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Thursday, January 22, 2026

Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act (1975) – Licensing and De-licensing – Rights of Apartment Owners. (A) Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act (1975) – License for Residential Colony – De-licensing of portion of land. Developer initially obtained license for 18.98 acres for a residential colony—Subsequently applied for de-licensing of 8 acres to develop a commercial complex (Mall/Hotel)—Residents of Phase-I (10.98 acres) challenged the reduction of area, alleging loss of promised open spaces—Held, the legality of de-licensing depends on whether the rights of apartment owners under the Apartment Buyers’ Agreement and the Haryana Apartment Ownership Act were violated—Matter scrutinized for alleged collusion between State authorities and developer.

Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act (1975) – Licensing and De-licensing – Rights of Apartment Owners.

(A) Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act (1975) – License for Residential Colony – De-licensing of portion of land. Developer initially obtained license for 18.98 acres for a residential colony—Subsequently applied for de-licensing of 8 acres to develop a commercial complex (Mall/Hotel)—Residents of Phase-I (10.98 acres) challenged the reduction of area, alleging loss of promised open spaces—Held, the legality of de-licensing depends on whether the rights of apartment owners under the Apartment Buyers’ Agreement and the Haryana Apartment Ownership Act were violated—Matter scrutinized for alleged collusion between State authorities and developer.

(B) National Green Tribunal Act (2010) – Environmental Compensation – Violation of open space norms. Original Application before NGT alleging destruction of parks and green belts—Joint Expert Committee recommending fine of Rs. 138.83 crores—Held, environmental violations in specialized jurisdictions like NGT are to be treated independently from general civil disputes regarding land title or licensing—Demolition of commercial structures a potential remedy for extreme environmental degradation.

(C) Civil Procedure Code (1908), S. 11 – Res Judicata – Multiplicity of proceedings. Previous suits filed by Residents’ Association (ALARWA) withdrawn or dismissed—Individual residents filing fresh Writ Petitions—Maintainability challenged on grounds of delay and prior litigation—Effect of withdrawal of representative suits on individual rights discussed.


2. Gujarat Public Service Commission v. Gnaneshwary D. Shah

2026 INSC 70

AICTE Act (1987) – Recruitment Rules – Estoppel.

(A) All India Council for Technical Education (Career Advancement Scheme) Regulations (2012) – Nature of Regulations – Direct Recruitment vs. Promotion. AICTE Regulations 2012 titled "Career Advancement Scheme"—Applicability to direct recruitment challenged—Held, the architecture of the Regulations (API scores, PBAS) is designed for "Promotion and Progression" of incumbent teachers—It serves as a "ladder" for those already in the system, not a "gate" for initial entry—Direct recruitment for Government Engineering Colleges to be governed by State Recruitment Rules, not CAS Regulations.

(B) Constitution of India, Art. 16 – Selection Process – Challenge by unsuccessful candidate – Estoppel. Candidate participated in the interview process for the post of Professor without protest—Failed to secure minimum qualifying marks—Challenged the selection criteria only after being declared unsuccessful—Held, a candidate having taken a chance in the selection process cannot turn around and challenge the "rules of the game" or the methodology of evaluation after failing—Principle of estoppel squarely applies.

(C) Administrative Law – Judicial Review – Expert Committees. Evaluation of suitability for academic posts—Held, the decision of a Committee of Experts regarding the suitability of a candidate should not be interfered with by Courts in exercise of powers of judicial review, unless there is patent illegality or mala fides.

A registered Sale Deed carrying clear and unambiguous terms of absolute transfer cannot be declared sham or nominal merely on the basis of oral evidence or subsequent conduct; in the absence of a reconveyance condition embodied in the same instrument as mandated by the proviso to Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act, the transaction cannot constitute a mortgage by conditional sale, and the strong statutory presumption of validity attached to registered instruments can be displaced only by specific pleadings and cogent proof satisfying the standard under Order VI Rule 4 CPC.

TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, 1882 — Section 58(c)

Mortgage by conditional sale — Mandatory statutory requirement — Condition must be in same document

For a transaction to constitute a mortgage by conditional sale, the condition that the sale shall become void or that reconveyance shall take place must be embodied in the very document which effects or purports to effect the sale.

Where the registered Sale Deed contained no such condition, the transaction cannot be treated as mortgage by conditional sale.

(Proviso to S.58(c) strictly applied.)
(Paras 44–49)


INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872 — Sections 91 & 92

Registered sale deed — Clear and unambiguous terms — Bar on oral evidence

Where the terms of a registered Sale Deed are clear, categorical and admit of no ambiguity, extrinsic or oral evidence is inadmissible to contradict its contents.

Oral evidence is not permissible merely to allege that the document was intended as security, unless foundational facts satisfying statutory exceptions are pleaded and proved.
(Paras 15–18, 41–43)


REGISTERED DOCUMENT — PRESUMPTION

Strong presumption of validity and genuineness

A registered Sale Deed carries a formidable presumption of validity.

The burden to rebut such presumption lies heavily upon the person alleging that the document is sham or nominal.

Courts must not casually or lightly declare a registered document to be fictitious.
(Paras 31–33, 38)


PLEADINGS — Order VI Rule 4 CPC

Allegation of sham transaction — Requirement of strict pleadings

A plea that a registered document is sham, nominal or fraudulent must satisfy rigorous pleading standards, akin to Order VI Rule 4 CPC.

