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Saturday, September 3, 2011

copy rights- M/s. Vijaya Production Private Limited (hereinafter referred to as "the Producer") produced 15 Telugu films. By an agreement dated 28.9.1987, the Producer granted the sole and exclusive video rights of the films to M/s. Jyothi Video for a period of seven years. During the currency of that agreement, the Producer gifted the films to M/s. Nagireddy Charities (respondent No.3) represented by its Managing Trustee, Shri B. Nagireddy. Respondent No.3 entered into an agreement of lease with respondent No.2- M/s. Vijaya Pictures whereby the rights of theatrical and non-theatrical distribution, exhibition and exploitation including video and TV rights were given to respondent No.2 for the areas of Andhra and Nizam for a period of 20 years commencing from 1.1.1975 for a consideration of Rs.20 lakhs. By another agreement dated 25.6.1990 (Exhibit A-4) the term of agreement dated 10.1.1975 was extended by 70 years with effect from 1.1.1995. The relevant portions of that agreement are extracted below: "Whereas the Lessors are the absolute owners in possession of the negatives, holding the entire rights for the Indian Union of the Telugu Talkie pictures produced by M/s Vijaya productions Private Ltd., as specified hereunder, the rights of which have been assigned absolutely by way of gift by the said Vijaya Productions Private Ltd., in favour of the Lessors. Whereas the Lessors have already granted to the Lessees, the exclusive lease rights of exploitation of their several Black and White and Colour pictures for the territory of Andhra and Nizam by way of agreement of lease dated 10.1.1975 for a


                                                                NON-REPORTABLE




                     IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


                       CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION




                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.6438 OF 2005










M/s. Divya Exports                                                   ... Appellant




                                          Versus




M/s. Shalimar Video Company


and others                                                           ... Respondents








                                   J U D G M E N T








G.S. Singhvi,  J.








1.     This   appeal   is   directed   against   the   judgment   of   the   learned   Single 




Judge   of   the   Andhra   Pradesh   High   Court   whereby   he   allowed   the   appeal 




filed by respondent No.1 and decreed the suit filed by the said respondent 




for grant of a declaration that it is having exclusive worldwide video rights 




of VCD/DVD and other formats of video rights in respect of 15 Telugu films 




for   which   it   had   entered   into   an   agreement   dated   27.8.2001   with   M. 




Srinivasa   Rao   and   also   for   restraining   the   appellant   and   respondent   Nos.2 




and 3 from producing or selling VCDs/DVDs or any other video format of 




those films in any form of exploitation. 



                                                                                             2










2.     M/s. Vijaya Production Private Limited (hereinafter referred to as "the 




Producer")   produced   15   Telugu   films.     By   an  agreement  dated   28.9.1987, 




the Producer granted the sole and exclusive video rights of the films to M/s. 




Jyothi   Video   for   a   period   of   seven   years.     During   the   currency   of   that 




agreement,   the   Producer   gifted   the   films   to   M/s.   Nagireddy   Charities 




(respondent No.3) represented by its Managing Trustee, Shri B. Nagireddy. 




Respondent No.3 entered into an agreement of lease with respondent No.2-




M/s.   Vijaya   Pictures   whereby   the   rights   of   theatrical   and   non-theatrical 




distribution, exhibition and exploitation including video and TV rights were 




given to respondent No.2 for the areas of Andhra and Nizam for a period of 




20 years commencing from 1.1.1975 for a consideration of Rs.20 lakhs.  By 




another   agreement   dated   25.6.1990   (Exhibit   A-4)   the   term   of   agreement 




dated 10.1.1975 was extended by 70 years with effect from 1.1.1995.   The 




relevant portions of that agreement are extracted below:




       "Whereas the Lessors are the absolute owners in possession of 


       the negatives, holding the entire rights for the Indian Union of 


       the Telugu Talkie pictures produced by M/s Vijaya productions 


       Private   Ltd.,   as   specified   hereunder,   the   rights   of   which   have 


       been   assigned   absolutely   by   way   of   gift   by   the   said   Vijaya 


       Productions Private Ltd., in favour of the Lessors.




       Whereas   the   Lessors   have   already   granted   to  the   Lessees,   the 


       exclusive lease rights of exploitation of their several Black and 


       White   and   Colour   pictures   for   the   territory   of   Andhra   and 


       Nizam   by   way   of   agreement   of   lease   dated   10.1.1975   for   a 



                                                                                          3






period   of   20   years   from   1st  of   January,   1975.     Whereas   the 


Lesees   have   approached   the   Lessors   to   grant   unto   them   the 


exclusive   lease   rights   of   Theatrical   and   Non-theatrical 


distribution, exhibition and exploitations of the several pictures 


by way of lease, in respect of the areas of Andhra and Nizam as 


known in the Film Trade, for a further period  of 70 (seventy) 


years from the date of expiry of the present lease agreement i.e. 


from   1st  January   1995   and   to   transfer   complete   pictures 


negatives in favour of the Lesees herein.  




NOW THIS AGREEMENT WITNESSETH AS FOLLOWS:-




1.   The   Lessors   hereby   grant   us   the   Lessees   as   the   rights   of 


Theatrical   and   Non-Theatrical   distribution,   exhibition   and 


exploitation by way of lease of the following Black and White 


Telugu Pictures produced by M/s Vijaya Productions Pvt. Ltd. 


Madras 600 020 including the video and T.V. Rights thereof




1. Shavukaru


2. Pathala Bhairavi


3. Pellichehi Choodu


4. Chandraharam


5. Missamma


6. Maya Bazar


7. Appuchesi Pappukudu


8. Jagadekaveerunikatha


9. Gundamma Katha


10. C.I.D.


12. Umachandi Gowrishankula Katha


13. Rechukka Pagatichukka


for   the   Areas   of   Andhra   and   Nizam,   and   to   appropriate   to 


themselves the proceeds earned by them on the said pictures by 


such   exploitation   for   a   period   of   70   (seventy)   years   from   1st 


January 1995.




4.   The   Lessees   shall   have   the  power   to  assign   this   agreement 


either   in   part   and/or   whole   to   third   parties   at   their   discretion, 


without in any manner affecting the rights of the Lessors under 


this agreement.



                                                                                              4






       5. It is agreed that the Lessors shall not lease out, sell or exhibit 


       the pictures in the territories for which the rights of exploitation 


       are   herein   be   granted,   till   the   expiry   of   the   agreement.     The 


       Lessees also shall not exhibit the pictures in any station outside 


       the territory leased herein.








       7.   It   is   understood   between   the   parties   herein   that   this 


       agreement   is   without   prejudice   to   the   16mm   rights;   T.V.   and 


       Video   rights   committed   by   the   producers   Vijaya   Productions 


       (P) Ltd for the various periods with the parties concerned and 


       the Lessees herein are entitled for the said rights after the expiry 


       of the periods committed thereunder."








3.     A   third   agreement   dated   11.12.1995   (Exhibit   A-5)   was   entered   into 




between   respondent   Nos.3   and   2   whereby   and   whereunder   copyright   for 




broadcasting of films through satellites, cassettes, disc, cable, wire, wireless 




or any other system including its transmission through cable system without 




restriction of geographical areas was assigned to respondent No.2 for a sum 




of   Rs.8   lakhs.     The   relevant   portions   of   the   third   agreement   are   also 




extracted below:




       "Now, This Agreement Witneseth:




       1.   The   Assignors   irrevocably   assign   to   the   Assignees   the 


       copyright   for   broadcasting   the   said   films   through   satellite, 


       cassette,   disc,   cable,   wire,   wireless   or   any   other   system 


       including   its   transmission   through   cable   system   without 


       restriction   of   geographical   areas   and   for   this   purpose   the 


       assigners are authorized to make such copies of recordings on 


       film, taps, disc or such other media as may be required.



                                                                                               5






       2.   The   Assignors   have   already   delivered   to   the   Assigners   the 


       concerned version of the picture and sound negatives of the said 


       films   as   per   the   Agreement   dated   25-6-1990   between   the 


       Assignors and Assignees. 




