LIVING AS WIFE AND HUSBAND IS ENOUGH FOR CLAIMING MAINTENANCE

                                                    REPORTABLE










                IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


                CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION










                CIVIL APPEAL NO._____ OF 2010


       (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.15071 of 2009)










Chanmuniya                                     ..Appellant(s)










                           Versus 










Virendra Kumar Singh Kushwaha & Anr.           ..Respondent(s)










                        J U D G M E N T










GANGULY, J.










1. Leave granted.










2. One   Sarju   Singh   Kushwaha   had   two   sons,   Ram   Saran 




  (elder   son)   and   Virendra   Kumar   Singh   Kushwaha 






  (younger   son   and   the   first   respondent).   The 






  appellant,   Chanmuniya,   was   married   to   Ram   Saran   and 






  had   2   daughters-Asha,   the   first   one,   was   born   in 










                                1



  1988   and   Usha,   the   second   daughter,   was   born   in 






  1990. Ram Saran died on 7.03.1992. 










3. Thereafter,   the   appellant   contended   that   she   was 




  married   off   to   the   first   respondent   as   per   the 






  customs   and   usages   prevalent   in   the   Kushwaha 






  community   in   1996.   The   custom   allegedly   was   that 






  after   the   death   of   the   husband,   the   widow   was 






  married   off   to   the   younger   brother   of   the   husband. 






  The appellant was married off in accordance with the 






  local   custom   of   Katha   and   Sindur.   The   appellant 






  contended   that   she   and   the   first   respondent   were 






  living   together   as   husband   and   wife   and   had 






  discharged   all   marital   obligations   towards   each 






  other.   The   appellant   further   contended   that   after 






  some time the first respondent started harassing and 






  torturing the appellant, stopped her maintenance and 






  also   refused   to   discharge   his   marital   obligations 






  towards her. 










4. As a result, she initiated proceedings under Section 




  125   of   the   Cr.P.C.   for   maintenance   (No.20/1997) 










                                2



  before   the   1st  Additional   Civil   Judge,   Mohamadabad, 






  Ghazipur. This proceeding is pending.    










5. She   also   filed   a   suit   (No.42/1998)   for   the 




  restitution   of   conjugal   rights   under   Section   9   of 






  the   Hindu   Marriage   Act,   1955   in   the   Court   of   1st 






  Additional District Judge, Ghazipur.  










6. The  Trial Court  decreed the  suit for  restitution of 




  conjugal   rights   in   favour   of   the   appellant   on 






  3.1.2004 as it was of the opinion that the appellant 






  had   remarried   the   first   respondent   after   the   death 






  of   Ram   Saran,   and   the   first   respondent   had   deserted 






  the   appellant   thereafter.   Thus,   it   directed   the 






  first   respondent   to   live   with   the   appellant   and 






  perform his marital duties. 










7. Hence, the first respondent preferred a first appeal 




  (No.110/2004) under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage 






  Act.   The   main   issue   in   appeal   was   whether   there   was 






  any   evidence   on   record   to   prove   that   the   appellant 






  was the legally wedded wife of the first respondent. 










                                 3



  The   High   Court   in   its   judgment   dated   28.11.2007   was 






  of   the   opinion   that   the   essentials   of   a   valid   Hindu 






  marriage,   as   required   under   Section   7   of   the   Hindu 






  Marriage   Act,   had   not   been   performed   between   the 






  first respondent and the appellant and held that the 






  first   respondent   was   not   the   husband   of   the 






  appellant   and   thus   reversed   the   findings   of   the 






  Trial Court.










8. Aggrieved   by   the   aforesaid   judgment   of   the   High 




  Court,   the   appellant   sought   a   review   of   the   order 






  dated   28.11.2007.   The   review   petition   was   dismissed 






  on   23.01.2009   on   the   ground   that   there   was   no   error 






  apparent   on   the   face   of   the   record   of   the   judgment 






  dated 28.11.2007.










9. Hence, the appellant approached this Court by way of 




  a special leave petition against the impugned orders 






  dated 28.11.2007 and 23.01.2009. 










10.One   of   the   major   issues   which   cropped   up   in   the 




  present   case   is   whether   or   not   presumption   of   a 










                                 4



  marriage   arises   when   parties   live   together   for   a 






  long   time,   thus   giving   rise   to   a   claim   of 






  maintenance   under   Section   125   Cr.P.C.     In   other 






  words, the question is what is meant by `wife' under 






  Section   125   of   Criminal   Procedure   Code   especially 






  having regard to explanation under clause (b) of the 






  Section. 










