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Friday, October 28, 2016

There is, therefore, no room for any doubt, that the duties and responsibilities discharged by the temporary employees in the present set of appeals, were the same as were being discharged by regular employees. It is not the case of the appellants, that the respondent-employees did not possess the qualifications prescribed for appointment on regular basis. Furthermore, it is not the case of the State, that any of the temporary employees would not be entitled to pay parity, on any of the principles summarized by us in paragraph 42 hereinabove. There can be no doubt, that the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ would be applicable to all the concerned temporary employees, so as to vest in them the right to claim wages, at par with the minimum of the pay-scale of regularly engaged Government employees, holding the same post. In view of the position expressed by us in the foregoing paragraph, we have no hesitation in holding, that all the concerned temporary employees, in the present bunch of cases, would be entitled to draw wages at the minimum of the pay-scale (- at the lowest grade, in the regular pay- scale), extended to regular employees, holding the same post.


                                                                “REPORTABLE”

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 213 OF 2013

State of Punjab & Ors.                                   … Appellants

                                   Versus

Jagjit Singh & Ors.                                      … Respondents
                                    WITH

|CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10356 OF 2016                |CIVIL APPEAL NO. 236 OF 2013        |
|(Arising out of SLP (CIVIL).31676 CC NO. 15616|                                    |
|OF 2011)                                      |                                    |
|CIVIL APPEAL NO.10357 OF 2016                 |CIVIL APPEAL NO. 245 OF 2013        |
|(Arising out of SLP (CIVIL) 31677 CC NO. 16434|                                    |
|OF 2011)                                      |                                    |
|CIVIL APPEAL NO.10358 OF 2016                 |CIVIL APPEAL NO. 246 OF 2013        |
|(Arising out of SLP (CIVIL) NO. 37162 OF 2012)|                                    |
|CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10360 OF 2016                |CIVIL APPEAL NO. 247 OF 2013        |
|(Arising out of SLP (CIVIL) NO. 37164 OF 2012)|                                    |
|CIVIL APPEAL NO.10361 OF 2016                 |CIVIL APPEAL NO. 248 OF 2013        |
|(Arising out of SLP (CIVIL) NO. 37165 OF 2012)|                                    |
|CIVIL APPEAL NO. 211 OF 2013                  |CIVIL APPEAL NO. 249 OF 2013        |
|CIVIL APPEAL NO. 212 OF 2013                  |CIVIL APPEAL NO. 257 OF 2013        |
|CIVIL APPEAL NO. 214 OF 2013                  |CIVIL APPEAL NO. 260 OF 2013        |
|CIVIL APPEAL NO. 217 OF 2013                  |CIVIL APPEAL NO. 262 OF 2013        |
|CIVIL APPEAL NO. 218 OF 2013                  |CIVIL APPEAL NO. 966 OF 2013        |
|CIVIL APPEAL NO. 219 OF 2013                  |CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2231 OF 2013       |
|CIVIL APPEAL NO. 220 OF 2013                  |CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2299 OF 2013       |
|CIVIL APPEAL NO. 221 OF 2013                  |CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2300 OF 2013       |
|CIVIL APPEAL NO. 222 OF 2013                  |CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2301 OF 2013       |
|CIVIL APPEAL NO. 223 OF 2013                  |CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2702 OF 2013       |
|CIVIL APPEAL NO. 224 OF 2013                  |CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7150 OF 2013       |
|CIVIL APPEAL NO. 225 OF 2013                  |CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8248 OF 2013       |
|CIVIL APPEAL NO. 226 OF 2013                  |CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8979 OF 2013       |
|CIVIL APPEAL NO. 227 OF 2013                  |CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9295 OF 2013       |
|CIVIL APPEAL NO. 228 OF 2013                  |CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10362 OF 2016      |
|                                              |(Arising out of SLP (CIVIL) NO. 9464|
|                                              |OF 2013)                            |
|CIVIL APPEAL NO. 229 OF 2013                  |CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10363 OF 2016      |
|                                              |(Arising out of SLP (CIVIL) NO.     |
|                                              |11966 OF 2013)                      |
|CIVIL APPEAL NO. 230 OF 2013                  |CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10364 OF 2016      |
|                                              |(Arising out of SLP (CIVIL) NO.     |
|                                              |17707 OF 2013)                      |
|CIVIL APPEAL NO. 231 OF 2013                  |CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10365 OF 2016      |
|                                              |(Arising out of SLP (CIVIL) NO.     |
|                                              |24410 OF 2013)                      |
|CIVIL APPEAL NO. 232 OF 2013                  |CIVIL APPEAL NO. 871 OF 2014        |
|CIVIL APPEAL NO. 233 OF 2013                  |CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10366 OF 2016      |
|                                              |(Arising out of SLP (CIVIL) NO. 4340|
|                                              |OF 2014)                            |
|CIVIL APPEAL NO. 234 OF 2013                  |CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10527 OF 2014      |
|CIVIL APPEAL NO. 235 OF 2013                  |                                    |


                               J U D G M E N T

Jagdish Singh Khehar, J.

1.    Delay in filing and refiling Special Leave Petition (Civil)….  CC  no.
15616 of 2011, and Special Leave Petition (Civil)…. CC no. 16434 of 2011  is
condoned.  Leave is granted in all special leave petitions.
2.    A division bench of the Punjab and Haryana High  Court,  in  State  of
Punjab & Ors. v. Rajinder Singh & Ors. (LPA no.  337  of  2003,  decided  on
7.1.2009), set aside, in an intra-court appeal, the judgment rendered  by  a
learned single Judge of the High Court, in Rajinder Singh &  Ors.  v.  State
of Punjab & Ors. (CWP no. 1536 of 1988, decided on 5.2.2003).  In the  above
judgment, the learned single Judge had directed the  State  to  pay  to  the
writ petitioners (who were daily-wagers working as Pump Operators,  Fitters,
Helpers, Drivers, Plumbers, Chowkidars  etc.),  minimum  of  the  pay-scale,
revised from time to time, with permissible allowances, as were  being  paid
to similarly placed regular employees; arrears payable, were  limited  to  a
period of three years, prior to the date of filing  of  the  writ  petition.
In sum  and  substance,  the  above  mentioned  division  bench  held,  that
temporary employees were not entitled to the minimum of  the  pay-scale,  as
was being paid to similarly placed regular employees.
3.    Another division bench of the same High Court, in State  of  Punjab  &
Ors. v. Rajinder Kumar  (LPA  no.  1024  of  2009,  decided  on  30.8.2010),
dismissed an intra-Court appeal preferred by the State  of  Punjab,  arising
out of the judgment rendered by a learned single Judge in Rajinder Kumar  v.
State of Punjab & Ors. (CWP no. 14050 of 1999, decided on  20.11.2002),  and
affirmed the decision of the single Judge, in  connected  appeals  preferred
by employees.  The letters patent bench  held,  that  the  writ  petitioners
(working as daily-wage Pump Operators, Fitters, Helpers, Drivers,  Plumbers,
Chowkidars, Ledger Clerks, Ledger Keepers,  Petrol  Men,  Surveyors,  Fitter
Coolies, Sewermen, and the like), were  entitled  to  minimum  of  the  pay-
scale, alongwith permissible allowances (as  revised  from  time  to  time),
which were being given  to  similarly  placed  regular  employees.   Arrears
payable to the concerned employees were limited to three years prior to  the
filing of the writ petition.  In sum and substance, the  division  bench  in
State of Punjab & Ors. v. Rajinder Kumar (LPA no.  1024  of  2009)  affirmed
the position adopted by the learned single Judge in Rajinder  Singh  &  Ors.
v. State of Punjab & Ors. (CWP no. 1536 of 1988).  It is apparent, that  the
instant  division  bench,  concluded  conversely  as  against  the  judgment
rendered in State of Punjab & Ors. v. Rajinder Singh (LPA no. 337 of  2003),
by the earlier division bench.
4.    It would be relevant to mention, that the earlier  judgment  rendered,
in State of Punjab & Ors. v. Rajinder Singh & Ors. (LPA  no.  337  of  2003)
was not noticed by the later division bench – in State of Punjab &  Ors.  v.
Rajinder Kumar (LPA no.  1024  of  2009).   Noticing  a  conflict  of  views
expressed in the judgments rendered by two division  benches  in  the  above
matters, a learned single Judge of the High Court, referred the  matter  for
adjudication to a larger bench, on 11.5.2011.   It  is,  therefore,  that  a
full bench of the High Court, took up the issue, for resolving  the  dispute
emerging out of the differences  of  opinion  expressed  in  the  above  two
judgments, in Avtar Singh v. State of  Punjab  &  Ors.  (CWP  no.  14796  of
2003), alongwith connected writ petitions.   The  full  bench  rendered  its
judgment on 11.11.2011.  The present bunch of cases, which we have taken  up
for collective disposal, comprise of a challenge to  the  judgment  rendered
by the division bench of the High  Court  in  State  of  Punjab  &  Ors.  v.
Rajinder Singh & Ors.  (LPA  no.  337  of  2003,  decided  on  7.1.2009);  a
challenge to the judgment, referred to above, in State of Punjab &  Ors.  v.
Rajinder Kumar (LPA no. 1024 of 2009, decided  on  30.8.2010);  as  also,  a
challenge to the judgment rendered by the full bench of the  High  Court  in
Avtar Singh v. State of Punjab & Ors. (CWP no. 14796  of  2003,  decided  on
11.11.2011).  This bunch of cases, also  involves  challenges  to  judgments
rendered by the High Court, by relying on the judgments referred to above.
5.    The issue which arises for our consideration is,  whether  temporarily
engaged  employees  (daily-wage  employees,  ad-hoc  appointees,   employees
appointed  on  casual  basis,  contractual  employees  and  the  like),  are
entitled to minimum of the regular pay-scale, alongwith  dearness  allowance
(as revised from time to time) on  account  of  their  performing  the  same
duties, which are discharged by those  engaged  on  regular  basis,  against
sanctioned posts.  The full bench of  the  High  Court,  while  adjudicating
upon  the  above  controversy  had  concluded,  that  such  like   temporary
employees were not entitled to the minimum of the regular pay-scale,  merely
for reason, that the activities carried on by daily-wagers and  the  regular
employees  were  similar.   However,  it  carved  out  two  exceptions,  and
extended the minimum of the regular pay to such employees.   The  exceptions
recorded by the full bench of the High Court in the  impugned  judgment  are
extracted hereunder:-
      “(1)  A daily wager, ad  hoc  or  contractual  appointee  against  the
      regular sanctioned posts, if appointed after  undergoing  a  selection
      process based upon fairness and equality of opportunity to  all  other
      eligible candidates, shall be entitled to minimum of the  regular  pay
      scale from the date of engagement.
      (2)   But if daily wagers, ad hoc or contractual  appointees  are  not
      appointed against regular sanctioned  posts  and  their  services  are
      availed continuously, with notional breaks, by the State Government or
      its instrumentalities for a sufficient long period i.e. for 10  years,
      such daily wagers, ad hoc or contractual appointees shall be  entitled
      to minimum of the regular pay scale  without  any  allowances  on  the
      assumption that work of  perennial  nature  is  available  and  having
      worked for such long period of time, an equitable right is created  in
      such category of persons.  Their claim for regularization, if any, may
      have to be considered  separately  in  terms  of  legally  permissible
      scheme.
      (3)   In the event, a claim is made for minimum pay scale  after  more
      than three  years  and  two  months  of  completion  of  10  years  of
      continuous working, a daily wager,  ad  hoc  or  contractual  employee
      shall be entitled to arrears for a  period  of  three  years  and  two
      months.”

6.    The issue which has arisen for consideration in  the  present  set  of
appeals, necessitates a bird’s eye view on the legal  position  declared  by
this Court, on the underlying ingredients, which  govern  the  principle  of
‘equal pay for  equal  work’.   It  is  also  necessary  for  resolving  the
controversy, to determine the manner in which this Court  has  extended  the
benefit of “minimum of the regular pay-scale” alongwith dearness  allowance,
as revised from time to time, to temporary employees (engaged on  daily-wage
basis, as ad-hoc appointees,  as  employees  engaged  on  casual  basis,  as
contract appointees, and the like).  For the aforesaid  purpose,  we  shall,
examine the above issue, in two stages.  We shall first  examine  situations
where the principle of ‘equal pay for  equal  work’  has  been  extended  to
employees engaged on regular basis.  And thereafter, how the same  has  been
applied with reference to different categories of temporary employees.
7.    Randhir Singh v. Union of India[1], decided by  a  three-Judge  bench:
The petitioner in  the  instant  case,  was  holding  the  post  of  Driver-
Constable in the Delhi Police Force, under the  Delhi  Administration.   The
scale of pay of Driver-Constables, in case of non-matriculates  was  Rs.210-
270, and in case of matriculates  was  Rs.225-308.   The  scale  of  pay  of
Drivers in the Railway Protection Force, at that  juncture  was  Rs.260-400.
The pay-scale of Drivers  in  the  non-secretariat  offices  in  Delhi  was,
Rs.260-350.  And that, of Drivers employed in secretariat offices in  Delhi,
was Rs.260-400.  The pay-scale of Drivers of  heavy  vehicles  in  the  Fire
Brigade Department, and in the  Department  of  Lighthouse  was  Rs.330-480.
The prayer of the petitioner was, that he should be placed in the  scale  of
pay, as was extended to  Drivers  in  other  governmental  organizations  in
Delhi.  The instant  prayer  was  based  on  the  submission,  that  he  was
discharging the same duties as other Drivers.  His contention was, that  the
duties of Drivers engaged by the Delhi Police Force, were more onerous  than
Drivers in other departments.  He based his claim on the logic,  that  there
was no reason/justification, to  assign  different  pay-scales  to  Drivers,
engaged in different departments of the Delhi Administration.
(ii)  This  Court  on  examining  the  above  controversy,  arrived  at  the
conclusion, that merely the fact that the concerned employees  were  engaged
in different departments of the Government, was not by itself sufficient  to
justify different pay-scales.  It  was  acknowledged,  that  though  persons
holding  the  same  rank/designation  in  different   departments   of   the
Government, may be discharging different duties.  Yet it was held,  that  if
their powers, duties and  responsibilities  were  identical,  there  was  no
justification for extending different scales of pay to them, merely  because
they were engaged in different departments.  Accordingly  it  was  declared,
that where all  relevant  considerations  were  the  same,  persons  holding
identical posts ought not to be treated differently, in the matter  of  pay.
If the officers in the same rank perform dissimilar functions  and  exercise
different powers, duties  and  responsibilities,  such  officers  could  not
complain, that they had been placed in a dissimilar pay-scale  (even  though
the nomenclature and designation of  the  posts,  was  the  same).   It  was
concluded, that the principle of ‘equal pay for  equal  work’,  which  meant
equal pay for everyone irrespective of sex, was deducible from the  Preamble
and Articles 14, 16 and 39(d) of the Constitution.  The principle of  ‘equal
pay for equal work’, was held to be applicable to cases  of  unequal  scales
of pay, based on no  classification  or  irrational  classification,  though
both  sets  of  employees  (-  engaged  on  temporary  and  regular   basis,
respectively) performed identical duties and responsibilities.
(iii) The Court arrived at the conclusion,  that  there  could  not  be  the
slightest doubt that Driver-Constables engaged in the  Delhi  Police  Force,
performed the same functions and duties, as other Drivers  in  the  services
of the Delhi Administration and the  Central  Government.   Even  though  he
belonged to a different department, the petitioner was held as  entitled  to
the pay-scale of Rs.260-400.
8.     D.S.  Nakara  v.  Union  of  India[2],  decided   by   a   five-Judge
Constitution Bench:  It is not necessary  for  us  to  narrate  the  factual
controversy adjudicated upon in this case.  In fact, the  main  issue  which
arose for consideration pertained to pension, and not to wages.  Be that  as
it may, it is of utmost importance to highlight the  following  observations
recorded in the above judgment:-
      “32.  Having succinctly focused our attention  on  the  conspectus  of
      elements and incidents  of  pension  the  main  question  may  now  be
      tackled. But, the approach of court while considering such measure  is
      of paramount importance. Since the advent  of  the  Constitution,  the
      State action must be directed towards attaining the goals set  out  in
      Part IV of the Constitution which, when achieved, would permit  us  to
      claim that we have set up a welfare State.  Article 38 (1) enjoins the
      State to strive to promote welfare  of  the  people  by  securing  and
      protecting as effective as it may a social order in  which  justice  -
      social, economic and political shall inform all  institutions  of  the
      national life. In particular the State shall strive  to  minimise  the
      inequalities in income and  endeavour  to  eliminate  inequalities  in
      status, facilities and opportunities. Art. 39 (d) enjoins  a  duty  to
      see that there is equal pay for equal work for both men and women  and
      this directive should be understood and interpreted in  the  light  of
      the judgment of this Court in Randhir Singh v. Union of India &  Ors.,
      (1982) 1 SCC 618. Revealing the scope and content  of  this  facet  of
      equality, Chinnappa Reddy, J.  speaking  for  the  Court  observed  as
      under: (SCC p.619, para 1)
           "Now, thanks to the rising social  and  political  consciousness
           and the expectations aroused as a consequence  and  the  forward
           looking posture of this Court,  the  under-privileged  also  are
           clamouring for the rights and are seeking  the  intervention  of
           the court with touching faith and confidence in the  court.  The
           Judges of the court have a duty to redeem  their  Constitutional
           oath and do justice no less to the pavement dweller than to  the
           guest of the five-star hotel."
      Proceeding further,  this  Court  observed  that  where  all  relevant
      considerations are the same, persons holding identical posts  may  not
      be treated differently in the matter of their pay merely because  they
      belong to different departments. If that can't be done when  they  are
      in service, can that be done during their retirement?  Expanding  this
      principle, one can confidently say that if pensioners  form  a  class,
      their computation cannot be by  different  formula  affording  unequal
      treatment solely on the ground that  some  retired  earlier  and  some
      retired later. Art. 39 (e) requires  the  State  to  secure  that  the
      health and strength of workers, men and women, and children of  tender
      age are not abused and  that  citizens  are  not  forced  by  economic
      necessity to enter avocations unsuited to their age or  strength. Art.
      41 obligates the State within the limits of its economic capacity  and
      development, to make effective provision for  securing  the  right  to
      work, to education and to provide assistance in cases of unemployment,
      old age, sickness and disablement, and in other  cases  of  undeserved
      want. Art. 43 (3) requires the State to endeavour  to  secure  amongst
      other things  full  enjoyment  of  leisure  and  social  and  cultural
      opportunities.”

