Whether assignment deed requires registration. Held that an assignment deed of a decree for specific performance is not compulsorily registrable under Section 17(1)(e) where the decree itself does not purport or operate to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any right, title or interest in immovable property; a decree for specific performance is a preliminary decree which recognises the right to obtain execution but does not transfer title. (Paras 16–31, 25–30.)

Rajeswari & Ors. v. Shanmugam & Anr.

CIVIL APPEAL NO.13835 OF 2025
(@ SLP (C) No.3532 of 2018)
Supreme Court of India — Judgment dated: 19th November, 2025
Coram: J.B. Pardiwala and K.V. Viswanathan, JJ.

Head Notes

1. Registration — s.17(1)(e), Registration Act, 1908 — Assignment of decree for specific performance — Whether assignment deed requires registration. Held that an assignment deed of a decree for specific performance is not compulsorily registrable under Section 17(1)(e) where the decree itself does not purport or operate to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any right, title or interest in immovable property; a decree for specific performance is a preliminary decree which recognises the right to obtain execution but does not transfer title. (Paras 16–31, 25–30.)

2. Nature of decree for specific performance — Decree does not itself vest title. A decree for specific performance recognises contractual obligations and empowers execution, but title and interest in immovable property pass only on execution and registration of the sale-deed. (Paras 16–24.)

3. Assignability & execution — Order XXI Rule 16 CPC. Rights under a decree (i.e., right to proceed in execution) are assignable; Order XXI Rule 16 permits execution by transferee, subject to proviso (notice to transferor and judgment-debtor and hearing of objections). Non-compliance with the proviso can vitiate execution proceedings. (Para 28.)

4. Precedent overruled to extent inconsistent. The decision in K. Bhaskaram (AIR 2005 AP 524), insofar as it treats assignment of a decree for specific performance as necessarily registrable under s.17(1)(e), is not correct law. (Paras 33–34.)

Facts of the Case

1. A decree for specific performance was passed on 13.09.1993 in O.S. No.100/1989 by the First Additional Sub Court, Erode, in favour of the decree-holder (predecessor of the appellants). The decree ordered execution of the sale-deed in favour of the decree-holder or permitted execution through court. (Para 3, 14.)

2. An assignment deed (Ex.B1) dated 17.07.1995 effected by the decree-holder purported to assign rights under that decree (for consideration of Rs.20,000) in favour of Shanmugam (respondent No.1). (Paras 3, 15.)

3. The assignee (respondent No.1) filed E.P. No.150/2004 in O.S. No.100/1989 seeking execution and direction to execute the sale-deed and deliver possession. The Executing Court on 13.03.2008 ordered execution of the sale-deed in favour of the assignee. (Paras 4–5.)

4. On 31.10.2009 the legal heirs of the judgment-debtor (appellants herein) filed E.A. No.180/2009 under Section 47 CPC to set aside execution, contending inter alia that the assignment deed was unregistered and therefore unenforceable; the Executing Court (by order dated 08.04.2010) allowed the application and held the assignment invalid for want of registration, relying on a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court (K. Bhaskaram). (Paras 6–6, 18–19.)

5. The assignee filed revision before the High Court which allowed the revision and held the assignment deed need not be registered because the decree did not create any right, title or interest in immovable property itself. The present appeal challenges that outcome. (Para 7.)

Findings of the Court (Reasoning)

1. Nature of specific performance decree: The Court analysed authorities (including Babu Lal v. Hazari Lal Kishori Lal and Suraj Lamp) and statutory provisions (Transfer of Property Act s.54; Specific Relief Act s.15, s.28) to reaffirm that a decree for specific performance is essentially a preliminary decree: it declares and enforces the contractual obligation but does not itself transfer ownership or create title/interest in the immovable property. Title passes only on execution of a registered sale-deed, either by the vendor or through court process. (Paras 16–24.)

2. Statutory text of s.17(1)(e): Section 17(1)(e) makes registration compulsory for non-testamentary instruments transferring/assigning any decree or order where the decree/order itself purports or operates to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any right, title or interest in immovable property of value ₹100 and upwards. The Court held that the decisive enquiry is whether the decree itself purports or operates to create/assign such right/title/interest. (Paras 25–26.)

3. Application to present facts: Since the decree for specific performance in this case does not itself create or vest title/interest in the immovable property in favour of the decree-holder (it only entitles the decree-holder to seek execution), Section 17(1)(e) is not attracted and registration of the assignment deed was not required. (Paras 26, 30.)

4. Assignability and procedure for execution: The Court noted rights under a decree may be assigned; Order XXI Rule 16 permits execution by transferee, subject to the proviso requiring notice to transferor and judgment-debtor and hearing of objections. The Court observed there was no argument of non-compliance with Order XXI Rule 16’s proviso before it in this appeal. (Paras 28–31.)

5. On contrary High Court decision (K. Bhaskaram): The Court held that the K. Bhaskaram decision had proceeded on an admission that registration was required and also dealt with non-compliance with Order XXI Rule 16; it does not correctly lay down the law in the broader sense and cannot be accepted as binding. (Para 33.)

6. Policy/revenue argument rejected: The Court rejected the submission that permitting assignment without registration will enable parties to avoid registration charges and cause revenue loss; since title does not pass until execution & registration of sale-deed, the fear is exaggerated. (Para 31–32.)

Final Decision / Disposition

1. The appeal is dismissed. The Supreme Court upholds the High Court’s judgment setting aside the Executing Court’s order that had denied execution on the ground that the assignment deed was unregistered. (Para 34–35.)

2. Reason: Assignment of the decree for specific performance in the facts of the case did not require registration under Section 17(1)(e) of the Registration Act because the decree itself did not purport or operate to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any right, title or interest in immovable property — title/interest passes only upon execution and registration of the sale-deed. (Paras 26–31, 33–34.)

3. No order as to costs. (Para 35.)

I Bomma case study

 

⚖️ The iBomma Prosecution: India’s New Blueprint for Crushing Transnational Cybercrime

By M.Murali Mohan Advocate Sreenilayam Atmakur Nandyal District AP

The arrest of Emmadi Ravi, alleged mastermind behind the iBomma piracy syndicate, marks a turning point in India’s cyberlaw and intellectual property enforcement landscape. For the first time, a high-impact digital piracy case is being prosecuted under India’s new criminal codes — the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), and Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (BSA).

Once Ravi was arrested through a Lookout Circular (LOC) at Hyderabad airport and investigators recovered hard disks containing 21,000 pirated films, the case transitioned into a textbook demonstration of how the new codes strengthen India’s ability to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction, handle digital evidence, and pursue financial crime across borders.

1. FIR & Remand Report: The Foundation of a Cross-Border Cybercrime Case

The prosecution began with a detailed complaint from film industry stakeholders, now governed by the procedural framework of the BNSS.