       3. The Assignees shall have the full right to broadcast the said 


       Films   after   subtitling,   editing,   deleting   any   portion,   altering 


       colour or inserting advertisement, or broadcasting the excerpts, 


       or   programme   including   the   excerpts,   or   part   of   whole   of   the 


       sound track only, at their sole and absolute discretion.




       4.  The   Assignees   shall  be  entitled  to  assign  their  rights   under 


       this   Agreement   in   part   or   in   full   to   any   other   party   and   to 


       broadcast   through   any   authority   or   agency,   at   their   sole   and 


       absolute   discretion   including   Doordharshan's   Terrestrial 


       Primary Channels."








4.     After five years, respondent No.2 entered into an agreement of lease 




dated 30.7.2001 with M. Srinivasa Rao and granted him rights of theatrical 




and   non-theatrical   (excluding   satellite   rights)   exhibition   and   35   mm 




exploitation,   video,   VCD,   DVD,   Audio   and   16   mm   by   way   of   lease   in 




respect  of 14  films  for  the areas   of  Andhra  and  Nizam for  a  period   of  60 




years for a consideration of Rs.10 lakhs.  Paragraphs 5 to 9 of that agreement 




read as under:




       "5. The Lessees shall have the power to assign this agreement 


       either   in   part   or   whole   to   third   parties   at   their   discretion, 


       without any manner affecting the rights of the lessors under this 


       agreement.




       6. The lessors hereby grant to the lessees the rights of theatrical 


       and   non-theatrical   (excluding   satellite   rights)   exhibition   and 



                                                                                               6






       35mm   exploitation,   video,   VCD,   DVD,   Audio   and   16mm   by 


       way of lease of the following.




       7. It is agreed the lessors shall not lease out, sell or exhibit the 


       pictures   in   the   territories   for   which   the   rights   of   exploitations 


       herein granted till the expiry of this agreement.




       8. In case the original procedures M/s Vijaya Productions Pvt. 


       Ltd. or lessors herein require any prints of the pictures lease out 


       herein for any overseas exploitation the same share be delivered 


       by the lessees herein at cost.




       9. It is understood between the parties herein that 16mm rights, 


       video   rights   committed   by   the   producers   Vijaya   Productions 


       Pvt. Ltd. with the parties concerned was expired.   The lessees 


       herein are entitled for the said rights."








5.     M. Srinivasa Rao executed an agreement dated 17.8.2001 in favour of 




respondent   No.1   and   granted   CDs,   VCDs,   DVDs,   copyrights   for 




transferring, processing, recording, duplication, copying, taping on to video 




grams, discs, CDs, VCDs, DVDs and the digital formats for commercial and 




private exhibition of the 15 films for the entire world.










6.     Three   days   prior   to   the   execution   of   the   aforesaid   agreement, 




respondent   No.3   entered   into   an   agreement   dated   14.8.2001   with   the 




appellant   and   assigned   it   exclusive   DVD   rights,   VCD   rights   and   internet 




rights (worldwide web TV rights) by way of lease in respect of the 15 films 



                                                                                              7






for the entire world including Indian Union Territory for a period of 60 years 




in lieu of a consolidated royalty amount of Rs.1,50,000/-. 










7.      Within   8   days   of   the   execution   of   agreement   dated   17.8.2001, 




respondent   No.1   got   published   a   notice   in   the   newspaper   dated   25.8.2001 




declaring  that it had purchased DVD and VCD rights for 15 Telugu films 




produced   by   M/s.   Vijaya   Production.     Thereupon,   respondent   No.3   issued 




telegram to respondent No.1 and called upon it to stop production of DVDs 




and   VCDs.     In   its   reply   dated   31.12.2001,   respondent   No.1   relied   upon 




agreement dated 17.8.2001 executed by M. Srinivasa Rao and claimed that it 




had purchased all the rights in respect of the 15 films.  By way of rejoinder, 




respondent No.3 informed respondent No.1 that it had not sold or assigned 




any   rights   to   respondent   No.2  or  M.   Srinivasa   Rao   to  produce   DVDs  and 




VCDs. 










8.      After   exchange   of   notices,   respondent   No.1   filed   suit   for   grant   of 




relief   to   which   reference   has   been   made   in   the   opening   paragraph   of   this 




judgment.  It also applied for and was granted ex parte injunction by the trial 




Court on 23.6.2003, which was vacated on 22.8.2003. The appeal preferred 




by respondent No.1 was dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court.



                                                                                              8










9.      In the written statement  filed by the appellant  through its Managing 




Partner Bh. Sudhakar Reddy, which was adopted by respondent No.3, it was 




pleaded that the rights of VCDs/DVDs had not been assigned by respondent 




No.3 to respondent No.2 and, as such, M. Srinivasa Rao could not acquire 




any   such   rights   from   respondent   No.2   and   assign   the   same   to   respondent 




No.1.  In a separate written statement, respondent No.2 claimed that in terms 




of   agreement   dated   15.12.1995   executed   with   respondent   No.3,   it   had 




acquired   the   rights   for   future   technical   development   in   the   field   of 




cinematography.     Respondent   No.2   pleaded   that   after   accepting   a   sum   of 




Rs.8   lakhs,   respondent   No.3   had   assigned   irrevocable   copyright   for 




broadcasting   the   said   films   through   satellite,   cassette,   disc,   cable,   wire, 




wireless or any other system including its transmission through cable system 




without restriction of geographical areas and for this purpose, the assignees 




were   authorised   to   make   copies   of   recording   of   films,   disc,   tape   or   such 




other   media   as   may   be   required.     Respondent   No.2   admitted   that   it   had 




entered   into   an   agreement   dated   30.7.2001   with   M.   Srinivas   Rao   for 




assignment   of   the   rights   acquired   by   it   under   agreements   dated   25.6.1990 




and 15.12.1995.



                                                                                                     9






10.     On the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed the following 




issues:




        "1)      Whether this court has territorial jurisdiction to maintain 


                 the suit?




        2)       Whether   the   suit   is   bad   for   non   joinder   of   necessary 


                 parties?




        3)       Whether   the   agreement   dt.   25.6.1990   will   include 


                 VCD/DVD rights and whether the plaintiff is entitled to 


                 claim the broadcasting rights thereunder coupled with the 


                 agreement   dt.   15.2.2002   and   thereby   the   plaintiff   is 


                 entitled for the manufacture and sale of the VCDs/DVDs 


                 of the suit films?




        4)       Whether   the   plaintiff   is   entitled   for   the   relief   of 


                 declaration and the injunction sought for?




        5)       To what relief?"










11.     After considering the pleadings of the parties and evidence produced 




by   them,   the   trial   Court   held   that   the   suit   was   bad   for   non   joinder   of   M. 




Srinivasa Rao, who is said to have assigned rights to respondent No.1.  This 




is evinced from the following observations made by the learned trial Court:  




        "The   plaintiff   is   claiming   his   right   through   M.   Srinivasa   Rao 


        from   whom   the   plaintiff   has   obtained   an   agreement   for 


        assignment of the rights over the suit schedule films.  When the 


        defendants   1   and   3   have   come   forward   with   a   specific 


        contention   that   the   M.   Srinivasa   Rao   have   no   right   at   all   to 


        assign   the   VCD   and   DVD   rights   the   plaintiff   ought   to   have 


        impleaded the said M. Srinivasa Rao as a party to the suit.  But 


        the plaintiff has not chosen to bring him on record and he has 



                                                                                            10






       deposed in his cross examination that he has no grievance at all 


       against M. Srinivas Rao and therefore he thought that it is not 


       necessary to bring him on record.   It is important to note that 


       the plaintiff is claiming right through M. Srinivas Rao.  He has 


       purchased   the   rights   from   the   2nd  defendant   and   because   the 


       dispute   is   that   he   has   conveyed   the   rights   which   was   not 


       covered by the agreement under which he got the assignment in 


       his   favour   from   the   2nd  defendant   the   plaintiff   ought   to   have 


       impleaded M. Srinivasa Rao as one of the parties and in spite of 


       the objection taken by the other side the plaintiff has not chosen 


       to   bring   the   Srinivasa   Rao   on   record   but   only   satisfied   by 


       saying   that   he   has   no   grievance   against   Srinivas   Rao.     This 


       issue   to   be   held   as   against   the   plaintiff   holding   that   the 


       necessary   party   Srinivas   Rao   is   not   brought   on   record   and 


       therefrom the suit is bad for non joinder of necessary party and 


       Issue No.2 is held accordingly."  










