When the genesis of the deprecated incident was the pending of civil disputes - Sc & St case should not be registered.

 

where it appears to the Court that the offence in   question,   although   covered   under   the   SC/ST   Act,   is   primarily private or civil in nature, or where the alleged offence has not been committed   on   account   of   the   caste   of   the   victim,   or   where   the continuation of the legal proceedings would be an abuse of the process of law, the Court can exercise its powers to quash the proceedings

We may hasten to add that in cases such as the present, the Courts ought to be even more vigilant to ensure that the complainantvictim has entered into the compromise on the volition of his/her free will and not on account of any duress. It cannot be understated that since members of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe belong to the weaker sections of our country, they are more prone to acts of coercion,   and   therefore   ought   to   be   accorded   a   higher   level   of protection. If the Courts find even a hint of compulsion or force, no relief can be given to the accused party. What factors the Courts should consider, would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.

Firstly,  the very purpose behind Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST is to deter caste­based insults and intimidations when they are used with  the intention of demeaning a victim on account of he/she belonging to the Scheduled Caste/  Scheduled Tribe community. 

In the present case, the record manifests that there was an undeniable pre­existing civil dispute between the parties. 

The case of the Appellant, from the very beginning, has been that the alleged abuses were uttered solely on account of frustration and anger over the pending dispute. 

Thus, the   genesis   of   the   deprecated   incident   was   the   afore­stated civil/property dispute. 

Considering this aspect, we are of the opinion that it would not be incorrect to categorise the occurrence as one being overarchingly private in nature, having only subtle undertones of criminality, even though the provisions of a special statute have been attracted in the present case. 

Secondly,  the offence in question, for which the Appellant has been convicted, does not appear to exhibit his mental depravity. 

The aim of the SC/ST Act is to protect members of the downtrodden classes from atrocious acts of the upper strata of the society. 

It appears to us that although  the  Appellant may  not belong to   the  same  caste  as  the Complainant,   he   too   belongs   to   the   relatively   weaker/backward section of the society and is certainly not in any better economic or social position when compared to the victim. 

Despite the rampant prevalence of segregation in Indian villages whereby members of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe community are forced to restrict  their quartes only to certain areas, it is seen that in the present case, the   Appellant   and   the   Complainant   lived   in   adjoining   houses. 

Therefore, keeping in mind the socio­economic status of the Appellant, we are of the opinion that the overriding objective of the SC/ST Act would not be overwhelmed if the present proceedings are quashed.  

Thirdly, the incident occurred way back in the year 1994. Nothing on record indicates that either before or after the purported compromise, any untoward incident had transpired between the parties. The State Counsel has also not brought to our attention any other occurrence that would lead us to believe that the Appellant is either a repeat offender or is unremorseful about what transpired. 

 Fourthly, the Complainant has, on her own free will, without any compulsion,   entered   into   a   compromise   and   wishes   to   drop   the present criminal proceedings against the accused.  Fifthly, given the nature of the offence, it is immaterial that the trial against the Appellant had been concluded.  

Sixthly,  the Appellant and the Complainant parties are residents of the same village and live in very close proximity to each other. We have no reason to doubt that the parties themselves have voluntarily settled their differences. 

Therefore, in order to avoid the revival of healed wounds, and to advance peace and harmony, it will be prudent to effectuate the present settlement. 

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1393 OF 2011

Ramawatar … Appellant

                                             VERSUS

State of Madhya Pradesh  … Respondent

JUDGMENT

SURYA KANT, J.

A civil dispute over the ownership and possessory rights of a

piece of land between the Appellant and his neighbour Prembai took

an ugly turn when the Appellant allegedly not only threw a brick on

the Complainant but also made filthy and slur remarks on her caste,

which prompted the Complainant to lodge FIR No. 18/94 at Police

Station O.E. Panna under Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and

the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities Act), 1989 (in short

‘SC/ST Act’) read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in

short ‘I.P.C.’).   The Appellant and his co­accused were subsequently

tried, which led to the Appellant’s conviction under Section 3(1)(x) of

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the SC/ST Act and consequential sentence of six months rigorous

imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1000/­. The Appellant challenged his

conviction and sentence before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh,

Jabalpur Bench but his appeal  was dismissed vide the impugned

judgment dated 02.08.2010.

