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Showing posts with label sales tax. Show all posts
Showing posts with label sales tax. Show all posts

Tuesday, January 22, 2013

Section 6-C of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957 states as follows: S.6-C Levy of tax on packing material: "Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 5, Section 5F, Section 6 and Section 6A, the rate of tax on packing material sold with the goods shall be the same as that of the goods packed or filled, whether or not there is separate sale or agreement for sale for the packing material and the goods packed or filled."- S.6 of the Andhra Pradesh VAT Act, 2005 states as follows: 6. Tax on packing material:- Where goods sold or purchased are contained in containers or are packed in any packing material liable to tax under the Act, the rate of tax applicable to such containers or packing material shall, whether the price of the containers or packing material is charged for separately or not, be the same as the rate of tax applicable to such goods so contained or packed, and where such goods sold or purchased are exempt from tax under the Act, the containers or packing material shall also be exempted. - in the business of sale of soft drinks, there is a facility and practice of recycling the bottles and crates in which beverages are sold and that the charges for such limited user of bottles and crates is recovered separately. Since the bottles and crates constitute packing material, such turnover is liable to be taxed @ 4 % u/s. 4(8) of the Andhra Pradesh VAT Act, 2005 r/w Item No.90 of Schedule-IV of the said Act. The Revenue therefore is not entitled to treat the entire turnover as taxable @ 12.5 % by placing reliance on S.6 of the Andhra Pradesh VAT Act, 2005 which was not even mentioned by the assessing authority in the show cause notice issued by him to the petitioner. The view taken by the assessing officer that the petitioner cannot split the turnover on the sales of soft drinks and the lease rentals on the bottles and crates and therefore the total consideration including both categories is liable to tax @ 12.5 % is not correct as held by us above. The assessing officer has also not made any enquiries from the wholesalers/ retailers regarding the claim of the petitioner that the bottles and crates were given on lease while the soft drink is subject matter of an outright sale. It is clear that the assessing authority ignored the terms and conditions between the parties and the fact that tax can only be levied on the transaction as it existed between the parties and not on what is presumed by him without any basis. Therefore, the Writ Petitions are allowed and the assessment order dated 15-09-2005 impugned in W.P.No.21115 of 2005, the assessment order dated 08-12- 2005 for September, 2005 impugned in W.P.No.856 of 2006 and the notice dated 27- 11-2007 of the Assistant Commissioner (CT) (LTU), Saroornagar division, Hyderabad u/s. 29 of the Andhra Pradesh VAT Act, 2005 are set aside and the respondent therein is restrained from taking any action pursuant to his notice in form VAT 305-A dated 8-12-2005 for October, 2005 and from issuing any notices for the months of November, 2005 onwards contrary to our decision in these cases. 48. Therefore, the TREVCs and the writ petitions are allowed. No costs.


THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE GODA RAGHURAM AND THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE M.S. RAMACHANDRA RAO      

TREVC Nos. 43, 44 AND 45 OF 2007,  

W.P.No.21115 of 2005, W.P.No. 856 of 2006 and W.P.No.25588 of 2007  

02.01.2013

TREVC No.43 of 2007 and batch:-

M/s. Hindustan Coco Cola Beverages P Limited,44-69, Moulali, Hyderabad.....
APPELLANT  

State of Andhra Pradesh,Rep. by its State Representative, before Sales Tax
Appellate Tribunal, Nampally, Hyderabad and another......RESPONDENTS  

Counsel for the appellants: Sri S. R. Ashok, Senior Advocate, Sri K. Raji Reddy
and Sri S.Dwarakanath,

 Counsel for respondent No.1: Sri Balaji Varma, Special Government Pleader for
Commercial Taxes
Counsel for respondent No.2: Sri M.V.J.K. Kumar.

<Gist:

>Head Note:

?Cases referred:
1. 43 STC 13 (SC)
2. (2005) 41 APSTJ 111
3. 1986 (2) APSTJ 253
4. 108 STC 599
5. 2000(6) SCC 12
6. (2007) 7 VST 531 (SC)
7. (1973) 33 STC 536 (M.P)
8. (1968) 21 STC 16 (SC)

T.R.E.V.C Nos.43, 44 & 45 OF 2007,

W.P.No.21115 of 2005, W.P.No. 856 of 2006 AND W.P.No.25588 of 2007    


COMMON ORDER:    
(per Hon'ble Sri Justice M.S.Ramachandra Rao)


1.      Since common issues of law and fact arise in these cases, they are being
disposed of together.

2.      Heard Sri S. R. Ashok, Senior Advocate, Sri K. Raji Reddy, Sri S.
Dwarakanath, for the petitioners and Sri Balaji Varma, Special Government
Pleader for Commercial Taxes and Sri M.V.J.K. Kumar for the impleaded
respondents.
       
3.      T.R.E.V.C Nos.43, 44 and 45 of 2007 are filed  by M/s. Hindusthan Coco
Cola Beverages (P) Limited (Formerly known as M/s.Bharat Coco Cola South East  
(P) Limited), Hyderabad (herein after referred to as "assessee") under Section
22 of the Andhra Pradesh. General Sales Tax Act, 1957 challenging the common  
order dated 17.10.2007 in T.A.Nos.1323 of 2003, 911 of 2003 and 912 of 2003 of
the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, Hyderabad for the assessment years 1998-99
(APGST), 1997-98 (APGST) and 1997-98 (CST) respectively.  
       
4.      The petitioner is a manufacturer and dealer in Soft Drinks and aerated
water having its factory at Moula Ali, Hyderabad.  
It is registered on the rolls
of the Commercial Tax Officer, Malkajigiri. It manufactures  Soft Drinks with
the brand names such as Thums Up, Citra and Limca, puts them in the standard  
glass bottles of 200 ml, 300 ml and 350 ml and transports the same to the
Wholesale  Dealers in  crates housing 24 bottles in each crate. The Wholesale
Dealers in turn sell the same to the retailers. The retail dealers sell the same
to the consumers who after consuming the soft drinks, return the bottles to the
retailers. The retailers return the same to the wholesalers who in turn return
the same to the manufacturers and this circle continues until the bottles and
crates become useless. In order to secure the return of bottles, the
manufacturers have been collecting rentals on the bottles and crates.

5.      For the assessment year 1997-98, the petitioner  was assessed under the
Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957 and the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956
by the Commercial Tax Officer, Malkajigiri Circle vide separate orders dated
21.03.2001.
The assessing authority levied tax @ 5% on the turnover
representing the value of rentals on the bottles and crates under Section 5E of
the A.P General Sales Tax Act, 1957. 

6.  The Deputy Commissioner (CT), Hyderabad Rural Division, Hyderabad, the 
Revisional Authority, examined the orders of assessment for 1997-98 (APGST and 
CST) and opined that the assessing authority erred in treating the said turnover
as rentals on bottles and crates; that it is nothing but part and parcel of the
value of the Soft Drink itself; that in the chain of transactions what is sold
by the manufacturers is only soft drinks and the bottles and crates are only a
medium of transport to transfer the soft drinks from the manufacturers to the
customer in fixed quantities; the wholesale dealers or the retail dealers do not
take bottles and  crates on lease; they have no say  in the method of
manufacturing of soft drinks or the shape  and size of bottles in which the soft
drinks are bottled.  So, the Revisional Authority opined that what was shown and
collected as rentals is nothing but the sale value of the soft drinks and the
turnover is liable to be taxed @ 12% under entry 21 of the VI Schedule of the
Act. He issued a show cause notices dated 19.3.2002 (for 1997-98 APGST and CST)   
and proposing revision of assessment to tax the crate rental @ 12% as applicable
to soft drinks.

7. The assessee filed objections on 30.4.2002 contending that the assessing
authority rightly levied tax @ 5% and that the said order of the assessing
authority did not warrant any interference.

8. The Deputy Commissioner overruled the objections and confirmed the proposed
Revision by separate orders dated 6.2.2003 under the A.P General Sales Tax Act,
1957 and the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 for 1997-98.

9. The assessee filed appeals T.A.No.911 of 2003 and T.A.No.912 of 2003 before
the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, Hyderabad (for short 'STAT')contending that
the sale invoice evidenced two different transactions and the nature of the
transactions cannot be changed contrary to the recitals of the contract and
pleaded for assessment under Section 5E of the Act for crate and bottle rental.

10. For the assessment year 1998-99, the petitioner was assessed under the AP
General Sales Tax Act,1957 by the Commercial Tax Officer, Malkajigiri Circle by
order dated 30.03.2002. He held that with the substitution of Sl.No.19 of the
First Schedule by Act 30 of 1997 with effect from 12.5.1997, packing material
has to be taxed at the same rate as the content.

11.     For the assessment year 1998-99, the assessee filed an appeal to the
Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) who upheld the assessment order stating that the
claim for assessment under Section 5E of the Act cannot be maintained in view of
Section 6C of the Act by order dated 14.2.2003.

12.     The assessee filed TA No.1323 of 2003 to the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal,
Hyderabad stating that Act 30 of 1997 has no relevance to the controversy and if
there was no sale of packing material, Section 6C  of the Act has no relevance.

13.     On 30.9.2004, a judgment was delivered by the Tribunal wherein the
Chairman agreed with the assessee and held that the crate rental represented a
transaction of right to use taxable under Section 5E of the Act and allowed the
appeal, but the Departmental Member disagreed with him and dismissed the appeal.
Thereafter, the matter was placed before a Larger Bench of the Tribunal.

14. The Revenue filed applications to group the appeals of the wholesalers from
the assessee, who had preferred appeals against the denial of tax set off under
the Proviso to Sl.No.21 of Schedule VI.  The said application included appeal
grounds of M/s. Vijayalakshmi General Stores from the order of the Deputy
Commissioner, Chittoor dated 13.10.2004 and also application of grounds of
wholesalers including Sri Vinayaga Agencies, Kadapa.  The Wholesalers pleaded
that they merely recouped the very same amount of rental for bottles and crates;
that they had contracted to pay for the prize of the soft drink and crate rental
and that the so called rentals for crates and bottles is nothing but part of the
sale price.  The appeals filed by the wholesalers were heard along with the
appeals filed by the assessee.

15.     While the appeals were pending, the AP General Sales Tax Act, 1957 was
repealed and the AP VAT Act, 2005 came into force with effect from 1.4.2005. For
the period April to July, 2005, the assessee filed the monthly returns admitting
the liability on the sale of soft drinks @ 12.5% but in respect of bottles and
crates which are used for the purpose of transportation and easy handling and
which are to be returned after the consumption of the liquid beverage is over,
it admitted liability only to the extent of 4% under entry 90 of the First
Schedule to the AP VAT Act, 2005. The Assistant Commissioner (CT), LTU,
Saroornagar Division, Hyderabad issued a notice dated 1.9.2005 under Rule 25(5)
of the Andhra Pradesh VAT Rules, 2005 proposing to levy a differential tax of
Rs.1.76 crores for all the four months observing that the entire turnover of
sales including the turnover on lease of packing material is liable to tax @
12.5%, that the assessee had admitted liability  of only 4% on the turnover
relating to the lease of packing material and this is not permissible as the
total consideration relates to sales only.  The petitioner filed objections on
14.9.2005. By order dated 15.9.2005, the Deputy Commissioner (CT), Saroornagar
Division rejected the objections of the petitioner and relying on Section 6 of
the AP VAT Act, 2005 held that the rate of tax applicable for the container with
content is the rate applicable  to the content only; that the soft drink
(content) is being sold with container (bottles and crates) and confirmed the
tax demand as per the proposal in the notice dated 1.9.2005.  Challenging the
same, the petitioner filed W.P.No.21115 of 2005 inter alia contending that  the
Revenue cannot tax the entire turnover @ 12.5% ignoring the terms and conditions
between the parties; that the dispute whether the bottles and crates were
subject matter of lease  or infact sold along with soft drinks and hence taxable
at a higher rate was a controversial issue between the petitioner and the
Revenue even under the repealed AP General Sales Tax Act, 1957 and appeals are
pending for various years commencing from 1997 to 2003 before the STAT; that the
impugned assessment order was passed without application of mind; that it was
never the case of the revenue that the turnover of bottles and crates shown
under 4% category is taxable at 12.5% in view of the provisions of Section 6 of
the VAT Act, 2005; that  there was no reference to Section 6 at all  in the show
cause notice and therefore, the said assessment order should be suspended. On
28.9.2005, in W.P.M.P.No.27041 of 2005, this Court granted interim suspension of
the said order.

