr.   Bajwa 






pointed   out   certain   discrepancies   as   to   the   number   of   gun 






shots, in view of the number of injuries, as seen from Exs. P1-






P4, supported by the evidence of Dr. Manmohan Sharma (PW-






1), the said objection is liable to be rejected and participation 






of   these   three   accused,   namely,   Arjun   Singh,   Banney   Singh 






and   Shivraj   Singh   is   clearly   proved   through   various 






circumstances including the evidence of PW-2.






17)    Finally,   learned   senior   counsel   for   the   accused   pointed 






out   that   inasmuch   as   Himmat   Raj   Singh   died   after   35   days 






due   to   septicemia,   the   Courts   below   are   not   justified   in 






convicting   the   accused   persons   for   an   offence   under   Section 






302 IPC for his death.   Considering the medical evidence that 






Himmat   Raj   Singh   sustained   7   gun   shot   injuries   which   were 






sufficient   to   cause   death   in   the   ordinary   course,   we   are 






satisfied that the death of Himmat Raj Singh undoubtedly falls 






within the ambit of 302 IPC.  








                                                                          21



18)    The materials placed by the prosecution clearly prove the 






guilt   against   the   three   convicted   accused,   namely,   Shivraj 






Singh,   Arjun   Singh   and   Banney   Singh   who   were   armed   with 






guns   and   with   their   common   intention   they   fired   gun   shots 






resulting in death of Raghuraj Singh and Himmat Raj Singh as 






well   as   causing   injuries   to   Raj   Singh   (PW-2),   in   such 






circumstances,   their   conviction   and   sentence   by   both   the 






courts have to be confirmed.






19)    Dr.   Manish   Singhvi   vehemently   argued   as   to   the   role   of 






the acquitted accused.   As discussed in the earlier paras and 






on   going   through   the   evidence   relating   to   their   role   and   the 






detailed   analysis   by   the   High   Court,   we   agree   with   the   said 






conclusion and reject his arguments.  For the same reasoning, 






the appeals filed by the son of the complainant are also liable 






to be dismissed.  






20)    In view of the above discussion and conclusion, we agree 






with   the   decision   of   the   High   Court,   consequently,   all   the 






appeals are dismissed.  










                                        ...........................................J. 








                                                                             22



                                 (P. SATHASIVAM)   
                                                                                           










                              ...........................................J. 


                                 (H.L. GOKHALE)    
                                                                                     






NEW DELHI;


SEPTEMBER 2, 2011.










                                                                                               23

after passing of the Punjab Pre-emption 2 (Haryana Amendment) Act, 10 of 1995, (hereinafter referered to as "the Act") the right of pre-emption on the basis of co- sharership is not available

                                                           REPORTABLE




                IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA




                 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION




                 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6391  OF 2003






Pirthi                                                   .... Appellant (s)






             Versus






Mohan Singh & Ors.                                     .... Respondent(s)










                            J U D G M E N T 




P. Sathasivam, J.




1)     This   appeal   is   directed   against   the   final   judgment   and 






order   dated   07.03.2002   passed   by   the   High   Court   of   Punjab 






and Haryana at Chandigarh in RSA No. 136 of 2001 whereby 






the   High   Court   dismissed   the   appeal   filed   by   the   appellant 






herein.




2)     Brief facts:




(a)    The   appellant-plaintiff   and   respondent   No.5   -   whose 






name   has   been   deleted   from   the   array   of   parties   by   this 






Court's order dated 08.08.2003,  filed  a suit for possession by 










                                                                           1



way   of   pre-emption   being   Civil   Suit   No.   107/92/93   against 






respondent Nos. 1-4 herein (Defendants) before the Civil Judge 






(Jr.   Division),   Bahadurgarh,   Haryana   claiming   themselves   to 






be   co-sharers   with   the   vendor   -   Shiv   Lal-defendant   No.3 






(respondent          No.3         herein-since         deceased,         his         legal 






representatives are on record), who sold away his half share of 






the suit land comprised in Khewat No. 22 (min.), Khasra Nos. 






47   and   48,   Khasra   No.   1043   measuring   3   bighas,   3   biswas 






pukhta   1058   (2-11)   and   Khewat   No.   28   (min.),   Khasra   Nos. 






