REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 375 OF 2007
Jupudy Pardha Sarathy Appellant(s)
versus
Pentapati Rama Krishna and others Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
| |
|M.Y. Eqbal, J.: |
This appeal by special leave is directed against order dated
21.9.2006 passed by learned Single Judge of the High Court of Andhra
Pradesh, who allowed the appeal preferred by Defendant no.1 and set aside
the judgment and decree of the trial Court in the original suit preferred
by the appellant.
2. The only question that needs consideration in this appeal is as to
whether the High Court is correct in law in interpreting the provisions of
Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (for short 'the Act') in
arriving at a conclusion that the widow of the deceased P. Venkata Subba
Rao acquired an absolute interest in the property by the operation of
Section 14 of the Act.
3. The undisputed facts are that the said suit property originally
belonged to one P. Venkata Subba Rao, who had three wives. Only the second
wife was blessed with two sons and one daughter, including defendant-
Narasimha Rao. Veeraraghavamma was the third wife of the said P.
Venkata Subba Rao but she did not have any issues. P. Venkata Subba Rao
executed a Will in the year 1920(Exh.A2) in favour of his 3rd wife
Veeraghavamma who in turn executed a Will dated 14.7.1971 (Exh.B1) in
favour of defendant-Pentapati Subba Rao, and thereafter, she died in 1976.
The case of the defendant is that the said P. Narasimha Rao has no right to
transfer the suit properties in favour of the plaintiff.
4. The plaintiff’s-appellant’s case is that he purchased the suit
property from one P. Narasimha Roa who was having a vested remainder in
respect of the said suit property on the expiry of life estate of
testator’s wife Veeraghavamma. According to the plaintiff-appellant,
during the life time of Veeraghavamma she enjoyed the properties and after
her death the property devolved upon the vendors of the plaintiff.
5. The trial court noted the undisputed case of both the parties that
Will (Exh.A2) was executed by late P. Venkata Subba Rao in favour of
Veeraghavamma but she had limited interest to enjoy the property during her
life time and thereafter the remainder vested with P. Narasimha Rao to
enjoy the said property as absolute owner after the death of Veeraghavamma.
However, the trial court held that life estate of Veeraghavamma under the
Will did not become enlarged into absolute estate under Section 14(1) of
the Act and the vested remainder in favour of P. Narasimha Rao did not get
extinguished in respect of the scheduled properties. Accordingly, the
suit was decreed.
6. Aggrieved by the decision of the trial court defendant no.1 - P.
Subba Rao preferred an appeal before the High Court. The High Court
allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court
holding that Veeraghavamma became the absolute owner of the suit property
by virtue of Section 14(1) and she had every right to bequeath the said
property in favour of P. Subba Rao, the first defendant under Exhibits B1
and B2.
7. Hence, the present appeal by special leave by the plaintiff. During
the pendency of the appeal before the High Court, first defendant died and
his legal representatives were brought on record and are arrayed in the
present appeal as respondent nos.1 to 3. Respondent no. 4 is defendant
no.3, and Legal representatives of Respondent no.5, who was defendant no.4,
were brought on record after his death during pendency of this appeal.
Rest respondents were brought on record as legal representatives of second
defendant, who died during pendency of the suit. Since respondent no.4 has
vacated the suit shop and delivered possession to the plaintiff on
6.7.2006, appellant has moved before us an application for deletion of
respondent no.4 from the array of parties. It is ordered accordingly.
8. Before we decide the question involved in this appeal we would like
to reproduce the contents of the Will (Exh.A1) which is as under:-
“I, Pularvathi Venkata Subba Rao, S/o late Pularvathy Venkamma Vysya,
Business, R/o Rajahmundhry, have executed the Will dt. 24.08.1920 with good
consciousness and wisdom.
I am now approximately 53 years. Now I have less physical strength
and consequently I may not survive for longer period, hence I have proposed
to give all my properties both movable and immovable mentioned in the
schedule below by way of this Will.
My first wife died issueless. My second wife got two sons by name
Manikyaro and Narasimha Rao and a daughter by name Nagarathnamma. My 2nd
wife also died. Thereafter I married Veeraghavamma my third wife and she
is alive. She has not begotten any children. I have house property
bearing Municipal D.No.6/875, another house bearing D.No.6/876 and also 5
shop rooms abutting to them with vacant house site covered by D.No.6/870 in
Innespeta, Rajahmundry Village, Rajahmundry Sub Registry, E.G. Dist.I have
wet land of extent ac15.17 cents in Rustumbada village Naraspuram Sub
Registry, Naraspuram Taluk. The said landed property was in the name of my
2nd wife and after her life time my two sons mentioned above got the same
mutated it in their names.
I have a policy bearing No. 23232 in Oriental Life Insurance Company
and I have to receive monies from the said policy and also silver, gold,
brass articles house hold utensils Beeruva, Furniture, iron safe etc., I
have made the following dispositions which are to take place after my life
time.
My third wife Veeraghavamma shall enjoy for life the tiled house with
site and compound wall and with half right in the well covered by municipal
D.No.6/875, Rajahmundry and after life time of my wife my 2nd son Narasimha
Rao shall have the property with absolute rights such as gift, sale etc.
My second son Narasimha Rao shall have absolute rights such as gift and
sale in respect of the tiled house bearing D/no.6/876 and the 5 shop rooms
covered by D.No.6/870 and the sit abutting the above two properties with
Chavidi and one Big latrine out of the two and that my wife Veeraraghavamma
shall enjoy for life the small latrine covered by D.No.6/870 and after her
life time my son Narasimha Rao shall have the property with absolute right.