It is however impossible to overlook, that the  Constitution  Bench  noticed
the Randhir Singh case1, and while affirming the  principle  of  ‘equal  pay
for equal work’, extended it to pensionary entitlements also.
9.    Federation of All  India  Customs  and  Central  Excise  Stenographers
(Recognized) v. Union of  India[3],  decided  by  a  two-Judge  bench:   The
petitioners in the above case, were Personal  Assistants  and  Stenographers
attached  to  heads  of  departments  in  the  Customs  and  Central  Excise
Department, of the Ministry of Finance.  They were placed in  the  pay-scale
of Rs.550-900.  The petitioners claimed, that the basic qualifications,  the
method, manner and source of recruitment,  and  their  grades  of  promotion
were the same  as  some  of  their  counterparts  (Personal  Assistants  and
Stenographers) attached to Joint Secretaries/Secretaries and other  officers
in the Central Secretariat.  The above counterparts, it  was  alleged,  were
placed in the pay-scale of Rs.650-1040.  The  petitioners’  contention  was,
that their duties and  responsibilities  were  similar  to  the  duties  and
responsibilities discharged by some of their counterparts.  Premised on  the
instant foundation, it was their contention,  that  the  differentiation  in
their pay-scales, was violative of Articles 14 and 16  of  the  Constitution
of India.  The petitioners claimed ‘equal pay for equal work’.
(ii)  The assertions made by the petitioners were repudiated  by  the  Union
of India.  Whilst acknowledging, that the duties and work performed  by  the
petitioners were/was identical  to  that  performed  by  their  counterparts
attached  to  Joint  Secretaries/Secretaries  and  other  officers  in   the
secretariat, yet it was pointed out, that their counterparts working in  the
secretariat, constituted a class, which was distinguishable from  them.   It
was asserted, that  the  above  counterparts  discharged  duties  of  higher
responsibility,  as  Joint  Secretaries  and  Directors   in   the   Central
Secretariat performed functions and duties  of  greater  responsibility,  as
compared to heads of departments, with whom the petitioners  were  attached.
It was contended, that the principle of ’equal pay for equal work’  depended
on the nature of the work done, and not on  the  mere  volume  and  kind  of
work.  The respondents also asserted, that  people  discharging  duties  and
responsibilities which were qualitatively different, when  examined  on  the
touchstone of reliability and responsibility, could not  be  placed  in  the
same pay-scale.
(iii) While adjudicating upon the controversy, this  Court  arrived  at  the
conclusion, that the differentiation of the pay-scale was not sought  to  be
justified on the basis of the functional work discharged by the  petitioners
and their counterparts in the  secretariat,  but  on  the  dissimilarity  of
their responsibility, confidentiality and the relationship with  the  public
etc.  It was accordingly concluded, that the same amount of  physical  work,
could entail different quality of work, some more sensitive, some  requiring
more tact, some less.  It was therefore held, that the principle  of  ‘equal
pay for equal work’ could not be translated  into  a  mathematical  formula.
Interference in a claim as the one  projected  by  the  petitioners  at  the
hands of a Court, would not be possible unless  it  could  be  demonstrated,
that either the differentiation in the pay-scale was  irrational,  or  based
on no basis, or arrived at mala fide, either in law  or  on  fact.   In  the
light of the stance adopted by the respondents, it was held that it was  not
possible  to  say,  that  the  differentiation  of  pay   in   the   present
controversy, was not based on a rational nexus. In the  above  view  of  the
matter, the prayer made by the petitioners was declined.
10.   State of U.P. v. J.P. Chaurasia[4],  decided  by  a  two-Judge  bench:
Prior to 1965, Bench Secretaries  in  the  High  Court  of  Allahabad,  were
placed in a pay-scale higher than that allowed to Section  Officers.   Bench
Secretaries were placed in the pay-scale of Rs.160-320 as against  the  pay-
scale  of  Rs.100-300  extended  to  Section  Officers.   A  Rationalization
Committee, recommended the pay-scale of  Rs.150-350  for  Bench  Secretaries
and Rs.200-400 for Section Officers.  While  examining  the  recommendation,
the State Government placed Bench Secretaries in the  pay-scale  of  Rs.200-
400, and Section Officers in  the  pay-scale  of  Rs.515-715.   Dissatisfied
with the  apparent  down-grading,  Bench  Secretaries  demanded,  that  they
should be placed at par with Section Officers, even though  their  principal
prayer was for being placed in a higher pay-scale.  The matter was  examined
by the Pay Commission, which also submitted its report.  The Pay  Commission
refused to accept, that Bench Secretaries  and  Section  Officers  could  be
equated, for the purpose of pay-scales.   The  Pay  Commission  was  of  the
view, that the nature of work of Section Officers was  not  only  different,
but also, more onerous than that of Bench Secretaries.   It  also  expressed
the view, that Section Officers had to bear more responsibilities  in  their
sections, and were required to exercise  control  over  their  subordinates.
Additionally, they were required  to  prepare  lengthy  original  notes,  in
complicated matters.  The Pay Commission  therefore  recommended,  the  pay-
scale of Rs.400-750  for  Bench  Secretaries  and  Rs.500-1000  for  Section
Officers.  Thereupon, the Anomalies Committee, while rejecting the claim  of
Bench Secretaries for being placed on par with Section  Officers,  suggested
that 10 posts of Bench Secretaries should be upgraded and placed in the pay-
scale  of  Rs.500-1000  (the  same  as,  Section  Officers).   Those   Bench
Secretaries,  who  were  placed  in  the  pay-scale  of   Rs.500-1000   were
designated as Bench Secretaries Grade-I, and those placed in  the  pay-scale
of Rs.400-750, were designated as Bench Secretaries Grade-II.
(ii)  This Court while  adjudicating  upon  the  controversy,  examined  the
matter from two different angles.  Firstly,  whether  Bench  Secretaries  in
the High Court of Allahabad, were entitled to the  pay-scale  admissible  to
Section  Officers?  Secondly,  whether  the  creation  of  two  grades  with
different pay-scales in the cadre of  Bench  Secretaries  despite  the  fact
that they  were  discharging  the  same  duties  and  responsibilities,  was
violative of the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’?
(iii) While answering the first question this Court  felt,  that  the  issue
required evaluation of duties and responsibilities of the respective  posts,
with which equation was sought.  And it was concluded, that on  the  subject
of equation of posts, the matter ought to be left for determination  to  the
executive, as the same would have to be examined by expert bodies.   It  was
however held, that  whenever  it  was  felt,  that  expert  bodies  had  not
evaluated the duties  and  responsibilities  in  consonance  with  law,  the
matter would be open  to  judicial  review.   In  the  present  case,  while
acknowledging that at one time Bench Secretaries were paid  more  emoluments
than Section Officers, it was held, that since  successive  Pay  Commissions
and even Pay Rationalization Committees had  found,  that  Section  Officers
performed more onerous duties, bearing greater  responsibility  as  compared
to Bench Secretaries, it was not possible for this Court to go  against  the
said opinion.  As  such,  this  Court  rejected  the  prayer  of  the  Bench
Secretaries as of right, to be assigned a pay-scale equivalent to or  higher
than that of Section Officers.
(iv)  With reference to the second question, namely, whether there could  be
two scales of pay in the same cadre,  of  persons  performing  the  same  or
similar work or duties, this  Court  expressed  the  view,  that  all  Bench
Secretaries in the High Court of Allahabad performed the  same  duties,  but
Bench Secretaries Grade-I were entitled to a  higher  pay-scale  than  Bench
Secretaries Grade-II, on account of their  selection  as  Bench  Secretaries
Grade-I, out  of  Bench  Secretaries  Grade-II,  by  a  Selection  Committee
appointed under the rules, framed by the High Court.  The  above  selection,
was based on merit with due  regard  to  seniority.   And  only  such  Bench
Secretaries Grade-II  who  had  acquired  sufficient  experience,  and  also
displayed a higher level of merit, could be appointed as  Bench  Secretaries
Grade-I.  It was therefore held,  that  the  rules  provided  for  a  proper
classification, for the grant of  higher  emoluments  to  Bench  Secretaries
Grade-I, as against Bench Secretaries Grade-II.
(v)   In the above view of  the  matter,  the  claim  raised  by  the  Bench
Secretaries for  equal  pay,  as  was  extended  to  Section  Officers,  was
declined by this Court.
11.   Mewa Ram Kanojia  v.  All  India  Institute  of  Medical  Sciences[5],
decided by  a  two-Judge  bench:       The  petitioner  in  this  case,  was
appointed against the post of Hearing Therapist, at the AIIMS,  with  effect
from 3.8.1972.  At that juncture, he was placed in the pay-scale of  Rs.210-
425.  Based on the recommendations made by the Third Pay  Commission  (which
were adopted by the AIIMS), the pay-scale for the post of Hearing  Therapist
was revised to  Rs.425-700,  with  effect  from  1.1.1973.   The  petitioner
accordingly came to be paid emoluments in the aforesaid  revised  pay-scale.
The petitioner asserted, that the post of Hearing Therapist was required  to
discharge duties and responsibilities which were similar  to  those  of  the
posts of Speech Pathologist and Audiologist.  The said  posts  were  in  the
pay-scale of Rs.650-1200.   Since  the  claim  of  the  petitioner  for  the
aforesaid higher pay-scale (made under  the  principle  of  ‘equal  pay  for
equal work’) was not acceded to by the department, he made a  representation
to the Third Pay Commission, which also negatived his claim for  parity,  as
also, for a higher pay-scale.  It  is  therefore  that  he  sought  judicial
intervention.  His main grievance  was,  that  Hearing  Therapist  performed
similar duties and functions as the  posts  of  Senior  Speech  Pathologist,
Senior Physiotherapist,  Senior  Occupational  Therapist,  Audiologist,  and
Speech Pathologist, and  further,  the  qualifications  prescribed  for  the
above said posts  were  almost  similar.   Since  those  holding  the  above
mentioned comparable posts were also working in the AIIMS, it was  asserted,
that the action of the employer was discriminatory towards the petitioner.
(ii)  Whilst controverting the claim of the petitioner it was  pointed  out,
that the post of  Hearing  Therapist  was  not  comparable  with  the  posts
referred  to  by  the  petitioner.   It  was  contended,  that  neither  the
qualifications nor the duties and functions of the posts referred to by  the
petitioner, were similar to that of Hearing Therapist.  In  the  absence  of
equality between  the  post  of  Hearing  Therapist,  and  the  other  posts
referred to by the petitioner, it  was  asserted,  that  the  claim  of  the
petitioner was not acceptable under the principle of ‘equal  pay  for  equal
work’.
(iii) During the course of hearing, the petitioner confined  his  claim  for
parity only with the post of Audiologist.  It was  urged,  that  educational
qualifications, as well as, duties and functions of  the  posts  of  Hearing
Therapist  and  Audiologist  were  similar  (if  not  the  same).   It   was
contended, that a Hearing Therapist was  required  to  treat  the  deaf  and
other patients suffering from  hearing  defects.   A  Hearing  Therapist  is
required to help in the rehabilitation of persons with hearing  impairments.
 It was also pointed out, that an Audiologist’s work was to  coordinate  the
separate professional skills, which contribute to the study,  treatment  and
rehabilitation of persons with impaired hearing.  As such it was  submitted,
that a person holding the post of an Audiologist, was a  specialist  in  the
non-medical evaluation, habilitation and rehabilitation, of those  who  have
language and speech disorders.  On the  aforesaid  premise,  the  petitioner
claimed parity with the pay-scale of Audiologists.
(iv)  This Court held, that there was a qualitative difference  between  the
two posts, on the basis of educational qualifications,  and  therefore,  the
principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’, could not be  invoked  or  applied.
It was further held, that the Third Pay Commission had considered the  claim
of Hearing Therapists, but did not accede to the grievances  made  by  them.
Since the Pay Commission was in better  position  to  judge  the  volume  of
work,  qualitative  difference  and  the  reliability   and   responsibility
required of the two posts, this Court declined to accept the prayer made  by
the petitioner, under the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’.
12.   Grih Kalyan Kendra Workers’ Union v. Union of India[6], decided  by  a
two-Judge bench:  The workers’ union in the above case, had approached  this
Court, in the first instance in 1984, by filing writ petition no.  13924  of
1984.  In the above petition, the relief claimed was for  payment  of  wages
under the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’.  The  petitioners  sought
parity with employees of the New Delhi Municipal  Committee,  and  employees
of other departments of the Delhi Administration, and the  Union  of  India.
They approached this Court again by filing civil writ petition  no.  869  of
1988, which was disposed of by the judgment cited above.
(ii)  The petitioners were employees of Grih Kalyan  Kendras.  They  desired
the Union of India to pay them wages in the regular pay-scale, on  par  with
other employees performing  similar  work  under  the  New  Delhi  Municipal
Committee, or the Delhi Administration, or the Union of India.  It would  be
relevant to mention, that the petitioner- Workers’  Union  was  representing
employees working in various centres of the Grih Kalyan Kendras,  on  ad-hoc
basis.  Some of them  were  being  paid  a  fixed  salary,  described  as  a
honorarium, while others were working on piece-rate wages at the  production
centres, without there being any provision for any scale  of  pay  or  other
benefits like gratuity, pension, provident fund etc.
(iii) In the first  instance,  this  Court  endeavoured  to  deal  with  the
question, whether the employers of these workers were denying them wages  as
were being paid to other similarly  placed  employees,  doing  the  same  or
similar work.  The question came to be examined for the reason, that  unless
the petitioners could demonstrate that the  employees  of  the  Grih  Kalyan
Kendras, were being discriminated against on the subject of  pay  and  other
emoluments, with other similarly placed employees, the principle  of  ‘equal
pay for equal work’ would not be  applicable.   During  the  course  of  the
first adjudication in writ petition no. 13924 of 1984, this Court  requested
a former Chief Justice of India, to make recommendations after  taking  into
consideration, firstly, whether other similarly situated employees  (engaged
in similar comparable posts, putting in  comparable  hours  of  work,  in  a
comparable employment) were being paid higher pay, and if  so,  what  should
be the entitlement of the agitating employees, so  as  not  to  violate  the
principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’,  and  secondly,  if  there  was  no
other  similar  comparable  employment,  whether  the  remuneration  of  the
agitating employees, deserved to  be  revised  on  the  ground,  that  their
remuneration was unconscionable or unfair, and if so, to  what  extent.   In
the report filed by the former Chief Justice of  India,  it  was  concluded,
that there was no employment comparable to  the  employment  held  by  those
engaged by the Grih Kalyan Kendras,  and  therefore,  they  could  not  seek
parity with other employees working either  with  the  New  Delhi  Municipal
Committee, or the Delhi Administration, or the Union of India.
(iv)  Based on the aforesaid factual conclusion, this Court  held  that  the
concept of ‘equal pay for equal work’ implies and requires, equal  treatment
for those who are similarly situated.  It was held, that a comparison  could
not be drawn between unequals.  Since the workers  who  had  approached  the
Court in the present case, had failed to establish that they  were  situated
similarly as others, it was held, that they could not be  extended  benefits
which were being given to those, with whom they  claimed  parity.   In  this
behalf this Court also opined, that the question as to whether persons  were
situated equally, had to be determined  by  the  application  of  broad  and
reasonable tests, and not by way of a mathematical  formula  of  exactitude.
And therefore, since  there  were  no  other  employees  comparable  to  the
employees working in  the  Grih  Kalyan  Kendras,  this  Court  declined  to
entertain the prayer made by the petitioners.
13.   Union of India v. Pradip Kumar Dey[7], decided by a  two-Judge  bench:
It was the case of the respondent, that he was  holding  the  post  of  Naik
(Radio Operator), in which capacity he was  discharging  similar  duties  as
those performed in the Directorate  of  Coordination  Police  Wireless,  and
other  central  government  agencies.   It  was  also  the  claim   of   the
respondent, that the duties performed by him as Naik (Radio  Operator)  were
more  hazardous   than   those   performed   by   personnel   with   similar
qualifications and experience in State services,  and  other  organizations.
Even though a learned single Judge dismissed the writ  petition,  an  intra-
Court appeal preferred by the respondent, was allowed.
(ii)  The Union of India raised three contentions, in  its  appeal  to  this
Court.  Firstly, that the pay-scale claimed by the respondent, was  that  of
the post of Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police.  It  was  pointed  out,  that
the respondent was holding an inferior post - of Naik (Radio Operator).   It
was highlighted, that the post of Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police,  was  a
promotional post, for the post held by the  respondent.   Secondly,  it  was
asserted on behalf of the Union  of  India,  that  the  respondent  had  not
placed any material before the Court, on which the  High  Court  could  have
arrived at the conclusion, that the essential  qualifications  of  the  post
against which  the  respondent  claimed  parity,  as  also,  the  method  of
recruitment thereto, were  the  same  as  that  of  the  post  held  by  the
respondent.  Thirdly,  the  post  of  Naik  (Radio  Operator)  held  by  the
respondent was extended the benefit of special pay  of  Rs.80/-  per  month,
and that, there was nothing on the record of the case to  show,  that  Radio
Operators in the Central Water  Commission  or  the  Directorate  of  Police
Wireless, were enjoying similar benefits.
(iii) This Court while accepting the contentions advanced at  the  hands  of
the Union of India held, that the pay-scale claimed by  the  respondent  was
that for the  post  of  Assistant  Sub-Inspector,  which  admittedly  was  a
promotional post for Naik (Radio Operator),  i.e.,  the  post  held  by  the
respondent.  And as such, the claim made by the respondent, of  parity  with
a  post  superior  in  hierarchy  (to  the  post  held  by  him),  was   not
sustainable.  Furthermore, this Court arrived at the conclusion, that  there
was no material  on  the  record  of  the  case  to  demonstrate,  that  the
essential qualifications and the method of recruitment  for,  as  also,  the
duties and responsibilities of the post held by him, were similar  to  those
of the post, against which the respondent was claiming parity.
14.   State Bank of India v. M.R. Ganesh Babu[8], decided by  a  three-Judge
bench:  Entry into  the  management  cadre  in  banking  establishments,  is
Junior Management Grade Scale-1.  The said cadre comprises  of  Probationary
Officers, Trainee Officers and other officers who possess  technical  skills
(specialized officers), such as Assistant Law Officers,  Security  Officers,
Assistant   Engineers,   Technical   Officers,   Medical   Officers,   Rural
Development Officers, and other technical  posts.   All  the  posts  in  the
Junior Management Grade Scale-1 cadre, were divisible into two categories  –
generalist officers, and specialist officers.  Under the prevalent  rules  –
the 1979 Order, the benefit of a higher starting pay, was extended  only  to
Probationary Officers and Trainee Officers (i.e.  to  generalist  officers),
while  Rural  Development  Officers  and  other  specialist  officers   like
Assistant Law Officers, Security Officers, Assistant  Engineers  etc.,  were
not  entitled  to  a  higher  starting  pay.   Rural  Development  Officers,
agitated their claim for similar benefits, as were extended to  Probationary
Officers and Trainee  Officers  (i.e.  to  the  generalist  officers).   The
question of viability of the claim raised  by  Rural  Development  Officers,
was referred to the Bhatnagar Committee.  The Bhatnagar Committee  made  its
recommendation, in favour of Rural Development Officers, finding  that  they
were  required  to  shoulder,  by   and   large,   the   same   duties   and
responsibilities, as Probationary Officers and Trainee Officers, so  far  as
agricultural   advances   were   concerned.    The   Committee   accordingly
recommended, that it was a fit case for removal  of  the  anomaly  in  their
salary fitment.  It recommended that, Rural Development Officers be  allowed
the same fitment of salary at the time of appointment, as  was  extended  to
Probationary  Officers  and  Trainee  Officers  (i.e.  to   the   generalist
officers).   The  recommendation  made  by  the  Bhatnagar   Committee   was
accepted, and accordingly, Rural  Development  Officers  were  extended  the
same fitment of salary, as generalist officers.
(ii)  Since  the  benefit  of  additional  increment  was  denied  to  other
specialist officers, they also made a grievance and claimed the  benefit  of
additional increments, as had been extended to Rural  Development  Officers.
Since the State Bank  of  India  did  not  accede  to  their  request,  they
approached the Karnataka High Court.  The specialist officers claimed,  that
in all respects, they performed  similar  duties  and  responsibilities,  as
Rural Development  Officers,  and  therefore,  they  were  entitled  to  the
benefit of additional increments, at the time of their appointment,  as  had
been extended to Rural Development Officers.  A learned single Judge of  the
High Court, on  being  impressed  by  the  fact,  that  some  of  the  Rural
Development Officers, who had not opted for  absorption  in  the  generalist
cadre (but had continued under the specialist  cadre),  were  also  extended
the benefit of higher starting pay, accepted the  claim  of  the  specialist
officers.  Appeals preferred against the judgment rendered  by  the  learned
single Judge, were dismissed by a division bench of the High Court.
(iii) This Court while examining the challenges, narrated the parameters  on
which the benefit of ‘equal pay for equal work’ can be made  applicable,  as
under:-
      “16.  The principle of equal pay for equal work  has  been  considered
      and applied in many reported decisions of this  Court.  The  principle
      has  been  adequately  explained  and  crystalised  and   sufficiently
      reiterated in a catena of decisions of this Court. It is well  settled
      that equal pay must depend upon the nature of work done. It cannot  be
      judged by the mere volume of work; there may be qualitative difference
      as regards reliability and responsibility. Functions may be  the  same
      but the responsibilities make a difference. One cannot deny that often
      the difference is a matter of degree and that there is an  element  of
      value judgment by those who are charged  with  the  administration  in
      fixing the scales of pay and other conditions of service. So  long  as
      such value judgment is made bona fide, reasonably on  an  intelligible
      criterion  which  has  a   rational   nexus   with   the   object   of
      differentiation,   such   differentiation   will   not    amount    to
      discrimination. The principle is not always easy to apply as there are
      inherent difficulties in comparing and evaluating  the  work  done  by
      different persons in different organizations,  or  even  in  the  same
      organization. Differentiation in pay scales of  persons  holding  same
      posts and performing similar work on the basis of  difference  in  the
      degree of responsibility, reliability and confidentiality would  be  a
      valid differentiation.  The  judgment  of  administrative  authorities
      concerning the responsibilities which attach  to  the  post,  and  the
      degree of reliability expected of  an  incumbent,  would  be  a  value
      judgment of the authorities concerned which, if arrived at  bona  fide
      reasonably and rationally, was not open to interference by the court.”

Based on the aforesaid parameters, this Court considered  the  acceptability
of the claim of the specialist officers,  for  parity  with  the  generalist
officers.  This Court recorded its conclusion, as under:-
      “19.  We have carefully perused the order of the Bank  and  find  that
      several reasons have been given for non-acceptance of the respondents'
      claim. It has been highlighted that the Probationary  Officers/Trainee
      Officers are being recruited from market/promoted from clerical  staff
      by the Bank by means of all-India written test and  interview  to  get
      the best talent from the market and within, with a  view  to  man  the
      Bank's  top  management  in  due  course.  Leaned  counsel   for   the
      respondents submitted  that  the  same  is  also  true  of  specialist
      officers. However, it is contended on behalf  of  the  appellant  Bank
      that the  generalist  officers  are  exposed  to  various  assignments
      including mandatory rural assignments. Unlike them,  the  services  of
      Assistant Law Officers are utilized  as  in-house  advisors  on  legal
      matters in administrative offices. The duties and responsibilities  of
      Probationary Officers/Trainee Officers  are  more  onerous  while  the
      specialist officers are not exposed to operational work/risk.  It  is,
      therefore, quite clear that there exists a valid  distinction  in  the
      matter of  work  and  nature  of  operations  between  the  specialist
      officers and the  general  category  officers.  The  general  category
      officers are directly linked to the  banking  operations  whereas  the
      specialist officers are not so linked and they perform  the  specified
      nature of work. RDOs were given  similar  fitment  as  the  generalist
      officers since it was found that they were required  to  shoulder,  by
      and large,  the  same  duties  and  responsibilities  as  Probationary
      Officers  and  Trainee  Officers  in  so  far  as  conducting   Bank's
      agricultural advances work was concerned. This was done on  the  basis
      of the recommendations of the Bhatnagar Committee and keeping in  view
      the fact that the decision has been  taken  that  there  would  be  no
      future recruitment of RDOs and the existing RDOs were proposed  to  be
      absorbed in general banking cadre. The recruitment of  RDOs  has  been
      discontinued since 1985. Taking into account the nature of duties  and
      responsibilities shouldered by the respondents the Bank has  concluded
      that the duties  and  responsibilities  of  the  respondents  are  not
      comparable to  the  duties  and  responsibilities  of  the  RDOs,  the
      Probationary Officers or the Trainee Officers.
      20.   Learned counsel for the respondents  submitted  that  specialist
      officers are also recruited from the open  market  and  are  confirmed
      after successfully completing the probation of  2  years.  Before  the
      Order of 1979 came into  force,  they  were  similarly  being  granted
      benefit of additional increments at the time  of  appointment  in  the
      same manner as the generalist officers. However, after  the  order  of
      1979 they have  been  deprived  of  this  benefit.  Subsequently  that
      benefit was extended to RDOs but not to  the  respondents  and  others
      like them. We have earlier  noticed  that  the  RDOs  were  given  the
      benefit of advance increments on the basis of the report of an  Expert
      Committee which justified their  classification  with  the  generalist
      officers, having regard to the nature of duties  and  responsibilities
      shouldered by them.  However, on consideration  of  the  case  of  the
      respondents, the Bank as reached a different conclusion. The Bank  has
      found that their duties and responsibilities are not the same as those
      of Probationary Officers/Trainee Officers/RDOs. It is  no  doubt  true
      that the specialist officers render useful service and their  valuable
      advice in the specialised fields is of great assistance to the Bank in
      its banking operations. The officers  who  belong  to  the  generalist
      cadre, namely the officers who actually conduct the banking operations
      and who take decisions in regard to all banking works are  advised  by
      the specialist officers. There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  service
      rendered by the specialist officers is also valuable, but that is  not
      to say that the degree of responsibility and reliability is  the  same
      as those of the Probationary Officers, the Trainee Officers,  and  the
      RDOs, who directly carry on the banking operations and are required to
      take crucial decisions based on the advice tendered by the  specialist
      officers.  The  Bank  has  considered  the  nature   of   duties   and
      responsibilities of the various categories of officers and has reached
      bona fide decision that while generalist  officers  take  all  crucial
      decisions in banking operations with which they are  directly  linked,
      and are exposed to operational work and risk since the decisions  that
      they take has significant effect on the functioning of  the  bank  and
      quality of its performance, the specialist officers are not exposed to
      such risks nor are they required to take decisions as vital  as  those
      to be taken by the generalist officers. They at best render advice  in
      their specialized field. The degree of reliability and  responsibility
      is not the same. It cannot be said that the value judgment of the Bank
      in this regard is either unreasonable, arbitrary or irrational. Having
      regard to the  settled  principles  and  the  parameters  of  judicial
      interference, we are of the considered view that the decision taken by
      the Bank  cannot  be  faulted  on  the  ground  of  its  being  either
      unreasonable,  arbitrary  or  discriminatory  and  therefore  judicial
      interference is inappropriate.”