Document

Key Revelation (Based on Court Filings)

Legal Significance

FIR (BNSS Sec. 173)

Identifies Ravi as the primary operator and records massive piracy losses.

Establishes territorial jurisdiction through the location of harm.

Remand Report

Seizure of 21,000 pirated films; freezing of ~₹3 crore; recovery of devices, editing tools, and evidence of monetization.

Supplies prima facie evidence and triggers the separate PMLA financial probe.

Together, these documents form the prosecution’s backbone:

 digital evidence + financial trails + organized criminal conduct.

2. The Multi-Statute Framework: India’s Layered Attack on Organized Cyber Piracy

The iBomma prosecution blends the new BNS/BNSS with powerful special statutes.

Law/Act

Section

Focus

Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS)

Sec. 61 – Criminal Conspiracy

Establishes coordinated operation of a piracy syndicate.

BNS

Sec. 318 – Cheating

Proves wrongful loss to producers and wrongful gain to operators.

BNS

Sec. 111 – Organized Crime

Newly introduced provision addressing syndicate-driven cybercrime.

IT Act, 2000

Sec. 66, Sec. 75

Punishes unauthorized access; grants extraterritorial jurisdiction.

PMLA, 2002

Sec. 3

Targets laundering of ₹12–₹20 crore in piracy proceeds.

Cinematograph Act (Amended)

Anti-piracy offences

Criminalizes unauthorized recording/transmission with 3 yrs + ₹10 lakh penalty.

Copyright Act

Sec. 63

Addresses commercial exploitation of copyrighted works.

This combined legal architecture creates a complete chain of liability:

 illegal access → reproduction → transmission → monetization → laundering → organized crime.

3. Probable Defense: Where They Will Try to Create Doubt

Defense Strategy

Applicable Law/Principle

Why the Defense Fails Under New Codes

Challenge to Digital Evidence

BSA + BNSS Sec. 105

BNSS now mandates audio-video recording of searches, and BSA’s strict electronic evidence rules make digital logs more reliable than before.

Attack on PMLA Predicate Offence

PMLA Sec. 24

Burden shifts to Ravi to prove money is not illicit — a near-impossible task without clean financial records.

“Aggregator, Not Uploader” Argument

Copyright Act Sec. 14

Legally irrelevant — unauthorized communication to the public is itself an offence.

Territorial Objection

IT Act Sec. 75

Neutralized by Objective Territoriality: harm occurred in India.

Under the new legal regime, these defenses are structurally weak.

4. The Game-Changer: Why Extradition and Offshore Servers Lose All Value After Arrest

One of the most misunderstood points in online discussions is this:

Once an accused is arrested in India and incriminating evidence is seized locally, extradition and foreign server locations become legally irrelevant.

4.1 Extradition Becomes Moot After Domestic Arrest

Extradition applies only when the accused is abroad.

Ravi was arrested in Hyderabad via a Lookout Circular (LOC).

Indian courts acquired complete personal jurisdiction immediately.

His alleged foreign citizenship or residence has zero legal impact.

This is settled criminal law doctrine.

4.2 Dual Enforcement: Police vs. Enforcement Directorate (ED)

Two systems operate independently:

✔ Police – BNSS (Equivalent to Old CrPC Sec. 102)

Freeze ~₹3 crore as part of the predicate offence investigation.

✔ Enforcement Directorate – PMLA

Registers ECIR.

Issues Provisional Attachment Order (PAO) for the larger ₹12–₹20 crore.

Proceeds to confirm attachment before the Adjudicating Authority.

Key point: ED’s powers are independent, wider, and aimed at permanent confiscation.

4.3 Offshore Servers Carry No Jurisdictional Weight

Under IT Act Sec. 75, India can prosecute cyber offences even when:

the server is abroad,

the website is hosted overseas, or

the operator uses foreign routing.

Jurisdiction depends on the place of harm, not the place of hosting.

Since iBomma’s financial and commercial injury occurred in India, foreign servers provide no defense.

5. International Law: India’s Assertion of Cyber Sovereignty

The case is an excellent illustration of international criminal law principles:

• Objective Territoriality

Jurisdiction arises because the harm — economic loss to Indian producers — occurred in India.

• Nationality Principle (BNS Sec. 4)

Indian citizens can be tried for offences committed abroad.

• Continuing Offence Doctrine

Digital streaming into India is a continuous offence, refreshed each time a viewer accesses the website.

6. Final Analysis: A Landmark Case in India’s Cyber Enforcement Architecture

The iBomma prosecution is much more than an anti-piracy case.

 It is the first real-world stress test for the BNS-BNSS-BSA trifecta in a transnational digital crime scenario.

If the State successfully:

links the seized devices to offshore operations,

tracks the full money trail into Indian accounts, and

proves organized criminal activity under BNS Sec. 111,

then this case will become India’s most important precedent on cyber piracy, digital forensics, extraterritoriality, and money laundering.

It will demonstrate that:

Modern cybercrime cannot hide behind foreign servers, foreign passports, VPN masking, or offshore monetization.

India is now fully equipped — legally and technologically — to assert cyber sovereignty in the global digital ecosystem.

Execution — Legal representatives (Section 146 CPC) — A legal representative claiming under a deceased decree-holder may maintain execution proceedings representing the deceased even if he was not a party to the original suit: Section 146 CPC permits proceedings by/against persons “claiming under” another. Execution court therefore cannot refuse jurisdiction merely because the claimant was not a party to the original suit. Scope of execution court — Wills and questions of title — Although execution courts are confined to enforcement of decrees, they must still examine whether a decree remains unsatisfied and whether the applicant (legal representative) is entitled to execute the decree in his representative capacity. When title disputes (e.g., competing Wills) bear directly on right to execute, the execution court must decide such facets as necessary for execution and may not dismiss for lack of jurisdiction without enquiry. Procedure — Order XXI, Rules 22–35 CPC — Where execution petition invokes the legal representative’s right and opposing party raises counter-claims based on Will or succession, the execution court must conduct enquiry (including witness evidence and document proof) rather than summarily dismissing on the ground that declaration of title requires a separate suit. Remedy and disposition — Where execution court dismisses an execution petition on incorrect view of limited jurisdiction, High Court in revision may set aside and remit the matter for de novo enquiry into maintainability and merits in execution proceedings.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI

FRIDAY, THE ELEVENTH DAY OF JULY, TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE

PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MS. JUSTICE B. S. BHANUMATHI

CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO. 1275 OF 2025

Between:

1. NAYINENI JANAKAMMA (DEAD) & ORS. — PETITIONERS / DHRS

2. BANDALAMOORI VENKALAKSHMAMMA (DEAD) & ORS. — RESPONDENTS / JDRS

Counsel:
For Petitioners: Sri P. Rajasekhar, Advocate.
For Respondents: Sri K. Mohan Rami Reddy, Advocate.