16.     For September, 2005, the Assistant Commissioner (CT) (LTU), Saroornagar
Division, Hyderabad passed orders dated 8.12.2005 also taxing the turnover on
rental for bottles and crates @ 12.5% and issued show cause notices for October,
2005 proposing to tax the entire consideration @ 12.5% on the alleged ground
that the total value received by the petitioner is towards price of soft drink
only and there is no question of lease of bottles in this line of trade apart
from proposing to restrict in put tax credit disputing the calculation made by
the petitioner.  The petitioner, therefore, filed W.P.No.856 of 2006 to set
aside the assessment order dated 8.12.2005 for September, 2005, to restrain the
revenue from taking any action pursuant to its notice dated 8.12.2005 for
October, 2005 and to restrain  the revenue from issuing any notices for the
months of November, 2005 onwards till decision is taken  by the STAT in
T.A.No.911 of 2003, T.A.No.912 of 2003 and T.A.No.1323 of 2003. In the said
writ, the petitioner filed W.P.M.P.No.1008 of 2006 for suspension of the order
of the assessment authority dated 8.12.2005 for September, 2005;
W.P.M.P.No.1007 of 2006 for stay of all further proceedings pursuant to the
notice dated 8.12.2005 for October, 2005; W.P.M.P.No.1006 of 2006 to restrain
the respondents from issuing any notices for the tax period commencing from
November, 2005 onwards. By separate orders dated 17.1.2006, interim suspension
was granted by this Court in all the three W.P.M.Ps.

17.     The Larger Bench of the Tribunal by a common order dated 17.10.2007 in
T.A.No.911 of 2003, T.A.No.912 of 2003, T.A.No.1323 of 2003 and others held
inter alia  that the return of the bottles by the end customers and the return
of the bottles and crates by the retailers to the wholesale dealers and by the
wholesale dealers to the manufacturers is not in dispute; that the manufacturers
collected deposits and the deposits will be kept with them till the agreement is
in force; the purpose of housing the soft drink in the bottle and sending the
bottles in crates is only to serve the purpose of making the soft drink
available to the end customers; that the end customer is not conferred with any
right to use the crates and bottles;  that the  end customer consumes the soft
drink and returns the bottles; and therefore, what is paid by the end customer
is the consideration for soft drink and not for getting any bottles or crates;
when the price of soft drink is collected from the end customers for the supply
of soft drink in a sealed and duly carbonated bottle to enable the customer to
consume the soft drink, the manufacturers are not justified in splitting of the
price into cost of soft drinks and rental value of crates and bottles; that the
same appears to be  a colourable device adopted by the manufacturers to avoid
payment of tax; that neither the wholesalers nor the retailers can use the
bottles and crates  for any other purpose except to make the soft drink
available to the end customer; therefore,  there is no "use" of the bottles and
crates by the wholesale dealers to the end customers and as such Section 5E of
the Act is inapplicable; that there is no transfer of right to use goods
exigible to tax under Section 5E of the Act as neither the wholesale dealers nor
the retailers or the end customers have any control or domain over the bottles
and crates; that no agreements between the manufacturers and the wholesale
dealers have been filed and only invoices  were filed to show the separate sale
of soft drinks and lease of bottles and cartons; that the deposits made by the
wholesale dealers have nothing to do with the turnover as the deposits were only
for the purpose of security for return of bottles and crates; as such the amount
collected under the garb of container charges is in fact a part of the sale
price and the same is segregated from sale price  and collected as container
charges only to claim exemption from sales tax; since the soft drinks cannot be
separated from the bottles, there cannot be any split up of price of bottles and
soft drinks; that sale invoices may be helpful for determining the value of the
goods and for determining the turnovers but they are not conclusive evidence and
invoices themselves without any corroborative evidence cannot establish the
agreement between the parties; non filing of agreements/contracts between the
manufacturers and the wholesale dealers is willful and therefore adverse
inference has to be drawn; that the contention of the distributors and the
wholesalers that the so called rentals for crates and bottles is nothing but
part of the sale price  is to be upheld and consequently all the appeals filed
by the manufacturers have to be dismissed and all the appeals filed by the
wholesale dealers have to be allowed.

18.     Challenging the said order in T.A.No.911 of 2003, T.A.No.912 of 2003,
T.A.No.1323 of 2003, the petitioner filed TREVC Nos.44, 45 and 43 of 2007 in
this Court respectively.

19. On 27.11.2007, the Deputy Commissioner (CT) (LTU), Saroornagar Division
issued notice under Section 29 of the AP VAT Act, 2005 to the petitioner's
banker  City Bank, Hyderabad to pay Rs.6,86,098/- for 1997-98 and Rs.50,03,191/-
for 1998-99 towards AP General Sales Tax dues of the petitioner.  Challenging
the same, the petitioner filed W.P.No.25588 of 2007 and sought directions to the
said officer restraining him from taking any coercive steps for recovery of the
said amounts pending disposal of the TRC Nos.43 and 44 of 2007.  The said writ
petition was admitted on 30-11-2007 and in W.P.M.P. No. 33332 of 2007, this
Court granted interim stay of the notice dated 27-11-2007 issued u/s. 29 of the
Andhra Pradesh VAT Act, 2005 by the Deputy Commissioner (CT)(LTU), Saroornagar  
Division.

20.     As can be seen from the above fact, the three revisions TREVC Nos. 43 to
45 of 2007 have been filed by the manufacturer of soft drinks and beverages
against the common order of the Larger Bench of the STAT, Hyderabad dated 17-10-
2007 in a batch of appeals preferred by similarly placed manufacturers of soft
drinks and beverages and by wholesale dealers as well.  These revisions are
restricted to the decision of the Tribunal insofar as it pertains to rejection
of the appeals by the manufacturers.  However, the decision of the Tribunal
insofar as it allowed appeals preferred by the wholesale dealers, on
interpretation of the same transactional documents has become final as the State
has not chosen to prefer any revision against the common order of the Tribunal
insofar as the Tribunal decided in favour of the wholesale dealers.

21.     Since the same transaction was in issue, both in the appeals preferred by
the manufacturers as well as the wholesale dealers, though the decision in these
revisions may not have an impact on the liability to tax of the wholesale
dealers (since the State has not preferred any revisions), it was felt that
hearing of the views of the wholesale dealers would aid holistic adjudication of
the issue involved in the revisions.  Therefore, when the State filed TREVC
M.P.No.239 of 2012 in TREVC No.43 of 2007 to implead the wholesale dealers/
distributors, the said application was ordered on 01-11-2012 by this Court
rejecting the objection of the petitioner in the TREVC No.43 of 2007 that such
application is not maintainable and that the State cannot plead the case of the
distributors.

22.     After notices on the distributors impleaded in the TREVC No.43 of 2007
were served, these revisions and writ petitions were heard.

23.     The Counsel for the petitioners/ manufacturers contended that the Tribunal
having held that there was no sale of the bottles and crates and that they were
delivered on bailment on returnable basis and continuously recycled, committed
grave error in law in concluding that there was sale of packing material; that
S.6 -C would apply only if there is evidence of sale of the bottles and crates
whereas in the present case there was never an assessment or revision of
assessment to tax of the value of the glass bottles or crates and controversy
pertained only to the liability of crate rental u/s. 5-E of the Act; the
Tribunal failed to note that even Serial No.21 of Schedule-VI r/w S.5(1) on its
terms applied to sale of the content with the container, whereas, in the case on
hand, the lower authorities had found that the empty bottles and crates were
delivered on returnable basis collecting security deposit and these containers
were recycled remaining the property and asset of the petitioners; the Tribunal
committed serious error of law and jurisdiction in disregarding the line of
decisions of the Taxation Tribunals and the Hon'ble Supreme Court for periods
prior to 1985 and for years thereafter holding that crate rentals for bottles
and crates was a trade practice and the rent did not constitute the wholesale
price for assessment of beverage.  These decisions also provided evidence of
trade practice to realize a rental on crates; the Tribunal erred in holding that
splitting the charges on sale of soft drinks and rentals for crates and bottles
is a device to defeat the law or to lower the tax due, whereas there were Apex
Court rulings accepting a trade practice to deliver on bailment the glass
bottles and crates on returnable basis while charging a rental on the
investment; the Tribunal misdirected itself  in placing reliance on Hindustan
Sugar Mills Limited Vs. State of Rajasthan1 which dealt with a contract which
was incompatible with the Cement Control Order whereas it was not even pleaded
that charging crate rental was contrary to any law of the land; the Tribunal
committed serious error of law  in relying upon the self-serving case of the
distributors that what was collected in the name of rental of bottles and crate
was an integral part of the price of the soft drink, whereas the wholesalers had
transacted accepting the invoice of the petitioners for a number of years and
paid for crate rental for the use and return of the bottles and crates;  the
Tribunal committed serious error of law and jurisdiction in permitting the
distributors to orally argue a case contrary to their own pleadings set out in
the Memorandum of Grounds as well as the stand of the wholesalers before the
assessing authorities to the effect that the crate rental paid to the
petitioner/manufacturer was recouped and the same cannot be taxed twice over;
The Tribunal committed error of law in relying upon Sri Satya Winery &
Distillery Private Limited vs. State of Andhra Pradesh 2, Amrut Distilleries vs.
State of Andhra Pradesh3 and Premier Breweries vs State of Kerala4 which
pertained to cases of sale of IMFL in bottles and packing materials for which
independent tax treatment was denied in the light of S.6-C and corresponding
provisions and were not at all matters where glass bottles and crates were
delivered on returnable basis on bailment; the Tribunal committed error in so
far as relying on a passage from the minority opinion in the judgment of 20th
Century Finance Corporation Limited vs State of Maharashtra5; The Tribunal
committed serious error of law and jurisdiction in disregarding and
distinguishing the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Orissa vs
Asiatic Gases Limited6 which authoritatively ruled that once the cylinder
containing oxygen was given on loan, the transfer of right to use the goods came
into existence, and the case on hand was admittedly one where bottles and crates
came to be delivered on bailment on returnable basis ; the finding of the
Tribunal that the petitioners allegedly contended that "they would file copies
of the agreement to prove the nature of the agreement, but they have not filed
any document to show the agreement executed between them and the wholesalers"  
is a purported finding without any basis since at no stage, the petitioners
admitted to the agreements with wholesalers in any formal form nor undertook or
agreed to file any such document.  The Tribunal has not stated the occasion and
the time when either the formal agreement was called for, or copy thereof was
agreed to be provided. Accordingly, in challenging the above finding, the
petitioners are also moving the Hon'ble Tribunal for rectification and for
deletion of the paragraph; the Tribunal ought to have seen that the burden was
on the Revenue to show that the ostensible evidence of the invoice was untrue
which was not done; the Tribunal had no material to state that the petitioners
did not transfer right to use to the wholesalers of the bottles and crates, and
the reasoning of the Tribunal that because allegedly the end-customer had no
right of use, there was no transfer of right to use in the bottles and crates to
the wholesalers is irrational. The petitioners therefore contended that the
TREVCs and the W.Ps be allowed.  

24.     On the other hand, the counsel for the Revenue contended that the Tribunal
had rightly held that there is no separate sale of soft drink without bottles
and crates; that the amount collected towards rental charges is in fact a part
of the sale price; that the segregation from sale price of the rental charges
was only done as a device to escape sales tax from that part of the turn over;
that there is no transfer of right to use bottles and crates; that S.5-E is not
applicable to the transactions between the manufacturers and wholesale
dealers/distributors; that the decisions cited by the petitioners are
inapplicable to the facts of the case; that the Tribunal rightly drew adverse
inference when the manufacturers did not produce copies of the agreements
between them and the wholesalers having pleaded in the grounds of appeal before
the Tribunal that such agreements existed; that what is sold by the manufacturer
is placing the soft drink(content) in a bottle(container) and therefore what is
sold is both the content and the container; the intention of the manufacturer is
that the soft drink should reach the consumer in that container directly and the
mere handling in between by the wholesaler or distributor is irrelevant; that
the bottle hire/rental issue therefore has to be ignored as there is a sale
directly of the soft drink in the container to the customer; that the artificial
contract, if any, between the manufacturer and the distributor is a colourable
one; and therefore the TREVCs and W.Ps should be dismissed.  

25.     Sri M.V. J. K. Kumar, Counsel for some of the distributors/ wholesalers
whose appeals before the STAT were allowed and which orders have not been
challenged before this Court by way of revision contended that the orders of the
Tribunal are correct; that the Tribunal has rightly held that the rentals for
crates and bottles is nothing but part of the sale price; and in any event,
irrespective of the decision in these TREVCs/ W.Ps, the set off already given to
the distributors/ wholesalers under the proviso to entry 21 of schedule VI to
the AP General Sales Tax Act,1957  cannot be disturbed in view of the decision
of the Tribunal in their appeals which has become final.

