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whether the notification dated 31st March, 1949 continued to exist even after the Act was repealed upon the reenactment of the Act of 1972 may be considered.= We are in respectful agreement with the above observations. Applying the said observations to the present case, it must be held that the notification under the 1947 Act continued in spite of its repeal and the enactment of the 1972 Act. It cannot be said that in the hiatus between the repeal of the 1947 Act and the issuance of a notification applying the 1972 Act to the Doiwala area, the Legislature intended that the tenants had no protection from eviction and there was an unrestricted right to evict them.- This Court construed Section 24 of the General Clauses Act 1904, in a similar way in Neel alias Niranjan Majumdar vs. The State of West Bengal[6]. It was held that though the offence of the possession of a sword would allege to have been committed in 1970, i.e. after the repeal of the Arms Act, 1878, the notification dated 19th of March, 1923 issued under the repealed Arms Act of 1878 would continue in force and would be deemed to have been enacted under the new Act by virtue of Section 24 of the General Clauses Act, 1904.- we hold that the old Act, i.e. the Act No.III of 1947 applied to the Doiwala area by virtue of notification dated 31st of March, 1949, when the suit for the eviction of the appellant was filed. The suit is untenable for the want of permission under the provisions of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 and is liable to be dismissed.

                                                                  REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL No. 1778 OF 2010


HARKESH CHAND                                                 ... APPELLANT

                             VERSUS
KRISHAN GOPAL MEHTA & ORS.                              ... RESPONDENTS


                                  JUDGMENT

S. A. BOBDE, J.

      This is a tenant’s appeal.  In the impugned judgment, the  High  Court
directed the tenant to be evicted.  The Trial Court dismissed the  suit  for
eviction filed  by  the  respondent-landlord.   The  First  Appellate  Court
dismissed the landlord’s appeal.  In  the  Second  Appeal,  the  High  Court
reversed the concurrent findings of both the courts below.


2.    The tenancy is in respect to a small shop situated in a rural area  in
the village of Daishwala, Doiwala Town, located in the Dehradun district  of
Uttarakhand. On the 19th of September, 1972, the landlord  issued  a  notice
terminating the tenancy of the shop under Section 106  of  the  Transfer  of
Property Act, 1882, and demanded the possession
of the shop.


3.    The landlord filed the  present  suit  for  eviction  on  the  1st  of
October  1972.  The  Court  of  Civil  Judge  (Junior  Division),   Dehradun
dismissed Small Cause Case No.85 of 1972 with costs.  The Trial  Court  held
that even though The  United  Provinces  (Temporary)  Control  of  Rent  and
Eviction Act, 1947 (U.P. Act No. III of 1947 ) hereinafter  referred  to  as
“the Act of 1947” had been repealed by the aforementioned date and  replaced
by a new rent act[1] hereinafter referred to as “the Act of 1972” which  was
brought into force on the 15th of July, 1972, the old  act  applied  to  the
suit property.


4.     The  Additional  District  Judge,  Dehradun,  dimissed  the  revision
petition No. 43 of 1976  filed  by  the  landlord.  It  was  held  that  the
notification by which the provisions of the old act were applicable  to  the
Doiwala area in the year 1949 continued and remained in force  on  the  date
when the notice of termination of the tenancy was issued.  Accordingly,  the
tenancy was protected by the Act of 1947.


5.    The landlord approached the High Court of Judicature at  Allahabad  by
way of Writ Petition No. 25951 of 2000. This writ petition  was  transferred
to the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nanital and
re-numbered as Writ Petition No. 4882 of 2001.


6.    The High Court of Uttarakhand upheld  the  landlord’s  plea  that  the
notice which terminated the tenancy of the shop under the provisions of  the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 was valid.  The High Court held that the  old
Act under which the Doiwala area was covered  by  a  notification  had  been
repealed and replaced by the new Act.  The old Act of  1947  did  not  cover
the rural areas that are not specially notified.  The  special  notification
with respect to Doiwala area  came  into  existence  only  on  the  23rd  of
January, 1973 and therefore, between the 15th of July, 1972  (when  the  old
act along with its notification stood repealed), and the  23rd  of  January,
1973 (when the notification was issued), there  was  no  protection  to  the
tenants in Doiwala area under any law.  Thus,  the  notice  terminating  the
tenancy was valid.  Accordingly, the High Court allowed  the  writ  petition
and set aside the orders of the Trial Court and the Revision Court by  which
the landlord’s suit was dismissed.


7.    Aggrieved by the order of the High Court that  decreed  the  suit  for
eviction filed by the respondent-landlord,  the  appellant  approached  this
Court.  This Court granted special leave to appeal, and hence this appeal.