HEADNOTES

1. Execution — Legal representatives (Section 146 CPC) — A legal representative claiming under a deceased decree-holder may maintain execution proceedings representing the deceased even if he was not a party to the original suit: Section 146 CPC permits proceedings by/against persons “claiming under” another. Execution court therefore cannot refuse jurisdiction merely because the claimant was not a party to the original suit.

2. Scope of execution court — Wills and questions of title — Although execution courts are confined to enforcement of decrees, they must still examine whether a decree remains unsatisfied and whether the applicant (legal representative) is entitled to execute the decree in his representative capacity. When title disputes (e.g., competing Wills) bear directly on right to execute, the execution court must decide such facets as necessary for execution and may not dismiss for lack of jurisdiction without enquiry.

3. Procedure — Order XXI, Rules 22–35 CPC — Where execution petition invokes the legal representative’s right and opposing party raises counter-claims based on Will or succession, the execution court must conduct enquiry (including witness evidence and document proof) rather than summarily dismissing on the ground that declaration of title requires a separate suit.

4. Remedy and disposition — Where execution court dismisses an execution petition on incorrect view of limited jurisdiction, High Court in revision may set aside and remit the matter for de novo enquiry into maintainability and merits in execution proceedings.

FACTS (condensed, material points only)

• O.S. No.41 of 1981 (Senior Civil Judge, Atmakur) was a suit for partition. Final decree allotted half share to plaintiff Nayineni Janakamma and half to B. V. Lakshmamma. Execution petitioner E.P. No.69 of 2008 was earlier prosecuted by D.Hr. No.1 (Janakamma) to take her half. E.P. No.125 of 2018 was later filed claiming delivery of physical possession of the remaining half share (the E.P. schedule property) alleged to belong to the other judgment-debtor (B.V. Lakshmammma).

• The 2nd revision-petitioner (N. Suresh Kumar) claims as legal representative of N. Janakamma (who died) under a registered Will dated 23.05.2014 and sought execution (delivery of possession) against J.Dr. No.2.

• J.Dr. No.2 opposed the execution petition, asserting that (a) B.V. Lakshmamma executed a registered Will dated 29.09.2010 in favour of J.Dr. No.2 and therefore succeeded to the half share; (b) the Will of D.Hr. No.1 (Janakamma) — relied upon by the revision-petitioner — is not proved; and (c) the revision-petitioner had earlier caused I.A. proceedings to be closed mala fide.

• In the execution enquiry both sides led evidence and marked documents (Wills, certified orders, objection letters, passbook / title material, petitions). After evidence the execution court dismissed E.P. No.125/2018 on the ground that the execution court had “limited powers” and could not adjudicate rights under Wills and hence the petition was not maintainable without a decree of a competent court.

• Aggrieved, the 2nd revision petitioner filed C.R.P. No.1275/2025 (joined by the deceased D.Hr.’s representatives).

ISSUES RAISED

1. Whether the execution court erred in dismissing E.P. No.125/2018 on the ground that the 2nd revision petitioner (legal representative) was not a party to the original suit and thus had no locus to maintain execution proceedings?

2. Whether the execution court was right in holding that it had “limited powers” and that rights based on Wills cannot be determined in execution and therefore dismissed the petition without enquiry?

3. What is the correct course — should execution court re-open enquiry to determine maintainability and, if necessary, the related issues of Will genuineness and entitlement before executing the decree?

FINDINGS / REASONS (record-based synthesis)

1. Statutory power — Section 146 CPC: The Court relied on Section 146 CPC (proceedings by/against representatives) and held that a legal representative claiming under a deceased party may maintain execution. The execution court’s view that it had only "limited powers" and therefore could not entertain an execution petition by the legal representative was an error of law because Section 146 authorises proceedings by/against persons claiming under others.

2. Jurisdiction ≠ summary refusal: Because the applicant asserted enforcement of rights flowing from the decree as the deceased’s legal representative, the execution court could not summarily disown jurisdiction. It had a duty to enquire into whether the decree remained unsatisfied and whether the legal representative is entitled to execute the decree; that enquiry may inevitably touch upon the genuineness of Wills and succession, but that does not automatically oust execution jurisdiction.

3. Need for enquiry into antecedent facts: The order observes that the execution court did not go into merits (genuineness of Wills or whether the decree was already satisfied by earlier execution E.P. No.69 of 2008). Those are material questions which the execution court should have examined before dismissal: e.g., whether the plaintiff had already taken possession of her allotted half (and whether the remaining half is liable for execution), and whether the 2nd revision petitioner is a proper legal representative entitled to prosecute execution. If the decree is already fully satisfied, execution may be unnecessary; otherwise execution court must decide entitlement.

4. On evidence already placed: Both sides examined witnesses and produced documentary evidence (registered Wills, certified orders, counters, notices). The execution court’s dismissal without deciding the substantive points after hearing evidence was therefore procedurally wrong.

5. Effect of competing Wills: The Court clarifies implications — if J.Dr. No.2’s Will (29.09.2010) is proved, then D.Hr. No.1 (Janakamma) could not inherit that half and could not pass title by her Will; conversely, if J.Dr. No.2’s Will fails and Janakamma succeeds to the share, then the genuineness of Janakamma’s Will (23.05.2014) must be examined to determine whether the revision petitioner can claim delivery of possession.

HOLDING / CONCLUSION

• The High Court found an error of law in the execution court’s conclusion that it had no jurisdiction to entertain an execution petition brought by the legal representative. The impugned order dated 13.03.2025 dismissing E.P. No.125 of 2018 is set aside.

• The matter is remitted to the execution court (Senior Civil Judge, Atmakur) with directions to conduct a fresh enquiry into E.P. No.125/2018, considering all evidence (including both Wills and previous execution proceedings) and to determine, inter alia:

1. Whether the decree was already satisfied in respect of the scheduled half (by earlier E.P. No.69/2008 or otherwise);

2. Whether the 2nd revision petitioner is a bona fide legal representative of the deceased decree-holder and thereby entitled to prosecute execution;

3. The genuineness and effect of the competing registered Wills (Exhibits P1, R7 etc.) and related documentary material, insofar as they bear upon the right to execute the decree and the right to delivery of possession;

4. Any other incidental matters necessary to determine maintainability and the execution relief.

• The execution court must proceed under Order XXI (Rules 22–35) C.P.C., hear parties on merits, decide questions of title only to the extent necessary for execution, and pass appropriate orders instead of dismissing on jurisdictional technicality.

• No order as to costs. Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, stand closed.

DIRECTIONS 

1. Impugned order (13.03.2025) is set aside.

2. Execution Court (Senior Civil Judge, Atmakur) to reopen / conduct de novo enquiry in E.P. No.125 of 2018 and decide all maintainability / entitlement questions (including whether decree remains to be executed and genuineness/effect of relevant Wills) and thereafter pass reasoned order.