12.    The   trial   Court   then   referred   to   agreements   dated   25.6.1990   and 




15.12.1995   executed   between   respondent   Nos.2   and   3,   agreement   dated 




30.7.2001   entered   into   between   respondent   No.2   and   M.   Srinivasa   Rao   as 




also agreement dated 14.8.2001 executed by M. Srinivasa Rao in favour of 




respondent No.1, referred to the provisions of the Copyright Act, 1957, two 




judgments   of   the   Madras   High   Court   and   concluded   that   the   plaintiff   has 




failed to make out a case for grant of declaration and injunction.










13.    In   the   appeal   filed   by   respondent   No.1,   the   learned   Single   Judge 




framed the following questions:



                                                                                                  11






        "1.     Whether the assignment of copyrights made by the third 


        defendant in favour of first defendant is true and valid?




        2.      Whether the assignment of copyrights made by the third 


        defendant   in   favour   of   second   defendant   confers   the   right   of 


        manufacturing and selling VCDs/DVDs and whether the rights 


        assigned and conferred under Exs.A.4 and A.5 are only meant 


        for   `broadcasting'   the   suit   films   and   if   so,   what   is   the   effect 


        thereof?




        3.      Whether   the   non-joinder   of   the   person   by   name 


        Srinivasarao,  who was allegedly  the assignee from the second 


        defendant and assignor in favour of the plaintiff, would vitiate 


        the suit?                                 or




        Whether the plaintiff can be non-suited for non-joinder of one 


        Srinivasarao   who   was   allegedly   the   assignee   from   the   second 


        defendant and assignor of the plaintiff?"










14.     Although, the trial Court had not framed any issue which could give 




rise   to   question   No.1   and   in   the   appeal   filed   by   the   respondent   no   such 




prayer was made, the learned Single Judge invoked Order XLI Rule 24 of 




the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) and justified the framing of first 




question by recording the following observations:




        "The first point as formulated by this Court in this appeal was 


        not framed by the trial court as an issue in the suit.  But in my 


        considered view, the trial court ought to have framed this issue 


        also in the light of the specific averment made by the plaintiff 


        in the plaint that the acquisition of rights by the first defendant-


        M/s   Divya   Exports   from   the   3rd  defendant-M/s   Nagireddy 


        Charities,   represented   by   its   Trustee-Venugopal   Reddy   was 


        totally  false and  baseless  having regard to the fact  that Sri  B. 


        Nagireddy, the original Managing Trustee of the 3rd  defendant-



                                                                                              12






       M/s   Nagireddy   Charities,   had   already   given   away   the 


       copyrights during the year 1995 itself in favour of the second 


       defendant.   Hence, having regard to the said specific averment 


       made  by the plaintiff  in the plaint and also in the light of the 


       specific ground taken by the plaintiff in this appeal with regard 


       to the application of Section 73 of the Indian Trusts Act 1881 


       (for short "the Trusts Act"),  I deem it absolutely  necessary to 


       formulate   the   first   point   for   consideration,   exercising   the 


       jurisdiction of this Court under Order 41, Rule 24 C.P.C.   For 


       this reason, this Court formulated the first point as stated supra.




       From the submissions made at the Bar by the learned Counsel 


       appearing   for   the   parties,   it   could   be   seen   that   the   whole 


       controversy   revolves   around   Exs.A.4   and   A.5   and   Ex.A.3   on 


       one side and Ex.A.3 on one side and Ex.B.1 on the other." 








       The   learned   Single   Judge   then   referred   to   the   pleadings   and   oral   as 




well as documentary evidence produced by the parties, Sections 73 and 74 of 




the   Trusts   Act   and   held   that   Exhibit   B.1   executed   by   respondent   No.3   in 




favour  of the appellant  was not valid.   Paragraphs 52 to 55 and 58 of the 




impugned   judgment,   which   contain   the   reasons   recorded   by   the   learned 




Single Judge for arriving at the said conclusion, are extracted below:




       "52.    What is more interesting to note is that no trust deed or 


       any   other   document   was   pressed   into   service   by   the   first 


       defendant  while getting  himself examined as D.W.1 to clarify 


       or explain that Mr. Venugopalreddy had acquired the status of a 


       trustee   of   M/s   Nagireddy   Charities   in   order   to   effectively 


       represent the trust and to execute Ex.B.1 document in favour of 


       the first defendant.  Interestingly, D.W.1 was the Special Power 


       of Attorney Holder also, representing M/s Nagireddy Charities.




       53.     In   other   words,   totally   an   alien,   not   connected   with   the 


       affairs   of   M/s   Nagireddy   Charities,   but   a   beneficiary   under 



                                                                                    13






Ex.B.1,   was   examined   as   D.W.1,   representing   both   defendant 


No.1   and   defendant   No.3.     No   document   relating   to 


appointment of Venugopalreddy as a trustee of M/s Nagireddy 


Charities,   authorizing   Venugopalreddy   to   represent   trust   has 


been brought on record and no person directly connected with, 


and having knowledge of the affairs of M/s Nagireddy Charities 


had been examined on behalf of the defendants.




54.    It is to be remembered that the suit was instituted in the 


year 2003 and during the pendency of the suit Mr. B. Nagireddy 


was   very   much   alive,   of   course,   totally   in   a   state   of 


indisposition.     In   such   circumstances,   I   am   of   the   considered 


view that the burden heavily lies on either the first defendant or 


the third defendant to establish the change in trusteeship of M/s 


Nagireddy Charities, in which case alone Ex.B.1 document can 


be   called   as   a   validly   and   legally   executed   document   by 


Venugopalreddy in the capacity of the trustee of M/s Nagireddy 


Charities   in   favour   of   the   first   defendant.     Unfortunately,   no 


other witness, except D.W.1, was examined in this behalf.




55.    It   is   well-known   principle   that   a   person   who   has   no 


proper   authorization   to   represent   a   trust   cannot   enter   into 


agreements with third parties in order to bind the trust - even if 


such agreements are entered into, such agreements are not valid 


in the eye of law.  In the instant case, the first defendant and the 


third   defendant   -   M/s   Nagireddy   Charities,   represented   by   its 


Power   of   Attorney   Holder   have   utterly   failed   to   establish   the 


capacity   of   Venugopalreddy   as   trustee   to   execute   Ex.B.1 


agreement assigning the VCDs and DVDs copyrights in respect 


of the suit schedule films in favour of the first defendant during 


the   lifetime   of   Sri   Nagireddy,   the   Managing   Trustee   of   M/s 


Nagireddy   Charities.   This   is   a   strong   and   suspicious 


circumstance,   which   compels   this   Court,   to   hold   that   Ex.B.1 


was   not   executed   by   a   proper   and   authorized   person 


representing the third defendant-trust, conveying the copyrights 


of VCDs and DVDs in favour of the first defendant.   Further, 


when   Mr.   Venugopalreddy's   authority   as   trustee   to   execute 


Ex.B.1   is   in   serious   doubt,   first   defendant,   who   is   the 


beneficiary of the said document cannot be placed on a higher 


and comfortable position that Mr. Venugopalreddy.



                                                                                         14










58.     From the perusal of the impugned judgment it could be 


seen the court below while discussing issues 3 and 4, without 


going to the aspect of validity or otherwise of the assignment of 


copyright   in   favour   of   first   defendant   by   third   defendant, 


incidentally recorded a finding basing on the Xerox copy of a 


document Ex.A-12, that the plaintiff is estopped from raising a 


plea   that   B.   Venugopal   Reddy   has   no   authority   to   represent 


third defendant trust.  But a perusal of Ex.A-12 discloses that it 


is   only   a   reiteration   of   assignment   of   broadcast   rights   under 


Ex.A-5.   In this context it is to be noted that Ex.A-12 is only a 


Xerox   copy   and   the   original   is   not   filed.   No   reasons   were 


recorded by the trial court with regard to the admissibility of the 


said   document.   Even   assuming   that   the   said   document   was 


really   executed   by   B.   Venugopal   Reddy   in   favour   of   second 


defendant,   as   already   noticed,   it   is   only   a   reiteration   or 


confirmation of Ex.A-5. Further there  is no cross-examination 


by  the  defendants   1  and  3  on  this  aspect  and  there  is   also  no 


reference   to   this   document   in   the   written   statements   filed   by 


them. Therefore, so long as the execution of Ex.A-4 was agreed 


to   have   been   in   subsistence   by   virtue   of   its   execution   by   B. 