BRIEF FACTS:

2. Ramawatar   (Appellant)   and   Prembai   (Complainant),   who   are

neighbours and live in adjoining houses, were entangled in a property

dispute with respect to a portion of land over which Prembai’s house

was   built.   On   25.06.1994,   Ramawatar   and   his   brother   Katulal   @

Kuddu (Co­accused) broke down a wall to make a door that opened

into the house of Prembai. When this was resisted by her, a quarrel

ensued between the parties and the Appellant threw a brick at the

Complainant. Thereafter, this incident was reported and a complaint

was lodged at Police Station, Devendra Nagar on the same date itself,

and an M.L.C was also performed. Since the nature of the injury was

simple, and the offence was found non­cognizable, the Police took no

further   steps.   On   the   following   day,   i.e.,   26.06.1994,   when   the

Complainant was sitting in front of her residence, the Appellant and

his brother appeared at the scene. They were visibly enraged by the

fact that Prembai had lodged an F.I.R. against them. They started

abusing   her   with   repeated   reference   to   her   caste   whilst   also

Page | 2

threatening her of dire consequences. After that, the Complainant and

her husband Chotelal reported this incident before the Harijan Welfare

Police Station, and the subject­F.I.R. under the SC/ST Act was lodged

against the Accused.

3. The investigation commenced in light of the afore­stated facts.

Upon   collection   of   substantial   evidence,   Appellant   and   co­accused

were committed to trial under Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act read

with Section 34 of the I.P.C.

4. The Trial Court noted that the Complainant belonged to the

‘Prajapati’   community   which   is   a   Scheduled   Caste.   It   was   also

observed that the parties had candidly admitted to a pending property

dispute  between them. The Trial  Court further discerned  that the

prosecution witnesses had, by and large, supported the version of the

Complainant and had indubitably substantiated that Ramawatar and

Kuddu   used   deprecatory   language   upon   the   Complainant.   It   was

found   that   the   Appellant   had   made   specific   reference   to   the

Complainant’s caste escorted by the intent to insult her. The actions

of   the   Appellant   &   co­accused   Kuddu   were   thus   held   to   be   in

contravention of Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act read with Section 34

I.P.C. The Trial Court, therefore, convicted both the accused persons

for the said offences and sentenced each of them to undergo rigorous

imprisonment for 6 months. 

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5. Discontented   with   their   conviction,   the   accused   preferred   an

appeal before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur Bench.

However, during the pendency of the proceedings, co­accused Kuddu

passed away, and the appeal only survived qua the present Appellant.

His primary contention before the High Court was that the abuses, if

any, were not meant to demean the Complainant on account of her

being   a  member   of   the   Scheduled   Caste   community.   Instead,   the

incident   occurred   on   account   of   a   property   dispute   between   the

parties. It was thus submitted that the alleged incident could not

attract the provisions of the SC/ST Act. However, after re­appraising

the evidence on record, the High Court disagreed with the Appellant’s

contention and held that there was sufficient material to establish that

the Complainant being a member of the Scheduled Caste community

was humiliated by the Appellant. Thus, concurring with the findings of

the Trial Court, the High Court maintained the order of conviction and

sentence passed against the Appellant. 

6. Aggrieved, the Appellant has approached this Court.

CONTENTIONS:

7. When the instant appeal came up for hearing, what prompted

this   Court   to   issue   notice   was   that   the   matter   had   been   settled

between the parties, and the Complainant had filed an application for

compromise.   Reiterating   the   same   plea,   learned   Counsel   for   the

Page | 4

Appellant canvassed before us that the parties are residents of the

same village and there is no existing enmity between them. It was

submitted that the parties wished to settle their dispute so that they

may continue to have cordial relations. He drew our attention to a

decision of this Court in Hitesh Verma v. The State of Uttarakhand

&   Anr1

,   wherein,   it   was   held   that   a   property   dispute   between   a

vulnerable section of the society and a person of upper caste would

not attract an offence under the SC/ST Act, unless the allegations are

on account of the victim being a Scheduled Caste. Learned Counsel for

the Appellant thus prayed for invocation of this Court’s powers under

Article   142   of   the   Constitution   to   quash   the   instant   criminal

proceedings.   The   Appellant’s   stand   and   the   application   for

compromise   were   fully   supported   by   the   learned   Counsel   for   the

Complainant.