26.     We have considered the respective contentions.

27.     Entry 21 of Schedule -Vi to the A.P General Sales Tax Act,1957 reads
"aerated water and bottled soft drinks sold under a brand name whether or not
flavoured or sweetened and whether or not containing vegetable or fruit juice
or fruit pulp, including squashes, jams, jellies, juices when sold in sealed or
capsuled or corked bottles, jaws, tins, drums or other containers and mineral
water sold under a brand name".

28. S.5-E of the A.P General Sales Tax Act, 1957 states as follows:
S.5-E Tax on the amount realized in respect of any right to use goods:
"Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act:-
(a) Every dealer who transfers the right to use any goods for any purpose,
whatsoever, whether or not for a specified period, to any lessee or licencee for
cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration, in the course of his
business shall, on the total amount realized or realizable by him by way of
payment in cash or otherwise in such transfer or transfers of the right to use
such goods from the lessee or licencee (pay a tax at the rate of eight paise on
every rupee) of the aggregate of such amount realized or realizable by him
during the year;
(b) the transfer of right to use any such goods entered into by any dealer,
shall be deemed to have taken place in this State whenever the goods are used
within the State, irrespective of the place where the agreement whether written
or oral for such transfer of right is made. (provided that no such tax shall be
levied if the total turnover of the dealer including such aggregate is less than
Rs. two lakhs)"

29.     The petitioners are manufacturers of beverages and in the course of their
business, they purchased and used crates and bottles with their respective brand
names; they put the soft drinks in the standard bottles of 200 ml, 300 ml and
350 ml and transport the same to the Wholesale  Dealers in the crates housing 24
bottles in each crate;  the Wholesale Dealers in turn sell the same to the
retailers;  the retail dealers sell the same to the consumers who after
consuming the soft drinks, return the bottles to the retailers;  the retailers
return the same to the wholesalers who in turn return the same to the
manufacturers and this circle continues until the bottles and crates  become
useless; the manufacturers collect deposits/rentals towards these bottles and
crates as security which is refundable.

30.     The issue to be decided is whether the rental charges collected by the
manufacturer from the distributors/ wholesalers for bottles and crates is to be
treated as part of the sale price of the soft drinks or is to be treated as a
compensation for transfer of possession thereof for a limited period assessable
under S.5-E of the AP General Sales Tax Act, 1957.

31.     It is important to note that the Tribunal has held in Paragraph 28 of its
order that bottles are returned by the end-customer to the retailers,  that
bottles and crates are returned by the retailers to the wholesalers and by the
wholesalers to the manufacturers.

32.     In view of the said finding by the Tribunal, we are of the view that when
an end-customer purchases a soft drink in a bottle, the bottle is not also sold
to the end-customer.  If there is such a sale of the bottle also, the question
of the customer returning the bottle to his vendor/ retailer, the retailer in
turn returning the bottle in the crate to the wholesaler and the wholesaler to
the manufacturer would not arise.  While the Tribunal does not say in so many
words that there is a sale by the manufacturer of the bottle and crates also to
the wholesaler, it relies upon the language in entry 21 of Schedule -VI of the
AP General Sales Tax Act, 1957 to hold that the said entry uses the words
"bottled soft drinks sold under a brand name" and not "soft drinks" only; that
the soft drinks cannot reach the end-customer without bottle; that the end-
customer is neither using the bottle nor the crate and he simply consumes the
soft drink and returns the bottles; that therefore what is paid by the end-
customer is the consideration for the soft drink and not for getting any bottles
or crates and consequently the manufacturers are not justified in splitting the
price into cost of soft drinks and rental value of crates and bottles(collected
by them from distributors) and that it is a colourable device adopted by the
manufacturers to avoid the payment of tax.

33.     We are unable to appreciate the above reasoning of the Tribunal.  In our
view the bottle is used only for storing the contents (soft drinks), and when
the bottle is returned to the retailer by the customer and so on to the
manufacturer, the cost of the bottle cannot be said to get included in the cost
of the soft drink.  The Tribunal has not explained how on the basis of entry 21
of Schedule-VI to the AP General Sales Tax Act, 1957 it can be said that the
cost of the soft drink would include the cost of the bottle also.  In our view,
entry 21 of Schedule-VI to the AP General Sales Tax Act,1957 imposes Sales Tax
only on the soft drinks which are bottled and sold under a brand name and merely
because the words "bottled soft drinks under a brand name" are used in the
entry, it does not follow that the bottle has to be taken as sold along with the
soft drink.  Merely because the soft drinks and bottles cannot be separated till
they reach the end-customer, in the absence of sale of the bottle, it cannot be
said that there is no transfer of the right to use the bottle. In our view there
is a transfer of the right to use, such use being "for storing the contents",
thereby attracting S.5-E of the Act.

34.     In Asiatic Gases Limited's case(6 Supra) the Supreme Court considered the
question whether there was a transfer of the right to use the goods for
consideration under the extended definition of the word "sale" u/s. 2(g)(iv) of
the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947 which incorporates the concept of transfer  of
the right to use any goods from Art. 366(29-A) (d) of the Constitution of India.
The Supreme Court was considering whether there was a transfer of the right to
use the cylinders (in which the gas was housed) and whether the charge levied by
the assessee/ manufacturer for over retention of the gas cylinders was in the
nature of a penalty and therefore did not form part of the sale price as defined
in S.2(h) of the said Act.  The Supreme Court was of the opinion that the
commodity in question being medical oxygen/ industrial gases which require a
container,  the said commodity cannot be sold without the containers, the
property in the goods(oxygen/gas) cannot pass to the customers without such
containers and the cylinders together with its content namely gas/oxygen
constitute goods.  But a customer can buy the gas cylinder or borrow it on loan
from the assessee. For the first 14 days, the loan was free of payment of any
charges.  However, thereafter a fixed amount was levied by the assessee as a
charge for over retention.  The assessee required empty cylinders to be returned
so that the cylinders could be re-filled and sold/ transferred by way of loan.
The Supreme Court held that when the said goods (cylinder containing medical
oxygen) were given on loan to the customer, the transfer of the right to use the
said goods came into existence; it may be that for the first 14 days the said
loan is free from payment of any charges; however, exemption from payment would
not militate against the concept of transfer of the right to use the goods which
is included within the definition of the term "sale" defined under the said Act
and that the levy of tax was not on the transfer of the goods itself but the
levy was on the transfer of the right to use such goods for consideration.

35.     We are of the view that the said decision applies on all fours to this
case and it has to be held that there is only a transfer of the right to use the
bottle or crate and there is no sale of the bottle or crate as the bottle is to
be returned by the end-customer to the retailer and by the retailer to the
wholesaler and by the wholesaler to the manufacturer.  The Tribunal erred in
distinguishing the said case simply on the ground that entry 118 of Schedule-I
to the Act mentions "industrial gases other than petroleum gases and gases
specified elsewhere in the schedules" i.e., only "gases" were mentioned and not
"bottled gases".

36.     We are also of the view that the decision of this Court in Sri Satya
Winery & Distillery Private Limited's Case (2 Supra), Amrut Distilleries's case
(3 Supra) and Premier Breweries's case (4 Supra) relied on by the Tribunal would
not apply because it was admitted in those cases that there is a sale of the
bottle along with the content whereas in the present case, it is a case where
glass bottles and crates were delivered on returnable basis on bailment.

37.     The Tribunal at para 29 of its order extracted certain portions from the
minority judgment in 20th Century Finance Corporation Limited's Case(5 Supra) in
coming to a conclusion that a transfer within the meaning of Art. 366 (29-A) (d)
would be complete when the contract is executed and the control/ domain of the
goods which are the subject of the contract are given to the hirer.  But the
majority in the said case held (at para 26 to para 28) that a transfer of the
right to use any goods will be a deemed sale in the case of sub-clause(d); and
that if the goods are available, the transfer of the right to use takes place
when the contract in respect thereof is executed and the delivery of goods
cannot constitute a basis for levy of tax on the transfer of right to use any
goods.  They held that where the goods are in existence, the taxable event on
the transfer of the right to use goods occurs when a contract is executed
between the lessor and the lessee and situs of sale of such a deemed sale would
be the place where the contract in respect thereof is executed.  In the present
case, the end-customer might retain the bottle for more than 24 hours and after
consuming the contents may even use it for storing water or other liquids.
Similarly, the wholesaler/ retailer might be in possession of the crates/bottles
for a  period of time extending upto may be even six months. Thus for the said
period both the end customer and the retailer/wholesaler  would have control or
domain over the bottles and crates.  Therefore, it cannot be said that there is
no transfer of the right to use the goods exigible to tax u/s. 5-E of the Act.

38.   Admittedly, the sale invoices indicate the price of the soft drink
separately and the rentals on bottles and crates separately.  The Tribunal at
para 32 of its order observed that the legislative entry i.e., entry 21 of
Schedule-VI to the Act was introduced from 01-08-1996 when S.5-E was introduced
on the statute book and that the sale invoices are therefore contrary to the
legislative entry and not in conformity  with the said entry.  The Tribunal
appears to have not noticed that even prior to 01-08-1996, the same entry was
there from 01-09-1976 as entry 108 in Schedule-I to the Act taxable at the point
of first sale. It was omitted w.e.f, 1-8-1996 from Schedule-I and introduced as
entry 21 in Schedule-VI making soft drinks taxable at every point, such tax to
be determined after deducting the tax levied on the turn over on such goods at
the immediately preceding point of sale by registered dealer from the tax
leviable on the turn over of the same goods at the point of sale by the selling
dealer.  Only "mineral water sold under brand name" was added for the first time
at the end of the entry w.e.f., 1-8-1996.

39.      In Commissioner of Sales Tax vs Gill & Company Limited7 and in Government
of Madras vs Simpson & Co., Limited8, it was held that in the absence of any
other material, recitals in invoices will furnish good proof of the intention of
the parties relating to the terms of the agreement and that by themselves, they
will be inclusive piece of evidence.  The Revenue, in the present case, has not
adduced any evidence to rebut the contents of the invoices filed by the
manufacturers nor did the Revenue dispute the correctness of the contents of the
invoices by pleading that they are fabricated and not genuine.  Therefore, in
our opinion, the invoices filed by the manufacturers, which show clearly the
separate charge on the sale of soft drinks and rental charges on crate and
bottles indicate a contract between  the parties to treat both as separate
categories( to be charged at the rate of 12 %(u/s. 5 of the Act) and 5 % (u/s.
5-E of the Act) respectively ) have to be accepted and tax levied accordingly.
The statement in the grounds of appeal before the STAT that there is a written
contract between the manufacturers and the distributors appears to be
erroneously made by the manufacturers as admittedly there is no such written
contract between them and none was filed even by the distributors.  The Tribunal
therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, erred in drawing an
adverse inference against the manufacturers for not filing the alleged written
contract between them and the distributors and holding against the manufacturers
on the said count.

40.     The decision in Hindustan Sugar Mills's case (1 Supra) relied on by the
Tribunal is also not applicable because in the said case, there was a contract
which was incompatible with the Cement Control Order.  The Control Order's
scheme was that  freight was payable by the producer and he must recover it from
the purchaser as part of the F.O.R destination railway price.  It was held that
the provision in the contract that the delivery to the purchaser was complete as
soon as the goods were put on rail and payment of the freight was the
responsibility of the purchaser was wholly inconsistent with the scheme of the
Control Order and must be held to be excluded by it.  On the other hand, in the
present case, the Revenue has not pleaded that collection of rental charges for
crates/ bottles by the manufacturer is prohibited by any law.  Therefore, the
said decision cannot apply here.

41.     It is not disputed that the manufacturers make investment on bottles and
crates and they need to recoup this investment.
The rotation of the bottles and
crates takes place about six times during their lifetime and the manufacturers
are entitled to calibrate their charges keeping this in mind.  In our view this
cannot be said to be a colourable device adopted by the manufacturers to evade
tax.

42.     Section 6-C of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957 states as 
follows:        
S.6-C Levy of tax on packing material: "Notwithstanding anything contained in
Section 5, Section 5F, Section 6 and Section 6A, the rate of tax on packing
material sold with the goods shall be the same as that of the goods packed or
filled, whether or not there is separate sale or agreement for sale for the
packing material and the goods packed or filled."

43.     In our opinion S.6-C would apply only if the packing material is sold with
the goods and as that is not the case here as bottles are returned to the
retailer and ultimately to the manufacturer, S.6-C has no application to the
facts of these cases.

44.     Therefore, the TREVCs No.43 to 45 of 2007 are allowed and the order dated
17-10-2007 passed therein by the STAT is set aside.

45.     Coming to the Writ Petitions, where order dated 15-09-2005 for assessment
for the period April to July, 2005 passed by the assessing officer under the
Andhra Pradesh VAT Act, 2005 and the order of assessment dated 08-12-2005 for
assessment for September, 2005 is questioned, the assessing officer purported to
rely on S.6 of the Andhra Pradesh VAT Act, 2005.

