The gift deed dated February 5, 1968 is a form of declaration by the donor and not an instrument of gift as contemplated under Section 17 of the Registration Act. As all the three essential requisites are satisfied by the gift deed dated February 5, 1968, the gift in favour of defendant 2 became complete and irrevocable.

                                                                        REPORTABLE
                                                                                               





                  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                    CIVIL  APPEAL NO. 1714 OF 2005





Hafeeza Bibi & Ors.                                           .... Appellants


                                     Versus


Shaikh Farid (Dead) by LRs. & Ors.                              ....Respondents





                                 JUDGMENT




R.M. Lodha, J.





             This   appeal,   by   special   leave,   arises   from   the   judgment


of   the   High   Court   of   Andhra   Pradesh   dated   September   13,   2004


whereby the Single Judge of that Court set aside the judgment and


decree   dated   April   27,   1988   passed   by   the   Principal,   Subordinate


Judge,   Vishakhapatnam   and   remitted   the   matter   back   to   the   trial





                                                                                    1


court   for   the   purpose   of   passing   a   preliminary   decree   after


determining the shares to which each party would be entitled.


2.             Shaik   Dawood   had   three   sons;   Shaik   Farid,     Mehboob


Subhani   and   Mohammed   Yakub.   He   also   had   five   daughters;


Sappoora Bibi,  Khairunnisa Begum, Noorajahan Begum,  Rabia Bibi


and   Alima   Bibi.   All   the   five   daughters   were   married.   His   wife


predeceased him. Shaik Dawood retired as Reserve Head Constable.


He was also a Unani Medical Practitioner.


3.             Shaik   Farid,   Sappoora   Bibi,   Khairunnisa   Begum,


Noorajahan Begum and Mohd. Iqbal (son of Alima Bibi) - hereinafter


referred   to   as   `plaintiffs'   -   filed   a   suit   for   partition   against     Mehboob


Subhani,   Mohammed   Yakub   and     Rabia   Bibi   (hereinafter   referred   to


as   `defendant   1',   `defendant   2'   and   `defendant   3'   respectively).   The


son  and  daughters   of  Syed  Ali,   who was  brother   of    Shaik  Dawood,


were   impleaded   as   other   defendants   (hereinafter   referred   to   as


`defendants 4 to 7').


4.             The   parties   are   governed   by   Sunni   Law.   The   plaintiffs


averred   in the plaint that Shaik Dawood died intestate on December


19, 1968 and the plaintiffs and defendants   1 to 3 became entitled to


`A' schedule properties and half share in `B' schedule properties. The




                                                                                             2


plaintiffs   stated   that   the   defendants   4   to   7   are   entitled   to   other   half


share in `B' schedule properties.


5.              Mohammed  Yakub  --  defendant    2  --  contested  the suit


for partition. He set up the defence that Shaik Dawood  executed hiba


(gift   deed)   on   February   5,   1968   and   gifted   his   properties     to   him.


Shaik  Dawood  put  him  in  possession  of  the  hiba  properties   on    that


day   itself.     The   hiba   became   complete   and   the   plaintiffs   were   fully


aware   of   that   fact.   The   defendant     2     in   his   written   statement   also


referred   to   a   previous   suit   for   partition   filed   by   some   of   the   parties


which was dismissed in default.


6.              Some   of   the   original   parties     have   died   during   the


pendency   of   the   suit.   Their   legal   representatives   have   been   brought


on record.


7.              The trial court framed four issues.   The issue   relevant for


the purpose of the present appeal is issue no.2 which is to the effect


whether hiba dated February 5, 1968 is true, valid and binding on the


plaintiffs. The trial court, after recording the evidence and on hearing


the   parties,   answered   issue   no.   2   in   the   affirmative   and,     held   that


plaintiffs   were   not   entitled   to   the   shares   claimed   in   the   plaint.





                                                                                            3


Consequently, vide judgment and decree dated April 27, 1988, the trial


court dismissed the plaintiffs'  suit.


8.             The   plaintiffs   challenged   the   judgment   and   decree   of   the


trial   court   before   the   High   Court.     Inter   alia,   one   of   the   arguments


raised  before the High Court on behalf of the appellants was that the


gift dated February 5, 1968 being  in writing was compulsorily required


to   be   registered   and   stamped   and   in   absence   thereof,   the   gift   deed


could   not   be   accepted   or   relied   upon   for   any   purpose   and   such


unregistered gift deed would not confer any title upon the defendant 2.


The   High   Court   was   persuaded   by   the   argument   and   held   that   the


unregistered gift deed would not pass any title to the defendant 2 as


pleaded   by   him.   The   High   Court,   as   indicated   above,   allowed   the


appeal; set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court and sent


the matter back to that court for the purposes of passing a preliminary


decree.


9.             The   present   appellants   are   legal   heirs   of   the   deceased


defendant 2.


10.            As to whether or not the High Court is  right in its view that


the   unregistered   gift   deed   dated   February   5,   1968   is   not   a   valid   gift





                                                                                          4


and   conveyed   no   title   to   the   defendant   2   is   the   question   for


determination in  this appeal.


11.              There is divergence of opinion amongst High Courts on the


question presented before us.


12.              The Privy Council in the case of  Mohammad Abdul Ghani


(since   deceased)   &   Anr.v.  Fakhr   Jahan   Begam   &   Ors.1    referred   to


`Mohammadan Law'; by Syed Ameer Ali  and approved the statement


made therein that three conditions   are necessary for a valid gift by a


Muslim: (a) manifestation of the wish to give on the part of the donor;


(b) the acceptance of the donee, either impliedly or expressly; (c) the


taking     of   possession   of   the   subject-matter   of   the   gift   by  the   donee,


either actually or constructively.



13.              In  Mahboob Sahab  v.  Syed Ismail and others2, this Court


referred   to   the   Principles   of   Mahomedan   Law   by   Mulla,   19th  Edition


and in paragraph 5 (pp. 696-697) noticed the legal position, in relation


to a gift by Muslim incorporated therein, thus :



          "5.  Under   Section   147   of   the  Principles   of   Mahomedan

          Law  by   Mulla,   19th   Edn.,   edited   by   Chief   Justice   M.

          Hidayatullah, envisages that writing is not essential to the

          validity   of   a   gift   either   of   moveable   or   of   immovable

          property.   Section   148   requires   that   it   is   essential   to   the

          validity   of   a   gift   that   the   donor   should   divest   himself


1  1922 (49) IA 195

2 (1995) 3 SCC 693



                                                                                           5


        completely of all ownership and dominion over the subject

        of   the   gift.   Under   Section   149,   three   essentials   to   the

        validity of the gift should be, (i) a declaration of gift by the

        donor, (ii) acceptance of the gift, express or implied, by or

        on behalf of the donee, and (iii) delivery of possession of

        the   subject   of   the   gift   by   the   donor   to   the   donee   as

        mentioned in Section 150. If these conditions are complied

        with, the gift is complete. Section 150 specifically mentions

        that for a valid gift there should be delivery of possession of

        the subject of the gift and taking of possession of the gift by

        the  donee, actually or constructively.  Then only the gift is

        complete. Section 152 envisages that where the donor is in

        possession,   a   gift   of   immovable   property   of   which   the

        donor   is   in   actual   possession   is   not   complete   unless   the

        donor   physically   departs   from   the   premises   with   all   his

        goods   and   chattels,   and   the   donee   formally   enters   into

        possession.   It   would,   thus,   be   clear   that   though   gift   by   a

        Mohammedan   is   not   required   to   be   in   writing   and

        consequently need not be registered under the Registration

        Act; for a gift to be complete, there should be a declaration

        of the gift by the donor; acceptance of the gift, expressed

        or   implied,   by   or   on   behalf   of   the   donee,   and   delivery   of

        possession of the property, the subject-matter of the gift by

        the donor to the donee. The donee should take delivery of

        the   possession   of   that   property   either   actually   or

        constructively.   On  proof of  these  essential   conditions,  the

        gift   becomes   complete   and   valid.   In   case   of   immovable

        property   in   the   possession   of   the   donor,   he   should

        completely   divest   himself   physically   of   the   subject   of   the

        gift......."




