no election could have been conducted on 02.08.2014 for electing member to the Bar Council of India from the State Bar Council. Further, the election of the member to the Bar Council of India is statutorily regulated by Bar Council of India Rules and Rule 7 require notice by the Secretary of the State Council fixing a date for the election of the member to the Council. The notices dated 16.07.2014 and 19.07.2014 cannot be read as notice as required under Rule 7 for holding election of a member to the Bar Council of India from the State Bar Council, hence, the conduct of election of a member as a representative from State Bar Council to Bar Council of India in the meeting dated 02.08.2014 cannot be said to be in conformity with Rule 7 of Bar Council of India Rules. The High Court was, thus, clearly right in its view that election of Shri 28 Pratap Mehta on 02.08.2014 as member of the Bar Council of India was not a valid election. The learned Single Judge having already taken a view that election dated 29.06.2014 electing Shri Sunil Gupta as the representative to the Bar Council of India was not a valid election, which issue was not, however, agitated either by the State Council or by Shri Sunil Gupta, there is no need to ponder over the above election. Both the elections dated 29.06.2014 and 02.08.2014 to elect a member in the Bar Council of India having been held to be invalid, the High Court was right in issuing directions for conducting a fresh election to elect a member in the Bar Council of India, which was necessary and just.

1
REPORTABLE
  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.8172­8173 OF 2018
PRATAP MEHTA … APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
SUNIL GUPTA & ORS.               … RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.8174­8177 OF 2018
BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA  … APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
STATE BAR COUNCIL OF M.P.
& ORS. ETC.                   … RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.
These   appeals   have   been   filed   against   the   common
judgment dated 17.07.2018 of the High Court of Delhi in
Letters   Patent   Appeal   NO.365/2018   and   other   connected
LPAs. Letters Patent Appeals were filed by the appellant
aggrieved by common judgment dated 06.07.2018 of learned
Single Judge in Writ Petition(C)No.2142 of 2016 (State
2
Bar   Council   of   M.P.   vs.   Bar   Council   of   India   &   Ors.)
and Writ Petition (C) No.2215 of 2016 (Sunil Gupta vs.
Bar Council of India & Ors.).  Learned Single Judge vide
its   judgment   dated   06.07.2018   disposed   of   the   writ
petitions with certain directions.
2. The brief facts of the case necessary to be noted
for deciding these appeals are:
State   Bar   Council   of   Madhya   Pradesh   held   the
elections   for   its   constituent   members   in   the   month   of
May­June, 2014. After declaration of the result notice
dated   09.06.2014   was   issued   for   holding   the   first
meeting of newly elected members on 29.06.2014.   Agenda
for the meeting to be held on 29.06.2014 was to conduct
the elections for the various offices and the Committees
of the State Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh including the
office of its representative member in the Bar Council
of   India.  In  these  appeals   we  are  concerned  only  with
one Agenda item which is to the following effect:
" Part­B
Serial   No.1:   Discussion,   consideration   and
decision   regarding   the   election   of   the
representative member of the Bar Council for
the Bar Council of India.”
3
3. Pursuant to notice dated 09.06.2014, a meeting  was
held   on   29.06.2014,   which   was   presided   over   by   the
Advocate General of the State of Madhya Pradesh and was
attended by all the 25 members of the State Bar Council
of M.P. In the meeting, one Shri Rameshwar Neekhra was
elected as Chairman.
4. The   case   of   the   respondents,   who   were   writ
petitioners before the High Court was that in the said
meeting,   election   for   other   office   bearers   including
election   for   representative   member   of   the   State   Bar
Council to Bar Council of India was held in which Shri
Sunil Gupta was unanimously elected. Shri Sunil Gupta,
also started working as member representative in the Bar
Council of India. On 29.06.2014, 9 members of the State
Bar Council wrote a letter to its Secretary requesting
him   to   organise   a   meeting   for   conducting   elections   to
the   various   offices   and   Committees   of   the   State   Bar
Council. It was further alleged in the letter that after
the election of Chairman on 29.06.2014, the meeting has
been   adjourned   and   the   members   without   any   further
notice to the members who had thereafter left the place
4
of   meeting,   reconvened   the   meeting   and   elected   Shri
Sunil   Gupta   as   representative   of   the   Bar   Council   of
India.   A  letter  dated  13.07.2014  was   also  sent  to  the
above effect by 13 members.
5. On   13.07.2014   another   letter   was   sent   to   the
Secretary   by   13   members   requesting   to   consider   a   noconfidence
  motion   under   Rule   122A   of   the   State   Bar
Council   of   M.P.   Rules   against   Shri   Rameshwar   Neekhra,
the   Chairman.   Taking   cognizance   of   the   letters   dated
29.06.2014 and 13.07.2014 sent by various members to the
Secretary, notice dated 16.07.2014/19.07.2014 was issued
to the members of State Bar Council informing them of a
special meeting scheduled to be held on 02.08.2014 for
deciding the issues brought forth in the said letters.
The   special   meeting   was   convened   on   02.08.2014.   The
proposed   no­confidence   motion   against   Chairman   was
withdrawn, Chairman relying on the various letters sent
by   the   members   declared   all   the   elections   held   on
29.06.2014   except   his   own,   as   void.   All   the   office
bearers   and   members   who   were   elected   on   29.06.2014
submitted their resignations from their respective posts
5
except   Shri   Sunil   Gupta   who   refused   to   resign   as
representative   to   the   Bar   Council   of   India.   On
02.08.2014,   election   of   several   officer   bearers
including representative to the Bar Council of India was
conducted   in   which   Shri   Pratap   Mehta   was   declared
elected   as   representative   of   the   State   Bar   Council   to
the Bar Council of India.