On account of the reasons recorded  above,  specialist  officers  could  not
substantiate their claim of parity.  They were held not entitled to  benefit
of the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’
15.    State  of  Haryana  v.  Haryana  Civil  Secretariat  Personal   Staff
Association[9], decided by a two-Judge bench:   The  respondent  Association
in the above case, filed a writ petition before the Punjab and Haryana  High
Court, seeking a direction  to  the  appellant  herein,  to  grant  Personal
Assistants in the Civil Secretariat, Haryana, the pay-scale of  Rs.2000-3500
+ Rs.150 as special  pay,  which  had  been  given  to  Personal  Assistants
working in the Central Secretariat.  The aforesaid prayer was  made  in  the
background of  the  fact,  that  the  State  of  Haryana  had  accepted  the
recommendations of  the  Fourth  Central  Pay  Commission,  with  regard  to
revision of pay-scales, with effect from 1.1.1986.   The  case  of  Personal
Assistants  before  the  High  Court  was,  that  prior  to  1986,  Personal
Assistants working in  the  Civil  Secretariat,  Haryana,  were  enjoying  a
higher scale of pay, than was extended to  Personal  Assistants  working  in
the Central Secretariat.  On the receipt of Fourth  Central  Pay  Commission
report, the Central Government revised the pay-scale of Personal  Assistants
to Rs.2000-3500 with effect from 1.1.1986.  It was pointed  out,  that  even
though the Government of Haryana had  accepted  the  recommendation  of  the
Fourth Central Pay  Commission,  and  had  also  implemented  the  same,  in
respect of certain categories of employees, it did not accept  the  same  in
the case of Personal Assistants.  The pay-scale of  Personal  Assistants  in
the Civil Secretariat,  Haryana,  was  revised  to  Rs.1640-2900  +  150  as
special pay.
(ii)  It was also the contention of Personal Assistants, that in respect  of
certain categories of employees of different departments  of  the  State  of
Haryana, like Education,  Police,  Transport,  Health  and  Engineering  and
Technical staff, the State Government had fully adopted the  recommendations
of the Fourth Central Pay Commission, by  granting  them  the  pay-scale  of
Rs.2000-3500.  The claim of the Personal Assistants  was  also  premised  on
the fact,  that  Personal  Assistants  working  in  the  Civil  Secretariat,
Haryana, discharged duties which  were  comparable  with  that  of  Personal
Assistants   in   the   Central   Secretariat.    And   so    also,    their
responsibilities.
(iii) The High Court allowed the claim of the Association.   It  held,  that
Personal  Assistants  working  in  the  Civil  Secretariat,  Haryana,   were
entitled to the pay-scale of Rs.2000-3500, with effect from  1.1.1986.   The
State of Haryana approached this Court.  This  Court,  while  recording  its
consideration, expressed the view, that the High Court had  ignored  certain
settled  principles  of  law,  while  determining  the  claim  of   Personal
Assistants, by applying the principle of parity.  This Court felt, that  the
High Court was persuaded to accept the claim of  Personal  Assistants,  only
because of the designation  of  their  post.   This,  it  was  held,  was  a
misconceived  application  of  the  principle.   In  its  analysis,  it  was
recorded, that the High Court had assumed, that the assertions made  at  the
behest of the  Personal  Assistants,  that  they  were  discharging  similar
duties  and  responsibilities  as  Personal  Assistants   in   the   Central
Secretariat,  had  remained  unrebutted.   That,  this  Court   found,   was
factually incorrect.  The State of Haryana, in its counter affidavit  before
the High  Court,  had  adopted  the  specific  stance,  that  there  was  no
comparison  between  the  Personal   Assistants   working   in   the   Civil
Secretariat,  Haryana,  and  Personal  Assistants  working  in  the  Central
Secretariat.  It was highlighted, that  the  qualifications  prescribed  for
Personal Assistants in the Central Secretariat, were  different  from  those
prescribed for Personal Assistants in Civil Secretariat, Haryana.  The  High
Court was also found to have erred in its determination, by not  making  any
comparison of the nature  of  duties  and  responsibilities,  or  about  the
qualifications prescribed  for  recruitment.   This  Court  accordingly  set
aside the order passed by the High Court, allowing parity.
(iv)  In order to delineate the  parameters,  on  the  basis  of  which  the
principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ can be made applicable,  this  Court
observed as under:-
      “10.  It is to be kept in mind that the claim of equal pay  for  equal
      work is not a fundamental right vested in any employee though it is  a
      constitutional goal to be achieved by the Government. Fixation of  pay
      and determination of  parity  in  duties  and  responsibilities  is  a
      complex matter which is for the executive to discharge. While taking a
      decision in the matter several relevant factors, some  of  which  have
      been noted by this Court in the decided case,  are  to  be  considered
      keeping in view the prevailing financial position and capacity of  the
      State Government to bear the additional liability of a  revised  scale
      of pay.  It is also to be kept in mind  that  the  priority  given  to
      different types of posts under the prevailing policies  of  the  State
      Government is also a relevant factor for consideration  by  the  State
      Government. In the context of complex nature of issues  involved,  the
      far-reaching consequences of a decision in the matter and  its  impact
      on the administration of the State Government courts  have  taken  the
      view that  ordinarily  courts  should  not  try  to  delve  deep  into
      administrative decisions pertaining to pay fixation  and  pay  parity.
      That is not to say that the matter is  not  justiciable  or  that  the
      courts cannot entertain any  proceeding  against  such  administrative
      decision taken by the Government.  The  courts  should  approach  such
      matters with restraint and interfere only when they are satisfied that
      the decision of the Government  is  patently  irrational,  unjust  and
      prejudicial to a section of employees and the Government while  taking
      the decision has ignored factors which are material and relevant for a
      decision in the matter. Even in a case where the court holds the order
      passed by  the  Government  to  be  unsustainable  then  ordinarily  a
      direction should be given to the State  Government  or  the  authority
      taking the decision to reconsider the matter and pass a proper  order.
      The court should avoid giving  a  declaration  granting  a  particular
      scale of pay and compelling the government to implement the  same.  As
      noted earlier, in the present case the High Court has  not  even  made
      any attempt to compare the nature of duties  and  responsibilities  of
      the two sections of the employees, one in the  State  Secretariat  and
      the other in the Central Secretariat. It has also  ignored  the  basic
      principle that there are  certain  rules,  regulations  and  executive
      instructions issued by the employers which govern  the  administration
      of the cadre.”
16.    Orissa  University  of  Agriculture  &   Technology   v.   Manoj   K.
Mohanty[10], decided by a two-Judge bench:   The  respondent  in  the  above
case, was appointed as a  Typist  in  1990,  on  a  consolidated  salary  of
Rs.530/- per month, against a vacancy of the post of Junior  Assistant.   It
was his averment, that even though in the appointment order,  he  was  shown
to have been appointed against the post of  Typist,  he  had  actually  been
working as a Junior Assistant, in the Examination Section of the  institute.
 In order to demonstrate the  aforesaid  factual  position,  the  respondent
placed reliance on two certificates dated 4.12.1993  and  25.3.1996,  issued
to him by the Dean of the institute,  affirming  his  stance.   Despite  the
passage of five years since his induction into  service,  he  was  paid  the
same consolidated salary  (referred  to  above),  and  was  also  not  being
regularized.  It was also pointed out, that  another  individual  junior  to
him was regularized against the post of Junior  Assistant.   The  respondent
then approached the Orissa High Court by way of  a  writ  petition,  seeking
appointment on regular basis.  The High Court  disposed  of  the  said  writ
petition, by directing, that the respondent be not disengaged from  service.
 The High Court further directed, that the respondent be paid salary in  the
regular scale of pay admissible  to  Junior  Assistants,  with  effect  from
September, 1997.  A review petition filed against  the  High  Court’s  order
dated 11.9.1997, was dismissed.  Dissatisfied with  the  above  orders,  the
Orissa University of Agriculture & Technology approached this Court.   While
dealing with the question  of  ‘equal  pay  for  equal  work’,  this  Court,
noticed the factual position as under:-
      “10.  The High Court before directing to give regular pay-scale to the
      respondent w.e.f. September, 1997 on the principle of “equal  pay  for
      equal work” did not examine the pleadings and facts  of  the  case  in
      order to appreciate whether  the  respondent  satisfied  the  relevant
      requirements such as the nature of work done by him as compared to the
      nature of work done by the regularly appointed Junior Assistants,  the
      qualifications,  responsibilities  etc.  When  the  services  of   the
      respondent had not been regularized, his appointment was on  temporary
      basis on consolidated pay and he had not  undergone  the  process  for
      regular recruitment, direction to give regular pay-scale could not  be
      given that too without examining the relevant  factors  to  apply  the
      principle of “equal  pay  for  equal  work”.  It  is  clear  from  the
      averments made in the writ petition extracted above, nothing is stated
      as regards the  nature  of  work,  responsibilities  attached  to  the
      respondent without comparing them with the regularly recruited  Junior
      Assistants. It cannot be disputed that there  were  neither  necessary
      averments in the writ petition nor any material was placed before  the
      High Court so as to consider the application of  principle  of  “equal
      pay for equal work”.”

Based on the fact, that the respondent had not  placed  sufficient  material
on the  record  of  the  case,  to  demonstrate  the  applicability  of  the
principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’, this  Court  set  aside  the  order
passed by the High Court, directing that the respondent  be  paid  wages  in
the regular scale of pay, with effect from September, 1997.
17.   Government of W.B. v. Tarun  K.  Roy[11],  decided  by  a  three-Judge
bench:  There were two technical posts,  namely,  Operator-cum-Mechanic  and
Sub-Assistant Engineer, in the Irrigation Department, of the  Government  of
West Bengal.  In 1970, the State Government revised pay-scales.  During  the
aforesaid revision, the pay-scale  of  the  post  of  Operator-cum-Mechanic,
which was initially Rs.180-350, was revised to Rs.230-425, with effect  from
1.4.1970.   The  pay-scale  of  the  post  of  Sub-Assistant  Engineer   was
simultaneously revised  to  Rs.350-600,  with  a  higher  initial  start  of
Rs.330, with effect from the same date.  Some persons  in  the  category  of
Operator-cum-Mechanic,  possessing   the   qualification   of   diploma   in
engineering,  claimed  entitlement  to  the  nomenclature  of  Sub-Assistant
Engineer, as also, the  scale  of  pay  prescribed  for  the  post  of  Sub-
Assistant Engineer.  The Government of West Bengal,  during  the  course  of
hearing of the matter before this Court, adopted the position, that  diploma
holder  engineers  working  as  Operator-cum-Mechanics  in  the   Irrigation
Department, were not entitled to be designated as  Sub-Assistant  Engineers.
The said plea was negatived by this Court in State of West Bengal v.  Debdas
Kumar, 1991 Supp. (1) SCC 138.
(ii)  Another group of Operator-cum-Mechanics, who did not  possess  diploma
in engineering, and were graduates in science, or were holding school  final
examination  certificate,  claimed   parity   with   Operator-cum-Mechanics,
possessing the qualification of diploma in engineering.  This  Court,  while
rejecting their claim, observed as under:-
      “30.  The respondents are merely graduates in Science.   They  do  not
      have the requisite technical qualification.   Only  because  they  are
      graduates, they cannot,  in  our  opinion,  claim  equality  with  the
      holders of diploma in Engineering.  If any relief is granted  by  this
      Court to the respondents on the aforementioned ground, the  same  will
      be in contravention of the statutory rules.  It  is  trite  that  this
      Court even in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article  142  of  the
      Constitution of India would not ordinarily grant such a  relief  which
      would be in violation of a statutory provision.”
18.   S.C. Chandra v. State of Jharkhand[12], decided by a two-Judge  bench:
 In the above matter, a number of civil appeals were disposed of, through  a
common order.  The  appellants  had  approached  the  High  Court  with  the
prayer, that directions be issued to the  respondents,  to  fix  their  pay-
scale at par with the pay-scale of government secondary school teachers,  or
at par with Grade I and II Clerks of the respondent company  (Bharat  Coking
Coal Ltd. – BCCL).  The appellants also  prayed,  that  facilities  such  as
provident fund, gratuity, pension and other retiral  benefits,  should  also
be  made  available  to  them.   In  addition  to  the  above  prayers,  the
appellants also sought a direction, that the management of  the  school,  be
taken over by the State Government.  Dissatisfied with the orders passed  by
the High Court, the employees of the school  approached  this  Court.   This
Court disposed of the matter by recording the following conclusion:-
      “21.  Learned counsel for the appellants have relied on Article  39(d)
      of the Constitution.   Article  39(d)  does  not  mean  that  all  the
      teachers working in the school should be equated with  the  clerks  in
      BCCL or the Government of Jharkhand for application of  the  principle
      of equal pay for equal work.  There should be total  identity  between
      both groups i.e. the teachers of the school on the one  hand  and  the
      clerks in BCCL, and as such the teachers cannot be  equated  with  the
      clerks  of  the  State  Government  or  of  BCCL.   The  question   of
      application of Article 39(d) of the  Constitution  has  recently  been
      interpreted by this Court in State  of  Haryana  v.  Charanjit  Singh,
      (2006) 9  SCC  321,  wherein  Their  Lordships  have  put  the  entire
      controversy to rest and held that the principle, “equal pay for  equal
      work” must satisfy the test that the incumbents are  performing  equal
      and identical work as discharged by employees against whom  the  equal
      pay is claimed.  Their Lordships have reviewed all the  cases  bearing
      on the subject and after a detailed discussion have  finally  put  the
      controversy to rest that the persons who  claimed  the  parity  should
      satisfy the court that the conditions are identical and equal and same
      duties are being discharged by them.  Though  a number of  cases  were
      cited for our consideration but no useful purpose will be served as in
      State of Haryana v. Charanjit Singh, (2006) 9 SCC 321, all these cases
      have been reviewed by this Court.  More so, when we have already  held
      that the appellants are  not  the  employees  of  BCCL,  there  is  no
      question seeking any parity of the pay with  that  of  the  clerks  of
      BCCL.”

A perusal of the determination rendered by  this  Court  reveals,  that  for
claiming parity under the principle of ‘equal pay  for  equal  work’,  there
should be total identity between the post held by  the  claimants,  and  the
reference post, with whom parity is claimed.
19.   Official Liquidator v. Dayanand[13], decided by a  three-Judge  bench:
Directions were issued  by  the  Calcutta  and  Delhi  High  Courts  to  the
appellant, in the above matter, to absorb persons employed by  the  Official
Liquidators (attached to those High Courts) under Rule 308 of the  Companies
(Court) Rules, 1959, against sanctioned posts, in the Department of  Company
Affairs.  By virtue of  the  above  directions,  the  respondents  who  were
employed/engaged by Official Liquidators, were paid salaries and  allowances
from the Company’s funds.  The question that arose for consideration  before
this  Court  was,  whether  the  respondents  were  entitled  to  sanctioned
Government posts, in  the  office  of  the  Official  Liquidator(s).   While
disposing of the above issue, this Court held as under:-
      “100. As mentioned earlier, the respondents were  employed/engaged  by
      the Official Liquidators pursuant to  the  sanction  accorded  by  the
      Court under Rule 308 of the 1959 Rules and they are paid salaries  and
      allowances from the company fund. They were neither appointed  against
      sanctioned posts nor were they paid out from the Consolidated Fund  of
      India. Therefore, the mere fact that they were doing work  similar  to
      the regular employees of  the  Offices  of  the  Official  Liquidators
      cannot be treated as sufficient for applying the  principle  of  equal
      pay for equal work. Any such direction will compel the  Government  to
      sanction additional posts in the Offices of the  Official  Liquidators
      so as to facilitate payment of salaries and allowances to the company-
      paid staff in the regular pay scale from the Consolidate Fund of India
      and in view of our finding that  the  policy  decision  taken  by  the
      Government of India to reduce the number of  posts  meant  for  direct
      recruitment  does  not  suffer  from  any  legal   or   constitutional
      infirmity, it is not possible to entertain the plea of the respondents
      for payment of salaries and allowances in the regular pay  scales  and
      other monetary benefits on a par with regular  employees  by  applying
      the principle of equal pay for equal work.”

20.    State  of  West  Bengal  v.  West  Bengal  Minimum  Wages  Inspectors
Association[14],  decided  by  a   two-Judge   bench:       The   respondent
Association  represented  the  cadre  of  Inspector  (Agricultural   Minimum
Wages), before the High Court of Calcutta.  The claim made before  the  High
Court was, that the said cadre was entitled to parity  in  pay-scales,  with
the  posts  of  Inspector   (Cooperative   Societies),   Extension   Officer
(Panchayats) and Revenue Officer.  The aforesaid claim of parity  was  based
on the  sole  consideration,  that  the  posts  of  Inspector  (Agricultural
Minimum Wages) on the one hand, and  the  posts  of  Inspector  (Cooperative
Societies), Extension  Officer  (Panchayats)  and  Revenue  Officer  on  the
other, were in the same pay-scale, prior  to  the  revision  of  pay-scales,
i.e., Pay-Scale 9 (– Rs.300-600).  After the pay  revision  in  1981,  while
the Inspector (Agricultural Minimum Wages) cadre, was retained in  Pay-Scale
9  (–  Rs.300-600),  the  other  three  cadres  –   Inspector   (Cooperative
Societies), Extension Officer (Panchayats) and Revenue Officer, were  placed
in Pay-Scale 11  (–  Rs.425-1050).   It  was  based  on  the  above  factual
assertion, that the respondents claimed placement in Pay-Scale 11 (- Rs.425-
1050).  The claim of the respondents, was not based on the  assertion,  that
Inspectors  (Agricultural  Minimum  Wages)  were  discharging   duties   and
responsibilities,  which  were  similar/identical  to  those  of  Inspectors
(Cooperative  Societies),  Extension  Officers  (Panchayats)   and   Revenue
Officers.   It  is  this  aspect,  which  weighed  with  this  Court   while
determining  the  claim  of  the  respondents  for  parity.   In  the  above
adjudication, this Court recorded the following observations:-
      “20.  The burden to prove  disparity  is  on  the  employees  claiming
      parity – vide State of U.P. v. Ministerial Karamchari Sangh, (1998)  1
      SCC 422; Associate Banks Officers’ Association v. SBI,  (1998)  1  SCC
      428; State of Haryana v.  Haryana  Civil  Secretariat  Personal  Staff
      Association, (2002) 6 SCC 72; State of Haryana v. Tilak Raj, (2003)  6
      SCC 123; S.C. Chandra v. State of Jharkhand, (2007) 8 SCC 279 and U.P.
      SEB v. Aziz Ahmad, (2009) 2 SCC 606.
      21.   What is significant in this case is that parity  is  claimed  by
      Inspectors, AMW, by seeking extension of the pay scale  applicable  to
      Inspector (Cooperative Societies), Extension Officers (Panchayat)  and
      KGO-JLRO (Revenue Officers) not on the basis that the holders of those
      posts were performing similar duties or functions as Inspectors,  AMW.
      On the other hand, the relief was claimed on the ground that prior  to
      ROPA Rules 1981, the posts in the said three reference categories, and
      Inspectors, AMW were all in the same pay scale (Pay Scale 9), and that
      under ROPA Rules 1981, those other three categories have been given  a
      higher Pay Scale of  No.11,  while  they  –  Inspectors,  AMW  -  were
      discriminated by continuing them in the Pay Scale 9.
      22.   The claim in the writ petition was not based on the ground  that
      subject post and reference category posts carried similar or identical
      duties and responsibilities but on the contention that as the  subject
      post holders and the holders of  reference  category  posts  who  were
      enjoying equal pay at an earlier point of time, should be continued to
      be given equal pay even after pay revision. In other words, the parity
      claimed was not on the basis of equal pay for equal work, but  on  the
      basis of previous equal pay.
      23.   It is now well-settled that parity cannot be claimed  merely  on
      the basis that earlier the subject post  and  the  reference  category
      posts were carrying the same  scale  of  pay.  In  fact,  one  of  the
      functions of the Pay Commission is to identify the posts which deserve
      a higher scale of  pay  than  what  was  earlier  being  enjoyed  with
      reference to their duties and responsibilities, and extend such higher
      scale to those categories of posts.
      24.   The Pay Commission has two functions; to revise the existing pay
      scale, by recommending revised pay scales corresponding  to  the  pre-
      revised pay scales and, secondly, make recommendations  for  upgrading
      or downgrading posts resulting in  higher  pay  scales  or  lower  pay
      scales, depending upon the nature of duties and functions attached  to
      those posts. Therefore, the mere fact that  at  an  earlier  point  of
      time, two posts were carrying the same pay scale does  not  mean  that
      after the implementation  of  revision  in  pay  scales,  they  should
      necessarily have the same revised pay scale.
      25.   As noticed above, one post  which  is  considered  as  having  a
      lesser pay scale may be assigned a higher pay scale and  another  post
      which is considered to have a proper pay scale may merely be  assigned
      the corresponding revised pay scale but  not  any  higher  pay  scale.
      Therefore, the benefit of higher pay scale  can  only  be  claimed  by
      establishing that holders of the subject post and holders of reference
      category posts, discharge duties  and  functions  identical  with,  or
      similar to, each other and  that  the  continuation  of  disparity  is
      irrational and unjust.”

Based on the above  consideration,  this  Court  observed,  that  Inspectors
(Agricultural Minimum Wages), had neither  pleaded  nor  proved,  that  they
were discharging duties and functions similar to the  duties  and  functions
of the Inspectors (Cooperative Societies), Extension  Officers  (Panchayats)
and Revenue Officers, and therefore held, that their claim for  pay  parity,
under the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’, could not be accepted.
21.    Union  Territory  Administration,  Chandigarh  v.  Manju  Mathur[15],
decided by a two-Judge bench:  In the above  matter,  the  respondents  were
working as Senior Dieticians and Dieticians in  the  Directorate  of  Health
Services of the Chandigarh Administration.  They were posted in the  General
Hospital,  Chandigarh,  under  the   Union   Territory   Administration   of
Chandigarh.  They were placed in the pay-scale of Rs.1500-2540 and  Rs.1350-
2400, respectively.  They moved the Chandigarh Administration,  seeking  the
pay-scale extended to their counterparts, employed in the State  of  Punjab.
The posts against which  they  were  claiming  equivalence,  were  those  of
Dietician (gazetted) and Dietician  (non-gazetted)  in  the  Directorate  of
Research and Medical Education, Punjab.  The  posts  with  which  they  were
seeking  equivalence,  were  sanctioned  posts  in  the  Rajindera  Hospital
(Patiala) and the Shri Guru Teg Bahadur Hospital  (Amritsar).   These  posts
were in  the  pay-scale  of  Rs.2200-4000  and  Rs.1500-2640,  respectively.
After the State Government declined to accept their claim,  they  approached
the  High  Court  of  Punjab  and  Haryana,  which  accepted  their   claim.
Dissatisfied with the  judgment  rendered  by  the  High  Court,  the  Union
Territory Administration of Chandigarh, approached this Court.
(ii)  During the pendency of the proceedings before this Court, a  direction
was issued to the Union Territory Administration of Chandigarh,  to  appoint
a ‘High Level Equivalence Committee’, to examine the nature  of  duties  and
responsibilities of the post of Senior Dietician  working  under  the  Union
Territory Administration  of  Chandigarh,  vis-a-vis,  Dietician  (gazetted)
working under the State of Punjab.   And  also  to  examine  the  nature  of
duties and responsibilities of the post  of  Dietician,  working  under  the
Union Territory Administration of  Chandigarh,  vis-a-vis,  Dietician  (non-
gazetted) working under the State of Punjab, and submit a report.  A  report
was accordingly submitted to this Court (which is  extracted  in  the  above
judgment).
(iii) In its report, the ‘High Level Equivalence Committee’ arrived  at  the
conclusion, that the duties and responsibilities of the posts  held  by  the
respondents, and the corresponding reference  posts  with  which  they  were
claiming parity, were not comparable or equivalent.   As  such,  this  Court
recorded the following observations:-
      “9.   We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties. We find  from
      the report of the High Level  Equivalence  Committee  extracted  above
      that the Directorate of Research and Medical Education, Punjab,  is  a
      teaching  institution  in  which  the   Dietician   has   to   perform
      multifarious duties  such  as  teaching  the  probationary  nurses  in
      subjects  of  nutrition  dietaries,  control  and  management  of  the
      kitchen, etc., whereas, the main duties of the  Dietician  and  Senior
      Dietician in the Government  Multi-Specialty  Hospital  in  the  Union
      Territory Chandigarh are only to  check  the  quality  of  food  being
      provided to the patients and to manage the kitchen.”