54-55.   Khasra   No.   5496/1693   (2-16)   5497/1693(1-5)   total 






measuring   10   Bighas   8   Biswas   to   defendant   Nos.   1   &   2 






(respondent Nos. 1 & 2 herein) by sale deed dated 08.06.1992 






for   a   consideration   of   Rs.1,40,000/-   and   for   declaring   the 






lease deed No. 326 dated 07.05.1992 illegal, null and void and 






unwarranted by law.   Defandant Nos. 1 & 2 are brothers and 






defendant No. 4 (respondent No.4 herein) is their mother.  






(b)    When   the   case   was   fixed   for   service   of   the   remaining 






defendants,   defendant   Nos.   1   &   4   filed   an   application   for 






dismissing the suit of the plaintiffs being not maintainable on 






the   ground   that   after   passing   of   the   Punjab   Pre-emption 








                                                                                        2



(Haryana   Amendment)   Act,   10   of   1995,   (hereinafter   referered 






to   as   "the   Act")   the   right   of   pre-emption   on   the   basis   of   co-






sharership   is   not   available   to   them.     The   Civil   Judge   (Jr. 






Division),   by   judgment   dated   09.02.1996,   accepting   the 






application filed by the defendants dismissed the suit filed by 






the plaintiffs.   






(c)    Aggrieved   by   the   said   judgment,   the   plaintiffs   filed   an 






appeal being Civil Appeal No. 23 of 1996 before the Additional 






District   Judge,   Jhajjar.     By   order   dated   18.07.2000,   the 






Additional   District   Judge   dismissed   the   appeal   filed   by   the 






plaintiffs.  






(d)    Challenging   the   order   passed   by   the   Additional   District 






Judge,   Pirthi-plaintiff   No.1   (appellant   herein)   filed   regular 






second   appeal   being   RSA   No.   136   of   2001   before   the   High 






Court   of  Punjab  &  Haryana   at Chandigarh.     The  High Court, 






by   impugned   judgment   dated   07.03.2002,   holding   that   the 






plaintiff/appellant had lost the character of a co-owner during 






the pendency  of the suit, dismissed the  appeal.     Against the 






said judgment, the appellant-plaintiff  has  filed this appeal by 






way of special leave petition before this Court.








                                                                                  3



3)     Heard Mr. Mahabir Singh, learned senior counsel for the 






appellant   and   Mr.   Pramod   Dayal,   learned   counsel   for 






respondent Nos. 2 & 4.   Despite service of notice, respondent 






Nos.1 and  3 have not  chosen  to appear in-person or through 






counsel.  




Discussion:




4)     It   is   the   case   of   the   respondents/defendants   that 






superior right of pre-emption on the basis of co-sharership is 






not   available   to   plaintiffs   now.     After   passing   of   the   Act,   this 






right has been restricted only to the tenants and the plaintiffs 






have  no  locus-standi  to  file  and pursue  their   suit  as they   are 






not   claiming   the   right   as   tenants.     It   is   the   claim   of   the 






appellant/plaintiff   that   the   suit   in   question   was   instituted 






prior to the amendment in the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 






hence   the   amendment   in   the   Act   is   not   applicable   to   the 






present   case.     The   trial   Court   accepted   the   objection   of   the 






defendants as to the maintainability of the suit and dismissed 






the same as not maintainable which was affirmed by the lower 






appellate   Court.     The   same   view   has   been   reiterated   by   the 






High Court by dismissing the second appeal.  








                                                                                  4



5)    It is true that the suit, in the present case, was filed prior 






to   the   amendment   in   the   Punjab   Pre-emption   Act,   1913. 






Section   15   of   the   Pre-emption   law   has   been   amended   and 






notified   vide   Gazette   Notification   dated   17.05.1995   which 






reads as under:






      "15. Right of Pre-emption to vest in tenant  - The right of 


      pre-emption in respect of sale of agricultural land and village 


      immovable property shall vest in the tenant who holds under 


      tenancy of the vendor/vendors the land or property sold or a 


      part thereof."









This   change   in   the   law   affects   all   pre-emption   cases   based 






upon the  co-sharership.   In view  of this  change  in the  law, a 






co-sharer has no right to bring a suit for possession by way of 






pre-emption, hence the application filed by the defendants for 






dismissing the suit of the plaintiffs being not maintainable had 






been accepted by the trial Court and suit of the plaintiff came 






to   be   dismissed.   This   was   affirmed   by   the   lower   appellate 






Court   and   finally   by   the   High   Court   which   order   is   under 






challenge in this appeal. 