6.  Aggrieved   by   the   Resolution   dated   02.08.2014
electing Shri Pratap Mehta, Election Petition No.01/2014
was filed by Shri Sunil Gupta before the Bar Council of
India.   During   pendency   of   the   aforesaid   Election
Petition,   State   Bar   Council   passed   Resolution   on
07.02.2015, with a majority of 17 votes, withdrawing its
earlier   Resolution   dated   02.08.2014,   thereby   reaffirming
  that   Shri   Sunil   Gupta   is   its   representative
member   in   the   Bar   Council   of   India.   Shri   Sunil   Gupta
filed   an   application   on   11.02.2015   before   the   Bar
Council   of   India   for   seeking   leave   to   withdraw   his
Election   Petition   No.01/2014.   However,   instead   of
permitting for withdrawal, Chairman of the Bar Council
of India passed an order dated 16.11.2015 observing that
6
Pratap Mehta has  prima facie  case, hence, he permitted
Pratap Mehta to join as representative of the State Bar
Council  in  the   Bar  Council   of  India  pending  the  final
report   of   the   sub­committee   which   was   constituted   for
enquiring   into   the   elections   of   Shri   Sunil   Gupta   and
Shri   Pratap   Mehta.   The   sub­committee   submitted   its
report in which report sub­committee found that election
of   Shri   Sunil   Gupta   cannot   be   held   to   be   valid   as
representative of State Bar Council in the Bar Council
of India rather it is Shri Pratap Mehta who was elected
on   02.08.2014   in   continuation   of   the   meeting   held   on
29.06.2014   which   meeting   was   held   to   dispose   of   and
transact the un­transacted business which was fixed for
29.06.2014.   The   Bar   Council   of   India   passed   an   order
dated 05.12.2015, dismissing the Election Petition filed
by   Shri   Sunil   Gupta.   Bar   Council   of   India   held   that
there   is   no   infirmity   in   the   election   of   Shri   Pratap
Mehta as representative to the Bar Council of India.
7. The State Bar Council of M.P. withdrew Writ Petition
(C) No.No.973 of 2016 challenging order dated 16.11.2015
and  Writ   Petition(C)  No.2142   of  2016   was  filed  by  the
7
State   Bar   Council   of   M.P.   challenging   order   dated
05.12.2015   of   the   Bar   Council   of   India.   Another   Writ
Petition   (C)No.2215   of   2016   was   filed   by   Shri   Sunil
Gupta challenging order dated 05.12.2015 passed by the
Bar Council of India. Both the writ petitions were heard
by the learned Single Judge and have been decided by a
common   judgment   dated   06.07.2018.   Learned   Single   Judge
held that election of Shri Sunil Gupta as representative
in   the   Bar   Council   of   India   dated   29.06.2014   is   not
valid.   Learned   Single   Judge   also   held   that   election
dated   02.08.2014   electing   Shri   Pratap   Mehta   as
representative in the Bar Council of India is also not
valid it having been held contrary to the Bar Council of
India Rules.
8. The   learned   Single   Judge   vide   its   judgment   dated
06.07.2018   allowed   few   of   the   prayers   made   by   writ
petitioners,   however,   certain   other   prayers   were
refused.     Allowing   the   petition,   learned   Single   Judge
held that election of representative in Bar Council of
India from the State Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh held
on 29.06.2014 as well as 02.08.2014 were both invalid.
8
In the circumstances, learned Single Judge took the view
that   the   State   Bar   Council   cannot   be   without   any
representative   in   the   Bar   Council   of   India,   hence   he
directed for holding of fresh elections by the State Bar
Council to elect its representative in the Bar Council
of   India.     Paragraph   45   of   the   judgment   contains   the
operative   portion   of   the   judgment,   which   is   to   the
following effect:­
“45. The prayers in the writ petitions, so far
as   they   seek   implementation   of   the
Petitioner s Resolutions dated 29.06.2014 and ‟
07.02.2015 electing the Respondent No. 3 as a
member   representative   of   Petitioner/SBCMP   in
the   Respondent   No.1/BCI,   are   rejected.
However,   the   prayer   quashing   the   Respondent
No.   1 s   Impugned   Order   dated   05.12.2015   is ‟
allowed   and   accordingly   the   Impugned   Order
dated 05.12.2015 is quashed and set aside. The
Petitioner in W.P.(C) No.2142/2016, i.e., the
State   Bar   Council   of   Madhya   Pradesh   is
directed to hold within a period of 4 weeks,
fresh   elections   for   electing   its
representative   member   in   the   Respondent
No.1/BCI   by   following   the   procedure   as
prescribed   in   the   BCI   Rules.   Upon   the
Petitioner   communicating   the   result   of   the
election to be held in terms of the aforesaid
directions   to   the   Respondent   No.   1/BCI,   the
said Respondent No. 1 would take consequential
steps   to   include   the   name   of   the   person
elected   by   the   Petitioner/SBCMP   as   its
representative   member   in   the   Respondent   No.
1/BCI.”
9
9. Aggrieved   by   the   judgment   dated   06.07.2018,   Shri
Pratap   Mehta   and   Bar   Council   of   India   filed   letters
patent   appeals   before   the   Division   Bench   of   the   High
Court.   All the appeals were dismissed by the Division
Bench vide its judgment dated 17.07.2018.   Shri Pratap
Mehta aggrieved by said judgment has filed Civil Appeal
Nos. 8172­8173 of 2018 whereas Bar Council of India has
filed   Civil   Appeal   Nos.   8174­8177   of   2018.     All   the
appeals have been heard together.
10. Shri   Vikas   Singh,   learned   senior   counsel   has
appeared   for   Shri   Pratap   Mehta   whereas   Shri   S.N.   Bhat
has   appeared   for   Bar   Council   of   India.       Shri   Vikas
Upadhyay,   learned   counsel   has   appeared   for   State   Bar
Council   of   Madhya   Pradesh.     Shri   Nitin   Gaur,   learned
counsel has appeared on behalf of Shri Sunil Gupta.
