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Thursday, September 2, 2021

suit for perpetual injunction to restrain the defendants from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property, as claimed by the plaintiff. - trail court dismissed the suit as the plaintiff not proved his possession and plaintiff not filed a suit for declaration of title and possession - Appellant court reassessed and found that plaintiff proved his possession as he is paying kists and decreed the suit - Second appeal, the High court set aside the appellant court judgment as the plaintiff failed to prove his possession and also not filed a suit for declaration of title and confirmed the judgment of trial court- Apex court held that While arriving at such conclusion the trial court had taken note of the right as claimed by the plaintiff and in that background had arrived at the conclusion that except for the say of plaintiff as PW1 there was no other evidence.-On the documentary evidence it was indicated that the kist receipts at Exhibit A5 series would not establish possession merely because the name has been subsequently substituted in the patta records and the kist had been paid. As against such conclusion, the first appellate court in fact has placed heavy reliance solely on the kist receipts which in fact had led the first appellate court to arrive at the conclusion that the continuous payment of kist would indicate that the plaintiff was also in possession of the property - divergent findings on fact were available - The said applications have not been pressed to its logical conclusion nor has any other step been taken to seek restoration of possession by establishing that the possession in fact had been taken by the defendant No.1 subsequent to the interim injunction. Therefore, on all counts the possession of the suit schedule property was also not established. - Civil appeal was dismissed

       

suit for perpetual   injunction   to   restrain   the   defendants   from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property, as claimed by the plaintiff. - trail court dismissed the suit as the plaintiff not proved his possession and plaintiff not filed a suit for declaration of title and possession - Appellant court reassessed and found that plaintiff proved his possession as he is paying kists and decreed the suit - Second appeal, the High court set aside the appellant court judgment as the plaintiff  failed to prove his possession and also not filed a suit for declaration of title  and confirmed the judgment of trial court- Apex court held that While arriving at such conclusion the trial court had taken note of   the   right   as   claimed   by   the   plaintiff   and   in   that background had arrived at the conclusion that except for the say of plaintiff as PW1 there was no other evidence.-On the documentary evidence it was indicated that the kist  receipts  at  Exhibit  A5  series would  not   establish possession   merely   because   the   name   has   been subsequently substituted in the patta records and the kist had been paid. As   against   such   conclusion,   the  first   appellate court in fact has placed heavy reliance solely on the kist receipts which in fact had led the first appellate court to arrive at the conclusion that the continuous payment of kist   would   indicate   that   the   plaintiff   was   also   in possession of the property - divergent findings on fact were available -    The   said applications   have   not   been   pressed   to   its   logical conclusion nor has any other step been taken to seek restoration   of   possession   by   establishing   that   the possession in fact had been taken by the defendant No.1 subsequent to the interim injunction. Therefore, on all counts the possession of the suit schedule property was also not established. - Civil appeal was dismissed 

                                       NON­REPORTABLE

   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

   CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

   CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2066 OF 2012

  

Balasubramanian & Anr.                .…Appellant(s)

Versus

M. Arockiasamy (dead) Through Lrs.    ….  Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

A.S. Bopanna,J.      

              

1.   The appellant is before this Court in this appeal,

assailing the judgment dated 30.10.2009 passed by the

High Court of Madras, Madurai Bench in S.A. No. 1303 of

1994. The appellant herein is the plaintiff in the suit

while the respondents are the legal representatives of the

deceased first defendant before the Trial Court. For the

sake   of   convenience   and   clarity   the   parties   will   be

Page 1 of 22

referred to in the rank assigned to them before the court

of first instance namely, the Court of District Munsif,

Palani.

2.   The factual matrix in brief is that the plaintiff filed

the suit bearing O.S No. 769/1987 seeking the relief of

perpetual   injunction   to   restrain   the   defendants   from

interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of

the plaint schedule property, as claimed by the plaintiff.