The said Veeraraghavamma is entitled to fetch water from the well situated
in back yard of house bearing D.No.6/870. My eldest so Maniyarao shall
have absolute rights such as gift and sale etc., in respect of ac
15.17 cents of Zeroyiti wet land of Rustumbada Village Narasapuram Taluk
and my eldest son Maniyarao shall pay Rs.650/- which I am liable to pay to
her and thus either Nagarathnamma or any one has got no right in the said
property.
The amount receivable from the Insurance Company referred above shall
be recovered and my two sons, daughter and my wife, all the four shall
share the same equally and that the ornaments lying with them shall take
the same absolutely and that one shall not claim or demand for any oweties
against another.
(Emphasis given)
This Will I have executed with full and good consciousness and the
same shall come into force after my life time. The properties mentioned in
this Will are all my self acquired properties and I did not get any
ancestral properties.
I reserve my right to change the contents of the Will during my life
time.
Signed Pularvati Venkata Subba Rao
Attesting Witnesses
Modali Subbarayudu
Yendi Surayya
Scribed by Pularvati Venkata Subba Rao
With his own handwriting
The contents of the said will shall come into force after my life time.
Signed by Pularvati Venkata Subbarao”
9. The trial court although noticed the decision of this Court in the
case of V. Tulasamma and others vs. Sesha Reddy (dead) by Lrs. (AIR 1977
SC 1944) but held that in that case on the basis of compromise the Hindu
widow was allotted immoveable properties expressly in lieu of her
maintenance, and hence, Section 14(1) of the Act was readily applicable to
that case. Whereas, the trial court held that the decision of this Court
in the case of Mst Karmi vs. Amru & Ors., (AIR 1971 SC 745), is applicable
because in that case the Hindu widow succeeded the properties of her
husband on the strength of Will where under she was given life estate in
the properties. For better appreciation paragraphs 25, 26 and 27 of the
trial court’s judgment are quoted thus:-
“25. The first defendant’s counsel placed heavy reliance on the decision
reported in Palchuri Hanumayamma vs. Tadikamalla Kotilingam (1986 (1)
ALT.546), it is only in that decision it was held that it is not necessary
that the will or other documents under which property is given to a Hindu
female should expressly specify that the property is given to a Hindu
female should expressly specify that the property is a given in lieu of a
pre-existing right or right of maintenance and that it is sufficient if
only a right was in existence in favour of the Hindu female on the date
when the document was executed. It is a judgment rendered by a single
judge of the High Court. It is a case where the High Court was considering
the bequest of property to a Hindu widow under a will as life estate.
26. In Vaddeboyina Tulasamma vs. Vaddeboyina Sesha Reddi (A.I.R. 1977 SC
1944) a Hindu widow obtained a decree for maintenance against the brothers
of her deceased husband and was executing the said decree for maintenance.
During that time, the Hindu Widow and the brothers of her deceased husband
entered into a compromise where under the Hindu widow was allotted
immovable properties to be enjoyed only as limited owner power of
alienation. It was a case where the Hindu Widow was allotted properties
expressly in lieu of her maintenance and satisfaction of her maintenance
decree. Therefore, Sec. 14 (1) of the Act is readily applicable to that
case. On the other hand, in the decision reported in Mst Karmi vs. Amro (
A.I.R. 1971 SC 745) a Hindu widow succeeded to the properties of her
husband on the strength of a Will where under she was given life estate in
the properties. In those circumstances the Supreme Court held that the
Hindu widow having succeeded to the properties of her husband on the
strength of that will cannot claim any rights in these properties over and
above that given to her under that will and that the life estate given to
her under the will cannot become an absolute estate under the provisions of
the Hindu Succession Act. It was a decision rendered by three Judges of
Supreme Court. This decision was not referred to in the subsequent
decision of the year 1977 referred to above. The decision of the year 1977
was also rendered by three judges of the Supreme Court. When the latter
decision of the Supreme Court is in all fours with the facts in the case
on hand, the former decision of the Supreme Court of the year 1977 cannot
be applied to the facts of the present case.
27. In Smt. Culwant Kaur vs. Mohinder Singh (A.I.R. 1987 SC 2251) the
provisions of Section 14(1) of the Act were applied because it was a case
where the Hindu female was put in possession of the property expressly in
pursuance to and in recognition of the maintenance in her. Similarly, in
the decision reported in Gurdip Singh vs. Amar Singh (1991 (1) L.W.15) the
Supreme Court applied the provisions of Section 14(1) of the Act where the
wife acquired property by way of gift from her husband explicitly in lieu
of maintenance. In Bai Vajia vs. Thakorbhai Chelabhai (A.I.R. 1979 SC 993)
also the Hindu widow obtained possession of the property in default of
payment of maintenance to her. So, the Supreme Court applied the
provisions of Section 14(1) of the Act to that case.”
10. On the basis of the ratio decided by this Court in the decision
quoted hereinabove and also other decisions of the High Court, the trial
court held that the life estate of Veeraghavamma under Exhibit A-2 will not
become enlarge into absolute estate under Section 14(1) of the Hindu
Succession Act and did not extinguish vested remainders interest of
Narasimha Rao in the suit property.