14.           Section   123   of   the   Transfer   of   Property   Act,   1882   (for


short,   `T.P.   Act')   lays   down   the   manner   in   which   gift   of   immoveable


property may be effected. It reads thus :



        "S.123.   Transfer   how   effected.   --  For   the   purpose   of

        making a gift of immoveable property, the transfer must be

        effected by a registered instrument signed by or on behalf

        of the donor, and attested by at least two witnesses.



                                                                                            6


                For   the   purpose   of   making   a   gift   of   moveable

        property,   the   transfer   may   be   effected   either   by   a

        registered instrument signed as aforesaid or by delivery.

                Such   delivery   may   be   made   in   the   same   way   as

        goods sold may be delivered."





15.             However, an exception is carved out in Section 129 of the


T.P.   Act   with   regard   to   the   gifts   by   a   Mohammadan.   It   reads   as


follows:


        "S.129.   Saving   of   donations                          mortis   causa     and

        Muhammadan  Law.   --   Nothing   in   this   Chapter   relates   to

        gifts of moveable property made in contemplation of death,

        or shall be deemed to affect any rule of Muhammadan law."




16.             At   this   stage,   we   may   also   refer   to   Section   17   of   the


Registration Act, 1908  which makes registration of certain documents


compulsory.   Section   17   of   the   Registration   Act,   to   the   extent   it   is


necessary, reads as follows :


        "S.17.  Documents   of   which   registration   is   compulsory.

        --(1)   The   following   documents   shall   be   registered,   if   the

        property to which they relate is situate in a district in which,

        and   if   they   have   been   executed   on   or   after   the   date   on

        which, Act No. XVI of 1864, or the Indian Registration Act,

        1866,   or   the   Indian   Registration   Act,   1871,   or   the   Indian

        Registration   Act,   1877,     or   this   Act   came   or   comes   into

        force, namely:--

        (a) instruments of gift of immovable property;


        (b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ;

        (c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ;





                                                                                              7


        (d)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . ;


        (e) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . ."




17.             Section 49 of the Registration Act deals with the effect of


non-registration of documents required to be registered.  It reads thus:


           "S.49.  Effect   of   non-   registration   of   documents

           required   to   be   registered.-   No   document   required   by

           section   17     or   by   any   provision   of   the   Transfer   of

           Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882),  to be registered shall--


            (a)  affect any immovable property comprised therein or


            (b) confer any power to adopt, or


            (c) be received as evidence of any transaction affecting

           such   property   or   conferring   such   power,   unless   it   has

           been registered:


                Provided   that   an   unregistered   document   affecting

           immovable   property   and   required   by   this   Act   or   the

           Transfer   of   Property   Act,   1882   (4   of   1882   ),   to   be

           registered may be received as evidence of a contract in a

           suit   for   specific   performance   under   Chapter   II   of   the

           Specific Relief Act, 1877 (3 of 1877 ), or as evidence of

           any collateral transaction not required  to be effected by

           registered instrument."




18.             Section 17(1)(a) of the Registration Act leaves no manner


of   doubt   that   an   instrument   of   gift   of   immoveable   property   requires


registration   irrespective   of   the   value   of   the   property.  The   question   is


about its applicability to a written gift executed by a Mohammadan in





                                                                                       8


the light of Section 129 of the T.P. Act and the rule of Mohammadan


Law relating to gifts.


19.             In the case of  Nasib Ali  v.  Wajed Ali3,  the contention was


raised  before  the  Division   Bench  of  the  Calcutta  High  Court   that  the


deed   of   gift,   not   being   registered   under   the   Registration   Act,   is   not


admissible in evidence. The Calcutta High Court held that a deed of


gift   by   a   Mohammadan   is   not   an   instrument   effecting,   creating   or


making   the   gift  but  a  mere   piece   of   evidence.   This  is   what  the   High


Court said :


         ".........The   position   under   the   Mahomedan   Law   is   this   :

         that a gift in order to be valid must be made in accordance

         with the forms stated above; and even if it is evidenced by

         writing, unless all the essential forms are observed, it is not

         valid   according   to   law.   That   being   so,   a   deed   of   gift

         executed by a Mahomedan is not the instrument effecting,

         creating or making the gift but a mere piece of evidence. It

         may so happen after a lapse of time that the evidence of

         the   observance   of   the   above   forms   might   not   be

         forthcoming, so it is sometimes thought prudent; to reduce

         the fact that a gift has been made into writing. Such writing

         is not a document of title but is a piece of evidence.


         3.   The   law   with   regard   to   the   gift   being   complete   by

         declaration and delivery of possession is so clear that in a

         case   before   their   Lordships   of   the   Judicial   Committee

         Kamarunnissa Bibi v. Hussaini Bibi [1880] 3 All. 266, where

         a gift was  said to have  been made  in lieu of dower,  their

         Lordships   held   that   the   requisite   forms   having   been

         observed   it   was   not   necessary   to   enquire   whether   there

         was any consideration for the gift or whether there was any

         dower   due.   The  case   of  Karam  Ilahi  v.  Sharfuddin  [1916]



3 AIR 1927 Cal 197



                                                                                        9


38 All. 212 is similar in principle to the present case. There

also a deed relating to the gift was executed. The learned

Judge held that if the gift was valid under the Mahomedan

Law it was none the less valid because there was a deed

of   gift   which,   owing   to   some   defect,   was   invalid   under

Section   123,   Transfer   of   Property   Act,   and   could   not   be

used in evidence.


4. The next, question that calls for consideration is whether

a document like the present one executed by a Mahomedan

donor after  he made a gift to show that  he had made it  in

favour   of   the   donee   is   compulsorily   registrable   under   the

Registration   Act.   Under   Section   17   of   the   Registration   Act

an instrument of gift must be registered. By the expression

'instrument   of   gift   of   immovable   property'   I   understand   an

instrument or deed which creates, makes or completes the

gift, thereby transferring the ownership of the property from

the executant to the person in whose favour it is executed.

In   order   to   affect   the   immovable   property,   the   document

must be a document of transfer; and if it is a document of

transfer   it   must   be   registered   under   the   provisions   of   the

Registration Act.


5.   The   present   document   does   not   affect   immovable

property.   It   does   not   transfer   the   immovable   property   from

the donor to the donee. It only affords evidence of the fact

that   the   donor   has   observed   the   formalities   under   the

Mahomedan   Law   in   making   the   gift   to   the   donee.   I   am

prepared   to   go   so   far   as   to   hold   that   a   document   like   the

present   one   is   not   compulsorily   registrable   under   the

Registration Act, or the Registration Act does not apply to a

so-called   deed   of   gift   executed   by   a   Mahomedan.   But   for

purposes of the present case it is not necessary to go so far

because   I   hold   that   this   document   is   only   a   piece   of

evidence,   and   conceding   that   it   should,   have   been

registered,   the   effect   of   its   non-registration   is   to   make   it

inadmissible   in   evidence   under   Section   49   of   the

Registration Act........."





                                                                                      10


20.                 In  Sankesula   Chinna   Budde   Saheb  v.  Raja   Subbamma4,


the Andhra Pradesh High Court, after noticing the three essentials of a


gift under the   Mohammadan Law, held that if a gift was   reduced to


writing,   it   required   registration     under   Section   17(1)(a)   of   the


Registration Act. It went on to hold that  even if by virtue of   Section


129 of the T.P. Act, a deed of gift executed by  Mohammadan was  not


required to comply with the provisions of Section 123 of the T.P. Act,


still it had   to be registered under Section 17(1)(a) of the Registration


Act when the gift related  to immoveable property.