11. Shri Vikas Singh, learned senior counsel appearing
for the appellants submits that High Court committed an
error in exceeding its jurisdiction under Article 226 by
entering into the issues of the facts by re­appreciating
evidence.  It is submitted that High Court under Article
10
226 could not have re­appreciated evidence and come to a
different conclusion to one which was arrived at by Bar
Council of India, the adjudicating authority, regarding
election   of   State   Bar   Council   for   electing   a
representative   to   the   Bar   Council   of   India.     It   is
submitted that both learned Single Judge as well as the
Division   Bench   of   the   Delhi   High   Court   committed   an
error  in   holding  that  there  was  no   agenda  for  holding
election of the State Bar Council representative for Bar
Council of India for the meeting dated 02.08.2014. It is
submitted that for the meeting dated 02.08.2014, letters
of the members of the State Bar Council dated 29.06.2014
as well as 13.07.2014 itself contain items, which were
to be considered in the meeting to be scheduled, hence
agenda of the meeting was very much clear and High Court
erred in setting aside the election dated 02.08.2014 on
an erroneous ground.  The meeting dated 02.08.2014 being
an adjourned meeting of 29.06.2014, no separate agenda
was   required   to   be   issued   for   the   meeting   dated
02.08.2014.
12. Shri Vikas Upadhyay, learned counsel appearing for
11
State   Bar   Council   submits   that   the   meeting   dated
02.08.2014 was not an adjourned meeting of meeting dated
29.06.2014. He submits that special meeting was convened
by   the   Secretary   of   the   State   Bar   Council   to   take   a
decision on the letter dated 29.06.2014 and 13.07.2014
given by members of the State Bar Council. The question
as to whether the election of representative to the Bar
Council of India was validly held on 29.06.2014, was a
disputed   question,   which   was   required   to   be   decided
before   holding   any   fresh   election,   hence   no   fresh
election could have been held on 02.08.2014.  He further
submits that the Bar Council of India Rules framed under
the   Advocates   Act,   1961   are   statutory   rules,   which
govern election of the member of the State Bar Council
to   the   Bar   Council   of   India,   which   election   is   to   be
held   in   accordance   with   the   Statutory   Rules.     The
election dated 02.08.2014 for electing a member of the
State Bar Council to the Bar Council of India having not
been held in accordance with Part II of Bar Council of
India   Rules   has   rightly   been   invalidated   by   the   High
Court.   It is submitted that election dated 02.08.2014
12
is in breach of Rules 2, 3 and 7.   He further submits
that State Bar Council having already elected Shri Sunil
Gupta   as   its   member   in   the   Bar   Council   of   India   on
29.06.2014,   the   said   election   could   not   have   been   set
aside   except   in   accordance   with   the   procedure   as
prescribed in Rule 9 of the Bar Council of India Rules.
There was no challenge to the election dated 29.06.2014
of   Shri   Sunil   Gupta   as   per   Rule   9,   hence   it   was   not
within   the   jurisdiction   of   State   Bar   Council   to   elect
another representative in place of Shri Sunil Gupta. He
submits that in the Election Petition No.1 of 2014 filed
by Shri Sunil Gupta in spite of there being application
by Shri Sunil Gupta to withdraw the election petition in
view  of  the  resolution  of  the  State  Bar  Council  dated
07.02.2015,   the   Bar   Council   of   India   erroneously
proceeded to decide the election petition on 05.12.2015.
He   further   submits   that   in   pursuance   of   judgment   of
learned Single Judge as confirmed by Division Bench on
17.07.2018, the State Bar Council has fixed 12.08.2018
for   holding   election   of   the   State   Bar   Council’s
representative   in   the   Bar   Council   of   India,   which
13
election has been held on 12.08.2018 and the result of
the election in pursuance of order of this Court dated
03.10.2018  has been submitted before this Court in the
sealed envelope on the date fixed for hearing.
13. Learned   counsel   for   the   Bar   Council   of   India
supported the decision of the Bar Council of India dated
05.12.2015.   It is submitted that in the meeting dated
29.06.2014, no election was held except the election of
Chairman.   After election of Chairman, the meeting was
adjourned, which is recorded in the meeting itself.  The
letter   dated   29.06.2014   and   13.07.2014   submitted   by
members   of   the   State   Bar   Council   were   for   fixing   a
meeting to hold rest of the elections and that meeting
having   been   fixed   for   02.08.2014,   no   fresh   agenda   was
required to be issued and there was no illegality in the
meeting dated 02.08.2014.   It is further submitted that
on 02.08.2014, apart from electing the representative to
the   Bar   Council   of   India,   rest   of   the   elections   were
conducted   and   no   one   has   any   objections   regarding
elections   held   on   02.08.2014   except   Shri   Sunil   Gupta,
who did not submit his resignation on that day whereas
14
all   other   office   bearers   and   members   elected   on
29.06.2014 has submitted their resignations. He submits
that   High   Court   committed   an   error   in   holding   that
election   dated   02.08.2014   in   so   far   as   it   relates   to
representative of State Bar Council in the Bar Council
of India is not correct.
14. We have considered the respective submissions of the
parties and have perused the records.
15. The   entire   dispute   in   the   present   appeals   centres
round   the   election   dated   02.08.2014   in   so   far   as   it
relates  to  election  of  Shri  Pratap  Mehta  as  State  Bar
Council representative in the Bar Council of India.  The
learned Single Judge having held that election of Shri
Sunil   Gupta   on   29.06.2014   as   State   Bar   Council
representative in the Bar Council of India was not valid
and the said decision having not been challenged either
by the State Bar Council or by Shri Sunil Gupta,   the
said  issue  has   become  final  between  the  parties.    The
High Court having held that election dated 02.08.2014 is
not   valid   in   so   far   as   it   relates   to   election   of
representative of State Bar Council in the Bar Council
15
of India is concerned, the only issue to be answered is
as to whether the said election is valid or not?
16. The Advocates Act, 1961, Section 4 provides for the
Bar Council of India.   According to Section 4(1)(c) in
the Bar Council of India, one member has to be elected
by   each   State   Bar   Council   from   amongst   its   members.