The defendant No.2 did not respond to the summons

issued in the suit and therefore, was placed ex­parte. The

defendant   No.1   appeared   before   the   trial   court   and

contested the suit. The case of the plaintiff was that the

plaint schedule property belonged to the plaintiff who has

been enjoying the same for a period of 40 years by paying

kist.  The  property  belonging  to  the  defendant   No.1  is

adjacent to the suit property. The same was sold by the

defendant   No.1   to   one   Parvatham   Ammal   wife   of

Ponnusamy in the year 1984. The properties were subdivided after the purchase and were assigned the Survey

No.1073/3V, and 1073/3B. The property bearing Survey

Page 2 of 22

No.1073/13A belonged to Parvatham Ammal. The said

Smt.  Parvatham  Ammal  alienated  the  property  to  one

Subban Asari. Hence, it was contended by the plaintiff

that the defendant No. 1 has no manner of right over the

suit   schedule   property.   The   plaintiff   alleged   that   the

defendant No.1 approached the plaintiff and demanded to

sell the property to him but the plaintiff refused to do so,

due to which the defendants attempted to trespass into

the suit property. The plaintiff having resisted the same

claimed   that   the   suit   is   filed   in   that   view   seeking

injunction.

3.  The defendant No.1 in order to resist the suit, filed

a detailed written statement disputing the right claimed

over the suit schedule property by the plaintiff. It was

contended   that   the   suit   schedule   property   neither

belonged   to   the   plaintiff   nor   was   the   plaintiff   in

possession   of   the   same.   On   the   other   hand,   it   was

contended that the defendant was in possession of the

property.   It   was   averred   that   the   suit   property   and

certain other properties originally belonged to Ponnimalai

Page 3 of 22

Chetti, the father of Konar Chettiar. He purchased 1/3rd

share in Survey No.1073/3 and 1/5th share in Survey

No.1073/13. Though only the said extent was purchased,

the entire extent was in his possession and enjoyment.

The said Konar Chettiar handed over the entire extent to

Marimuthu Kudumban son of Sivanandi Kudumban who

was  the   grandfather  of   defendant   No.1.  Subsequently,

0.33 cents of land in Survey No.1073/3A was acquired

for the formation of Kodaikanal road and the remaining

extent of land available in the said Survey Number is only

46 cents. Marimuthu Kudumban disposed 0.35 cents of

land in Survey No.1073/13 from out of the extent of 1.76

acre to one Arockiammal i.e., the mother of the defendant

No.1 under a sale deed dated 10.08.1937 and delivered

the possession. The remaining 1.41 acres of land was

also enjoyed by Marimuthu Kudumban. Subsequently, he

died leaving behind him the mother of defendant no. 1

namely Arockiammal as the only heir. Arockiammal was

thus in possession and enjoyment of 0.79 cents in Survey

No.1073/3V   and   1.41   acre   in   Survey   No.1072/13A

Page 4 of 22

alongwith   the   0.35   cents   of   land   purchased   by

Arockiammal.   The   defendant   No.1   was   enjoying   the

properties through the guardian since the defendant No.1

was 3 years old when Arockiammal and her husband

died. 

4.    It was further averred that the defendant No.1

sold 0.31 cents of land in survey No.1073/13 from out of

1.76 acres of land to Parvatham Ammal on 24.11.1984.

The remaining 1.41 acres of land has been in possession

and enjoyment of defendant No.1. After the purchase of

land   Parvatham   Ammal   obtained   patta   for   Survey

No.1073/13 to the extent of 55 cents and sub­divided in

1073/13A. The Revenue authorities issued patta for the

extent of 55 cents and on 19.12.1987 Parvatham Ammal

sold 55 cents of land to one Subban Asari. The defendant

alleged   that   Subban   Asari   in   order   to   grab   the   suit

property is litigating in the instant suit in the name of the

plaintiff. The defendant No.1 disputed the payment of kist

by the plaintiff which has been done with the ulterior

motive for the suit. The defendant No.1 claimed in the

Page 5 of 22

written statement that the defendant No.1 is residing in

the thatched house in the suit property and is engaged in

agricultural work. The defendant No.1 therefore, sought

for dismissal of the suit.