11.Thus, the question that arises is whether a man and 




  woman   living   together   for   a   long   time,   even   without 






  a   valid   marriage,   would   raise   as   in   the   present 






  case,   a   presumption   of   a   valid   marriage   entitling 






  such a woman to maintenance.










12.On   the   question   of   presumption   of   marriage,   we   may 




  usefully   refer   to   a   decision   of   the   House   of   Lords 






  rendered   in   the   case   of  Lousia   Adelaide   Piers   & 






  Florence A.M. De Kerriguen  v.  Sir Henry Samuel Piers 






  [(1849)   II   HLC   331],   in   which   their   Lordships 






  observed that the question of validity of a marriage 






  cannot   be   tried   like   any   other   issue   of   fact 






  independent of presumption.   The Court held that law 










                                 5



  will   presume   in   favour   of   marriage   and   such 






  presumption   could   only   be   rebutted   by   strong   and 






  satisfactory evidence. 










13.In   Lieutenant  C.W.   Campbell  v.  John   A.G.   Campbell 




  [(1867)   Law   Rep.   2   HL   269],   also   known   as   the 






  Breadalbane   case,   the   House   of   Lords   held   that 






  cohabitation,   with   the   required   repute,   as   husband 






  and   wife,   was   proof   that   the   parties   between 






  themselves   had   mutually   contracted   the   matrimonial 






  relation.   A   relationship   which   may   be   adulterous   at 






  the   beginning   may   become   matrimonial   by   consent. 






  This   may   be   evidenced   by   habit   and   repute.     In   the 






  instant   case   both   the   appellant   and   the   first 






  respondent   were   related   and   lived   in   the   same   house 






  and   by   a   social   custom   were   treated   as   husband   and 






  wife.     Their   marriage   was   solemnized   with   Katha   and 






  Sindur.        Therefore,   following   the   ratio   of   the 






  decisions   of   the   House   of   Lords,   this   Court   thinks 






  there   is   a   very   strong   presumption   in   favour   of 






  marriage.     The   House   of   Lords   again   observed   in 






  Captain   De   Thoren  v.  The   Attorney-General  [(1876)   1 






  AC   686],   that   the   presumption   of   marriage   is   much 






                                 6



  stronger   than   a   presumption   in   regard   to   other 






  facts. 










14.Again   in  Sastry   Velaider   Aronegary   &   his   wife  v. 




  Sembecutty Viagalie & Ors. [(1881) 6 AC 364], it was 






  held   that   where   a   man   and   woman   are   proved   to   have 






  lived   together   as   man   and   wife,   the   law   will 






  presume, unless the contrary is clearly proved, that 






  they   were   living   together   in   consequence   of   a   valid 






  marriage, and not in a state of concubinage.










15.In  India, the  same principles  have been  followed in 




  the   case   of  A.   Dinohamy  v.  W.L.   Balahamy  [AIR   1927 






  P.C.   185],   in   which   the   Privy   Council   laid   down   the 






  general   proposition   that   where   a   man   and   woman   are 






  proved   to   have   lived   together   as   man   and   wife,   the 






  law   will   presume,   unless,   the   contrary   is   clearly 






  proved,         that         they         were         living         together         in 






  consequence   of   a   valid   marriage,   and   not   in   a   state 






  of concubinage.










                                            7



16.In  Mohabbat   Ali   Khan  v.  Muhammad   Ibrahim   Khan   and 




  Ors.  [AIR   1929   PC   135],   the   Privy   Council   has   laid 






  down that the law presumes in favour of marriage and 






  against   concubinage   when   a   man   and   woman   have 






  cohabited continuously for number of years.










17.In   the   case   of  Gokal   Chand  v.  Parvin   Kumari  [AIR 




  1952   SC   231],   this   Court   held   that   continuous   co-






  habitation   of   man   and   woman   as   husband   and   wife   may 






  raise         the         presumption                   of         marriage,              but         the 






  presumption   which   may   be   drawn   from   long   co-






  habitation                is         rebuttable               and         if         there            are 






  circumstances                   which         weaken               and         destroy           that 






  presumption, the Court cannot ignore them.










18.Further, in the case of Badri Prasad v. Dy. Director 




  of   Consolidation   &   Ors.  [(1978)   3   SCC   527],   the 






  Supreme   Court   held   that   a   strong   presumption   arises 






  in   favour   of   wedlock   where   the   partners   have   lived 






  together   for   a   long   spell   as   husband   and   wife. 