11. In appeal, the High Court, after discussing the ratio decided by this
Court in the decisions noted by the trial court and also other decisions of
this Court, reversed the finding of the trial court and held that the case
falls under Section 14(1) of the Act and Veeraghavamma became the absolute
owner of the suit property and she had every right to bequeath the said
property in favour of the first defendant P. Subba Rao under Exhibits B-1
and B-2. The High Court held that:-
“In view of the aforesaid authoritative judgment of Hon'ble Justice
Jagannadha Rao following several judgments of the Apex Court, I am of the
opinion that the reasoning given by the trial Court, that as there is no
specific wording in the instrument Ex.A2 that life estate has been given in
lieu of a pre-existing right or right of maintenance the same do not become
enlarged into absolute estate, is not relevant and is quite contrary to the
aforesaid judgment.
Merely because Veeraraghavamma was appointed as the guardian of P.
Narasimha Rao - vendor of the plaintiff it could not be said that
Veeraraghavamma had no pre-existing right or right of maintenance in
respect of the property in which a limited interest had been created in her
favour. As the vendor of plaintiff was also having properties other than
the property in question, after the death of his natural father,
Veeraraghavamma was appointed as his guardian. Immediately after the
vendor of the plaintiff attained majority the guardianship was discharged
and he used to manage his own movable and immovable properties
individually. It cannot be said that for the first time the life estate
has been created under Ex.A2 Will in favour of Veeraraghavamma, as
undoubtedly, she was having a pre-existing right to be maintained by her
husband, therefore, it is the duty of her husband to maintain her during
her lifetime. Though no specific words have been mentioned in Ex.A2 that
in lieu of maintenance the life estate has been created, under Section
14(1) in whatever form a limited interest is created in favour of a Hindu
female, who is having a pre-existing right of maintenance, it becomes
absolute right after 1956 Act came into force.
As Veeraraghavamma became absolute owner by virtue of Section 14(1) of the
Act she had right to bequeath the said property in favour of the first
defendant under Exs.B1 and B2. Therefore, as the vested remainder of P.
Narasimha Rao got nullified, he had no right or authority to sell the said
property under Ex.A1 sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. As the limited
interest of Veeraraghavamma blossomed into absolute right, bequeathing the
said property in favour of the first defendant under Exs.B1 and B2 is legal
and valid. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, I
am of the opinion that the limited interest to enjoy the property during
the lifetime of Veeraraghavamma blossomed into an absolute right in
accordance with Section 14(1), after the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came
into force and the vested remainder created in favour of the vendor of the
plaintiff is nullified.”
12. Mr. K.V. Viswanathan, learned senior advocate appearing for the
appellant, confined his argument to the question of law as to whether the
High Court erred in law in holding that Section 14(1) of the Act will be
attracted and the widow Veeraghavamma have acquired absolute interest in
the properties. Learned counsel made the following submissions:-
“(i) Section 14(1) cannot be interpreted to mean that each and every Will
granting a limited/life interest in a property to a widow is deemed/assumed
to be in lieu of her maintenance. If the testator in his Will specifically
provides that he is granting only life interest in the property to his
widow, his right to limit his widow’s right in the property is recognized
by Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Further, the
testator’s right to dispose off his property by will or other testamentary
disposition is recognized by Section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
Therefore, Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 cannot be
interpreted in a manner that renders Section 14(2) and Section 30 of the
same Act otiose.
(ii) In Mst. Karmi vs. Amru & Ors. (1972)4 SCC 86), a 3-Judge Bench of
this Court held to the effect that a widow who succeeded to the property
of her deceased husband on the strength of his will cannot claim any rights
in the property other than those conferred by the will.. “The life estate
given to her under the Will cannot become an absolute estate under the
provisions of the Hindu Succession Act”
(iii) In V. Tulsamma vs. Sesha Reddy (1977) 3 SCC 99, this Court clarified
the difference between sub-section (1) and (2) of Section 14, thereby
restricting the right of a testator to grant a limited life interest in a
property to his wife. Learned counsel referred para 62 of the judgment in
Tulsamma case.
(iv) V. Tulsamma’s case involved a compromise decree arising out of decree
for maintenance obtained by the widow against her husband’s brother in a
case of intestate succession. It did not deal with situations of
testamentary succession. Therefore, strictly on facts, it may not be
applicable to cases of testamentary succession. However, in terms of law
declared therein, a doubt may arise whether Section 14(1) may apply to
every instance of a Will granting a limited/life interest in a property to
the widow on the ground that the widow has a pre-existing right of
maintenance.
(v) This doubt was resolved by the Supreme Court in Sadhu Singh vs.
Gurdwara Sahib Narike, (2006) 8 SCC 75, where it was held at paras 13 and
14 that the right under section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 cannot
be rendered otiose by a wide interpretation of Section 14(1) and that these
two provisions have to be balanced.
(vi) The above view has been subsequently affirmed by this Court. In
Sharad Subramanayan vs. Soumi Mazumdar & Ors. (2006) 8 SCC 91 (at para 20),
this Court upheld the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents
therein that there was no proposition of law that all dispositions of
property made to a female Hindu were necessarily in recognition of her
right to maintenance whether under the Shastric Hindu law or under the
statutory law.
(vii) Learned counsel referred para 14 in the case of Shivdev Kaur vs.
R.S. Grewal.
(viii) The position of law as recorded in Sadhu Singh’s case and
followed subsequently, therefore, appears to be that the question as to
whether Section 14(1) applies to a Will granting life interest to a widow
hinges on the finding by the Court that the grant was in lieu of
maintenance. This leads to the second arguments.”
13. Mr. Viswanathan, learned senior counsel. submitted the fact that the
life interest in property granted to the widow by way of a Will was
actually in lieu of her maintenance needs to be specifically pleaded,
proved and decided by the Court based on examination of evidence and
material on record.