5.    Based on the rival pleadings, the trial court framed

two issues and an additional issue casting burden on the

plaintiff to prove whether the plaintiff was in exclusive

possession and enjoyment of the suit property and as to

whether the plaintiff is entitled for permanent injunction

as prayed for. The plaintiff examined himself as PW1 and

relied upon the documents at Exhibit A1 to A16. No other

witness   was   examined   on   behalf   of   the   plaintiff.   The

defendant examined two witnesses as DW1 and DW2 and

documents at Exhibits B1 to B14 were marked. 

6.    The learned District Munsif (Trial Court) having

taken   note   of   the   rival   contentions   and   the   evidence

tendered  by  the   parties   recorded   a  categorical  finding

that the plaintiff has failed to prove possession over the

suit   schedule   property   and   taking   note   of   certain

admissions made by the plaintiff during the course of the

Page 6 of 22

cross­examination and the contention put­forth by the

defendant, was also of the view that though the claim of

the plaintiff is denied by the defendant No.1 the plaintiff

has not sought the relief of declaration and in that light

the only question relating to possession was answered

against   the   plaintiff.   The   suit   of   the   plaintiff   was

accordingly dismissed with costs through its judgment

dated 13.04.1993.

7.  The plaintiff being aggrieved by the same preferred

a   Regular   First   Appeal   under   Section   96   of   the   Civil

Procedure Code before the District Judge, Dindigul (First

Appellate   Court)   in   A.S   No.51   of   1993.   The   learned

District   Judge   framed   two   points   for   consideration,

essentially   to   the   effect   as   to   whether   the   plaintiff   is

entitled   to   the   relief   of   permanent   injunction.   While

taking note of the evidence tendered by the parties before

the   trial   court,  the   learned   District   Judge   has  placed

much reliance on the documents at Exhibit A5 series,

namely, the kist receipts and based mainly on the same

has   arrived   at   the   conclusion   that   the   claim   of   the

Page 7 of 22

plaintiff that he is in possession of the suit schedule

property is to be accepted since he was paying kist in

respect of the property. 

8. The   defendant   No.1   therefore,   claiming   to   be

aggrieved by the judgment dated 18.03.1994 passed by

the learned District Judge in A.S. No.51/1993 preferred

the   Second   Appeal   under   Section   100   of   the   Civil

Procedure Code before the Madras High Court, Madurai

Bench in S.A. No.1303 of 1994. The High court while

admitting the Second Appeal had framed a substantial

question of law, as to whether the suit without the prayer

for declaration is maintainable when especially the title of

the plaintiff is disputed. Thereupon having taken note of

the rival contentions urged by the parties had arrived at

the   conclusion   that   the   substantial   question   of   law

framed   has   substance   and   therefore,   set   aside   the

judgment dated 18.03.1984 passed in A.S. No.51/1993

by   the   learned   District   Judge   Dindigul.   The   plaintiff

therefore, claiming to be aggrieved has filed the instant

appeal. 

Page 8 of 22

9.     In   the   above   background   we   have   heard   Mr.

Jayanth Muth Raj, learned senior counsel appearing for

the   plaintiff­appellant,   Mr.   Sriram   P.,   learned   counsel

appearing for the respondents and perused the appeal

papers.

10.     The   reference   made   hereinabove   to   the   rival

pleadings would delineate the nature of contentions that

were put­forth by the parties in support of the suit and to

oppose the same. The manner in which it is dealt by the

various fora in the hierarchy will have to rest on the

claim that was originally put­forth in the plaint and the

manner in which the claim was sought to be established

with the evidence tendered, either documentary or oral.