21.                 A Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case


of Inspector General of Registration and Stamps, Govt.  of Hyderabad


v.  Smt. Tayyaba Begum5,  was called upon to decide on   a reference


made   by   the   Board   of   Revenue   under   Section   55   of   the   Hyderabad


Stamp Act whether the document  under consideration therein  was a


gift deed or it merely  evidenced    a past transaction.  The  High  Court


applied the test - whether the parties regarded  the instrument to be a


receptacle   and   appropriate   evidence   of   the   transaction;   was   it


intended to constitute the gift or was it to serve as a record of a past


event - and held as under :




4 1954 2 MLJ 113

5 AIR 1962 Andhra Pradesh 199



                                                                                 11


         "12.     We have to examine the document in question in the

         light   of   these   rules.   No   doubt,   there   was   recitals   therein

         which relate to past transaction. But that is not decisive of

         the matter. What is the purpose which it was  designed to

         serve?   That   the   executant   did   not   treat   it   as   a

         memorandum of a completed hiba is evident from some of

         the   sentences.     In   the   deed,   such   as   "I   deemed   it

         necessary to execute a deed also making a declaration in

         favour of my son...in accordance with the Muslim law", and

         the last portion of the document. The anxiety of the donor

         to free the title of the donee to the property from all doubts

         and to save him from future litigation is clearly exhibited in

         the last sentence.


                 "I   pray   that   no   one   may   have   any   kind   of   doubt

                 regarding   the   ownership   of   Syed   Ehasan   Hussain

                 and that if per chance any doubt at all should arise,

                 this deed of Ekrarnama may prove sufficient."


                  This   sentence   is   expressive   of   her   intention   to

         silence all doubts regarding the ownership of the property

         with the aid of this document. She did not want anyone to

         challenge   the   title   of   the   donee   to  the   house   in   question.

         This   object   could   be   attained   only   if   it   is   regarded   as   a

         conveyance, a document which effected the transfer by its

         own force. If, on the other hand, if it is a mere record of a

         past   transaction,   that   would   not   have   the   desired   effect.

         There is one circumstance which gives some indication as

         to   the   intention   of   the   executant   of   the   document.   The

         document   is   attested   by   two   witnesses   as   required   by

         Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act. No doubt, this

         is   not   conclusive   of   the   matter.   But   it   is   indicative   of   the

         desire of the executant that it should serve as evidence of

         the gift and not as a memorandum of a past transaction."





22.              In Makku Rawther's Children: Assan Ravther and others v.


Manahapara   Charayil6,  V.R.   Krishna   Iyer,   J.   (as   His   Lordship   then


6 AIR 1972 Kerala 27



                                                                                                12


was) did not agree with the test applied   by the Full Bench of Andhra


Pradesh High Court  and the reasoning given in Tayyaba Begum5 . He


held in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the report thus :




      "8.     I   regret   my   inability   to   agree   with   the   reasoning   in

      these decisions. In the context of Section 17, a document

      is the same as an instrument and to draw nice distinctions

      between the two only serves to baffle, not to ill mine. Mulla

      says:   "The   words   `document'   and   `instrument'   are   used

      interchangeable   in   the   Act".     An   instrument   of   gift   is   one

      whereby   a   gift   is   made.   Where   in   law   a   gift   cannot   be

      effected   by   a   registered   deed   as   such,   it   cannot   be   an

      instrument   of   gift.   The   legal   position   is   well-settled.   A

      Muslim   gift   may   be   valid   even   without   a   registered   deed

      and   may   be   invalid   even   with   a   registered   deed.

      Registration   being   irrelevant   to   its   legal   force,   a   deed

      setting  out  Muslim gift cannot be regarded  as constitutive

      of the gift and is not compulsorily registerable."



      9.   Against   this  argument  counsel   invoked  the   authority   of

      the   Andhra   Pradesh   Full   Bench.   One   may   respect   the

      ruling but still reiect the reasoning. The Calcutta Bench in

      AIR 1927 Cal 197 has discussed the issue from the angle I

      have presented. The logic of the law matters more than the

      judicial   numbers   behind   a   view.   The   Calcutta   Bench

      argued:




             "The essentials of a gift under the Mahomedan law

             are   .....   A   simple   gift   can   only   be   made   by   going

             through   the   above   formalities   and   no   written

             instrument   is   required.   In   fact   no   writing   is

             necessary to validate a gift; and if a gift is made by

             a written instrument without delivery of possession,

             it is invalid in law ..... That being so, a deed of gift

             executed   by   a   Mahomedan   is   not   the   instrument

             effecting,   creating   or   making   the   gift   but   a   mere

             piece   of   evidence   .....   Under   Section   17   of   the

             Registration   Act   an   instrument   of   gift   must   be



                                                                                         13


               registered. By the expression 'instrument of gift of

               immovable property' I understand an instrument or

               deed   which   creates,   makes   or   completes   the   gift

               thereby transferring the ownership of the property

               .....   The   present   document   does   not   affect

               immovable   property.   It   does   not   transfer   an

               immovable   property   from   the   donor   to   the   donee

               which   only   affords   evidence   of   the   fact   that   the

               donor   has   observed   the   formalities   under   the

               Mahomedan   law   in   making   the   gift   .....   I   am

               prepared  to go so far as to hold that a document

               like the present one is not compulsorily registrable

               under the Registration Act, or the Registration Act

               does not apply to a so-called deed of gift executed

               by a Mahomedan."



        These observations of Suhrawardy, J. have my respectful

        concurrence. So confining myself to this contention for the

        nonce,   I   am   inclined   to   hold   that   Ext.   B1   is   admissible

        notwithstanding   Ss.   17   and   49   of   the   Indian   Registration

        Act.   This   conclusion,   however,   is   little   premature   if   I   may

        anticipate my opinion on the operation of Section 129 of the

        Transfer of Property Act expressed later in this judgment.

        Indeed, in the light of my interpretation of Section 129, Ext.

        B1   needs   to   be   registered.   For   the   present   I   indicate   my

        conclusion,   if   the   law   of   gifts   for   Muslims   were   not   to   be

        governed by Section 129."




23.            The   Full   Bench   of   Jammu   and   Kashmir   High   Court   in


Ghulam   Ahmad   Sofi  v.  Mohd.   Sidiq   Dareel   and   others7    had   an


occasion  to consider the question whether in view of the provisions of


Sections   123   and   129   of   the   T.P.   Act,   the   rule   of   gifts   in


Mohammadan Law    stands superseded; and whether it is necessary


that there   should be a registered instrument as required by Sections



7 AIR 1974 Jammu & Kashmir 59



                                                                                             14


123 and 138 of the T.P. Act in the case of gifts made  under that Law.


The Full Bench noticed the statutory provisions and also decisions of


different High Courts including the decision of Calcutta High Court in


the case of Nasib Ali3. The Full Bench  held  as follows :



         "14.    The ratio of the above cited authorities is therefore in

         favour  of the  proposition  that  an  oral  gift made  under the

         Muslim   law   would   not   be   affected   by   Section   123   of   the

         Transfer of Property Act and the gift if it has otherwise all

         the attributes of a valid gift under the Muslim Law would not

         become   invalid   because   there   is   no   instrument   in   writing

         and   registered.   Therefore   the   answer   to   the   question

         formulated would be in the negative i.e. that Sections 123

         and 129 of the Transfer of Property Act do not supersede

         the Muslim law on matters relating to making of oral gifts,

         that   it   is   not   essential   that   there   should   be   a   registered

         instrument   as   required   by   Sections   123   and   138   of   the

         Transfer   of   Property   Act   in   such   cases.   But   if   there   is

         executed   an   instrument   and   its   execution   is

         contemporaneous   with   the   making   of   the   gift   then   in   that

         case the instrument must be registered as provided under

         Section           17          of         the          Registration          

         Act. If, however, the making of the gift is an antecedent act

         and a deed is executed afterwards as evidencing the said

         transaction   that   does   not   require   registration   as   it   is   an

         instrument   made   after   the   gift   is   made   and   does   not

         therefore   create,   make   or   complete   the   gift   thereby

         transferring   the   ownership   of   the   property   from   the

         executant to the person in whose  favour it is executed."