8.    The questions that fall for consideration before us are -


(i)   Whether or not, the tenancy in question is protected by Act No.III  of
1947.
(ii)  Whether or not, the  notification  dated  31st  of  March  1949  which
applied the provisions of the Act of 1947 to Doiwala town was  in  force  on
the 19th of September, 1972, i.e. when the landlord terminated  the  tenancy
and sought possession of the suit premises.
(iii) Whether or not, Section 24 of  the  U.P.  General  Clauses  Act,  1904
continued the notification dated 31st of March 1949  that  protects  Doiwala
town by applying the provisions of the Act of 1947.


9.    A similar notification was issued under the re-enacted Act of 1972  on
the 21st of March, 1973.  The Act of 1947 was a  temporary  statute  enacted
to control the letting and renting of property as well  as  to  prevent  the
eviction of tenants from such accommodation.  The provisions of the  Section
3 (c) of the Act  of  1972  inter  alia  restricted  evictions  without  the
permission of the District Magistrate which could be  granted  only  on  the
grounds specified in the Act.


10.   The Act of 1947 was extended from time to time and was in  force  when
the Act of 1972 was enacted.


      Sub-section (2) of Section  1  of  Act  No.III  of  1947  provided  as
follows:-

“Section 1…

(2)   It extends to the whole of the United Provinces and applies  to  every
Municipal Area and Cantonment Area and to every Notified Area contiguous  to
such municipal area or cantonment area and to accommodation situated  within
one mile of the boundaries of any such municipal area, cantonment  area  and
notified area, and to such other area  as  the  Provincial  Government  may,
from time to time, notify in the official Gazette in this behalf. “
                                             (emphasis supplied)


      Sub-section (3) brought the Act into force on the 1st day of  October,
1946.  It provided as follows:-
“(3)  It shall apply to-

(a)   every  city  as  defined  in  the  Uttar  Pradesh    Nagar  Mahapalika
Adhiniyam, 1959;

(b)   every municipality as defined in the United  Provinces  Municipalities
Act, 1916;

(c)    every  notified  area  constituted  under  the     United   Provinces
Municipalities Act, 1916;    and

(d)   every town area constituted under the   United  Provinces  Town  Areas
Act, 1914.”

      Sub-section 4, which provided for its expiry on the
30th September, 1948, read as follows:-
“(4)  It shall cease to have effect on the expiry  of  September  30,  1948,
except as respects things done or omitted to be done before  the  expiration
thereof, and Section 6 of the United Provinces General  Clauses  Act,  1904,
shall apply upon the expiry of the Act as if it had then  been  repealed  by
an United Provinces Act.“


      Section 43 of the Act of 1972 repealed the Act of 1947.
Sub-section (2) of Section 1 of the Act of 1972 extended the Act of 1972  to
the whole of Uttar Pradesh.


11.   A notification under Section 1 (1) of the Act of 1972  declaring  that
the Act shall apply to Doiwala town area was issued on the  21st  of  March,
1973.  Even though, the subsequent Act is essentially a
re-enactment of  the  earlier  Act  of  1947,  the  landlord  acted  on  the
presupposition that with the repeal and re-enactment of the Act of  1947  on
the 15th of July, 1972, the notification dated 31st March, 1949 also  ceased
to exist, thus assuming that there was no law restricting  the  eviction  of
tenants  in  the  Doiwala  area  during   the   period   between   the   two
notifications; ergo, terminating the  tenancy  on  the  19th  of  September,
1972.


(a)   As stated earlier, the primary question before us is as to whether  or
not there existed a protection of tenants in  the  Doiwala  area  under  Act
No.III of 1947 by virtue of the notification dated 31st March, 1949


      The answer to this depends on whether Section 24 of the
U.P. General Clauses Act, 1904 continued the notification dated
31st March, 1949.


12.   Shri Nikhil Goel, Advocate for the appellant, contended that by
virtue of Section 24 of the  U.P.  General  Clauses  Act,  the  notification
dated 31st March, 1949 that applied Act No.III of 1947 to the  Doiwala  area
continued even after the expiry of the Act.  Thus,  the  protection  to  the
tenants in the Doiwala area also continued and was in force on  the  1st  of
October, 1972, when the suit was  filed.   The  protection  of  the  tenants
under the 1947 Act continued throughout and in any case up to the  issue  of
the notification dated 23rd of January, 1973, under  the  Act  No.  XIII  of
1972. It made no difference that  the  new  Act  of  1972  was  specifically
applicable to Doiwala town area by the aforesaid notification.  As  long  as
there was nothing inconsistent in the notification dated  31st  March,  1949
with the  re-enacted  provisions  of  the  Act  of  1972,  the  notification
continued in force by virtue of Section 24 of the U.P. General Clauses  Act,
1904.