Section 4(1)(c) is as follows:­
“4. Bar Council of India.­(1) There shall be a
Bar Council for the territories to which this
Act extends to be known as the Bar Council of
India   which   shall   consist   of   the   following
members, namely:­
(a) ... ... ...
(b) ... ... ...
(c)   one   member   elected   by   each   State   Bar
    Council from amongst its members.”
17. Under   Section   49   of   the   Advocates   Act,   1961,   Bar
Council   of   India   is   empowered   to   make   rules   for
discharging its functions.   In exercise of power under
Section   49   and   all   other   enabling   powers   under   the
Advocates Act, 1961, the Bar Council of India has framed
the Bar Council of India Rules. Chapter I of Part II of
the Rules refers to Section 15, Sections 4 and 10B of
the   Advocates   Act,   1961.     Chapter   I   Part   II   of   the
16
Rules, thus, are to give effect to provisions of Section
4   of   the   Act,   which   provides   for   constitution   of   Bar
Council   of   India   in   which   one   of   its   members   to   be
elected   by   each   State   Bar   Council   from   amongst   its
members.  Rule 2, Rule 3 and rule 7 of Chapter I of Part
II of the Rules are as follows:­
“2.   (1)   The   notice   and   agenda   for   the
first meeting of the State Council held after
the election of its members on the expiry of
the   term   of   its   members   elected   at   the
previous election under Section 8 of the Act
may include the election of a member of the
State Council to the Council under Section (1)
(c) of the Act.
(2) Every such election shall be held not
later than 30 days after the first meeting of
the State Council after election under Section
8 of the Act.
3. The election of a member of the Council
shall   be   conducted   by   the   Secretary   of   the
State Council who shall act as the Returning
Officer.
7.   Every   notice   by   the   Secretary   of   the
State Council fixing a date for the election
of a member to the Council under these rules
shall   be   sent   not   less   than   15   clear   days
before the date fixed for the election. A copy
of   the   said   notice   shall   be   sent
simultaneously   to   the   Secretary   of   the
Council.”
18. A conjoint reading of the aforesaid Rules indicate
that for holding election of a member of Bar Council of
India   to   be   elected   by   State   Bar   Council,   notice   and
17
agenda has to be issued by the Secretary of the State
Bar Council, which is a statutory requirement.  There is
no   issue   between   the   parties   regarding   the   fact   that
agenda   dated   09.06.2014   was   issued   for   the   meeting   of
the   members   of   the   State   Bar   Council   on   29.06.2014
including   the   agenda   for   electing   a   member   from   the
State Bar Council to the Bar Council of India as noticed
above. Minutes of the meeting dated 29.06.2014 has been
brought on the record in Civil Appeal Nos. 8174­8177 of
2018   as   Annexure   A4.   A   perusal   of   the   proceeding
indicates   that   all   25   elected   members   and   learned
Advocate General, who is Ex­officio member was present
and meeting started at 11.00 am and by 12.00 noon, the
election   of   the   Chairman   was   completed.     The   Minutes
record that for greeting the newly elected Chairman and
to see­off learned Advocate General, the proceeding of
the   meeting   were   stayed/adjourned   and   thereafter   again
the meeting started in presence of members for election
of   rest   of   the   office   bearers   and   members   of   the
Committees.  It is useful to refer to the above portion
of the proceeding (English translation of the proceeding
18
brought on record), which is to the following effect:­
“The meeting of the Council started at 11:00
am   at   morning   and   till   12:00   noon   the
election for the post Chairman was completed
and in wishing the newly elected Chairman and
for   giving   respectful   departure   to   the
Hon’ble Advocate, the working of the meeting
was stayed.  Thereafter, again the meeting of
general   assembly   was   started   before   the
present   members   and   the   remaining   office
bearers   and   member   of   the   Council   were
elected.”
19. The   proceeding   dated   29.06.2014   also   contain   a
resolution   as   Resolution   No.   7   Part   B,   by   which   Shri
Sunil Gupta’s name was proposed and unanimously approved
as   representative  of  the   State   Bar  Council   to  the  Bar
Council   of   India.     On   29.06.2014   itself,   9   members
submitted   a   letter   addressed   to   Chairman   of   the   State
Bar Council that no information of holding of adjourned
meeting   after   2.00   pm   was   received   by   them,   hence
adjourned meeting be called for completing the rest of
the   elections.    To   the   same   effect   is   another   letter
dated   13.07.2014   by   13   members   of   the   Bar   Council   of
State, which was received on 15.07.2014 by the State Bar
Council.  Another   letter   dated   13.07.2014   signed   by   13
members  of  the   State   Bar  Council   was  submitted  to  the
19
State   Bar   Council   of   M.P.   requesting   for   convening   a
meeting   under   Rule   122A   for   considering   no   confidence
motion against the Chairman of the State Bar Council –
Shri Rameshwar Nikhra.  The Officiating Secretary of the
State   Bar   Council   issued   a   notice   dated   16.07.2014   to
all  the  members  of  the   State   Bar  Council   referring   to
the   letters   received   from   members   where   election
proceeding   of   Vice­Chairman,   Treasurer   and
representative   to   the   Bar   Council   of   India   are   being
disputed   and   no   confidence   motion   has   been   presented
against   the   Chairman.     The   officiating   Secretary   has
convened a special meeting dated 02.08.2014 for disposal
of   aforesaid   letters   received   from   the   members   of   the
State Bar Council.   It is useful to extract the entire
notice dated 16.07.2014 issued by officiating Secretary,
which is to the following effect:­
“No.   –   SBC/MP/Important   Meeting/General
Body/4277/2014,
Date 16/07/2014
To,
All Hon'ble Members
State Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh,
Sir/Ma'm„
The Special Meeting of the General Body of the
State   Bar   Council   of   Madhya   Pradesh   is
20
scheduled for 2nd August, 2014, Day­Saturday,
in the Meeting Room of the Council's Office at
11:   O'clock   in   the   Morning,   in   which   the
letter   dated   29/06/2014   signed   by   9   Hon'bie
Members   of   the   Council,   two   letters   dated
13/07/2017 received on 14/07/2014 signed by 11
Hon'ble   Member   and   Two   letters   signed   by   2
Hon'ble   Members   received   by   e­mail   dated
15/07/2014 and one letter signed by 1 Hon'ble
Member   received   on   16/07/2014,   vide   which
because   of   the   election   process   of   the   Vice
Chairman   of   the   Council,   Treasurer,   various
committees including the representative to the
Bar   Council   of   India   being   disputed,   a
proposal   for   no   confidence   against   the
Chairman   of   the   Council   has   been   submitted
under   Ru1e   122­A   of   the   Council.   In   the
special meeting both the aforesaid letters are
to   be   decided.   You   all   are   requested   to   be
present in the Meeting.