14. Further, referring paragraph nos. 17, 22 and 24 of the decision in G.
Rama vs. TG Seshagiri Rao, (2008) 12 SCC 392, learned counsel submitted
that issues are required to be framed and evidence has to be led to
specifically show that the Will granted interest in property in lieu of
maintenance.
15. It is well settled that under the Hindu Law, the husband has got a
personal obligation to maintain his wife and if he is possessed of
properties then his wife is entitled to a right to be maintained out of
such properties. It is equally well settled that the claim of Hindu widow
to be maintained is not a mere formality which is to be exercised as a
matter of concession, grace or gratis but is a valuable, spiritual and
moral right. From the judicial pronouncement, the right of a widow to be
maintained, although does not create a charge on the property of her
husband but certainly the widow can enforce her right by moving the Court
and for passing a decree for maintenance by creating a charge.
16. The Hindu Married Women’s Right to Separate, Maintenance and
Residence Act, 1946 was enacted giving statutory recognition of such right
and, therefore, there can be no doubt that the right to maintenance is a
pre-existing right.
17. In V. Tulsamma and others vs. Sesha Reddy, AIR 1977 SC 1944, three
Judges Bench of this Court has elaborately considered the right of a Hindu
woman to maintenance which is a pre-existing right. My Lord Justice Fazal
Ali writing the judgment firstly observed:-
“Thus on a careful consideration and detailed analysis of the authorities
mentioned above and the Shastric Hindu law on the subject, the following
propositions emerge with respect to the incidents and characteristics of a
Hindu woman’s right to maintenance:
(1) that a Hindu woman’s right to maintenance is a personal
obligation so far as the husband is concerned, and it is his duty to
maintain her even if he has no property. If the husband has property then
the right of the widow to maintenance becomes an equitable charge on his
property and any person who succeeds to the property carries with it the
legal obligation to maintain the widow;
(2) though the widow’s right to maintenance is not a right, to
property but it is undoubtedly a pre-existing right in property i.e. it is
a jus ad rem not jus in rem and it can be enforced by the widow who can get
a charge created for her maintenance on the property either by an agreement
or by obtaining a decree from the civil court;
(3) that the right of maintenance is a matter of moment and is of
such importance that even if the joint property is sold and the purchaser
has notice of the widow’s right to maintenance, the purchaser is legally
bound to provide for her maintenance;
(4) that the right to maintenance is undoubtedly a pre-existing
right which existed in the Hindu law long before the passing of the Act of
1937 or the Act of 1946, and is, therefore, a pre-existing right;
(5) that the right to maintenance flows from the social and
temporal relationship between the husband and the wife by virtue of which
the wife becomes a sort of co-owner in the property of her husband, though
her co-ownership is of a subordinate nature; and
(6) that where a Hindu widow is in possession of the property of
her husband, she is entitled to retain the possession in lieu of her
maintenance unless the person who succeeds to the property or purchases the
same is in a position to make due arrangements for her maintenance.”
18. Interpreting the provisions of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession
Act, their Lordships observed: -
“In the light of the above decisions of this Court the following principles
appear to be clear:
“(1) that the provisions of Section 14 of the 1956 Act must be
liberally construed in order to advance the object of the Act which is to
enlarge the limited interest possessed by a Hindu widow which was in
consonance with the changing temper of the times;
(2) it is manifestly clear that sub-section (2) of Section 14 does
not refer to any transfer which merely recognises a pre-existing right
without creating or conferring a new title on the widow. This was clearly
held by this Court in Badri Pershad case.
(3) that the Act of 1956 has made revolutionary and far-reaching
changes in the Hindu society and every attempt should be made to carry out
the spirit of the Act which has undoubtedly supplied a long felt need and
tried to do away with the invidious distinction between a Hindu male and
female in matters of intestate succession;
(4) that sub-section (2) of Section 14 is merely a proviso to sub-
section (1) of Section 14 and has to be interpreted as a proviso and not in
a manner so as to destroy the effect of the main provision.”
19. Lastly, His Lordship after elaborate consideration of the law and
different authorities came to the following conclusions:-
“We would now like to summarise the legal conclusions which we have reached
after an exhaustive considerations of the authorities mentioned above on
the question of law involved in this appeal as to the interpretation of
Sections 14(1) and (2) of the Act of 1956. These conclusions may be stated
thus:
“(1) The Hindu female’s right to maintenance is not an empty formality or
an illusory claim being conceded as a matter of grace and generosity, but
is a tangible right against property which flows from the spiritual
relationship between the husband and the wife and is recognised and
enjoined by pure Shastric Hindu law and has been strongly stressed even by
the earlier Hindu jurists starting from Yajnavalkya to Manu. Such a right
may not be a right to property but it is a right against property and the
husband has a personal obligation to maintain his wife and if he or the
family has property, the female has the legal right to be maintained
therefrom. If a charge is created for the maintenance of a female, the said
right becomes a legally enforceable one. At any rate, even without a charge
the claim for maintenance is doubtless a pre-existing right so that any
transfer declaring or recognising such a right does not confer any new
title but merely endorses or confirms the pre-existing rights.
(2) Section 14(1) and the Explanation thereto have been couched in the
widest possible terms and must be liberally construed in favour of the
females so as to advance the object of the 1956 Act and promote the socio-
economic ends sought to be achieved by this long needed legislation.
(3) Sub-section (2) of Section 14 is in the nature of a proviso and has a
field of its own without interfering with the operation of Section 14(1)
materially. The proviso should not be construed in a manner so as to
destroy the effect of the main provision or the protection granted by
Section 14(1) or in a way so as to become totally inconsistent with the
main provision.