The   learned   senior   counsel   for   the   appellant   has

strenuously   contended   that   the   parameter   for

interference   by   the   High   Court   in   the   Second   Appeal

under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code is well

established and the High Court cannot travel beyond the

same and advert to re­appreciate the evidence on factual

aspects.   It   is   contended   that   though   a   substantial

Page 9 of 22

question of law was framed by the High Court, the same

has not been answered. It is his contention that even

otherwise the substantial question of law as framed by

the High Court is not sustainable inasmuch as the law is

well settled that in a suit for bare injunction the plaintiff

need not always seek for declaratory relief and if this

aspect of the matter is kept in view there was no other

substantial question of law subsisting and the second

appeal ought to have been dismissed. He contended that

in such event when the lower appellate court which is the

last   court   for   appreciation   of   facts   has   recorded   its

finding of fact, the same cannot be interfered by the High

Court on re­appreciation of the evidence. In that view it is

contended that the judgment passed by the High court is

liable   to   be   set   aside   and   the   judgment   of   the   lower

appellate court is to be restored.

11.   The   learned   counsel   for   the   defendant   No.1

however, sought to sustain the judgment passed by the

High Court. It is pointed out that the suit was instituted

by the plaintiff as far back as in the year 1987 and the

Page 10 of 22

trial court through its judgment dated 13.04.1993 had

referred to the entire evidence and arrived at a conclusion

that the prayer made in the plaint is liable to be rejected.

Though the lower appellate court has set aside the same,

the judgment of the lower appellate court would indicate

that the evidence has not been properly appreciated and,

in such circumstance, the High Court as far back as on

30.10.2009   has   set   aside   the   judgment   of   the   lower

appellate court and in such event, at this distant point in

time it would not be appropriate to set aside the order of

the  High  Court  more  particularly  when  the  defendant

No.1 has been in possession, prior to and subsequent to

the   suit.   The   learned   counsel   therefore,   sought   for

dismissal of this appeal.

12.    In   the   light   of   the   rival   contentions,   before

adverting to the fact situation herein it is to be stated at

the outset that on the general principles of law laid down

in the decisions referred to by the learned senior counsel

for the appellant, there can be no quarrel whatsoever. In

the   case   of  Gajaraba   Bhikhubha   Vadher   &   Ors.

Page 11 of 22

versus  Sumara  Umar  Amad  (dead)   thr.  Lrs.  &  Ors.

(2020)  11  SCC  114   the fact situation arising therein

was   referred   to   and   having   taken   note   that   five

substantial questions of law had been framed, this Court

had   arrived   at   the   conclusion   that   such   substantial

questions of law which arose therein had not been dealt

with appropriately since it had not been considered in the

light of the contentions. It is in that circumstance, this

Court was of the view that the judgment of the High

Court is to be set aside and the matter is to be remitted

to   the   High   Court.   In   the   case   of  Ramathal   versus

Maruthathal   &   Ors.   (2018)   18   SCC   303,   the   issue

considered was as to whether the High Court was wrong

in interfering with the question of fact in the Second

Appeal. It was a case where both the courts below had

arrived   at   a   concurrent   finding   of   fact   and   both   the

Courts had disbelieved the evidence of witnesses. In such

a   case   where   such   concurrent   factual   finding   was

rendered by two courts and in such situation, it had been

interfered by the High Court in a Second Appeal, this

Page 12 of 22

Court   was   of   the   view   that   the   interference   was   not

justified. However, it is appropriate to notice that in the

said decision this Court had also indicated that such

restraint against interference is not an absolute rule but

when there is perversity in findings of the court which are

not   based   on   any   material   or   when   appreciation   of

evidence suffers from material irregularity the High Court

would be entitled to interfere on a question of fact as well.

The decision in the case of Ram Daan (dead) through

Lrs.  versus  Urban Improvement  Trust.  (2014) 8 SCC

902, is a case, where in a suit for permanent injunction

the plaintiff had pleaded possession from the year 1942

and the defendant had admitted the possession of the

plaintiff from 1965 though it was contended that they

had re­entered the property after being evicted in 1965. It

is in that circumstance the case of the plaintiff seeking to

protect the possession was accepted and the necessity for

seeking declaration did not arise as the defendant did not

assert   its   right   of   ownership   which   is   not   so   in   the

instant   case.   In   the   case   of  P.   Velayudhan   &   Ors.