6)    While   ordering   notice   on  the   special  leave  petition,   even 






as  early   as  on  02.09.2002,   it  was  specifically   mentioned   that 






as to why the case be not decided in the light of a Constitution 










                                                                          5



Bench   judgment   in  Shyam   Sunder   and   Others  vs.  Ram  




Kumar and Another, (2001) 8 SCC 24.  




7)    In  Bhagwan   Das  (dead)   by  LRS.   and   Others  vs.  Chet  




Ram,   1971   (1)   SCC   12,   a   three-Judge   Bench   of   this   Court, 




while   considering   right   of   pre-emption   has   held   that   pre-






emptor's   right   should   subsist   till   institution   of   suit   for   pre-






emption   and   passing   of   decree.     It   was   further   held   that   the 






rule that a pre-emptor must maintain his qualification to pre-






empt up to the date of decree was recognized as well settled. 






8)    In  Rikhi   Ram   and   Another  vs.  Ram   Kumar   and  




Others, (1975) 2 SCC 318, again, a three-Judge Bench of this 




Court,   while   considering   right   of   pre-emption   under   the 






Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, after adverting to the principles 






laid   down   in  Bhagwan   Das   (supra)  and   considering   Section 






15(1)   of   the   Punjab   Pre-emption   Act   held   that   under   the 






general   law   of   pre-emption,   it   is   firmly   established   that   the 






decisive   date   as   regards   the   right   of   pre-emptor   to   pre-empt 






the sale was the date of the decree.   In other words, the pre-






emptor who claims the right to pre-empt the sale on the date 






of the sale must continue to possess that right till the date of 








                                                                              6



the   decree.     If   he   loses   that   right   before   the   passing   of   the 






decree, decree for pre-emption cannot be granted even though 






he may have had such right on the date of the suit.   






9)     Now,   let   us   consider   the   decision   of   the   Constitution 






Bench i.e.  Shyam Sunder  (supra) and its applicability  to the 






case on hand.  Both the above decisions being Bhagwan Das  




(supra)  and  Rikhi   Ram   (supra)  were   relied   on   by   the 




Constitution Bench.    






10)    The   very   same   Haryana   Amendment   Act,   10   of   1995, 






which   introduced   Section   15,   was   considered   by   a 






Constitution Bench in  Shyam Sunder  (supra).   The question 






posed before the Constitution Bench was: 






       "What   is   the   effect   of   substituted   Section   15 


       introduced   by   the   Haryana   Amendment   Act,   1995 


       (hereinafter referred to as `the amending Act, 1995') 


       in   the   parent   Act   i.e.   the   Punjab   Pre-emption   Act 


       (hereinafter   referred   to   as   `the   parent   Act')   as 


       applicable to the State of Haryana whereby the right 


       of   a   co-sharer   to   pre-empt   a   sale   has   been   taken 


       away during the pendency of an appeal filed against 


       a   judgment   of   the   High   Court   affirming   the   decree 


       passed by the trial Court in a pre-emption suit?"






11)    When   in   the   case   of  Shyam   Sunder  (supra),   the   main 






appeal, i.e., Civil Appeal No. 4680 of 1993 came up for hearing 










                                                                                 7



before a Bench of this Court, the Bench, on the question of the 






effect   of   the   amendment   made   in   1995   in   the   parent   Act, 






found that there is conflict in the view taken in the decisions 






of   two   three-Judge   Benches   of   this   Court,   which   are  Didar  




Singh  vs.  Ishar Singh  (2001) 8 SCC 52 wherein it was held 




that in a suit for pre-emption, the pre-emptor must prove his 






right to pre-empt up to the date of decree of the first court and 






any loss of right or subsequent change in law after the date of 






adjudication of the suit and during pendency of appeal would 






not affect the decree of the first court and Ramjilal vs. Ghisa  




Ram  (1996) 7 SCC 507 wherein it was laid down that appeal 




being continuation of the suit, the right to claim pre-emption 






must be available on the date when the decree is made and is 






finally   to   be   affirmed   or   needs   to   be   modified   at   the   time   of 






disposal of the appeal therefrom, and since the amending Act 






came   into   force   during   pendency   of   appeal,   the   right   and 






remedy of the plaintiff stood extinguished and as a result the 






suit   must   fail.     In   order   to   resolve   the   conflict   between   the 






aforesaid two decisions rendered by two different Benches, the 






Bench   referred   the   appeal   for   decision   by   a   Bench   of   five 








                                                                                  8



Judges.   It   is   in   this   way,   the   matter   was   heard   by   the 






Constitution Bench.  