24.              The Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the


case of  Chota Uddandu Sahib  v.  Masthan Bi (died) and others8, was


concerned   with   the   question   about   the   gift   by    Mohammadan.     The




8 AIR 1975 Andhra Pradesh 271



                                                                                            15


Single Judge referred to some of the decisions noticed above and few


other decisions and held in paragraph 10 of the report thus :



         "10.   Under   Section  129  of   the   Transfer   of   Property   Act,

         nothing in Chapter VII relates to gifts of movable property

         made   in   contemplation   of   death   or   shall   be   deemed   to

         affect   any   rule   of   Mohammadan   Law.     According   to   the

         Mohammedan   Law,   there   can   be   a   valid   gift,   if   three

         essentials  of the gift are satisfied.  (1) a declaration of the

         gift by the donor, (2) the acceptance of the gift express or

         implied   by   or   on   behalf   of   the   donee   and   (3)   delivery   of

         possession of the subject of gift by the donor to the donee.

         If  these   conditions  are  complied  with  the   gift  is  complete.

         According   to   Muslim   law   it   is   not   necessary   that   there

         should be a deed of gift in order to make it a valid gift, but

         of course, if there is a deed it should be registered. But if

         the   deed   is   merely   a   memoranda   of   an   already   effected

         gift,   then   it   stands   on   a   separate   footing.   In   view   of   this

         specific provision of Muslim Law, which is saved by Section

         129, it cannot be held that the gifts amongst muslims also

         should satisfy the provisions of Chapter VII.   . . . . . . . . . . .

         Hence if all the formalities, as prescribed  by Muslim Law,

         regarding the making of gifts are satisfied, the gift is valid

         notwithstanding   the   fact   that   it   is   oral   and   without   any

         instrument.   If   there   is   a   contemporaneous   document   it

         should be registered.  But if the gift is antecedent  and the

         deed is subsequent merely evidencing the past transaction,

         it does not require registration, because it does not by itself

         make or complete the gift. . . . . . . . . ."




25.             In   the   case   of  Amirkhan  v.  Ghouse   Khan9,   one   of   the


questions that  arose for consideration  before the Madras High Court


was : whether the gift of the immoveable property by  Mohammadan, if


reduced   to   writing,     required   registration.  The   Single   Judge   of   the




9 (1985) 2 MLJ 136



                                                                                               16


Madras   High   Court   concluded   that   though   a  Mohammadan  could


create a valid gift orally,  if he should reduce the same in writing, the


gift will not be valid unless it is duly registered.



26.             In   the   case   of  Md.   Hesabuddin   and   others  v.  Md.


Hesaruddin   and   others10,   the   question   with   regard   to   gift   of


immoveable   property   written   on   ordinary   unstamped   paper   arose


before   the   Gauhati   High   Court.   That   was   a   case   where   a


Mohammadan mother made a gift of land in favour of her son by a gift


deed written on ordinary unstamped paper.   The Single Judge of the


High   Court   relying   upon   an   earlier   decision   of   that   Court   in  Jubeda


Khatoon v. Moksed Ali11 held as under:



         ".....   But   it   cannot   be   taken   as   sine   qua   non   in   all   cases

         that wherever there is a writing about a Mahomedan gift of

         immovable   property,   there   must   be   registration   thereof.

         The   facts   and   circumstances   of   each   case   have   to   be

         taken into consideration before finding whether the writing

         requires registration or not. The essential requirements, as

         said   before,   to   make   a   Mahomedan   gift   valid   are

         declaration   by   the   donor,   acceptance   by   the   donee   and

         delivery of possession to the donee. It was held in Jubeda

         Khatoon v. Moksed Ali, AIR 1973 Gau 105 (at p. 106)-


         "Under the Mahomedan Law three things are necessary for

         creation   of   a   gift.   They   are   (i)   declaration   of   gift   by   the

         donor, (ii) acceptance of the gift express or implied by or on

         behalf of the donee and (iii) delivery of possession of the

         subject of the gift by the donor to the donee. The deed of



10 AIR 1984 Gauhati 41

11 AIR 1973 Gauhati 105



                                                                                               17


gift is immaterial for creation of gift under the Mahomedan

Law.   A   gift   under   the   Mahomedan   Law   is   not   valid   if   the

above mentioned essentials  are  not  fulfilled,  even  if  there

be a deed of gift or even a registered deed of gift. In other

words  even if there be a declaration of acceptance of the

gift, there will be no valid gift under the Mahomedan Law if

there be no delivery of possession, even though there may

be registered deed of gift." In that case there was a deed of

gift which was not produced during trial. Still it was found in

that   case   that   had   the   defendants   produced   the   deed   of

gift, at best it would have proved a declaration of the gift by

the   donor   and   acceptance   thereof   by   the   donee.   It   was

further held that despite this the defendants would have to

lead   independent   oral   evidence   to   prove   delivery   of

possession in order to prove a valid gift. Therefore it was

found in that case that deed of gift under the Mahomedan

Law does not create a disposition of property. Relying  on

this it cannot be said that whenever there is a writing with

regard to a gift executed by the donor, it must be proved as

a   basic   instrument   of   gift   before   deciding   the   gift   to   be

valid. In the instant case a mere writing in the plain paper

as   aforesaid   containing   the   declaration   of   gift   cannot

tantamount to a formal instrument of gift. Ext. A (2) has in

the   circumstances   of   the   present   case   to   be   taken   as   a

form of declaration of the donor. In every case the intention

of   the   donor,   the   background   of   the   alleged   gift   and   the

relation of the donor and the donee as well as the purpose

or motive of the gift all have to be taken into consideration.

In the present case,  it is recited in the said writings that the

3rd defendant  has been maintaining and looking after the

donor   and   that   the   other   children   of   the   donor   were

neglecting her. The gift was from a mother to a son and it

was   based   on   love   and   affection   for   the   son   in   whose

favour the gift was made. Therefore, it cannot be held that

because a declaration is contained in the paper Ext. A (2)

the latter must have been registered in order to render the

gift   valid.   Admittedly,   the   3rd   defendant   has   been

possessing   the   land   and   got   his   name   mutated   in   the

revenue   records   with   respect   to   the   land.   It   is   therefore

implied that there was acceptance on behalf of the donee

and also that the possession of the property was delivered

to the donee by the donor. It should be remembered that

unless   there   was   possession   on   behalf   of   the   3rd


                                                                                  18


         defendant, no mutation would have taken place with regard

         to the property. It may be repeated that Ext. A (2) has to be

         taken   in   the   present   case   as   a   mere   declaration   of   the

         donor in presence  of the witnesses  who  are said to have

         attested the writing."


27.             The   position   is   well   settled,   which   has   been   stated   and


restated   time   and   again,   that   the   three   essentials   of   a   gift   under


Mohammadan  Law   are;   (i)   declaration   of   the   gift   by   the   donor;   (2)


acceptance   of   the   gift   by   the   donee   and   (3)   delivery   of   possession.


Though, the rules of  Mohammadan Law do not make writing essential


to the validity of a gift; an oral gift fulfilling all the three essentials make


the gift complete and irrevocable. However, the donor may record the


transaction   of   gift   in   writing.   Asaf   A.   A.   Fyzee   in   Outlines   of


Muhammadan  Law,   Fifth   Edition   (edited   and   revised   by   Tahir


Mahmood) at page 182 states in this regard that writing may be of two


kinds   :   (i)   it   may  merely   recite   the   fact   of   a   prior   gift;   such   a   writing


need   not   be   registered.   On   the   other   hand,   (ii)   it   may   itself   be   the


instrument   of   gift;   such   a   writing   in   certain   circumstances   requires


registration.  He further says that if there is a declaration, acceptance


and delivery of possession coupled with the formal instrument of a gift,


it must be registered.     Conversely, the author   says that registration,





                                                                                                   19


however,   by   itself   without   the   other   necessary   conditions,   is   not


sufficient.



28.             Mulla,   Principles   of   Mahomedan   Law   (19th  Edition),   Page


120, states the legal position in the following words :



        "Under the  Mahomedan  law the three essential  requisites

        to make a gift valid : (1) declaration of the gift by the donor:

        (2)   acceptance   of   the   gift   by   the   donee   expressly   or

        impliedly   and   (3)   delivery   of   possession   to   and   taking

        possession thereof by the donee actually or constructively.