Based on the above determination, the prayer for parity under the  principle
of ‘equal  pay  for  equal  work’  was  declined  to  the  respondents,  and
accordingly the judgment of the High Court, was set aside.
22.    Steel  Authority  of  India  Limited  v.  Dibyendu  Bhattacharya[16],
decided by a three-Judge bench:  The  respondent  in  the  above  case,  was
appointed against the post of Speech Therapist/Audiologist, in the  Durgapur
Steel Plant, in S-6 grade in Medical and  Health  Services.   After  serving
for a few years, he addressed a representation to  the  appellant,  claiming
parity with one B.V. Prabhakar, employed at  the  Rourkela  Steel  Plant  (a
different unit of the same company).  The said B.V.  Prabhakar  was  holding
the post of E-1 grade in the executive cadre, though  designated  as  Speech
Therapist/Audiologist.  In his representation, the respondent did not  claim
parity in pay, but only claimed change of the cadre and upgradation  of  his
post, and accordingly relaxation in eligibility, so as to be entitled to  be
placed in the pay-scale of posts in E-1 grade.
(ii)  The appellant did not accept the claim raised by the  respondent.   He
accordingly approached the High Court of Calcutta.  A division bench of  the
High Court, accepted his claim for pay  parity.   It  is  in  the  aforesaid
background,  that  the  appellant  approached  this  Court,  to  assail  the
judgment rendered by the High Court.  The issue  of  pay  parity  was  dealt
with by this Court, by recording the following observations:-
      “30.  In view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarised  to
      the effect  that  parity  of  pay  can  be  claimed  by  invoking  the
      provisions of Articles 14 and 39(d) of the Constitution  of  India  by
      establishing that  the  eligibility,  mode  of  selection/recruitment,
      nature and  quality  of  work  and  duties  and  effort,  reliability,
      confidentiality, dexterity, functional need and  responsibilities  and
      status of both the posts are identical. The functions may be the  same
      but the skills and responsibilities may be  really  and  substantially
      different. The other post may not require  any  higher  qualification,
      seniority or other like factors. Granting parity in pay scales depends
      upon the comparative evaluation of job  and  equation  of  posts.  The
      person claiming parity, must plead necessary averments and prove  that
      all things are equal between the posts concerned. Such a complex issue
      cannot be adjudicated  by  evaluating  the  affidavits  filed  by  the
      parties.
      31.   The onus to establish the discrimination by the employer lies on
      the person claiming the parity of pay. The  Expert  Committee  has  to
      decide such issues, as the fixation of pay scales  etc.  falls  within
      the exclusive domain of the executive. So long as the  value  judgment
      of  those  who  are  responsible  for  administration   i.e.   service
      conditions,  etc.,  is  found  to  be  bonafide,  reasonable,  and  on
      intelligible criteria which has  a  rational  nexus  of  objective  of
      differentiation,   such   differentiation   will   not    amount    to
      discrimination. It is not prohibited in law  to  have  two  grades  of
      posts in the same cadre. Thus, the nomenclature of a post may  not  be
      the sole determinative factor. The courts in exercise of their limited
      power of judicial review can only examine whether the decision of  the
      State authorities is rational and just or prejudicial to a  particular
      set of employees. The court has to keep in mind that a mere difference
      in service conditions does not amount to discrimination. Unless  there
      is complete and wholesale/wholesome identity  between  the  two  posts
      they should not be treated as equivalent and the  Court  should  avoid
      applying the principle of equal pay for equal work.”


Based on the above consideration, this Court recorded its analysis,  on  the
merits of the controversy, as under:-
      “34.  Shri B.V. Prabhakar, had been appointed in  E-1  Grade,  in  the
      Rourkela unit, considering his  past  services  in  the  Bokaro  Steel
      Plant, another unit of the Company, for about two decades prior to the
      recruitment of the respondent. As every  unit  may  make  appointments
      taking into consideration the local needs and requirement, such parity
      claimed by the respondent cannot be held to be  tenable.  The  reliefs
      sought by the respondent for upgradation of the post and  waiving  the
      eligibility criteria had rightly been refused by the appellants and by
      the learned Single Judge. In  such  a  fact-situation,  there  was  no
      justification for the Division  Bench  to  allow  the  writ  petition,
      granting the benefit from the  date  of  initial  appointment  of  the
      respondent. The respondent has not produced any tangible  material  to
      substantiate his claim, thus, he could not discharge the onus of proof
      to establish that he had made some justifiable claim.  The  respondent
      miserably failed to make out a case for pay parity to the post of  E-1
      Grade in executive cadre. The appeal, thus, deserves to be allowed.”

It is, therefore apparent, that this Court did not accept the prayer of  pay
parity, in the above cited case, based on the principle of  ‘equal  pay  for
equal work’.
23.   Hukum Chand Gupta v. Director General, Indian Council of  Agricultural
Research[17], decided by a  two-Judge  bench:   In  the  above  matter,  the
appellant was originally appointed as a Laboratory Assistant in Group D,  in
the National Dairy Research Institute.  He was promoted as a Lower  Division
Clerk, after he qualified a limited  departmental  competitive  examination.
He was further promoted as a Senior Clerk, again after qualifying a  limited
departmental competitive examination.  At this stage, he was placed  in  the
pay-scale  of  Rs.1200-2040.   He  was  further  promoted  to  the  post  of
Superintendent in the pay-scale of Rs.1640-2900, yet again, after passing  a
departmental examination.  Eventually,  he  was  promoted  as  an  Assistant
Administrative Officer, on the basis of seniority-cum-fitness.   The  Indian
Council of Agricultural Research revised the pay-scales of Assistants,  from
Rs.1400-2600 to Rs.1640-2900, with effect from 1.1.1986.  However, the  pay-
scale of the post of Superintendent was not revised.
(ii)  The appellant submitted a representation seeking revision of his  pay-
scale on the ground, that in the  headquarters  of  the  Indian  Council  of
Agricultural Research, the post of Superintendent  is  a  promotional  post,
from the post of Assistant (which carried the  pay-scale  of  Rs.1640-2900).
He also claimed parity in pay-scale with one J.I.P. Madan.    The  claim  of
the appellant was not accepted  by  the  authorities,  whereupon,  he  first
approached the Administrative Tribunal and  eventually  the  High  Court  of
Punjab and Haryana, which also  did  not  accept  his  contention.   It  is,
therefore, that he approached this Court.
(iii) While adjudicating upon the above controversy, this Court  relied  and
endorsed the reasons recorded by the Administrative  Tribunal  in  rejecting
the claim of the appellant in the following manner:-
      “9.   By a detailed order, the Tribunal rejected both the  claims.  It
      was observed that the post at headquarters cannot be compared with the
      post at institutional level as both are governed by different sets  of
      service rules. The second prayer with regard to the higher  pay  scale
      given to Shri J.I.P. Madan was rejected on the ground that he had been
      given the benefit of second upgradation in pay  since  he  had  earned
      only one promotion throughout his professional career.   Aggrieved  by
      the aforesaid, the appellant filed a writ petition C.W.P. No. 9595 CAT
      of 2004 before the  High  Court.  The  writ  petition  has  also  been
      dismissed by judgment dated 8-7-2008. This judgment is impugned in the
      present appeal.”

This Court, recorded the following additional  reasons,  for  not  accepting
the claim of the appellant, by observing as under:-
      “15.  In our opinion, the explanation given by Mrs.  Sunita  Rao  does
      not leave any room for doubt that the claim made by the  appellant  is
      wholly misconceived. There is no comparison between the appellant  and
      Shri J.I.P. Madan. The appellant had  duly  earned  promotion  in  his
      cadre from the lowest rank to the higher rank. Having joined in  Group
      D, he retired on the post of AAO. On the other hand, Shri J.I.P. Madan
      had been working in the same pay scale till his promotion on the  post
      of AAO. Therefore, he was held  entitled  to  the  second  upgradation
      after 24 years of service. He had joined as  an  Assistant  by  Direct
      Recruitment and promoted on          24-8-1990  as  a  Superintendent.
      After the merger of the post of Assistant with the Superintendent, the
      earlier promotion of Shri Madan was nullified,  as  Assistant  was  no
      longer a feeder post for the promotion on the post of  Superintendent.
      Thus, a financial upgradation, in view of ACP Scheme, was  granted  to
      him since he had no opportunity for the second promotion.”

This Court concluded the issue by holding as under:-
      “20.  We are also  not  inclined  to  accept  the  submission  of  the
      appellant that there can be no distinction in the pay  scales  between
      the employees working at headquarters and the employees working at the
      institutional level. It is a  matter  of  record  that  the  employees
      working at headquarters are governed by a completely different set  of
      rules. Even the hierarchy of the posts and the channels  of  promotion
      are different. Also, merely because any two posts at the  headquarters
      and the institutional level have  the  same  nomenclature,  would  not
      necessarily require that the pay scales on the two posts  should  also
      be the same. In our opinion, the prescription  of  two  different  pay
      scales would not violate the principle of equal pay  for  equal  work.
      Such action would not be arbitrary or violate Articles 14, 16 and  39D
      of the Constitution of India. It is for the employer to categorize the
      posts and to prescribe the duties of each post. There can not  be  any
      straitjacket formula for  holding  that  two  posts  having  the  same
      nomenclature would have to be given the same pay  scale.  Prescription
      of pay scales on particular posts  is  a  very  complex  exercise.  It
      requires assessment of the nature and quality of the duties  performed
      and the responsibilities shouldered by  the  incumbents  on  different
      posts. Even though, the two posts may be referred to by the same name,
      it would not lead to  the  necessary  inference  that  the  posts  are
      identical in every manner. These are matters to be assessed by  expert
      bodies like the employer or the Pay Commission.  Neither  the  Central
      Administrative Tribunal nor a Writ Court  would  normally  venture  to
      substitute its own opinion for the opinions rendered by  the  experts.
      The Tribunal or the Writ Court  would  lack  the  necessary  expertise
      undertake the complex exercise of equation of posts or the pay scales.
      21.   In expressing the aforesaid opinion, we  are  fortified  by  the
      observations made by this Court in State of Punjab vs.  Surjit  Singh,
      (2009) 9 SCC 514. In that case, upon  review  of  a  large  number  of
      judicial precedents relating to the principle of “equal pay for  equal
      work”, this Court observed as follows: (SCC pp. 527-28, para 19)
           “19. … ‘19. … Undoubtedly, the doctrine of “equal pay for  equal
           work” is not an  abstract  doctrine  and  is  capable  of  being
           enforced in a court of law. But equal pay must be for equal work
           of equal value. The principle of “equal pay for equal work”  has
           no mechanical application in  every  case.  Article  14  permits
           reasonable classification based on qualities or  characteristics
           of persons recruited and grouped together, as against those  who
           were left out. Of course, the qualities or characteristics  must
           have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be  achieved.
           In service matters, merit or experience can be  a  proper  basis
           for classification for the purposes of pay in order  to  promote
           efficiency in  administration.  A  higher  pay  scale  to  avoid
           stagnation or resultant  frustration  for  lack  of  promotional
           avenues is also an acceptable reason for pay  differentiation…..
           A mere nomenclature designating a person as say a carpenter or a
           craftsman is not enough to come to the  conclusion  that  he  is
           doing the same work as another carpenter or craftsman in regular
           service. The quality of work which is produced may be  different
           and even the nature of work assigned may be different. It is not
           just a comparison of physical activity. The application  of  the
           principle of “equal pay for equal work”  requires  consideration
           of various dimensions of a given job. The accuracy required  and
           the dexterity that the job may entail may  differ  from  job  to
           job. It cannot be judged by the mere volume of work.  There  may
           be   qualitative   difference   as   regards   reliability   and
           responsibility.   Functions   may   be   the   same   but    the
           responsibilities  make  a   difference.   Thus,   normally   the
           applicability of this principle must be left to be evaluated and
           determined by an expert body. These are not matters where a writ
           court can lightly interfere. Normally a party claiming equal pay
           for equal work should be required to raise  a  dispute  in  this
           regard. In any event, the party who claims equal pay  for  equal
           work has to make necessary averments and prove that  all  things
           are equal. Thus, before any direction can be issued by a  court,
           the court must first see that there are necessary averments  and
           there is a proof.’*” (emphasis supplied)
      In our opinion, the aforesaid observations would be a complete  answer
      to all the submissions made by the appellant.”

For the above reasons, this Court  rejected  the  claim  of  the  appellant,
based on the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’.
24.   National Aluminum Company Limited v. Ananta Kishore Rout[18],  decided
by a two-Judge bench: The appellant in  the  above  matter,  i.e.,  National
Aluminum  Company  Limited  (hereinafter  referred   to   as,   NALCO)   had
established two schools.  In the first instance, NALCO itself  looked  after
the management of the said schools.  In 1985, it entered into  two  separate
but identical agreements with the Central  Chinmoy  Mission  Trust,  Bombay,
whereby the management of the schools was entrusted to the above trust.   In
1990, a similar agreement was entered into for the management of  the  above
two schools, with the Saraswati Vidya Mandir Society  (affiliated  to  Vidya
Bharati Akhila Bharatiya Shiksha Sansthan).  Accordingly, with  effect  from
1990, the said Society commenced to manage the affairs of the employees,  of
the above two schools.  Two writ petitions were filed by  the  employees  of
the two schools before the High  Court  of  Orissa  at  Cuttack,  seeking  a
mandamus, that they be declared as employees of NALCO,  and  be  treated  as
such, with the consequential prayer, that the employees of the  two  schools
be accorded suitable pay-scales, as were  admissible  to  the  employees  of
NALCO.  The High Court accepted the above prayers.  It is,  therefore,  that
NALCO approached this Court.
(ii)  In adjudicating  upon  the  above  matter,  this  Court  recorded  its
consideration as under:-
      “33.  Insofar as their service conditions are  concerned,  as  already
      conceded by even the respondents themselves, their salaries and  other
      perks which they are getting are better than their  counter  parts  in
      Government schools or aided/ unaided recognised schools in  the  State
      of Orissa. In a situation like this even if, for the sake of argument,
      it is presumed that NALCO is the employer  of  these  employees,  they
      would not be entitled to the pay  scales  which  are  given  to  other
      employees of NALCO as there cannot be any comparison between the  two.
      The principle of ‘‘equal pay for equal work’’ is not attracted at all.
      Those employees directly employed by NALCO are discharging  altogether
      different kinds of duties. Main activity of NALCO is  the  manufacture
      and  production  of  alumina  and  aluminium  for  which  it  has  its
      manufacturing units. The process and method of  recruitment  of  those
      employees, their eligibility conditions for appointment, nature of job
      done by those employees etc. is entirely different from the  employees
      of these schools. This aspect is squarely dealt with in the case of SC
      Chandra vs. State of Jharkhand, (2007) 8 SCC 279, where the  plea  for
      parity in employment was rejected thereby refusing to give  parity  in
      salary claim by school teachers with class working under Government of
      Jharkhand and BCCL. The discussion which ensued, while rejecting  such
      a claim, is recapitulated hereunder in the majority  opinion  authored
      by A.K. Mathur, J.: (SCC p. 289, paras 20-21)
           “20.  After going through the order of the Division Bench we are
           of opinion that the view taken by the Division Bench of the High
           Court is correct. Firstly, the school is not  being  managed  by
           BCCL as from the facts it is more than clear that BCCL was  only
           extending financial assistance from time to  time.  By  that  it
           cannot be saddled with the liability to pay  these  teachers  of
           the school as being paid to the clerks working with BCCL  or  in
           the Government of Jharkhand. It is essentially a school  managed
           by a body independent of the management of BCCL. Therefore, BCCL
           cannot be saddled with  the  responsibilities  of  granting  the
           teachers the salaries equated to that of the clerks  working  in
           BCCL.
           21.   Learned counsel for the appellants have relied on  Article
           39(d) of the Constitution. Article 39(d) does not mean that  all
           the teachers working in the school should be  equated  with  the
           clerks in BCCL or the Government of Jharkhand for application of
           the principle of equal pay for equal work. There should be total
           identity between both groups i.e. the teachers of the school  on
           the one hand and the clerks in BCCL, and as  such  the  teachers
           cannot be educated with the clerks of the State Government or of
           BCCL. The question  of  application  of  Article  39(d)  of  the
           Constitution has recently been  interpreted  by  this  Court  in
           State of Haryana v. Charanjit Singh, (2006) 9 SCC  321,  wherein
           Their Lordships have put the entire controversy to rest and held
           that the principle, 'equal pay for equal work' must satisfy  the
           test that the incumbents are performing equal and identical work
           as discharged  by  employees  against  whom  the  equal  pay  is
           claimed. Their Lordships have reviewed all the cases bearing  on
           the subject and after a detailed discussion have finally put the
           controversy to rest that the  persons  who  claimed  the  parity
           should satisfy the court that the conditions are  identical  and
           equal and same duties are being discharged  by  them.  Though  a
           number of cases were cited for our consideration but  no  useful
           purpose will be served as in Charanjit  Singh  all  these  cases
           have been reviewed by this Court. More so, when we have  already
           held that the appellants are not the employees of BCCL, there is
           no question seeking any parity of  the  pay  with  that  of  the
           clerks of BCCL.”

Based on the above consideration, this  Court  recorded  its  conclusion  as
follows:-


      “35.  We say at the cost of repetition that there is no parity in  the
      nature  of  work,  mode  of   appointment,   experience,   educational
      qualifications between the NALCO employees and the  employees  of  the
      two schools. In fact, such a comparison can be made with their counter
      parts in the Government schools and/or aided or  unaided  schools.  On
      that parameter, there cannot be any grievance of the  staff  which  is
      getting  better  emoluments  and   enjoying   far   superior   service
      conditions.”

It is, therefore apparent, that the principle of ‘equal pay for equal  work’
was held to be not applicable to the employees of the two schools, so as  to
enable them to claim parity, with the employees of NALCO.
25.   We shall now attempt an analysis of the  decisions  rendered  by  this
Court, wherein temporary employees (differently designated  as  work-charge,
daily-wage, casual, ad-hoc, contractual, and the like) raised  a  claim  for
being extended wages, equal to those being drawn by regular  employees,  and
the parameters determined by this Court, in furtherance  of  such  a  claim.
Insofar as the present controversy is concerned, the same  falls  under  the
present category.
26.   Dhirendra Chamoli v. State of U.P.[19], decided by a two-Judge  bench:
 Two Class-IV employees of the Nehru  Yuvak  Kendra,  Dehradun,  engaged  as
casual workers on daily-wage basis, claimed that they were  doing  the  same
work as Class-IV employees appointed  on  regular  basis.   The  reason  for
denying them the pay-scale extended to regular  employees  was,  that  there
was no sanctioned post to accommodate the  petitioners,  and  as  such,  the
assertion on behalf of the respondent-employer was, that they could  not  be
extended the benefits permissible to regular employees.  Furthermore,  their
claim was sought to be repudiated on the ground, that  the  petitioners  had
taken up their employment with the Nehru Yuvak Kendra  knowing  fully  well,
that they would be paid emoluments of casual workers engaged  on  daily-wage
basis, and therefore, they could not claim beyond what they had  voluntarily
accepted.
(ii)  This Court held, that it was not open to  the  Government  to  exploit
citizens,  specially  when  India  was  a  welfare  state,  committed  to  a
socialist pattern of society.  The argument raised  by  the  Government  was
found to be violative of the mandate of equality, enshrined  in  Article  14
of the Constitution.  This  Court  held  that  the  mandate  of  Article  14
ensured, that there would be equality before law  and  equal  protection  of
the law.  It was inferred therefrom, that  there  must  be  ‘equal  pay  for
equal work’.  Having found, that employees engaged by different Nehru  Yuvak
Kendras in the country were performing similar duties  as  regular  Class-IV
employees in its employment, it was  held,  that  they  must  get  the  same
salary and conditions of service as regular Class-IV  employees,  and  that,
it made no difference whether they were appointed  on  sanctioned  posts  or
not.  So long as they were performing the same  duties,  they  must  receive
the same salary.
27.   Surinder Singh v. Engineer-in-Chief, CPWD[20], decided by a  two-Judge
bench:  The petitioners in the instant case were  employed  by  the  Central
Public Works Department on daily-wage basis.  They demanded  the  same  wage
as was being paid to permanent employees,  doing  identical  work.   Herein,
the respondent-employer again contested the claim, by raising the plea  that
petitioners could not be employed on regular and permanent  basis  for  want
of permanent posts.  One of the objections raised to repudiate the claim  of
the petitioners was, that the doctrine of ‘equal pay for equal work’  was  a
mere abstract doctrine and was not capable of being enforced in law.
(ii)  The objection raised by the Government was  rejected.   It  was  held,
that all organs of the State were committed to the directive  principles  of
the State policy.  It  was  pointed  out,  that  Article  39  enshrined  the
principle of  ‘equal  pay  for  equal  work’,  and  accordingly  this  Court
concluded, that the principle of ‘equal pay  for  equal  work’  was  not  an
abstract doctrine.  It  was  held  to  be  a  vital  and  vigorous  doctrine
accepted throughout the world,  particularly  by  all  socialist  countries.
Referring to the decision rendered by this Court in the D.S.  Nakara  case2,
it was held, that the above proposition had been affirmed by a  Constitution
Bench of this Court.  It was held, that the Central  Government,  the  State
Governments and likewise, all public sector undertakings, were  expected  to
function like model and enlightened  employers  and  further,  the  argument
that the above principle was merely an abstract doctrine,  which  could  not
be enforced through a Court of law, could not be raised either by the  State
or by State undertakings.  The petitions were accordingly allowed,  and  the
Nehru  Yuvak  Kendras  were  directed  to  pay  all  daily-rated  employees,
salaries and allowances as were paid to regular employees, from the date  of
their engagement.
28.   Bhagwan Dass v. State of Haryana[21], decided by  a  two-Judge  bench:
The Education Department of the State of  Haryana,  was  pursuing  an  adult
education scheme, sponsored by the Government of India, under  the  National
Adult Education Scheme.  The object of the scheme was to provide  functional
literacy to illiterates, in the age group of 15 to 35, as  also,  to  impart
learning through special contract courses, to students in the age  group  of
6 to  15,  comprising  of  dropouts  from  schools.   The  petitioners  were
appointed as Supervisors.  They  were  paid  remuneration  at  the  rate  of
Rs.5,000/- per month, as fixed salary.  Prior to 7.3.1984,  they  were  paid
fixed salary and allowance, at the rate of Rs.60/- per  month.   Thereafter,
the fixed salary was  enhanced  to  Rs.150/-  per  month.   The  reason  for
allowing them fixed salary was, that they were required  to  work,  only  on
part-time basis.  The case set up by the  State  Government  was,  that  the
petitioners were not full-time employees;  their  mode  of  recruitment  was
different  from  Supervisors  engaged  on  regular  basis;  the  nature   of
functions discharged by  them,  was  not  similar  to  those  discharged  by
Supervisors engaged in the regular cadre; and their appointments  were  made
for a period of six months,  because  the  posts  against  which  they  were
appointed, were sanctioned for one year at a time.
(ii)  Having examined the controversy, this Court  rejected  all  the  above
submissions advanced on behalf of the State Government.  It was  held,  that
the  duties  discharged  by  the  petitioners  even  though  for  a  shorter
duration, were not any different from Supervisors, engaged  in  the  regular
cadre.  Even though recruitment of Supervisors  in  the  regular  cadre  was
made by the Subordinate  Selection  Board  by  way  of  an  open  selection,
whereas the petitioners were selected through  a  process  of  consideration
which was limited to a cluster of a few villages,  it  was  concluded  that,
that could not justify the denial  to  the  petitioners,  wages  which  were
being paid to Supervisors, working in the regular cadre.  It was held,  that
so long as the petitioners were doing work, which was similar  to  the  work
of Supervisors engaged in the  regular  cadre,  they  could  not  be  denied
parity in their wages.  Accordingly it was held, that  from  the  standpoint
of the doctrine of ‘equal pay for equal work’, the petitioners could not  be
discriminated against, in regard to pay-scales.  Having concluded  that  the
petitioners possess the essential qualification for appointment to the  post
of Supervisor, and further the duties discharged by  them  were  similar  to
those appointed on regular basis, it was held, that  the  petitioners  could
not be denied wages payable to regular employees.  This Court also  declined
the plea canvassed on behalf of the Government, that they were engaged in  a
temporary scheme against posts which were sanctioned on year to year  basis.
 On the instant aspect of the matter, it was held,  that  the  same  had  no
bearing to the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’.  It was  held,  that
the only relevant consideration  was,  whether  the  nature  of  duties  and
functions discharged and the work done was similar.  While concluding,  this
Court clarified that in the instant case,  it  was  dealing  with  temporary
employees engaged by the same employer, doing work of the  same  nature,  as
was being required of those engaged in  the  regular  cadre,  on  a  regular
basis.  It was held, that the petitioners, who  were  engaged  on  temporary
basis as Supervisors, were entitled to be paid on the  same  basis,  and  in
the  same  pay-scale,  at  which  those  employed  in  the   regular   cadre
discharging similar duties as Supervisors, were being paid.
29.   Daily Rated  Casual  Labour  Employed  under  P&T  Department  through
Bhartiya Dak Tar Mazdoor Manch v. Union of  India[22],  decided  by  a  two-
Judge bench:  The persons on whose behalf the Mazdoor Manch  had  approached
this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India,  were  working  as
daily-rated casual labourers, in the Posts and Telegraphs Department.   They
included three broad categories of workers, namely, unskilled,  semi-skilled
and skilled.  The unskilled labour  consisted  of  Safai  Workers,  Helpers,
Peons, and the like.  The unskilled labour was engaged in digging,  carrying
loads and other similar types of work.  The  semi-skilled  labour  consisted
of Carpenters, Wiremen, Draftsmen, A.C. Mechanics etc.  They needed to  have
technical experience, but  were  not  required  to  possess  any  degree  or
diploma qualification.  The skilled  labour  consisted  of  labourers  doing
technical work.  The skilled labourers were required  to  possess  technical
degree/diploma qualification.
(ii)  All the  three  categories  of  employees,  referred  to  above,  were
engaged as casual labourers.  They were being paid very  low  wages.   Their
wages were  far  less  than  the  salary  and  allowances  paid  to  regular
employees, of the Posts and Telegraphs  Department,  engaged  for  the  same
nature of work.  The Director General, Posts and Telegraphs  Department,  by
an  order  dated  15.5.1980  prescribed  the  following  wages  for   casual
labourers in the Department:-
      “(i)  Casual labour who has not completed 720 days  of  service  in  a
      period of three years at the rate of  240  days  per  annum  with  the
      Department as on April 1, 1980.
            No change.  They will continue to be paid at the approved  local
      rates.
      (ii)  Casual labour who having been working with the  Department  from
      April 1, 1977 or earlier and have completed 720 days of service as  on
      April 1, 1980.
            Daily wages equal to 75 per cent of 1/30th  of  the  minimum  of
      Group D Time Scale plus admissible DA.
      (iii) Casual labour who has been working in the Department from  April
      1, 1975 or earlier and has completed 1200 days of service as on  April
      1, 1980.
            Daily wages equal to 1/30th of the minimum of the Group  D  Time
      Scale plus 1/30th of the admissible DA.
      (iv)  All the casual labourers will, however, continue to be  employed
      on daily wages only.
      (v)   These orders for enhanced rates  for  category  (ii)  and  (iii)
      above will take effect from May 1, 1980.
      (vi)  A review will be carried out every year as on the first of April
      for making officials eligible for wages indicated in  paras  (ii)  and
      (iii) above.
      (vii) The above arrangement of enhanced rates of daily wages  will  be
      without prejudice to absorption of  casual  mazdoors  against  regular
      vacancies as and when they occur….”