  Although   the   presumption   is   rebuttable,   a   heavy 










                                                8



  burden   lies   on   him   who   seeks   to   deprive   the 






  relationship of legal origin. 










19.Again, in  Tulsa and Ors.  v.  Durghatiya & Ors.  [2008 




  (4)   SCC   520],   this   Court   held   that   where   the 






  partners   lived   together   for   a   long   spell   as   husband 






  and   wife,   a   presumption   would   arise   in   favour   of   a 






  valid wedlock.










20.Sir   James   Fitz   Stephen,   who   piloted   the   Criminal 






  Procedure   Code   of   1872,   a   legal   member   of   Viceroy's 






  Council,   described   the   object   of   Section   125   of   the 






  Code (it was Section 536 in 1872 Code) as a mode of 






  preventing   vagrancy   or   at   least   preventing   its 






  consequences.  










21.Then came the 1898 Code in which the same provision 




  was   in   Chapter   XXXVI   Section   488   of   the   Code.   The 






  exact   provision   of   Section   488(1)   of   the   1898   Code 






  runs as follows:






     "488.   (1)   If   any   person   having   sufficient 


     means   neglects   or   refuses   to   maintain   his 


     wife   or   his   legitimate   or   illegitimate 


     child   unable   to   maintain   itself,   the 










                                 9



     District         Magistrate,          a         Presidency 


     Magistrate,   a   Sub-divisional   Magistrate   or 


     a   Magistrate   of   the   first   class   may,   upon 


     proof   of   such   neglect   or   refusal,   order 


     such   person   to   make   a   monthly   allowance 


     for   the   maintenance   of   his   wife   or   such 


     child, at such monthly rate, not exceeding 


     five   hundred   rupees   in   the   whole   as   such 


     Magistrate thinks fit, and to pay the same 


     to such person as the Magistrate from time 


     to time directs." 










22.In  Jagir   Kaur   &   Anr.  v.  Jaswant   Singh  [AIR   1963   SC 




  1521],   the   Supreme   Court   observed   with   respect   to 






  Chapter XXXVI of Cr.P.C. of 1898 that provisions for 






  maintenance   of   wives   and   children   intend   to   serve   a  






  social   purpose.   Section   488   prescribes   forums   for   a 






  proceeding   to   enable   a   deserted   wife   or   a   helpless 






  child,   legitimate   or   illegitimate,   to   get   urgent 






  relief.










23.In  Nanak   Chand  v.  Chandra   Kishore   Aggarwal   &   Ors. 




  [1969   (3)   SCC   802],   the   Supreme   Court,   discussing 






  Section   488   of   the   older   Cr.P.C,   virtually   came   to 






  the   same   conclusion   that   Section   488   provides   a 






  summary   remedy   and   is   applicable   to   all   persons 






  belonging   to   any   religion   and   has   no   relationship 






  with the personal law of the parties.










                                10



24.In  Captain
                
                 
                    Ramesh
                                Chander   Kaushal  v.  Veena   Kaushal 






  and   Ors.  [AIR   1978   SC   1807],   this   Court   held   that 






  Section 125 is a reincarnation of Section 488 of the 






  Cr.P.C.   of   1898   except   for   the   fact   that   parents 






  have   also   been   brought   into   the   category   of   persons 






  entitled   for   maintenance.   It   observed   that   this 






  provision   is   a   measure   of   social   justice   specially 






  enacted   to   protect,   and   inhibit   neglect   of   women, 






  children,   old   and   infirm   and   falls   within   the 






  constitutional   sweep   of   Article   15(3)   reinforced   by 






  Article   39.   Speaking   for   the   Bench   Justice   Krishna 






  Iyer   observed   that-   "We   have   no   doubt   that   sections 






  of   statutes   calling   for   construction   by   courts   are 






  not   petrified   print   but   vibrant   words   with   social 






  functions   to   fulfill.   The   brooding   presence   of   the 






  constitutional   empathy   for   the   weaker   sections   like 






  women   and   children   must   inform   interpretation   if   it 






  is   to   have   social   relevance.   So   viewed,   it   is 






  possible   to   be   selective   in   picking   out   that 






  interpretation out of two alternatives which advance 






  the   cause-   the   cause   of   the   derelicts."   (Para   9   on 






  pages 1809-10)






                                    11



25.Again in  Vimala (K)  v.  Veeraswamy (K)  [(1991) 2 SCC 




  375],   a   three-Judge   Bench   of   this   Court   held   that 






  Section  125  of  the  Code  of  1973  is  meant  to  achieve 






  a   social   purpose   and   the   object   is   to   prevent 






  vagrancy and destitution.   Explaining the meaning of 






  the word `wife' the Court held: 