(4) Sub-section (2) of Section 14 applies to instruments, decrees, awards,
gifts, etc. which create independent and new titles in favour of the
females for the first time and has no application where the instrument
concerned merely seeks to confirm, endorse, declare or recognise pre-
existing rights. In such cases a restricted estate in favour of a female is
legally permissible and Section 14(1) will not operate in this sphere.
Where, however, an instrument merely declares or recognises a pre-existing
right, such as a claim to maintenance or partition or share to which the
female is entitled, the sub-section has absolutely no application and the
female’s limited interest would automatically be enlarged into an absolute
one by force of Section 14(1) and the restrictions placed, if any, under
the document would have to be ignored. Thus where a property is allotted or
transferred to a female in lieu of maintenance or a share at partition, the
instrument is taken out of the ambit of sub-section (2) and would be
governed by Section 14(1) despite any restrictions placed on the powers of
the transferee.
(5) The use of express terms like ‘property acquired by a female Hindu at a
partition’, ‘or in lieu of maintenance’, ‘or arrears of maintenance’, etc.
in the Explanation to Section 14(1) clearly makes sub-section (2)
inapplicable to these categories which have been expressly excepted from
the operation of sub-section (2).
(6) The words ‘possessed by’ used by the Legislature in Section 14(1) are
of the widest possible amplitude and include the state of owning a property
even though the owner is not in actual or physical possession of the same.
Thus, where a widow gets a share in the property under a preliminary decree
before or at the time when the 1956 Act had been passed but had not been
given actual possession under a final decree, the property would be deemed
to be possessed by her and by force of Section 14(1) she would get absolute
interest in the property. It is equally well settled that the possession of
the widow, however, must be under some vestige of a claim, right or title,
because the section does not contemplate the possession of any rank
trespasser without any right or title.
(7) That the words ‘restricted estate’ used in Section 14(2) are wider than
limited interest as indicated in Section 14(1) and they include not only
limited interest, but also any other kind of limitation that may be placed
on the transferee.”
20. Mr. Vishwanathan put heavy reliance on the decision of this Court in
the case of Mst. Karmi vs. Amru (1972 Vol. 4 SCC 86). In our considered
opinion, the ratio decided in that case will not apply in the facts of the
present case. In Mst. Karmi case (Supra), one Jaimal, who was the owner of
the property, had executed a Will directing that on his death, his entire
estate would devolve upon his widow Nihali during her life and thereafter,
the same would devolve upon his collaterals on the death of Jaimal. The
properties were mutated in the name of Nihali who eventually died in 1960.
On her death, the collaterals claimed the properties on the basis of Will,
but the appellant claimed the properties as their sole legatee from Nihali
under her Will of 1958. On these facts, it was held that Nihali having
succeeded to the properties of Jaimal on the strength of Will cannot claim
any right in those properties over and above that was given to her under
the Will. The Court observed that the life estate given to her under the
Will cannot become an absolute estate under the provisions of Hindu
Succession Act, 1956.
21. The facts in Karmi’s case (supra) and that of the present case are
fully distinguishable. In the instant case, the Will was executed in 1920
in which Subba Rao has mentioned that his first wife died, the second wife
got two sons and one daughter. Thereafter, second wife also died. He,
then, married to Veeraraghavamma as a third wife, who is alive. The
executant of the Will have also mentioned the description of the properties
owned by him. He, very specifically mentioned in the Will that his third
wife Veeraraghavamma shall enjoy for life one tiled house situated in the
compound wall. For that enjoyment, it was also mentioned in the Will that
the widow Veeraraghavamma shall also be entitled to fetch water from the
well situated in the backyard of a different house. In other words, the
executant of the Will made arrangements for his third wife to maintain her
enjoyment in the suit schedule property till her life. The intention of
the executant is therefore clear that he gave the suit schedule property to
his third wife Veeraraghavamma in order to hold and enjoy the suit property
for her maintenance during her lifetime. It is not a case like Karmi case
that by executing a Will, the executant directed that his entire estate
will devolve upon his widow Veeraraghavamma.
22. A three Judges Bench of this Court in the case of R.B. S.S. Munnalal
and Others vs. S.S. Rajkumar & Others, AIR 1962 SC 1493, while
interpreting the provisions of Section 14(1) of the Act observed:-
“16. By Section 14(1) the legislature sought to convert the interest of a
Hindu female which under the Sastric Hindu law would have been regarded as
a limited interest into an absolute interest and by the Explanation thereto
gave to the expression “property” the widest connotation. The expression
includes property acquired by a Hindu female by inheritance or devise, or
at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by
gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her
marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by
prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever. By Section 14(1)
manifestly it is intended to convert the interest which a Hindu female has
in property however restricted the nature of that interest under the
Sastric Hindu law may be into absolute estate. Pratapmull case undoubtedly
laid down that till actual division of the share declared in her favour by
a preliminary decree for partition of the joint family estate a Hindu wife
or mother, was not recognised as owner, but that rule cannot in our
judgment apply after the enactment of the Hindu Succession Act. The Act is
a codifying enactment, and has made far reaching changes in the structure
of the Hindu law of inheritance, and succession. The Act confers upon Hindu
females full rights of inheritance, and sweeps away the traditional
limitations on her powers of dispositions which were regarded under the
Hindu law as inherent in her estate. She is under the Act regarded as a
fresh stock of descent in respect of property possessed by her at the time
of her death. It is true that under the Sastric Hindu law, the share given
to a Hindu widow on partition between her sons or her grandsons was in lieu
other right to maintenance. She was not entitled to claim partition. But
the Legislature by enacting the Hindu Womens' Right to Property Act, 1937
made a significant departure in that branch of the law; the Act gave a
Hindu widow the same interest in the property which her husband had at the
time of his death, and if the estate was partitioned she became owner in
severalty of her share, subject of course to the restrictions on
disposition and the peculiar rule of extinction of the estate on death
actual or civil. It cannot be assumed having regard to this development
that in enacting Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, the legislature
merely intended to declare the rule enunciated by the Privy Council in
PratapmuIl case. Section 4 of the Act gives an overriding effect to the
provisions of the Act.”
