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Thursday, October 7, 2021

benefit of parity =absconding for more than two years without any justifiable reason should have weighed in mind while granting her any discretionary relief. These facts put her on a starkly different pedestal than the coaccused with whom she seeks parity.We are, thus, of the considered view that the High Court has wrongly accorded the benefit of parity in favour of the Respondent­Accused. It has to be borne in mind that the deceased met with a tragic end within three months of her marriage. While it is too early to term it an offence under Sections 302 or 304B I.P.C., but the fact remains that a young life came to an abrupt end before realizing any of her dreams which were grimly shattered. She died an unnatural death in her matrimonial home. The Respondent­Accused is the mother­in­law of the deceased. The Investigating Agency, therefore, deserves a free hand to investigate the role of the Respondent­Accused, if any, in the unnatural and untimely death of her daughter in­law.Suffice to mention that the needle of suspicion revolves around only against the Respondent­Accused and her family members while at this stage the others have been found innocent by the investigating agency

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.1161­1162   OF 2021

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRL.) NOS. 5404­5405 OF 2021)

Vipan Kumar Dhir ..... Appellant(s)

VERSUS

State of Punjab and another ..... Respondent(s)

                                                    

             

JUDGMENT

Surya Kant, J.

Leave granted.

2. The challenge laid is to an order dated 28.01.2021 passed by the

High Court of Punjab and Haryana whereby anticipatory bail has been

granted to Respondent No.2 (hereafter ‘Respondent­Accused’), who is

the  mother­in­law  of  the  deceased  and  is   charged  under  Sections

304B, 302 read with 120B of Indian Penal Code (for short “I.P.C.”). 

3. The prosecution version in brief is that the appellant (hereafter

‘Complainant’), who is the father of the deceased, lodged an FIR dated

02.10.2017 against 7 accused persons, 4 of whom are members of the

in­laws family of the deceased including the Respondent­Accused. The

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Complainant has alleged that his daughter was married to the son of

Respondent­accused on 28­07­2017.   Soon thereafter, the accused

family members started to harass and physically torture the deceased

on the pretext of dowry demands. His daughter died an unnatural

death on 02­10­2017 in suspicious circumstances.  There are specific

allegations vis­a­vis Respondent­Accused alleging that she exploited

the deceased and deprived her of any chance to recuperate from the

arduous domestic chores. This was despite the fact that deceased was

also working as a full­time lecturer in the local government college. It

was further alleged that due to non­fulfilment of the dowry demands,

the vicious cycle of humiliation and abuse continued to be meted out

to   the   deceased.   The   deceased   contacted   the   Complainant   on

30­09­2017 and informed that she had been again physically tortured

because of her failure to meet their dowry demands. The Complainant

assured that he would try to amicably settle this household squabble

by coming to her marital home on the very next day. However, this

assurance could never be materialised as the accused are alleged to

have   clandestinely   administered   poison   to   the   deceased   on

01.10.2017,   which   led   to   her   unfortunate   demise   the   following

morning. It is to be noted that the factum of poisoning is supported by

medical evidence gathered by the Investigating Agency.

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4. Soon after the FIR was lodged, the Respondent­Accused moved

an anticipatory bail application before the Sessions Court, which was

rejected   on   21.12.2017.   Discontented,   the   Respondent­Accused

approached the High Court for a similar relief, but the petition was

dismissed as withdrawn on 08.03.2018. Meanwhile, on account of

non­cooperation   with   the   ongoing   investigation,   the   SHO   of   the

concerned police station applied for and got issued arrest warrants

against the Respondent­Accused from Judicial Magistrate. However,

the arrest warrant could not be executed as the Respondent­Accused

had been on the run and she was thus declared an absconder on 23­

04­2018 under Section 82 of the Code of Criminal  Procedure (for

short, “Cr.P.C.”). 