12)    The Constitution Bench noted the facts which have given 






rise   to   Civil   Appeal   No.   4680   of   1993.       The   defendant-






appellants   herein   purchased   land   measuring   54   kanals, 






situated in Village Rithal Phogat, being 1/2 share of the land 






of Khewat Nos. 204, 205 and 206, measuring 108 kanals for a 






sum   of   Rs   84,000/-   from   vendors   viz.   Bharpai,   Chhoto   and 






Pyari   --   daughters   of   Bhagwana   vide   sale   deed   dated 






17-07-1985.   The   plaintiff-respondents   herein   claimed 






preferential   right   to   pre-empt   the   sale   in   favour   of   the 






defendant-appellants   on   the   ground   that   they   are   co-sharers 






by   means   of  a  civil   suit  laid   before   the   Sub-Judge,   Ist  Class, 






Gohana.   In   the   said   suit,   issues   were   framed   and   the   trial 






court   decided   all   the   issues   in   favour   of   the   plaintiff-






respondents   and   consequently   on   30-5-1990   the   suit   was 






decreed.   The   respondents   after   passing   of   the   decree   by   the 






court   of   first   instance   deposited   the   purchase   money   as 






required under Order 20 Rule 14 CPC. The appeal preferred by 






the appellants before the first appellate court and the second 








                                                                             9



appeal before the High Court were dismissed and the decree of 






the   trial   court   was   affirmed.   The   appellants   thereafter 






preferred  this   appeal   by   way  of   special   leave   petition.   During 






pendency of the appeal, Section 15(1)(b) of the parent Act, on 






the   basis   of   which   the   suit   was   filed   by   the   plaintiff-






respondents,   was   amended   and   was   substituted   by   new 






Section 15 whereby the right of a co-sharer to pre-empt a sale 






was   taken   away.   The   substituted   Section   15   of   the   Act   has 






been quoted earlier.






13)    Since several decisions have been cited, the Constitution 






Bench  categorized those  decisions  and referred them   as  first, 






second and third categories of decisions.   The first category of 






decisions  are those wherein the  view  of law  expressed  is that 






in   a   suit   for   pre-emption,   the   pre-emptor   must   possess   his 






right   to   pre-empt   right   from   the   date   of   sale   till   the   date   of 






decree of the first court, and loss of that right after the date of 






decree   either   by   own   act,   or   an   act   beyond   his   control   or   by 






any   subsequent   change   in   legislation   which   is   prospective   in 






operation   during   pendency   of   the   appeal   filed   against   the 






decree of the court of first instance would not affect the right 








                                                                                   10



of the pre-emptor. The second category of decisions deals with 






the cases where right of a pre-emptor was taken away after the 






date   of   decree   of   the   first   court   and   during   pendency   of   the 






appeal   by   statutory   enactment   which   had   retroactive 






operation. In such cases, it was held that the appellate court 






is   competent   to   take   into   account   legislative   changes   which 






are   retrospective   and   accordingly   affect   the   rights   of   the 






parties to the litigation. The decisions in the third category of 






cases   are   those   where   it   has   been   held   that   appeal   being   a 






continuation of the suit, the right to pre-empt a sale must be 






available on the date when the decree is made and is finally to 






be affirmed or needs to be modified at the time of disposal of 






appeal   and   in   case   of   loss   of   right   by   legislative   changes 






during pendency of appeal, the suit for pre-emption must fail. 






After   analyzing   various   decisions   referred   to   in   the   first 






category,   the   Constitution   Bench   formulated   the   following 






legal principles:






      "1.  The  pre-emptor  must  have  the  right  to  pre-empt  on  the 


      date of sale, on the date of filing of the suit and on the date 


      of   passing   of   the   decree   by   the   court   of   the   first   instance 


      only.










                                                                                            11



       2. The pre-emptor who claims the right to pre-empt the sale 


       on the date of the sale must prove that such right continued 


       to  subsist  till  the passing  of  the  decree   of the first   court.  If 


       the claimant loses that right or a vendee improves his right 


       equal   or   above   the   right   of   the   claimant   before   the 


       adjudication of suit, the suit for pre-emption must fail.