8. Per Contra, learned Counsel for the Respondent State, without

controverting the factum of compromise, vehemently opposed such a

recourse. It was contended that there was a concurrent finding of

conviction, and no substantial question of law was involved in the

present appeal. Referring to the decisions of this Court in the case of

Ram Lal & Anr v. State of J&K2

, Surendra Nath Mohanty & Anr

1 (2020) 10 SCC 710, ¶ 22 & 24

2 (1999) 2 SCC 213

Page | 5

v.  State  of  Orissa3

  and  Bankat  &  Anr  v.  State  of  Maharastra4

,

learned   State   Counsel   submitted   that   the   purported   settlement

between the parties is inconsequential as the offence in question is not

compoundable   in   terms   of   Section   320   of   the   Code   of   Criminal

Procedure,   1973   (in   short   ‘Cr.P.C’).   It   was   thus   argued   that   the

present case did not warrant any interference by this Court.

ANALYSIS:

9. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties at some length, we

are of the opinion that two questions fall for our consideration in the

present appeal.  First,  whether the jurisdiction of this Court under

Article 142 of the Constitution can be invoked for quashing of criminal

proceedings arising out of a ‘non­compoundable offence? If yes, then

whether the power to quash proceedings can be extended to offences

arising out of special statutes such as the SC/ST Act?

10. So far as the first question is concerned, it would be ad rem to

outrightly refer to the recent decision of this Court in the case of

Ramgopal & Anr v. The State of Madhya Pradesh5

, wherein, a twoJudge Bench of this Court consisting of two of us (N.V. Ramana, CJI &

Surya Kant, J) was confronted with an identical question. Answering

in the affirmative, it has been clarified that the jurisdiction of a Court

under   Section   320   Cr.P.C   cannot   be   construed   as   a   proscription

3 (1999) 5 SCC 238

4 (2005) 1 SCC 343

5 Criminal Appeal No. 1489 of 2012

Page | 6

against the invocation of inherent powers vested in this Court under

Article 142 of the Constitution nor on the powers of the High Courts

under Section 482 Cr.P.C. It was further held that the touchstone for

exercising the extra­ordinary powers under Article 142 or Section 482

Cr.P.C., would be to do complete justice. Therefore, this Court or the

High Court, as the case may be, after having given due regard to the

nature of the offence and the fact that the victim/complainant has

willingly   entered   into   a   settlement/compromise,   can   quash

proceedings   in   exercise   of   their   respective   constitutional/inherent

powers. 

11. The   Court   in  Ramgopal   (Supra)    further   postulated   that

criminal proceedings involving non­heinous offences or offences which

are predominantly of a private nature, could be set aside at any stage

of   the   proceedings,   including   at   the   appellate   level.   The   Court,

however, being conscious of the fact that unscrupulous offenders may

attempt to escape their criminal liabilities by securing a compromise

through   brute   force,   threats,   bribes,   or   other   such   unethical   and

illegal means, cautioned that in cases where a settlement is struck

post­conviction, the Courts should,  inter­alia,  carefully examine the

fashion in which the compromise has been arrived at, as well as, the

conduct of the accused before and after the incident in question. While

concluding, the Court also formulated certain guidelines and held:

Page | 7

“19… Nonetheless, we reiterate that such powers of wide

amplitude ought to be exercised carefully in the context

of quashing criminal proceedings, bearing in mind:  (i)

Nature and effect of the offence on the conscious of

the society; (ii) Seriousness of the injury, if any; (iii)

Voluntary   nature   of   compromise   between   the

accused   and   the   victim;   &   (iv)   Conduct   of   the

accused persons, prior to and after the occurrence of

the   purported   offence   and/or   other   relevant

considerations.”                     

                                                                          [Emphasis Applied]

12. In view of the settled proposition of law, we affirm the decision of

this Court in Ramgopal (Supra) and re­iterate that the powers of this

Court   under   Article   142   can   be   invoked   to   quash   a   criminal

proceeding   on   the   basis   of   a   voluntary   compromise   between   the

complainant/victim and the accused.