        No   written   document   is   required   in   such   a   case.   Section

        129   Transfer   of   Property   Act,   excludes   the   rule   of

        Mahomedan   law   from   the   purview   of   Section   123   which

        mandates   that   the   gift   of   immovable   property   must   be

        effected by a registered instrument as stated therein. But it

        cannot   be   taken   as   a   sine   qua   non   in   all   cases   that

        whenever   there   is   a   writing   about   a   Mahomedan   gift   of

        immovable   property   there   must   be   registration   thereof.

        Whether the writing requires registration or not depends on

        the facts and circumstances of each case."




29.             In   our   opinion,   merely   because   the     gift     is   reduced   to


writing by a  Mohammadan instead of it having been made orally, such


writing   does   not   become     a   formal   document     or     instrument   of   gift.


When a gift   could be made by   Mohammadan  orally, its nature and


character is not changed because of it having been made by a written


document.  What is important for a valid gift under  Mohammadan Law


is   that   three   essential   requisites   must   be   fulfilled.   The   form   is


immaterial. If all the three essential requisites are satisfied constituting



                                                                                        20


valid gift, the transaction of gift would not be rendered invalid because


it has been written on a plain piece of paper.   The distinction that if a


written deed of gift recites the factum of prior gift then such deed is not


required   to   be   registered   but   when   the   writing   is   contemporaneous


with the making of the gift, it must be registered, is inappropriate and


does   not   seem   to   us   to   be     in   conformity   with   the   rule     of   gifts   in


Mohammadan Law.



30.            In   considering   what   is   the    Mohammadan  Law   on   the


subject   of   gifts   inter   vivos,   the   Privy   Council   in  Mohammad   Abdul


Ghani1  stated   that   when   the   old   and   authoritative   texts   of


Mohammadan Law were promulgated there were not in contemplation


of any one any Transfer of Property Acts, any Registration Acts, any


Revenue   Courts   to   record   transfers   of   possession   of   land,   and   that


could   not   have   been   intended   to   lay   down   for   all   time   what   should


alone be the evidence that titles to lands had passed.



 31.           Section   129   of   T.P.   Act   preserves   the   rule   of


Mohammadan  Law  and   excludes   the   applicability     of   Section  123   of


T.P. Act to a gift of an immovable property by a   Mohammadan.   We


find   ourselves   in   express   agreement   with   the   statement   of   law


reproduced   above   from   Mulla,   Principles   of   Mahomedan   Law   (19th



                                                                                              21


Edition), page 120.   In other words, it is not the requirement that in all


cases where the gift deed is contemporaneous   to the making of the


gift   then   such   deed   must   be   registered   under   Section   17   of   the


Registration Act.   Each case would depend on its own facts.



32.           We are unable to concur with the view of the Full Bench of


Andhra   Pradesh   High   Court   in   the   case   of  Tayyaba   Begum5.  We


approve the view of the Calcutta High Court in   Nasib Ali3 that a deed


of   gift   executed   by   a     Mohammadan   is   not   the   instrument   effecting,


creating or making the gift but a mere piece of evidence, such writing


is not a document of title but is a piece of evidence.



33.           We also approve the view of the Gauhati High Court in the


case of  Md. Hesabuddin10  .  The judgments to the contrary by Andhra


Pradesh   High   Court,   Jammu   and   Kashmir   High   Court   and   Madras


High Court do not lay down the correct law.



34.           Now, as regards the facts of the present case, the gift was


made by Shaik Dawood by a written deed dated February 5, 1968 in


favour   of   his   son  Mohammed  Yakub   in   respect   of   the   properties   `A'


schedule and `B' schedule appended thereto.   The gift - as is recited


in the deed - was based on love and affection for Mohammed Yakub





                                                                                    22


as   after   the   death   of   donor's   wife,   he   has   been   looking   after   and


helping him.   Can it be said that because a declaration is reduced to


writing, it must have been registered?   We think not. The acceptance


of the gift  by  Mohammed  Yakub   is also evidenced  as he signed  the


deed.   Mohammed  Yakub was   residing in the `B' schedule property


consisting   of   a   house   and   a   kitchen   room   appurtenant   thereto   and,


thus, was in physical possession of residential house with the donor.


The trial court on consideration of the entire evidence on record has


recorded   a   categorical   finding   that   Shaik   Dawood   (donor),   executed


the gift deed dated February 5, 1968 in favour of donee (Mohammed


Yakub),   the donee accepted the gift and the donor handed over the


properties   covered   by   the     gift   deed   to   the   donee.     The   trial   court


further   held   that   all   the   three   essentials   of   a   valid   gift   under   the


Mohammadan  Law   were   satisfied.     The   view   of   the   trial   court   is   in


accord with the legal position stated by us above.   The gift deed dated


February   5,   1968   is   a   form   of   declaration   by   the   donor   and   not   an


instrument of gift as contemplated under Section 17 of the Registration


Act. As all the three essential requisites are satisfied by the gift deed


dated   February   5,   1968,   the   gift   in   favour   of   defendant   2   became


complete and irrevocable.




                                                                                         23


35.           The High Court in the impugned judgment relied upon the


Full   Bench     decision   in   the   case   of  Tayyaba   Begum5    but   we     have


already held that the view of the Full Bench in Tayyaba Begum5 is not


a correct view and does not lay down the correct law.



36.           Consequently, the appeal is allowed and the judgment and


order dated September 13, 2004 passed by the High Court of Andhra


Pradesh is set aside. The judgment and decree dated April 27, 1988


passed   by   the   Principal,   Subordinate   Judge,   Vishakhapatnam   is


restored. The parties shall bear their own costs.





                                                             ........................ J.

                                                                  (R.M. Lodha)


                       


                                                           .......................... J.

                                                          (Surinder Singh Nijjar)




NEW DELHI.

MAY 5, 2011.    





                                                                                    24

In the present case, time and again, the respondent has stated that she wants this marriage to continue, especially in order to secure the future of their minor daughter, though her husband wants it to end. She has stated that from the beginning, she never wanted the marriage to be dissolved. Even now, she states that she is willing to live with her husband putting away all the bitterness that has existed between the parties. In light of these facts and circumstances, it would be travesty of justice to dissolve this marriage as having broken down. Though there is bitterness amongst the parties and they have not even lived as husband and wife for the past about 11 years, we hope that they will give this union another chance, if not for themselves, for the future of their daughter. We conclude by quoting the great poet 16 George Eliot "What greater thing is there for two human souls than to feel that they are joined for life - to strengthen each other in all labour, to rest on each other in all sorrow, to minister to each other in all pain, to be one with each other in silent, unspeakable memories at the moment of the last parting."

                                                                      REPORTABLE




                  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                   CIVIL APPEALATE JURISDICTION


                     CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6288 OF 2008



Hitesh Bhatnagar                                            .............. Appellant




                                         versus




Deepa Bhatnagar                                             ..............Respondent




                                 J U D G M E N T




H.L. Dattu, J.




1)    Marriages are made in heaven, or so it is said. But we are more often


      than   not   made   to   wonder   what   happens   to   them   by   the   time   they


      descend   down to  earth.  Though  there  is  legal  machinery  in  place  to


      deal with such cases, these are perhaps the toughest for the courts to


      deal with.  Such is the case presently before us.




2)    The appellant-husband and the respondent-wife got married according


      to the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 [hereinafter referred to as `the Act']


      in 1994, and are blessed with a daughter a year thereafter. Some time


      in the year 2000, due to differences in their temperaments, they began




                                                                                       1


      to   live   separately   from   each   other   and   have   been   living   thus   ever


      since.  Subsequently, in 2001, the parties filed a petition under Section


      13B of the Act before the District Court, Gurgaon, for dissolution of


      the   marriage   by   grant   of   a   decree   of   divorce   by   mutual   consent.