       3.   A   pre-emptor   who   has   a   right   to   pre-empt   a   sale   on   the 


       date  of institution  of the suit and on the date  of passing of 


       decree, the loss of such right subsequent to the decree of the 


       first court would not affect his right or maintainability of the 


       suit for pre-emption.




       4.   A   pre-emptor   who   after   proving   his   right   on   the   date   of 


       sale, on the date of filing the suit and on the date of passing 


       of   the   decree   by   the   first   court,   has   obtained   a   decree   for 


       pre-emption by the court of first instance, such right cannot 


       be taken away by subsequent legislation during pendency of 


       the   appeal   filed   against   the   decree   unless   such   legislation 


       has retrospective operation."






14)    The   legal   position   that   emerges  on   review   of   the   second 






category of decisions is that the appeal being a continuation of 






the   suit,   the   appellate   court   is   required   to   give   effect   to   any 






change in law which has retrospective effect.   In para 15, the 






Constitution   Bench   has   held   that   the   legal   principle   that 






emerges out of the aforesaid decisions is that an appeal being 






a   continuation   of   the   suit,   the   right   to   pre-empt   must   be 






available on the date when the decree is made and is finally to 






be affirmed or needs to be modified at the time of disposal of 






the   appeal   and   where   right   and   remedy   of   the   plaintiff   has 










                                                                                             12



been   taken   away   statutorily   during   pendency   of   appeal,   the 






suit must fail.






15)    The   following   discussion   and   conclusion   in   para   28   are 






relevant:






       "...   .....   In  Shanti   Devi  v.  Hukum   Chand,   (1996)   5   SCC   768, 


       this Court had occasion to interpret the substituted Section 


       15   with   which   we   are   concerned   and   held   that   on   a   plain 


       reading of Section 15, it is clear that it has been introduced 


       prospectively   and   there   is   no   question   of   such   section 


       affecting in any manner the judgment and decree passed in 


       the   suit   for   pre-emption   affirmed   by   the   High   Court   in   the 


       second   appeal.   We   are   respectfully   in   agreement   with   the 


       view   expressed   in   the   said   decision   and   hold   that   the 


       substituted   Section   15   in   the   absence   of   anything   in   it   to 


       show that it is retrospective, does not affect the right of the 


       parties which accrued to them on the date of the suit or on 


       the   date   of   passing   of   the   decree   by   the   court   of   first 


       instance.   We   are   also   of   the   view   that   the   present   appeals 


       are   unaffected   by   change   in   law   insofar   it   related   to 


       determination of the substantive rights of the parties and the 


       same are required to be decided in the light of the law of pre-


       emption as it existed on the date of passing of the decree."






16)    After   analyzing   all   the   decisions   cited   therein,   the 






Constitution Bench has concluded thus:






       "44.  From   the   aforesaid   decisions,   the   legal   principle   that 


       emerges is that the function of a declaratory or explanatory 


       Act is to supply an obvious omission or to clear up doubts as 


       to meaning of the previous Act and such an Act comes into 


       effect from the date of passing of the previous Act. Learned 


       counsel for the appellants strongly relied upon a decision of 


       a two-Judge Bench of this Court in Mithilesh Kumari v. Prem  


       Behari   Khare  in   support   of   his   argument.   In   the   said 


       decision,   it   was   held   by   this   Court   that   the   Benami 


       Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 being a declaratory Act, 


       the   provisions   of   Section   4   of   the   Act   have   retroactive 


       operation.   The   reliance   on   this   decision   by   the   appellants' 










                                                                                          13



       counsel is totally misplaced as this decision was overruled in 


       R. Rajagopal  Reddy  v.  Padmini  Chandrasekharan  wherein it 


       was held that the Act was not passed to clear any doubt that 


       existed as to the common law or the meaning of effect of any 


       statute and it was, therefore, not a declaratory Act.






       45.  We   have   already   quoted   substituted   Section   15   of   the 


       amending  Act but do not  find that  the amending  Act either 


       expressly or by necessary implication intended to supply an 


       omission   or   to   clear   up   a   doubt   as   to   the   meaning   of   the 


       previous Section 15 of the parent Act. The previous  Section 


       15   of   the   parent   Act   was   precise,   plain   and   simple.   There 


       was   no   ambiguity   in   it.   The   meaning   of   the   words   used   in 


       Section   15   of   the   parent   Act   was   never   in   doubt   and   there 


       was no omission in its phraseology which was required to be 


       supplied  by the  amending   Act.   Moreover,   the  amending  Act 


       either   expressly   or   by   implication   was   not   intended   to   be 


       retroactive and for that reason we hold that amending Act 10 


       of   1995   is   not   a   declaratory   Act   and,   therefore,   it   has   no 


       retrospective operation.