3. The Court should proceed by recording evidence already taken, permitting additional evidence if necessary, and decide under the powers available in execution proceedings (Order XXI CPC), including appropriate interlocutory directions.

4. The High Court made no order as to costs.

Civil Procedure Code — Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 — Temporary injunction — Scope of interference in appeal When the trial court grants a blanket injunction over the entire joint property without examining the respective shares of co-owners or considering counters filed, the High Court may remit the matter for de novo enquiry to ensure due opportunity and balanced interim protection. Partition suit — Common layout land developed into plots — Injunction against alienation In suits for partition of land developed under a single approved layout, an injunction restraining alienation may be necessary to protect the integrity of the layout and the eventual allotment by metes and bounds. However, such injunction must be proportionate to the plaintiffs’ share and based on a fair hearing to all defendants.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI

CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL No. 62 of 2025
Date: 03 April 2025
Coram: Hon’ble Sri Justice B. Krishna Mohan and Hon’ble Sri Justice A. Hari Haranadha Sarma

Case Title

Degala Sambaiah and Another … Appellants / Defendants 1 & 5
versus
Degala Srinivasa Rao and Another … Respondents / Plaintiffs
(Respondents 3–5 arrayed as Defendants 3–5 before the trial court)

Counsel

• For Appellants: Sri N. Sriram Murthy

• For Respondents 1 & 2: Sri Venkateshwarlu Yarram Reddy

• For Respondents 3 to 5: None appeared

HEADNOTES

Civil Procedure Code — Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 — Temporary injunction — Scope of interference in appeal

When the trial court grants a blanket injunction over the entire joint property without examining the respective shares of co-owners or considering counters filed, the High Court may remit the matter for de novo enquiry to ensure due opportunity and balanced interim protection.

Partition suit — Common layout land developed into plots — Injunction against alienation

In suits for partition of land developed under a single approved layout, an injunction restraining alienation may be necessary to protect the integrity of the layout and the eventual allotment by metes and bounds.
However, such injunction must be proportionate to the plaintiffs’ share and based on a fair hearing to all defendants.

Appellate procedure — Duty to remand

Where the trial court failed to notice a counter-affidavit on record and disposed of the interlocutory application ex parte in substance, remand for rehearing with direction to decide within a fixed time is appropriate.

FACTS OF THE CASE

1. The respondents/plaintiffs filed O.S. No. 74 of 2023 before the II Additional District Judge, Guntur seeking a preliminary decree for partition of joint family land measuring Ac. 3-27 cents (≈ 18,072.96 sq. yds.) in Sy.Nos. 714/1B, 1C, 1D & 1E, Yanamadala Village, Prattipadu Mandal, Guntur District.

   • Plaintiffs claimed 3971.74 sq. yds. as their share.

   • The land had been developed into a residential layout under CRDA L.P.No. 5/2019/GNT dated 20-03-2019.

2. In I.A.No. 654 of 2023, the plaintiffs sought temporary injunction restraining defendants from alienating or dealing with the entire suit property pending the suit.

3. The trial court (order dated 25-10-2024) granted an injunction over the whole extent, observing that alienations during pendency would complicate partition and prejudice the plaintiffs.

4. Defendants 1 and 5 (present appellants) challenged the order contending—

   • the injunction covered even portions admittedly belonging to defendants;

   • the counter-affidavit filed by 1st defendant was ignored though on record;

   • the court below did not conduct a proper enquiry nor mark any documents;

   • 5th defendant (2nd appellant) owned Ac. 0-75 cents in Sy.No. 714/1B, laid plots Nos. 34–50 with her own funds, and had not executed any sale deeds.

5. Respondents 1 & 2 argued that all parties were co-owners under one layout, and unless restrained, defendants might alienate parcels affecting roads, open spaces and park areas, making future partition impossible.

REASONS FURNISHED BY THE HIGH COURT

1. Non-consideration of counter: The record showed that the 1st defendant’s counter was in the material papers, yet the trial court’s order stated “no counter filed.” This procedural lapse required correction.

2. Extent of injunction: The trial court granted injunction for the entire property though the plaintiffs’ claim was limited to 3971.74 sq. yds. Without ascertaining respective shares, such blanket restraint was unjustified.

3. Purpose of injunction: Since the suit is one for partition of developed land, protection of the property from indiscriminate alienation is justified—but it must be done after full hearing and enquiry into each party’s share and ownership.

4. Need for de novo hearing: Given the ex parte nature of the impugned order and lack of proper enquiry, the matter should be remitted to the trial court for fresh consideration, allowing parties to file additional affidavits, counters and documents.

5. Interim balance: To preserve the subject matter pending such rehearing, the High Court directed status quo to be maintained regarding the suit property.

CONCLUSION / FINAL ORDER

1. The Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is disposed of with the following directions:

   • The order of the II Additional District Judge, Guntur dated 25-10-2024 in I.A.No. 654 of 2023 is set aside.

   • The trial court shall re-hear the I.A. afresh, permitting all parties to file additional affidavits, counters and supporting documents.

   • A de novo enquiry shall be conducted and appropriate orders passed on merits, uninfluenced by the earlier order.

   • Pending such disposal, the parties shall maintain status quo with respect to the suit property.

   • The I.A. shall be disposed of within three (3) months from receipt of the High Court’s order.

   • Both parties are directed to co-operate for early disposal.

   • No order as to costs.

2. All pending miscellaneous petitions stand closed.

RATIO DECIDENDI

When a trial court, in an application for temporary injunction within a partition suit, fails to consider existing counters or the limited share of the plaintiffs and grants a sweeping restraint over the whole property, the proper course for the appellate court is to remand for de novo enquiry ensuring fair opportunity to all co-owners. Pending such rehearing, status quo must be maintained to safeguard the property.

Held: Appeal allowed in part; impugned order set aside; I.A. remitted for fresh consideration within three months; status quo to continue meanwhile; no costs.

CPC, 1908 — Order 43 Rule 1(r) — Interim injunction — Alienation and alteration of property — Permissible scope of maintenance — Where purchasers of the property (defendants 7–10) undertook not to alienate or alter the suit property but only to carry out maintenance and minor improvements for habitability, the Trial Court granted injunction restraining alienation and structural changes. Held, no interference warranted; the injunction does not bar routine maintenance. Clarified that defendants may carry out repairs and upkeep without claiming equities pending disposal of the suit. Interlocutory orders — Equitable clarification by appellate court — Where the Trial Court’s order already protects the property from alienation or structural change, the High Court may merely clarify its scope to avoid hardship and ensure preservation of property.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI

(Special Original Jurisdiction)

THURSDAY, THE TWENTY-FOURTH DAY OF APRIL, 2025

PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE B. KRISHNA MOHAN
AND
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA

CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEALS Nos. 86 & 90 of 2025

(Common Order)

Between:
Eddula Venkata Swaroop Kumar Reddy and Others … Appellants/Respondents 7–10/Defendants

And
Dr. Devireddy Sridhar Reddy and Others … Respondents/Petitioners/Plaintiffs

Counsel for Appellants: Sri V. Nitesh
Counsel for Respondents: Sri Mujtahid Hussain

HEADNOTES

CPC, 1908 — Order 43 Rule 1(r) — Interim injunction — Alienation and alteration of property — Permissible scope of maintenance —
Where purchasers of the property (defendants 7–10) undertook not to alienate or alter the suit property but only to carry out maintenance and minor improvements for habitability, the Trial Court granted injunction restraining alienation and structural changes. Held, no interference warranted; the injunction does not bar routine maintenance. Clarified that defendants may carry out repairs and upkeep without claiming equities pending disposal of the suit.