For   the   convenience   of   the   Hon’ble   Members
Rule 122­A of the Council is as under:­
"122­A   The   Chairman,   Vice   Chairman   or   the
Treasurer of the Council could be removed by a
vote   of   no   confidence   passed   by   majority   of
the members present and voting in a meeting of
the council especially called for the purpose
provided   that   at   least   7   members   of   the
Council   have   signed   the   requisition   for
holding   such   a   special   meeting,   and   such
meeting shall be called within a period of 21
days   from   the   date   of   receipt   of   the
requisition by the Secretary”.
Sd/­
(MUKESH M1SHRA)
Officiating Secretary
ENCLOSED­   The   letters   dated   29/06/2014,
14/07/2014, 15/07/2014 and 16/07/2017 received
from the Hon’ble members.”
21
20. Another   notice   referred   to   as   Amended   notice   of
letter dated 16.07.2014 convening a special meeting was
issued on 19.07.2014, which is to the following effect:­
No. ­ SBC/MP/Important Meeting/General
Body/4311/2014,
Date 19/07/2014
Amended letter for date 16/07/2014 of Special
Meeting
To,
All Hon'bie Members
State Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh,
Sir/Ma' m,
The Special Meeting of the General Body of the
State   Bar   Council   of   Madhya   Pradesh   is
scheduled for 2nd  August,  2014,  Day­Saturday,
in the Meeting Room of the Council's Office at
11:   O'clock   in   the   Morning,   in   which   the
letter   dated   29/06/2014   signed   by   9   Hon'ble
Members   of   the   Council,   two   letters   dated
13/07/2017 received on 14/07/2014 signed by 11
Hon'bie   Members   and   Two   letters   signed   by   2
Hon'ble   Members   received   by   e­mail   dated
15/07/2014 and two letters signed by 1 Hon'ble
Member received on 16/07/2014, in which vide
one letter the prayer has been made to call
for   the   meeting   for   election   of   the   ViceChairman
  of   Council,   Treasurer,   election   of
various   committees   along   with   the
representative to the Bar Council of India and
vide   the   second   letter   the   no­confidence
motion has been presented against the Chairman
of the Council under Rule 122­A of the Rules
of the Council.   In the special meeting both
aforesaid letters are to be decided.  You all
are   requested   to   be   present   in   the   meeting.
[Enclosure­Page 1 to 7]
For   the   convenience   of   the   Hon’ble   Members
Rule 122­A of the Council is as under:­
22
"122­A   The   Chairman,   Vice   Chairman   or   the
Treasurer of the Council could be removed by a
vote   of   no   confidence   passed   by   majority   of
the members present and voting in a meeting of
the council especially called for the purpose
provided   that   at   least   7   members   of   the
Council   have   signed   the   requisition   for
holding   such   a   special   meeting,   and   such
meeting shall be called within a period of 21
days   from   the   date   of   receipt   of   the
requisition by the Secretary”.
Sd/­
(MUKESH M1SHRA)
Officiating Secretary
NOTE­   The   letters   received   from   the   Hon'bie
Members in relation to the Special Meeting has
already been sent alongwith the letter dated
16/07/2014.”
21. The   notice   dated   16.07.2014   as   well   as   dated
19.07.2014   clearly   indicate   that   special   meeting   was
convened for taking a decision on the letters received
from   members   of   the   Council.     The   notice   dated
19.07.2014   categorically   mentions  “in   the   special
meeting both aforesaid letters are to be decided”.  The
letters   dated   29.06.2014   and   13.07.2014   has   been
referred in the notice where following two subjects were
mentioned:­
(a) Request   for   convening  a   meeting   for   conducting
elections of the rest of the office bearers and
23
members;
(b) Under Rule 122­A, considering the motion of no
confidence   given   by   13   members   of   the   Bar
Council against the Chairman, Rameshwar Nikhra.
22. The notice dated 16.07.2014 clearly indicate that it
did not contain any agenda for the meeting.  The notice
convening the meeting only referred to consideration of
letters   received   from   the   members,   which   was
specifically   mentioned   as   noticed   above.   The   subject
mentioned   in   both   the   notices   was   to   the   following
effect:­
(i)Notice   dated   16.07.2014  “in   the
special   meeting   both   the   aforesaid   letters
are to be decided”;
(ii)Amended   notice   dated   19.07.2014  “in
the   special   meeting   both   aforesaid   letters
are to be decided”.

23. Shackleton  on   the   Law   and   Practices   of   Meetings,
Fourteenth   Edition,   while   dealing   with   the   subject
“notice” states following:­
“The purpose to be stated
A notice, to be valid, must clearly state the
business to be transacted at the meeting and
24
give all material information to enable it to
be fully understood.”
24. It is clear from the  aforesaid  that notices dated
16.07.2014 and 19.07.2014 were issued not for convening
any   adjourned   meeting   rather   special   meeting  was
convened to consider two set of letters given by members
of   the   Council  requesting   for   convening   a   meeting   for
holding elections of office bearers and the members of
different   Committees   including   representative   to   Bar
Council   of   India   and   for   considering   no   confidence
motion   against   the   Chairman   of   the   State   Bar   Council.