       46.  For the aforestated reasons, we approve the view of law 


       taken in Didar Singh v. Ishar Singh and further hold that the 


       decision   in   the   case   of  Ramjilal  v.  Ghisa   Ram  does   not   lay 


       down the correct view of law.






       47.  The   result   of   the   aforesaid   discussion   is   that   the 


       amending Act being prospective in operation does not affect 


       the   rights   of   the   parties   to   the   litigation   on   the   date   of 


       adjudication of the pre-emption suit and the appellate court 


       is   not   required   to   take   into   account   or   give   effect   to   the 


       substituted Section 15 introduced by the amending Act.






       48. In view of what has been stated above, these appeals fail 


       and accordingly are dismissed, but there shall be no order as 


       to costs."






17)    From  the above discussion, particularly, in para 45, the 






Constitution Bench observed that the Amending Act 10/1995 






is not a declaratory Act and, therefore, it has no retrospective 










                                                                                            14



operation.     In   para   46,   the   Constitution   Bench   has   approved 






the view of law taken in Didar Singh (supra) and further held 






that the decision in the case of  Ramjilal  (supra) does not lay 






down   the   correct   view   of   law.     No   doubt,   in   the   penultimate 






para   47,   the   Constitution   Bench   has   concluded   that   the 






amending   Act   being   prospective   in   operation   does   not   affect 






the   rights   of   the   parties   to   the   litigation   on   the   date   of 






adjudication of the pre-emption suit and the appellate court is 






not   required   to   take   into   account   or   give   effect   to   the 






substituted Section 15 introduced by the amending Act.   It is 






clear   that   the   appellate   court   is   not   required   to   take   into 






account or give effect to the substituted Section 15 introduced 






by   the   amending   Act.     On   the   other   hand,   as   discussed   and 






concluded   in   para   46,   the   dictum   laid   down   in  Didar   Singh 






(supra)   has   been   approved.     In  Didar   Singh  (supra),   it   was 






held that in a suit for pre-emption, pre-emptor must prove his 






right to pre-empt up to the date of the decree of the first court 






and   any   loss   of   right   or   subsequent   change   in   law   after   the 






date   of   adjudication   of   the   suit   and   pre-tendency   of   appeal 






would   not   affect   the   decree   of   the   first   court.     The   said   view 








                                                                                  15



has been approved by the Constitution Bench.  In other words, 






in a suit for pre-emption, the pre-emptor must prove his right 






to pre-empt up to the date of decree of the first court.   To put 






it clear, the pre-emptor must have the right to pre-empt on the 






date of sale on the date of filing of the suit and on the date of 






passing   of   the   decree   by   the   court   of   the   first   instance 






[Emphasis   supplied].     In   the   case   on   hand,   the   amendment 






Act came into force with effect from 17.05.1995 and suit had 






been   laid   on   31.10.1992.     In   other   words,   on   the   date   of 






institution  of  the  suit,   the  plaintiff/pre-emptor had  a  right  to 






claim "right of pre-emption".  However, during the pendency of 






the   suit,   since   the   amendment   Act   came   into   force,   deleting 






the   right   of   pre-emption   and   in   the   absence   of   such   right   on 






the date of passing of the decree by the court of first instance, 






we   are   of   the   view   that   both   the   courts   below   have   correctly 






appreciated   the   effect   of   the   amendment   and   the   High   Court 






also   rightly   dismissed   the   second   appeal   holding   that   the 






plaintiff   had   lost   the   character   of   a   co-owner   during   the 






pendency of the suit by virtue of the amendment Act. 










                                                                               16



18)    In view of the above discussion and the interpretation of 






the   Constitution   Bench   in   respect   of   substituted   Section   15 






introduced   by   the   Haryana   Amendment   Act,   1995   in   the 






Parent Act i.e. the Punjab Pre-emption Act, we concur with the 






view   expressed   by   all   the   three   courts   including   the   High 






Court.     Consequently,   the   appeal   fails   and   the   same   is 






dismissed.  No order as to costs.               






                                   ..........................................J. 


                                          (P. SATHASIVAM) 








                                      ..........................................J. 


                                         (H.L. GOKHALE) 




NEW DELHI;


September 2, 2011.          










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