      However, before the stage of second motion and passing of the decree


      of divorce, the respondent withdrew her consent, and in view of this,


      the   petition   came   to   be   dismissed   by   the   Ld.   Addl.   District   Judge,


      Gurgaon, though the appellant insisted for passing of the decree.  The


      appellant,   being   aggrieved,   has   filed   appeal   No.   F.A.O.   No.   193   of


      2003,   before   the   High   Court   of   Punjab   and   Haryana.     The   Learned


      Judge, by his well considered order, dismissed the appeal vide order


      dt. 08.11.2006.   Being aggrieved by the same, the appellant is before


      us in this appeal.




3)    We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and since the parties


      wanted to ventilate their grievances, we have heard them also.




4)    The issues that arise for our consideration and decision are as under:




         (a) Whether the consent once given in a petition for divorce

             by mutual consent can be subsequently withdrawn by one

             of the parties after the expiry of 18 months from the date

             of   the   filing   of   the   petition   in   accordance   with   Section

             13B (1) of the Act.





                                                                                            2


         (b) Whether   the   Court   can   grant   a   decree   of   divorce   by

             mutual consent when the consent has been withdrawn by

             one of the parties, and if so, under what circumstances.


5)    In   order   to   answer   the   issues   that   we   have   framed   for   our


      consideration   and   decision,   Section   13B   of   the   Act   requires   to   be


      noticed :-




         13B.   Divorce   by   mutual   consent.   -   (1)  Subject   to   the

         provisions of this Act a petition for dissolution of marriage

         by a decree of divorce may be presented to the district court

         by   both   the   parties   to   a   marriage   together,   whether   such

         marriage was solemnized before or after the commencement

         of the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976, (68 of 1976.)

         on   the   ground   that   they   have   been   living   separately   for   a

         period of one year or more, that they have not been able to

         live   together   and   that   they   have   mutually   agreed   that   the

         marriage should be dissolved.


         (2) On the motion of both the parties made not earlier than

         six  months  after the  date of the presentation  of the petition

         referred   to   in   sub-section   (1)   and   not   later   than   eighteen

         months after the said date, if the petition is not withdrawn in

         the   meantime,   the   court   shall,   on   being   satisfied,   after

         hearing the parties and after making such inquiry as it thinks

         fit,   that   a   marriage   has   been   solemnized   and   that   the

         averments  in  the  petition   are  true,  pass  a  decree   of divorce

         declaring  the  marriage   to  be  dissolved   with  effect  from the

         date of the decree.





6)    Admittedly,   the   parties   had   filed   a   petition   for   divorce   by   mutual


      consent   expressing   their   desire   to   dissolve   their   marriage   due   to


      temperamental   incompatibility   on   17.08.2001.     However,   before   the





                                                                                           3


      stage of second motion, the respondent withdrew her consent by filing


      an application dated 22.03.2003.  The withdrawal of consent was after


      a   period   of   eighteen   months   of   filing   the   petition.   The   respondent,


      appearing in-person, submits that she was taken by surprise when she


      was   asked   by   the   appellant   for   divorce,   and   had   given   the   initial


      consent   under   mental   stress   and   duress.   She   states   that   she   never


      wanted divorce and is even now willing to live with the appellant as


      his wife.




7)    The appellant, appearing in-person, submits that at the time of filing


      of the petition, a settlement was reached between the parties, wherein


      it was agreed that he would pay her  `3.5 lakhs, of which he states he


      has already paid  `1.5 lakhs in three installments. He further states in


      his appeal, as well as before us, that he is willing to take care of the


      respondent's   and   their   daughter's   future   interest,   by   making   a


      substantial   financial   payment   in   order   to   amicably   settle   the   matter.


      However, despite repeated efforts for a settlement, the respondent is


      not agreeable to a decree of divorce.   She says that she wants to live


      with the appellant  as his wife, especially for the future of their only


      child, Anamika.





                                                                                         4


8)    The   question   whether   consent   once   given   can   be   withdrawn   in   a


      proceeding for divorce by mutual consent is no more res integra. This


      Court,   in   the   case   of   Smt.  Sureshta   Devi   v.   Om   Prakash,   (1991)   2


      SCC 25, has concluded this issue and the view expressed in the said


      decision as of now holds the field.  




9)    In the case of Sureshta Devi (supra.), this Court took the view:




         "9. The `living separately' for a period of one year should be

         immediately preceding the presentation of the petition. It is

         necessary   that   immediately   preceding   the   presentation   of

         petition,   the   parties   must   have   been   living   separately.   The

         expression   `living   separately',   connotes   to   our   mind   not

         living like husband and wife. It has no reference to the place

         of living. The parties may live under the same roof by force

         of circumstances, and yet they may not be living as husband

         and wife. The parties may be living in different houses and

         yet  they  could live as  husband and wife. What  seems to be

         necessary   is   that   they   have   no   desire   to   perform   marital

         obligations   and   with   that   mental   attitude   they   have   been

         living   separately   for   a   period   of   one   year   immediately

         preceding   the   presentation   of   the   petition.   The   second

         requirement   that  they   `have   not  been  able  to  live  together'

         seems to indicate the concept of broken down marriage and

         it   would   not   be   possible   to   reconcile   themselves.   The   third

         requirement   is   that   they   have   mutually   agreed   that   the

         marriage should be dissolved.


         10. Under sub-section (2) the parties are required to make a

         joint   motion   not   earlier   than   six   months   after   the   date   of

         presentation   of   the   petition   and   not   later   than   18   months

         after the said date. This motion enables the court to proceed

         with the case in order to satisfy itself about the genuineness

         of the averments in the petition and also to find out whether

         the   consent   was   not   obtained   by   force,   fraud   or   undue




                                                                                             5


            influence.   The   court   may  make   such   inquiry   as   it   thinks   fit

            including  the  hearing   or  examination   of  the   parties   for   the

            purpose   of   satisfying   itself   whether   the   averments   in   the

            petition are true. If the court is satisfied that the consent of

            parties was not obtained by force, fraud or undue influence

            and they have mutually agreed that the marriage should be

            dissolved, it must pass a decree of divorce."


         On   the   question   of   whether   one   of   the   parties   may   withdraw   the


consent at any time before the actual decree of divorce is passed, this Court


held:




            "13. From the analysis of the section, it will be apparent that

            the   filing   of   the   petition   with   mutual   consent   does   not

            authorise the court to make a decree for divorce. There is a

            period of waiting from 6 to 18 months. This interregnum was

            obviously   intended   to   give   time   and   opportunity   to   the

            parties   to   reflect   on   their   move   and   seek   advice   from

            relations   and  friends.   In   this   transitional   period   one  of   the

            parties may have a second thought and change the mind not

            to proceed with the petition. The spouse may not be a party

            to the joint motion under sub-section (2). There is nothing in

            the section which prevents such course. The section does not

            provide that if there is a change of mind it should not be by

            one   party   alone,   but   by   both.   The   High   Courts   of   Bombay

            and   Delhi   have   proceeded   on   the   ground   that   the   crucial

            time   for   giving   mutual   consent   for   divorce   is   the   time   of

            filing   the   petition   and   not   the   time   when   they   subsequently

            move   for   divorce   decree.   This   approach   appears   to   be

            untenable. At the time of the petition by mutual consent, the

            parties are not unaware that their petition does not by itself

            snap marital ties. They know that they have to take a further

            step to snap marital ties. Sub-section (2) of Section 13-B is

            clear on this point. It provides that "on the motion of both

            the   parties.   ...   if   the   petition   is   not   withdrawn   in   the

            meantime,   the   court   shall   ...   pass   a   decree   of   divorce   ...".

            What is significant in this provision is that there should also





                                                                                                  6


         be mutual consent when they move the court with a request

         to   pass   a   decree   of   divorce.   Secondly,   the   court   shall   be

         satisfied about the bona fides and the consent of the parties.

         If there is no mutual consent at the time of the enquiry, the

         court gets no jurisdiction to make a decree for divorce. If the

         view is otherwise, the court could make an enquiry and pass

         a  divorce  decree  even   at  the  instance   of  one   of  the   parties

         and against the consent of the other. Such a decree cannot

         be regarded as decree by mutual consent."