Mere use of expressions such as “sham”, “nominal” or “fraud” without material particulars amounts to clever drafting creating illusion of cause of action, and cannot displace statutory presumptions.
(Paras 34–41)


SALE DEED v. MORTGAGE

Intention of parties — To be gathered primarily from document

Where the Sale Deed:

  • recites absolute transfer of ownership,

  • records full consideration,

  • contains indemnity clause,

  • acknowledges delivery of possession, and

  • is followed by execution of a registered lease deed,

the intention of parties is clearly that of an outright sale and not a mortgage transaction.
(Paras 43–55)


RENTAL AGREEMENT — EFFECT

Execution of lease after sale — Admission of ownership

Execution of a registered Rental Agreement by the vendor in favour of purchaser subsequent to sale deed:

  • acknowledges change of status from owner to tenant, and

  • constitutes strong evidence that the sale was intended to be acted upon.

Payment of rent for fourteen months reinforces genuineness of sale.
(Paras 5–9, 54–55)


ADMISSION — LEGAL NOTICE REPLY

Reply admitting tenancy and arrears — Evidentiary value

Where the executant:

  • replies to eviction notice admitting default in rent, and

  • undertakes to clear arrears,

such reply constitutes a clear admission, especially when no plea is taken that reply was issued under mistake or without understanding contents.
(Paras 6–8, 73–75)


INADEQUACY OF CONSIDERATION

Does not invalidate sale

Mere allegation that consideration was inadequate does not render a sale deed void.

In absence of proof of total absence of consideration, Explanation 2 to Section 25 of the Contract Act applies.
(Para 60)


MUNICIPAL RECORDS — MUTATION

Not proof of title

Non-mutation of purchaser’s name in municipal or revenue records and payment of taxes by vendor do not defeat title created under registered Sale Deed.

Revenue entries do not confer ownership.
(Paras 61–65)


EVIDENCE — SUBSEQUENT CONDUCT

Subsequent conduct such as payment of taxes or continued possession cannot override:

  • express recitals of registered conveyance, and

  • statutory presumptions attached thereto.
    (Paras 61–65)


GANGABAI v. CHHABUBAI — (1982) 1 SCC 4

Distinction explained

Principle permitting oral evidence to prove sham transaction applies only where:

  • execution itself was not intended to operate at all.

It does not apply where:

  • parties knowingly executed registered sale and lease deeds, and

  • subsequent conduct affirms transfer.

High Court erred in mechanically applying Gangabai.
(Paras 72)


CIVIL PROCEDURE — SECOND APPEAL

High Court exceeded jurisdiction

High Court erred in:

  • ignoring statutory presumptions,

  • misapplying Section 92 Evidence Act, and

  • restoring trial court decree contrary to settled law.

Interference warranted.
(Paras 72–78)


ANALYSIS OF FACTS AND LAW


1. Nature of dispute

The litigation arose from a registered Sale Deed dated 12.11.1971 followed by a registered Rental Agreement of the same date.

The vendor later sought declaration that:

  • sale deed was sham and nominal;

  • transaction was actually a mortgage;

  • eviction proceedings should be restrained.


2. Trial Court approach

The Trial Court:

  • relied heavily on oral testimony,

  • ignored statutory bar under Sections 91–92 Evidence Act,

  • treated subsequent conduct as decisive, and

  • declared the sale deed sham.


3. First Appellate Court

The First Appellate Court reversed the decree holding:

  • intention must be gathered from document;

  • oral evidence barred;

  • sale was genuine and intended to operate.


4. High Court error

The High Court restored trial court decree relying almost entirely on Gangabai without:

  • examining Section 58(c) TPA proviso;

  • appreciating registered lease deed;

  • addressing admissions in reply notice;

  • applying Order VI Rule 4 CPC standards.


5. Supreme Court correction

The Supreme Court held:

  • Registration creates strong presumption of genuineness.

  • Sham plea requires strict pleadings and strong proof.

  • No clause of reconveyance existed in sale deed.

  • Mortgage by conditional sale statutorily impossible.

  • Subsequent tax payments and possession irrelevant.

  • Reply notice admitting tenancy fatal to plaintiff case.

The Court restored the judgment of the First Appellate Court.


RATIO DECIDENDI

A registered Sale Deed carrying clear and unambiguous terms of absolute transfer cannot be declared sham or nominal merely on the basis of oral evidence or subsequent conduct; in the absence of a reconveyance condition embodied in the same instrument as mandated by the proviso to Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act, the transaction cannot constitute a mortgage by conditional sale, and the strong statutory presumption of validity attached to registered instruments can be displaced only by specific pleadings and cogent proof satisfying the standard under Order VI Rule 4 CPC.