Page 13 of 22

versus  Kurungot  Imbichia  Moidu’s  son  Ayammad  &

Ors.   (1990)   Supp.   SCC   9  and in the case of  Tapas

Kumar  Samanta   versus  Sarbani  Sen  &  Anr.  (2015)

12   SCC  523, the decisions are to the effect that in a

Second Appeal the High Court would not be justified in

interfering   with   the   finding   of   fact   made   by   the   first

appellate   court   since   such   finding   rendered   would   be

based on evidence. On this aspect there can be no doubt

that the same is the settled position of law but it would

depend on the fact situation and the manner in which

the evidence is appreciated in the particular facts. In the

case   of  Ramji   Rai   &   Anr.   versus   Jagdish   Mallah

(dead) thr. Lrs. & Anr. (2007) 14 SCC 200 though it is

held that there was no need to seek for declaration and

suit for possession alone was sustainable, it was held so

in   the   circumstance   where   injunction   was   sought   in

respect   of   the   disputed   land   which   was   an   area

appurtenant to their building in which case possession

alone   was   relevant   and   restraint   sought   was   against

preventing construction of compound wall. 

Page 14 of 22

13.   In the background of the legal position and on

reasserting the position that there is very limited scope

for reappreciating  the  evidence  or interfering  with  the

finding of fact rendered by the trial court and the first

appellate court in a second appeal under Section 100 of

the Civil Procedure Code, it is necessary for us to take

note as to whether in the instant facts the High Court

has breached the said settled position. To that extent the

factual aspects and the evidence tendered by the parties

has already been noted above in brief. Further, what is

distinct in the present facts of the case is that the finding

rendered by the learned Munsif (Trial Court) and by the

learned   District   Judge   (First   Appellate   Court)   are

divergent. The trial court on taking note of the pleadings

and the evidence available before it was of the opinion

that the plaintiff has failed to prove exclusive possession

and,   in   such   light,   held   that   the   entitlement   for

permanent injunction has not been established. While

arriving at such conclusion the trial court had taken note

of   the   right   as   claimed   by   the   plaintiff   and   in   that

Page 15 of 22

background had arrived at the conclusion that except for

the say of plaintiff as PW1 there was no other evidence.

On the documentary evidence it was indicated that the

kist  receipts  at  Exhibit  A5  series would  not   establish

possession   merely   because   the   name   has   been

subsequently substituted in the patta records and the

kist had been paid. 

14.    As   against   such   conclusion,   the  first   appellate

court in fact has placed heavy reliance solely on the kist

receipts which in fact had led the first appellate court to

arrive at the conclusion that the continuous payment of

kist   would   indicate   that   the   plaintiff   was   also   in

possession of the property. When such divergent findings

on fact were available before the High Court in an appeal

under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code though

reappreciation   of   the   evidence   was   not   permissible,

except when it is perverse, but it was certainly open for

the High Court to take note of the case pleaded, evidence

tendered, as also the findings rendered by the two courts

which was at variance with each other and one of the

Page 16 of 22

views   taken   by   the   courts   below   was   required   to   be

approved. 

15.  In view of the above, although the counsel for the

appellant may be technically correct in his submission

that the High Court erred in not clearly answering the

question of law framed by it under Section 100, CPC, the

High Court was still within its jurisdiction to determine

whether the reading of the evidence on record by one of

the   Courts   below   was   perverse.   Question   of   law   for

consideration will not arise in abstract but in all cases

will emerge from the facts peculiar to that case and there

cannot   be   a   strait   jacket   formula.   Therefore,   merely

because the High Court refers to certain factual aspects

in the case to raise and conclude on the question of law,

the  same  does  not  mean   that  the  factual  aspect  and

evidence has been reappreciated. As already noted, the

divergent view of the courts below on the same set of

facts   was   available   before   the   High   Court.   From   the

judgment   rendered   by   the   trial   court,   the   nature   of

contentions   as   noted   would   disclose   that   the   plaintiff

Page 17 of 22

except contending that the suit schedule property was

being enjoyed for the past 40 years by paying kist has not

in fact referred to the manner in which such right had

accrued so as to suggest or indicate unassailable right to

be   in   physical   possession.   On   the   other   hand,   the

defendant while denying the right of the plaintiff to claim

the relief had traced the manner in which the property

had devolved and the right which is being claimed by the

defendant. It was also contended that the defendant No.1

is   residing   in   the   thatched   house   which   is   on   the

property. It is in that light the trial court having taken

note of the assertions made by the defendant No.1 and

lack   of   evidence   by   the   plaintiff   had   arrived   at   the

conclusion that the possession of the plaintiff as claimed

cannot be accepted and that the plaintiff has not sought

for declaration despite the defendant having disputed the

claim of the plaintiff. 