Nagi   Reddy,   Managing   Trustee   of   third   defendant   assigning 


rights for a period of seventy years, Ex.A-12 does not gain any 


significance. If Ex.A-12 is to be accepted, notwithstanding the 


admissibility   or   otherwise   of  it,   at   best   it   has   to   be   presumed 


that B. Venugopal Reddy had become the Managing Trustee of 


third   defendant   as   on   the   date   of   execution   of   Ex.A-12   dated 


15-2-2002.   But   in   the   present   case,   the   whole   dispute   is   with 


regard to the authority of B. Venugopal Reddy to execute Ex.B-


1   document   in   the   capacity   of   trustee   of   third   defendant   in 


favour of first defendant, which is a prior transaction. In other 


words   the   genesis   of   the   rights   of   assignment   of   broadcast   is 


Exs.A-4 and A-5, but not Ex.A-12. Furthermore, the reasons for 


bringing   into   existence   of   the   controversial   Ex.A-12   is   not 


explained   in   the   evidence   of   either   of   the   parties   and   as   its 


execution  is  subsequent  to the  execution  of  Ex.B-1,  on which 


defendants   1   and   3   are   mustering   their   claim   of   copyright   of 


VCDs and DVDs, the same is not relevant and inconsequential. 


Hence, the finding of the trial court that the plaintiff is estopped 



                                                                                                  15






        to   question   the   validity   or   otherwise   of   the   trusteeship   of   B. 


        Venugopal Reddy for third defendant is not justifiable."










15.     Although,   learned   senior   counsel   appearing   for   the   parties   made 




elaborate   arguments   on  the   merits   of  the   findings  recorded   by   the   learned 




Single   Judge   with   reference   to   questions   No.2   and   3   and   produced 




publications  titled  Copinger and Skone James  on Copyright  (15th  Edition), 




Goldstein   on   Copyright   (3rd  Edition)   Volume   1   and   the   judgments   of 




different High Courts, we do not consider it necessary to examine the same 




because   in   our   considered   view,   the   learned   Single   Judge   was   not   at   all 




justified in non-suiting the appellant by recording a finding that Exhibit B.1 




was invalid.










16.     Since   the   trial   Court   had   not   framed   specific   issue   touching   the 




validity   of   agreement   Exhibit   B.1,   the   parties   did   not   get   effective 




opportunity   to   lead   evidence   in   support   of   their   respective   cases.     In   the 




absence   of   any   issue,   the   trial   Court   did   not   even   advert   to   the   question 




whether or not agreement Exhibit B.1 was valid.  The evidence available on 




the   record   was   not   at   all   sufficient   for   deciding   that   question   and   yet   the 




learned Single Judge decided that question by drawing inferences from the 




statements made by the witnesses examined by the parties with reference to 



                                                                                               16






the issues framed by the trial Court and returned a negative finding on the 




validity of Exhibit B.1.










17.     In our view, in the peculiar facts of this case, the learned Single Judge 




was not at all justified  in invoking Order  XLI Rule  24 CPC.   If  at all the 




learned   Single   Judge   felt   that   the   trial   Court   should   have   framed   specific 




issue   on   the   validity   of   agreement   Exhibit   B.1,   then   he   should   have 




remanded the matter to the trial Court with a direction to frame such an issue 




and decide the suit afresh.   The omission on the part of the learned Single 




Judge to adopt that course has resulted in manifest injustice to the appellant. 










18.     In   the   result,   the   appeal   is   allowed.     The   impugned   judgment   is   set 




aside and the case is remitted to the trial Court with the direction that it shall, 




after considering the pleadings of the parties, frame an additional issue on 




the validity of agreement Exhibit B.1 executed between respondent No.1 and 




respondent   No.3,   give   opportunity   to   the   parties   to   produce   evidence   and 




decide the suit afresh without being influenced by any  of the observations 




made by the High Court and this Court.    



                                                                                           17






19.     Since the matter is sufficiently old, we direct the trial Court to dispose 




of the matter as early as possible but latest within nine months from the date 




of receipt/production of copy of this judgment.   The parties are directed to 




appear before the trial Court on 10.10.2011.










20.     The   Registry   is   directed   to   send   a   copy   of   this   judgment   to   IX 




Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court (Fast Track Court), Hyderabad by 




fax.










                                                       .....................................J.


                                                        [G.S. Singhvi]










                                                                 ..............................


                                                                                    ........J.


                                                       [Asok Kumar Ganguly]


New Delhi;


September 02, 2011.





validity of notification - In the absence of any rules, under Article 309 or Statute, the appellant had the power to appoint under its general power of administration and prescribe such eligibility criteria as it is considered to be necessary and reasonable. Therefore, it cannot be said that the prescription of Ph.D. is unreasonable. 13 13. The Tribunal and the High Court have held that in the years 1989 and 1991, the Tribunal had accepted the earlier administrative instructions dated 20.8.1987 which required the UT cadre employees to be considered for the post has to be followed. The fact that at that time Ph.D. degree was not insisted upon, does not mean that for all times to come, Ph.D. degree could not be insisted. Ph.D. degree was made a qualification because UGC guidelines required it for direct recruitment post and the UPSC approved the same. Therefore, merely because on some earlier occasions, the posts of Principal were filled by UT cadre lecturers without Ph.D. degree, it cannot be argued that the Ph.D. degree cannot be prescribed subsequently. 14. The Tribunal and High Court were not justified in holding that 1976 Punjab Rules were not applicable on the ground that no material had been placed to show that they were followed while appointing a principal in the past. The fact that the appellant had issued a notification dated 13.1.1992 adopting the corresponding Punjab Rules governing the conditions of service of its employees, is not disputed. Therefore when appellant acted in accordance with the said directions, it is not necessary to consider whether there were any occasion between 1992 to 2001 to invoke the said rules or whether they were in fact invoked. The notification dated 13.1.1992 could 14 not have been brushed aside in the manner done by the Tribunal and the High Court.


                                          1








                                                                          Reportable




                    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA




                     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION




                      CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7570 OF 2011


                     [Arising out of SLP (C) No.3568/2006]








Chandigarh Administration through the


Director Public Instructions (Colleges), Chandigarh              ... Appellant




Vs.




Usha Kheterpal Waie & Ors.                                       ... Respondents










                                 J U D G M E N T










R.V.RAVEENDRAN,J.








       Leave granted. 




2.     There   are   four   Government   Arts   and   Science   colleges   in   Union 




Territory   of   Chandigarh.   Till   1988,   the   Chandigarh   Administration, 




appellant herein, used to fill the vacancies of the post of Principal of the Arts 




and Science colleges by deputation from neighbouring States of Punjab and 




Haryana.   When   the   post   of   Principal   in   Government   College   for   Boys, 



                                              2








Sector   11,   Chandigarh   was   due   to   fall   vacant   on   29.2.1988   on 




superannuation   of   a   deputationist,   two   UT   cadre   lecturers   filed   an 




application before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh, seeking 




a   direction   that   UT   cadre   lecturers   from   the   Government   Arts   &   Science 




Colleges   should   be   considered   for   the   post   of   Principal   instead   of   taking 




someone   on  deputation   from  the   neighbouring   states.   The   said   application 




was   ultimately   disposed   of   with   a   direction   to   the   Chandigarh 




Administration to consider the case of the applicants and other lecturers of 




UT   cadre   who   may   fall   within   the   zone   of   consideration   as   may   be 




determined by a competent authority, for regular appointment to the post of 




Principals   of   the   Government   Arts   &   Science   colleges,   on   the   basis   of 




relevant criteria, and appoint those who were found suitable. In pursuance of 




the said order, the Chandigarh Administration fixed 30 years experience as 




Lecturer as the eligibility criterion for promotion of lecturers to the post of 




Principal, though at that time (1989-90) there were no lecturer with 30 years 




experience in the cadre. As no UT cadre lecturer possessed such experience, 




again deputationists were appointed as Principals in the said colleges.