Interlocutory orders — Equitable clarification by appellate court —
Where the Trial Court’s order already protects the property from alienation or structural change, the High Court may merely clarify its scope to avoid hardship and ensure preservation of property.

SUMMARY OF FACTS

1. Respondents/plaintiffs instituted O.S. No. 29 of 2022 before the II Additional District Judge, Proddatur, seeking declaration of rights and injunction regarding the petition schedule property.

2. They filed I.A. Nos. 1290 and 1291 of 2024, seeking (i) restraint from changing physical features, and (ii) restraint from alienation or dealing with the property pending suit.

3. The Trial Court, by orders dated 03.01.2025, granted temporary injunctions restraining defendants (including appellants/respondents 7–10) from alienating, mortgaging, or altering the property.

4. The appellants filed C.M.A. Nos. 86 & 90 of 2025, contending that they had purchased the property for residence and business use, and only intended repairs and maintenance, not alienation or demolition.

5. Counsel for the plaintiffs submitted that the injunction does not prohibit reasonable maintenance, only alienation and material alteration.

COURT’S REASONING

• The record shows appellants admitted ownership and occupation for residential and shop purposes and undertook not to alienate the property.

• The Trial Court’s order, though restraining alienation, does not prevent necessary maintenance or repairs to preserve the property.

• The High Court clarified that upkeep and non-structural improvements are permissible to maintain the property’s usability, provided they do not change the physical features or prejudice the pending litigation.

• Regarding I.A. No. 1290/2024 (C.M.A. No. 90/2025), the injunction restraining alteration of physical features was appropriate and requires no modification.

OPERATIVE CONCLUSION

Held:

• Orders dated 03.01.2025 in I.A. Nos. 1290 & 1291 of 2024 are affirmed.

• Defendants (appellants) may carry out necessary maintenance and repairs to keep the property intact but shall not alienate, transfer, or materially alter the same pending suit.

• No equities shall be claimed by them on that account.

• Both appeals are accordingly disposed of without costs.

As a sequel, pending interlocutory applications, if any, shall stand closed.

— B. KRISHNA MOHAN, J.
— A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA, J.

Date: 24.04.2025

Ratio Capsule (for digest index):

“Temporary injunction — Restraint on alienation and structural alteration — Routine maintenance permitted — Injunction clarified, not modified.”

Civil Rules of Practice (A.P.) — Rule 55 — Multiple interim reliefs in a single I.A. — Duty of court — Rule 55 mandates separate applications for each distinct relief; if several reliefs are combined, the court shall direct the applicant to confine to one unless the others are consequential, and to file separate applications for the rest. Where the trial court granted an omnibus interim injunction both (i) restraining alienation, and (ii) restraining dispossession/interference, in a single I.A., Held, appellate court relegated parties to trial court to apply Rule 55 and proceed; merits left open. Interim injunction — Maintainability vs. Merits — Appellate restraint — When maintainability turns on procedural non-compliance (Rule 55) and respondents are absent, appellate court may decline to pick which relief subsists and permit correction before the trial court; liberty reserved to assail the 07-02-2025 order on merits as well.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI

(Special Original Jurisdiction)

FRIDAY, THE TWENTY-FIRST DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2025

PRESENT
THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE R. RAGHUNANDAN RAO
AND
THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE MAHESWARA RAO KUNCHEAM

CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL No. 93 of 2025

Between
Mallidi Sathireddy & Anr. … Appellants/Respondents/Defendants

And
Mallidi Srinivasa Reddy & Ors. … Respondents/Petitioners/Plaintiffs

Counsel: For Appellants — C. Subodh · For Respondents — —

HEADNOTES

Civil Rules of Practice (A.P.) — Rule 55 — Multiple interim reliefs in a single I.A. — Duty of court —
Rule 55 mandates separate applications for each distinct relief; if several reliefs are combined, the court shall direct the applicant to confine to one unless the others are consequential, and to file separate applications for the rest. Where the trial court granted an omnibus interim injunction both (i) restraining alienation, and (ii) restraining dispossession/interference, in a single I.A., Held, appellate court relegated parties to trial court to apply Rule 55 and proceed; merits left open.

Interim injunction — Maintainability vs. Merits — Appellate restraint —
When maintainability turns on procedural non-compliance (Rule 55) and respondents are absent, appellate court may decline to pick which relief subsists and permit correction before the trial court; liberty reserved to assail the 07-02-2025 order on merits as well.

SUMMARY OF FACTS

1. Plaintiffs filed O.S. No. 3 of 2025 (II Addl. District Judge, Amalapuram) for declaration of title and injunction against interference and alienation.

2. By I.A. No. 156 of 2025, they sought two interim injunctions in one application: (a) against alienation, and (b) against dispossession/interference (with an endorsement later reflecting the dispossession limb).

3. The trial court, by order 07.02.2025, granted both interim restraints.

4. Defendants filed the present CMA, invoking Rule 55 of the Civil Rules of Practice and disputing merits.

COURT’S REASONING

• Rule 55 text & effect: When distinct reliefs are clubbed, the court should confine the applicant to one (unless consequential) and require separate I.As. for others.

• Application here: Injunctions against alienation and dispossession are separate and not necessarily consequential to each other; thus, the Rule 55 issue squarely arises.

• Appropriate course: In the absence of respondents and given the procedural posture, the appellate court will not unilaterally choose which injunction survives. Parties are relegated to the trial court to apply Rule 55, with liberty to both sides to advance their cases; appellants may also assail merits of the 07-02-2025 order there.

OPERATIVE CONCLUSION

• Appeal disposed of by relegating parties to the trial court to address Rule 55 compliance (separate I.As. or confinement to one relief) and to consider the merits of the interlocutory reliefs.

• No order as to costs.

• All pending miscellaneous petitions — Closed.

— R. RAGHUNANDAN RAO, J.
— MAHESWARA RAO KUNCHEAM, J.