16.    The   trial   court   while   answering   Issue   No.1and

Addl. Issue No.1, on adverting to rival contentions and

evidence, recorded thus: 

Page 18 of 22

“Though the claim of the plaintiff is denied by

the 1st defendant, the plaintiff has not sought

the relief of declaration as already adverted.

The only question remains to be answered is

whether   the   plaintiff   has   been   enjoyment   of

suit   property   and   he   is   entitled   to   relief   of

permanent injunction as prayed for”. 

The trial court, thereafter on assessing the evidence has

concluded thus:

 “This Court feels that these documents do not

require   any   consideration.   Hence   this   court

could   not   conclude   that   the   plaintiff   is   in

possession   and   enjoyment   of   the   suit

properties based on the documents marked as

exhibits on the side of the plaintiff”.

17.  One other aspect which is also to be noted is that

the plaintiff himself had filed applications before the trial

court claiming that the defendant No.1 had trespassed

into the suit property and encroached the house after

grant   of   temporary   injunction.   In   another   application

filed it was contended by the plaintiff that the defendant

had trespassed and is residing in the thatched house.

Whereas   the   defendant   No.1   in   his   written   statement

itself had stated that he is residing in the thatched house

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situate   in   the   suit   schedule   property.   The   said

applications   have   not   been   pressed   to   its   logical

conclusion nor has any other step been taken to seek

restoration   of   possession   by   establishing   that   the

possession in fact had been taken by the defendant No.1

subsequent to the interim injunction. Therefore, on all

counts the possession of the suit schedule property was

also not established. 

18.   That apart, though the lower appellate court had

reversed the judgment of the trial court, this aspect of the

matter relating to the grievance of the plaintiff that he

had   been   dispossessed   had   not   been   addressed   and

despite   the   plaintiff   not   being   in   possession   the

injunction   being   granted   by   the   lower   appellate   court

would not be justified. On the other hand a perusal of the

judgment passed by the learned District Judge and the

observations   contained   therein   to   the   effect   that   the

defendant has not produced any documentary evidence

to show that Arockiammal is the only heir of deceased

Marimuthu   Kudumban   and   also   that   defendant   No.1

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alone is the legal heir of deceased Arockiammal, daughter

of Marimuthu Kudumban and the conclusion that there

is no clinching proof on behalf of the defendant that he

has paid kist to the suit property as also the observation

that   the   defendant   has   miserably   failed   to   prove   his

possession   over   the   suit   property,   on   the   face   of   it

indicate that the learned District Judge has misdirected

himself and proceeded at a tangent by placing the burden

on the defendant. Though there was no issue to that

effect before the trial court, the learned District Judge

with such conclusions has ultimately set aside the wellconsidered   judgment   and   decree   dated   13.04.1993

passed by the trial court in O.S. No.769/1987, which will

indicate   perversity   and   material   irregularity   in

misdirecting itself in wrongly expecting the defendant to

discharge the burden in a suit for bare injunction and

arriving at a wrong conclusion.

19. When the above aspects are kept in view, without

making any observations as to the question of law raised

in the present appeal, we are of the considered opinion

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that it would not be appropriate to interfere with the

judgment of the High Court which is in consonance with

the fact situation arising in the instant case.   In that

view, we see no merit in this appeal.

20. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with no order

as to costs in this appeal.

21. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed

of. 

………….…………CJI

(N.V. RAMANA)

          ………….…………….J.

                                                (A.S. BOPANNA)

………….…………….J.

                                              (HRISHIKESH ROY)

New Delhi,

September 02, 2021

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