     "...The   object   is   to   prevent   vagrancy   and 


     destitution.   It   provides   a   speedy   remedy 


     for   the   supply   of   food,   clothing   and 


     shelter   to   the   deserted   wife.   When   an 


     attempt is made by the husband to negative 


     the   claim   of   the   neglected   wife   depicting 


     her   as   a   kept-mistress   on   the   specious 


     plea   that   he   was   already   married,   the 


     court   would   insist   on   strict   proof   of   the 


     earlier   marriage.   The   term   `wife'   in 


     Section   125   of   the   Code   of   Criminal 


     Procedure,   includes   a   woman   who   has   been 


     divorced   by   a   husband   or   who   has   obtained 


     a   divorce   from   her   husband   and   has   not 


     remarried.   The   woman   not   having   the   legal 


     status   of   a   wife   is   thus   brought   within 


     the   inclusive   definition   of   the   term 


     `wife' consistent with the objective... "










26.Thus,   in   those   cases   where   a   man,   who   lived   with   a 




  woman   for   a   long   time   and   even   though   they   may   not 






  have   undergone   legal   necessities   of   a   valid 






  marriage,   should   be   made   liable   to   pay   the   woman 






  maintenance if he deserts her. The man should not be 






  allowed   to   benefit   from   the   legal   loopholes   by 






  enjoying   the   advantages   of   a         de   facto     marriage 








                                  12



  without undertaking the duties and obligations.   Any 






  other   interpretation   would   lead   the   woman   to 






  vagrancy   and   destitution,   which   the   provision   of 






  maintenance in Section 125 is meant to prevent.










27.The Committee on Reforms of Criminal Justice System, 




  headed   by   Dr.   Justice   V.S.   Malimath,   in   its   report 






  of   2003   opined   that   evidence   regarding   a   man   and 






  woman   living   together   for   a   reasonably   long   period 






  should   be   sufficient   to   draw   the   presumption   that 






  the   marriage   was   performed   according   to   the 






  customary rites of the parties. Thus, it recommended 






  that   the   word   `wife'   in   Section   125   Cr.P.C.   should 






  be   amended   to   include   a   woman   who   was   living   with 






  the man like his wife for a reasonably long period. 










28.The   Constitution   Bench   of   this   Court   in  Mohammad 




  Ahmed   Khan  v.  Shah   Bano   Begum   &   Ors.  reported   in 






  [(1985)   2   SCC   556],   considering   the   provision   of 






  Section   125   of   the   1973   Code,   opined   that   the   said 






  provision   is   truly   secular   in   character   and   is 






  different   from   the   personal   law   of   the   parties.   The 










                                13



  Court   further   held   that   such   provisions   are 






  essentially   of   a   prophylactic   character   and   cut 






  across   the   barriers   of   religion.   The   Court   further 






  held   that   the   liability   imposed   by   Section   125   to 






  maintain   close   relatives,   who   are   indigent,   is 






  founded   upon   the   individual's   obligation   to   the 






  society to prevent vagrancy and destitution.










29.In a subsequent decision, in  Dwarika Prasad Satpathy 




  v.  Bidyut   Prava   Dixit   &   Anr.  [(1999)   7   SCC   675], 






  this   Court   held   that   the   standard   of   proof   of 






  marriage   in   a   Section   125   proceeding   is   not   as 






  strict   as   is   required   in   a   trial   for   an   offence 






  under   Section   494   of   IPC.   The   learned   Judges 






  explained   the   reason   for   the   aforesaid   finding   by 






  holding that an order passed in an application under 






  Section 125 does not really determine the rights and 






  obligations   of   parties   as   the   section   is   enacted 






  with a view to provide a summary remedy to neglected 






  wives to obtain maintenance. The learned Judges held 






  that   maintenance   cannot   be   denied   where   there   was 






  some   evidence   on   which   conclusions   of   living 






  together could be reached. (See para 9)






                               14



30.However,   striking   a   different   note,   in  Yamunabai 




  Anantrao   Adhav       v.       Anantrao   Shivram   Adhav   and 






  another,   reported   in   AIR   1988   SC   644,   a   two-Judge 






  Bench   of   this   Court   held   that   an   attempt   to   exclude 






  altogether         personal         law         of         the         parties         in 






  proceedings under Section 125 is improper. (See para 






  6).  The learned Judges also held (paras 4 & 8) that 






  the   expression   `wife'   in   Section   125   of   the   Code 






  should   be   interpreted   to   mean   only   a   legally   wedded 






  wife. 