In the notice dated 16.07.2014 as well as notice dated
19.07.2014, the subject of special meeting was thus for
disposal   of   letters   received   by   the   members   of   the
Council.     It   is   to   be   noted   that   the   minutes   of   the
proceeding dated 29.06.2014 has recorded and signed by
Chairman   containing   the   election   of   not   only   the
Chairman   rather   election   of   other   office   bearers   and
different   representatives,   which   is   clear   from   the
proceedings   brought   on   the   record   by   Bar   Council   of
India itself as Annexure A4.   It is a well established
25
principle that minutes of the proceeding signed by the
Chairman   are   prima   facie   evidence   of   proceeding   and
decisions recorded therein are deemed to be valid until
contrary   is   proved.    Shackleton,   while   dealing   with
minutes as evidence in Chapter 8 states following:­
“8.  MINUTES AS EVIDENCE
8­07 In general, minutes form evidence of the
matters   to   which   they   refer,   which   can   be
relied on in civil proceedings:
'In an action against one or several
members   of   the   Gosport   and   Forton
Water   Works   Company   for   the   value   of
lead pipes supplied by the plaintiffs
to   the   company,   after   the   defendant
had been proved to be a partner in the
company the entries in a book containing
a record of the proceedings of the
society produced at its meetings, and
open,   to   the   inspection   of   ail
members,   were   admissible   in   evidence
against   the   defendant;   the   minutes
showed   that   the   order   had   been
authorised by the society:”
When minutes are signed by the chairman of
the meeting, or the next succeeding meeting,
they   are   prima   facie   evidence   of   the
proceedings,   and   decisions   recorded   therein
are deemed to be valid until the contrary is
proved.   In   practice,   certified   copies   of
minutes   are   frequently   provided   to   third
parties   as   evidence   of   the   matters   decided
upon at the Meeting.
The chairman of a meeting has authority to
determine all incidental questions which arise
26
at   the   meeting,   and   an   entry   by   him   in   the
minute book of the result of a poll, or of his
decision   on   such   questions,   is   prima   facie
evidence   of   that   result,   and   the   onus   of
displacing   that   evidence   is   thrown   on   those
who impeach the entry:”
25. Thus,   the   letters   issued   by   the   members   on
29.06.2014   and   13.07.2014   raised   a   dispute   containing
allegations  disputing  minutes of the proceeding of the
meeting dated 29.06.2014. Thus, it was a disputed matter
as to what actually happened on 29.06.2014, i.e. as to
whether   the   election   of   other   office   bearers   and
representatives were validly completed on 29.06.2014  or
after   the   election   of   the   Chairman,   the   meeting   was
adjourned.   This   dispute   was   to   be   resolved   in   the
special   meeting   dated   02.08.2014,   which   was   clearly
indicated by notice dated 16.07.2014 and 19.07.2014 as
indicated   above.     The   issue   of   agenda   alongwith   the
notice is requirement of a valid meeting and it is only
in   context   of   adjourned   meeting   that   no   fresh   agenda
need   to   be   issued.   The   notices   dated   16.07.2014   and
19.07.2014   having   not   contained   any   agenda   and   the
meeting also not being described as adjourned meeting,
27
issuance   of   agenda   for   the   meeting   was   necessary.
Issuance   of   an   agenda,   if   any   election   was   to   be
conducted on 02.08.2014 was necessary.
26. We, thus, do not find any infirmity in the view of
the High Court ­ both of learned Single Judge as well as
the   Division   Bench   that   no   election   could   have   been
conducted on 02.08.2014 for electing member to the Bar
Council of India from the State Bar Council.   Further,
the election of the member to the Bar Council of India
is statutorily regulated by Bar Council of India Rules
and Rule 7 require notice by the Secretary of the State
Council fixing a date for the election of the member to
the Council. The notices dated 16.07.2014 and 19.07.2014
cannot be read as notice as required under Rule 7 for
holding election of a member to the Bar Council of India
from   the   State   Bar   Council,   hence,   the   conduct   of
election of a member as a representative from State Bar
Council   to   Bar   Council   of   India   in   the   meeting   dated
02.08.2014 cannot be said to be in conformity with Rule
7 of Bar Council of India Rules.   The High Court was,
thus,  clearly  right  in  its   view  that  election  of  Shri
28
Pratap Mehta on 02.08.2014 as member of the Bar Council
of   India   was  not   a  valid   election.   The  learned   Single
Judge   having   already   taken   a   view   that   election   dated
29.06.2014   electing   Shri   Sunil   Gupta   as   the
representative   to   the   Bar   Council   of   India   was   not   a
valid election, which issue was not, however, agitated
either   by   the   State   Council   or   by   Shri   Sunil   Gupta,
there   is   no   need   to   ponder   over   the   above   election.
Both   the   elections   dated   29.06.2014   and   02.08.2014   to
elect a member in the Bar Council of India having been
held to be invalid, the  High Court was right in issuing
directions   for   conducting   a   fresh   election   to   elect   a
member in the Bar Council of India, which was necessary
and just.
27. Now, we come to the submission of Shri Vikas Singh
that High Court committed error in re­appreciating the
evidence on record and coming to a different conclusion
to one which was recorded by the Bar Council of India.
Shri   Vikas   Singh   has   relied   on   the   judgment   of   this
Court   in  Waryam   Singh   and   another   Vs.   Amarnath   and
another,   AIR   1954   SC   215;   Syed   Yakoob   Vs.   K.S.
29
Radhakrishnan and others, AIR 1964 SC 477.
28. In  Waryam  Singh  (supra), the landlord  has filed a
petition   for   eviction   on   the   ground   of   non­payment   of
rent  by  the  tenant.     The   Rent  Controller   rejected  the
application of the landlord against which landlord has
moved   to   the   Judicial   Commissioner,   Himachal   Pradesh.