3.     Feeling   aggrieved,   the   UT   cadre   lecturers   again   approached   the 




Tribunal and their applications were allowed by the Tribunal by order dated 



                                              3








12.1.1991,   quashing   the   order   prescribing   30   years   experience   as   also   the 




order appointing deputationists. Thereafter, whenever vacancies arose, it is 




stated that the appellant promoted UT cadre lecturers as Principals. It may be 




mentioned that persons so promoted did not possess a Ph.D. degree. 










4.      By notification dated 13.1.1992, Chandigarh Administration adopted 




the   corresponding   Service   Rules   of   Punjab   with   effect   from   1.4.1991   to 




govern   the   conditions   of   service   of   its   employees,   where   it   had   no   rules 




governing   the   matter.   The   effect   of   it   was   that   the   provisions   of   Punjab 




Educational Service (College Grade) (Class I) Rules, 1976 (as amended in 




1983   (for   short   `1976   Punjab   Rules')   became   applicable   in   regard   to   the 




recruitment of candidates to UT college cadre. Under the said 1976 Punjab 




Rules, the qualification and experience for appointment to the service was as 




under:  For   direct   recruitment  :   (a)   MA,   first   division   or   high   second 




division   (50%)   in   relevant   subject   or   an   equivalent   degree   of   a   foreign 




university with eight years teaching experience; (b) Ph.D. with eight years 




teaching experience; By promotion : Experience of working as a lecturer for 




a minimum period of eight years.  



                                               4








5.     When   matters   stood   thus   the   Administrator,   Chandigarh 




Administration,   framed   and   notified   the   "Chandigarh   Educational   Service 




(Group A Gazetted) Government Arts and Science College Rules, 2000 (for 




short   `Recruitment   Rules')   vide   notification   dated   29.3.2000   published   in 




the Gazette dated 1.4.2000. The said Rules were framed in consultation with 




the   Union   Public   Service   Commission   (`UPSC'   for   short)   and   sent   to   the 




Government of India for being issued in the name of the President of India. 




As   per   the   said   Rules,   the   appointment   to   the   posts   of   Principal   in 




Government Arts and Science Colleges was 25% by direct recruitment and 




75% by promotion. The said rules prescribed the educational qualification of 




Ph.D.   for   appointment   to   the   post   of   Principal   by   direct   recruitment.   The 




appellant   advertised   a   post   of   Principal   (which   was   falling   vacant   on 




31.7.2001) on 14.7.2001 prescribing the following eligibility criteria as per 




the said Rules : 




       "Educational   and   other   qualifications   required   for   direct   recruits   : 


       Essential: (i) A Doctorate degree or equivalent with at least 55% marks at 


       the Master's Degree level from a recognized university or equivalent; (ii) 


       12 years teaching experience of degree classes in a college affiliated to a 


       university or equivalent."










6.     Respondents 1 to 4 had joined UT Colleges (Arts & Science) cadre in 




1969   and   1970   and   were   serving   as   lecturers   in   the   Government   Arts   & 




Science Colleges. None of them possessed a Ph.D. degree. They filed OA 



                                             5








No.684/CH/2001 before the Central Administrative Tribunal challenged the 




said   Recruitment   Rules   and   the   advertisement   dated   14.7.2001,   as 




unconstitutional   and   for   a   direction   that   they   along   with   other   eligible 




candidates from the UT cadre should be considered for promotion to the said 




post. It was contended that the Administrator of the Union Territory had no 




power to make the said Recruitment Rules, as it was only the President of 




India   who   was   competent   to   frame   such   rules   under   Article   309   of   the 




Constitution   of   India.   They   also   contended   that   on   earlier   occasions   the 




appellant   had   promoted   lecturers   as   Principals   without   insisting   upon   the 




qualification  of  Ph.D.;  and  that  though they  did not  possess   Ph.D.  degree, 




having   regard   to   the   eligibility   criteria   earlier   being   applied,   they   were 




eligible for being considered for the post of Principals, and the Chandigarh 




Administration   should   fill   the   vacancies   of   Principals,   by   applying   the 




eligibility   criteria   which   was   prevalent   prior   to   the   making   of   the   said 




recruitment rules. 










7.     The appellant, in its statement of objections filed before the Tribunal 




conceded   that   the   "power  to  notify   the   recruitment  rules   for   Class   I  Posts 




vested   with   the   President   of   India".   The   appellant   stated   that   they   had 




forwarded the Recruitment Rules to the government of India under cover of 



                                               6








letter dated 21.9.2001, to notify the said Rules under the name of President 




of   India,   and   such   notification   was   awaited.   They   contended   that   pending 




publication   of   the   Rules,   they   could   resort   to   recruitment   in   terms   of   the 




draft   Rules   on   the   basis   of   administrative   instructions.   The   appellant   also 




contested   the   application   by   contending   that   the   post   in   question   was 




required   to   be   filled   under   the   direct   recruitment   quota,   and   none   of   the 




applicants were eligible as they did not possess Ph.D. degree, which was the 




qualification   prescribed   by   the   university   Grants   Commission   (`UGC'   for 




short)   and   approved   by   the   UPSC,   and   therefore   none   of   them   could   be 




considered for appointment to the said post.  










8.      The said application (OA No.648 - CH of 2001) was allowed by the 




Tribunal, by order dated 22.4.2002. The Tribunal held that in the absence of 




any recruitment rules prescribing such qualification, Ph.D. degree was not an 




eligibility requirement for the post of Principal. The Tribunal held that UGC 




guidelines   would   not   apply   as   the   Rules   providing   for   25%   by   direct 




recruitment was not in force; and that even if the new rules were to be duly 




framed,   such   Rules   would   apply   only   to   future   vacancies   and   not   to   the 




vacancies which arose on 31.7.2001. The Tribunal held that in the absence 




of any Rules, it was appropriate to take guidance from its earlier judgments 



                                               7








dated   12.9.1989   and   12.11.1991   which   accepted   the   administrative 




instructions dated 20.8.1987 permitting UT cadre lecturers to be promoted as 




Principals, even though they did not possess any Ph.D. degree. The Tribunal 




also   rejected   the   contention   of   the   appellant   that   as   per   notification   dated 




13.1.1992, the 1976 Punjab Rules  became  applicable  under which 75% of 




the posts had to be filled by promotion and 25% by direct recruitment with 




Ph.D as an eligibility requirement, on the ground that no material was placed 




to show that the said 1976 Punjab Rules were ever followed for appointing 




Principals   in   UT   of   Chandigarh.   The   Tribunal   therefore   quashed   the 




advertisement dated 14.7.2001 inviting applications for the post of Principal 




and directed  the appellant  to fill the vacancy  according to law, keeping in 




view the eligibility criteria and the past practice till the Rules are framed and 




notified   by   the   competent   authority.   The   said   order   of   the   Tribunal   was 




challenged   by   the   appellant   before   the   High   Court.   The   High   Court 




dismissed the writ petition by impugned order dated 26.10.2005, affirming 




the findings of the Tribunal. 










9.      Feeling aggrieved, the appellant has filed this appeal by special leave 




raising  the  following   contentions:  (i)  When   appellant  has   framed  the  draft 




Rules in consultation with UPSC and had been placed the Rules before the 



                                              8








central   government,   for   being   notified   under   the   name   of  the   President   of 




India,   pending   such     notification   of   the   Rules,   it   was   entitled   to   invite 




applications for the post of Principal in terms of the said Rules by treating 




them as draft rules under consideration. (ii) The Tribunal and the High Court 




could not substitute the eligibility requirements prescribed by the appellant. 