31.Again   in   a   subsequent   decision   of   this   Court   in 




  Savitaben   Somabhat   Bhatiya  v.  State   of   Gujarat   and 






  others,   reported   in   AIR   2005   SC   1809,   this   Court 






  held   however   desirable   it   may   be   to   take   note   of 






  plight   of   an   unfortunate   woman,   who   unwittingly 






  enters   into   wedlock   with   a   married   man,   there   is   no 






  scope to include a woman not lawfully married within 






  the   expression   of   `wife'.   The   Bench   held   that   this 






  inadequacy   in   law   can   be   amended   only   by   the 






  Legislature.   While   coming   to   the   aforesaid   finding, 










                                      15



  the   learned   Judges   relied   on   the   decision   in   the 






  Yamunabai case (supra).










32.It is, therefore, clear from what has been discussed 




  above that there is a divergence of judicial opinion 






  on   the   interpretation   of   the   word   `wife'   in   Section 






  125. 










33.We   are   inclined   to   take   a   broad   view   of   the 




  definition   of   `wife'   having   regard   to   the   social 






  object   of   Section   125   in   the   Code   of   1973.   However, 






  sitting   in   a   two-Judge   Bench,   we   cannot,   we   are 






  afraid,   take   a   view   contrary   to   the   views   expressed 






  in the abovementioned two cases.










34.However,  law in  America has  proceeded on  a slightly 




  different   basis.   The   social   obligation   of   a   man 






  entering   into   a   live-in   relationship   with   another 






  woman,   without   the   formalities   of   a   marriage,   came 






  up   for   consideration   in   the   American   courts   in   the 






  leading   case   of  Marvin  v.  Marvin  [(1976)   18   Cal.3d 






  660].   In   that   context,   a   new   expression   of 










                                 16



  `palimony'   has   been   coined,   which   is   a   combination 






  of `pal' and `alimony', by the famous divorce lawyer 






  in the said case, Mr. Marvin Mitchelson.










35.In   the  Marvin   case  (supra),   the   plaintiff,   Michelle 




  Marvin, alleged that she and Lee Marvin entered into 






  an   oral   agreement   which   provided   that   while   "the 






  parties   lived   together   they   would   combine   their 






  efforts and earnings and would share equally any and 






  all   property   accumulated   as   a   result   of   their 






  efforts whether individual or combined." The parties 






  allegedly further agreed that Michelle would "render 






  her   services   as   a   companion,   homemaker,   housekeeper 






  and cook." Michelle sought a judicial declaration of 






  her   contract   and   property   rights,   and   sought   to 






  impose   a   constructive   trust   upon   one   half   of   the 






  property         acquired         during         the         course         of         the 






  relationship.     The   Supreme   Court   of   California   held 






  as follows:






     (1)   The   provisions   of   the   Family   Law   Act   do   not 




     govern   the   distribution   of   property   acquired 




     during   a   non-marital   relationship;   such   a 




     relationship   remains   subject   solely   to   judicial 




     decision. 






                                      17



     (2)   The   courts   should   enforce   express   contracts 




     between non-marital partners except to the extent 




     that   the   contract   is   explicitly   founded   on   the 




     consideration of meretricious sexual services. 










     (3)   In   the   absence   of   an   express   contract,   the 




     courts   should   inquire   into   the   conduct   of   the 




     parties   to   determine   whether   that   conduct 




     demonstrates   an   implied   contract,   agreement   of 




     partnership or joint venture, or some other tacit 




     understanding between the parties. The courts may 




     also   employ   the   doctrine   of   quantum   meruit,   or 




     equitable   remedies   such   as   constructive   or 




     resulting   trusts,   when   warranted   by   the   facts   of 




     the case. 










36.Though in our country, law has not developed on the 




  lines   of   the  Marvin   case  (supra),   but   our   social 






  context   also   is   fast   changing,   of   which   cognizance 






  has   to   be   taken   by   Courts   in   interpreting   a 






  statutory   provision   which   has   a   pronounced   social 






  content like Section 125 of the Code of 1973.