23. Reference may also be made to a three Judges Bench decision of this
Court in the case of Nirmal Chand vs. Vidya Wanti, (1969) 3 SCC 628. In
that case, by a registered document of partition, the related right was
given to the widow - the user of the land with the condition that she will
have no right to alienate in any manner. This Court holding that the case
falls under Section 14(1) of the Act held as under:-
“6. If Subhrai Bai was entitled to a share in her husband’s properties then
the suit properties must be held to have been allotted to her in accordance
with law. As the law then stood she had only a life interest in the
properties taken by her. Therefore the recital in the deed in question that
she would have only a life interest in the properties allotted to her share
is merely recording the true legal position. Hence it is not possible to
conclude that the properties in question were given to her subject to the
condition of her enjoying it for a life time. Therefore the trial court as
well as the first appellate court were right in holding that the facts of
the case do not fall within Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act,
1956. Consequently Subhrai Bai must be held to have had an absolute right
in the suit properties, in view of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession
Act.”
24. In the case of Thota Sesharathamma vs. Thota Manikyamma, (1991) 4 SCC
312, life estate was granted to a Hindu women by a Will as a limited owner
and the grant was in recognition of pre-existing right. Following the
ratio decided in Tulasamma’s case, their Lordships held that the decision
in Mst. Karmi cannot be considered as an authority on the ambit of Section
14(1) and (2) of the Act. The Court held:-
“9. It was clearly held in the above case that Section 14(2) of the Act is
in the nature of a proviso or an exception to Section 14(1) and comes into
operation only if acquisition in any of the methods indicated therein is
made for the first time without there being any pre-existing right in the
female Hindu to the property. The Bench consisted of Hon. J.C. Shah, V.
Ramaswamy and A.N. Grover, JJ.
10. The case of Mst Karmi v. Amru on which a reliance has now been placed
by learned counsel for the appellant and petitioners was also decided by a
bench of three Judges Hon. J.C. Shah, K.S. Hegde and A.N. Grover, JJ. It
may be noted that two Hon’ble Judges, namely, J.C. Shah and A.N. Grover
were common to both the cases. In Mst Karmi v. Amru, one Jaimal died in
1938 leaving his wife Nihali. His son Ditta pre-deceased him. Appellant in
the above case was the daughter of Ditta and the respondents were
collaterals of Jaimal. Jaimal first executed a will dated December 18, 1935
and by a subsequent will dated November 13, 1937 revoked the first will. By
the second will a life estate was given to Nihali and thereafter the
property was made to devolve on Bhagtu and Amru collaterals. On the death
of Jaimal in 1938, properties were mutated in the name of Nihali. Nihali
died in 1960/61. The appellant Mst Karmi claimed right on the basis of a
will dated April 25, 1958 executed by Nihali in her favour. It was held
that the life estate given to a widow under the will of her husband cannot
become an absolute estate under the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act.
Thereafter, the appellant cannot claim title to the properties on the basis
of the will executed by the widow Nihali in her favour. It is a short
judgment without adverting to any provisions of Section 14(1) or 14(2) of
the Act. The judgment neither makes any mention of any argument raised in
this regard nor there is any mention of the earlier decision in Badri
Pershad v. Smt Kanso Devi. The decision in Mst Karmi cannot be considered
as an authority on the ambit and scope of Section 14(1) and (2) of the
Act.”
25. Reference may also be made to the decision of three Judges Bench of
this Court in the case of Shakuntala Devi vs. Kamla and Others, (2005) 5
SCC 390, where a Hindu wife was bequeathed life interest for maintenance by
Will with the condition that she would not have power to alienate the same
in any manner. As per the Will, after death of the wife, the property was
to revert back to his daughter as an absolute owner. On this fact their
Lordships following the ratio decided in Tulasamma’s case (supra) held that
by virtue of Section 14(1) a limited right given to the wife under the Will
got enlarged to an absolute right in the suit property.
26. Mr. K.Ramamurty, learned senior counsel appearing for the
respondent, also relied upon the decision in the case of Santosh and Others
vs. Saraswathibai and Another, (2008) 1 SCC 465, Subhan Rao and Others vs.
Parvathi Bai and Others, (2010) 10 SCC 235 and Sri Ramakrishna Mutt vs. M.
Maheswaran and Others, (2011) 1 SCC 68.
27. In Santosh’s case (supra), this Court followed the decision given in
Nazar Singh’s case, (1996) 1 SCC 35, and held that the pre-existing right
of wife was crystallized and her limited interest became an absolute
interest in the property possessed by her in lieu of maintenance.
28. A similar question arose for consideration before this Court in
Subhan Rao case (supra), where a portion of suit property was given to the
plaintiff-wife for her maintenance subject to restriction that she will not
alienate the land which was given to her maintenance. The question arose
as to whether by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act she became the owner of
the suit property. Considering all the earlier decisions of this Court,
their Lordships held that by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act, the pre-
existing right in lieu of her right to maintenance transformed into
absolute estate.