46.     S.6 of the Andhra Pradesh VAT Act, 2005 states as follows:
6. Tax on packing material:- Where goods sold or purchased are contained in
containers or are packed in any packing material liable to tax under the Act,
the rate of tax applicable to such containers or packing material shall, whether
the price of the containers or packing material is charged for separately or
not, be the same as the rate of tax applicable to such goods so contained or
packed, and where such goods sold or purchased are exempt from tax under the  
Act, the containers or packing material shall also be exempted.

47.     We have already held that in the business of sale of soft drinks, there is
a facility and practice of recycling the bottles and crates in which beverages
are sold and that the charges for such limited user of bottles and crates is
recovered separately.  
Since the bottles and crates constitute packing material,
such turnover is liable to be taxed @ 4 % u/s. 4(8) of the Andhra Pradesh VAT
Act, 2005 r/w Item No.90 of Schedule-IV of the said Act.  The Revenue therefore
is not entitled to treat the entire turnover as taxable @ 12.5 %  by placing
reliance on S.6 of the Andhra Pradesh VAT Act, 2005 which was not even mentioned  
by the assessing authority in the show cause notice issued by him to the
petitioner.  
The view taken by the assessing officer that the petitioner cannot
split the turnover on the sales of soft drinks and the lease rentals on the
bottles and crates and therefore the total consideration including both
categories is liable to tax @ 12.5 % is not correct as held by us above.  
The
assessing officer has also not made any enquiries from the wholesalers/
retailers regarding the claim of the petitioner that the bottles and crates were
given on lease while the soft drink is subject matter of an outright sale. 
 It
is clear that the assessing authority ignored the terms and conditions between
the parties and the fact that tax can only be levied on the transaction as it
existed between the parties and not on what is presumed by him without any
basis.  
Therefore, the Writ Petitions are allowed and the assessment order dated
15-09-2005 impugned in W.P.No.21115 of 2005, the assessment order dated 08-12-   
2005 for September, 2005 impugned in W.P.No.856 of 2006 and the notice dated 27- 
11-2007 of the Assistant Commissioner (CT) (LTU), Saroornagar division,
Hyderabad u/s. 29 of the Andhra Pradesh VAT Act, 2005 are set aside and the 
respondent therein is restrained from taking any action pursuant to his notice
in form VAT 305-A dated 8-12-2005 for October, 2005 and from issuing any notices
for the months of November, 2005 onwards contrary to our decision in these
cases. 

48.     Therefore, the TREVCs and the writ petitions are allowed.  No costs.

_____________________________    
JUSTICE GODA RAGHURAM      
_____________________________________    
JUSTICE M.S. RAMACHANDRA RAO        
Dt: 02.01.2013