(iii) The Tribunal and the High Court could not have ignored the notification 




dated   13.1.1992   adopting   the   corresponding   Punjab   Rules   to   govern   the 




service   of   its   employees   wherever   there   were   no   rules   of   the   Chandigarh 




Administration. (iv) The 1976 Punjab Rules were applicable, and in terms of 




it, the advertisement for filling one post of Principal by direct recruitment by 




prescribing the eligibility requirement of Ph.D was valid. The appellant also 




pointed  out  that  another  bench  of  the  Tribunal  by  order  dated   3.8.1995  in 




OA No.844-CH of 1994 has clearly held that the 1976 Punjab Rules would 




apply   to   recruitment/employment,   having   regard   to   the   notification   dated 




13.1.1992 of the Chandigarh Administration adopting the Punjab Rules; and 




as there was a clear divergence between the two decisions of the Tribunal, 




the   High   Court   could   not   have   mechanically   affirmed   the   decision   of   the 




Tribunal that the 1996 Punjab Rules were inapplicable.



                                             9








10.    The first question for our consideration is whether the appellant could 




have prescribed  in the advertisement, the educational  qualifications for the 




post of Principal in terms of its 2000 Recruitment rules. The Administrator 




of the Chandigarh Administration made the Chandigarh Educational Service 




(Group A) Gazetted Government Arts & Science College Rules, 2000 vide 




notification dated 29.3.2000 and published it in the Gazette dated 1.4.2000. 




The said Rules were made in consultation with the UPSC, taking note of the 




UGC   guidelines   prescribing   Ph.D.   degree   as   an   eligibility   criteria   for   the 




post of Principals to be filled by direct recruitment. The Rules were sent to 




the Central Government for being notified in the name of the President of 




India   and   were   pending   consideration.   It   is   in   these   circumstances   the 




appellant advertised the post in terms of the said Rules, by prescribing the 




educational   qualification   of   Ph.D.   for   direct   recruitment   to   the   post   of 




Principal.   In  Abraham   Jacob   vs.   Union   of   India  [1998   (4)   SCC   65],   this 




Court held that where draft rules have been made, an administrative decision 




taken to make promotions in accordance with the draft rules which were to 




be finalized later on, was valid. In Vimal Kumari vs. State of Haryana [1998 




(4) SCC 114], this Court held that it is open to the Government to regulate 




the service conditions of the employees for whom the rules were made, even 




if they were in their draft stage, provided there is a clear intention on the part 



                                                   10








of the Government to enforce those rules in the near future. In this case, the 




High   Court   however   rejected   the   advertisement   on   the   ground   that   the 




regular rules were not notified by the President of India even after five years, 




when   the   High   Court   decided   the   matter.   But   what   is   relevant   to   test   the 




validity   of   the   advertisement,   was   the   intention   of   the   appellant   when   the 




advertisement was issued. At that time, the appellant had the clear intention 




to   enforce   the   Recruitment   Rules   in   future   as   they   had   been   made   in 




consultation   with   UPSC,   in   accordance   with   the   UGC   guidelines   and   the 




Rules   had   been   sent   to   the   Central   Government   for   being   notified   by   the 




President and the matter was pending consideration for a few months when 




the advertisement was issued. The appellant at that time had no inkling that 




there   would   be   inordinate   delay   or   the   Rules   may   not   be   notified   by   the 




President.   Therefore,   the   advertisement   in   terms   of   the   2000   Recruitment 




rules was valid. 










11.     Even   in   the   absence   of   valid   rules,   it   cannot   be   said   that   the 




advertisement was invalid. In exercise of its executive power, the appellant 




could   issue   administrative   instructions   from   time   to   time   in   regard   to   all 




matters   which   were   not   governed   by   any   statute   or   rules   made   under   the 




Constitution   or   a   statute.   In   fact   it   is   the   case   of   the   respondents   that   the 



                                              11








appellant   had   issued   such   instructions   on   20.8.1987   directing   that   the 




lecturers   from   UT   cadre   should   be   promoted   as   principals.   In   fact,   the 




administrator  of  appellant   had   issued  a   notification   on   13.1.1992  adopting 




the   corresponding   Punjab   Rules   to   govern   the   service   conditions   of   its 




employees. If so, the administrator of appellant could issue fresh directions 




in regard to qualifications for recruitment. The Recruitment Rules made by 




the   Administrator   were   duly   notified.   Though   they   were   not   rules   under 




Article   309,   they   were   nevertheless   valid   as   administrative   instructions 




issued   in   exercise   of   executive   power,   in   the   absence   of   any   other   Rules 




governing   the   matter.   Once   the   recruitment   rules,   made   by   the 




Administrator,   were   notified,   they   became   binding   executive   instructions 




which   would   hold   good   till   the   rules   were   made   under   Article   309. 




Therefore, the advertisement issued in terms of the said Recruitment Rules 




was valid.










12.     The Tribunal and High Court also committed an error in holding that 




the appellant could not prescribe the qualifications of Ph.D. for the post of 




principal   merely   because   earlier  the  said  educational  qualification  was  not 




prescribed   or   insisted.     The   Recruitment   Rules   were   made   in   consultation 




with   UPSC,   to   give   effect   to   the   UGC   guidelines   which   prescribed   Ph.D. 



                                                12








degree as the eligibility qualification for direct recruitment of Principals. In 




fact, even the 1976 Punjab Rules prescribed Ph.D. degree as a qualification. 




In several States, Ph.D. is a requirement for direct recruitment to the post of 




a college Principal. When the said qualification is not unrelated to the duties 




and functions of the post of Principal and is reasonably relevant to maintain 




the   high   standards   of   education,   there   is   absolutely   no   reason   to   interfere 




with the provision of the said requirement as an eligibility requirement. It is 




now   well   settled   that   it   is   for   the   rule-making   authority   or   the   appointing 




authority to prescribe the mode of selection and minimum qualification for 




any recruitment. Courts and tribunals can neither prescribe the qualifications 




nor   entrench   upon   the   power   of   the   concerned   authority   so   long   as   the 




qualifications prescribed by the employer   is reasonably relevant and has a 




rational nexus with the functions and duties attached to the post and are not 




violative   of   any   provision   of   Constitution,   statute   and   Rules.   [See  J.  




Rangaswamy vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh  - 1990 (1) SCC 288 and 




P.U. Joshi vs. Accountant General  - 2003 (2) SCC 632]. In the absence of 




any   rules,   under   Article   309   or   Statute,   the   appellant   had   the   power   to 




appoint   under   its   general   power   of   administration   and   prescribe   such 




eligibility   criteria   as   it   is   considered   to   be   necessary   and   reasonable. 




Therefore, it cannot be said that the prescription of Ph.D. is unreasonable. 



                                                13








13.     The Tribunal and the High Court have held that in the years 1989 and 




1991, the Tribunal had accepted the earlier administrative instructions dated 




20.8.1987 which required the UT cadre employees to be considered for the 




post   has   to   be   followed.   The   fact   that   at   that   time   Ph.D.   degree   was   not 




insisted upon, does not mean that for all times to come, Ph.D. degree could 




not   be   insisted.   Ph.D.   degree   was   made   a   qualification   because   UGC 




guidelines required it for direct recruitment post and the UPSC approved the 




same.   Therefore,   merely   because   on   some   earlier   occasions,   the   posts   of 




Principal were filled by UT cadre lecturers without Ph.D. degree, it cannot 




be argued that the Ph.D. degree cannot be prescribed subsequently. 










14.     The Tribunal and High Court were not justified in holding that 1976 




Punjab Rules were not applicable on the ground that no material had been 




placed to show that they were followed while appointing a principal in the 




past.   The fact that the appellant  had issued a notification dated 13.1.1992 




adopting   the   corresponding   Punjab   Rules   governing   the   conditions   of 




service of its employees, is not disputed. Therefore when appellant acted in 




accordance with the said directions, it is not necessary to consider whether 




there were any occasion between 1992 to 2001 to invoke the said rules or 




whether they were in fact invoked. The notification dated 13.1.1992 could 



                                                14








not   have   been   brushed   aside   in   the   manner   done   by   the   Tribunal   and   the 




High Court. 