Exercising   jurisdiction   under   Articles   226   and   227,
which allowed the application for ejectment of tenant,
which has been noted in Para 10 of the judgment, which
is to the following effect:­
“10.  The   respondents   moved   the   Judicial
Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, under Articles
226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for
setting aside the order of the District Judge.
The learned Judicial Commissioner held that in
view of the admitted failure to pay the rent
as provided by the rent deed or at the first
hearing   of   the   court   under   the   proviso   to
Section 13 (2) (i) the courts below had acted
arbitrarily in refusing to make an order for
ejectment against the tenants who had not done
what was incumbent on them to do under the law
and   that   such   a   situation   called   for
interference   by   the   Court   of   the   Judicial
Commissioner in order to keep the subordinate
courts within the bounds of their authority.
He, accordingly, set aside the orders of the
courts below and allowed the application for
ejectment   but   gave   the   appellants   three
months’   time   for   vacating   the   premises.   The
appellants have now come up before this court
on appeal by special leave obtained from this
30
court.”
29. The tenant challenged the orders under Articles 226
and 227 in this Court and one of the submissions raised
was   that   Judicial   Commissioner   acted   wholly   without
jurisdiction   in   as   much   as   the   order   of   the   Rent
Controller   exercising   powers   under   the   Act   was   not
amenable   to   the   jurisdiction   of   the   High   Court   under
Article  227,   the  said  submission  is  noted  in   Para  11,
which is to the following effect:­
“11.  Learned advocate appearing in support
of this appeal urges that the learned Judicial
Commissioner acted wholly without jurisdiction
inasmuch   as   (1)   the   Rent   Controller   or   the
District Judge exercising powers under the Act
was   not   amenable   to   the   jurisdiction   of   the
High Court and, therefore, Article 227 confers
no   power   on   the   Court   of   the   Judicial
Commissioner over the Rent Controller or the
District Judge, and (2) that Article 227 read
with Article 241 confers no power of judicial
superintendence on the Court of the Judicial
Commissioner.”
30. This Court repelled the submission of the tenant and
held   that   the   High   Court   has   judicial   superintendence
over   tribunals   and   authorities.     In   Paragraph   Nos.   13
and 14, following has been laid down:­
“13.   Re.  2.—The  material  part  of  Article
227 substantially reproduces the provisions of
31
Section   107   of   the   Government   of   India
Act,1915,   except   that   the   power   of
superintendece   has   been   extended   by   the
Article   also   to   Tribunals.   That   the   Rent
Controller   and   the   District   Judge   exercising
jurisdiction   under   the   Act   are   Tribunals
cannot and has not been controverted. The only
question   raised   is   as   to   the   nature   of   the
power   of   superintendence   conferred   by   the
Article.   Reference   is   made   to   clause   (2)   of
the article in support of the contention that
this   article   only   confers   on   the   High   Court
administrative   superintendence   over   the
subordinate   courts   and   tribunals.   We   are
unable   to   accept   this   contention   because
clause   (2)   is   expressed   to   be   without
prejudice to the generality of the provisions
in clause (1). Further, the preponderance of
judicial opinion in India was that Section 107
which was similar in terms to Section 15 of
the   High   Courts   Act,   1861,   gave   a   power   of
judicial   superintendence   to   the   High   Court
apart from and independently of the provisions
of   other   laws   conferring   revisional
jurisdiction on the High Court.
In this connection it has to be remembered
that   Section   107   of   the   Government   of   India
Act, 1915, was reproduced in the Government of
India Act, 1935, as Section 224. Section 224
of   the   1935   Act,   however,   introduced   subsection
  (2),   which   was   new,   providing   that
nothing in the section should be construed as
giving   the   High   Court   any   jurisdiction   to
question   any   judgment   of   any   inferior   court
which was not otherwise subject to appeal or
revision. The idea presumably was to nullify
the effect of the decisions of the different
High Courts referred to above. Section 224 of
the 1935 Act has been reproduced with certain
modifications   in   Article   227   of   the
Constitution. It is significant to note that
32
sub­section (2) to Section 224 of the 1935 Act
has been omitted from Article 227.
This significant omission has been regarded
by all High Courts in India before whom this
question has arisen as having restored to the
High   Court   the   power   of   judicial
superintendence it had under Section 15 of the
High Courts Act, 1861, and Section 107 of the
Government of India Act, 1915. See the cases
referred to in Moti Lal v. The State through
Shrimati   Sagrawati1.   Our   attention   has   not
been   drawn   to   any   case   which   has   taken   a
different view and, as at present advised, we
see no reason to take a different view.
14. This power of superintendence conferred
by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries
C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. v. Sukumar
Mukherjee2, to be exercised most sparingly and
only in appropriate cases in order to keep the
subordinate courts within the bounds of their
authority and not for correcting mere errors.
As   rightly   pointed   out   by   the   Judicial
Commissioner in the case before us the lower
courts   in   refusing   to   make   an   order   for
ejectment acted arbitrarily. The lower courts
realised   the   legal   position   but   in   effect
declined   to   do   what   was   by   Section   13(2)(i)
incumbent on them to do and thereby refused to
exercise jurisdiction vested in them by law.
It was, therefore, a case which called for an
interference   by   the   Court   of   the   Judicial
Commissioner   and   it   acted   quite   properly   in
doing so. In our opinion there is no ground on
which   in   an   appeal   by   special   leave   under
Article 136 we should interfere. The appeal,
therefore, must stand dismissed with costs.”
31. The above decision in no manner support the
case of the appellant rather it reiterates that
33
the   High   Court   under   Articles   226   and   227   can
interfere with an arbitrary order passed by an
authority.   The   next   judgment   relied   by   the
appellant is Constitution Bench judgment of this
Court   in  Syed   Yakoob   (supra).  This   Court   had
elaborately considered the scope of Article 226
of the Constitution in the aforesaid case.  This
Court   held   that   a   writ   of   certiorari   can   be
issued   for   correcting   errors   of   jurisdiction
committed   by   inferior   courts   or   tribunals.   It
was further held that jurisdiction of High Court
under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari
is a supervisory jurisdiction and the High Court
exercising   it   is   not   entitled   to   act   as   an
appellate court.