Four years later, by an order dated 26.7.1984, the rate of wages payable  to
casual labourers in Posts and Telegraphs Department, was revised as under:-
      “(i)  Casual semi-skilled/skilled labour who  has  not  completed  720
      days of service over  a  period  of  three  years  or  more  with  the
      department.
            No change.  They will continue to be paid at the approved  local
      rates.
      (ii)  Casual semi-skilled/skilled labour who has completed 720 days of
      service over a period of three years or more.
            Daily wage equal to 75 per cent of 1/30th of the minimum of  the
      scale of semi-skilled (Rs.210-270) or skilled (Rs.260-350) as the case
      may be, plus admissible DA/ADA thereon.
      (iii) Casual labour who has completed 1200  days  of  service  over  a
      period of 5 years or more.
            Daily wage equal to 1/30th of the minimum of the  pay  scale  of
      semi-skilled (Rs.210-270) skilled (Rs.260-350) as  the  case  may  be,
      plus DA/ADA admissible thereon.
      (iv)   All  the  casual  semi-skilled/skilled  labour  will,   however
      continue to be employed on daily wages only.
      (v)   These orders for enhanced rates  for  category  (ii)  and  (iii)
      above will take effect from April 1, 1984.
      (vi)  A review for making further officials eligible  for  wages  vide
      (ii) and (iii) above will take effect as on first of April every year.
      (vii) If the rates calculated vide (ii) and (iii) above happen  to  be
      less than the approved local rates,  payment  shall  be  made  as  per
      approved local rates for above categories of labour.
      (viii)      The above arrangements of enhanced rates  of  daily  wages
      will be without prejudice to absorption of casual semi-skilled/skilled
      labour against regular vacancies as and when they occur…..”

(iii) Aggrieved  by  the  discrimination  made  against  them,  through  the
aforementioned orders dated  15.5.1980  and  26.7.1984,  the  Mazdoor  Manch
submitted a statement of demands, inter alia, claiming the same  salary  and
allowances and other benefits, as were being paid to regular  and  permanent
employees  of  the  Union  of  India,  in  the  corresponding  cadres.   The
aforesaid demands  were  departmentally  rejected  on  13.12.1985.   It  is,
therefore, that the petitioners approached this Court for the  redressal  of
their grievances.
(iv)  Before this Court the Union of India contended, that the employees  in
question belonged to the category of casual  labourers,  and  had  not  been
regularly employed.  As such, it was urged that they were  not  entitled  to
the same privileges, which were extended to regular employees.
(v)    This  Court  while  adjudicating  upon  the  controversy,  took  into
consideration the fact that, the employees in question  were  rendering  the
same kind of service which was being rendered  by  regular  employees.   The
submission advanced before this Court, on behalf of  the  casual  labourers,
was under Article 38(2) of the Constitution, which provides that “The  State
shall, in particular, strive to minimize the  inequalities  in  income,  and
endeavour   to   eliminate   inequalities   in   status,   facilities    and
opportunities, not only amongst  individuals  but  also  amongst  groups  of
people residing in different areas or engaged in different  vocations.”   It
was also urged on behalf of the employees, that the  State  could  not  deny
(at least) the minimum pay in the pay-scales of regularly employed  workmen,
even though the Government may not be compelled to extend all  the  benefits
enjoyed by regularly recruited employees.
(vi)  While adjudicating upon the  controversy,  this  Court  expressed  the
view, that the denial of wages claimed by the workers in question,  amounted
to exploitation of labour.  It was held, that  the  Government  cannot  take
advantage of its dominant position, and compel any worker to work even as  a
casual labourer on starvation wages.  It was  pointed  out,  that  a  casual
labourer who had agreed to work on such low wages, had done so,  because  he
had no other choice.  In the opinion of this Court,  it  was  poverty,  that
had driven the workers to accept such low wages.  In the above view  of  the
matter, in the facts and circumstances of the case,  this  Court  held  that
classification of employees into regularly recruited  employees  and  casual
employees for the purpose of paying less than the minimum  wage  payable  to
employees in the corresponding regular cadres, particularly  in  the  lowest
rung in the department,  where  the  pay-scales  were  the  least,  was  not
tenable.  This Court also held that the  classification  of  labourers  into
three categories (depicted in the  orders  dated  15.5.1980  and  26.7.1984,
extracted above) for the purpose of payment of  wages  at  different  rates,
was not tenable.  It was held, that such a classification was  violative  of
Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, besides being opposed to the  spirit
of Article 7 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and  Cultural
Rights, 1966, which exhorts all State  parties  to  ensure  fair  wages  and
equal wages for equal work.  Accordingly, this Court directed the  Union  of
India, and the other respondents, to pay wages  to  the  workmen,  who  were
engaged as casual labourers, belonging to  different  categories,  at  rates
equivalent to the minimum pay,  in  the  pay-scales  of  regularly  employed
workers, in the corresponding  cadres,  but  without  any  increments.   The
workers were also held to be entitled to  corresponding  dearness  allowance
and additional dearness allowance, if any, payable  thereon.   It  was  also
directed, that  whatever  other  benefits  were  being  extended  to  casual
labourers hitherto before, would be continued.
30.   Harbans Lal v. State of Himachal Pradesh[23], decided by  a  two-Judge
bench:  The petitioners in this case were Carpenters (1st  and  2nd  grade),
employed  at  the  Wood  Working  Centre  of  the  Himachal  Pradesh   State
Handicraft Corporation.  They were termed as daily-rated  employees.   Their
claim in their petition was for emoluments in terms of wages paid  to  their
counterparts in regular Government service, under the  principle  of  ‘equal
pay for equal work’.  On the factual matrix, based on the averments made  in
the  pleadings,  this  Court  felt  that  the  Corporation  with  which  the
petitioners were employed, had no  regularly  employed  Carpenter.   It  is,
therefore  evident,  that  the  claim  of  the  petitioners  was  only  with
reference to Carpenters engaged in different Government  services.   In  the
instant factual backdrop, this Court expressed  the  view,  that  the  claim
made by the petitioners could not be accepted,  because  the  discrimination
complained of, must be within the same  establishment,  owned  by  the  same
management.  It was emphasized, that a comparison  under  the  principle  of
‘equal pay for equal work’ could not be  made  with  counterparts  in  other
establishments, having a different management, or even  with  establishments
in different geographical locations, though owned by the  same  master.   It
was held, that unless it was shown, that there  was  discrimination  amongst
the same set of employees under the same master, in the same  establishment,
the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ would  not  be  applicable.   It
is, therefore, that the claim of the petitioners was rejected.
31.   Grih Kalyan Kendra Workers’ Union v. Union of  India6,  decided  by  a
two-Judge bench: The workers’ union  had  approached  this  Court,  for  the
first time, in 1984, by filing writ petition no.  13924  of  1984.   In  the
above petition, the relief claimed  was  for  payment  of  wages  under  the
principle of ‘equal pay for equal  work’.   The  petitioners  sought  parity
with employees  of  the  New  Delhi  Municipal  Committee,  and  also,  with
employees of other departments of the Delhi Administration,  and  the  Union
of India.  They approached this Court again by filing  civil  writ  petition
no. 869 of 1988, which was disposed of by the above cited case.
(ii)  The petitioners were employees of Grih Kalyan  Kendras.  They  desired
the Union of India, to pay them wages in  the  regular  pay-scales,  at  par
with other employees performing similar work, under the New Delhi  Municipal
Committee, or the Delhi Administration, or the Union of India.  It would  be
relevant to mention, that the petitioner- Workers’ Union,  was  representing
employees working on ad-hoc basis.  Some of them were  being  paid  a  fixed
salary (described as honorarium), while others were  working  on  piece-rate
wages at the production centres, without there being any provision  for  any
scale of pay, or other benefits like gratuity, pension, provident fund etc.
(iii) This Court, in the  first  instance,  endeavoured  to  deal  with  the
question, whether employers of these workers, were  denying  them  wages  as
were being paid to other similarly  placed  employees,  doing  the  same  or
similar work.  The question came to be examined  on  account  of  the  fact,
that unless the petitioners could demonstrate, that  the  employees  of  the
Grih Kalyan Kendras were being discriminated against, on the subject of  pay
and other emoluments, with other similarly placed employees,  the  principle
of ‘equal pay for equal work’ would not be applicable.   During  the  course
of the first adjudication, in writ petition no. 13924 of  1984,  this  Court
requested a former Chief Justice of  India  to  make  recommendations  after
taking  into  consideration,  firstly,  whether  other  similarly   situated
employees (engaged in similar comparable works, putting in comparable  hours
of work, in a comparable employment) were being paid higher pay, and if  so,
what should be the entitlement of  the  agitating  employees,  in  order  to
comply with the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’;  and  secondly,  if
there is no other similar comparable employment,  whether  the  remuneration
of the agitating employees deserved to be revised, on the ground that  their
remuneration was unconscionable or  unfair,  and  if  so,  to  what  extent.
Pursuant  to  the  above  request,  the  former  Chief  Justice  of   India,
concluded, that there was no employment comparable to  the  employment  held
by those engaged by the Grih Kalyan Kendras, and therefore, they  could  not
seek parity with employees, working either under  the  New  Delhi  Municipal
Committee, or the Delhi Administration, or the Union of India.
(iv)  Based on the aforesaid factual conclusion, this Court held,  that  the
concept of equality implies and requires equal treatment, for those who  are
situated equally.  Comparison between unequals is not possible.   Since  the
workers who had approached this Court had failed  to  establish,  that  they
were situated similarly as others,  they  could  not  be  extended  benefits
which were being given  to  those,  with  whom  they  claimed  parity.   And
therefore, since there were no other employees comparable to  the  employees
working in the Grih Kalyan Kendras, this Court  declined  to  entertain  the
prayer made by the petitioners.
32.   Ghaziabad Development Authority v. Vikram Chaudhary[24], decided by  a
two-Judge bench: The respondents in this case were engaged by the  Ghaziabad
Development Authority, on daily-wage basis.  The instant judgment  has  been
referred to only because it  was  cited  by  the  learned  counsel  for  the
appellants.  In the cited case, the claim raised by the respondents was  not
based on the principle of ‘equal pay  for  equal  work’,  yet  it  would  be
relevant to mention, that while disposing of the  appeal  preferred  by  the
Ghaziabad Development Authority, this Court held that the  respondents,  who
were engaged as temporary daily-wage employees, would  not  be  entitled  to
pay at par with regular employees, but would  be  entitled  to  pay  in  the
minimum wages prescribed under the statute, if any, or the prevailing  wages
as available in the locality.  It would, therefore, be improper  for  us  to
treat this judgment as laying down any principle emerging from  the  concept
of ‘equal pay for equal work’.
33.   State of Haryana v. Jasmer Singh[25], decided by  a  two-Judge  bench:
The respondents  were  employed  as  Mali-cum-Chowkidars/Pump  Operators  on
daily-wage basis, under the employment of the Government of  Haryana.   They
had approached the High Court claiming the same salary as was being paid  to
the regularly employed persons,  holding  similar  posts  in  the  State  of
Haryana.  The  instant  prayer  was  made  by  the  respondents,  under  the
principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’.   The  above  prayer  made  by  the
respondents, was granted by  the  High  Court.   The  High  Court  issued  a
direction to the State Government, to pay the respondents, the  same  salary
and allowances as were being  paid  to  regular  employees  holding  similar
posts, with effect from the dates on which the respondents were  engaged  by
the State Government.
(ii)  This Court held, that the respondents who were employed on  daily-wage
basis, could not be treated at par with persons employed on  regular  basis,
against similar posts.  It was concluded, that daily-rated workers were  not
required to possess the qualifications required  for  regular  workers,  nor
did they have to fulfill the postulated requirement of age, at the  time  of
recruitment.  Daily-rated workers, it was felt, were  not  selected  in  the
same manner as regular employees, inasmuch as, their selection  was  not  as
rigorous as that  of  employees  selected  on  regular  basis.   This  Court
expressed the view, that  there  were  also  other  provisions  relating  to
regular service, such as the liability of a member  of  the  service  to  be
transferred, and his being subjected to disciplinary jurisdiction.   It  was
pointed out, that daily-rated employees were not subjected to either of  the
aforesaid   contingencies/consequences.    In   view   of   the    aforesaid
consideration, this Court held that the respondents, who  were  employed  on
daily-wage basis, could not be equated with regular employees  for  purposes
of their wages, nor were they entitled to obtain the minimum of the  regular
pay-scale extended to regular employees.  This Court, however held, that  if
a minimum wage was prescribed for such workers,  the  respondents  would  be
entitled to it, if it was higher than the emoluments which were  being  paid
to them.
(iii) It would be relevant to mention that in the above decision this  Court
took notice of the  fact,  that  the  State  of  Haryana  had  taken  policy
decisions from time to time to regularize the  services  of  the  employees,
similarly  placed  as  the  respondents,  wherein  daily-wage  employees  on
completion of 3/5 years’  service,  were  entitled  to  regularization.   On
their being regularized, they were entitled  to  wages  payable  to  regular
employees.
34.   State of Punjab v. Devinder Singh[26], decided by a  two-Judge  bench:
The respondents were daily-wage Ledger-Keepers/Ledger Clerks engaged by  the
State of Punjab.  They approached the Punjab & Haryana High Court,  claiming
salary and allowances, as were  being  paid  to  regular  employees  holding
similar posts.  The High Court held in their favour, and directed the  State
Government to pay to the respondents, salary and allowances, as  were  being
paid to regular employees holding similar  posts.   The  aforesaid  decision
was rendered because the High Court accepted  their  contention,  that  they
were doing the same work as was  taken  from  regular  Ledger-Keepers/Ledger
Clerks.  Their prayer was  accordingly  accepted,  under  the  principle  of
‘equal pay for equal work’.
(ii)  This Court was of the view that the principle of ‘equal pay for  equal
work’ could enure to the benefit of the respondents to the  limited  extent,
that they could have been paid the  minimum  of  the  pay-scale  of  Ledger-
Keepers/Ledger Clerks, appointed on  regular  basis.   This  conclusion  was
drawn by applying the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’.  This  Court,
therefore, allowed the prayer made by the State Government to the  aforesaid
limited extent.  The right claimed by the respondents, to  be  paid  in  the
same time scale, as regularly  employed  Ledger-Keepers/Ledger  Clerks  were
being paid, was declined.
35.   State of Haryana v. Tilak  Raj[27],  decided  by  a  two-Judge  bench:
Thirty five respondents were appointed  at  different  points  of  time,  as
Helpers on daily-wages by the Haryana Roadways.  They filed a writ  petition
before the Punjab and Haryana High Court,  claiming  regularization  because
they had rendered long years of service.  They also claimed salary,  as  was
payable to regular employees, engaged for the same nature of  work,  as  was
being performed by them.  Even though, the High Court  did  not  accept  the
prayer made by the respondents, either for regularization or for payment  of
wages at par with regular employees, it directed the  State  of  Haryana  to
pay to the respondents, the minimum pay in the scale of  pay  applicable  to
regular employees.  The State  of  Haryana  being  aggrieved  by  the  order
passed by the High Court, approached this Court.
(ii)  While disposing of the appeal preferred by the State of Haryana,  this
Court accepted the contention advanced on its behalf, that a  scale  of  pay
is attached to a definite post.  This Court also  accepted,  that  a  daily-
wager holds no post.  In view of  the  above  factual/legal  position,  this
Court arrived at the conclusion, that the prayer  made  by  the  respondents
before the High Court, that they be granted emoluments in the  pay-scale  of
the regular employees, could not be  acceded  to.   Since  no  material  was
placed before the High Court, comparing  the  nature  of  duties  of  either
category, it was held, that it was not possible to hold that  the  principle
of ‘equal pay for equal work’ could be invoked by the respondents, to  claim
wages in the regular pay-scale.
(iii) Despite having found that the respondents were not eligible  to  claim
wages in the regular scale of pay, on account of the  fact  that  they  were
engaged on daily-wage basis, this Court directed the  State  of  Haryana  to
pay to the respondents, the minimum wages as prescribed for such workers.
36.   Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi[28], decided by a  five-Judge
Constitution  Bench:   Needless  to  mention,  that  the  main   proposition
canvassed  in  the  instant  judgment,  pertained   to   regularization   of
government servants, based on the employees having rendered  long  years  of
service, as temporary, contractual, casual, daily-wage or on  ad-hoc  basis.
It is, however relevant to mention, that the Constitution Bench did  examine
the question of wages, which such  employees  were  entitled  to  draw.   In
paragraph 8 of the judgment, a reference was made to civil appeal nos. 3595-
612 of 1999, wherein, the respondent-employees were temporarily  engaged  on
daily-wages in the  Commercial  Taxes  Department.   As  they  had  rendered
service for more than 10 years, they claimed  permanent  employment  in  the
department.   They  also  claimed  benefits  as  were  extended  to  regular
employees of their  cadre,  including  wages  (equal  to  their  salary  and
allowances) with effect from the  dates  from  which  they  were  appointed.
Even though  the  administrative  tribunal  had  rejected  their  claim,  by
returning a finding, that they had not  made  out  a  case  for  payment  of
wages, equal to those engaged on regular basis, the  High  Court  held  that
they were entitled to wages, equal to the salary  of  regular  employees  of
their cadre, with effect from the date from which they were appointed.   The
direction issued by the High Court  resulted  in  payment  of  higher  wages
retrospectively, for a period of 10  and  more  years.   It  would  also  be
relevant to mention, that in passing the above  direction,  the  High  Court
had relied on the decision rendered by a three-Judge bench of this Court  in
Dharwad District PWD Literate Daily-Wage Employees Association v.  State  of
Karnataka[29].  The Constitution Bench, having noticed  the  contentions  of
the rival  parties,  on  the  subject  of  wages  payable  to  daily-wagers,
recorded its conclusions as under:-
      “55.  In cases relating to service in the commercial taxes department,
      the High Court has directed that those engaged on daily wages, be paid
      wages equal to the salary and allowances that are being  paid  to  the
      regular employees of their cadre in government  service,  with  effect
      from the dates  from  which  they  were  respectively  appointed.  The
      objection taken was to the direction for payment  from  the  dates  of
      engagement. We find that the High Court  had  clearly  gone  wrong  in
      directing that these employees be paid salary equal to the salary  and
      allowances that are being paid to the regular employees of their cadre
      in government service, with effect from the dates from which they were
      respectively engaged or appointed. It was not open to the  High  Court
      to impose such an obligation on  the  State  when  the  very  question
      before the High Court in the case was  whether  these  employees  were
      entitled to have equal pay for equal work so called and were  entitled
      to any other benefit. They had also  been  engaged  in  the  teeth  of
      directions not to do so. We are, therefore, of the view that, at best,
      the Division Bench of the High Court should have directed  that  wages
      equal to the salary that is being paid to regular employees be paid to
      these daily-wage employees with effect from the date of its  judgment.
      Hence, that part of the direction of the Division  Bench  is  modified
      and it is directed that these daily-wage earners be paid  wages  equal
      to the salary at the lowest grade of employees of their cadre  in  the
      Commercial Taxes Department in government service, from  the  date  of
      the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court. Since, they  are
      only  daily-wage  earners,  there  would  be  no  question  of   other
      allowances being paid to them. In view of our conclusion, that  Courts
      are not expected to issue directions for making such persons permanent
      in service, we set aside that part of the direction of the High  Court
      directing the Government to consider their cases  for  regularization.
      We also notice that the High Court has not adverted to the  aspect  as
      to whether it was regularization or it was giving permanency that  was
      being directed by the High Court. In such a situation,  the  direction
      in that regard will stand deleted and the appeals filed by  the  State
      would stand allowed to that extent. If  sanctioned  posts  are  vacant
      (they are said to be vacant) the State will take immediate  steps  for
      filling those posts by  a  regular  process  of  selection.  But  when
      regular recruitment is undertaken, the respondents in C.A. Nos.  3595-
      3612 and those in the Commercial Taxes Department similarly  situated,
      will be allowed to compete, waiving the age  restriction  imposed  for
      the recruitment and  giving  some  weightage  for  their  having  been
      engaged for work in the Department for a significant period  of  time.
      That would be the extent of  the  exercise  of  power  by  this  Court
      under Article 142 of the Constitution to do justice to them.”