Monday, February 27, 2012

How far deductions are allowable under rule 9(a) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Rules, 1963 ("the Rules" hereinafter) for trade discounts? -The Assessing Authority shall not reject the appellants' claim for exemption of the amounts of trade discount solely on the ground that the discount amounts were not shown in the sale invoices.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 2516-2517 OF 2012 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) Nos. 26102-26103 of 2010) M/s IFB Industries Ltd. .....Appellant Versus State of Kerala .....Respondent AND CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 2521-2522 OF 2012 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) Nos. 6861-6862 of 2011) The India Cements Ltd. ...Appellant Versus The Assistant Commissioner & Ors. ...Respondents JUDGMENT Aftab Alam,J. 1. Leave granted in both the Special Leave Petitions. 2 2. How far deductions are allowable under rule 9(a) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Rules, 1963 ("the Rules" hereinafter) for trade discounts? 3. A division bench of the Kerala High Court has held that unless the discount was shown in the invoice itself, it would not qualify for deduction and further that any discount that was given by means of credit note issued subsequent to the sale of the article was in reality an incentive and not trade discount eligible for exemption under rule 9(a) of the Rules. The decision was rendered somewhat gratuitously in the case of M/s IFB Industries Ltd., (the appellant in the appeals arising from SLP (Civil) Nos. 26102-03 of 2010) but it is the India Cements Ltd., the appellant in the other set of appeals (arising from SLP (Civil) Nos. 6861-62 of 2011), that got badly hit by the decision and its claim for deduction of many kinds of trade discounts was rejected summarily and even without an opportunity of any effective hearing to it right from the stage of assessment up to the High Court. But to put the matter in order, we must see how the issue developed before reaching this Court and for that we need to first advert to the case of M/s IFB Industries Ltd. 4. M/s IFB Industries Ltd. is a manufacturer of home appliances. It has a scheme of trade discount for its dealers under which the dealer, on achieving a pre-set sale target gets certain discount on the price for which it purchased 3 the articles from the manufacturer, the appellant. As the discount is subject to achieving the sale target the dealer would naturally qualify for it in the later part of the financial year/assessment period, that is to say, long after the sales took place between the appellant and its dealer. For the sales taking place between the appellant and its dealer after the sale target is achieved, the dealer would of course get the articles on the discounted price but for the sales that took place before the sale target was achieved, the appellant would issue credit notes in favour of the dealer. The Assessing Authority, in principle, accepted the appellant's claim for deduction of the amount of discount given by it to its dealers through credit notes under rule 9(a) of the Rules and it was only a dispute over computation that took the matter to the High Court and the High Court held that the discount in question was not trade discount at all and it was not eligible for deduction in terms of rule 9(a). 5. The case of the appellant (M/s IFB Industries Ltd.) relates to assessment periods 2001-02 and 2002-03. Dealing with the assessment periods 2001-02, the Assistant Commissioner (Assessment), Commercial Taxes, (the Assessing Authority) in its order dated January 27, 2006 observed that the dealer had given discount to the tune of Rs.58,15,485/- and 4 as the discount was allowable in ordinary course of business, that turnover was allowed as exempted. 6. In making the computation, however, the Assessing Authority started with the figure of `Taxable turnover as per account (Home appliances) Vth Schedule Items' that was Rs.11,62,36,424.23. He then added to it the amounts of (i) Turnover under AMC, (ii) Sales return, (iii) Stock transfer, (iv) Second sale, (v) Tax collected and (vi) Scheme Discount amounting to Rs.58,15,485/- and arrived at the figure of `total turnover proposed' that came to Rs.14,27,69,607/-. From the total turnover, he then deducted the amounts of (i) AMC, (ii) Sales return, (iii) Second sales, (iv) Tax Collected and (v) Scheme Discount being the sum of Rs.58,15,485/- and, thus, finally arrived at the figure of Rs.11,95,56,460/- as the `taxable turnover proposed'. 7. The Assessing Authority passed a similar order for the assessment period 2002-03 as well. 8. The appellant had objection to the computation made by the Assessing Authority. It contended that though in principle allowing deduction for the trade discount the Assessing Authority actually denied any deduction by subtracting the amount of trade discount only after first adding it to the turnover. In the computation made by the Assessing Authority the amount of 5 trade discount, thus, got neutralized and the appellant did not actually get any deduction of the trade discount from its turnover. 9. Before proceeding further, it needs to be understood that the appellant's objection would have any basis only in case it is shown that the original figure of Rs.11,62,36,424.23 taken by the Assessing Authority as `Taxable turnover' was inclusive of the amount of the scheme discount being the sum of Rs.58,15,485/-. For, unless the amount of scheme discount was a factor of `Taxable turnover' there would be no question of deducting it from taxable turnover. Only in case the appellant could show that the figure of Rs.11,62,36,424.23 also included the amount of Rs.58,15,485/- as the trade discount, there would be any question of deducting it from the larger figure. 10. Be that as it may, the appellant preferred appeals against the Assessment Order (Sales Tax Appeal Nos. 219 & 220 of 2006) in which it also took the objection that the computation made by the Assessing Authority by first adding up the amount of trade discount and only then deducting it from the turnover denied it the exemption of trade discount which the Assessing Authority had himself allowed in the earlier part of his order. It is significant to note, however, that in the appeal also it was never 6 stated that the figure of Rs.14,27,69,607/- forming the basis of the computation included the amount of trade discount of Rs.58,15,485/-. 11. The Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) III Ernakulam, (the Appellate Authority) seems to have accepted the case of the appellant and while disposing of its appeals by order dated April 28, 2006 observed that in effect the appellant's claim was disallowed even though it was allowed in the order of the Assessing Authority. He, accordingly, directed the Assessing Authority to verify whether it was a computation mistake and to modify the order accordingly. 12. Against the order passed by the Appellate Authority, the Revenue preferred appeals (T.A. Nos. 429 & 430 of 2006/C.O. 67 & 68 of 2006) before the Kerala Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal and the Tribunal by its order dated February 28, 2007 allowed the Revenue's appeals holding that since there was no assessment on trade discount, the direction of the Assessing Authority to verify whether there was a mistake in this computation was without any basis. 13. The appellant made a Rectification application but it was rejected by the Tribunal by order dated August 29, 2008. 7 14. Against the order passed by the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, the appellant went to the High Court in ST Revision Nos. 396 & 397/2008. The appellant, safe in the belief that the Assessing Authority had in principle accepted its claim for deduction of the trade discount from the taxable turnover, confined its revision to the computation made by the Assessing Authority. The High Court, nevertheless, went into the basic question whether the discount under the scheme of the appellant at all qualified for deduction under rule 9(a) of the Rules. In a brief order dated June 26, 2009 that does not refer to any earlier precedents of this Court or even of the Kerala High Court, the High Court observed that from a plain reading of rule 9(a) it appeared that what is allowable as discount in the computation of taxable turnover is the trade discount given in the bills. According to the High Court, what is insisted in the rule is that the purchaser should have paid the price charged, less the discount. And this certainly meant that the discount should be shown in the original invoice and tax should be charged only on the net amount exclusive of discount so that the buyer gets the deduction towards discount. 15. On the appellant's claim of deduction of their trade discount from the taxable turnover, the High Court made the following observation: - 8 "Petitioner is a manufacturer engaged in supply of goods in wholesale to distributors and dealers. Sales are therefore first sales and discount if any given can only be trade margin to dealers. If tax is not to be charged on the dealer margin, then discount should be given in the invoice itself. If the petitioner has made sales in this way, then necessarily deduction should have been claimed in the monthly return itself as the taxable turnover does not cover discount/trade margin given in the invoice. On the other hand, in the Tribunals order, what is referred to as scheme discount which is nothing but incentives given by manufacturers, and wholesalers to dealers, may be for seasonal sales or may be for annual sales. Such incentives are normally given by the credit note at the end of the season or at the end of the year. These incentives given through credit notes are outside the scope of discount covered by Rule 9(a) of the KGST Rules." 16. Observing thus, the High Court found and held that the assessment in the case of the appellant had not been properly made. It, accordingly, set aside the orders passed by the Revenue authorities and remitted the case to the Assessing Authority for passing fresh assessment orders in light of its order and after examining the quarterly returns and the annual returns submitted by the appellant. 17. The appellant has brought the matter to this Court making the grievance that though the order of the High Court is an order of remand, for all intent and purposes it puts an end to its claim of deduction of trade discount from its taxable turnover. 9 18. Shortly after the case of M/s IFB Industries Ltd., came the case of Godrej and Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. and in an equally brief order dated November 4, 2009 a bench of the Kerala High Court took the same view on the question of deductibility of trade discounts as in the case of M/s IFB Industries Ltd. The High Court observed that in order to be eligible for deduction in terms of rule 9(a) of the Rules the discount must be granted in the invoices itself. According to the High Court, the rule stipulates that in order to qualify for deduction it should be proved that the purchaser had paid the sale price less amount of discount allowed. This presupposed that the deduction available is only trade discount allowed in invoices and not on credit notes given later. 19. By the time the case of the India Cement Ltd. (appellant in the appeals arising from SLP(C) Nos. 6861-6862 of 2011) came up for assessment for the assessment periods 2003-04 and 2004-05 the decision of the High Court in M/s IFB Industries Ltd. was firmly before the Revenue authorities. The Assessing Authority, therefore, turned down the claim of the appellant, the India Cement Ltd., for exemption of different kinds of discount, namely, special discount, annual discount, turnover discount, target discount etc. given by means of credit notes and aggregating to the large sum of Rs.25,55,83,751.82. The Assessing Authority referred to the High Court 10 decision in M/s IFB Industries Ltd. and rejected the appellant's claim for deduction of the aforesaid amount from their taxable turnover holding that, discounts given through credit notes were nothing but incentives and did not come under rule 9(a) of the Rules. 20. The appellant challenged the assessment orders before the High Court in Writ Petitions (WP(C) Nos. 34989 & 38517 of 2010). A single judge of the High Court declined to entertain the writ petitions filed directly against the assessment orders and by order dated January 18, 2011 dismissed the writ petitions leaving it open to the appellant to seek their remedies before the statutory authorities. 21. Against the order of the single judge the appellant filed intra-court appeals (W.A. Nos. 173 & 177 of 2011). The division bench agreed that since the appellant was confronted with an order of the division bench of the High Court, it would be pointless to relegate it to the statutory authorities. It referred to its orders passed in the cases of M/s IFB Industries Ltd. and Godrej and Boyce Mfg. Co. It also noted that against its decision in M/s IFB Industries Ltd. a SLP was filed which was admitted by this Court. It also referred to the decisions of this Court and of the Kerala High Court relied upon by the appellant in support of the contentions that a discount in order to 11 qualify for deduction under rule 9(a) need not necessarily be shown in the invoice itself and may also be given by means of credit notes. It, however, declined to reconsider its order in M/s IFB Industries Ltd. and by order dated February 8, 2011 dismissed the appeals observing as follows: - "We feel that appellant's remedy is to challenge the decision of this Court relied on by the Assessing Officer in disallowing claim of deduction of discount before the Supreme Court. Consequently, following our above two decision, we uphold the assessment disallowing discount on credit notes. These Writ Appeals are, accordingly, dismissed on merit leaving it open to the appellant to approach the Supreme Court, if they have any grievance against this judgment." 22. In the aforesaid circumstances, the appellant is before this Court making the grievance that its claim stands rejected practically unheard and without any considerations of the earlier precedents on the point relied upon by it in support of its claim. 23. In order to clearly understand the kinds of discount that are exempted in terms of rule 9(a) we may usefully refer to the definition of `turnover' under Section 2(xxvii) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963. The main body of the definition is as follows: - "(xxvii) "turnover" means the aggregate amount for which goods are either bought or sold, supplied or distributed by a dealer, either directly or through another, on his own account or on account of others, whether for cash or for deferred payment or other valuable consideration." It is followed by several explanations. Explanation 2(ii) is as follows: - 12 "Explanation 2 - Subject to such conditions and restrictions, if any, as may be prescribed in this behalf,- (i) xxx (ii) any cash or other discount on the price allowed in respect of any sale and any amount refunded in respect of articles returned by customers shall not be included in the turnover." (emphasis added) 24. It is, thus, to be seen that the very definition of "turnover" recognises discounts other than cash discount and provides that those other discounts too like the cash discount shall not be included in the turn over. 25. Rule 9(a) provides as follows - "9. Determination of taxable turnover - In determining the taxable turnover, the amounts specified in the following clauses shall subject to the conditions specified therein, be deducted from the total turnover of the dealer: - (a) All amounts allowed as discount, provided that such discount is allowed in accordance with the regular practice in the trade and provided also that the accounts show that the purchaser has paid only the sum originally charged less the discount." (emphasis added) 26. It is significant to note that the rule does not speak of invoices but stipulates that the discount must be shown in the accounts. On a plain reading of the provision it is clear that the exemption is allowable subject to 13 two conditions; first, the discount is given in accordance with the regular practice in the trade and secondly, the accounts should show that the purchaser had paid only the sum originally charged less the discount. We find nothing in rule 9(a) to read it in the restrictive manner to mean that a discount in order to qualify for exemption under its provision must be shown in the invoice itself. 27. We, therefore, find it difficult to sustain the view taken by the Kerala High Court in the orders impugned before us. 28. We are fortified in our view on the basis of some earlier decisions of this Court and some High Courts, including the Kerala High Court. 29. In Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law) Board of Revenue (Taxes) v. M/s Advani Oorlikon (P) Ltd., (1980) 1 SCC 360, this Court pointed out that cash discounts and trade discounts are wholly distinct and separate concepts and are not to be confused with one another. Advani Oorlikon was a case under the Central Sales Tax Act and section 2(h) of the Act defined the expression `sale price' to mean `the amount payable to a dealer as consideration for the sale of any goods, less any sum allowed as cash discount...'. It is to be noted that though the Central Sales Tax Act mentioned only cash discount as being deductible from sale price, this Court 14 nevertheless held that any trade discount must also be similarly deducted for determining sale price of goods. In paragraphs 5 and 6 of the judgment the Court observed and held as follows: - "5. At the outset, it is appropriate that we set forth the two relevant definitions contained in the Central Sales Tax Act. Section 2(j) defines "turnover" to mean "the aggregate of the sale prices received and receivable by him (the dealer) in respect of sales of any goods in the course of inter-State trade or commerce...". And Section 2(h) of the Act defines the expression "sale price" to mean "the amount payable to a dealer as consideration for the sale of any goods, less any sum allowed as cash discount according to the practice normally prevailing in the trade...". It is true that a deduction on account of cash discount is alone specifically contemplated from the sale consideration in the definition of "sale price" by Section 2(h), and there is no doubt that cash discount cannot be confused with trade discount. The two concepts are wholly distinct and separate. Cash discount is allowed when the purchaser makes payment promptly or within the period of credit allowed. It is a discount granted in consideration of expeditious payment. A trade discount is a deduction from the catalogue price of goods allowed by wholesalers to retailers engaged in the trade. The allowance enables the retailer to sell the goods at the catalogue price and yet make a reasonable margin of profit after taking into account his business expense. The outward invoice sent by a wholesale dealer to a retailer shows the catalogue price and against that a deduction of the trade discount is shown. The net amount is the sale price, and it is that net amount which is entered in the books of the respective parties as the amount reliable. Orient paper Mills Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (1975) 35 STC 84: 1974 Tax LR 2224 (Ori. HC) 6. Under the Central Sales Tax Act, the sale price which enters into the computation of the turnover is the consideration for which the goods are sold by the assessee. In a case where trade discount is allowed on the catalogue price, the sale price is the amount determined after deducting the trade discount. The trade 15 discount does not enter into the composition of the sale price, but exists apart from and outside it and prior to it. It is immaterial that the definition of "sale price" in Section 2(h) of the Act does not expressly provide for the deduction of trade discount from the sale price. Indeed, having regard to the circumstance that the sale price is arrived at after deducting the trade discount, no question arises of deducting from the sale price any sum by way of trade discount." 30. The decision of this Court in Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax(Law) Board of Revenue (Taxes), Ernakulam v. Motor Industries Co, Ernakulam, (1983) 2 SCC 108, is on rule 9(a) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Rules and the discount admissible to exemption under that provision. It may, however, be clarified that in terms of the rule, as it stood at that time, exemption was allowable on trade discount given not only in accordance with the regular practice in the trade but also in accordance with the terms of the contract or agreement entered into a particular case. In Motor Industries Co. the claim for exemption was on the basis of the agreement entered into between the dealer and its purchaser, the retailer. But that is of no significance as the issue in the case was in regard to the nature of discount admissible to exemption under rule 9(a). This Court, upholding the decision of the Kerala High Court allowing exemption to the dealer, held and observed as follows:- "We shall first deal with the claim made in respect of "service discount". Under clause (a) of Rule 9 of the Rules all amounts allowed as discount where such discount is allowed in accordance with the regular practice of the dealer or is in accordance with the terms of contract or agreement entered into 16 in a particular case have to be deducted from the total turnover in determining the taxable turnover provided the accounts of the assessee show that the purchaser has paid only the sum originally charged less the discount. In the instant case the "service discount" in respect of which the deduction was claimed by the assessee was the additional trade discount allowed by it to its main distributors (purchasers) namely the T.V.S. group of companies which constitute a prestigious group of commercial concerns over and above the normal trade discount in consideration of the extra benefit derived by the assessee by reason of the marketing of its goods through them. This additional trade discount is allowed in accordance with the trade agreement subject to periodical variation depending upon the cost structure and changes in market conditions. It is not disputed that there were such agreements between the assessee and the purchasers and the accounts of the assessee truly reflected the actual discount allowed to the purchasers. What is however urged by the department is that the said additional discount allowed by the assessee could not strictly be termed as discount as it was in lieu of services rendered by its main distributors by way of popularisation of the sales and consumption of the products sold by the assessee. We find it difficult to accept the submission made on behalf of the department. Rule 9(a) says that all amounts allowed as discount either in accordance with regular practice or in accordance with agreement would be deductible from the total turnover provided they are duly supported by the entries in the accounts of the assessee. Ordinarily any concession shown in the price of goods for any commercial reason would be a trade discount which can legitimately be claimed as a deduction under clause (a) of Rule 9 of the Rules. Such a concession is usually allowed by a manufacturer or a wholesale dealer in favour of another dealer with the object of improving prospects of his own business. It is common experience that when goods are marketed through reputed companies, firms or other individual dealers the demand for such goods increases and correspondingly the business of the manufacturer or the wholesaler would become more and more prosperous and its capacity to withstand competition from other manufacturers or other dealers dealing in similar goods would also improve. Hence any concession in 17 price shown in such circumstances by way of an additional incentive with a view to promote one's own trade does qualify for deduction as a trade discount. It cannot be termed as a service charge as is attempted to be termed in this case. In fact in this case apart from buying the products of the assessee, no other service is being rendered by the T.V.S. group of companies to the assessee. In the circumstances the additional discount or "service discount" as it is called in this case is no other than the discount referred to in Rule 9(a) of the Rules." 31. In Union of India and Others v. Bombay Tyres International (P) Ltd., (2005) 3 SCC 787, in a very brief order this Court very succinctly described `trade discount' and held it to be deductible from the sale price: "(1) Trade discounts - Discounts allowed in the trade (by whatever name such discount is described) should be allowed to be deducted from the sale price having regard to the nature of the goods, if established under agreements or under terms of sale or by established practice, the allowance and the nature of the discount being known at or prior to the removal of the goods. Such trade discounts shall not be disallowed only because they are not payable at the time of each invoice or deducted from the invoice price." (emphasis added) 32. A bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Godavari Fertilizers and Chemicals Ltd. v. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, (2004) 138 STC 133, examined a number of earlier decisions on this point and came to the conclusion that a discount given by means of credit notes issued subsequent to the sale is as much a trade discount admissible to deduction in determining the turnover of a dealer. 18 33. A bench of the Kerala High Court in Kalpana Lamps and Components Ltd. v. State of Kerala, (2006) 143 STC 666, in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the judgment observed and held as follows: - "4. According to us, in the present case, the Appellate Tribunal dismissed the appeal merely on the ground that the circumstances under which the special discount has been granted to the customer (sic). Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was not able to convince the Tribunal because no opportunity was given by both the authorities, viz., the assessing authority and the appellate authority. They rejected the case of the petitioner merely on the ground that the books of accounts were not produced. Hence, the petitioner prayed for an opportunity to explain the circumstances under which the special discount was granted. 5. Before parting with the case, we may state that so far as the special discount is concerned, all that the authorities have to look into whether as a matter of fact, the petitioner received only the sum originally charged less the discount. It is the look out of the traders to see that the trade increase and it is for that purpose the trade discount is given. Hence, a person may not be able to clearly prove as to why the special discount was given. But if there has been a consistent practice of giving special discount, that has to be accepted by the assessing authority." 34. On the basis of the discussions made above and in light of the earlier decisions of the Court, we are unable to sustain the orders of the Kerala High Court coming under appeal. The impugned orders in both the appeals are set aside. The cases of the appellants for the respective assessment periods are 19 remitted to the Assessing Authority with a direction to make assessments and pass fresh orders in accordance with law and in light of this judgment. The Assessing Authority shall not reject the appellants' claim for exemption of the amounts of trade discount solely on the ground that the discount amounts were not shown in the sale invoices. 35. In the result the appeals are allowed but with no orders as to cost. .................................J. (Aftab Alam) .................................J. (Anil R. Dave) New Delhi; February 27, 2012.