5. The Respondent­Accused continued to evade her arrest until this

Court   granted   anticipatory   bail   to   her   younger   son   Daksh   Adya

(brother­in­law   of   the   deceased)   on   22.10.2019.   Thereafter,   taking

advantage of this subsequent event and presenting the same as a

material   change   in   circumstance,   Respondent­Accused   filed   two

petitions before the High Court, seeking quashing of the order that

declared her a ‘proclaimed offender’ and further sought the relief of

anticipatory bail. 

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6. It is noted explicitly that during the pendency of the abovementioned proceedings, the High Court granted interim bail to the

Respondent­Accused on 03.12.2020 and pursuant thereto, she joined

the investigation on 07.12.2020. Thereafter, vide the impugned order,

High   Court   allowed   both   the   petitions   and   set   aside   the   order

declaring the Respondent­Accused as an absconder and also granted

her   anticipatory   bail.   These   reliefs   were   primarily   allowed   on   two

grounds   ­  firstly  that   the   Respondent­Accused   had   joined   the

investigation and undertook to remain present at each date of trial

proceedings;  secondly  she was entitled to seek parity with the coaccused Daksh Adya whom this Court granted anticipatory bail. 

7. The aggrieved Complainant is before us, contending inter­alia,

that the High Court has committed a grave error of law in over­looking

the well­established principles which guide courts to exercise their

discretion in the matter of granting anticipatory bail. Learned State

Counsel has also supported the cause of Appellant­Complainant.

8. We have heard Learned Counsel for the parties at length and

perused the relevant material placed on record.

9. At the outset, it would be fruitful to recapitulate the well­settled

legal principle that the cancellation of bail is to be dealt on a different

footing in comparison to a proceeding for grant of bail. It is necessary

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that   ‘cogent   and   overwhelming   reasons’   are   present   for   the

cancellation   of   bail.   Conventionally,   there   can   be   supervening

circumstances which may develop post the grant of bail and are nonconducive to fair trial, making it necessary to cancel the bail. This

Court in  Daulat Ram  and others vs. State  of  Haryana1

observed

that:

“Rejection of bail in a non­bailable case at the initial

stage and the cancellation of bail so granted, have to

be considered and dealt with on different basis. Very

cogent   and   overwhelming   circumstances   are

necessary for an order directing the cancellation of the

bail,   already   granted.   Generally   speaking,   the

grounds for cancellation of bail, broadly (illustrative

and   not   exhaustive)   are:   interference   or   attempt   to

interfere   with   the   due   course   of   administration   of

Justice or evasion or attempt to evade the due course

of justice or abuse of the concession granted to the

accused in any manner. The satisfaction of the court,

on   the   basis   of   material   placed   on   the   record   of

the possibility   of   the   accused   absconding   is   yet

another   reason   justifying   the   cancellation   of   bail.

However, bail once granted should not be cancelled in

a   mechanical   manner   without   considering   whether

any supervening circumstances have rendered it no

longer conducive to a fair trial to allow the accused to

retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of bail

during the trial.”

These   principles   have   been   reiterated   time   and   again,   more

recently by a 3­judge Bench of this Court in X vs. State of Telegana

and Another.

2

1

(1995) 1 SCC 349 at ¶ 4.

2

(2018) 16 SCC 511 at  ¶ 14­15.

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10. In addition to the caveat illustrated in the cited decision(s), bail

can also be revoked where the court has considered irrelevant factors

or has ignored relevant material available on record which renders the

order   granting   bail   legally   untenable.   The   gravity   of   the   offence,

conduct of the accused and societal impact of an undue indulgence by

Court when the investigation is at the threshold, are also amongst a

few situations, where a Superior Court can interfere in an order of bail

to prevent the miscarriage of justice and to bolster the administration

of criminal justice system.   This Court has repeatedly viewed that

while   granting   bail,   especially   anticipatory   bail   which   is  per   se

extraordinary in nature, the possibility of the accused to influence

prosecution   witnesses,   threatening   the   family   members   of   the

deceased, fleeing from justice or creating other impediments in the fair

investigation, ought not to be overlooked. 

