REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 98 of 2021
[Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 11616 of 2019]
Union of India ..... Appellant (s)
VERSUS
K.A. Najeeb ..... Respondent (s)
ORDER
Surya Kant, J:
Leave Granted.
2. The present appeal has been preferred by the Union of India
through the National Investigation Agency (in short, “NIA”) against an
order dated 23.07.2019 of the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam,
whereby bail was granted to the respondent for an offence under
Sections 143, 147, 148, 120B, 341, 427, 323, 324, 326, 506(H), 201,
202, 153A, 212, 307, 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”),
Section 3 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 and Sections 16, 18,
18B, 19 and 20 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967
(“UAPA”).
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FACTS
3. The prosecution case in brief is that one Professor TJ Joseph
while framing the Malayalam question paper for the second semester
B.Com. examination at the Newman College, Thodupuzha, had
included a question which was considered objectionable against a
particular religion by certain sections of society. The respondent in
association with other members of the Popular Front of India (PFI),
decided to avenge this purported act of blasphemy. On 04.07.2010 at
about 8AM, a group of people with a common object, attacked the
victimprofessor while he was returning home with his mother and
sister after attending Sunday mass at a local Church. Over the course
of the attack, members of the PFI forcefully intercepted the victim’s
car, restrained him and choppedoff his right palm with choppers,
knives, and a small axe. Countrymade bombs were also hurled at
bystanders to create panic and terror in their minds and to prevent
them from coming to the aid of the victim. An FIR was consequently
lodged against the attackers by the victimprofessor’s wife under
Sections 143, 147, 148, 120B, 341, 427, 323, 324, 326, 506(H), 307,
149 of IPC; and Section 3 of Explosive Substances Act.
4. It emerged over the course of investigation that the attack was
part of a larger conspiracy involving meticulous preplanning,
numerous failed attempts and use of dangerous weapons. Accordingly,
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several dozen persons including the present respondent were
arraigned by the police. It was alleged that the respondent was one of
the main conspirators and the provisions contained in Sections 153A,
201, 202, 212 of IPC, along with Section 16, 18, 18B, 19 and 20 of
the UAPA were also thus invoked against him. However, owing to him
being untraceable, the respondent was declared an absconder and his
trial was split up from the rest of his coconspirators. The coaccused
of the respondent were tried and most of them were found guilty by
the Special Court, NIA vide order dated 30.04.2015 and were awarded
cumulative sentence ranging between two and eightyears’ rigorous
imprisonment.
5. The respondent could be arrested on 10.04.2015 only and a
chargesheet was refiled by the National Investigation Agency against
him, pursuant to which the respondent is now facing trial. The
respondent approached the Special Court and the High Court for bail
as many as six times between 2015 and 2019, seeking leniency on
grounds of his limited role in the offence and claiming parity with
other coaccused who had been enlarged on bail or acquitted. Save for
the impugned order, bail was declined to the respondent, observing
that prima facie he had prior knowledge of the offence, had assisted
and facilitated the attack, arranged vehicle and SIM cards, himself
waited near the place of occurrence, transported the perpetrators,
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sheltered, and medically assisted them afterwards. The Courts were,
therefore, of the view that the bar against grant of bail under Section
43D (5) of the UAPA was attracted.
6. The respondent again approached the High Court in May, 2019
for the third time, questioning the Special Court’s order denying bail.
The High Court through the impugned order, released the respondent
on bail noting that the trial was yet to begin though the respondent
had been in custody for four years. Placing emphasis on the mandate
for an expeditious trial under the National Investigation Agency Act,
2008, the High Court held that the undertrialrespondent could not be
kept in custody for too long when the trial was not likely to commence
in the near future, for not doing so would cause serious prejudice and
suffering to him. The operation of the aforementioned bail order was,
however, stayed by this Court. Resultantly, the respondent has spent
nearly five years and five months in judicial custody.
CONTENTIONS
7. Learned Additional Solicitor General, for the appellant, argued
that the High Court erred in granting bail without adverting to the
statutory rigours of Section 43D(5) of UAPA. Relying upon judgment
in National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali1
,
it was highlighted that bail proceedings under the special enactment
were distinct and the Courts are dutybound to refuse bail where the
1
(2019) 5 SCC 1.
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suspect is prima facie believed to be guilty. It was further contended
that in numerous prior rounds before the Special Court and the High
Court, there emerged enough reasons to believe that the respondent
was, prima facie, guilty of the accusations made against him. The fact
that the respondent had absconded for years was pressed into aid as
legitimate apprehension of his not returning if set free. As regard to
the early conclusion of trial, NIA has filed an additional affidavit
suggesting to examine 276 witnesses and at the same time expecting
to conduct the trial on a daytoday basis and complete it within
around a year.
8. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent, on the
other hand, highlighted that many of the coaccused had been
acquitted, and although a few had been convicted as well, but those
convicts had also been awarded a sentence of not more than eight
years. Given how the respondent has already suffered incarceration of
almost fiveandahalf years without the trial having even started, it
would violate his Constitutional liberty and rights to have him serve
most of his sentence without any adjudication of guilt by a judicial
authority. He urged that once the High Court had exercised discretion
to grant bail, the same ought not to be interfered with except in rare
circumstances. Relying upon Shaheen Welfare Association v. Union
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of India2 and Hussain v. Union of India,3
it was argued that such
protracted incarceration violates the respondent’s right to speedy trial
and access to justice; in which case, Constitutional Courts could
exercise their powers to grant bail, regardless of limitations specified
under special enactments.
ANALYSIS
9. It must be emphasised at the outset that there is a vivid
distinction between the parameters to be applied while considering a
bail application, visàvis those applicable while deciding a petition for
its cancellation. In Puran v. Rambilas4
, it was reiterated that at the
time of deciding an application for bail, it would be necessary to record
reasons, albeit without evaluating the evidence on merits. In turn,
Puran (supra) cited Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.)5
;
wherein this Court observed that bail once granted by the trial Court,
could be cancelled by the same Court only in case of new
circumstances/evidence, failing which, it would be necessary to
approach the Higher Court exercising appellate jurisdiction.
10. In State of Bihar v. Rajballav Prasad6
, this Court ruled that
deference must be given to the discretion exercised by Superior Courts
2
(1996) 2 SCC 616.
3
(2017) 5 SCC 702.
4
(2001) 6 SCC 338.
5
(1978) 1 SCC 118.
6 (2017) 2 SCC 178.
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in matters of bail, save for exceptional circumstances. The aforecited
decision holds as follows:
“14. We may observe at the outset that we are conscious of the
limitations which bind us while entertaining a plea against
grant of bail by the lower court, that too, which is a superior
court like High Court. It is expected that once the discretion
is exercised by the High Court on relevant considerations
and bail is granted, this Court would normally not
interfere with such a discretion, unless it is found that
the discretion itself is exercised on extraneous
considerations and/or the relevant factors which need to
be taken into account while exercising such a discretion
are ignored or bypassed. ... There have to be very cogent
and overwhelming circumstances that are necessary to
interfere with the discretion in granting the bail. These
material considerations are also spelled out in the
aforesaid judgments viz. whether the accused would be
readily available for his trial and whether he is likely to
abuse the discretion granted in his favour by tampering
with the evidence. …”
(emphasis supplied)
11. It is a fact that the High Court in the instant case has not
determined the likelihood of the respondent being guilty or not, or
whether rigours of Section 43D(5) of UAPA are alien to him. The High
Court instead appears to have exercised its power to grant bail owing
to the long period of incarceration and the unlikelihood of the trial
being completed anytime in the near future. The reasons assigned by
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the High Court are apparently traceable back to Article 21 of our
Constitution, of course without addressing the statutory embargo
created by Section 43D (5) of UAPA.
12. The High Court’s view draws support from a batch of decisions of
this Court, including in Shaheen Welfare Association (supra),
laying down that gross delay in disposal of such cases would justify
the invocation of Article 21 of the Constitution and consequential
necessity to release the undertrial on bail. It would be useful to quote
the following observations from the cited case:
“10. Bearing in mind the nature of the crime and the need to
protect the society and the nation, TADA has prescribed in
Section 20(8) stringent provisions for granting bail. Such
stringent provisions can be justified looking to the
nature of the crime, as was held in Kartar Singh
case [(1994) 3 SCC 569 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 899] , on the
presumption that the trial of the accused will take place
without undue delay. No one can justify gross delay in
disposal of cases when undertrials perforce remain in
jail, giving rise to possible situations that may justify
invocation of Article 21.”
(emphasis supplied)
13. Even in the case of special legislations like the Terrorist and
Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 or the Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (“NDPS”) which too have somewhat
rigorous conditions for grant of bail, this Court in Paramjit Singh v.
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State (NCT of Delhi)7
, Babba alias Shankar Raghuman Rohida v.
State of Maharashtra8 and Umarmia alias Mamumia v. State of
Gujarat9
enlarged the accused on bail when they had been in jail for
an extended period of time with little possibility of early completion of
trial. The constitutionality of harsh conditions for bail in such special
enactments, has thus been primarily justified on the touchstone of
speedy trials to ensure the protection of innocent civilians.
14. We may also refer to the orders enlarging similarlysituated
accused under the UAPA passed by this Court in Angela Harish
Sontakke v. State of Maharashtra10
. That was also a case under
Sections 10, 13, 17, 18, 18A, 18B, 20, 21, 38, 39 and 40(2) of the
UAPA. This Court in its earnest effort to draw balance between the
seriousness of the charges with the period of custody suffered and the
likely period within which the trial could be expected to be completed
took note of the five years’ incarceration and over 200 witnesses left to
be examined, and thus granted bail to the accused notwithstanding
Section 43D(5) of UAPA. Similarly, in Sagar Tatyaram Gorkhe v.
State of Maharashtra11
, an accused under the UAPA was enlarged
for he had been in jail for four years and there were over 147
7
(1999) 9 SCC 252.
8
(2005) 11 SCC 569.
9
(2017) 2 SCC 731.
10 SLP (Crl.) No. 6888 of 2015, Order dated 04.05.2016.
11 SLP (Crl.) No. 7947 of 2015, Order dated 03.01.2017.
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witnesses still unexamined.