Date: 21.02.2025

CPC, 1908 — Sections 115, 151; Order XXI Rules 90 & 106 — Allegation of fraud in execution sale — Failure to plead particulars — Dismissal upheld — When a judgment debtor sought to set aside an ex parte order and execution sale alleging fraud and undervaluation, but failed to particularize or prove fraud as required by Order VI Rule 4 CPC, and offered no satisfactory explanation for delay, Held, dismissal of his applications by the executing court cannot be faulted. — Mere assertions of fraud, unsupported by evidence, do not justify interference under Section 115 CPC or sustain an appeal under Order 43 Rule 1(j). Fraud — Burden of proof — Pleadings — Fraud must be specifically pleaded and proved by cogent evidence; vague averments or conjectures are insufficient to invoke equitable relief.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI

(Special Original Jurisdiction)

FRIDAY, THE EIGHTEENTH DAY OF JULY, 2025

PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI CHEEMALAPATI

CIVIL REVISION PETITION No. 588 of 2025

AND

CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL No. 110 of 2025

(Common Order)

Between:
Boddula Siva Surya Venkateswara Rao,
S/o. Late Appala Narasayya … Petitioner / Judgment Debtor / Appellant

And

1. Koppisetti Veerababu, S/o. Venkateswarlu

2. Vasamsetty Sri Siva Kumar, S/o. Venkateswarlu
   … Respondents / Decree Holders / Respondents

Counsel for Petitioner: Sri Shaik Mohammed Ismail
Counsel for Respondents: Sri V.V.N. Narayana Rao

HEADNOTES

CPC, 1908 — Sections 115, 151; Order XXI Rules 90 & 106 — Allegation of fraud in execution sale — Failure to plead particulars — Dismissal upheld —
When a judgment debtor sought to set aside an ex parte order and execution sale alleging fraud and undervaluation, but failed to particularize or prove fraud as required by Order VI Rule 4 CPC, and offered no satisfactory explanation for delay, Held, dismissal of his applications by the executing court cannot be faulted.
— Mere assertions of fraud, unsupported by evidence, do not justify interference under Section 115 CPC or sustain an appeal under Order 43 Rule 1(j).

Fraud — Burden of proof — Pleadings —
Fraud must be specifically pleaded and proved by cogent evidence; vague averments or conjectures are insufficient to invoke equitable relief.

SUMMARY OF FACTS

1. The respondents/decree holders filed O.S. No. 370 of 2015 on the file of the I Additional Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada, for recovery of money, which was decreed on 23.10.2017.

2. To enforce the decree, they filed E.P. No. 32 of 2019 before the Senior Civil Judge, Vizianagaram (as the attached property lay within that jurisdiction).

3. The petitioner/judgment debtor was set ex parte on 28.01.2020, and his property was auctioned on 06.02.2024.

4. He thereafter filed E.A. Nos. 38 & 39 of 2024 seeking to set aside the ex parte order and cancel the sale, alleging that he was unaware of the proceedings, that his counsel had died during the COVID period, and that the property worth ₹2 crores was sold for ₹21,30,000/- through fraudulent undervaluation.

5. The executing court dismissed both applications on 31.12.2024, finding no proof of fraud or bona fide explanation for delay. Hence, the present Civil Revision Petition (No. 588/2025) and CMA (No. 110/2025).

COURT’S ANALYSIS

• Fraud allegation: The petitioner alleged fraud and undervaluation but did not file any documentary proof such as market value certificates or conversion documents.

• Order VI Rule 4 CPC mandates that cases involving fraud, misrepresentation, or undue influence must contain specific particulars — dates, acts, and items. The petitioner’s affidavit was vague and bereft of details.

• No substantial injury proved: Even assuming irregularity, the petitioner failed to prove that substantial injury resulted from the sale, as required under Order XXI Rule 90 CPC.

• Delay and laches: No satisfactory reason was offered for not filing the applications within limitation. The plea that his counsel died and he fell ill was unsupported by any evidence.

• Findings of lower court: The executing court rightly held that the allegations were unsubstantiated and the sale was conducted per procedure.

• Scope of revision under Section 115 CPC: The High Court will not interfere unless there is jurisdictional error or manifest illegality, neither of which was demonstrated here.

OPERATIVE CONCLUSION

Held:
The petitioner failed to plead or prove fraud with requisite particulars or to justify the delay.
The executing court’s orders are reasoned and proper.
No illegality, perversity, or jurisdictional error is found warranting interference.

• Accordingly, C.R.P. No. 588 of 2025 and C.M.A. No. 110 of 2025 are dismissed.

• No order as to costs.

• All pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.

— RAVI CHEEMALAPATI, J.
Date: 18.07.2025

Ratio Capsule for Digest:

“Execution sale — Allegation of fraud — Pleadings must satisfy Order VI Rule 4 CPC — Mere assertion without proof insufficient — Applications rightly dismissed; no interference under Section 115 CPC.”

Indian Divorce Act, 1869 — Section 55 — Appeal — Non-joinder of alleged second wife — Divorce petition dismissed — Liberty to refile — Where a petition for divorce was dismissed solely on the ground that the alleged second wife of the respondent was not impleaded as a party, Held, such defect is curable, and dismissal of the petition does not preclude a fresh filing with proper parties. Appellate Court therefore disposed of the appeal granting liberty to the wife to institute a fresh petition impleading necessary parties. Practice — Matrimonial proceedings — Joinder of parties — Where the cause of action involves allegations of bigamy, the alleged second spouse is a necessary party, and non-impleadment renders the proceedings defective; however, the defect is not fatal to the right to re-agitate the claim properly.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI

(Special Original Jurisdiction)

THURSDAY, THE TWENTY-FOURTH DAY OF APRIL, 2025

PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE B. KRISHNA MOHAN
AND
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA

---

CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL No. 143 of 2025

Between:
J. Shantha Kumari, W/o. T. Pullaiah @ Chinna Pullaiah … Appellant / Petitioner

And
T. Pullaiah @ Chinna Pullaiah @ Chinna, S/o. T. Pedda Pullaiah … Respondent / Respondent

Counsel for Appellant: Sri Papudippu Sashidar Reddy
Counsel for Respondent: None appeared

HEADNOTES

Indian Divorce Act, 1869 — Section 55 — Appeal — Non-joinder of alleged second wife — Divorce petition dismissed — Liberty to refile —
Where a petition for divorce was dismissed solely on the ground that the alleged second wife of the respondent was not impleaded as a party, Held, such defect is curable, and dismissal of the petition does not preclude a fresh filing with proper parties. Appellate Court therefore disposed of the appeal granting liberty to the wife to institute a fresh petition impleading necessary parties.

Practice — Matrimonial proceedings — Joinder of parties —
Where the cause of action involves allegations of bigamy, the alleged second spouse is a necessary party, and non-impleadment renders the proceedings defective; however, the defect is not fatal to the right to re-agitate the claim properly.

SUMMARY OF FACTS

1. The appellant-wife filed D.O.P. No. 8 of 2021 before the II Additional District Judge, Proddatur, seeking dissolution of marriage dated 14.08.2008 under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, alleging cruelty and desertion.