Wednesday, January 18, 2012

Essar Oil Limited (hereinafter "Essar") was given the benefit of Sales Tax incentive under the Government of Gujarat =a person

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO_599_ OF 2012 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.17130/2008) State of Gujarat & others ...Appellant(s) - Versus - Essar Oil Limited and another ...Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T GANGULY, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. This appeal is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Gujarat dated 22.04.2008 in Special Civil Application No.24233/2007, whereby the Respondent No. 1 herein, Essar Oil Limited (hereinafter "Essar") was given the benefit of Sales Tax incentive under the Government of Gujarat 1 "Capital Investment Incentive to Premier/Prestigious Unit Scheme, 1995-2000" (hereinafter "the said Scheme") 3. The State Government in the Industries and Mines Department vide Resolution dated 11.09.1995 introduced the said scheme to accelerate development of the backward area of the State and to create large-scale employment opportunities. 4. The operative period of the said scheme was from 16.08.1995 upto 15.08.2000, during which new units have to go into commercial production. 5. The Scheme envisaged grant of Sales Tax incentives by way of Sales Tax Exemption or Sales Tax Deferment or Composite Schemes, for Premier/Prestigious Units according to the location, investment and status of the project. Essar fell in the category of premier unit i.e. new industrial unit having a project cost 2 of more than Rs.1,000/- crores and employing 100 workers on a regular basis and following the employment policy of the State Government. Clause (v) of the Scheme defined premier unit in the following terms:- "(v) PREMIER UNIT A new industrial unit or industrial complex fulfilling the following criteria will be considered for granting status of a "Premier Unit". (a) The industrial unit shall have a project cost of Rs.500 crores or more. Such units having project cost of Rs.1,000 crores and above shall be entitled for extended period to avail incentive as provided under para 6 B. (b) Only one unit per taluka will be eligible for the Premier Unit status. In banned area no unit is permitted. (c) The unit shall employ at least 100 workers on a regular basis and shall follow the employment policy of the State Government." 6. Part II of the said Scheme provided that the rate of incentive would depend on the location, investment and status of the project. The incentives offered 3 were sales-tax exemption or sales-tax deferment or composite scheme. There is no dispute about the fact that Essar opted for sales-tax deferment scheme. As per clause 6(i)(B), the rate of incentive applicable to Essar was the rate available for the most backward area. The extent of exemption was 125% of eligible fixed capital investment. 7. Part II Clause (iii) (b) provided that Under the Sales Tax Deferment incentive scheme, the recovery of sales tax connected by the unit on sale of goods manufactured by it including intermediate products, by products and scrap/waste generated as incidental to manufacturing activities and turnover tax, leviable to Government will be deferred and amount so deferred will be recovered in six equal annual installments by Sales Tax Department beginning from the financial year subsequent to the year in which the unit exhausts limit of incentive granted to it under the scheme or after the expiry of relevant period or time limit during which deferment is available or whichever is earlier. 4 8. Since Essar's investment was going to be more than Rs.1,000 crores, the duration of incentive of sales- tax deferment was to be for a period of 17 years from the date of commercial production. 9. Clause 6(v) of the said Scheme provided for effective steps for extending date of commercial production in the following terms : "6(v) Effective steps for extending date of commercial production : The unit which cannot go into commercial production before expiry of the scheme will be allowed to go into commercial production beyond the last date of the scheme provided it has taken the following effective steps: (1) The industrial unit should have obtained provisional registration as a Prestigious/Premier unit before 15th August 2000. (2) 25% of project cost should have been incurred before 15th August 2000. The unit which has taken above effective steps will be allowed to go into commercial production as shown below: 5 (a) The unit with project cost above Rs.100 crores but below Rs.300 crores should go into commercial production on or before 15th August 2002. (b) The unit with project cost more than Rs.300 crores should go into commercial production on or before 15th February 2003. Such units shall have to apply to industries Commissioner for extending date of commercial production by 31st August 2000." 10.A High Power State Level Committee (hereinafter "HPSLC") was the Sanctioning Authority for granting permanent registration of all the Prestigious/Premier Units 11.Part III provides the procedure for Registration for Premier/Prestigious Status, the relevant clause of the said Part in respect of instant case is set out below: "An Industrial unit eligible for Prestigious/Premier status under the scheme will apply to Industries Commissioner in prescribed form before expiry of the scheme along with details of following effective steps. i) Possession of plot or shed in GIDC Estate. For units located outside GIDC Estate, the 6 unit must be in legal possession of land with valid non-agricultural use permission of industrial use or as per Revenue Act as modified from time to time. ii) The Letter of intent/Letter of Approval or Registration/ obtained receipt against filling of IEM to the appropriate authority. iii) NOC of GPCB (Gujarat Pollution Control Board) iv) Detailed Project Report. The following procedure will be adopted for granting the temporary and permanent Prestigious/Premier registration. (a) The Industries Commissioner shall give provisional registration to the eligible prestigious/premier unit after approval of committee where applicable. (b) The eligible unit after completion of project will apply to Industries Commissioner for permanent prestigious/premier registration, Industries Commissioner will carryout the assets verification and submit a verification report to the High Power State Level Committee, for granting permanent registration." 12.Some relevant facts which arose prior to the floating of the Scheme and which are necessary for appreciating the said Scheme, as contended by Essar and which the records also shows, are as under. 7 13.Essar was encouraged by the State Government to set up a major venture at Vadinar in Jamnagar District of Gujarat as a 100% export oriented unit for refining of petroleum products with a capacity of 9 Million Tons per annum at an estimated project cost of Rs. 1900 crores in collaboration with M/s Bechtel Inc., USA. 14.By letter dated 11th April, 1990, the then Chief Minister of the State of Gujarat wrote to the Ministry of Planning, Government of India, stating that the project was expected to generate foreign exchange earnings of over Rs.3000 crores within a period of 5 years and that it was expected to be set up in 36 months. It was anticipated by the State Government that the project would "completely change the face of the Vadinar area, which is traditionally a backward area of Gujarat offering direct and indirect employment and will encourage growth of various other ancillary industries in that region". The letter further said that the project had the 8 full support of the Government of Gujarat and it was being accorded highest priority and that Essar's proposal for setting up the oil refinery should be cleared by the Government of India urgently. The clearance for setting up the oil refinery was then granted by the Government of India. 15.In January, 1993, Essar applied to the Gujarat Pollution Control Board (GPCB) for grant of a `No Objection Certificate' to establish the refinery for manufacturing several kinds of petroleum products. By letter dated 15th February, 1993, the GPCB stated that it had no objection from the Environmental Pollution potential point of view in the setting up of the refinery project subject to certain environmental pollution control measures to be taken by the appellant. Essar's proposal regarding the environmental pollution control system was approved by the GPCB on 17th April, 1993 and a Site Clearance Certificate was issued on that date. 9 16. On 10.11.1994, Essar filed an application for right of way over 15.49 hectares of forest land for laying Submarine Crude Oil Pipeline, Cooling Water/Return Water Pipeline and Product Jetty for establishment of its Refinery Project at Vadinar, District Jamnagar, to the Conservator of Forests, Marine National Park, Jamnagar. Undisputedly, 15.49 hectares of forest land applied for includes 8.79 hectares of Jamnagar Marine National Park and Sanctuary. Therefore, permission under Section 2 of the Forest Conservation Act ("FCA") was required for the entire 15.49 hectares. At the same time, permission of State Government was required under the Wildlife Protection Act ("WPA") for 8.79 hectares. 17.On 13.02.1995, the State Government requested the Chief Conservator of Forests, Regional Office, Western Region, Bhopal, to move the Government of India to issue suitable orders to allow Essar to make geophysical survey in Marine National 10 Park/Sanctuary area. The proposal was forwarded by the Chief Conservator of Forests, Bhopal to the Government of India on 15.05.1995. 18.The Conservator of Forests recommended and forwarded the proposal of Essar for Right of Way to the Chief Conservator of Forests (WL) by letter dated 2nd June, 1995 along with an application in the prescribed form seeking prior approval from the Central Government under Section 2 of FCA. The application with its enclosures together with the recommendation of the State Government that 15.49 hectares of forest land be made available to the appellant, was forwarded to the Central Government by the Central Chief Conservator of Forests on 3rd February, 1997. Upon receipt of the proposal of the State Government, the Central Government constituted a team for joint inspection of the area. The report of the joint inspection team was that the proposed activity of the appellant would not have much ramification from the forestry point of view and the 11 damage would only be temporary in nature in a localized area during the construction phase. 19.On 08.09.1995, the State Government in its Forests and Environment Department informed the Government of India in the Ministry of Environment and Forests, inter alia, that the approval "in principle" was granted to Essar to install Single Buoy Mooring / Crude Oil Terminal / Jetty and connecting pipeline in the National Marine Park and Sanctuary area in Vadinar, District Jamnagar on the terms and conditions to be decided in due course by the State Government. 20.On 11.09.1995 the said Scheme was announced and thereafter on 01.02.1996 Essar applied in the new format to the Industries Commissioner, Gandhinagar for registering the Industrial Undertaking as a "Premier/Prestigious Unit" under the said Scheme. 21.On 29.05.1996 the Forest and Environment Department, State of Gujarat made a proposal to Government of 12 India seeking approval under Section 2 of FCA for diversion of 15.49 hectares of forest land for construction and operation of certain offshore and onshore facilities for a grass root refinery project of Essar. 22.On the basis of the letter-dated 30.09.1997 of the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests, the State Government conveyed on 16.10.1997 its permission under section 29 of WPA to Essar's proposal of right to way through the National Park and Sanctuary subject to Essar's compliance with certain terms and conditions including obtaining permission of the Central Government under the FCA, 1980 (which was granted on 08.12.1999, mentioned later) and also getting clearance under the Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ) Regulations, which was granted on 03.11.2000. 23.This permission was conveyed to Essar by the Conservator of Forests under cover of his letter- dated 18.10.1997. The permission was, however, restricted to the Kandla Port Trust area. Kandla 13 Port Trust granted permission to Essar to install "marine facilities" on 10.10.1997. 24.On 27.11.1997 the Ministry of Environment & Forest, Government of India granted "in-principle" approval to Essar under FCA, 1980 for diverting 15.49 hectares of forest land for non-forest purpose. 25.On 25.06.1999 Essar was issued the provisional Premier Registration Certificate by the Industries Commissioner. The provisional certificate was valid upto 15.08.2000 i.e. the last date of Scheme, within this time period Essar was obliged to start commercial production, failing which Essar would have to apply for extension of date of commercial production. 26.In the meantime in view of the permissions granted to install "marine facilities", Essar started construction work of laying of water in-take jetty and product jetty in the forest area of Marine 14 National Park and Marine Sanctuary. Essar's grievances are that despite the aforesaid permissions being given to them for construction, the State Forest Department forced Essar to stop work and further lodged on 19.3.1999 a criminal complaint against Essar and its contractor, for offence committed under sections 17(A), 29, 35(6), 51(1) and 58 of the WPA and section 26 of the Indian Forests Act. 27.In April 1999, a writ petition being Special Civil Application No.2840/1999 in the nature of Public Interest Litigation was filed before the High Court of Gujarat by one Halar Utkarsh Samiti (hereinafter "Samiti") alleging serious violations of several environmental legislations on the part of Essar, who was impleaded as Respondent No.4 in the petition. 28.By interim order-dated 20.04.1999 passed in that PIL High Court directed Essar not to carry on any construction activity in the Marine National Sanctuary and Marine National Park in violation of 15 the statutory provisions including the provisions contained in Wild life (Protection) Act, 1972. 29.By order-dated 20.08.1999 the High Court disposed of the said PIL in which Essar undertook to file an Undertaking to the effect that they would not carry out any construction activities at the site in question, without obtaining the approval from the authorities. Pursuant to the said order, on 28.09.1999 Essar filed an undertaking to the following effect: "...no construction activities or marine facilities will be undertaken without obtaining the approval from the authorities including those which are under process before the authorities. This undertaking is given without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the Respondent No.4. This undertaking will come to an end as and when the permission is granted by the authorities." 30.In the meantime on 09.09.1999, a charge sheet was filed against the officers of Essar and its 16 contractor in respect of earlier mentioned offences allegedly committed by them under the WPA and FCA. 31.On 08.12.1999 the Ministry of Environment and Forest, Government of India granted approval under section 2 of the FCA for the total land of 15.49 hectares of forest land. 32.In April 2000, said Samiti filed another PIL being Special Civil Application No.1778, and subsequently two other PILs were also filed by one Jan Sangarsh Manch and one Shri Alpesh Y. Kogje, being Civil Application Nos.5476 and 5928 of 2000, (hereinafter "second PILs") in the High Court of Gujarat challenging, inter alia, the permission granted by the State Government to one Bharat Oman Refineries Ltd. (`BORL') to lay pipeline in the Marine National Park and Sanctuary Area. It is pertinent to note here that Essar was not a party to these petitions. 33.On 29.04.2000 the Government of Gujarat discontinued the said Scheme with effect from 01.01.2000. 17 However, vide the same Government Resolution dated 29.04.2000, it was specifically mentioned that industry units in pipelines cases which have been registered should start production within two years from January 1, 2000 failing which such units shall be rendered ineligible for sales tax incentive. Therefore, the time to start commercial production was thus extended to 01.01.2002. It is common ground that Essar, being a registered unit, was entitled to the benefit of the said extension. 