15.     In   view   of   the   above,   we   allow   this   appeal   and   set   aside   the   order 




dated 22.4.2002 of the Tribunal and the order dated 26.10.2005 of the High 




Court.   The   original   application   (OA   No.648   -   CH   of   2001)   filed   by 




respondents   2   to   5   before   the   Tribunal   is   dismissed.   The   prayer   that 




Chandigarh   Administration   should   be   directed   to   fill   the   vacancies   of 




Principals in accordance with the eligibility criteria as was prevalent prior to 




the   issue   of   the   notification   dated   14.7.2001,   is   rejected.   The   notification 




prescribing educational qualification of doctorate degree or equivalent with 




55% marks at the Master's Degree Level examination or 12 years teaching 




experience   of   degree   classes   in   a   college   affiliated   to   any   university   or 




equivalent  is upheld as validly prescribing the qualifications for filling the 




post by direct recruitment. 




  




                                                          ................................J.


                                                          (R V Raveendran)










New Delhi;                                                ...............................J.


September 2, 2011.                                        (Markandey Katju)            


Friday, September 2, 2011

The appellant has a statutory right to apply for and obtain supply of electricity from the distribution licensee and the distribution licensee has a corresponding statutory obligation to supply electricity to the appellant. Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 also do not object to the supply of electricity by 10 the distribution licensee to the appellant as it will be clear from the averments made in writ petition No.345 of 2005 filed by them before the High Court but they object to the line for supply of electricity being drawn through the passage in Dag Nos.406, 407 and 409 which they claim to be theirs. The further grievance of the respondent Nos.1, 2 and 3 is that they were not made parties in the earlier Writ Petition No.18220 of 2004 filed by the appellant in which the High Court directed the distribution licensee to effect supply of electricity to the house of the appellant. The case of the appellant, on the other hand, is that this passage is not a private passage of respondent Nos. 1 to 3 but is a common passage and therefore an electric line can be drawn through this common passage. This dispute will have to be resolved in Civil Suit No.83 of 2004 pending in the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), Howrah, or in any other suit, but pending resolution of this dispute between the parties, the appellant cannot be denied supply of electricity to his house. when drawing of a electric line on private land inevitable =


                                                               Reportable




              IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA






                CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION




               CIVIL APPEAL No. 7572 OF 2011 


        (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 15332 of 2008)




                                        


Sri Chandu Khamaru                                             ...  Appellant






                                  Versus






Smt. Nayan Malik & Ors.                             ... Respondents










                                 J U D G M E N T




A. K. PATNAIK, J.








      Delay   condoned   in   filing   rejoinder   affidavit.     Leave 






granted.






2.    This   is   an   appeal   by   way   of   special   leave   against   the 






impugned   judgment   and   order   dated   09.05.2008   of   the 






Calcutta High Court in MAT No.514 of 2006.  






3.    The facts briefly are that the appellant owns a house in 






Dag   No.408,   Khatiyan   No.1212,   Mauja   Panchpara   P.S. 






Sankrail,   District   Howrah,   West   Bengal.     The   house   of   the 






appellant   was   not   being   supplied   with   electricity   whereas 






the   house   located   on   Dag   No.409,   Khatiyan   No.1212,   was 



                                       2








being   supplied   with   electricity   by   the   Calcutta   Electricity 






Board   Supply   Corporation   Ltd.   (hereinafter   referred   to   as 






`the   distribution   licensee').   The   appellant   approached   the 






distribution   licensee   for   supply   of   electricity   but   when   the 






distribution   licensee   did   not   give   an   electricity   connection 






for his house, he filed Writ Petition No.18220 of 2004 in the 






Calcutta   High   Court   and   by   order   dated   23.09.2004, 






learned Single Judge of the High Court disposed of the Writ 






Petition   by   directing   the   distribution   licensee   to   effect 






supply of electricity to the house of the appellant within six 






weeks  from  the  date  of  compliance  of all the formalities   by 






the appellant.  Pursuant to the order dated 23.09.2004, the 






distribution licensee gave an electric connection and started 






supplying electricity to the house of the appellant.






4.     On   10.01.2005,   however,   the   respondent   Nos.   1   to   3 






filed   Writ   Petition   No.345   of   2005   claiming   that   they   were 






owners of the house situated on Dag Nos.406, 407 and 409, 






Khatiyan   No.1212,   Mouza-Panchpara,   P.S.   Sankrail, 






District, Howrah.  Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 stated in the Writ 






Petition   that   the   distribution   licensee   has   provided 






electricity   to   the   house   of   the   appellant   by   an   electric   line 



                                      3








taken through a passage located on Dag Nos.406, 407 and 






409   which  belongs  to  them   and  not  the   appellant.     In  this 






Writ Petition, respondent Nos. 1 to 3 prayed  inter alia  for a 






writ   prohibiting   the   distribution   licensee   to   give   electric 






connection   in   favour   of   the   appellant   through   the   passage 






situated   on   Dag   Nos.406,   407   and   409.     By   order   dated 






13.02.2006,   the   learned   Single   Judge   of   the   High   Court 






allowed   the   Writ   Petition   and   directed   the   distribution 






licensee  to   disconnect   the   supply   of  electricity   given   to   the 






appellant   for   using   the   land   (Dag   Nos.406,   407   and   409). 






The reason given by the learned Single Judge in order dated 






13.02.2006   is   that   the   appellant   was   not   entitled   to   get 






supply through the land in Dag Nos.406, 407 and 409 until 






he established his right over the land in the civil court.  






5.    Aggrieved,   the   appellant   filed   an   appeal   being   MAT 






No.514   of   2006   before   the   Division   Bench   of   the   Calcutta 






High   Court   but   by   the   impugned   order   dated   09.05.2008, 






the   Division   Bench   dismissed   the   appeal.     The   Division 






Bench   took   note   of   the   fact   that   Civil   Suit   No.83   of   2004 






filed   by   the   appellant   in   the   Court   of   Civil   Judge   (Junior 






Division), Howrah, in respect of the land was pending.   The 



                                    4








Division   Bench   held   in   the   impugned   order   that   until   the 






private dispute between the appellant  and respondent Nos. 






1   to   3   was   resolved   in   the   civil   court,   the   distribution 






licensee   could   not   supply   electricity   to   the   house   of   the 






appellant through the disputed land.  






6.    Sub-section   (1)   of   Section   42   and   sub-section   (1)   of 






Section   43   of   the   Electricity   Act,   2003   are   quoted 






hereinbelow:






         "42.  Duties   of   distribution   licensees   and 


         open   access-(1)   It   shall   be   the   duty   of   a 


         distribution licensee to develop and maintain 


         an   efficient   co-ordinated   and   economical 


         distribution system in his area of supply and 


         to   supply   electricity   in   accordance   with   the 


         provisions contained in this Act."






         "43.  Duty   to   supply   on   request-(1)   Save   as 


         otherwise   provided   in   this   Act,   every 


         distribution licensee, shall, on an application 


         by   the   owner   or   occupier   of   any   premises, 


         give   supply   of   electricity   to   such   premises, 


         within   one   month   after   receipt   of   the 


         application requiring such supply"






7.    It will be clear from sub-section (1) of Section 42 that 






every   distribution   licensee   has   a   duty   to   develop   and 






maintain   an   efficient   co-ordinated   and   economical 






distribution   system   in   his   area   of   supply   and   to   supply 






electricity   in   accordance   with   the   provisions   contained   in 



                                      5








this  Act.    Sub-section   (1)  of  Section   43  provides  that  every 






distribution  licensee, shall, on an application by the owner 






or   occupier   of   any   premises,   give   supply   of   electricity   to 






such   premises,   within   one   month   after   receipt   of   the 






application requiring such supply.   These provisions in the 






Electricity Act, 2003 make it amply clear that a distribution 






licensee   has   a   statutory   duty   to   supply   electricity   to   an 






owner   or   occupier   of   any   premises   located   in   the   area   of 






supply   of   electricity   of   the   distribution   licensee,   if   such 






owner   or   occupier   of   the   premises   applies   for   it,   and 






correspondingly   every   owner   or   occupier   of   any   premises 






has   a   statutory   right   to   apply   for   and   obtain   such   electric 






supply from the distribution licensee. 