2. The petitioner averred that the respondent-husband contracted a second marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage.

3. The Trial Court dismissed the petition on 25.02.2022, observing that the alleged second wife was not made a party, relying on Radhika @ M. Lavanya v. M. Lokender, 2014 (5) ALD 340.

4. Aggrieved, the wife preferred the present Civil Miscellaneous Appeal under Section 55 of the Act.

COURT’S REASONING

• The Trial Court was correct in observing that, in a case alleging a second marriage, the alleged second wife is a necessary and proper party for effective adjudication.

• However, dismissal on this technical ground does not extinguish the appellant’s right to pursue dissolution of marriage after curing the procedural defect.

• The appellant expressed readiness to implead the alleged second wife in a fresh petition.

• Accordingly, the appellate court considered it just to grant liberty rather than interfere substantively.

OPERATIVE CONCLUSION

• Civil Miscellaneous Appeal disposed of granting liberty to the appellant to file a fresh divorce petition before the competent court, impleading all necessary parties.

• No order as to costs.

• All pending interlocutory applications — Closed.

— B. KRISHNA MOHAN, J.
— A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA, J.

Date: 24.04.2025

Order 39 Rules 1 & 2; Order 43 Rule 1 — Ad-interim injunction pending first appeal — Duty of appellate court — Where the lower appellate court declined injunction solely because the trial court record was not yet received, without recording findings on prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury, Held, such refusal is unsustainable. An application under O.39 Rr.1&2 must be examined on merits even on available materials; the court can call for records, receive copies, or take affidavits, but cannot reject on technicalities. Order set aside; matter remanded for fresh consideration within a time-frame.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI

(Special Original Jurisdiction)

THURSDAY, THE SEVENTEENTH DAY OF JULY, 2025

PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE CHALLA GUNARANJAN

CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL No. 318 of 2025

Between
Kammela Sambasiva Rao & Anr. … Appellants / Plaintiffs

And
Velivela Subba Rao … Respondent / Defendant

Counsel: For Appellants — P. Durga Prasad · For Respondent — Venkata Subbaiah Pogula

HEADNOTES

CPC, 1908 — Order 39 Rules 1 & 2; Order 43 Rule 1 — Ad-interim injunction pending first appeal — Duty of appellate court —
Where the lower appellate court declined injunction solely because the trial court record was not yet received, without recording findings on prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury, Held, such refusal is unsustainable. An application under O.39 Rr.1&2 must be examined on merits even on available materials; the court can call for records, receive copies, or take affidavits, but cannot reject on technicalities. Order set aside; matter remanded for fresh consideration within a time-frame.

Practice & Procedure — Interim relief in appeal —
Appellate courts must avoid mechanical rejection; they are required to render reasoned findings on the three injunction tests, even where records are awaited, adopting pragmatic case-management.

SUMMARY OF FACTS

1. Plaintiffs filed O.S. No. 707 of 2021 seeking permanent injunction to protect a 6-ft access way for ingress/egress to their residence.

2. The suit was dismissed on 19.11.2024. Plaintiffs preferred A.S. No. 5 of 2025 and, therein, I.A. No. 16 of 2025 under O.39 Rr.1&2 for ad-interim injunction against interference with the pathway.

3. By order 15.04.2025, the XI Addl. District Judge, Tenali, rejected the I.A., stating that trial court record had not been received and, on the rival affidavits alone, merits could not be decided.

4. Hence, the present CMA under O.43 R.1.

COURT’S REASONING

• The impugned order shows the appellate court did not address the three settled tests for interim injunction.

• Non-receipt of records is not a legal ground to refuse interim relief; courts must assess prima facie right, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury on the material available (pleadings, affidavits, documents annexed), and may call for records or direct filing of copies where necessary.

• The approach adopted reflects a procedural infirmity warranting interference.

OPERATIVE CONCLUSION

• Impugned order dated 15.04.2025 in I.A. No. 16 of 2025 in A.S. No. 5 of 2025 — Set aside.

• Remand: I.A. No. 16 of 2025 to be considered afresh on merits (prima facie case, balance of convenience, irreparable injury) after hearing both sides; to be disposed within three (03) months from receipt of this order.

• CMA disposed of; no order as to costs.

• All pending miscellaneous petitions — Closed.

— CHALLA GUNARANJAN, J.
Date: 17.07.2025

A. Whether the High Court was justified in interfering with the finding of the first appellate court qua payment of additional amount of $\text{Rs. 1,95,000}$ by the plaintiff-appellant? If receipt of additional payment by D-1 and D-2 is proved, as found by the first appellate court, whether it could be held that plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform its part under the contract?The Supreme Court found that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the First Appellate Court's finding on this issue, and that the finding conclusively proved the Appellant's readiness and willingness.Interference in Second Appeal: The High Court erred in law by setting aside the First Appellate Court's finding that the vendors (D-1 and D-2) received the additional $\text{Rs. 1,95,000}$. This was a finding of fact based on the appreciation of evidence (admitted signatures on the endorsement, Exb. A-2), and the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC by overturning it without establishing perversity.Waiver and Readiness/Willingness: By accepting the $\text{Rs. 1,95,000}$ after the expiry of the six-month deadline stipulated in the agreement, the vendors waived their right to insist on the time limit for the balance $\text{Rs. 10,000}$. This action confirmed the contract was subsisting. As the Appellant had paid over 90% of the original consideration plus the additional demanded amount, his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract were unequivocally established.B. Whether the suit for specific performance was maintainable without seeking a declaration that termination of the agreement was invalid in law?The Supreme Court found that the suit was maintainable without the declaratory relief.Termination as a Void Act: The vendors' subsequent termination notice (20.08.2010) was deemed a void act because they had already waived their right to terminate by accepting the additional payment post-deadline (09.06.2010), and had committed a prior breach (selling to D-3 on 17.08.2010).Declaration Not Essential: A declaratory relief is only essential where a cloud exists on the plaintiff's right, typically when termination is executed under an express contractual right. Since the termination here was a repudiation following a breach, the plaintiff was entitled to treat the contract as subsisting and sue directly for specific performance.C. Whether in the facts of the case the plaintiff was entitled to the discretionary relief of specific performance?The Supreme Court found that the plaintiff was entitled to the discretionary relief of specific performance, and the High Court erred in denying it.Rejection of Grounds to Deny Relief: The Court rejected the High Court's grounds for denying relief:The claim of additional payment was upheld, negating the finding of "false claim/unclean hands."The unproven claim of possession was held to be immaterial, as an unproven claim is not equivalent to a deliberately false statement, and the Appellant would be entitled to possession upon receiving the decree anyway.Vendors' Mala Fide Conduct: The grant of relief was mandated because the vendors acted in bad faith by demanding extra money and then selling the property to D-3 (Vasanthi), who, as D-1's daughter, was not a bona fide purchaser without knowledge of the prior agreement.Conclusion: Given the Appellant's substantial performance (payment of over 90%) and the vendors' clear mala fides, this was a case where denying the equitable relief of specific performance would be arbitrary.