Exception — Perjury proceedings Proceedings under Section 340 CrPC / Section 379 read with Section 215 BNSS alleging perjury and fabrication of evidence excluded from blanket quashing — Such proceedings to continue independently as no party can be permitted to pollute the stream of justice. (Paras 28–29) False statements — Stream of justice Perjury proceedings cannot be terminated merely because matrimonial dispute has been settled — Allegations of false evidence must be adjudicated on merits. (Paras 28–29)

advocatemmmohan



Constitution of India — Article 142 — Divorce — Irretrievable breakdown of marriage

Supreme Court, in exercise of power under Article 142(1), may dissolve a marriage on the ground of irretrievable breakdown, even though such ground is not provided under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 — Power may be exercised despite opposition of one spouse, where marriage is completely shattered and beyond salvage.
(Paras 10–11, 15, 20, 26)


Irretrievable breakdown — Indicators

Marriage where parties cohabited only for 65 days, lived separately for more than a decade, and were engaged in over 40 civil and criminal proceedings against each other — repeated failure of mediation and reconciliation — held to be a clear case of irretrievable breakdown.
(Paras 7–9, 15–21, 26)


Article 142 — Complete justice — Scope

Power under Article 142 is discretionary, equitable and situation-specific — Court may dissolve marriage to put an end to prolonged litigation, suffering and misery where continuation of legal relationship serves no purpose.
(Paras 11–11.2, 20–21, 26)


Opposition by spouse — Not a bar

Consent of both spouses not mandatory — Divorce can be granted even when one party opposes dissolution, provided Court is satisfied that there is no possibility of cohabitation and continuation of marriage would be unjustified.
(Paras 11.2, 19–20, 26)


Multiplicity of litigation — Abuse of judicial process

More than four decades of cumulative litigation including matrimonial, criminal, execution and perjury proceedings — Courts cannot be used as battlefields by warring spouses to settle personal scores — Judicial system cannot be choked by endless matrimonial litigation.
(Paras 8–9, 21–22)


Mediation — Failure — Consequence

Despite reference to mediation by Supreme Court, process could not commence — repeated attempts at reconciliation failed — absence of any realistic possibility of settlement justified dissolution of marriage.
(Paras 2, 15)


Pending matrimonial and criminal proceedings — Quashing

All pending proceedings arising out of matrimonial dispute between the parties directed to stand disposed of upon grant of divorce, to bring quietus to litigation.
(Paras 18, 28, 30)


Exception — Perjury proceedings

Proceedings under Section 340 CrPC / Section 379 read with Section 215 BNSS alleging perjury and fabrication of evidence excluded from blanket quashing — Such proceedings to continue independently as no party can be permitted to pollute the stream of justice.
(Paras 28–29)


False statements — Stream of justice

Perjury proceedings cannot be terminated merely because matrimonial dispute has been settled — Allegations of false evidence must be adjudicated on merits.
(Paras 28–29)


Alimony

No alimony claimed by wife — All past claims deemed settled upon dissolution of marriage.
(Para 26)


Costs

Both parties saddled with costs of ₹10,000 each for indulging in prolonged and excessive litigation.
(Para 32)


ANALYSIS OF THE JUDGMENT


1. Nature of proceedings

The case originated as a transfer petition filed by the wife seeking transfer of perjury proceedings from Delhi to Lucknow.

During pendency:

  • wife filed application under Article 142 seeking dissolution of marriage;

  • husband opposed dissolution and appeared in person.


2. Factual matrix

  • Marriage solemnized: 28.01.2012

  • Separation: 02.04.2012

  • Cohabitation: 65 days only

  • Separation period: over 13 years


3. Litigation history

The Court undertook an unprecedented factual verification by:

  • directing both parties to file exhaustive lists of cases;

  • calling reports from Registrars General of Delhi High Court and Allahabad High Court;

  • identifying discrepancies in parties’ disclosures.

More than 40 civil and criminal cases were found to have been filed between the parties across multiple jurisdictions.


4. Application of Constitution Bench ruling

The Court relied principally on:

Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan

(2023) 14 SCC 231

Holding that:

  • irretrievable breakdown is not a statutory ground under HMA;

  • but Supreme Court may dissolve marriage under Article 142;

  • long separation, multiple litigations and failed mediation are decisive factors.


5. Factors applied (para 63 of Shilpa Sailesh)

The Court evaluated:

  • duration of separation (over a decade);

  • absence of children;

  • continuous litigation;

  • failure of mediation;

  • level of bitterness;

  • absence of possibility of reunion.

All parameters stood fully satisfied.


6. Findings

The Court held:

  • marriage was “wrecked beyond salvage”;

  • reconciliation impossible;

  • continuation of legal tie unjustified;

  • case squarely fell within irretrievable breakdown doctrine.


7. Final directions

  • Marriage dissolved under Article 142.

  • All matrimonial proceedings quashed.

  • Perjury proceedings preserved.

  • Parties restrained from further matrimonial litigation.

  • Costs imposed on both parties.


RATIO DECIDENDI

Where spouses have cohabited only briefly, lived separately for more than a decade, engaged in extensive civil and criminal litigation against each other, and all efforts at reconciliation including mediation have failed, the Supreme Court may, in exercise of its extraordinary power under Article 142 of the Constitution, dissolve the marriage on the ground of irretrievable breakdown, notwithstanding the absence of such ground under the Hindu Marriage Act and despite opposition by one spouse, in order to do complete justice and bring finality to the dispute.


LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE

This judgment:

  • Reaffirms the binding authority of Shilpa Sailesh

  • Clarifies that Article 142 divorce is independent of consent

  • Permits global settlement of matrimonial litigation

  • Protects perjury jurisdiction from compromise

  • Demonstrates judicial intolerance towards litigation abuse in family disputes

Factories Act, 1948 — Section 59(2) — “Ordinary rate of wages” — Meaning Expression “ordinary rate of wages” under Section 59(2) means basic wages plus such allowances as the worker is for the time being entitled to — Statute expressly excludes only bonus and overtime wages — No other exclusion can be read into the provision by executive instructions. (Paras 2, 8, 15)

Factories Act, 1948 — Section 59(2) — “Ordinary rate of wages” — Meaning

Expression “ordinary rate of wages” under Section 59(2) means basic wages plus such allowances as the worker is for the time being entitled to — Statute expressly excludes only bonus and overtime wages — No other exclusion can be read into the provision by executive instructions.
(Paras 2, 8, 15)


Overtime wages — Compensatory allowances — Inclusion

House Rent Allowance (HRA), Transport Allowance (TA), Clothing and Washing Allowance (CWA), Small Family Allowance (SFA) and similar compensatory allowances form part of “ordinary rate of wages” for calculation of overtime wages — Exclusion thereof is contrary to the plain language of Section 59(2).
(Paras 2, 15)


Executive instructions — Office Memorandums — No statutory force

Letters, circulars and Office Memorandums issued by Ministries of Defence, Labour or Finance have no statutory authority to interpret or modify Section 59(2) — Executive instructions cannot override or dilute parliamentary legislation.
(Paras 6.1, 9.3, 10–10.2, 12)


Powers under Factories Act — Central Government — Limits

Factories Act vests rule-making and exemption powers only with State Governments — Central Government has no authority to issue clarifications altering wage components under Section 59(2) — Section 113 permits only issuance of directions to State Governments for implementation.
(Paras 8–10.2)


Statutory interpretation — Legislature does not waste words

When statute expressly provides exclusions, courts cannot permit executive to add further exclusions — Legislature consciously excluded only bonus and overtime wages — Reading additional exclusions violates settled principles of statutory construction.
(Paras 15)


Beneficial labour legislation — Interpretation

Factories Act, 1948 is a beneficial and welfare legislation — Provisions relating to working hours and overtime must receive liberal construction in favour of workers — Interpretation curtailing statutory benefits must be avoided.
(Paras 6.2, 12.1–13)


Overtime wages — Social and economic purpose

Payment of overtime at double rate is a statutory safeguard against labour exploitation — Section 59 forms a mandatory protection mechanism — Neither employer nor employee can contract out of it.
(Paras 12.1–13)


Different interpretations by Ministries — Impermissibility

Different Ministries of Government of India cannot assign divergent meanings to the same parliamentary enactment — Uniform interpretation of central legislation is mandatory.
(Paras 14–14.1)


Judgments distinguished

Decisions in:

Bridge and Roofs Co. Ltd. v. Union of India
Govind Bapu Salvi v. Vishwanath Joshi
Union of India v. Suresh C. Baskey

held distinguishable on facts and statutory context — None supports exclusion of compensatory allowances under Section 59(2).
(Paras 11–11.2)


Kerala High Court judgment — Overruled

Judgment of Kerala High Court in V.E. Jossie v. Flag Officers Commanding-in-Chief Headquarters held not laying down correct law, being contrary to Section 59(2) of the Factories Act.
(Para 16)


Result

High Court judgment upheld — Appeals dismissed — Compensatory allowances to be included while computing overtime wages.
(Paras 17–18)


ANALYSIS OF THE JUDGMENT


1. Core issue

Whether compensatory allowances such as:

  • HRA

  • Transport Allowance

  • Clothing and Washing Allowance

  • Small Family Allowance

can be excluded while computing overtime wages under Section 59(2) of the Factories Act, 1948.


2. Statutory provision examined

Section 59(2):

“Ordinary rate of wages means the basic wages plus such allowances… as the worker is for the time being entitled to, but does not include bonus and wages for overtime work.”


3. Court’s interpretation

The Supreme Court held:

  • Phrase “such allowances” is wide and inclusive.

  • Legislature made only two exclusions:

    • bonus, and

    • overtime wages.

  • No power exists to exclude compensatory allowances by executive fiat.


4. Lack of executive power

The Court held:

  • Chapter VI (Sections 59–65) vests exemption powers exclusively in State Governments.

  • Chapter XI confers no interpretative power on Central Government.

  • Ministries cannot issue clarifications altering statutory meaning.


5. Rejection of Ministry circulars

Multiple Office Memorandums relied upon by Union of India were rejected because:

  • they lack statutory backing,

  • they contradict express statutory language,

  • they attempt to amend law indirectly.


6. Beneficial interpretation reaffirmed

The Court reiterated:

  • Factories Act is meant to prevent exploitation,

  • overtime compensation is a labour-welfare guarantee,

  • restrictive interpretation defeats legislative intent.


7. Uniformity of central legislation

The Court strongly disapproved:

  • Defence Ministry excluding allowances, while

  • Railways including the same allowances,

holding that:

Parliament cannot be interpreted differently by different Ministries.


8. Precedents distinguished

Earlier judgments relied upon by Union of India were held inapplicable because they concerned:

  • definition of “basic wages” under other statutes, or

  • notional inclusion of allowances not actually paid.


9. Final holding

The High Court was correct in holding that:

  • compensatory allowances form part of ordinary wages,

  • executive instructions cannot curtail statutory benefits,

  • overtime wages must be calculated accordingly.