We have extracted the aforesaid paragraph, so as not to make  any  inference
on our own, but to project the determination rendered  by  the  Constitution
Bench, as was expressed by the Bench.  We have no hesitation in  concluding,
that the Constitution Bench  consciously  distinguished  the  issue  of  pay
parity, from the issue of  absorption/regularization  in  service.   It  was
held, that on the issue  of  pay  parity,  the  High  Court  ought  to  have
directed, that the daily-wage workers be paid wages equal to the  salary  at
the lowest grade of their  cadre.   The  Constitution  Bench  expressed  the
view, that the concept of equality would not be applicable to the  issue  of
absorption/regularization in service.  And conversely,  on  the  subject  of
pay parity, it was unambiguously held, that  daily-wage  earners  should  be
paid  wages  equal  to  the  salary  at  the  lowest  grade   (without   any
allowances).
37.   State of Haryana v. Charanjit  Singh[30],  decided  by  a  three-Judge
bench: A large number of civil appeals were collectively disposed  of  by  a
common order.  In all these appeals, the respondents were daily-wagers,  who
were appointed as Ledger Clerks, Ledger Keepers, Pump  Operators,  Mali-cum-
Chowkidar, Fitters, Petrol Men, Surveyors, etc.  All  of  them  claimed  the
minimum wages payable under  the  pay-scale  extended  to  regular  Class-IV
employees.  The above relief was claimed with effect from the date of  their
initial appointment.  It would  be  relevant  to  mention,  that  while  the
appeals disposed of by the common order were pending before this Court,  all
the respondents were regularized.  From the date  of  their  regularization,
they were in any case,  being  paid  salary  in  the  scales  applicable  to
regular  Class-IV  employees.   The  limited  question  which  came  up  for
adjudication before this Court in the matters was,  whether  the  directions
issued by the High Court to pay the minimum wage in  the  scale  payable  to
Class-IV employees to the respondents, from the date  of  their  filing  the
respective petition before the High Court, was  required  to  be  interfered
with.  While adjudicating upon the aforesaid  issue,  this  Court  made  the
following observations:-
      “19.  Having considered the authorities and the submissions we are  of
      the view that the authorities in the cases  of  State  of  Haryana  v.
      Jasmer Singh, (1996) 11 SCC 77, State of Haryana v. Tilak Raj,  (2003)
      6 SCC 123, Orissa University of Agriculture & Technology v.  Manoj  K.
      Mohanty, (2003) 5 SCC 188, Govt. of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy, (2004) 1 SCC
      347, lay down the correct law. Undoubtedly, the doctrine of "equal pay
      for equal work" is not an abstract doctrine and is  capable  of  being
      enforced in a Court of law. But equal pay must be for  equal  work  of
      equal value. The principle of  "equal  pay  for  equal  work"  has  no
      mechanical application in every  case. Article  14 permits  reasonable
      classification  based  on  qualities  or  characteristics  of  persons
      recruited and grouped together, as against those who were left out. Of
      course, the  qualities  or  characteristics  must  have  a  reasonable
      relation to the object sought to  be  achieved.  In  service  matters,
      merit or experience can be a proper basis for classification  for  the
      purposes of pay in order to promote efficiency  in  administration.  A
      higher pay scale to avoid stagnation or resultant frustration for lack
      of  promotional  avenues  is  also  an  acceptable  reason   for   pay
      differentiation. The very fact that the person has  not  gone  through
      the process of recruitment  may  itself,  in  certain  cases,  make  a
      difference. If the educational qualifications are different, then also
      the doctrine may have no application. Even though persons may  do  the
      same work, their  quality  of  work  may  differ.  Where  persons  are
      selected by a Selection Committee on  the  basis  of  merit  with  due
      regard to seniority a higher pay scale granted to such persons who are
      evaluated  by  the  competent  authority  cannot  be   challenged.   A
      classification  based  on  difference  in  educational  qualifications
      justifies a difference in pay scales. A mere nomenclature  designating
      a person as say a carpenter or a craftsman is not enough  to  come  to
      the conclusion that he is doing the same work as another carpenter  or
      craftsman in regular service. The quality of work  which  is  produced
      may be  different  and  even  the  nature  of  work  assigned  may  be
      different. It is not just  a  comparison  of  physical  activity.  The
      application of the principle of "equal pay for  equal  work"  requires
      consideration of various dimensions  of  a  given  job.  The  accuracy
      required and the dexterity that the job may entail may differ from job
      to job. It cannot be judged by the mere volume of work. There  may  be
      qualitative difference  as  regards  reliability  and  responsibility.
      Functions may be the same but the responsibilities make a  difference.
      Thus normally the applicability of this principle must be left  to  be
      evaluated and determined by an expert  body.  These  are  not  matters
      where a writ court can lightly interfere. Normally  a  party  claiming
      equal pay for equal work should be required to raise a dispute in this
      regards. In any event the party who claims equal pay  for  equal  work
      has to make necessary averments and prove that all things  are  equal.
      Thus, before any direction can be issued by a Court,  the  Court  must
      first see that there are necessary averments and there is a proof.  If
      the High Court, is on basis of material placed  before  it,  convinced
      that there was equal work of equal  quality  and  all  other  relevant
      factors are fulfilled it may direct payment of equal pay from the date
      of the filing of the respective Writ Petition. In all these cases,  we
      find that the High Court has blindly proceeded on the basis  that  the
      doctrine of equal pay for equal work  applies  without  examining  any
      relevant factors.”

Having made the above observations,  the  judgments  rendered  by  the  High
Court were set aside, and the matters were remanded back to the High  Court,
to examine each case in order to  determine  whether  the  respondents  were
discharging the same duties and  responsibilities,  as  the  employees  with
whom they claimed parity.   In  sum  and  substance  therefore,  this  Court
acceded to the proposition that daily-wagers who  were  rendering  the  same
duties and responsibilities as regular employees, would be entitled  to  the
minimum wage in the pay-scale payable to  regular  employees.   It  is  only
because the said factual determination had not been  rendered  by  the  High
Court, the matter was remanded back, for a fresh adjudication on  the  above
limited issue.
38.   State of U.P. v. Putti Lal[31], decided by a three-Judge  bench:   The
question which arose for adjudication was, whether the respondents who  were
daily-rated  wage  earners  in  the  Forest  Department,  were  entitled  to
regularization, and should be paid the  minimum  of  the  pay-scale  as  was
payable  to  a  regular  worker,  holding  a  corresponding  post   in   the
Government.  On the above issue, this Court in the above judgment,  recorded
the following conclusion:-
      “5.   In several cases this Court applying the principle of equal  pay
      for equal work has held that a daily-wager, if he is  discharging  the
      similar duties as those in the regular employment of  the  Government,
      should at least be entitled to receive the minimum of  the  pay  scale
      though he might  not  be  entitled  to  any  increment  or  any  other
      allowance that is permissible to his counterpart  in  the  Government.
      In our opinion that would be the correct position and  we,  therefore,
      direct that these daily-wagers  would  be  entitled  to  draw  at  the
      minimum of the pay scale being received by their counterparts  in  the
      Government and would not  be  entitled  to  any  other  allowances  or
      increment so long as they continue as daily-wagers.  The  question  of
      their regular absorption will obviously be dealt  with  in  accordance
      with the statutory rules already referred to.”

It is therefore apparent, that in  the  instant  judgment,  the  three-Judge
bench extended the benefit of the principle of ‘equal pay  for  equal  work’
to persons engaged on daily-wage basis.
39.   State of Punjab v. Surjit Singh[32], decided  by  a  two-Judge  bench:
The respondents in the above mentioned matter, were appointed  in  different
posts in the Public Health Department of the State of Punjab.  All  of  them
were admittedly appointed on daily-wage  basis.   Inter  alia,  because  the
respondent-employees had put in a number of  years  of  service,  they  were
held by the High Court to be entitled to the benefit  of  the  principle  of
‘equal pay for equal work’.  In the challenge raised before this  Court,  it
was concluded as under:-
      “36.  With utmost respect, the principle, as  indicated  hereinbefore,
      has undergone a sea change.  We are bound by the decisions  of  larger
      Benches.  This Court had been insisting on strict pleadings and  proof
      of various factors as indicated heretobefore.  Furthermore, the burden
      of proof even in that case had wrongly been placed on the State  which
      in fact lay on the writ petitioners claiming  similar  benefits.   The
      factual  matrix  obtaining  in  the  said  case  particularly  similar
      qualification, interchangeability of the positions within the  regular
      employees and the casual employees and other  relevant  factors  which
      have been noticed by us also had some role to play.”

Rather than determining whether or not the respondents were entitled to  any
benefit under the principle of ‘equal pay for equal  work’,  on  account  of
their satisfying the  conditions  stipulated  by  this  Court  in  different
judgments including the one in State of Haryana v. Charanjit  Singh30,  this
Court while disposing of the above matter, required  the  State  to  examine
the cases of the respondents by appointing an expert committee, which  would
determine whether or not the parameters laid down in the judgments  rendered
by this Court, would entitle the respondent-employees to any  benefit  under
the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’.  Herein  again,  the  principle
in question, was considered as applicable to temporary employees.
40.    Uttar  Pradesh  Land  Development  Corporation  v.  Mohd.   Khursheed
Anwar[33],  decided  by  a  two-Judge  bench:   In  the  instant  case,  the
respondents were employed on  contract  basis,  on  a  consolidated  monthly
salary of Rs.2000/-.  Prior to their appointment, they were  interviewed  by
a selection committee alongwith other eligible candidates,  and  were  found
to be suitable for the job.  Their  contractual  appointment  was  continued
from time to time.  Though they were employed on contract  basis,  the  fact
that two posts of Assistant Engineer and one post of  Junior  Engineer  were
vacant at the time of their engagement, was not disputed.   The  respondents
were not given any specific designation.  The Allahabad  High  Court,  while
accepting the claim filed by the respondents, held that they  were  entitled
to wages in the regular pay-scale of Rs.2200-4000, prescribed for  the  post
of Assistant Engineer.
(ii)  This Court, while adjudicating upon the  controversy  arrived  at  the
conclusion, that the High Court had granted relief  to  the  respondents  on
the assumption that two vacant posts of  Assistant  Engineer  were  utilized
for appointing the respondents.  The above impression was found  to  be  ex-
facie fallacious, by this Court.  This Court  was  of  the  view,  that  the
orders of appointment issued  to  the  respondents,  did  not  lead  to  the
inference, that  they  were  appointed  against  the  two  vacant  posts  of
Assistant Engineer.  Despite the above, this Court held, that  the  decision
of the appellant Corporation to effect economy by depriving the  respondents
even, the minimum of  pay-scale,  was  totally  arbitrary  and  unjustified.
This Court expressed the view, that the very fact that the respondents  were
engaged on a consolidated salary of Rs.2000 per month, while the  prescribed
pay-scale of the post of  Assistant  Engineer  in  the  other  branches  was
Rs.2200-4000, and that of Junior Engineer was Rs.1600-2660,  was  sufficient
to infer, that both the respondents were engaged to work against  the  posts
of Assistant Engineer.  The appellants were directed to  pay  emoluments  to
the respondents, at the minimum of the pay-scale, prescribed  for  the  post
of Assistant Engineer (as revised from time  to  time),  from  the  date  of
their  appointment,  till  they  continued  in   the   employment   of   the
Corporation.
41.   Surendra Nath Pandey  v.  Uttar  Pradesh  Cooperative  Bank  Ltd.[34],
decided by a two-Judge bench:  The appellants in the above  mentioned  case,
were appointed during  1978  to  1981  on  daily-wage  basis,  by  the  U.P.
Cooperative Bank Ltd.  Upto 30.6.1981, they  were  paid  daily-wages.   From
1.7.1981, they were paid consolidated salary of Rs.368 per month, which  was
increased to Rs.575 per month with effect  from  1.4.1982.   From  1.7.1983,
they were extended the benefit of minimum in  the  pay-scale  applicable  to
regular employees, with allowances, but without  yearly  increments.   Based
on regulations framed for regularization of ad-hoc appointees in  1985,  the
appellants were regularized from different  dates  in  1985-86,  whereafter,
they were paid wages in the regular  pay-scale,  with  all  allowances.   In
1990, they approached the Allahabad High Court, seeking benefit  of  regular
pay-scale, allowances and other benefits, which  were  extended  to  regular
employees, with effect from the date of their original  appointment.   Their
claim was rejected by the High Court.  While adjudicating  upon  the  appeal
preferred by the appellants, this Court held as under:-
      “9.    We are of the view that the  real  issue  is  whether  persons
      employed on stopgap or ad hoc basis were entitled to  the  benefit  of
      pay scales with increments during the period of service  on  daily  or
      stopgap or ad hoc basis.  Unless the appellants are able to  establish
      that either under  the  contract,  or  applicable  rules,  or  settled
      principles of service jurisprudence, they are entitled to the  benefit
      of pay scale with increments during the period of their stopgap/ad hoc
      service, it cannot be said that the appellants have the right to claim
      the benefit of pay scales with increments.”