37.We   think   the   larger   Bench   may   consider   also   the 




  provisions   of   the   Protection   of   Women   from   Domestic 






  Violence   Act,   2005.   This   Act   assigns   a   very   broad 






                                18



  and   expansive   definition   to   the   term   `domestic 






  abuse'   to   include   within   its   purview   even   economic 






  abuse.   `Economic   abuse'   has   been   defined   very 






  broadly   in   sub-explanation   (iv)   to   explanation   I   of 






  Section   3   of   the   said   Act   to   include   deprivation   of 






  financial and economic resources.










38.Further, Section 20 of the Act allows the Magistrate 




  to   direct   the   respondent   to   pay   monetary   relief   to 






  the aggrieved person, who is the harassed woman, for 






  expenses   incurred   and   losses   suffered   by   her,   which 






  may   include,   but   is   not   limited   to,   maintenance 






  under Section 125 Cr.P.C. [Section 20(1)(d)].










39.Section   22   of   the   Act   confers   upon   the   Magistrate, 






  the   power   to   award   compensation   to   the   aggrieved 






  person,   in   addition   to   other   reliefs   granted   under 






  the Act.










40.In   terms   of   Section   26   of   the   Act,   these   reliefs 




  mentioned   above   can   be   sought   in   any   legal 






  proceeding,   before   a   civil   court,   family   court   or   a 










                                 19



  criminal   court,   affecting   the   aggrieved   person   and 






  the respondent.










41.Most   significantly,   the   Act   gives   a   very   wide 




  interpretation   to   the   term   `domestic   relationship' 






  as   to   take   it   outside   the   confines   of   a   marital 






  relationship,           and          even         includes         live-in 






  relationships   in   the   nature   of   marriage   within   the 






  definition   of   `domestic   relationship'   under   Section 






  2(f) of the Act.










42.Therefore,   women   in   live-in   relationships   are   also 






  entitled to all the reliefs given in the said Act.










43.We   are   thus   of   the   opinion   that   if   the 




  abovementioned   monetary   relief   and   compensation   can 






  be   awarded   in   cases   of   live-in   relationships   under 






  the   Act   of   2005,   they   should   also   be   allowed   in   a 






  proceedings under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. It seems to 






  us  that  the  same  view  is  confirmed  by  Section  26  of 






  the said Act of 2005.










                                      20



44.We   believe   that   in   light   of   the   constant   change   in 




  social   attitudes   and   values,   which   have   been 






  incorporated   into   the   forward-looking   Act   of   2005, 






  the   same   needs   to   be   considered   with   respect   to 






  Section   125   of   Cr.P.C.   and   accordingly,   a   broad 






  interpretation of the same should be taken.










45.We,   therefore,   request   the   Hon'ble   Chief   Justice   to 




  refer   the   following,   amongst   other,   questions   to   be 






  decided   by   a   larger   Bench.   According   to   us,   the 






  questions are:










  1.    Whether the living together of a man and woman 






        as   husband   and   wife   for   a   considerable   period 






        of time would raise the presumption of a valid 






        marriage   between   them   and   whether   such   a 






        presumption         would         entitle         the         woman         to 






        maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C?










  2.    Whether   strict   proof   of   marriage   is   essential 






        for   a   claim   of   maintenance   under   Section   125 






        Cr.P.C.   having   regard   to   the   provisions   of 






        Domestic Violence Act, 2005?










                                          21



  3.    Whether   a   marriage   performed   according   to 






        customary          rites         and          ceremonies,               without 






        strictly   fulfilling   the   requisites   of   Section 






        7(1)   of   the   Hindu   Marriage   Act,   1955,   or   any 






        other   personal   law   would   entitle   the   woman   to 






        maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C.?










46.We   are   of   the   opinion   that   a   broad   and   expansive 




  interpretation should be given to the term `wife' to 






  include   even   those   cases   where   a   man   and   woman   have 






  been   living   together   as   husband   and   wife   for   a 






  reasonably   long   period   of   time,   and   strict   proof   of 






  marriage           should         not         be         a         pre-condition         for 






  maintenance   under   Section   125   of   the   Cr.P.C,   so   as 






  to   fulfil   the   true   spirit   and   essence   of   the 






  beneficial   provision   of   maintenance   under   Section 






  125. 










47.We also believe that such an interpretation would be 




  a   just   application   of   the   principles   enshrined   in 






  the   Preamble   to   our   Constitution,   namely,   social 






  justice and upholding the dignity of the individual.










                                           22



                         .....................J.


                         (G.S. SINGHVI)










                         .....................J.