10)    In the case of Ashok Hurra v. Rupa Bipin Zaveri, (1997) 4 SCC 226,


       this Court in passing reference, observed:




         "16.  We are of opinion that in the light of the fact-situation

         present   in   this   case,   the   conduct   of   the   parties,   the

         admissions made by the parties in the joint petition filed in

         Court,   and   the   offer   made   by   appellant's   counsel   for

         settlement,   which   appears   to   be   bona   fide,   and   the

         conclusion reached by us on an overall view of the matter, it

         may not be necessary to deal with the rival pleas urged by

         the   parties   regarding   the   scope   of   Section   13-B   of   the   Act

         and   the   correctness   or   otherwise   of   the   earlier   decision   of

         this Court in  Sureshta Devi case  or the various High Court

         decisions   brought   to   our   notice,   in   detail.   However,   with

         great   respect   to   the   learned   Judges   who   rendered   the

         decision in  Sureshta Devi case, certain observations therein

         seem to be very wide and may require reconsideration in an

         appropriate case. In the said case, the facts were:


         The   appellant   (wife)   before   this   Court   married   the

         respondent   therein   on   21-11-1968.   They   did   not   stay

         together from 9-12-1984 onwards. On 9-1-1985, the husband

         and wife together moved a petition under Section 13-B of the

         Act   for   divorce   by   mutual   consent.   The   Court   recorded

         statements   of   the   parties.   On   15-1-1985,   the   wife   filed   an

         application in the Court stating that her statement dated 9-1-

         1985   was   obtained   under   pressure   and   threat.   She   prayed

         for   withdrawal   of   her   consent   for   the   petition   filed   under

         Section   13-B   and   also   prayed   for   dismissal   of   the   petition.




                                                                                             7


The District Judge dismissed the petition filed under Section

13-B of the Act. In appeal, the High Court observed that the

spouse   who   has   given   consent   to   a   petition   for   divorce

cannot   unilaterally   withdraw   the   consent   and   such

withdrawal, however, would not take away the jurisdiction of

the Court to dissolve the marriage by mutual consent, if the

consent was otherwise free. It was found that the appellant

(wife)   gave   her   consent   to   the   petition   without   any   force,

fraud   or   undue   influence   and   so   she   was   bound   by   that

consent. The issue that came up for consideration before this

Court   was,   whether   a   party   to   a   petition   for   divorce   by

mutual   consent   under   Section   13-B   of   the   Act,   can

unilaterally   withdraw   the   consent   and   whether   the   consent

once given is irrevocable. It was undisputed that the consent

was withdrawn within a week from the date of filing of the

joint petition under Section 13-B. It was within the time-limit

prescribed   under   Section   13-B(2)  of   the  Act.  On  the   above

premises, the crucial question was whether the consent given

could be unilaterally withdrawn. The question as to whether

a party to a joint application filed under Section 13-B of the

Act can withdraw the consent beyond the time-limit provided

under   Section   13-B(2)   of   the   Act   did   not   arise   for

consideration. It was not in issue at all. Even so, the Court

considered the larger question as to whether it is open to one

of the parties at any time till a decree of divorce is passed to

withdraw the consent given to the petition. In considering the

larger   issue,   conflicting   views   of   the   High   Courts   were

adverted   to   and   finally   the   Court   held   that   the   mutual

consent should continue till the divorce decree is passed. In

the   light   of   the   clear   import   of   the   language   employed   in

Section 13-B(2) of the Act, it appears that in a joint petition

duly filed  under  Section 13-B(1) of the Act,  motion of both

parties should be made six months after the date of filing of

the  petition  and  not later  than  18 months,  if  the petition   is

not withdrawn in the meantime. In other words, the period of

interregnum of 6 to 18 months was intended to give time and

opportunity   to   the   parties   to   have   a   second   thought   and

change the mind. If it is not so done within the outer limit of

18 months, the petition duly filed under Section 13-B(1) and

still pending shall be adjudicated by the Court as provided in




                                                                                   8


          Section 13-B(2) of the Act. It appears to us, the observations

          of   this   Court   to   the   effect   that   mutual   consent  should

          continue till the divorce decree is passed, even if the petition

          is not withdrawn by one of the parties within the period of 18

          months,   appears   to   be   too   wide   and   does   not   logically

          accord   with   Section   13-B(2)   of   the   Act.   However,   it   is

          unnecessary to decide this vexed issue in this case, since we

          have reached the conclusion on the fact-situation herein. The

          decision in  Sureshta Devi case  may require reconsideration

          in an appropriate case. We leave it there."


11)    These observations of this Court in the case of  Ashok Hurra (supra)


       cannot   be   considered   to   be   ratio   decidendi   for   all   purposes,   and   is


       limited to the facts of that case. In other words, the ratio laid down by


       this Court in the case of Sureshta Devi (supra) still holds the field.



12)    In   the   case   of  Smruti   Pahariya   v.   Sanjay   Pahariya,   (2009)   13   SCC


       338, a bench of three learned judges of this Court, while approving the


       ratio   laid   down   in   the   case   of  Sureshta   Devi   (supra),  has   taken   the


       view :-




          "40. In the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Rupa

          Ashok Hurra this Court did not express any view contrary to

          the   views   of   this   Court   in  Sureshta   Devi.   We   endorse   the

          views taken by this Court in Sureshta Devi as we find that on

          a   proper   construction   of   the   provision   in   Sections   13-B(1)

          and 13-B(2), there is no scope of doubting the views taken in

          Sureshta   Devi.   In   fact   the   decision   which   was   rendered   by

          the two learned Judges of this Court in  Ashok Hurra  has to

          be treated to be one rendered in the facts of that case and it

          is also clear by the observations of the learned Judges in that

          case.





                                                                                            9


          41.  None   of   the   counsel   for   the   parties   argued   for

          reconsideration of the ratio in Sureshta Devi.


          42. We are of the view that it is only on the continued mutual

          consent of the parties that a decree for divorce under Section

          13-B of the said Act can be passed by the court. If petition

          for   divorce   is   not   formally   withdrawn   and   is   kept   pending

          then on the date when the court grants the decree, the court

          has   a   statutory   obligation   to   hear   the   parties   to   ascertain

          their consent. From the absence of one of the parties for two

          to   three   days,   the   court   cannot  presume   his/her   consent   as

          has   been   done   by   the   learned   Family   Court   Judge   in   the

          instant   case   and   especially   in   its   fact   situation,   discussed

          above.


          43.  In our view it is only the mutual consent of the parties

          which   gives   the   court   the   jurisdiction   to   pass   a   decree   for

          divorce under Section 13-B. So in cases under Section 13-B,

          mutual   consent   of   the   parties   is   a   jurisdictional   fact.   The

          court while passing its decree under Section 13-B would be

          slow   and   circumspect   before   it   can   infer   the   existence   of

          such jurisdictional fact. The court has to be satisfied about

          the existence of mutual consent between the parties on some

          tangible   materials   which   demonstrably   disclose   such

          consent."


13)    The   appellant   contends   that   the   Additional   District   Judge,   Gurgaon,


       was bound to grant divorce if the consent was not withdrawn within a


       period   of   18   months   in   view   of   the   language   employed   in   Section


       13B(2) of the Act.   We find no merit in the submission made by the


       appellant in the light of the law laid down by this Court in Sureshta


       Devi's case (supra).