13.   Thus, it was submitted that at all  times,  and  particularly  on  the
date when the notice was issued on the 19th  of  September,  1972,  and  the
date when the suit for eviction was filed on the 1st of October,  1972,  the
appellant’s  tenancy  in  the  Doiwala  town  area  was  protected  by   the
notification issued under Act No. III of 1947.  The  notice  issued  by  the
respondent-landlord  terminating  the  tenancy  under  Section  106  of  the
Transfer of Property Act was not valid and hence,  the  suit  filed  on  the
basis of such a notice was not tenable.


Applicability of U.P. Act No. III of 1947 to Doiwala Area

14.   It is clear from sub-section (1) and sub-section (2)  of  the  Act  of
1947 that it extended to the whole of the  erstwhile  United  Provinces  and
applied to every municipal area, cantonment area and notified  area  as  per
the  provincial   government   notification   in   the   official   gazette.
Undisputedly, the Governor declared that the provisions of Section 2,  3(a),
4, 5, 6, 8, 11, 12 and 16 of the Act shall apply to Doiwala town located  in
Dehradun by a notification dated 31st March, 1949 because this  notification
has never been expressly repealed.

Whether the notification dated 31st  March,  1949  continued  by  virtue  of
Section 24 of the U.P. General Clauses Act, 1904


15.    The  question  whether  the  notification  dated  31st  March,   1949
continued to exist even after the Act was repealed upon the  reenactment  of
the Act of 1972 may be considered.


      Section 24 of the U.P. General Clauses Act, 1904:-

“24.  Continuation of  appointments,  notifications,  orders,  etc.,  issued
under enactments repealed and re-enacted. – Where any enactment is  repealed
and re-enacted by an [Uttar Pradesh]  Act,  with  or  without  modification,
then, unless it  is  otherwise  expressly  provided,  any  appointment,  [or
statutory instrument or form], made or issued under the repealed  enactment,
shall, so far as it is not  inconsistent  with  the  provisions  re-enacted,
continue in force, and be deemed to have  been  made  or  issued  under  the
provisions  so  re-enacted,  unless  and  until  it  is  superseded  by  any
appointment, [or statutory instrument or form]  made  or  issued  under  the
provisions so
re-enacted.”
                                  (emphasis supplied)


16.   A plain reading of the above provision  suggests  that  any  statutory
instrument (which a notification is) issued  under  the  repealed  enactment
continues in force as if it were issued under the re-enacted  provisions  to
the extent that it is  not  inconsistent  with  the  re-enacted  provisions.
Such continuance exists till the statutory instrument  is  superseded  by  a
statutory instrument issued under the re-enacted provisions.


17.   It is therefore necessary; to see whether the notification dated
31st March, 1949, issued under the Act of 1947 is inconsistent with the
re-enacted  provisions  of  the  Act  of  1972.   Obviously,  if  the   1949
notification cannot stand  along  with  the  re-enacted  provisions  and  is
inconsistent with them, it cannot be said to have been  continued  in  force
by virtue of Section 24 of the U. P. General Clauses Act, 1904.


18.   The Governor of the  erstwhile  United  Provinces,  through  the  said
notification, simply declared that the provisions of Sections 2, 3  (a),  4,
5, 6 etc. shall apply to Doiwala town in Dehradun district.  The  effect  of
this notification thus, was that the protection to the tenants
offered by Section 3 (a) i.e.  the  restrictions  on  eviction,  applied  to
Doiwala town.


19.   We find nothing inconsistent between the protection  accorded  to  the
tenants  under  the  Act  of  1947  as  applied  to  Doiwala  town  by   the
notification dated 31st March, 1949, and  the  protection  accorded  to  the
tenants in the re-enacted provision of  the  Act  of  1972,  both  of  which
regulated the eviction of tenants in the whole of  Uttar  Pradesh.   Section
21 of the later act provided  the  same  restrictions  on  the  eviction  of
tenants on specified grounds that Section 3 (a) of the 1947 Act did.   Thus,
there is no inconsistency whatsoever found between the two  provisions.   We
also, do not find any express provision to the contrary  in  the  subsequent
enactment.