                         (ASOK KUMAR GANGULY)










New Delhi            


October 07, 2010










                         23

RECORDING OF VOICE - PERMISSIBLE

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SAMUDRALA GOVINDARAJULU                
CRIMINAL REVISION CASE NO.1219 OF 2010        


27-07-2010 


Y. Ranganadh Goud   


State rep. By the Public Prosecutor, High Court of AP., Hyderabad.


Counsel for the Petitioner : Sri C. Mastan Naidu


Counsel for the  Respondent:  Public Prosecutor


:ORDER:  


1.      The revision petitioner/A-1 is accused of offences punishable  under
Sections  417, 420, 376 and 506 IPC in Crime No.122 of 2009 of Ponnur Town 
Police Station.  The Sub Divisional  Police Officer, Bapatla filed petition
Criminal M.P.No.3250 of 2010 before the Additional Judicial Magistrate of the
First Class, Ponnur under Section 173 Cr.P.C requesting the court to record
original voice of the petitioner/A-1 and the victim before the court for
forwarding the same to Andhra Pradesh Forensic Science Laboratory, Hyderabad for 
comparison with a Compact  Disc (CD) allegedly  containing voices/conversations
of A-1 and the victim recorded by cell phone. This petition was opposed by A-1.
The lower court  by the impugned order dated 24.06.2010 allowed the petition
permitting to record original voices of A-1 and the victim in open court and
fixed a date.  As against the said order, A-1 filed the present revision
petition.


2.      Main contention put forward  by the petitioner's counsel in this revision
petition is that directing A-1 to give sample voice for the purpose of
comparison of the same with his alleged voice contained in a C.D, offends  A-1's
fundamental right under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India and that
therefore, the lower court should not have passed the impugned order.  The
petitioner's counsel placed reliance on Vinod Kumar v. The State1 of the Delhi
High Court and H. Chandrashekhar v. Shafiq Ali Khan2 of the Karnataka High Court
in this regard.  In the former  decision, the Delhi High Court held that there
is nothing in the Evidence Act which even remotely suggests that the court has
power to call upon  a prosecution witness to get his sample voice recorded for
comparison with his disputed tape recorded voices and that neither Section 73 of
the Evidence Act provides for recording of sample voice for comparison nor under
Section 45 of the said Act, evidence of an expert on comparison of sample voice
with disputed one has been made admissible.  The Delhi High Court further held
that even the High Court in exercise of inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C
cannot direct the trial court to do so.  In the latter decision, the Karnataka
High Court held  that no person can be compelled to give his voice to be tested
in comparison of voice already recorded, following the view  taken  by the Delhi
High Court.


3.      The petitioner's counsel also placed reliance on State v. Taylor3 wherein
it was held that to compel a suspect  while in custody and prior to his trial,
to speak the very words a witness heard the offender speaking at the time of the
offence, so as to enable the witness to compare the voice of the suspect with
that of the offender and thereby, if possible, to identify the suspect, as being
the offender, and to admit in evidence at his trial on identification, is
violative of  his privilege against of 'self-incrimination'.


4.      On the other hand, it is contended by the Additional Public Prosecutor
that in case, the petitioner/A-1 is not willing to give his sample voice for the
purpose of comparison with voice contained in the C.D, then he may be  permitted
to do so subject to the lower court drawing adverse inference on his refusal to
give his sample voice.   The petitioner's counsel contended that  such drawing
of adverse inference in criminal law is not permissible.  The Additional Public
Prosecutor further contended that  recording sample voice of the accused in
court, does not violate  Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India.


5.      State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad4  rendered by a Bench consisting of 11
Judges of the Supreme Court  has been the leading case on  Article 20(3) of the
Constitution of India.  While upholding  obtaining of specimen finger
impressions and specimen handwritings  from the accused person vis--vis Article
20(3) of the Constitution of India, the Supreme Court observed therein:


"It is well established that cl. (3) of Art. 20 is directed against self-
incrimination by an accused person. Self-incrimination must mean conveying
information based upon the personal knowledge of the person giving the
information and cannot include merely the mechanical process of producing
documents in court which may throw a light on any of the points in controversy,
but which do not contain any statement of the accused based on his personal
knowledge. For example, the accused person may be in possession of a document   
which is in his writing or which contains his signature or his thumb impression.
The production of such a document, with a view to comparison of the writing or
the signature or the impression, is not the statement of an accused person,
which can be said to be of the nature of a personal testimony. When an accused
person is called upon by the Court or any other authority holding an
investigation to give his finger impression or signature or a specimen of his
handwriting, he is not giving any testimony of the nature of a 'personal
testimony. ' The giving of a 'personal testimony' must depend upon his volition.
He can make any kind of statement or ay refuse to make any statement. But his 
finger impressions or his handwriting, in spite of efforts at concealing the
true nature of it by dissimulation cannot change their intrinsic character.
Thus, the giving of finger impressions or of specimen writing or of signatures
by an accused person, though it may amount to furnishing evidence in the larger
sense, is not included within the expression 'to be a witness. '