29. In the case of Nazar Singh and Others vs. Jagjit Kaur and Others,
(1996) 1 SCC 35, this Court following the decision in Tulasamma’s case held
as under:-
“9. Section 14 and the respective scope and ambit of sub-sections (1) and
(2) has been the subject-matter of a number of decisions of this Court, the
most important of which is the decision in V. Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddy. The
principles enunciated in this decision have been reiterated in a number of
decisions later but have never been departed from. According to this
decision, sub-section (2) is confined to cases where property is acquired
by a female Hindu for the first time as a grant without any pre-existing
right under a gift, will, instrument, decree, order or award, the terms of
which prescribe a restricted estate in the property. It has also been held
that where the property is acquired by a Hindu female in lieu of right of
maintenance inter alia, it is in virtue of a pre-existing right and such an
acquisition would not be within the scope and ambit of sub-section (2) even
if the instrument, decree, order or award allotting the property to her
prescribes a restricted estate in the property. Applying this principle, it
must be held that the suit lands, which were given to Harmel Kaur by
Gurdial Singh in lieu of her maintenance, were held by Harmel Kaur as full
owner thereof and not as a limited owner notwithstanding the several
restrictive covenants accompany-ing the grant. [Also see the recent
decision of this Court in Mangat Mal v. Punni Devi where a right to
residence in a house property was held to attract sub-section (1) of
Section 14 notwithstanding the fact that the grant expressly conferred only
a limited estate upon her.] According to sub-section (1), where any
property is given to a female Hindu in lieu of her maintenance before the
commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, such property becomes the
absolute property of such female Hindu on the commencement of the Act
provided the said property was ‘possessed’ by her. Where, however, the
property is given to a female Hindu towards her maintenance after the
commencement of the Act, she becomes the absolute owner thereof the moment
she is placed in possession of the said property (unless, of course, she is
already in possession) notwithstanding the limitations and restrictions
contained in the instrument, grant or award whereunder the property is
given to her. This proposition follows from the words in sub-section (1),
which insofar as is relevant read: “Any property possessed by a female
Hindu … after the commencement of this Act shall be held by her as full
owner and not as a limited owner.” In other words, though the instrument,
grant, award or deed creates a limited estate or a restricted estate, as
the case may be, it stands transformed into an absolute estate provided
such property is given to a female Hindu in lieu of maintenance and is
placed in her possession. So far as the expression ‘possessed’ is
concerned, it too has been the subject-matter of interpretation by several
decisions of this Court to which it is not necessary to refer for the
purpose of this case.”
30. In Sadhu Singh’s case, (2006) 8 SCC 75, the facts of the case were
quite different to that of the present case. In Sadhu Singh’s case, this
Court proceeded on the basis that the widow had no pre-existing right in
the property, and therefore, the life estate given to her in the Will
cannot get enlarged into absolute estate under Section 14(1) of the Act.
31. Mr. Vishwanathan, learned senior counsel for the appellant’s last
contention was that in the absence of any pleading and proof from the side
of the appellant to substantiate the plea that Veeraraghavamma was
occupying the property in lieu of maintenance, Section 14 will not be
automatically attracted. We do not find any substance in the submission
made by the learned counsel. Indisputably, Exhibit A-2 is a document which
very categorically provided that the property in question was given to
Veeraraghavamma to enjoy the same till her life. Neither the genuineness
of the said Exhibit A-2 was disputed nor it was disputed that
Veeraraghavamma was enjoying the property by way of maintenance. In our
considered opinion, unless the factum of bequeathing the property in favour
of the wife and her continuous possession are disputed, the question of
pleading and proof does not arise. In other words, no one disputed the
arrangement made in the Will and Veeraraghavamma continued to enjoy the
said property in lieu of maintenance. Hence, the ratio decided in G. Rama’s
case (supra) does not apply.
32. Further, indisputably, Mr. P. Venkata Subba Rao, the original owner of
the property, realized the fact that his wife Veeraraghavamma was issueless
and she has a pre-existing right to be maintained out of his property. He
further realized that physically he was weak and may not survive for long
period. He therefore, decided to give his properties to his family
members. For the maintenance of his third wife Veeraraghavamma, he gave
the tiled house with site and compound wall with the stipulation that she
shall enjoy the property for life in lieu of maintenance. She will also be
entitled to fetch water from the well and use other facilities.
Admittedly, no one disputed the arrangements made in the Will and
Veeraraghavamma continued to enjoy the said property. In view of the
admitted position, we have no doubt to hold that by virtue of Section 14(1)
of the Act, her limited right became absolute right to the suit property.
33. In the impugned judgment, the High Court has elaborately discussed
the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto and came to the
conclusion that the trial court committed serious error of law in holding
that by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Act, her limited right has not
become absolute.
34. Though no specific word has been mentioned in Exhibit A-2 that in
lieu of maintenance life interest has been created in favour of
Veeraraghavamma, in our opinion in whatever form a limited interest is
created in her favour who was having a pre-existing right of maintenance,
the same has become an absolute right by the operation of Section 14(1) of
the Hindu Succession Act.
35. After giving our anxious consideration to the matter and the judicial
pronouncements of this Court in a series of decisions, we hold that the
impugned judgment of the High Court is perfectly in accordance with law and
needs no interference by this Court.
36. For the reasons aforesaid, this appeal has no merit and dismissed.
However, there shall be no order as to costs.