RATIO DECIDENDI

Under Section 59(2) of the Factories Act, 1948, the “ordinary rate of wages” includes basic wages together with all allowances to which the worker is entitled at the relevant time, excluding only bonus and overtime wages; compensatory allowances such as house rent allowance, transport allowance and similar payments cannot be excluded through executive instructions, as neither the Central Government nor its Ministries possess statutory authority to modify or restrict the scope of the provision.


LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE

This judgment conclusively establishes that:

  • Executive circulars cannot amend labour statutes

  • Compensatory allowances are part of overtime wage computation

  • Only Parliament may restrict statutory wage components

  • Factories Act must receive worker-protective interpretation

  • Section 59(2) admits no exclusions beyond those expressly stated

Whether the BOCW Act, 1996 and the Cess Act, 1996, though notified in 1995–96, could be treated as operative legislation before constitution of Welfare Boards, so as to deny contractors the benefit of “subsequent legislation” clauses in NHAI contracts.

Building and Other Construction Workers (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1996 — Sections 18, 24 — Operation of Act — When effective

Though the BOCW Act was brought into force on 01.03.1996, its provisions could not be given actual effect until Welfare Boards were constituted under Section 18 — In absence of Welfare Boards, levy, collection and utilisation of cess could not arise — The enactment remained dormant in fact, owing to failure of appropriate Governments to implement statutory machinery.
(Paras 35–38, 50, 59(ii)–(iii))


Building and Other Construction Workers’ Welfare Cess Act, 1996 — Sections 3 & 14 — Levy of cess — Condition precedent

Cess Act is complementary to the BOCW Act and enacted solely to augment resources of Welfare Boards — In absence of constitution of Welfare Boards, levy and collection of cess under the Cess Act could not arise — Constitution of Welfare Boards is sine qua non for levy and collection of cess.
(Paras 9, 35–37, 50–51, 59(iii)–(iv))


BOCW Act & Cess Act — Date of enforcement versus date of operability

Though the Acts were notified in 1995–96, they remained ineffective in practical terms until statutory machinery was created — Mere existence of statute on the statute book does not imply enforceability in absence of implementation framework — Welfare legislation cannot operate in vacuum.
(Paras 14–17, 35–38, 59(ii))


Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Sections 34 & 37 — Scope of interference

Courts cannot re-appreciate evidence or substitute their interpretation where arbitral tribunal has adopted a plausible and reasonable view — Construction and interpretation of contract fall primarily within arbitral jurisdiction — Interference is impermissible unless award is perverse, patently illegal or contrary to fundamental policy of Indian law.
(Paras 23–33, 52, 59(vi))


Contract — ‘Subsequent legislation’ clause — Interpretation

Clause fixing a cut-off date of 28 days prior to submission of bids governs determination of liabilities to be factored into bid prices — Where levy of cess became enforceable only after such cut-off date due to later constitution of Welfare Boards or issuance of State notifications, such levy qualifies as ‘subsequent legislation’ under contractual clauses.
(Paras 38–40, 52)


Contractor — Liability to pay cess — When arises

Contractors could not have factored cess into bid prices when no statutory machinery for levy or collection existed — Factoring such levy earlier would have resulted in unjust enrichment — Liability to pay cess arises only after Welfare Boards are constituted and levy mechanism becomes operational.
(Paras 36–38, 50–52)


Dewan Chand Builders case — Interpretation affirmed

Observation in Dewan Chand Builders v. Union of India that BOCW Act and Cess Act became operative in Delhi only after notification of Rules was not stray — It affirmed High Court findings — Later decision in A. Prabhakara Reddy clarified that constitution of Welfare Boards is condition precedent for effective levy.
(Paras 21–22, 53, 59(i), (iv))


Public policy — Patent illegality — Test

An arbitral award is not contrary to public policy merely because an alternate interpretation is possible — Violation must strike at fundamental policy of Indian law — Plausible interpretation of contractual terms cannot be interfered with.
(Paras 24–33, 52, 59(vi))


Execution proceedings — Recovery of cess — Impermissibility

Where cess liability did not exist during subsistence of contract, recovery cannot be imposed retrospectively during execution of arbitral award — Post-contract notifications cannot fasten liability on terminated contracts.
(Paras 42–44, 54)


Result

Appeals filed by NHAI dismissed — Appeal filed by Prakash Atlanta (JV) allowed — Deduction of cess from arbitral award amounts held impermissible — NHAI directed to refund adjusted amounts with interest.
(Paras 60)


ANALYSIS OF THE JUDGMENT


1. Core issue

Whether the BOCW Act, 1996 and the Cess Act, 1996, though notified in 1995–96, could be treated as operative legislation before constitution of Welfare Boards, so as to deny contractors the benefit of “subsequent legislation” clauses in NHAI contracts.


2. Court’s central finding

The Supreme Court held that:

Mere notification of the Acts did not make them operational.

Until Welfare Boards were constituted and statutory machinery created:

  • no levy could be raised,

  • no cess could be collected, and

  • no fund could be credited.


3. Dormancy of the Acts

The Court took judicial notice of:

  • decades of non-implementation,

  • repeated monitoring orders in National Campaign Committee cases,

  • massive unutilised cess collections,

  • absence of Boards and authorities in most States.