In order that a testimony by an accused person may be said to have been self-
incriminatory, the compulsion of which comes within the prohibition of the
constitutional provision, it must be of such a character that by itself it
should have the tendency of incriminating the accused, if not also of actually
doing so. In other words, it should be a statement which makes the case against
the accused person at least probable, considered by itself. A specimen
handwriting or signature or finger impressions by themselves are no testimony at
all, being wholly innocuous because they are unchangeable except in rare cases
where the ridges of the fingers or the style of writing have been tampered with.
They are only materials for comparison in order to lend assurance to the Court
that its inference based on other pieces of evidence is reliable. They are
neither oral nor documentary evidence but belong to the third category of
material evidence which is outside the limit of 'testimony. '"


6.      In Selvi v. State of Karnataka5 the Supreme Court made a distinction
between such materials  which are likely to lead to incrimination by themselves
and those materials which furnish a link in the chain of evidence which could
lead into the same result; and held that reliance on contents  of compelled
testimony comes within the prohibition of Article 20(3) of the Constitution of
India but it is not barred for the purpose of identification or corroboration
with the facts already noted by the investigators. The Supreme Court observed:


"136.  Since the majority decision in Kathi Kalu Oghad (4 supra) is the
controlling precedent, it will be useful to re-state the two main premises for
understanding the scope of 'testimonial compulsion'.  The first is that
ordinarily it is the oral or written statements which convey the personal
knowledge of a person in respect of relevant facts that amount  to 'personal
testimony' thereby coming within the prohibition contemplated by Article 20(3).
In most cases, such 'personal testimony' can be readily distinguished from
material evidence such as bodily substances and other physical objects.  The
second premise is that in some cases, oral or written statements can be relied
upon but only for the purpose of identification or comparison with facts and
materials that are already in the possession of the investigators.  The bar of
Article 20(3) can be invoked when the statements are likely to lead to
incrimination by themselves or 'furnish a link in the chain of evidence' needed
to do so. We must emphasize that a situation where a testimonial response is
used for comparison with facts already known to investigators is inherently
different from a situation where a testimonial response helps the investigators
to subsequently discover fresh facts or materials that could be relevant to the
ongoing investigation.
------------------------------------------------------------------      --------
----------------------------------------------------------


However, the compulsory extraction of material (or physical) evidence lies
outside the protective scope of Article 20(3).  Furthermore, even testimony in
oral or written form can be required under compulsion if it is to be used for
the purpose of identification or comparison with materials and information that
is already in the possession of investigators."


7.      If the facts in the present case are examined in the light of the above
pronouncements of the Apex Court, it is evident that the Sub Divisional Police
Officer, Bapatla is already in possession of a CD containing voices or
conversation  said to be between A-1 and the victim woman; and the investigating
officer wanted sample voice of A-1 and the victim to be recorded in court for
the purpose of making comparison of voices contained in the CD with the sample
voices recorded in open court.  This exercise of recording of sample voices of
A-1 and the victim in open court is not going to incriminate A-1 on the basis of
such sample voice, but only facilitates the investigating officer and the court
to identify voice contained in the CD which is already in possession of the
investigating officer.  By any stretch of imagination, the exercise of recording
sample voice of A-1 for the purpose of identifying the male voice already
contained in CD which is collected by the investigating officer during
investigation, cannot amount to testimonial compulsion which is prohibited under
Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India.


8.      This is not the stage to consider  about relevancy or admissibility or
evidentiary value of the talk contained in the CD and the expert's opinion on
comparison of that talk contained in the CD with sample voices to be recorded in
the lower court.  Those contentions are left open to be decided by the trial
court during recording of evidence and during final disposal of the case after
trial in case the police are going to file charge sheet.    Since  this Court
found that the proposed exercise of recording sample voices of the petitioner/A-
1 and the victim is not offended by Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India,
the lower court is at liberty to proceed towards  that exercise.


9.      In the result, the criminal revision petition is dismissed.


?1 1981 CRI.L.J.927 
2 2001(1) CCC 453 
3 213 SCt 330:49 SE 2nd 289  
4 1962 (3) SCR 10 
5 2010 AIR SCW 3011