32. The   findings   of   the   fact   reached   by   the   inferior
Court   or   Tribunal   as   result   of   the   appreciation   of
evidence   cannot   be   reopened   or   questioned   in   writ
proceedings.   There cannot be any dispute to the above
propositions laid down by the Constitution Bench of this
Court.   However, in the same judgment, in paragraph 8,
34
following was laid down by this Court:­
“8. It is, of course, not easy to define or
adequately   describe   what   an   error   of   law
apparent on the face of the record means. What
can be corrected by a writ has to be an error
of law; hut it must be such an error of law as
can be regarded as one which is apparent on
the face of the record. Where it is manifest
or clear that the conclusion of law recorded
by an inferior Court or Tribunal is based on
an obvious mis­interpretation of the relevant
statutory provision, or sometimes in ignorance
of it, or may be, even in disregard of it, or
is   expressly   founded   on   reasons   which   are
wrong   in   law,   the   said   conclusion   can   be
corrected   by   a   writ   of   certiorari.   In   all
these cases, the impugned conclusion should be
so   plainly   inconsistent   with   the   relevant
statutory   provision   that   no   difficulty   is
experienced by the High Court in holding that
the said error of law is apparent on the face
of   the   record.   It   may   also   be   that   in   some
cases, the impugned error of law may not be
obvious or patent on the face of the record as
such   and   the   Court   may   need   an   argument   to
discover the said error; but there can be no
doubt that what can be corrected by a writ of
certiorari   is   an   error   of   law   and   the   said
error   must,   on   the   whole,   be   of   such   a
character as would satisfy the test that it is
an error of law apparent on the face of the
record……………………..”
33. Applying the above proposition in the present case,
it was clear that High Court had referred to statutory
provisions of Bar Council of India Rules and came to the
35
conclusion   that   there   was   no   notice   of   agenda   for
holding election of the State Bar Council member in the
Bar Council of India for meeting dated 02.08.2014.   An
obvious   error   of   law   was   committed   by   Bar   Council   of
India in dismissing the election petition of Shri Sunil
Gupta.     The   High   Court   was   right   in   exercise   of   its
certiorari jurisdiction to set aside the erroneous order
of the Bar Council of India.  The High Court was, thus,
well   within   its   jurisdiction   in   deciding   the   writ
petition and submission of the learned counsel for the
appellant   cannot   be   accepted   that   the   High   Court
exceeded its jurisdiction in deciding the writ petition.

34. Learned counsel for the appellant has also relied on
K.   Narasimhiah   Vs.   H.C.   Singri   Gowda   and   others,   AIR
1966 SCC 330.    In the above case, this Court held that
three   days   clear   notice   to   Councillors   for   holding   a
special general meeting is not mandatory.  What was held
that period of notice in the facts of that case was not
mandatory.     Present   is   not   a   case   where   any   one   has
complained   that  there  was  no  notice  for  meeting  to   be
held on 02.08.2014.  In the above case also, the notice
36
was   received   by   members,   some   of   them   have   received
three days notice, some of them had received notice of
less than three days.  In the above circumstances, this
Court held that provision of three days notice was only
directory and not mandatory.   The said judgment has no
application in the present case.
35. Another   judgment   relied   by   the   appellant   is  P.
Kasilingam Vs. P.S.G. College of Technology, AIR 1981 SC
789.   In the said case, this Court was dealing with a
question   regarding   effectiveness   of   resignation   and
consequence   of   withdrawal   of   resignation   before   the
effective date.  The said case has no application in the
present case.  Last case relied by the appellant is V.S.
Krishnan and others Vs. Westfort Hi­tech Hospital Ltd.
and Others, (2008) 3 SCC 363.   In the above case, the
Court  held  that  when   there   are  materials  to  show  that
notices   were   sent,   the   burden   is   on   the   addressee   to
rebut   the   statutory   presumption.   In   paragraph   29,
following has been held:­   
“29.  Section   172   as   well   as   Section   53
emphasised   “giving   notice”.   We   have   already
adverted to how notice should be given for AGM
37
as per Section 172(2) and Sections 53(1) and
(2) of the Act. In view of the fact that the
Company   has   placed   materials   to   substantiate
that   notices,   in   terms   of   the   above
provisions, were given, as rightly pointed out
by learned Senior Counsel for the contesting
respondents,   statutory   presumption   under
Section 53 will apply though the said act is
rebuttable. In view of the fact that there are
materials to show that notices were sent, the
burden   is   on   the   addressee   to   rebut   the
statutory   presumption.   The   High   Court,   on
verification of those materials, has concluded
that “postal receipt with post office seal was
produced to show that notice was sent to all
shareholders by certificate of posting in the
correct address as per the report”.”
36. In   the   present   case,   challenge   to   the   proceeding
dated 02.08.2014 was not on the ground of want of notice
for the special meeting, hence this case also does not
help the appellant in the present case.
37. Learned counsel appearing for the State Bar Council
has   produced   the   result   of   fresh   election   dated
12.08.2018 as conducted in pursuance of the directions
of the High Court, which election was also permitted by
this  Court  vide  its  order  dated  09.08.2018   but  with  a
condition that the result thereof shall not be declared
without the permission of the Court.
38
38. In view of the foregoing discussions, we are of the
view  that  there  are  no   merits  in  these  appeals,  which
are hereby dismissed.   In view of the dismissal of the
appeals, the election already conducted on 12.08.2018 be
given   effect   to   by   all   concerned.     The   appeals   are
dismissed   subject   to   above.     Parties   shall   bear   their
own costs.
            ..........................J.
( A.K. SIKRI )
..........................J.
    ( ASHOK BHUSHAN )
NEW DELHI,
November 02, 2018.