The Consideration
42.   All the judgments noticed in paragraphs 7 to 24  hereinabove,  pertain
to employees engaged on regular  basis,  who  were  claiming  higher  wages,
under the principle of ‘equal pay for equal  work’.   The  claim  raised  by
such  employees  was  premised  on  the  ground,   that   the   duties   and
responsibilities rendered by them, were against the same post  for  which  a
higher pay-scale was being allowed, in  other  Government  departments.   Or
alternatively, their duties and responsibilities were the same, as of  other
posts with different designations, but they were placed in  a  lower  scale.
Having been painstakingly taken through the parameters  laid  down  by  this
Court, wherein the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ was  invoked  and
considered, it would be just and appropriate, to  delineate  the  parameters
laid down by this Court.  In recording the said  parameters,  we  have  also
adverted to some other judgments pertaining  to  temporary  employees  (also
dealt with, in the instant judgment),  wherein  also,  this  Court  had  the
occasion to express the legal position with reference to  the  principle  of
‘equal pay for equal work’.  Our consideration, has led us to the  following
deductions:-
(i)   The ‘onus of proof’, of parity in the duties and  responsibilities  of
the subject post with the reference post, under the principle of ‘equal  pay
for equal work’, lies on the person who claims it.  He  who  approaches  the
Court has to establish, that the subject post occupied by him, requires  him
to discharge equal work of equal value, as the reference  post  (see  –  the
Orissa University  of  Agriculture  &  Technology  case10,  Union  Territory
Administration, Chandigarh v. Manju Mathur15, the Steel Authority  of  India
Limited case16, and the National Aluminum Company Limited case18).
(ii)  The mere fact that the subject post occupied by the claimant, is in  a
“different department” vis-a-vis the  reference  post,  does  not  have  any
bearing on the determination of a claim, under the principle of  ‘equal  pay
for equal work’.  Persons discharging identical duties,  cannot  be  treated
differently, in the matter of their  pay,  merely  because  they  belong  to
different departments of Government (see – the Randhir Singh case1, and  the
D.S. Nakara case2).
(iii) The principle of ‘equal pay for  equal  work’,  applies  to  cases  of
unequal  scales  of  pay,  based  on   no   classification   or   irrational
classification (see  –  the  Randhir  Singh  case1).   For  equal  pay,  the
concerned employees with whom  equation  is  sought,  should  be  performing
work, which besides being functionally equal, should be of the same  quality
and sensitivity (see – the Federation  of  All  India  Customs  and  Central
Excise Stenographers (Recognized) case3, the Mewa  Ram  Kanojia  case5,  the
Grih Kalyan Kendra Workers’ Union case6 and the S.C. Chandra case12).
(iv)  Persons holding the same rank/designation (in different  departments),
but having dissimilar powers, duties and responsibilities, can be placed  in
different scales of pay, and cannot claim the benefit of  the  principle  of
‘equal pay for equal work’ (see – the Randhir Singh case1, State of  Haryana
v. Haryana Civil Secretariat Personal  Staff  Association9,  and  the  Hukum
Chand Gupta case17).  Therefore, the principle would  not  be  automatically
invoked, merely because the  subject  and  reference  posts  have  the  same
nomenclature.
(v)   In determining equality of functions and responsibilities,  under  the
principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’, it is necessary to  keep  in  mind,
that the duties of the two posts should be of equal sensitivity,  and  also,
qualitatively  similar.   Differentiation  of  pay-scales  for  posts   with
difference in degree of  responsibility,  reliability  and  confidentiality,
would fall within the realm of  valid  classification,  and  therefore,  pay
differentiation would be legitimate and permissible (see  –  the  Federation
of All India Customs and Central  Excise  Stenographers  (Recognized)  case3
and the State Bank of India case8).  The nature of work of the subject  post
should be the same and not less onerous than the reference post.   Even  the
volume  of  work  should  be  the  same.   And  so  also,   the   level   of
responsibility.  If these parameters are not met, parity cannot  be  claimed
under the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ (see - State  of  U.P.  v.
J.P. Chaurasia4, and the Grih Kalyan Kendra Workers’ Union case6).
(vi)  For placement in a  regular  pay-scale,  the  claimant  has  to  be  a
regular appointee.  The claimant should have been selected, on the basis  of
a regular process of recruitment.  An  employee  appointed  on  a  temporary
basis, cannot claim to be placed in the regular pay-scale (see – the  Orissa
University of Agriculture & Technology case10).
(vii)  Persons  performing  the  same  or  similar  functions,  duties   and
responsibilities, can also be placed in different  pay-scales.   Such  as  -
‘selection grade’, in the same post.  But this difference  must  emerge  out
of a legitimate foundation, such as – merit, or  seniority,  or  some  other
relevant criteria (see - State of U.P. v. J.P. Chaurasia4).
(viii)      If the qualifications for recruitment to the subject post vis-a-
vis the reference post are different, it may be difficult to conclude,  that
the duties and responsibilities of the posts are  qualitatively  similar  or
comparable (see – the Mewa Ram Kanojia case5,  and  Government  of  W.B.  v.
Tarun K. Roy11).  In such a cause, the principle of  ‘equal  pay  for  equal
work’, cannot be invoked.
(ix)  The reference post, with which parity is claimed, under the  principle
of ‘equal pay for equal work’, has to  be  at  the  same  hierarchy  in  the
service, as the subject post.  Pay-scales of posts may be different, if  the
hierarchy of the posts in question, and their  channels  of  promotion,  are
different.  Even if the duties and responsibilities are same,  parity  would
not be permissible, as against a superior post, such as a  promotional  post
(see - Union of India v. Pradip  Kumar  Dey7,  and  the  Hukum  Chand  Gupta
case17).
(x)   A comparison between the subject post and the  reference  post,  under
the principle of ‘equal pay for equal  work’,  cannot  be  made,  where  the
subject post and the reference post are in different establishments,  having
a different management.  Or even, where the establishments are in  different
geographical locations, though owned by the same master (see –  the  Harbans
Lal case23).  Persons engaged differently, and being paid out  of  different
funds, would not be entitled to pay parity (see  -  Official  Liquidator  v.
Dayanand13).
(xi)  Different pay-scales, in certain eventualities, would  be  permissible
even for posts clubbed together at the same hierarchy in the cadre.  As  for
instance, if the duties and responsibilities of one of the  posts  are  more
onerous, or are exposed to  higher  nature  of  operational  work/risk,  the
principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ would not be applicable.   And  also
when, the  reference  post  includes  the  responsibility  to  take  crucial
decisions, and that is not so for the subject post (see – the State Bank  of
India case8).
(xii) The priority given to different types of posts, under  the  prevailing
policies of the Government, can  also  be  a  relevant  factor  for  placing
different posts under different pay-scales.  Herein also, the  principle  of
‘equal pay for equal work’ would not be applicable (see - State  of  Haryana
v. Haryana Civil Secretariat Personal Staff Association9).
(xiii)      The parity in pay, under the principle of ‘equal pay  for  equal
work’, cannot be claimed, merely on the ground, that at an earlier point  of
time, the subject post and the reference post, were placed in the same  pay-
scale.  The principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ is applicable only  when
it is shown, that the incumbents of  the  subject  post  and  the  reference
post, discharge similar duties and responsibilities (see  -  State  of  West
Bengal v. West Bengal Minimum Wages Inspectors Association14).
(xiv) For parity in pay-scales, under the principle of ‘equal pay for  equal
work’, equation in the nature of duties, is  of  paramount  importance.   If
the principal nature of duties of one post is teaching, whereas that of  the
other is non-teaching, the  principle  would  not  be  applicable.   If  the
dominant nature of duties of one post is of control and management,  whereas
the subject post has no such duties, the principle would not be  applicable.
 Likewise, if the central nature  of  duties  of  one  post  is  of  quality
control, whereas the subject post has minimal  duties  of  quality  control,
the  principle  would   not   be   applicable   (see   -   Union   Territory
Administration, Chandigarh v. Manju Mathur15).
(xv)  There can be a valid  classification  in  the  matter  of  pay-scales,
between employees even  holding  posts  with  the  same  nomenclature  i.e.,
between those discharging duties at the headquarters, and others working  at
the institutional/sub-office level (see – the  Hukum  Chand  Gupta  case17),
when the duties are qualitatively dissimilar.
(xvi) The principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ would not  be  applicable,
where a differential higher pay-scale is  extended  to  persons  discharging
the same duties and holding the same  designation,  with  the  objective  of
ameliorating stagnation, or on account of lack of promotional  avenues  (see
– the Hukum Chand Gupta case17).
(xvii)      Where there is no comparison between one  set  of  employees  of
one organization, and another set of employees of a different  organization,
there can be no question of equation of pay-scales, under the  principle  of
‘equal pay for  equal  work’,  even  if  two  organizations  have  a  common
employer.  Likewise, if the management and control of two organizations,  is
with  different  entities,  which  are  independent  of  one  another,   the
principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ would not  apply  (see  –  the  S.C.
Chandra case12, and the National Aluminum Company Limited case18).
43.   We shall now venture to summarize the  conclusions  recorded  by  this
Court, with reference  to  a  claim  of  pay  parity,  raised  by  temporary
employees (differently designated as work-charge,  daily-wage,  casual,  ad-
hoc, contractual, and the like), in the following two paragraphs.
44.   We shall first outline the conclusions drawn in cases  where  a  claim
for pay parity, raised at the hands of the  concerned  temporary  employees,
was accepted by this Court, by applying the  principle  of  ‘equal  pay  for
equal work’, with reference to regular employees:-
(i)   In the Dhirendra Chamoli case19 this Court examined a  claim  for  pay
parity raised by  temporary  employees,  for  wages  equal  to  those  being
disbursed to regular employees.  The prayer was  accepted.   The  action  of
not paying the same wage, despite the work being the  same,  was  considered
as violative of Article 14 of the  Constitution.   It  was  held,  that  the
action amounted to  exploitation  –  in  a  welfare  state  committed  to  a
socialist pattern of society.
(ii)  In the Surinder Singh case20 this Court held, that the right of  equal
wages claimed by temporary employees emerged, inter alia,  from  Article  39
of the Constitution.  The principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ was  again
applied, where the subject employee had been appointed on  temporary  basis,
and the reference employee was borne on the  permanent  establishment.   The
temporary employee was held entitled to wages drawn by an  employee  on  the
regular establishment.  In this judgment, this Court also took note  of  the
fact, that the above proposition was affirmed by  a  Constitution  Bench  of
this Court, in the D.S. Nakara case2.
(iii) In the Bhagwan Dass case21 this Court recorded, that in  a  claim  for
equal wages, the duration for which an  employee  would  remain  (-  or  had
remained) engaged, would not make any difference.  So also,  the  manner  of
selection and appointment would make no difference.  And therefore,  whether
the selection was made on the basis of open competition or was limited to  a
cluster  of  villages,  was  considered  inconsequential,  insofar  as   the
applicability of the principle is  concerned.   And  likewise,  whether  the
appointment was for a fixed limited duration (six months, or one  year),  or
for an unlimited duration, was also considered inconsequential,  insofar  as
the applicability of  the  principle  of  ‘equal  pay  for  equal  work’  is
concerned.   It  was  held,  that  the  claim  for  equal  wages  would   be
sustainable, where an employee is required to discharge similar  duties  and
responsibilities as regular employees, and the concerned employee  possesses
the qualifications prescribed for the post.  In the above case,  this  Court
rejected the contention advanced on behalf of the Government, that the  plea
of equal wages by the employees in question,  was  not  sustainable  because
the concerned employees were engaged in  a  temporary  scheme,  and  against
posts which were sanctioned on a year to year basis.
(iv)  In the  Daily  Rated  Casual  Labour  Employed  under  P&T  Department
through Bhartiya Dak Tar Mazdoor Manch case22 this Court  held,  that  under
principle flowing from Article 38(2) of the Constitution,  Government  could
not deny a temporary employee, at least the minimum wage being  paid  to  an
employee in the corresponding regular cadre,  alongwith  dearness  allowance
and additional dearness allowance, as well as, all the other benefits  which
were being  extended  to  casual  workers.   It  was  also  held,  that  the
classification of workers (as unskilled, semi-skilled  and  skilled),  doing
the same work, into different categories, for payment of wages at  different
rates, was not tenable.  It was also held, that such an act of an  employer,
would  amount  to  exploitation.   And  further  that,  the  same  would  be
arbitrary and discriminatory, and therefore, violative of  Articles  14  and
16 of the Constitution.
(v)   In State of Punjab v. Devinder Singh26 this Court  held,  that  daily-
wagers were entitled to be  placed  in  the  minimum  of  the  pay-scale  of
regular employees, working against the same post.  The above  direction  was
issued after accepting, that the concerned employees, were  doing  the  same
work as regular incumbents holding the same post, by applying the  principle
of ‘equal pay for equal work’.
(vi)  In the Secretary, State of Karnataka case28, a Constitution  Bench  of
this Court, set aside the judgment of the  High  Court,  and  directed  that
daily-wagers be paid  salary  equal  to  the  lowest  grade  of  salary  and
allowances being paid to regular  employees.   Importantly,  in  this  case,
this Court  made  a  very  important  distinction  between  pay  parity  and
regularization.  It was held that the  concept  of  equality  would  not  be
applicable to issues of absorption/regularization.   But,  the  concept  was
held as applicable, and was indeed applied, to the issue of pay parity –  if
the work component was the same.  The judgment rendered by the  High  Court,
was modified by this Court, and  the  concerned  daily-wage  employees  were
directed to be paid wages, equal to the salary at the lowest  grade  of  the
concerned cadre.
(vii) In State of Haryana v. Charanjit Singh30, a three-Judge bench of  this
Court held, that the decisions rendered by this Court in  State  of  Haryana
v. Jasmer Singh25, State of Haryana v. Tilak Raj27,  the  Orissa  University
of Agriculture & Technology case10, and  Government  of  W.B.  v.  Tarun  K.
Roy11, laid down the correct law.  Thereupon, this Court declared,  that  if
the  concerned  daily-wage  employees  could  establish,  that   they   were
performing equal work of equal quality, and all other relevant factors  were
fulfilled, a direction by a Court to pay such employees  equal  wages  (from
the date of filing the writ petition), would be justified.
(viii)      In State of U.P. v. Putti Lal31, based on decisions  in  several
cases (wherein the  principle  of  ‘equal  pay  for  equal  work’  had  been
invoked), it was held, that a daily-wager  discharging  similar  duties,  as
those engaged on regular basis, would be entitled to draw his wages  at  the
minimum of the pay-scale (drawn by his  counterpart,  appointed  on  regular
basis), but would not be entitled to any other allowances or increments.
(ix)  In the Uttar Pradesh Land Development Corporation  case33  this  Court
noticed, that  the  respondents  were  employed  on  contract  basis,  on  a
consolidated salary.  But, because they were actually appointed  to  perform
the work of  the  post  of  Assistant  Engineer,  this  Court  directed  the
employer to pay the respondents wages, in  the  minimum  of  the  pay-scales
ascribed for the post of Assistant Engineer.
45.   We shall now attempt an analysis of the judgments, wherein this  Court
declined to grant the benefit of ‘equal pay for  equal  work’  to  temporary
employees, in a claim for pay parity with regular employees:-
(i)   In the Harbans  Lal  case23,  daily-rate  employees  were  denied  the
claimed benefit, under the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’,  because
they could not establish,  that  the  duties  and  responsibilities  of  the
post(s) held by them, were similar/equivalent  to  those  of  the  reference
posts, under the State Government.
(ii)  In the Grih Kalyan  Kendra  Workers’  Union  case6,  ad-hoc  employees
engaged in the Kendras,  were  denied  pay  parity  with  regular  employees
working  under  the  New   Delhi   Municipal   Committee,   or   the   Delhi
Administration, or the Union of India, because of the  finding  returned  in
the report submitted by a former Chief Justice of  India,  that  duties  and
responsibilities discharged by employees holding the reference  posts,  were
not comparable with the posts held by members of the petitioner union.
(iii) In State of Haryana  v.  Tilak  Raj27,  this  Court  took  a  slightly
different course, while determining a claim for pay parity, raised by daily-
wagers (- the respondents).  It was concluded,  that  daily-wagers  held  no
post, and as such, could not be equated  with  regular  employees  who  held
regular posts.  But herein also,  no  material  was  placed  on  record,  to
establish that the nature of  duties  performed  by  the  daily-wagers,  was
comparable with those discharged by regular employees.  Be that as  it  may,
it was directed, that the State should  prescribe  minimum  wages  for  such
workers, and they should be paid accordingly.
(iv)  In State of Punjab v. Surjit Singh32, this Court held,  that  for  the
applicability  of  the  principle  of  ‘equal  pay  for  equal  work’,   the
respondents  who  were  daily-wagers,  had  to  establish   through   strict
pleadings  and  proof,  that  they  were  discharging  similar  duties   and
responsibilities, as were assigned to regular  employees.   Since  they  had
not done so, the matter was remanded back to  the  High  Court,  for  a  re-
determination on the above position.  It is  therefore  obvious,  that  this
Court had accepted, that where duties, responsibilities and  functions  were
shown to be similar, the principle of ‘equal pay for equal  work’  would  be
applicable, even to temporary employees  (otherwise  the  order  of  remand,
would be meaningless, and an exercise in futility).
(vi)  It is, therefore apparent, that in all matters where  this  Court  did
not  extend  the  benefit  of  ‘equal  pay  for  equal  work’  to  temporary
employees, it was because the employees could not establish, that they  were
rendering similar duties and responsibilities, as were being  discharged  by
regular employees, holding corresponding posts.
46.   We have consciously not referred to  the  judgment  rendered  by  this
Court in State of  Haryana  v.  Jasmer  Singh25  (by  a  two-Judge  division
bench), in the preceding two paragraphs.  We are  of  the  considered  view,
that the above judgment, needs to be examined and  explained  independently.
Learned counsel representing  the  State  government,  had  placed  emphatic
reliance on this judgment.  Our analysis is recorded hereinafter:-
(i)   In  the  above  case,  the  respondents  who  were  daily-wagers  were
claiming the same salary as was being paid to regular employees.   A  series
of reasons were recorded, to deny them pay parity  under  the  principle  of
‘equal pay for equal work’.  This Court  expressed  the  view,  that  daily-
wagers could not be treated at par with persons employed on  regular  basis,
because they were not required  to  possess  qualifications  prescribed  for
appointment on regular basis.  Daily-wagers, it was felt, were not  selected
in the same manner as regular employees, inasmuch as,  a  regular  appointee
had to compete in a process of open selection, and would be appointed,  only
if he fell within the zone of merit.  It was also  felt,  that  daily-wagers
were not required to fulfill the prescribed requirement of age, at the  time
of their recruitment.  And also because, regular employees were  subject  to
disciplinary proceedings, whereas, daily-wagers were not.  Daily-wagers,  it
was held, could also not be equated with regular employees, because  regular
employees were liable to be transferred anywhere within their  cadre.   This
Court therefore held, that those  employed  on  daily-wages,  could  not  be
equated with regular employees, and  as  such,  were  not  entitled  to  pay
parity, under the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’.
(ii)  First and foremost, it is necessary to emphasise, that in  the  course
of its consideration in State of Haryana v.  Jasmer  Singh25,  this  Court’s
attention had not been invited to the judgment in the Bhagwan  Dass  case21,
wherein  on  some  of  the  factors  noticed  above,  a  contrary  view  was
expressed.  In the said case, this Court had  held,  that  in  a  claim  for
equal wages, the manner of selection for  appointment  would  not  make  any
difference.  It will be  relevant  to  notice,  that  for  the  posts  under
reference in the Bhagwan Dass case21, the selection of  those  appointed  on
regular basis, had to be made through the Subordinate  Selection  Board,  by
way of open selection.  Whereas, the selection of the petitioners as  daily-
wagers, was limited to candidates belonging to a cluster  of  villages,  and
was not through any specialized selection body/agency.  Despite thereof,  it
was held, that the benefit under the  principle  of  ‘equal  pay  for  equal
work’, could not be denied to the  petitioners.   The  aforesaid  conclusion
was drawn on the ground, that as long as  the  petitioners  were  performing
similar duties, as those engaged on regular basis (on  corresponding  posts)
from the standpoint of the doctrine of ‘equal pay  for  equal  work’,  there
could be no distinction on the subject of payment of wages.
(iii) Having noticed the conclusion drawn in  State  of  Haryana  v.  Jasmer
Singh25, it would be relevant to emphasise,  that  in  the  cited  judgments
(noticed  in  paragraph  26  onwards,  upto  paragraph  41),  the  employees
concerned, could not have been granted  the  benefit  of  the  principle  of
‘equal pay for equal work’ (in such of the cases, where it was so  granted),
because temporary employees (daily-wage employees, in  the  said  case)  are
never ever selected through a process of open selection,  by  a  specialized
selection body/agency.  We would therefore be obliged to  follow  the  large
number of cases where pay parity  was  granted,  rather  than,  the  instant
singular judgment recording a divergent view.
(iv)  Temporary employees (irrespective  of  their  nomenclature)  are  also
never governed by any rules of disciplinary action.  As a matter of fact,  a
daily-wager is engaged only for a day, and his  services  can  be  dispensed
with at the end of the day for which he is engaged.  Rules  of  disciplinary
action, are therefore  to  the  advantage  of  regular  employees,  and  the
absence  of  their  applicability,  is  to  the  disadvantage  of  temporary
employees, even though the judgment in State of Haryana v.  Jasmer  Singh25,
seems to project otherwise.
(v)   Even the issue of transferability of regular employees referred to  in
State of Haryana v. Jasmer Singh25, in  our  view,  has  not  been  examined
closely.   Inasmuch  as,  temporary  employees  can  be  directed  to   work
anywhere, within or outside their cadre, and they  have  no  choice  but  to
accept.  This  is  again,  a  further  disadvantage  suffered  by  temporary
employees, yet the judgment projects as if it is to their advantage.
(vi)   It  is  also  necessary  to  appreciate,  that   in   all   temporary
appointments (- work-charge, daily-wage, casual,  ad-hoc,  contractual,  and
the like), the distinguishing features referred to in State  of  Haryana  v.
Jasmer Singh25, are inevitable, yet in all the judgments referred  to  above
(rendered before and after, the judgment in the State of Haryana  v.  Jasmer
Singh25), the proposition  recorded  in  the  instant  judgment,  was  never
endorsed.
(vii) It is not the case of the appellants,  that  the  respondent-employees
do not possess the minimum  qualifications  required  to  be  possessed  for
regular  appointment.   And  therefore,  this  proposition  would   not   be
applicable to the facts of the cases in hand.
(viii)      Another reason for us in passing by, the judgment  in  State  of
Haryana v. Jasmer Singh25 is, that the bench  deciding  the  matter  had  in
mind,  that  daily-wagers  in  the  State  of  Haryana,  were  entitled   to
regularization on completion of 3/5 years of  service,  and  therefore,  all
the concerned employees, would in any case  be  entitled  to  wages  in  the
regular pay-scale, after a little while.  This factual position was  noticed
in the judgment itself.
 (ix) It is not necessary for us to refer the matter for adjudication  to  a
larger bench, because the judgment in State of Haryana  v.  Jasmer  Singh25,
is irreconcilable and inconsistent with a large number  of  judgments,  some
of which are by larger benches,  where  the  benefit  of  the  principle  in
question was extended to temporary employees (including daily-wagers).
(x)   For all the above reasons, we are of the view that the  claim  of  the
appellants cannot be considered, on the basis of the judgment  in  State  of
Haryana v. Jasmer Singh25.
47.   We shall now endeavour to examine the impugned judgments.
48.   First and foremost, it is essential for us to deal with  the  judgment
dated 11.11.2011 rendered by the full bench of  the  High  Court  (in  Avtar
Singh v. State of Punjab & Ors., CWP no. 14796 of 2003).  A perusal  of  the
above judgment reveals,  that  the  High  Court  conspicuously  focused  its
attention to the decision of the Constitution Bench in the Secretary,  State
of Karnataka case28.  While dealing with the above judgment, the full  bench
expressed the view, that  though  at  the  first  impression,  the  judgment
appeared  to  expound  that  payment  of  minimum  wages  drawn  by  regular
employees, had also to be extended to persons employed on  temporary  basis,
but a careful reading of  the  same  would  show  that,  that  was  not  so.
Learned counsel, representing the State  of  Punjab,  reiterated  the  above
position.  In order to understand the  tenor  of  the  aforesaid  assertion,
reference was made  to  paragraphs  44  and  48,  of  the  judgment  of  the
Constitution Bench, which are extracted hereunder:-
      “44.  The concept of “equal pay for equal work’’ is different from the
      concept of conferring permanency on those who have been  appointed  on
      ad hoc basis, temporary basis, or based on no process of selection  as
      envisaged by the rules.  This Court has in various  decisions  applied
      the principle of equal pay for  equal  work  and  has  laid  down  the
      parameters for the application of that principle.  The  decisions  are
      rested on the concept of equality enshrined in our Constitution in the
      light of the directive principles in that behalf.  But the  acceptance
      of that principle cannot lead to a  position  where  the  court  could
      direct that appointments made  without  following  the  due  procedure
      established by law, be deemed permanent or issue directions  to  treat
      them as permanent.  Doing so, would be negation of  the  principle  of
      equality of opportunity.  The power to make an order as  is  necessary
      for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before  this
      Court, would not  normally  be  used  for  giving  the  go-by  to  the
      procedure established by law in the matter of public employment….
      …..It would not be just or proper to pass  an  order  in  exercise  of
      jurisdiction under Article  226  or  32  of  the  Constitution  or  in
      exercise of power under Article 142  of  the  Constitution  permitting
      those persons engaged, to be absorbed or to be made  permanent,  based
      on their appointments  or  engagements.   Complete  justice  would  be
      justice according to law and though it would be open to this Court  to
      mould the relief, this Court would not  grant  a  relief  which  would
      amount to perpetuating an illegality.
                 xxx              xxx              xxx
      48.   It was then contended that the  rights  of  the  employees  thus
      appointed, under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, are violated.
      It is stated that the State has  treated  the  employees  unfairly  by
      employing them on less than minimum wages  and  extracting  work  from
      them for a pretty  long  period  in  comparison  with  those  directly
      recruited who are getting more wages or  salaries  for  doing  similar
      work. The employees before us were  engaged  on  daily  wages  in  the
      department concerned on a wage that was made known to them.  There  is
      no case that the wage agreed upon was not being paid.  Those  who  are
      working on daily wages formed a class by themselves, they cannot claim
      that they are discriminated as against those who have  been  regularly
      recruited on the basis of the relevant rules. No right can be  founded
      on an employment on daily wages to claim that such employee should  be
      treated on a par  with  a  regularly  recruited  candidate,  and  made
      permanent in employment, even assuming that  the  principle  could  be
      invoked  for  claiming  equal  wages  for  equal  work.  There  is  no
      fundamental right in those who have been employed on  daily  wages  or
      temporarily or on contractual basis, to claim that they have  a  right
      to be absorbed in service. As has been held by this Court, they cannot
      be said to be holders of a post, since, a regular appointment could be
      made only by making appointments consistent with the  requirements  of
      Articles 14 and 16 of  the  Constitution.  The  right  to  be  treated
      equally with the other employees employed on daily  wages,  cannot  be
      extended to a claim for equal treatment with those who were  regularly
      employed. That would be treating unequals as equals. It cannot also be
      relied on to claim a right to be absorbed in service even though  they
      have never been selected in terms of the relevant  recruitment  rules.
      The arguments based on Articles 14 and  16  of  the  Constitution  are
      therefore overruled.”

We have given our thoughtful consideration to the observations  recorded  by
this Court, as were relied upon by  the  full  bench  (-  as  also,  by  the
learned counsel representing the State of Punjab).  It is not  possible  for
us to concur with the inference drawn by the full  bench,  for  the  reasons
recorded hereunder:-
(i)   We are of the considered view, that in paragraph 44  extracted  above,
the Constitution Bench clearly distinguished the issues of pay  parity,  and
regularization in service.  It was held, that on the issue  of  pay  parity,
the concept of ‘equality’ would be applicable (as had  indeed  been  applied
by the Court, in various decisions), but the principle of  ‘equality’  could
not be invoked for absorbing temporary employees in Government  service,  or
for making temporary  employees  regular/permanent.   All  the  observations
made  in  the  above  extracted  paragraphs,  relate  to  the   subject   of
regularization/permanence, and not, to  the  principle  of  ‘equal  pay  for
equal work’.  As we have  already  noticed  above,  the  Constitution  Bench
unambiguously held, that on the issue of pay parity, the  High  Court  ought
to have directed, that the daily-wage workers be paid  wages  equal  to  the
salary, at the lowest grade of their cadre.  This deficiency was made  good,
by making such a direction.
(ii)  Insofar as paragraph 48 extracted above is concerned, all  that  needs
to be stated is, that they were merely submissions of learned  counsel,  and
not conclusions drawn by this Court.  Therefore, nothing  further  needs  to
be stated, with reference to paragraph 48.
(iii) We are therefore of the view, that the High Court seriously  erred  in
interpreting the judgment rendered by this Court in the Secretary, State  of
Karnataka case28, by placing reliance on  paragraphs  44  and  48  extracted
above, for drawing its inferences with  reference  to  the  subject  of  pay
parity.  On the above subject/issue, this Court’s conclusions were  recorded
in paragraph  55  (extracted  in  paragraph  36,  hereinabove),  which  have
already been dealt with by us in an earlier part of this judgment.
49.   It would also  be  relevant  to  mention,  that  to  substantiate  its
inference drawn from the judgment rendered by this Court in  the  Secretary,
State of Karnataka  case28,  the  full  bench  of  the  High  Court,  placed
reliance on  State  of  Punjab  v.  Surjit  Singh32,  and  while  doing  so,
reference was made to the following observations recorded in  paragraphs  27
to 30 (of the said judgment).  Learned counsel for the State of  Punjab  has
reiterated the above position.   Paragraphs  27  to  30  aforementioned  are
being extracted hereunder:-
      “27.   While  laying  down  the  law  that  regularization  under  the
      constitutional scheme is wholly impermissible, the Court in  State  of
      Karnataka  v.  Umadevi  (3),  (2006)  4  SCC  1,  had  issued  certain
      directions relating to the employees in the services of the Commercial
      Taxes Department, as  noticed  hereinbefore.   The  employees  of  the
      Commercial Taxes Department were in service for more than  ten  years.
      They were appointed in 1985-1986.  They were sought to be  regularized
      in terms of a scheme.  Recommendations  were  made  by  the  Director,
      Commercial  Taxes  for  their  absorption.   It  was  only  when  such
      recommendations were not acceded to, the Administrative  Tribunal  was
      approached.  It  rejected  their  claim.   The  High  Court,  however,
      allowed their prayer which was in question before this Court.
      28.   This Court stated: (Secretary, State of  Karnataka  v.  Umadevi,
      (2006) 4 SCC 1, pp. 19-20, para 8)
           "8.   … It is seen that the High Court without really coming  to
           grips with the question falling for decision in the light of the
           findings of the Administrative Tribunal  and  the  decisions  of
           this Court, proceeded to order that they are entitled  to  wages
           equal to the salary and allowances that are being  paid  to  the
           regular employees of their  cadre  in  government  service  with
           effect  from  the  dates  from  which  they  were   respectively
           appointed. It may be noted that this gave  retrospective  effect
           to the judgment of the High Court by more  than  12  years.  The
           High Court also issued a command to the State to consider  their
           cases for regularisation within a period of four months from the
           date of receipt of that order. The  High  Court  seems  to  have
           proceeded on the basis that, whether they were appointed  before
            1-7-1984, a situation covered by the  decision  of  this  Court
           in Dharwad District PWD Literate Daily Wage Employees  Assn.  v.
           State of Karnataka, (1990) 2  SCC  396, and  the  scheme  framed
           pursuant to the direction  thereunder,  or  subsequently,  since
           they have worked for a period of 10 years, they were entitled to
           equal pay for equal  work  from  the  very  inception  of  their
           engagement  on  daily  wages  and  were  also  entitled  to   be
           considered for regularisation in their posts."
      29.   It is in the aforementioned  factual  backdrop,  this  Court  in
      exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution  of
      India, directed: (Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi,  (2006)  4
      SCC 1, p. 43, para 55)
           "55.  …  Hence, that part of the direction of the Division Bench
           is modified and it is directed that these daily-wage earners  be
           paid wages equal to the salary at the lowest grade of  employees
           of their cadre in the Commercial Taxes Department in  government
           service, from the date of the judgment of the Division Bench  of
           the High Court. Since, they are only daily-wage  earners,  there
           would be no question of other allowances being paid to them.  In
           view of our conclusion, that the  courts  are  not  expected  to
           issue directions for making such persons permanent  in  service,
           we set aside that part  of  the  direction  of  the  High  Court
           directing  the  Government   to   consider   their   cases   for
           regularisation. We also notice  that  the  High  Court  has  not
           adverted to the aspect as to whether it was regularisation or it
           was giving permanency that was being directed by the High Court.
           In such a situation, the direction in  that  regard  will  stand
           deleted and the appeals filed by the State would  stand  allowed
           to that extent. If sanctioned posts are vacant (they are said to
           be vacant) the State will take immediate steps for filling those
           posts by a  regular  process  of  selection.  But  when  regular
           recruitment is undertaken, the respondents in CAs Nos.  3595-612
           and those in the Commercial Taxes Department similarly situated,
           will be allowed to compete, waiving the age restriction  imposed
           for the recruitment and giving some weightage for  their  having
           been engaged for work in the Department for a significant period
           of time. That would be the extent of the exercise  of  power  by
           this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution to  do  justice
           to them."
      30.   We, therefore, do not see that any law has  been  laid  down  in
      para 55 of the judgment in Umadevi case.  Directions  were  issued  in
      view of the limited controversy.  As indicated, the State’s grievances
      were limited.”