20.   The provisions of an Act, and a  conditional  legislation  such  as  a
notification, belong to a different order of things. A statutory  instrument
(i.e. the  notification)  itself  does  not  enact  the  protection  to  the
tenants.  The Act of 1947 does that.   The  notification  merely  makes  the
enactment applicable to the Doiwala area.  Apparently the purpose of the re-
enacted provision is, inter alia, to  protect  the  tenants  from  eviction,
except on special grounds.  Nothing in the Act shows that such a  protection
was intended to be removed from any area or for  that  matter,  the  Doiwala
area.  In fact, the contrary is clear from  the  fact  that  a  notification
expressly applying the re-enacted provisions to the Doiwala area was  issued
on the 21st of March, 1973.


      Thus, there can be no inconsistency between the notification  applying
the Act to the Doiwala area,  and  the  re-enacted  provisions  of  the  Act
unless the Act  of  1972  clearly  expresses  an  intention  to  remove  the
protection accorded to the tenants from an area.


21.   Section 24 of the General Clauses Act, 1904 clearly  provides  that  a
statutory instrument issued under a repealed  enactment  shall  continue  in
force and be deemed to  have  been  made  or  issued  under  the  re-enacted
provisions unless
(a)   the re-enacted provision expressly provides otherwise

or

(b)   it is superseded by a statutory instrument made under the
re-enacted provision

      The section further provides that the extent to  which  the  statutory
instrument under the repealed enactment shall continue is “so far as  it  is
not inconsistent with the re-enacted provisions.”


22.    We  find  that  none  of  the  conditions  which  derogate  from  the
continuation of the notification exist in the present  case.   There  is  no
express  provision  to  the  contrary,  there  is  no  supersession  by  any
statutory instrument under the re-enacted provisions and  there  is  nothing
inconsistent in the continuance of the notification  with  any  of  the  re-
enacted provisions.


23.   At this stage, it is apposite to consider the central purpose  of  the
General Clauses Act in relation to a statute.  In  The  Chief  Inspector  of
Mines and Anr vs. Lala Karam Chand Thapar Etc[2].,  this  Court  stated  its
purpose as follows:-
“…it will be profitable to remember that the purpose of the General  Clauses
Act is to place in  one  single  statute  different  provisions  as  regards
interpretations of words and legal principles which would otherwise have  to
be specified separately in many different  acts  and  regulations.  Whatever
the General Clauses Act says, whether as regards the meanings  of  words  or
as regards legal principles, has to be read into every statute to  which  it
applies.”


24.   The decision of this Court  in  The  State  of  Bombay  vs.  Pandurang
Vinayak Chaphalkar and Ors[3], throws a  light  on  the  present  case.  The
Building  Control  Ordinance,  enacted  in  1948  empowered  the  provincial
Government to extend its provisions to any other area as  may  be  specified
by notification.  A notification was issued on the  15th  of  January,  1948
extending the provisions of the Ordinance to Ratnagiri district.


      The aforementioned Ordinance was repealed by an Act which contained  a
provision empowering the State Government to issue a notification to  extend
the Act to any other specified area.   The  Act  provided  that  the  Bombay
General Clauses Act would apply to the repeal as if the  Ordinance  were  an
enactment.


      The respondent started constructing a cinema at Ratnagiri district  on
the 15th of August, 1948, after the  commencement  of  the  Act.  Since  the
district of Ratnagiri was not specified in the  Schedule  to  the  Act,  the
respondent assumed that the Act did not apply to Ratnagiri.   As  a  result,
the construction was carried out without obtaining  the  permission  of  the
Controller.


      The High Court acquitted the respondent, and the  State  preferred  an
appealed to this Court.  This Court held that, by virtue  of  the  repealing
provision and Section 25 of the Bombay General Clauses Act,  1904  which  is
in pari materia with the provisions of the U.P. General Clauses  Act,  1904,
the notification issued under the Ordinance continued  in  force  under  the
Act (XXXI of 1948).  Therefore, the provisions of the Act stood extended  to
the other areas as indicated in the notification.  The  appeal  was  allowed
and the judgment of the High Court was set aside.


25.   We find that the ratio in the  above  case  squarely  applies  to  the
present case. An identical  notification  extending  the  provisions  of  an
earlier enactment to an area was issued through  an  Ordinance.  Though  the
repealing Act was not specifically extended to that area,
it was held that the notification under the earlier enactment
continued in force under the new enactment by virtue of the General  Clauses
Act, 1904.