8.     The   Electricity   Act,  2003   has   also   made   provisions   to 






enable   the   distribution   licensee   to   carry   out   works   for   the 






purpose   of   supplying   electricity   to   the   owners   or   the 






occupiers of premises in his area of supply.     Section 67 of 






the Electricity Act, 2003 is quoted hereinbelow:






      "67.  Provision   as   to   opening   up   of   streets, 


      railways, etc.- (1) A licensee may, from time-to-time 


      but   subject   always   to   the   terms   and   conditions   of 


      his   licence,   within   his   area   of   supply   or 


      transmission or when permitted by the terms of his 


      licence   to   lay   down   or   place   electric   supply   lines 



                               6








without the area of supply, without that area carry 


out works such as-






    (a)   to   open   and   break   up   the   soil   and 


    pavement   of   any   street,   railway   or   tram-


    way;






    (b) to open and break up any sewer, drain or 


    tunnel   in   or   under   any   street,   railway   or 


    tramway;






    (c) to alter the position of any line or works 


    or pipes, other than a main sewer pipe;






    (d)   to   lay   down   and   place   electric   lines, 


    electrical plant and other works;






    (e) to repair, alter or remove the same;






    (f)   to   do   all   other   acts   necessary   for 


    transmission or supply of electricity.






(2) The Appropriate Government may, by rules made 


by it in this behalf, specify,-


    (a)   the   cases   and   circumstances   in   which 


    the   consent   in   writing   of   the   appropriate 


    Government,   local   authority   owner   or 


    occupier,   as   the   case   may   be,   shall   be 


    required for carrying out works;






    (b)   the   authority   which   may   grant 


    permission   in   the   circumstances   where   the 


    owner   or   occupier   objects   to   the   carrying 


    out of works;






    (c)   the   nature   and   period   of   notice   to   be 


    given   by   the   licensee   before   carrying   out 


    works;






    (d)   the   procedure   and   manner   of 


    consideration   of  objections   and  suggestions 


    received   in   accordance   with   the   notice 



                            7








referred to in clause (c);






(e)   the   determination   and   payment   of 


compensation   or   rent   to   the   persons 


affected by works under this section;






(f)   the   repairs   and   works   to   be   carried   out 


when emergency exists;






(g)   the   right   of   the   owner   or   occupier   to 


carry   out   certain   works   under   this   section 


and the payment of expenses therefor;






(h)   the   procedure   for   carrying   out   other 


works   near   sewers,   pipes   or   other   electric 


lines or works;






(i)   the   procedure   for   alteration   of   the 


position   of   pipes,   electric   lines,   electrical 


plant,   telegraph   lines,   sewer   lines,   tunnels, 


drains, etc.;






(j)   the   procedure   for   fencing,   guarding, 


lighting   and   other   safety   measures   relating 


to   works   on   streets,   railways,   tramways, 


sewers,   drains   or   tunnels   and   immediate 


reinstatement thereof;






(k)   the   avoidance   of   public   nuisance, 


environmental   damage   and   unnecessary 


damage   to   the   public   and   private   property 


by such works;






(l)   the   procedure   for   undertaking   works 


which   are  not  reparable   by   the   Appropriate 


Government, licensee or local authority;






(m)   the   manner   of   deposit   of   amount 


required   for   restoration   of   any   railways, 


tramways, waterways, etc;






(n)   the   manner   of   restoration   of   property 



                                          8








          affected   by   such   works   and   maintenance 


          thereof;






          (o)         the         procedure         for         deposit         of 


          compensation   payable   by   the   licensee   and 


          furnishing of security; and






          (p)   such   other   matters   as   are   incidental   or 


          consequential   to   the   construction   and 


          maintenance of works under this section.






      (3) A licensee shall, in exercise of any of the powers 


      conferred   by   or   under   this   section   and   the   rules 


      made thereunder, cause as little damage, detriment 


      and   inconvenience   as   may   be,   and   shall   make   full 


      compensation   for   any   damage,   detriment   or 


      inconvenience   caused   by   him   or   by   any   one 


      employed by him.






      (4)   Where   any   difference   or   dispute   including 


      amount   of   compensation   under   sub-section   (3) 


      arises   under   this   section,   the   matter   shall   be 


      determined by the Appropriate Commission.






      (5) The Appropriate Commission, while determining 


      any difference  of  dispute  arising  under  this section 


      in addition to any compensation under sub-section 


      (3), may impose a penalty not exceeding the amount 


      of compensation payable under that sub-section."





9.     Thus,   sub-section(1)   of   Section   67   of   the   Electricity 






Act, 2003 provides that the licensee may, from time to time, 






but   subject   always   to   the   terms   and   conditions   of   his 






licensee,   within   the   area   of   supply   carry   out   the   works 






mentioned   in   clauses   (a)   to   (f)   therein.     It   is   provided   in 






clause  (d)  of sub-section  (1) of Section  67 that  the licensee 



                                       9








may   lay   down   and   place   electric   lines,   electrical   plant   and 






other works.  Sub-section (2) of Section 67 of the Electricity 






Act, 2003 further provides that the appropriate Government 






may, by rules made by it in that behalf, specify the various 






matters   mentioned   in   clauses   (a)   to   (p)   thereof.     Under 






clause   (a)   of   sub-section   (2)   of   Section   67,   the   appropriate 






Government   may,   by   rules,   specify   the   cases   and 






circumstances   in   which   the   consent   in   writing   of   the 






appropriate Government, local authority, owner or occupier, 






as the case may be, shall be required for carrying out works. 






Under   clause   (b)   of   sub-section   (2)   of   Section   67,   the 






appropriate Government may, by rules, specify the authority 






which may grant permission in the circumstances where the 






owner or the occupier objects to the carrying out of works.






10.    We   may   now   apply   the   aforesaid   provisions   of 






Electricity   Act,   2003   to   the   facts   of   the   present   case.     The 






appellant   has   a   statutory   right   to   apply   for   and   obtain 






supply   of   electricity   from   the   distribution   licensee   and   the 






distribution   licensee   has   a   corresponding   statutory 






obligation to supply electricity to the appellant.  Respondent 






Nos. 1 to 3 also do not object to the supply of electricity by 



                                      10








the  distribution   licensee   to the  appellant   as  it  will  be  clear 






from   the   averments   made   in   writ   petition   No.345   of   2005 






filed   by   them   before   the   High   Court   but   they   object   to   the 






line   for   supply   of   electricity   being   drawn   through   the 






passage in  Dag  Nos.406, 407  and 409 which they claim to 






be theirs.   The further grievance of the respondent Nos.1, 2 






and 3 is that they were not made parties in the earlier Writ 






Petition   No.18220   of   2004   filed   by   the   appellant   in   which 






the   High   Court   directed   the   distribution   licensee   to   effect 






supply of electricity to the house of the appellant.  The case 






of the appellant, on the other hand, is that this passage is 






not   a   private   passage   of   respondent   Nos.   1   to   3   but   is   a 






common   passage   and   therefore   an   electric   line   can   be 






drawn   through   this   common   passage.     This   dispute   will 






have   to   be   resolved  in   Civil   Suit   No.83   of   2004   pending   in 






the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), Howrah, or in any 






other   suit,   but   pending   resolution   of   this   dispute   between 






the   parties,   the   appellant   cannot   be   denied   supply   of 






electricity to his house.  






11.    We, therefore, set aside the order of the learned Single 






Judge as well as the impugned order of the Division Bench 



                                         11








and   dispose   of   the   Writ   Petition   of   respondent   nos.1   to   3 






with the direction that the distribution licensee will find out 






whether there is any other way in which electric line can be 






drawn for supply of electricity to the house of the appellant, 






other   than   the   disputed   passage   in   Dag   Nos.406,   407   and 






409.     If   there   is   no   other   way   to   supply   electricity   to   the 






house   of   the   appellant,   the   distribution   licensee   will   follow 






the   provisions   of   sub-section   (2)   of   Section   67   of   the 






Electricity Act, 2003 for carrying out the work for supply of 






electricity   to  the  house   of  the   appellant.     This  exercise   will 






be completed within a period of six months from today and 






till the supply of electricity to the house of the appellant is 






effected through some other way, supply of electricity to the 






house of the appellant will not be disconnected.  The appeal 






is   allowed   to   the   extent   indicated   in   this   judgment.     No 






costs.






                                                         ..........................J.


                                                               (R.V. Raveendran)








                                                         ..........................J.


                                                               (A. K. Patnaik)


New Delhi,


September 02, 2011.