13. We, however, put a further caveat that the powers under Article

142 or under Section 482 Cr.P.C., are exercisable in post­conviction

matters only where an appeal  is pending before one or the other

Judicial forum. This is on the premise that an order of conviction does

not   attain   finality   till   the   accused   has   exhausted   his/her   legal

remedies and the finality is sub­judice before an appellate court. The

pendency of legal proceedings, be that may before the final Court, is

sine­qua­non  to   involve   the   superior   court’s   plenary   powers   to   do

complete justice. Conversely, where a settlement has ensued post the

attainment of all legal remedies, the annulment of proceedings on the

basis of a compromise would be impermissible. Such an embargo is

Page | 8

necessitated   to   prevent   the   accused   from   gaining   an   indefinite

leverage, for such a settlement/compromise will always be loaded with

lurking suspicion about its bona fide. We have already clarified that

the purpose of these extra­ordinary powers is not to incentivise any

hollow­hearted agreements between the accused and the victim but to

do complete justice by effecting genuine settlement(s).

14. With respect to the second question before us, it must be noted

that even though the powers of this Court under Article 142 are wide

and far­reaching, the same cannot be exercised in a vacuum. True it is

that ordinary statutes or any restrictions contained therein, cannot be

constructed  as  a  limitation  on  the  Court’s  power  to  do  “complete

justice”. However, this is not to say that this Court can altogether

ignore the statutory provisions or other express prohibitions in law. In

fact, the Court is obligated to take note of the relevant laws and will

have to regulate the use of its power and discretion accordingly. The

Constitution Bench decision in the case of Supreme Court Bar Assn.

v.   Union   of   India   &   Anr6 has   eloquently   clarified   this   point   as

follows:

“48. The  Supreme  Court   in exercise  of  its  jurisdiction

under Article 142 has the power to make such order as

is necessary   for   doing   complete   justice “between   the

parties in any cause or matter pending before it”. The

very nature of the power must lead the Court to set limits

for   itself   within   which   to   exercise   those   powers   and

6 (1998) 4 SCC 409, ¶ 48

Page | 9

ordinarily   it   cannot   disregard   a   statutory   provision

governing   a   subject,   except   perhaps   to   balance   the

equities between the conflicting claims of the litigating

parties by “ironing out the creases” in a cause or matter

before it. Indeed this Court is not a court of restricted

jurisdiction of only dispute­settling. It is well recognised

and established that this Court has always been a lawmaker and its role travels beyond merely dispute­settling.

It   is   a   “problem­solver   in  the   nebulous   areas”   (see K.

Veeraswami v. Union of India [(1991) 3 SCC 655 : 1991

SCC (Cri) 734] but the substantive statutory provisions

dealing with the subject­matter of a given case cannot be

altogether ignored by this Court, while making an order

under Article 142. Indeed, these constitutional powers

cannot,   in   any   way,   be controlled by   any   statutory

provisions but at the same time these powers are not

meant   to   be   exercised   when   their   exercise may   come

directly in conflict with what has been expressly provided

for in a statute dealing expressly with the subject.”

15. Ordinarily,   when   dealing   with   offences   arising   out   of   special

statutes   such   as   the   SC/ST   Act,   the   Court   will   be   extremely

circumspect  in   its   approach.  The   SC/ST   Act  has  been  specifically

enacted to deter acts of indignity, humiliation and harassment against

members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The Act is also a

recognition of the depressing reality that despite undertaking several

measures,   the   Scheduled   Castes/Scheduled   Tribes   continue   to   be

subjected to various atrocities   at the hands of upper­castes. The

Courts have to be mindful of the fact that the Act has been enacted

keeping in view the express constitutional safeguards enumerated in

Articles 15, 17 and 21 of the Constitution, with a twin­fold objective of

Page | 10

protecting the members of these vulnerable communities as well as to

provide relief and rehabilitation to the victims of caste­based atrocities.

16. On the other hand, where it appears to the Court that the offence

in   question,   although   covered   under   the   SC/ST   Act,   is   primarily

private or civil in nature, or where the alleged offence has not been

committed   on   account   of   the   caste   of   the   victim,   or   where   the

continuation of the legal proceedings would be an abuse of the process

of law, the Court can exercise its powers to quash the proceedings. On

similar lines, when considering a prayer for quashing on the basis of a

compromise/settlement, if the Court is satisfied that the underlying

objective of the Act would not be contravened or diminished even if the

felony in question goes unpunished, the mere fact that the offence is

covered under a ‘special statute’ would not refrain this Court or the

High Court, from exercising their respective powers under Article 142

of the Constitution or Section 482 Cr.P.C.