26.   In The Chief Inspector of Mines case (supra), the question  that  fell
for consideration was whether or not the regulations framed under the  Mines
Act, 1923 (for short, “the 1923 Act”) continued in force  after  its  repeal
by the Mines Act, 1952.  The accused was prosecuted  for  the  violation  of
the regulations framed under the 1923 Act.  The appellants applied  for  the
quashing  of  the  criminal  proceedings  on  the  ground  that  they   were
prosecuted for the breach of the regulations that had  ceased  to  exist  by
the repeal of the Mines Act, 1923.  The regulations were “as if  enacted  in
this Act”, and therefore, repealed along with
the 1923 Act.


      This Court held that though the regulations were a part  of  the  1923
Act for some purposes, but for the purpose of continuity of  existence  they
would not be considered a part of the Act:-
“… even though the Act is repealed, the regulation will continue  to  exist,
in accordance with the provisions of Section 24 of the General  Clauses  Act
1904.”[4]


      Section 24 was given full effect for holding that the  regulations  or
rules framed under a repealed law would continue in force in  spite  of  the
repeal. Expounding on the purpose of Section 24 of the General Clauses  Act,
1904, the Court held:-
“One may pause here to remember that regulations framed under an Act are  of
the  very  greatest  importance.  Such  regulations  are  framed   for   the
successful operation of the Act. Without proper regulations, a statute  will
often be worse than useless. When an Act is repealed, but
re-enacted, it is almost  inevitable  that  there  will  be  some  time  lag
between the re-enacted statute coming  into  force,  and  regulations  being
framed under the re-enacted  statute.  However  efficient  the  rule  making
authority may be, it is impossible to avoid some hiatus between  the  coming
into force of the re-enacted statute and the simultaneous repeal of the  old
Act,  and  the  making  of  regulations.  Often,  the  time  lag  would   be
considerable. Is it conceivable that  any  legislature,  in  providing  that
regulations made under its statute will have effect as  if  enacted  in  the
Act, could have intended by those words to say  that  if  ever  the  Act  is
repealed and re-enacted (as is more than likely to happen sooner or  later),
the regulations will have no existence for the  purpose  of  the  re-enacted
statute, and thus the re-enacted statute, for some time
at least, will be in many respects, a dead letter.”[5]


27.   We are in respectful agreement with the above observations.   Applying
the said observations to  the  present  case,  it  must  be  held  that  the
notification under the 1947 Act continued in spite of  its  repeal  and  the
enactment of the 1972 Act. It cannot be said that in the hiatus between  the
repeal of the 1947 Act and the issuance of a notification applying the  1972
Act to the Doiwala area, the Legislature intended that the  tenants  had  no
protection from eviction and there was an unrestricted right to evict  them.



28.   This Court construed Section 24 of the General Clauses Act 1904, in  a
similar  way  in  Neel  alias  Niranjan  Majumdar  vs.  The  State  of  West
Bengal[6].  It was held that though the  offence  of  the  possession  of  a
sword would allege to have been committed in 1970, i.e. after the repeal  of
the Arms Act, 1878, the notification dated 19th of March, 1923 issued  under
the repealed Arms Act of 1878 would continue in force and  would  be  deemed
to have been enacted under the new Act  by  virtue  of  Section  24  of  the
General Clauses Act, 1904.


29.   This  Court  has  taken  a  concurrent  view  in   State   of   Punjab
vs. Harnek Singh[7].


30.   In the result, we hold that the old Act, i.e. the Act No.III  of  1947
applied to the Doiwala area by virtue of notification dated 31st  of  March,
1949, when the suit for the eviction of the appellant was filed.   The  suit
is untenable for the want of permission under the  provisions  of  the  U.P.
Act No. XIII of 1972 and is liable to be dismissed.  However,  having  heard
the learned counsels for both sides  on  the  point,  and  in  view  of  the
circumstances of this case, as well  as  in  the  interest  of  justice,  we
direct that the appellant-tenant shall hand over possession of the  premises
to the respondent after a period of three  years  from  today.  The  premise
admittedly belongs to the respondent, which he bona  fide  needs  after  the
said period. Till the time the appellant hands over the  possession  to  the
respondent, the appellant shall pay a monthly  rent  of  Rs.4,000/-  to  the
respondent.


      Accordingly, the appeal is disposed off.


                                                          ….………………………………..J.
                                                                [S.A. BOBDE]



                                                          ….………………………………..J.
                                                             [ASHOK BHUSHAN]
New Delhi
February 13, 2017











-----------------------
[1]    The Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of  Letting,  Rent  and
Eviction) Act, 1972
[2]    (1962) 1 SCR 9
[3]    (1953) 4 SCR 773
[4]    Page 19, (1962) 1 SCR  9
[5]    Page 20, (1962) 1 SCR  9
[6]    (1972) 2 SCC 668
[7]    (2002) 3 SCC 481


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