11. Broadly speaking, each case has its own unique factual scenario

which   holds   the   key   for   adjudication   of   bail   matters   including

cancellation thereof. The offence alleged in the instant case is heinous

and   protrudes   our   medieval   social   structure   which   still   wails   for

reforms despite multiple efforts made by Legislation and Judiciary.   

12. In   the   case   in   hand,   the   High   Court   seems   to   have   been

primarily swayed by the fact that the Respondent­Accused was ‘coPage | 6

operating’ with investigation. This is, however, contrary to the record

as the Respondent­Accused remained absconding for more than two

years after being declared a proclaimed offender on 23.04.2018. She

chose to join investigation only after securing interim bail from the

High Court. She kept on hiding from the Investigating Agency as well

as Magistrate’s Court till she got protection against arrest from the

High Court in the 2nd round of bail proceedings.

13. Even if there was any procedural irregularity in declaring the

Respondent­Accused   as   an   absconder,   that   by   itself   was   not   a

justifiable ground to grant pre­arrest bail in a case of grave offence

save where the High Court on perusal of case­diary and other material

on record is, prima facie, satisfied that it is a case of false or overexaggerated accusation.  Such being not the case here, the High Court

went   on   a   wrong   premise   in   granting   anticipatory   bail   to   the

Respondent­Accused.

14. The ground of parity with co­accused Daksh Adya invoked by the

High Court is equally unwarranted. The allegations in the FIR against

the Respondent­Mother­in­Law and her younger son Daksh Adya are

materially   different.   It   is   indubitable   that   some   of   the   allegations

against   all   the   family   members   are   common   but   there   are   other

specific allegations accusing the Respondent­Accused of playing a key

role in the alleged offence. The conduct of the Respondent­Accused in

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absconding for more than two years without any justifiable reason

should have weighed in mind while granting her any discretionary

relief. These facts put her on a starkly different pedestal than the coaccused with whom she seeks parity. We are, thus, of the considered

view that the High Court has wrongly accorded the benefit of parity in

favour of the Respondent­Accused.   It has to be borne in mind that

the   deceased   met   with   a   tragic   end   within   three   months   of   her

marriage. While it is too early to term it an offence under Sections 302

or 304B I.P.C., but the fact remains that a young life came to an

abrupt end  before  realizing any of her dreams which  were  grimly

shattered.   She died an unnatural death in her matrimonial home.

The Respondent­Accused is the mother­in­law of the deceased.   The

Investigating Agency, therefore, deserves a free hand to investigate the

role of the Respondent­Accused, if any, in the unnatural and untimely

death of her daughter in­law.

15. Learned   Senior   Counsel   for   the   Respondent­Accused   may   be

right in contending that the Appellant­Complainant has widened the

net and included even other than the family members of the in­laws of

the deceased.  According to him, the entire version of the AppellantComplainant should be seen with suspicious eyes as he being a retired

District   Attorney,   has   a   legally   trained   mind.   We   do   not   deem   it

necessary to comment upon this contention at this stage.  Suffice to

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mention that the needle of suspicion revolves around only against the

Respondent­Accused and her family members while at this stage the

others have been found innocent by the investigating agency. 

16. In  light of  the above  discussion and  without expressing any

views on merit, we set aside the impugned order of the High Court

dated 28.01.2021 and direct the Respondent­Accused to surrender

before the Trial Court within a period of one week. We make it clear

that the observations made herein above are limited for the purposes

of present proceedings and would not be construed as any opinion on

the merits of the case. We also clarify that after the surrender, the

Respondent­Accused   will   be   free   to   seek   regular   bail   before   the

concerned Trial Court and any such prayer shall be decided as per

law, without being influenced by this order.  

The appeals are disposed of in the above terms.

..…………………….. CJI.

(N.V. RAMANA)

………..………………… J.

(SURYA KANT)

………..………………… J.

(HIMA KOHLI)

NEW DELHI

DATED : 04.10.2021

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