Yet again, we are of the view, that the full bench  erred  in  referring  to
the  above  observations,  to  draw  its  conclusions.   Our   reasons   are
summarized hereinbelow:-
(i)   It is apparent, that this Court in State of Punjab v. Surjit  Singh32,
did hold, that the determination rendered in paragraph 55  of  the  judgment
in the Secretary, State of Karnataka case28, was in exercise  of  the  power
vested in this Court, under Article 142 of the Constitution of  India.   But
the above observation does not lead, to the  conclusion  or  the  inference,
that the principle of ‘equal pay  for  equal  work’  is  not  applicable  to
temporary employees.  In  fact,  there  is  a  positive  take-away  for  the
temporary employees.  The Constitution Bench would, in the above  situation,
be deemed to have concluded, that to do complete justice  to  the  cause  of
temporary employees, they should be paid  the  minimum  wage  of  a  regular
employee, discharging the same duties.  It needs to be noticed, that on  the
subject  of  pay  parity,  the  findings  recorded  by  this  Court  in  the
Secretary, State of  Karnataka  case28,  were  limited  to  the  conclusions
recorded in paragraph 55 thereof (which we  have  dealt  with  above,  while
dealing with the case law, on the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’).
(ii)  Even in the case under reference - State of Punjab v. Surjit  Singh32,
this Court accepted  the  principle  of  ‘equal  pay  for  equal  work’,  as
applicable to temporary employees, by requiring the  State  to  examine  the
claim of the respondents for pay parity, by appointing an expert  committee.
 The expert committee was required to  determine,  whether  the  respondents
satisfied the conditions stipulated in different  judgments  of  this  Court
including State of Punjab v.  Charanjit  Singh30,  wherein  this  Court  had
acceded to the proposition, that daily-wagers who were  rendering  the  same
duties and responsibilities as regular employees, would be entitled  to  the
minimum wage payable to regular employees.  And had therefore, remanded  the
matter back to the High Court for a fresh  adjudication.   Paragraph  38  of
the judgment in State of Punjab v. Surjit Singh32, wherein  the  remand  was
directed, is being extracted below:-
      “38.  We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest  of  justice
      would be subserved if the State is directed to examine  the  cases  of
      the respondents herein by appointing an expert committee as to whether
      the principles of  law  laid  down  herein  viz.  as  to  whether  the
      respondents satisfy the factors for  invocation  of  the  decision  in
      State of Haryana v. Charajnit Singh, (2006) 9 SCC 321 in its  entirety
      including the question of appointment  in  terms  of  the  recruitment
      rules have been followed.”

(iii) For all the above reasons, we are of the view, that the claim  of  the
temporary employees, for  minimum  wages,  at  par  with  regularly  engaged
Government employees, cannot be declined, on the basis of  the  judgment  in
State of Punjab v. Surjit Singh32.
50.   The impugned judgment rendered by the full  bench,  also  relied  upon
the judgment in Satya Prakash v. State of Bihar[35],  which  also  attempted
to interpret the judgment in  the  Secretary,  State  of  Karnataka  case28.
Learned counsel for the State of  Punjab  also  referred  to  the  same,  to
canvass the case of the  State  government.   Relevant  observations  relied
upon, are reproduced below:-
      “7.   We are of the view that the appellants are not entitled  to  get
      the benefit of regularization of their services since they were  never
      appointed in any sanctioned posts. The appellants were only engaged on
      daily wages in the Bihar Intermediate Education Council.
      8.    In State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1, this Court
      held that the Courts are not  expected  to  issue  any  direction  for
      absorption/regularization  or  permanent  continuance  of   temporary,
      contractual, casual, daily-wage or ad hoc employees. This  Court  held
      that such directions issued could not be said to be inconsistent  with
      the constitutional scheme of public employment. This Court  held  that
      merely because a  temporary  employee  or  a  casual  wage  worker  is
      continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would  not
      be entitled to be absorbed  in  regular  service  or  made  permanent,
      merely  on  the  strength  of  such  continuance,  if   the   original
      appointment was not made by following a due process  of  selection  as
      envisaged by the relevant rules. In view of the law laid down by  this
      Court, the directions sought for by the appellants cannot be granted.
      9.    Paragraph 53 of  Umadevi  (3)  judgment,  deals  with  irregular
      appointments  (not  illegal  appointments).   The  Constitution  Bench
      specifically referred to the judgments in State  of  Mysore  vs.  S.V.
      Narayanappa, AIR 1967 SC 1071, and R.N. Nanjundappa vs.  T.  Thimmiah,
      (1972) 1 SCC 409, in para 15 of Umadevi (3) judgment as well.  Let  us
      refer to paras 15 and 16 of Umadevi (3) judgment in this context.

                 xxx              xxx              xxx
      15.   In our view, the appellants herein would fall under the category
      of persons mentioned in paras 8 and 55 of the judgment and not in para
      53 of judgment of Umadevi (3).”

Yet again, all that needs to be stated  is,  that  the  observations  relied
upon by the  full  bench  of  the  High  Court,  dealt  with  the  issue  of
regularization, and not with the concept of  ‘equal  pay  for  equal  work’.
Paragraph 7 extracted above, leaves no room for any doubt,  that  the  issue
being considered in the Satya Prakash case35,  pertained  to  regularization
of the appellants in service.  Our view, that the  issue  being  dealt  with
pertained to regularization gains further ground from the fact (recorded  in
paragraph 1 of the  above  judgment),  that  the  appellants  in  the  Satya
Prakash case35 had approached this Court, to claim the benefit of  paragraph
53 of the judgment in the Secretary, State of Karnataka  case28.   Paragraph
53 aforementioned, is reproduced below:-
      “53.   One  aspect  needs  to  be  clarified.  There  may   be   cases
      where irregular appointments (not illegal appointments)  as  explained
      in State of Maysore v.  S.V.  Narayanappa,  AIR  1967  SC  1071,  R.N.
      Nanjundappa v. T. Thimmiah, (1972) 1 SCC 409, and  B.N.  Nagarajan  v.
      State of Karnataka, (1979) 4 SCC 507,  and  referred  to  in  para  15
      above, of duly qualified persons in duly sanctioned vacant posts might
      have been made and the employees have continued to work for ten  years
      or more but without the intervention of orders of  the  courts  or  of
      tribunals. The question of regularisation  of  the  services  of  such
      employees may have to be considered on merits  in  the  light  of  the
      principles settled by this Court in the cases abovereferred to and  in
      the light of this judgment. In that context, the Union of  India,  the
      State Governments and their instrumentalities  should  take  steps  to
      regularize    as    a    one-time    measure,    the    services    of
      such irregularly appointed, who have worked for ten years or  more  in
      duly sanctioned posts but not under cover of orders of the  courts  or
      of tribunals and should further ensure that regular  recruitments  are
      undertaken to fill those vacant sanctioned posts that  require  to  be
      filled up, in cases where temporary  employees  or  daily  wagers  are
      being now employed. The process must  be  set  in  motion  within  six
      months from this date. We also clarify  that  regularisation,  if  any
      already made, but not sub judice, need not be reopened based  on  this
      judgment,  but  there  should  be  no   further   bypassing   of   the
      constitutional requirement and regularizing or making permanent, those
      not duly appointed as per the constitutional scheme.”

A perusal of paragraph 53 extracted above, leaves no  room  for  any  doubt,
that the issue canvassed was of regularization, and not pay parity.  We  are
therefore of the view, that reliance on paragraph 53,  for  determining  the
question of pay parity (claimed by the  concerned  employees),  resulted  in
the High Court drawing an incorrect inference.
51.   The full bench of the High Court, while adjudicating  upon  the  above
controversy had concluded, that temporary employees  were  not  entitled  to
the minimum of the regular  pay-scale,  merely  for  the  reason,  that  the
activities carried on by daily-wagers and regular  employees  were  similar.
The full bench however, made two exceptions.  Temporary employees, who  fell
in either of the two exceptions, were held entitled to wages at the  minimum
of the pay-scale drawn by regular employees.   The  exceptions  recorded  by
the full bench of the High Court in  the  impugned  judgment  are  extracted
hereunder:-
      “(1)  A daily wager, ad  hoc  or  contractual  appointee  against  the
      regular sanctioned posts, if appointed after  undergoing  a  selection
      process based upon fairness and equality of opportunity to  all  other
      eligible candidates, shall be entitled to minimum of the  regular  pay
      scale from the date of engagement.
      (2)   But if daily wagers, ad hoc or contractual  appointees  are  not
      appointed against regular sanctioned  posts  and  their  services  are
      availed continuously, with notional breaks, by the State Government or
      its instrumentalities for a sufficient long period i.e. for 10  years,
      such daily wagers, ad hoc or contractual appointees shall be  entitled
      to minimum of the regular pay scale  without  any  allowances  on  the
      assumption that work of  perennial  nature  is  available  and  having
      worked for such long period of time, an equitable right is created  in
      such category of persons.  Their claim for regularization, if any, may
      have to be considered  separately  in  terms  of  legally  permissible
      scheme.
      (3)   In the event, a claim is made for minimum pay scale  after  more
      than three  years  and  two  months  of  completion  of  10  years  of
      continuous working, a daily wager,  ad  hoc  or  contractual  employee
      shall be entitled to arrears for a  period  of  three  years  and  two
      months.”

A perusal of the above conclusion drawn in the impugned judgment (passed  by
the full bench), reveals  that  the  full  bench  carved  an  exception  for
employees who were not appointed against regular sanctioned posts, if  their
services had remained continuous (with notional  breaks,  as  well),  for  a
period of 10 years.  This category of temporary employees, was extended  the
benefit  of  wages  at  the  minimum  of  the  regular  pay-scale.   In  the
Secretary, State of Karnataka case28, similarly, employees who had  rendered
10 years service, were granted an exception (refer to paragraph  53  of  the
judgment,  extracted  in  the  preceding  paragraph).   The  above  position
adopted by the High Court reveals, that  the  High  Court  intermingled  the
legal position determined by this Court on the subject of regularization  of
employees, while adjudicating upon the proposition of pay  parity,  emerging
under the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’.  In our view, it is  this
mix-up, which has resulted in the High Court recording  its  afore-extracted
conclusions.
(ii)  The High Court extended different wages  to  temporary  employees,  by
categorizing them on the basis of their length of service.  This is  clearly
in the teeth of judgment in the Daily Rated  Casual  Labour  Employed  under
P&T Department through Bhartiya Dak Tar Mazdoor Manch case22.  In the  above
judgment, this Court held, that classification of employees based  on  their
length of service (- those who had not completed 720 days of service,  in  a
period of 3 years; those who had completed more than 720 days of  service  -
with effect from  1.4.1977;  and  those  who  had  completed  1200  days  of
service), for payment of different levels of wages (even  though  they  were
admittedly  discharging  the   same   duties),   was   not   tenable.    The
classification was held to be  violative  of  Articles  14  and  16  of  the
Constitution.
(iii) Based on the consideration recorded hereinabove, the determination  in
the impugned judgment rendered by the full bench of the High Court,  whereby
it classified temporary employees for differential treatment on the  subject
of wages, is clearly unsustainable, and is liable to be set aside.
52.   In view of all our above conclusions, the  decision  rendered  by  the
full bench of the High Court in Avtar Singh v. State of Punjab &  Ors.  (CWP
no. 14796 of 2003), dated 11.11.2011, is liable to be  set  aside,  and  the
same is hereby set aside.  The decision rendered by the  division  bench  of
the High Court in State of Punjab & Ors. v. Rajinder Singh & Ors.  (LPA  no.
337 of 2003, decided on 7.1.2009) is also liable to be set  aside,  and  the
same is also hereby set aside.  We affirm the decision rendered in State  of
Punjab &  Ors.  v.  Rajinder  Kumar  (LPA  no.  1024  of  2009,  decided  on
30.8.2010), with the modification, that the  concerned  employees  would  be
entitled to the minimum of the pay-scale, of  the  category  to  which  they
belong, but would not be entitled to allowances attached to the  posts  held
by them.
53.   We shall now deal with the claim of temporary  employees  before  this
Court.
54.   There is no room for any doubt, that the principle of ‘equal  pay  for
equal work’ has emerged from an interpretation of  different  provisions  of
the Constitution.  The principle has been expounded through a  large  number
of judgments rendered by this Court, and constitutes law  declared  by  this
Court.  The same is binding on all the courts in India,  under  Article  141
of the Constitution of India.  The parameters of the  principle,  have  been
summarized by us in paragraph 42 hereinabove.  The principle of  ‘equal  pay
for equal work’ has also been extended to temporary  employees  (differently
described as work-charge, daily-wage, casual, ad-hoc, contractual,  and  the
like).  The legal  position,  relating  to  temporary  employees,  has  been
summarized by us, in paragraph 44 hereinabove.   The  above  legal  position
which has been repeatedly declared, is being reiterated by us, yet again.
55.   In our considered view,  it  is  fallacious  to  determine  artificial
parameters to deny fruits of labour.   An  employee  engaged  for  the  same
work, cannot be paid less than another, who performs  the  same  duties  and
responsibilities.  Certainly not,  in  a  welfare  state.   Such  an  action
besides being demeaning, strikes at the very foundation  of  human  dignity.
Any one, who is compelled  to  work  at  a  lesser  wage,  does  not  do  so
voluntarily.  He does so, to provide food and shelter to his family, at  the
cost of his self respect and dignity, at the cost of his self worth, and  at
the cost of his integrity.  For he knows, that his dependents  would  suffer
immensely, if he does not accept the lesser wage.  Any act, of  paying  less
wages, as compared to  others  similarly  situate,  constitutes  an  act  of
exploitative  enslavement,  emerging  out   of   a   domineering   position.
Undoubtedly, the action is  oppressive,  suppressive  and  coercive,  as  it
compels involuntary subjugation.
56.   We would also like to extract herein Article 7, of  the  International
Covenant on Economic,  Social  and  Cultural  Rights,  1966.   The  same  is
reproduced below:-

      “Article 7
      The States Parties to the present  Covenant  recognize  the  right  of
      everyone to the enjoyment of just and favourable  conditions  of  work
      which ensure, in particular:
      (a)   Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:
           (i)   Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal  value
           without distinction of  any  kind,  in  particular  women  being
           guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those  enjoyed  by
           men, with equal pay for equal work;
           (ii)  A decent living  for  themselves  and  their  families  in
           accordance with the provisions of the present Covenant;
      (b)   Safe and healthy working conditions;
      (c)   Equal opportunity for everyone to be promoted in his  employment
      to an appropriate higher level, subject  to  no  considerations  other
      than those of seniority and competence;
      (d)   Rest, leisure and reasonable limitation  of  working  hours  and
      periodic holidays  with  pay,  as  well  as  remuneration  for  public
      holidays.”

India is a signatory to the above covenant,  having  ratified  the  same  on
10.4.1979.  There is no  escape  from  the  above  obligation,  in  view  of
different provisions of the Constitution referred to above, and in  view  of
the law declared by this Court under Article  141  of  the  Constitution  of
India, the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ constitutes a  clear  and
unambiguous right and is vested in  every  employee  –  whether  engaged  on
regular or temporary basis.
57.    Having  traversed  the  legal  parameters  with  reference   to   the
application of the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’, in  relation  to
temporary employees  (daily-wage  employees,  ad-hoc  appointees,  employees
appointed on casual basis, contractual employees and  the  like),  the  sole
factor that requires our determination is, whether the  concerned  employees
(before this Court), were rendering similar duties and responsibilities,  as
were being discharged by regular employees, holding  the  same/corresponding
posts.  This exercise would require the application  of  the  parameters  of
the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ summarized by  us  in  paragraph
42 above.   However,  insofar  as  the  instant  aspect  of  the  matter  is
concerned, it is not difficult for us to record the  factual  position.   We
say  so,  because  it  was  fairly  acknowledged  by  the  learned   counsel
representing the State of Punjab, that all the temporary  employees  in  the
present bunch of appeals, were  appointed  against  posts  which  were  also
available in the regular cadre/establishment.  It was  also  accepted,  that
during the course of their employment,  the  concerned  temporary  employees
were being randomly deputed to discharge duties and responsibilities,  which
at some point in  time,  were  assigned  to  regular  employees.   Likewise,
regular employees holding substantive posts, were also posted  to  discharge
the same work, which was assigned  to  temporary  employees,  from  time  to
time.  There is, therefore, no room for  any  doubt,  that  the  duties  and
responsibilities discharged by the temporary employees in  the  present  set
of appeals, were the same as were being  discharged  by  regular  employees.
It is not the case of the appellants, that the respondent-employees did  not
possess the qualifications prescribed  for  appointment  on  regular  basis.
Furthermore, it is not the case of the State,  that  any  of  the  temporary
employees would not be entitled to pay parity,  on  any  of  the  principles
summarized by us in paragraph 42 hereinabove.  There can be no  doubt,  that
the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ would be applicable to  all  the
concerned temporary employees, so as to vest in  them  the  right  to  claim
wages, at par with  the  minimum  of  the  pay-scale  of  regularly  engaged
Government employees, holding the same post.
58.   In view of the position expressed by us in  the  foregoing  paragraph,
we  have  no  hesitation  in  holding,  that  all  the  concerned  temporary
employees, in the present bunch of cases, would be entitled  to  draw  wages
at the minimum of the pay-scale (- at the lowest grade, in the regular  pay-
scale), extended to regular employees, holding the same post.
59.   Disposed of in the above terms.
60.   It would be unfair for us, if we do not express our gratitude for  the
assistance  rendered  to  us  by  Mr.  Rakesh  Khanna,  Additional  Advocate
General, Punjab.  He researched for us, on our asking, all the judgments  on
the issue of pay parity.  He presented them to us, irrespective  of  whether
the conclusions recorded therein,  would  or  would  not  favour  the  cause
supported by  him.   He  also  assisted  us,  on  different  parameters  and
outlines, suggested by us, during the course of hearing.

                                                           …..…………………………….J.
                                              (Jagdish Singh Khehar)


                                                           …..…………………………….J.
                                                    (S.A. Bobde)
New Delhi;
October 26, 2016.


Note: The emphases supplied in all the quotations in the  instant  judgment,
are ours.

        ITEM NO.1A               COURT NO.3               SECTION IV


                         S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                               RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS


Civil Appeal  No(s).  213/2013

STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS                            Appellant(s)

                                VERSUS

JAGJIT SINGH AND ORS                               Respondent(s)

WITH

C.A. No. 10356/2016 @ SLP(C) No.31676/2016 @ CC 15616/2011
C.A. No. 10357/2016 @ SLP(C) No.31677/2016 @ CC 16434/2011

C.A. No. 10358/2016 @ SLP(C) No.37162/2012

C.A. No. 10360/2016 @ SLP(C) No.37164/2012

C.A. No. 10361/2016 @ SLP(C) No.37165/2012

C.A. No. 211/2013

C.A. No. 212/2013

C.A. No. 214/2013

C.A. No. 217/2013

C.A. No. 218/2013

C.A. No. 219/2013

C.A. No. 220/2013

C.A. No. 221/2013

C.A. No. 222/2013

C.A. No. 223/2013

C.A. No. 224/2013

C.A. No. 225/2013

C.A. No. 226/2013

C.A. No. 227/2013

C.A. No. 228/2013

C.A. No. 229/2013

C.A. No. 230/2013

C.A. No. 231/2013

C.A. No. 232/2013

C.A. No. 233/2013

C.A. No. 234/2013

C.A. No. 235/2013



C.A. No. 236/2013
C.A. No. 245/2013

C.A. No. 246/2013

C.A. No. 247/2013

C.A. No. 248/2013

C.A. No. 249/2013

C.A. No. 257/2013

C.A. No. 260/2013

C.A. No. 262/2013

C.A. No. 966/2013

C.A. No. 2231/2013

C.A. No. 2299/2013

C.A. No. 2300/2013

C.A. No. 2301/2013

C.A. No. 2702/2013

C.A. No. 7150/2013

C.A. No. 8248/2013

C.A. No. 8979/2013

C.A. No. 9295/2013

C.A. No. 10362/2016 @ SLP(C) No. 9464/2013

C.A. No. 10363/2016 @ SLP(C) No. 11966/2013

C.A. No. 10364/2016 @ SLP(C) No. 17707/2013

C.A. No. 10365/2016 @ SLP(C) No. 24410/2013

C.A. No. 871/2014

C.A. No. 10366/2016 @ SLP(C) No. 4340/2014

C.A. No. 10527/2014

[HEARD BY HON'BLE JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR AND HON'BLE S.A.BOBDE, JJ.]



Date   :   26/10/2016   These   appeals/petitions   were   called   on   for
                       judgment today.

For Appellant(s)       Mr. Rakesh Khanna, AAG
                             Mr. Jagjit Singh Chhabra,Adv.

                             & for Ms. Kaveeta Wadia,AOR(NP)

                             for Mr. Kuldip Singh,AOR(NP)

                             for M/s. Mahalakshmi Balaji & Co.(NP)

                             for Ms. Naresh Bakshi,AOR(NP)





For Respondent(s)      Mr. Brijesh Kr. Tamber, Adv.
                       for Mr. A.V. Balan, AOR





                       Mr. Prem Prakash, Adv.

                       Mr. Mukesh K. Verma, Adv.
                       Mr. Ramesh Goyal, Adv.

                       for Mr. Ashwani Bhardwaj, AOR



                       Mr. Vijendra Kasana, Adv.
                       Mr. Chand Qureshi, Adv.

                       for Dr. Kailash Chand, AOR



                       Mr. Shish Pal Laler, Adv.
                       Mr. S.D. Sharma, Adv.

                       Mr. Sonit Sinhmar, Adv.

                       for Mr. Balbir Singh Gupta, AOR



                       Mr. Himanshu Gupta, Adv.

                       Mr. Dinesh Verma, Adv.
                       for Mr. S.L. Aneja, AOR

                       for Mr. Subhasish Bhowmick, AOR



                       Mr. Vikas Mahajan, Adv.
                       Mr. Vishal Mahajan, Adv.

                       Mr. Vinod Sharma, Adv.

                       for Mr. B.Y. Kulkarni, AOR



                       Mr. Ajay Kumar Singh, AOR

                       Mr. Ujjal Singh, Adv.
                       Mr. J.P. Singh, Adv.

                       for Mr. R.C. Kaushik, AOR



                       Ms. Manju Sharma, AOR

                       Mr. Anil Kumar Tandale, AOR

                       Mr. Ashok Mathur, AOR

                       Mr. Varun Punia, AOR

                       Mr. A.S. Pundir, AOR

                       Ms. Vanita Mehta, AOR

                       Mr. Balraj Dewan, AOR



                       Mr. Varinder Kumar Sharma, AOR

                       Mr. Yash Pal Dhingra, AOR


             Hon'ble  Mr.  Justice  Jagdish  Singh  Khehar  pronounced   the
judgment of the Bench comprising His Lordship and Hon'ble Mr.  Justice  S.A.
Bobde.
            Leave granted in the special leave petitions.

            For the reasons recorded in the reportable judgment, which is
placed on the file, the appeals stand disposed of.



  (Indu Pokhriyal)                                (Parveen Kumar)
    Court Master                                         AR-cum-PS



-----------------------
[1] (1982) 1 SCC 618

[2] (1983) 1 SCC 304

[3] (1988) 3 SCC 91

[4] (1989) 1 SCC 121

[5] (1989) 2 SCC 235

[6] (1991) 1 SCC 619

[7] (2000) 8 SCC 580

[8] (2002) 4 SCC 556

[9] (2002) 6 SCC 72

[10] (2003) 5 SCC 188

[11] (2004) 1 SCC 347

[12] (2007) 8 SCC 279

[13] (2008) 10 SCC 1

[14] (2010) 5 SCC 225

[15] (2011) 2 SCC 452

[16] (2011) 11 SCC 122

[17] (2012) 12 SCC 666

[18] (2014) 6 SCC 756

[19] (1986) 1 SCC 637

[20] (1986) 1 SCC 639

[21] (1987) 4 SCC 634

[22] (1988) 1 SCC 122

[23] (1989) 4 SCC 459

[24] (1995) 5 SCC 210

[25] (1996) 11 SCC 77

[26] (1998) 9 SCC 595

[27] (2003) 6 SCC 123

[28] (2006) 4 SCC 1

[29] (1990) 2 SCC 396

[30] (2006) 9 SCC 321

[31] (2006) 9 SCC 337

[32] (2009) 9 SCC 514

[33] (2010) 7 SCC 739

[34] (2010) 12 SCC 400

[35] (2010) 4 SCC 179



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