                                                                                               10


14)    The   language  employed  in  Section  13B(2)  of  the  Act  is  clear.    The


       Court is bound to pass a decree of divorce declaring the marriage of


       the parties before it to be dissolved  with effect from the date of the


       decree, if the following conditions are met:




         a. A second motion of both the parties is made not before 6 months


             from   the   date   of   filing   of   the   petition   as   required   under   sub-


             section (1) and not later than 18 months;


         b. After hearing the parties and making such inquiry as it thinks fit,


             the Court is satisfied that the averments in the petition are true;


             and


         c. The petition is not withdrawn by either party at any time before


             passing the decree;




15)    In other words, if the second motion is not made within the period of


       18 months, then the Court is not bound to pass a decree of divorce by


       mutual consent. Besides, from the language of the Section, as well as


       the settled law, it is clear that one of the parties may withdraw their


       consent   at   any   time   before   the   passing   of   the   decree.   The   most


       important requirement for a grant  of a divorce  by mutual  consent is


       free   consent   of   both   the   parties.     In   other   words,   unless   there   is   a





                                                                                               11


       complete agreement between husband and wife for the dissolution of


       the   marriage   and   unless   the   Court   is   completely   satisfied,   it   cannot


       grant a decree for divorce by mutual consent.  Otherwise, in our view,


       the expression `divorce by mutual consent' would be otiose.  




16)    In   the   present   fact   scenario,   the   second   motion   was   never   made   by


       both the parties as is a mandatory requirement of the law, and as has


       been   already   stated,   no   Court   can   pass   a   decree   of   divorce   in   the


       absence of that. The non-withdrawal of consent before the expiry of


       the said eighteen months has no bearing. We are of the view that the


       eighteen month period was specified only to ensure quick disposal of


       cases of divorce by mutual consent, and not to specify the time period


       for withdrawal of consent, as canvassed by the appellant.




17)    In the light of the settled position of law, we do not find any infirmity


       with the orders passed by the Ld. Single Judge.




18)    As   a   last   resort,   the   appellant   submits   that   the   marriage   had


       irretrievably broken down and prays that the Court should dissolve the


       marriage   by   exercising   its   jurisdiction   under   Article   142   of   the


       Constitution   of   India.     In   support   of   his   request,   he   invites   our


       attention   to   the   observation   made   by   this   Court   in   the   case   of  Anil





                                                                                             12


       Kumar   Jain  v.   Maya  Jain,  (2009)   10  SCC   415,  wherein   though   the


       consent was withdrawn by the wife, this Court found the marriage to


       have been irretrievably broken down and granted a decree of divorce


       by   invoking   its   power   under   Article   142.     We   are   not   inclined   to


       entertain this submission of the appellant since the facts in that case


       are   not   akin   to   those   that   are   before   us.     In   that   case,   the   wife   was


       agreeable   to   receive   payments   and   property   in   terms   of   settlement


       from her husband, but was neither agreeable  for divorce, nor to live


       with   the   husband   as   his   wife.   It   was   under   these   extraordinary


       circumstances that this Court was compelled to dissolve the marriage


       as having irretrievably broken down.   Hence, this submission of the


       appellant fails.  




19)    In the case of Laxmidas Morarji v. Behrose Darab Madan, (2009) 10


       SCC 425, a Bench of three learned Judges (of which one of us was a


       party), took the view:




          "25.  Article   142   being   in   the   nature   of   a   residuary   power

          based   on   equitable   principles,   the   Courts   have   thought   it

          advisable   to   leave   the   powers   under   the   article   undefined.

          The   power   under   Article   142   of   the   Constitution   is   a

          constitutional   power   and   hence,   not   restricted   by   statutory

          enactments. Though the Supreme Court would not pass any

          order   under   Article   142   of   the   Constitution   which   would

          amount   to   supplanting   substantive   law   applicable   or





                                                                                                    13


          ignoring   express   statutory   provisions   dealing   with   the

          subject, at the same time these constitutional powers cannot

          in   any   way,   be   controlled   by   any   statutory   provisions.

          However,   it   is   to   be   made   clear   that   this   power   cannot   be

          used to supplant the law applicable to the case. This means

          that   acting   under   Article   142,   the   Supreme   Court   cannot

          pass an order or grant relief which is totally inconsistent or

          goes   against   the   substantive   or   statutory   enactments

          pertaining to the case. The power is to be used sparingly in

          cases which cannot be effectively and appropriately tackled

          by   the   existing   provisions   of   law   or   when   the   existing

          provisions   of   law   cannot   bring   about   complete   justice

          between the parties."


20)    Following   the   above   observation,   this   Court   in   the   case   of  Manish


       Goel v. Rohini Goel, (2010) 4 SCC 393, while refusing to dissolve the


       marriage on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage, held:




          "19. Therefore, the law in this regard can be summarised to

          the effect that in exercise of the power under Article 142 of

          the Constitution, this Court generally does not pass an order

          in contravention of or ignoring the statutory provisions nor

          is the power exercised merely on sympathy."





21)    In   other   words,   the   power   under   Article   142   of   the   Constitution   is


       plenipotentiary.  However, it is an extraordinary jurisdiction vested by


       the   Constitution   with   implicit   trust   and   faith   and,   therefore,


       extraordinary   care   and   caution   has   to   be   observed   while   exercising


       this jurisdiction.  





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22)    This Court in the case of V. Bhagat v. Mrs. D. Bhagat, (1994) 1 SCC


       337 held that irretrievable breakdown of a marriage cannot be the sole


       ground for the dissolution of a marriage, a view that has withstood the


       test of time.




23)    In the case of Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chandra Pandey, (2002) 2 SCC


       73, this Court took the view:




          "17.  The marriage between the parties cannot be dissolved

          only on the averments made by one of the parties that as the

          marriage between them has broken down, no useful purpose

          would   be   served   to   keep   it   alive.   The   legislature,   in   its

          wisdom, despite observation of this Court has not thought it

          proper   to   provide   for   dissolution   of   the   marriage   on   such

          averments.  There may  be cases where, on facts,  it is found

          that   as   the   marriage   has   become   dead   on   account   of

          contributory acts of commission and omission of the parties,

          no useful purpose would be served by keeping such marriage

          alive. The sanctity of marriage cannot be left at the whims of

          one of the annoying spouses......."





24)    This   Court   uses   its   extraordinary   power   to   dissolve   a   marriage   as


       having irretrievably broken down only when it is impossible to save


       the marriage and all efforts made in that regard would, to the mind of


       the   Court,   be   counterproductive   [See  Samar   Ghosh   v.   Jaya   Ghosh,


       (2007) 4 SCC 511].





                                                                                             15


25)    It is settled law that this Court grants a decree of divorce only in those


       situations in which the Court is convinced beyond any doubt that there


       is   absolutely   no   chance   of   the   marriage   surviving   and   it   is   broken


       beyond repair. Even if the chances are infinitesimal for the marriage


       to survive, it is not for this Court to use its power under Article 142 to


       dissolve the marriage as having broken down irretrievably.   We may


       make it clear that we have not finally expressed any opinion on this


       issue.    




26)    In the present case, time and again, the respondent has stated that she


       wants   this   marriage   to   continue,   especially   in   order   to   secure   the


       future   of  their   minor   daughter,   though   her   husband   wants   it   to   end.


       She has stated that from the beginning, she never wanted the marriage


       to be dissolved.   Even now, she states that she is willing to live with


       her husband putting away all the bitterness that has existed between


       the   parties.   In   light   of   these   facts   and   circumstances,   it   would   be


       travesty  of justice  to dissolve  this  marriage as  having broken down.


       Though there is bitterness amongst the parties and they have not even


       lived as husband and wife for the past about 11 years, we hope that


       they will give this union another chance, if not for themselves, for the


       future   of   their   daughter.     We   conclude   by   quoting   the   great   poet




                                                                                            16


       George Eliot "What greater thing is there for two human souls than to


       feel   that   they   are   joined   for   life   -   to   strengthen   each   other   in   all


       labour, to rest on each other in all sorrow, to minister to each other


       in all pain, to be one with each other in silent, unspeakable memories


       at the moment of the last parting."




27)    Before parting with the case, we place on record our appreciation for


       the efforts made by Shri. Harshvir Pratap Sharma, learned counsel, to


       bring about an amicable settlement between the parties.




28)    In the result, the appeal fails.  Accordingly, it is dismissed.  No order


       as to costs.  




                                                             .................................J.

                                                                        [ D. K. JAIN]





                                                             .................................J.

                                                                      [ H. L. DATTU]

       New Delhi,

       April 18, 2011.





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