Result: the Acts remained dormant in fact.
(Paras 14–17, 35–38)


4. Complementary nature of the two Acts

The Court emphasised:

  • Cess Act exists only to fund Welfare Boards.

  • Levy without Boards would collapse the fee–tax distinction.

  • Collection without utilisation would violate statutory purpose.

Hence, cess could not precede Board constitution.
(Paras 35–37)


5. Application to contracts

Across all six appeals:

  • bids were submitted before Welfare Boards existed,

  • State notifications enforcing cess came much later,

  • contractors could not have priced a non-existent levy.

Accordingly, arbitral tribunals correctly applied:

  • Clause 14.3 (bid reference date), and

  • Clause 70.8 (subsequent legislation).
    (Paras 38–52)


6. Arbitration law reaffirmed

The Court reiterated settled principles:

  • Contract interpretation belongs to arbitrator.

  • Two plausible views → arbitrator’s view prevails.

  • Courts under Sections 34 & 37 cannot act as appellate forums.

No award was found:

  • perverse,

  • patently illegal, or

  • contrary to public policy.
    (Paras 23–33, 52)


7. Prakash Atlanta (JV) — special case

  • Contract executed in 2001.

  • Terminated in 2008.

  • UP Rules notified only in 2010 with retrospective sweep.

Court held:

  • NHAI’s attempt to deduct cess during execution proceedings was an afterthought.

  • Liability could not be imposed retrospectively on a terminated contract.
    (Paras 42–54)


RATIO DECIDENDI

Though the Building and Other Construction Workers Act, 1996 and the Welfare Cess Act, 1996 were notified in 1995–96, their provisions could not be given effect to until Welfare Boards were constituted under Section 18 of the BOCW Act; in the absence of such Boards, levy and collection of cess did not arise, and contractors who submitted bids prior to creation of the statutory machinery could not be fastened with cess liability, making subsequent State notifications “subsequent legislation” within the meaning of contractual clauses.


LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE

This judgment conclusively holds that:

  • Statutory notification ≠ operational enforceability

  • Welfare Board constitution is condition precedent

  • Cess cannot exist in institutional vacuum

  • Contractors cannot price imaginary levies

  • Arbitral interpretation of ‘subsequent legislation’ stands protected

  • IBC-style non-interference principles apply equally to infrastructure arbitration

The National Company Law Tribunal, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 60(5)(c) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, cannot adjudicate or declare title to a trademark where such dispute does not arise out of or relate directly to the insolvency resolution process; nor can it modify or enlarge rights beyond those provided in the approved resolution plan, as any such declaration would amount to an impermissible alteration of the plan and exceed the statutory limits of insolvency jurisdiction.

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Section 60(5)(c) — Scope and limits

Jurisdiction under Section 60(5)(c) extends only to questions of law or fact arising out of or in relation to insolvency resolution proceedings — Adjudicating Authority cannot assume jurisdiction over disputes de hors insolvency, especially where the issue is independent of CIRP — Nexus with insolvency must exist — Section 60(5) cannot be used to bypass appropriate civil or statutory fora.
(Paras 24–26, 29–31, 37–38)


IBC — Section 60(5) — Declaration of title — Impermissibility

Adjudicating Authority has no jurisdiction to adjudicate or declare title to intellectual property where such issue does not arise directly from insolvency resolution — Title dispute over trademark involving rival claimants is beyond the scope of summary insolvency jurisdiction — Such adjudication requires determination by competent civil or statutory forum.
(Paras 37–41, 50–51)


Resolution Plan — Sanctity and finality — Modification prohibited

Once a resolution plan is approved by the Committee of Creditors and the Adjudicating Authority under Section 31, the plan becomes binding and final — No authority under the IBC may modify, supplement, or enlarge rights beyond what is provided in the approved plan — Any declaration granting additional proprietary rights amounts to impermissible alteration of the resolution plan.
(Paras 19–23, 35–38)


Resolution Applicant — Rights confined strictly to approved plan

Successful Resolution Applicant cannot obtain rights superior to or beyond those recognized in the resolution plan — Where the plan itself acknowledges rival claims and records only belief or understanding regarding ownership, adjudicating authority cannot confer absolute title post-approval.
(Paras 12–13, 21–23, 38)


Trademark — Ownership dispute — Outside insolvency jurisdiction

Determination of ownership of trademark involving disputed assignments, contingent agreements, licensing arrangements and statutory rights under Trade Marks Act, 1999 cannot be undertaken under IBC proceedings — Such disputes are highly contentious, fact-intensive and unsuitable for insolvency adjudication.
(Paras 39–41, 50–51)


Section 43 & 45 IBC — Preferential and undervalued transactions — Procedure

Findings under Sections 43 and 45 cannot be recorded in absence of a properly instituted avoidance application — Rigorous pleading, forensic scrutiny and notice to affected parties are mandatory — Adjudicating Authority cannot suo motu invalidate transactions while approving resolution plan.
(Paras 42–49)


Principles of natural justice — Violation

Recording findings of preferential or undervalued transaction without pleadings, application or notice to affected party amounts to gross violation of principles of natural justice — Such findings are perverse and unsustainable.
(Paras 45–49)


IBC — Role of Resolution Professional

Avoidance of preferential or undervalued transactions must ordinarily be initiated by Resolution Professional — In absence of application under Sections 43, 45 or 47, adjudicating authority cannot conduct collateral enquiry.
(Paras 14–16, 42–44)


Precedents followed

Applied and reaffirmed:

Embassy Property Developments Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka
Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Amit Gupta
Tata Consultancy Services Ltd. v. SK Wheels Pvt. Ltd.
SREI Multiple Asset Investment Trust v. Deccan Chronicle Marketeers
Ebix Singapore Pvt. Ltd. v. Educomp Solutions Ltd.
Kalyani Transco v. Bhushan Power & Steel Ltd.