34.Before the High Court, when proceedings in respect of the second PILs were going on, the counsel of Government of Gujarat placed a copy of the letter- dated 25.07.2000. Relying on the letter, the High Court noted that there were two more pending proposals for laying pipeline in the Marine Park/Sanctuary Area with the State Government - one from Essar and the other from one Gujarat Poshitra Port Ltd. 18 35.Before the High Court, the State Government submitted that the proposal from Essar for laying down pipelines in Marine National Park and Marine Sanctuary, Vadinar in Jamnagar District has been only approved `in principle' vide letter-dated 08.09.1995. However, formal sanction under section 29 of the WPA, 1972 is yet to be given by the State Government. 36.By judgment and order dated 13.07.2000, 18.07.2000, 20.07.2000, 27.07.2000 and 03.08.2000 the High Court, in the second PILs, restrained the Government of Gujarat from granting any more authorization and permission for laying down any pipeline in any part of the sanctuary or the national park. As a result of this order, Essar was not given permission to lay down pipelines by the State Government. 37.Being aggrieved, inter alia, on the ground that it was not a party to the second PILs, Essar filed a review/recall application before the High Court 19 being MCA No.250 of 2011 in SCA No.1778 of 2000, inter alia, seeking review and recall of the judgment and order dated 13.07.2000, 18.07.2000, 20.07.2000, 27.07.2000 and 03.08.2000 passed in the second PILs by the High Court and a further declaration to the effect that Essar's project at Vadinar was not affected in any manner by the said judgment. 38.By judgment and order dated 23.02.2001 the High Court rejected the said application for review on the ground that there was a factual controversy between Essar and the State Government and that therefore the grievance of Essar was beyond the scope of review. 39.Meanwhile, on 12.04.2001 the Government of Gujarat extended the time for going into commercial production upto 15.08.2003 for various pipeline units including Essar, vide Government Resolution dated 12.04.2001. By that time Essar had obtained Provisional Premier Unit Registration before 20 15.08.2000 and had also incurred 25% of the Project Cost before 15.08.2000 and therefore, it was entitled to the benefit of this extension. 40.Essar challenged the aforesaid judgment and order dated 13.07.2000, 18.07.2000, 20.07.2000, 27.07.2000, 03.08.2000 and 23.02.2001 of the High Court delivered in the second PILs and the rejection of its review petition in that second PILs respectively by way of filing Special Level Petition being (SLP) CC No.3654 of 2001 [later SLP No.9454- 9455 of 2001] before this Hon'ble Court. 41.By interim order-dated 11.05.2001 this Court granted stay of the judgment of the High Court in so far as Essar was concerned in SLP No.9454-9455 of 2001 i.e. SLP filed by Essar. The text of the order of this Court is set out: "Permission to file Special Leave Petition is granted. Issue notice. Stay of the High Court judgment in so far as the petitioner is concerned. 21 Counter affidavit be filed within four weeks. Rejoinder be filed within four weeks thereafter. List after eight weeks." 42.In view of the above stay order granted by this Court, Essar moved the State Government for permitting it to proceed with the construction of jetty and laying the pipeline. By letter dated 29.10.2001, the State Government in the Forests and Environment Department specifically called Essar to ensure that no construction activities were commenced before obtaining all necessary clearances from different Government departments, agencies and the conditions stipulated by the Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of India as well as the Forests and Environment Department of the State Government were strictly complied with. However, Essar did not commence the construction of jetty or laying down the pipeline in the National Marine Park/Sanctuary area. One thing which is of some importance is that despite the stay of this Court and the Government letter dated 29.10.2001, Essar did not challenge the Government stand in the 22 pending special leave petition filed by it in this Court. 43. It is also pertinent to note that the Government of Gujarat had also challenged the judgment and order dated 13.07.2000, 18.07.2000, 20.07.2000, 27.07.2000 and 03.08.2000 of the High Court passed in the second PILs by way of filing Special Leave Petition being (SLP) CC No.5123-5125 of 2001 (later SLP No.17694-96 of 2001) before this Court, wherein by interim order dated 24.09.2001 this Court passed the following operative order: "Issue notice. Tag with SLP(C) 9454-9455/2001. There will be status quo as of today with the result that any permission which has been granted is not stayed. It will be open to the State Government to consider the granting of further permission which will be subject to the outcome of this appeal." 44.Essar just requested by its letter dated 11.04.2002 the Industries Commissioner to extend the date of 23 commercial production to 30.11.2004 instead of 15.08.2003 for the purpose of availing the incentive benefit under the Scheme and cited that the delay in completing the project and consequent delay in starting commercial production was due to the factors beyond the control of Essar. Further by letter-dated 07.05.2002 Essar in continuation of the letter-dated 11.04.2002 requested the Industries Commissioner to extend the date of commercial production to August 2006. 45.The Industries Commissioner refused to grant any further extension of time vide its letter-dated 28.05.2002 and also made it clear to Essar to go into commercial production within the specified time i.e. till 15.08.2003. Essar, therefore, submitted a representation dated 19.06.2002 to the Chief Minister pointing out the circumstances which had delayed the completion of the project. Similar representations were thereafter made to different authorities of the State Government on 27.06.2002, 14.03.2003, 30.07.2003, 02.12.2003 and 26.12.2003. 24 It appears that the said representations were not responded to. 46.By an order-dated 19.01.2004, this Court quashed and set aside the judgment dated 03.08.2000 of High Court and directed the State Government to issue the authorization to Essar in the requisite format under Sections 29 and 35 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act within a fortnight after disapproving the interpretation placed by the High Court on the provisions of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972. This Court took the view that the permission granted by the State Government on 16.10.1997 was the permission contemplated by Section 29 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act. 47. In compliance with the above judgment, by letter dated 12.02.2004, the State Government authorized the Chief Wild Life Warden, Gujarat State under Sections 29 and 35 (6) of the Wild Life (Protection) Act to permit Essar for laying oil pipeline in the 25 National Marine Park/Sanctuary area. The Chief Wild Life Warden also issued the requisite permission on 27.02.2004. 48. In the meantime, the accused i.e. officials and contractors of Essar involved in the Criminal Case of 1999 moved an application for discharge before the Metropolitan Magistrate at Khambalia. By order- dated 27.05.2004 the Magistrate allowed the said application and discharged the accused persons from all the charges levelled against them. 49.In view of the above permission granted by the Chief Wild Life Warden under Sections 29 and 35 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, Essar again sent representations dated 06.04.2004, 12.07.2004, 27.07.2004 and 22.12.2004 to the Government requesting extension of time limit for commencement of commercial production for the purpose of sales tax deferment incentive scheme. In view of the above representations, the State Government in the Industries and Mines Department vide Resolution 26 dated 10.05.2006 constituted a Committee comprising of the Advisor to the Chief Minister, the then Additional Chief Secretary, Finance Department and the then Principal Secretary, Industries and Mines department. The Committee was constituted to consider various such representations of Essar and other Companies. 50.On 26.11.2006 Essar commenced commercial production and started paying sales tax on the products sold by it, under protest. 51.As nothing was heard from the said Committee constituted in the year 2006 and the representations made by Essar in respect of granting Sales Tax Deferment were undecided, Essar filed a writ petition being Special Civil Application No. 24233/2007 before the High Court contending that for no fault of it, Essar was prevented from completing the project and that it was on account of being so prevented, Essar 27 could not commence the commercial production within the time limit of 15.08.2003. 52.It is pertinent to note at this stage that before the High Court, Essar had expressly withdrawn the allegation that Department of Forest and Conservation, Government of Gujarat was guilty of delay. This is noted in para 6.2 of the High Court judgment which is set out below: "6.2 While in the memo of the petition some allegations/submissions have been made attributing the delay to the Forests and Conservation Department of State Government, but the petitioner Company is not interested in pursuing those allegations and in fact would like to withdraw those allegations and the petitioner would like to invoke the following maxims of equity:- (i) "An act of the Court shall prejudice no man", and (ii) "The law does not compel a man to do that which he cannot possibly perform." 53. Before the High Court Essar contended that reason for delay in commencement of commercial production was on account of the injunction granted by the High Court on 13.07.2000/03.08.2000, restraining the 28 State from granting further permission under Section 29 of the WPA in the second PILs (where Essar was not a party). And this situation continued till 27.02.2004, when pursuant to the judgment-dated 19.01.2004 of this Court the Chief Warden granted the said permission. Therefore Essar was entitled to get benefit of the exclusion of the said intervening period of from 13.07.2000 to 27.02.2004 i.e. three years and 230 days in calculating the time limit for commencement of commercial production. 54. By impugned order-dated 22.04.2008 the High Court excluded the aforesaid intervening period and as such extended the time limit for commencement of commercial production from 15.08.2003 to 02.04.2007 after observing in the impugned judgment as under: "17. ...In the facts of the present case also, the State Government had granted the permission on 16.10.1997 and the Central Government had granted the permission on 08.12.1999. The very fact that the Chief Wild Life Warden issued the permission on 27.02.2004 after the decision of the Apex Court on 19.01.2004 is itself sufficient to show that the request made by the 29 petitioner for excluding the intervening period between 13th July/3rd August, 2000 and 27.02.2004 is reasonable." 55.It is also pertinent to note herein that in the impugned order, a direction was given to the State Government that while considering Essar's application for the incentives, the State Government shall stipulate the following conditions, provided the final eligibility certificate is issued within one month from the date of receipt of the judgment:- "22. ... (i) The petitioner shall not be given the benefit of deferment of Sales-tax/Value Added Tax beyond 14th August, 2020. (ii) The amount of Sales-tax/VAT already paid/payable by the petitioner for the period upto today shall not be refunded to the petitioner. (The above amount is stated by the petitioner company to be above Rs.300 crores) (iii) Without adjusting the Sales-tax/VAT paid for the period upto today as aforesaid, the amount otherwise computable under the Incentive Scheme on the basis of the eligible capital investment made by the petitioner in 30 the unit under consideration shall be reduced by Rs.700 crores." 56. The above direction is based on the submissions of the counsel of both the parties, which were made without prejudice to their respective cases. The counsel of Essar submitted a proposal that Essar was ready to make the above mentioned concessions no. (i) & (ii) if the State Government does not challenge the decision of the High Court and within one month from that day the State Government grants Essar the benefit of the Sales Tax/VAT deferment as per the said scheme. In response to the said proposal the learned counsel for the State Government replied that assuming that Essar was found to be eligible under the said Scheme, the amount otherwise computable under the Incentive Scheme on the basis of the eligible capital investment made by Essar in the unit under consideration shall be reduced by Rs.700 crores. 57.The learned counsel for the respondents made an attempt to urge that the judgment of the High Court 31 was virtually rendered by way of a concession and the impugned judgment is a consent order. As such the appeal, at the instance of the State, is not maintainable. Learned counsel for the State strongly opposed this contention and submitted that the same contention was raised at the time of admission of the special leave petition. Then, further affidavit was filed by the State with the leave of the Court. The Court was satisfied and then issued notice. 58. Ultimately, the matter was argued on merits before this Court and it was common ground that the impugned judgment is not by consent. 59.The impugned judgment of the High Court is based on two basic line of reasoning that the respondents are entitled to the benefit of Sales Tax Waiver Scheme firstly on the principle of restitution and secondly, that the respondents cannot be made to lose the benefit under the Sales Tax Waiver Scheme, for an act of Court. In this regard it has been urged that the respondents could not set up the 32 plant for the purpose of commercial production within 15th August, 2003 as it was prevented from doing so by an order of injunction of the High Court. An order of injunction is an act of Court and an act of High Court cannot prejudice anyone. The loss of time suffered by the respondent as a result of the injunction order cannot cause any prejudice to the respondent. 60.Examining the aforesaid two contentions, this Court finds that there is an overlapping area between the two. The concept of restitution is basically founded on the idea that when a decree is reversed, law imposes an obligation on the party who received an unjust benefit of the erroneous decree to restitute the other party for what the other party has lost during the period the erroneous decree was in operation. Therefore, the Court while granting restitution is required to restore the parties as far as possible to their same position as they were in at the time when the Court by its erroneous action displaced them. In the case of Lal Bhagwant 33 Singh v. Sri Kishen Das reported in AIR 1953 SC 136, Justice Mahajan speaking for a unanimous three-Judge Bench of this Court explained the doctrine of restitution in the following words:- "...the principles of the doctrine of restitution which is that on the reversal of a judgment the law raises an obligation on the party to the record who received the benefit of the erroneous judgment to make restitution to the other party for what he had lost and that it is the duty of the Court to enforce that obligation unless it is shown that restitution would be clearly contrary to the real justice of the case..." 61.Subsequently, in Binayak Swain v. Ramesh Chandra Panigrahi and another (AIR 1966 SC 948) this Court relied on the principles in Bhagwant Singh (supra) and explained the concept of restitution as follows:- "...The principle of the doctrine of restitution is that on the reversal of a decree, the law imposes an obligation on the party to the suit who received the benefit of the erroneous decree to make restitution to the other party for what he has lost." 62.The concept of restitution is virtually a common law principle and it is a remedy against unjust 34 enrichment or unjust benefit. The core of the concept lies in the conscience of the Court which prevents a party from retaining money or some benefit derived from another which he has received by way of an erroneous decree of Court. Such remedy in English Law is generally different from a remedy in contract or in tort and falls within a third category of common law remedy which is called quasi contract or restitution. 