Annamalai v. Vasanthi and Others (Revised)

1. Cause Title

Element	Detail
Case Name	ANNAMALAI v. VASANTHI AND OTHERS
Citation	2025 INSC 1267
Court	Supreme Court of India
Appeal No.	Civil Appeal No. of 2025 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 26848-26849/2018)

---

2. Head Notes (Legal Principles Applied)

• Jurisdiction in Second Appeal (Section 100 CPC): The High Court commits an error of law if it interferes with a finding of fact made by the First Appellate Court, as no substantial question of law arises.

• Waiver and Readiness/Willingness: By accepting additional money ($\text{Rs. 1,95,000}$) after the stipulated deadline, the vendors waive the time condition, confirming the purchaser's readiness and willingness.

• Bona Fide Purchaser Status: The subsequent purchaser (Vasanthi, D-3) was held not to be a bona fide purchaser due to the close family relationship (D-3 being the daughter of vendor D-1) and presumed knowledge of the prior, subsisting agreement for sale.

• Possession Claim: The High Court erred in using the unproven claim of possession by the purchaser as a ground to deny specific performance, as an unproven claim is not equivalent to a false claim made in bad faith.

• Discretionary Relief (Section 20, Specific Relief Act): Specific performance must be granted where the vendor's conduct is mala fide (selling property to a relative after receiving over 90% of consideration) and the denial of relief would be arbitrary.

3. Facts of the Case

The appellant, Annamalai, entered into an agreement for sale with Saraswathi (D-1) and Dharmalingam (D-2) on 08.01.2010 for $\text{Rs. 4,80,000}$, paying $\text{Rs. 4,70,000}$ in advance.

1. Waiver: Annamalai paid an additional $\text{Rs. 1,95,000}$ to the vendors on 09.06.2010, which was endorsed on the agreement.

2. Breach and Subsequent Sale: The vendors sold a part of the property to Vasanthi (D-3) (D-1's daughter) on 17.08.2010. They issued a termination notice on 20.08.2010.

3. Litigation History: The High Court ultimately set aside the specific performance decree by finding Annamalai lacked readiness and willingness and by disbelieving the $\text{Rs. 1,95,000}$ payment.

4. Findings of the Apex Court

The Supreme Court overruled the High Court's judgment, confirming the First Appellate Court's findings:

• Payment and Readiness: The Court restored the finding that the vendors received the additional $\text{Rs. 1,95,000}$. It ruled that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC by overturning this finding of fact. This payment confirmed Annamalai's readiness and willingness and established the vendors' waiver of the time clause.

• Status of Vasanthi (D-3) - Bona Fide Purchaser: Vasanthi, being the daughter of vendor D-1, was deemed not a bona fide purchaser. The family connection implied presumed knowledge of the prior sale agreement, making the subsequent sale in her favour non-protected. The vendors committed a breach of contract by selling the property to D-3 before terminating the agreement with Annamalai.

• Possession Claim: The Court held that the High Court was wrong to use the unproven claim of possession as a ground to deny relief. It reasoned that an unproven claim is not necessarily a false claim that demonstrates unclean hands, and Annamalai's substantial performance (paying over 90% plus the additional amount) far outweighed this technicality. Furthermore, a decree for specific performance would, in any event, entitle him to possession.

• Discretionary Relief: The denial of specific performance was found to be arbitrary and not guided by sound judicial principles, given the overwhelming evidence of the vendor's mala fide conduct and the purchaser's substantial performance.

• findings of issues : 

A. Whether the High Court was justified in interfering with the finding of the first appellate court qua payment of additional amount of $\text{Rs. 1,95,000}$ by the plaintiff-appellant? If receipt of additional payment by D-1 and D-2 is proved, as found by the first appellate court, whether it could be held that plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform its part under the contract?

The Supreme Court found that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the First Appellate Court's finding on this issue, and that the finding conclusively proved the Appellant's readiness and willingness.

• Interference in Second Appeal: The High Court erred in law by setting aside the First Appellate Court's finding that the vendors (D-1 and D-2) received the additional $\text{Rs. 1,95,000}$. This was a finding of fact based on the appreciation of evidence (admitted signatures on the endorsement, Exb. A-2), and the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC by overturning it without establishing perversity.

• Waiver and Readiness/Willingness: By accepting the $\text{Rs. 1,95,000}$ after the expiry of the six-month deadline stipulated in the agreement, the vendors waived their right to insist on the time limit for the balance $\text{Rs. 10,000}$. This action confirmed the contract was subsisting. As the Appellant had paid over 90% of the original consideration plus the additional demanded amount, his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract were unequivocally established.

B. Whether the suit for specific performance was maintainable without seeking a declaration that termination of the agreement was invalid in law?

The Supreme Court found that the suit was maintainable without the declaratory relief.

• Termination as a Void Act: The vendors' subsequent termination notice (20.08.2010) was deemed a void act because they had already waived their right to terminate by accepting the additional payment post-deadline (09.06.2010), and had committed a prior breach (selling to D-3 on 17.08.2010).

• Declaration Not Essential: A declaratory relief is only essential where a cloud exists on the plaintiff's right, typically when termination is executed under an express contractual right. Since the termination here was a repudiation following a breach, the plaintiff was entitled to treat the contract as subsisting and sue directly for specific performance.

C. Whether in the facts of the case the plaintiff was entitled to the discretionary relief of specific performance?

The Supreme Court found that the plaintiff was entitled to the discretionary relief of specific performance, and the High Court erred in denying it.

• Rejection of Grounds to Deny Relief: The Court rejected the High Court's grounds for denying relief:

  • The claim of additional payment was upheld, negating the finding of "false claim/unclean hands."

  • The unproven claim of possession was held to be immaterial, as an unproven claim is not equivalent to a deliberately false statement, and the Appellant would be entitled to possession upon receiving the decree anyway.

• Vendors' Mala Fide Conduct: The grant of relief was mandated because the vendors acted in bad faith by demanding extra money and then selling the property to D-3 (Vasanthi), who, as D-1's daughter, was not a bona fide purchaser without knowledge of the prior agreement.

• Conclusion: Given the Appellant's substantial performance (payment of over 90%) and the vendors' clear mala fides, this was a case where denying the equitable relief of specific performance would be arbitrary.

5. Relief Granted

The Supreme Court ALLOWED the appeals by Annamalai and issued the following order:

• The Judgment and Decree of the High Court was SET ASIDE.

• The Judgment and Decree of the First Appellate Court (granting specific performance) was RESTORED.

• The Appellant, Annamalai, was directed to deposit the remaining balance amount of Rs. 10,000 in the execution court within a period of one month.

• The parties were directed to bear their own costs.