(Paras 26–36)


ANALYSIS OF THE JUDGMENT


1. Core controversy

The dispute concerned ownership of the trademark “Gloster”, claimed by:

  • Fort Gloster Industries Ltd. (FGIL) – Corporate Debtor, and

  • Gloster Cables Ltd. (GCL) – asserting ownership by assignment.

During CIRP, the Successful Resolution Applicant (Gloster Limited) claimed entitlement to the trademark on the premise that it was an asset of the Corporate Debtor.

The NCLT declared the trademark to be an asset of the Corporate Debtor.

The NCLAT reversed that finding but upheld jurisdiction.

Both findings were challenged before the Supreme Court.


2. Resolution plan itself recognised rival claims

The approved resolution plan:

  • Set out the entire history of licensing, charge, supplemental agreement and assignment;

  • Recorded only the “belief” and “understanding” of the Resolution Applicant;

  • Explicitly acknowledged competing claims over ownership.

There was no definitive declaration of title in the plan.
(Paras 11–13)


3. Central question before Supreme Court

Whether, while adjudicating an application under Section 60(5) of the IBC, the Adjudicating Authority could declare that the trademark “Gloster” was an asset of the Corporate Debtor and consequently vest title in the Successful Resolution Applicant.

(Para 10)


4. Interpretation of Section 60(5)(c)

The Court undertook a detailed review of precedent and held:

  • Section 60(5)(c) is wide but not unlimited.

  • The dispute must arise out of or relate to insolvency resolution itself.

  • Matters independent of insolvency fall outside its scope.

The Court reaffirmed:

  • Embassy Property — no adjudication of public law rights.

  • Gujarat Urja — nexus with insolvency essential.

  • TCS v. SK Wheels — disputes dehors insolvency excluded.

(Paras 24–31)


5. Title dispute not arising from insolvency

The Court held:

  • Trademark ownership dispute existed independently and prior to CIRP.

  • It did not arise because of insolvency.

  • CIRP merely brought parties before NCLT.

Hence, there was no jurisdictional foundation under Section 60(5)(c).

(Paras 37–41)


6. Impermissible modification of resolution plan

Relying heavily on:

  • SREI Multiple Asset Investment Trust v. Deccan Chronicle, and

  • Ebix Singapore,

the Court held:

  • Resolution plan is sacrosanct once approved.

  • NCLT cannot confer additional proprietary rights not granted by plan.

  • Declaration of trademark ownership amounted to modification of approved plan, which is impermissible.

(Paras 35–38)


7. Errors by NCLT on Sections 43 & 45

The Court strongly disapproved:

  • NCLT invoking preferential and undervalued transaction provisions without:

    • application,

    • pleadings,

    • forensic audit,

    • notice to affected party.

Such findings were held:

  • beyond jurisdiction,

  • violative of natural justice,

  • legally perverse.

(Paras 42–49)


8. NCLAT also exceeded jurisdiction

The Supreme Court also set aside NCLAT’s observation that:

title vested in GCL under supplemental agreement,

holding that NCLAT too lacked jurisdiction to pronounce upon ownership.

(Para 51)


9. Final determination

  • Declaration by NCLT that trademark was asset of Corporate Debtor — set aside.

  • Observations of NCLAT recognising title in GCL — set aside.

  • Ownership dispute left open for determination by competent forum.

  • Resolution plan stands unaltered.

(Paras 50–52)


RATIO DECIDENDI

The National Company Law Tribunal, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 60(5)(c) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, cannot adjudicate or declare title to a trademark where such dispute does not arise out of or relate directly to the insolvency resolution process; nor can it modify or enlarge rights beyond those provided in the approved resolution plan, as any such declaration would amount to an impermissible alteration of the plan and exceed the statutory limits of insolvency jurisdiction.


AUTHORITATIVE VALUE

This judgment conclusively establishes that:

  • IBC is not a forum for deciding property title disputes.

  • Trademark ownership cannot be determined in CIRP.

  • Resolution plan is inviolable once approved.

  • Section 60(5) is not a substitute for civil adjudication.

  • Avoidance powers require strict procedural compliance.

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 19...

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 19...: advocatemmmohan Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992 — Section 3 — Delegated legislation — Enforceability — Publication in O...


Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992 — Section 3 — Delegated legislation — Enforceability — Publication in Official Gazette — Mandatory requirement

Order regulating imports or exports issued under Section 3 of the Act acquires force of law only upon publication in the Official Gazette — Uploading of notification on official website prior to gazette publication does not create enforceable law — Delegated legislation cannot bind citizens unless published in the manner prescribed by the parent statute — Gazette publication is not an empty formality but a condition precedent to legal enforceability.
(Paras 16–19, 22–23)


Delegated legislation — Date of operation — “Date of Notification” — Meaning

Expression “date of this Notification” occurring in subordinate legislation must be construed as the date of its publication in the Official Gazette, and not the date mentioned on the face of the notification or the date of uploading on website — Notification is “born in law” only upon gazette publication — Executive cannot prescribe an alternative mode of promulgation.
(Paras 12, 19–22)


Foreign Trade Policy 2015–2020 — Para 1.05(b) — Transitional protection — Scope

Where goods freely importable under FTP are subsequently subjected to restriction or regulation, imports covered by irrevocable letters of credit established prior to imposition of restriction are entitled to protection under Para 1.05(b) — Such transitional provision stands incorporated when expressly referred to in the notification — Benefit cannot be denied by adopting an artificial or retrospective interpretation.
(Paras 9, 14–15, 20–22)


Import Policy — Minimum Import Price (MIP) — Steel products — Notification No. 38/2015-2020

Minimum Import Price introduced under Notification dated 05.02.2016 published in Official Gazette on 11.02.2016 — Notification cannot apply to imports made under irrevocable letters of credit opened prior to 11.02.2016 — High Court erred in holding that website uploading constituted sufficient notice.
(Paras 5–8, 19–24)


Rule of Law — Commercial certainty — Fiscal and trade restrictions

Imposition of fiscal or trade burdens on the basis of unpublished delegated legislation would erode commercial confidence and offend the Rule of Law — Trade regulation requires transparency, predictability and legal certainty — Courts must guard against enforcement of unpublished executive action.
(Paras 16, 21)


Interpretation — Subordinate legislation — Harmonious construction

Notification expressly incorporating Para 1.05(b) of FTP must be read harmoniously with the policy — No conflict arises between statutory notification and FTP where the notification itself adopts the policy provision — Transitional protection cannot be nullified indirectly.
(Paras 20–21)


High Court — Error of law

High Court committed error in holding that uploading of notification on 05.02.2016 amounted to sufficient notice — Publication in Official Gazette alone confers statutory force — Judgment set aside.
(Paras 8, 19, 24)


ANALYSIS OF THE JUDGMENT


1. Central Issue

The Supreme Court framed a narrow but significant issue:

Whether the expression “date of this Notification” in Para 2 of Notification No. 38/2015-2020 could mean any date other than the date of its publication in the Official Gazette.
(Para 12)


2. Statutory Scheme

  • Section 3 of the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992 mandates that import restrictions must be imposed by order published in the Official Gazette.
    (Paras 13–14)

  • Para 1.05(b) of the Foreign Trade Policy provides transitional protection where restrictions are imposed after irrevocable letters of credit are opened.
    (Para 15)


3. Nature of Delegated Legislation

The Court emphasised fundamental constitutional principles:

  • Delegated legislation is framed without parliamentary debate.

  • Publication ensures:

    • accessibility and notice, and

    • accountability in executive law-making.

Gazette publication is therefore transformative — it converts executive intention into binding law.
(Paras 16–17)


4. Binding Precedents Applied

The Court relied upon long-standing precedent holding that:

  • Law must be promulgated in a manner reasonably calculated to inform affected persons.

  • Where the statute prescribes publication in the Gazette, that mode is mandatory.

Authorities relied upon include:

  • Harla v. State of Rajasthan

  • B.K. Srinivasan v. State of Karnataka

  • Gulf Goans Hotels Co. Ltd. v. Union of India

  • G.S. Chatha Rice Mills

  • Nabha Power Ltd.
    (Paras 17–18)


5. Rejection of “Website Upload” Theory

The Court categorically rejected the High Court’s reasoning that:

  • Uploading of notification on DGFT website on 05.02.2016 amounted to sufficient notice.

The Court held:

  • The notification itself admitted incompleteness by stating “to be published in the Gazette of India”.

  • Until publication, it remained only an intention, not law.

  • Executive cannot invent alternative modes of promulgation.
    (Para 19)


6. Interpretation of Para 2 of the Notification

Para 2 exempted imports under letters of credit entered into before the date of this notification.

The Court held:

  • Once notification becomes operative only on 11.02.2016,

  • The expression “date of this notification” must necessarily mean the date of publication.

Any other interpretation would allow unpublished law to impose civil consequences.
(Paras 20–22)


7. Applicability of Para 1.05(b) FTP

The Court rejected the Union’s argument that Para 1.05(b) was irrelevant:

  • Para 2 of the notification expressly incorporates Para 1.05(b).

  • Hence, transitional protection formed an integral part of the notification.

  • Denial of benefit would defeat both the FTP and the parent Act.
    (Paras 20–21)


8. Final Holding

Since:

  • Gazette publication occurred on 11.02.2016; and

  • Appellants opened irrevocable letters of credit on 05.02.2016; and

  • Procedural requirements were complied with,

the Minimum Import Price could not be applied to the appellants’ imports.
(Paras 22–25)


RATIO DECIDENDI

A notification issued under Section 3 of the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992 acquires enforceable legal force only upon its publication in the Official Gazette, and the expression “date of this Notification” occurring therein must be construed as the date of such publication; consequently, trade restrictions introduced by the notification cannot be applied to imports covered by irrevocable letters of credit opened prior to the date of gazette publication.