63.If we analyze the concept of restitution one thing emerges clearly that the obligation to restitute lies on the person or the authority that has received unjust enrichment or unjust benefit (See Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Volume 9, page 434). 64.If we look at Restatement of the Law of Restitution by American Law Institute (1937 American Law Institute Publishers, St. Paul) we get that a person is enriched if he has received a benefit and similarly a person is unjustly enriched if the 35 retention of the benefit would be unjust. Now the question is what constitutes a benefit. A person confers benefit upon another if he gives to the other possession of or some other interest in money, land, chattels, or performs services beneficial to or at the request of the other, satisfies a debt or a duty of the other or in a way adds to the other's security or advantage. He confers a benefit not only where he adds to the property of another but also where he saves the other from expense or loss. Thus the word "benefit" therefore denotes any form of advantage (page 12 of the Restatement of the Law of Restitution by American Law Institute). 65.Ordinarily in cases of restitution if there is a benefit to one, there is a corresponding loss to other and in such cases; the benefiting party is also under a duty to give to the losing party, the amount by which he has been enriched. 66.We find that a person who has conferred a benefit upon another in compliance with a judgment or whose 36 property has been taken thereunder, is entitled to restitution if the judgment is reversed or set- aside, unless restitution would be inequitable (page 302 of the Restatement of the Law of Restitution by American Law Institute). 67.Equity demands that if one party has not been unjustly enriched, no order of recovery can be made against that party. Other situation would be when a party acquires benefits lawfully, which are not conferred by the party claiming restitution, Court cannot order restitution. 68. From the facts of the case which has been discussed above it is debatable whether the respondent's inability to avail benefit under the said Scheme is because of its own act or because of the act of the appellant. There is a reasonable basis in the argument of the appellant that after this Court granted the stay order on 11.5.2001 on the special leave petition filed by Essar, the respondents should have made an effort of obtaining the 37 necessary licence by again coming to the Court. Admittedly Essar did not do it. Essar merely represented to the State for grant of licence. Assuming that the State had not responded favourably to the representation of Essar by giving the clearance, it was open to Essar to approach this Court for some order as its special leave petition was pending before this Court. Essar did not do it. Therefore, the question remains whether Essar acted with due diligence in obtaining the equitable remedy of restitution. It is well known that due diligence must be exhibited by the party to seek equity. 69.Now, if we take the case of Essar on a higher plain that it has done its duty even then it has been denied of the benefit of the said scheme, even then there is no question of restitution by the State for the simple reason that it is nobody's case that State has received any unjust benefit or any unjust enrichment in view of stay order given by the High Court in the second PILs filed in the High Court. On the contrary, it is clear from the record that the 38 State contested those proceedings and specially, challenging the orders of the Gujarat High Court dated 13.07.2000, 18.07.2000, 20.07.2000, 27.07.2000 and 03.08.2000 on the second PILs, the State has filed its SLP. Therefore, the State has not at all gained or received any benefit as a result of the orders passed by the High Court on the second PILs. Therefore, the principle of restitution cannot be applied against the State, the appellant before us. The judgment of the High Court to that extent is erroneous. 70.The second principle that an act of court cannot prejudice anyone, based on latin maxim "actus curiae neminem gravabit" is also encompassed partly within the doctrine of restitution. This actus curiae principle is founded upon justice and good sense and is a guide for the administration of law. 71.The aforesaid principle of "actus curiae" was applied in the case of A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak & another reported in (1988) 2 SCC 602, wherein 39 Sabyasachi Mukharji, J (as his lordship then was) giving the majority judgment for the Constitution Bench of this Court, explained its concept and application in para 83, page 672 of the report. His lordship quoted the observation of Lord Cairns in Rodger v. Comptoir D'escompte De Paris, [(1869-71) LR 3 PC 465 at page 475) which is set out below: "Now, their Lordships are of opinion, that one of the first and highest duties of all Courts is to take care that the act of the Court does no injury to any of the Suitors, and when the expression 'the act of the Court' is used, it does not mean merely the act of the Primary Court, or of any intermediate Court of appeal, but the act of the Court as a whole, from the lowest Court which entertains jurisdiction over the matter up to the highest Court which finally disposes of the case. It is the duty of the aggregate of those Tribunals, if I may use the expression, to take care that no act of the Court in the course of the whole of the proceedings does an injury to the suitors in the Court." 72.In the Antulay case (supra), it was found that directions of this Court in its order-dated 16.02.1984 in the previous Antulay Case {R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antuley, (1984) 2 SCC 183} was given per incuriam and without noticing the provisions of 40 section 6 and 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 and also the binding nature of the Larger Bench decision in The State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar & another (AIR 1952 SC 75). 73.It was made clear in the Antulay Case [(1988) 2 SCC 602] that when Court passes an order, which is rendered per incuriam, and the party suffered because of the mistake of the Court, it is the Court's duty to rectify the said mistake. It is in that context that the concept of actus curiae can be invoked. In the instant case the order passed by the High Court in the second PILs was overturned by this Court by its order-dated 19.01.2004 on a different interpretation of section 29 of the WPA. 74.This Court while giving a different interpretation of section 29 of WPA never held that High Court acted per incuriam in rendering its judgment on second PIL filed by the Samiti. Therefore in the case of a mere erroneous judgment of a Court the principle of "actus curiae" cannot be invoked. 41 75.The learned counsel for Essar in support of the applicability of Doctrine of Restitution has cited the case of South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. State of M.P. & others reported in (2003) 8 SCC 648 wherein this Court through R.C. Lahoti, J (as his Lordship then was) in para 27 had observed that: "Section 144 C.P.C. is not the fountain source of restitution, it is rather a statutory recognition of a pre-existing rule of justice, equity and fair play. That is why it is often held that even away from Section 144 the Court has inherent jurisdiction to order restitution so as to do complete justice between the parties." 76.His Lordship at para 28 observed as under: "That no one shall suffer by an act of the court is not a rule confined to an erroneous act of the court; the 'act of the court' embraces within its sweep all such acts as to which the court may form an opinion in any legal proceedings that the court would not have so acted had it been correctly apprised of the facts and the law. The factor attracting applicability of restitution is not the act of the Court being wrongful or a mistake or error committed by the Court; the test is whether on account of an act of the party persuading the Court to pass an order held at the end as not sustainable, has resulted in one party gaining 42 an advantage which it would not have otherwise earned, or the other party has suffered an impoverishment which it would not have suffered but for the order of the Court and the act of such party. The quantum of restitution, depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case, may take into consideration not only what the party excluded would have made but also what the party under obligation has or might reasonably have made." 77.As discussed earlier a mere mistake or error committed by Court cannot be a ground for restitution. Now in view of the above, two questions arise for consideration: (i) Whether the orders dated 13.07.2000, 18.07.2000, 20.07.2000, 27.07.2000 and 03.08.2000 of the High Court whereby the appellant was restrained from giving any further permission for laying pipelines has resulted in any undue advantage to appellant? (ii) Whether in respect of the order dated 13.07.2000, 18.07.2000, 20.07.2000, 27.07.2000 and 03.08.2000 of the High Court, later on reversed by this Court on 19.01.2004 on a different 43 interpretation of Section 29 of WPA, the actus curiae principle can be invoked. 78.Coming to the first question, as mentioned above, it is clear that the appellant had also challenged this restraining order before this Court. It cannot be said by this restraining order the appellant had gained any undue advantage. On the contrary, twin objects of development of the backward areas and employment opportunities, which were sought to be achieved by the appellant by floating the said scheme, were adversely affected. 79.Therefore the principles in South Eastern Coalfield Ltd. (supra) are not attracted here. 80.In Mumbai International Airport Pvt. Ltd v. Golden Chariot Airport & another, (2010) 10 SCC 422, after a Civil Court returned the plaint filed by respondent, the respondent came up in appeal against the said order before the High Court and expressly gave up its claim of irrevocable license in order to 44 revive the suit and on such stand, the High Court remanded the suit for trial. Thereafter the respondent therein tried to urge the same plea of irrevocable license before the Trial Court and this Court. This Court did not accept the plea holding that the common law doctrine of approbation and reprobation is well established in our jurisprudence and applicable in our laws too. That principle has no application to the facts of this case. 81.The principles decided in the case of Karnataka Rare Earth & Anr. v. Senior Geologist, Department of Mines & Geology and Anr. , reported in (2004) 2 SCC 783 is equally of no assistance to Essar. In that case both the doctrines of "actus curiae" and "restitution" were discussed together. We have already held that these equitable doctrines are not applicable in the facts of the present case. In Karnataka Rare Earth (supra), the appellants, on the basis of an interim order granted by this Court, extracted minerals and disposed of the same. Ultimately the interim order was vacated by this 45 Court and the appeal filed by Karnataka Rare Earth was dismissed. In that context this Court held that the appellants cannot enjoy the benefits earned by them under the interim order of this Court and this Court held that the demand of the State for the price of mines and minerals from the appellant is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. 82.Reliance was placed on the judgment of this Court in Bareilly Development Authority v. Methodist Church of India & Anr., reported in (1988) Supp SCC 174. In that case no principle was decided but the case was decided on its facts. In Bareilly Development Authority (supra), a commercial complex was to be constructed within a time schedule. During the said period of construction, the work had to be stopped in view of the demolition order passed by the authority. This Court held that the said period has to be excluded in computing the period of completion. It was not a case of construing any exemption scheme. What was construed was condition 6 of the construction sanction plan. Therefore 46 principles of Bareilly Development Authority (supra) cannot be applied. 83.In the case of Hitech Electrothermics & Hydro Power Ltd. v. State of Kerala & Ors., reported in (2003) 2 SCC 716 it is true that this case is one relating to grant of concessional tariff rate. However the fact shows that in that case the Electricity Board provided power to the appellant only in the year 1998 and the Court found that the delay in giving power was for sheer inaction on the part of Electricity Board. In that context this Court held that literal construction to the entitlement of concessional tariff rate should not be done and the Court also noted that the appellant enjoyed concessional tariff rates on the basis of interim order of Court. 84.In the instant case, no inaction on the part of appellant was pleaded by Essar. In fact before the High Court, Essar expressly gave up its plea of delay against the appellant. In fact the High Court 47 passed the injunction order not because of the inaction of the appellant but the said order was passed in a proceedings which was opposed by appellant right upto this Court. Therefore, the case of Hitech Electrothermics (supra) is clearly distinguishable on facts. 85.The learned counsel for Essar relied on a decision of this Court in Ishwar Dutt v. Land Acquisition Collector & another reported in (2005) 7 SCC 190. But no question of issue estoppel was argued before the High Court and no such question actually has fallen for consideration in the course of argument before this Court. Therefore reliance on the principle of issue estoppel on the basis of Ishawar Dutt (supra) is not relevant at all. 86.In this case we are to interpret the provisions of exemption scheme. 87.In Novopan India Ltd. Hyderabad v. Collector of Central Exercise and Customs, Hyderabad [(1994) Supp 48 3 SCC 606] the question for consideration before this Court was that, in case of ambiguity, which rule of construction will be applicable to exemption provision. This Court relied on the case of Union of India & others v. Wood Papers Ltd & another reported in (1990) 4 SCC 256, wherein at para 4, page 260 this Court observed as under: "...Truly speaking liberal and strict construction of an exemption provision are to be invoked at different stages of interpreting it. When the question is whether a subject falls in the notification or in the exemption clause then it being in nature of exception is to be construed strictly and against the subject but once ambiguity or doubt about applicability is lifted and the subject falls in the notification then full play should be given to it and it calls for a wider and liberal construction." 88.This Court held that the principle that in case of ambiguity, a taxing statute should be construed in favour of the assessee, does not apply to the construction of an exception or an exempting provision, as the same have to be construed strictly. Further this Court also held that a person 49 invoking an exception or an exemption provision to relieve him of the tax liability must establish clearly that he is covered by the said provision and in case of doubt or ambiguity, benefit of it must go to the State. 89.In this case, Essar was categorically told by letter dated 28.05.2002, which is much prior to the expiry of the period, that time for availing the exemption cannot be extended. Admittedly, Essar failed to meet the deadline. In that factual scenario, the exercise undertaken by the High Court in the impugned judgment by directing various adjustments which virtually re-wrote the State's exemption scheme, is an exercise which is, with great respect, neither warranted in law nor supported by precedents. There is no question of equity here, an exemption is a stand alone process. Either an industry claiming exemption comes within it or it does not. 90.For the reasons aforesaid we allow the appeal. The High Court judgment is set aside. 50 91.The parties are left to bear their own costs. .......................J. (ASOK KUMAR GANGULY) .......................J. New Delhi (JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR) January 17, 2012 51