15. The facts of the instant case are more egregious than these two
abovecited instances. Not only has the respondent been in jail for
much more than five years, but there are 276 witnesses left to be
examined. Charges have been framed only on 27.11.2020. Still
further, two opportunities were given to the appellantNIA who has
shown no inclination to screen its endless list of witnesses. It also
deserves mention that of the thirteen coaccused who have been
convicted, none have been given a sentence of more than eight years’
rigorous imprisonment. It can therefore be legitimately expected that if
found guilty, the respondent too would receive a sentence within the
same ballpark. Given that twothird of such incarceration is already
complete, it appears that the respondent has already paid heavily for
his acts of fleeing from justice.
16. This Court has clarified in numerous judgments that the liberty
guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution would cover within its
protective ambit not only due procedure and fairness but also access
to justice and a speedy trial. In Supreme Court Legal Aid
Committee Representing Undertrial Prisoners v. Union of India12
,
it was held that undertrials cannot indefinitely be detained pending
trial. Ideally, no person ought to suffer adverse consequences of his
acts unless the same is established before a neutral arbiter. However,
12(1994) 6 SCC 731, ¶ 15.
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owing to the practicalities of real life where to secure an effective trial
and to ameliorate the risk to society in case a potential criminal is left
at large pending trial, Courts are tasked with deciding whether an
individual ought to be released pending trial or not. Once it is obvious
that a timely trial would not be possible and the accused has suffered
incarceration for a significant period of time, Courts would ordinarily
be obligated to enlarge them on bail.
17. As regard to the judgment in NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah
Watali (supra), cited by learned ASG, we find that it dealt with an
entirely different factual matrix. In that case, the High Court had reappreciated the entire evidence on record to overturn the Special
Court’s conclusion of their being a prima facie case of conviction and
concomitant rejection of bail. The High Court had practically
conducted a minitrial and determined admissibility of certain
evidences, which exceeded the limited scope of a bail petition. This not
only was beyond the statutory mandate of a prima facie assessment
under Section 43D(5), but it was premature and possibly would have
prejudiced the trial itself. It was in these circumstances that this
Court intervened and cancelled the bail.
18. It is thus clear to us that the presence of statutory restrictions
like Section 43D (5) of UAPA perse does not oust the ability of
Constitutional Courts to grant bail on grounds of violation of Part III of
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the Constitution. Indeed, both the restrictions under a Statue as well
as the powers exercisable under Constitutional Jurisdiction can be
well harmonised. Whereas at commencement of proceedings, Courts
are expected to appreciate the legislative policy against grant of bail
but the rigours of such provisions will melt down where there is no
likelihood of trial being completed within a reasonable time and the
period of incarceration already undergone has exceeded a substantial
part of the prescribed sentence. Such an approach would safeguard
against the possibility of provisions like Section 43D (5) of UAPA
being used as the sole metric for denial of bail or for wholesale breach
of constitutional right to speedy trial.
19. Adverting to the case at hand, we are conscious of the fact that
the charges levelled against the respondent are grave and a serious
threat to societal harmony. Had it been a case at the threshold, we
would have outrightly turned down the respondent’s prayer. However,
keeping in mind the length of the period spent by him in custody and
the unlikelihood of the trial being completed anytime soon, the High
Court appears to have been left with no other option except to grant
bail. An attempt has been made to strike a balance between the
appellant’s right to lead evidence of its choice and establish the
charges beyond any doubt and simultaneously the respondent’s rights
guaranteed under Part III of our Constitution have been well
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protected.
20. Yet another reason which persuades us to enlarge the
Respondent on bail is that Section 43D(5) of the UAPA is
comparatively less stringent than Section 37 of the NDPS. Unlike the
NDPS where the competent Court needs to be satisfied that prima
facie the accused is not guilty and that he is unlikely to commit
another offence while on bail; there is no such precondition under the
UAPA. Instead, Section 43D (5) of UAPA merely provides another
possible ground for the competent Court to refuse bail, in addition to
the wellsettled considerations like gravity of the offence, possibility of
tampering with evidence, influencing the witnesses or chance of the
accused evading the trial by absconsion etc.
CONCLUSION
21. In light of the above discussion, we are not inclined to interfere
with the impugned order. However, we feel that besides the conditions
to be imposed by the trial Court while releasing the respondent, it
would serve the best interest of justice and the societyatlarge to
impose some additional conditions that the respondent shall mark his
presence every week on Monday at 10AM at the local police station
and inform in writing that he is not involved in any other new crime.
The respondent shall also refrain from participating in any activity
which might enrage communal sentiments. In case the respondent is
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found to have violated any of his bail conditions or attempted to have
tampered the evidence, influence witnesses, or hamper the trial in any
other way, then the Special Court shall be at liberty to cancel his bail
forthwith. The appeal is accordingly dismissed subject to above stated
directions.
…………………………….. J.
(N.V. RAMANA)
…………………………… J.
(SURYA KANT)
…………………………...J.
(ANIRUDDHA BOSE)
NEW DELHI
DATED : 01.02.2021
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