17.  Adverting to the case in hand, we note that the present Appellant

has been charged and convicted under the unamended Section 3(1)(x)

of the SC/ST Act7

, which was as follows: 

“3.   Punishments   for   offences   of   atrocities­  (1)

Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a

Scheduled Tribe,—

 xxxx 

7 Section 3(1)(x) of the Act stands substituted by Act No. 1 of 2016 w.e.f. 26.01.2016.

Page | 11

(x)   intentionally   insults   or   intimidates   with   intent   to

humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled

Tribe in any place within public view;

xxxx"

18. We may hasten to add that in cases such as the present, the

Courts ought to be even more vigilant to ensure that the complainantvictim has entered into the compromise on the volition of his/her free

will and not on account of any duress. It cannot be understated that

since members of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe belong to

the weaker sections of our country, they are more prone to acts of

coercion,   and   therefore   ought   to   be   accorded   a   higher   level   of

protection. If the Courts find even a hint of compulsion or force, no

relief can be given to the accused party. What factors the Courts

should consider, would depend on the facts and circumstances of each

case.

19. Having considered the peculiar facts and circumstances of the

present case in light of the afore­stated principles, as well as having

meditated on the application for compromise, we are inclined to invoke

the   powers   under   Article   142   and   quash   the   instant   Criminal

proceedings with the sole objective of doing complete justice between

the parties before us. We say so for the reasons that: 

Firstly,  the very purpose behind Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST is to

deter caste­based insults and intimidations when they are used with

Page | 12

the intention of demeaning a victim on account of he/she belonging to

the Scheduled Caste/  Scheduled Tribe community. In the present

case, the record manifests that there was an undeniable pre­existing

civil dispute between the parties. The case of the Appellant, from the

very beginning, has been that the alleged abuses were uttered solely

on account of frustration and anger over the pending dispute. Thus,

the   genesis   of   the   deprecated   incident   was   the   afore­stated

civil/property dispute. Considering this aspect, we are of the opinion

that it would not be incorrect to categorise the occurrence as one

being overarchingly private in nature, having only subtle undertones

of criminality, even though the provisions of a special statute have

been attracted in the present case.

Secondly,  the offence in question, for which the Appellant has been

convicted, does not appear to exhibit his mental depravity. The aim of

the SC/ST Act is to protect members of the downtrodden classes from

atrocious acts of the upper strata of the society. It appears to us that

although  the  Appellant may  not belong to   the  same  caste  as  the

Complainant,   he   too   belongs   to   the   relatively   weaker/backward

section of the society and is certainly not in any better economic or

social position when compared to the victim. Despite the rampant

prevalence of segregation in Indian villages whereby members of the

Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe community are forced to restrict

Page | 13

their quartes only to certain areas, it is seen that in the present case,

the   Appellant   and   the   Complainant   lived   in   adjoining   houses.

Therefore, keeping in mind the socio­economic status of the Appellant,

we are of the opinion that the overriding objective of the SC/ST Act

would not be overwhelmed if the present proceedings are quashed. 

Thirdly, the incident occurred way back in the year 1994. Nothing on

record indicates that either before or after the purported compromise,

any untoward incident had transpired between the parties. The State

Counsel has also not brought to our attention any other occurrence

that would lead us to believe that the Appellant is either a repeat

offender or is unremorseful about what transpired. 

Fourthly, the Complainant has, on her own free will, without any

compulsion,   entered   into   a   compromise   and   wishes   to   drop   the

present criminal proceedings against the accused. 

Fifthly, given the nature of the offence, it is immaterial that the trial

against the Appellant had been concluded. 

Sixthly,  the Appellant and the Complainant parties are residents of

the same village and live in very close proximity to each other. We

have no reason to doubt that the parties themselves have voluntarily

settled their differences. Therefore, in order to avoid the revival of

healed wounds, and to advance peace and harmony, it will be prudent

to effectuate the present settlement.

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CONCLUSION: 

20. Consequently, and for the aforementioned reasons, we find it

appropriate to invoke our powers under Article 142 of the Constitution

and quash the criminal proceedings to do complete justice between

the parties. As a sequel thereto, judgment and orders passed by the

Trial Court and the High Court are set aside. Bail bonds, if any, are

discharged. The appeal is allowed in above terms.

……………………….. CJI.

(N.V. RAMANA)

………..………………… J.

(SURYA KANT)

………..………………… J.

(HIMA KOHLI)

NEW DELHI

DATED: 25.10.2021

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