…………………………….J.
(M.Y. Eqbal)
…………………………….J.
(C. Nagappan)
New Delhi
November 06, 2015
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 375 OF 2007
Jupudy Pardha Sarathy Appellant(s)
versus
Pentapati Rama Krishna and others Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
| |
|M.Y. Eqbal, J.: |
This appeal by special leave is directed against order dated
21.9.2006 passed by learned Single Judge of the High Court of Andhra
Pradesh, who allowed the appeal preferred by Defendant no.1 and set aside
the judgment and decree of the trial Court in the original suit preferred
by the appellant.
2. The only question that needs consideration in this appeal is as to
whether the High Court is correct in law in interpreting the provisions of
Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (for short 'the Act') in
arriving at a conclusion that the widow of the deceased P. Venkata Subba
Rao acquired an absolute interest in the property by the operation of
Section 14 of the Act.
3. The undisputed facts are that the said suit property originally
belonged to one P. Venkata Subba Rao, who had three wives. Only the second
wife was blessed with two sons and one daughter, including defendant-
Narasimha Rao. Veeraraghavamma was the third wife of the said P.
Venkata Subba Rao but she did not have any issues. P. Venkata Subba Rao
executed a Will in the year 1920(Exh.A2) in favour of his 3rd wife
Veeraghavamma who in turn executed a Will dated 14.7.1971 (Exh.B1) in
favour of defendant-Pentapati Subba Rao, and thereafter, she died in 1976.
The case of the defendant is that the said P. Narasimha Rao has no right to
transfer the suit properties in favour of the plaintiff.
4. The plaintiff’s-appellant’s case is that he purchased the suit
property from one P. Narasimha Roa who was having a vested remainder in
respect of the said suit property on the expiry of life estate of
testator’s wife Veeraghavamma. According to the plaintiff-appellant,
during the life time of Veeraghavamma she enjoyed the properties and after
her death the property devolved upon the vendors of the plaintiff.
5. The trial court noted the undisputed case of both the parties that
Will (Exh.A2) was executed by late P. Venkata Subba Rao in favour of
Veeraghavamma but she had limited interest to enjoy the property during her
life time and thereafter the remainder vested with P. Narasimha Rao to
enjoy the said property as absolute owner after the death of Veeraghavamma.
However, the trial court held that life estate of Veeraghavamma under the
Will did not become enlarged into absolute estate under Section 14(1) of
the Act and the vested remainder in favour of P. Narasimha Rao did not get
extinguished in respect of the scheduled properties. Accordingly, the
suit was decreed.
6. Aggrieved by the decision of the trial court defendant no.1 - P.
Subba Rao preferred an appeal before the High Court. The High Court
allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court
holding that Veeraghavamma became the absolute owner of the suit property
by virtue of Section 14(1) and she had every right to bequeath the said
property in favour of P. Subba Rao, the first defendant under Exhibits B1
and B2.
7. Hence, the present appeal by special leave by the plaintiff. During
the pendency of the appeal before the High Court, first defendant died and
his legal representatives were brought on record and are arrayed in the
present appeal as respondent nos.1 to 3. Respondent no. 4 is defendant
no.3, and Legal representatives of Respondent no.5, who was defendant no.4,
were brought on record after his death during pendency of this appeal.
Rest respondents were brought on record as legal representatives of second
defendant, who died during pendency of the suit. Since respondent no.4 has
vacated the suit shop and delivered possession to the plaintiff on
6.7.2006, appellant has moved before us an application for deletion of
respondent no.4 from the array of parties. It is ordered accordingly.
8. Before we decide the question involved in this appeal we would like
to reproduce the contents of the Will (Exh.A1) which is as under:-
“I, Pularvathi Venkata Subba Rao, S/o late Pularvathy Venkamma Vysya,
Business, R/o Rajahmundhry, have executed the Will dt. 24.08.1920 with good
consciousness and wisdom.
I am now approximately 53 years. Now I have less physical strength
and consequently I may not survive for longer period, hence I have proposed
to give all my properties both movable and immovable mentioned in the
schedule below by way of this Will.
My first wife died issueless. My second wife got two sons by name
Manikyaro and Narasimha Rao and a daughter by name Nagarathnamma. My 2nd
wife also died. Thereafter I married Veeraghavamma my third wife and she
is alive. She has not begotten any children. I have house property
bearing Municipal D.No.6/875, another house bearing D.No.6/876 and also 5
shop rooms abutting to them with vacant house site covered by D.No.6/870 in
Innespeta, Rajahmundry Village, Rajahmundry Sub Registry, E.G. Dist.I have
wet land of extent ac15.17 cents in Rustumbada village Naraspuram Sub
Registry, Naraspuram Taluk. The said landed property was in the name of my
2nd wife and after her life time my two sons mentioned above got the same
mutated it in their names.
I have a policy bearing No. 23232 in Oriental Life Insurance Company
and I have to receive monies from the said policy and also silver, gold,
brass articles house hold utensils Beeruva, Furniture, iron safe etc., I
have made the following dispositions which are to take place after my life
time.
My third wife Veeraghavamma shall enjoy for life the tiled house with
site and compound wall and with half right in the well covered by municipal
D.No.6/875, Rajahmundry and after life time of my wife my 2nd son Narasimha
Rao shall have the property with absolute rights such as gift, sale etc.
My second son Narasimha Rao shall have absolute rights such as gift and
sale in respect of the tiled house bearing D/no.6/876 and the 5 shop rooms
covered by D.No.6/870 and the sit abutting the above two properties with
Chavidi and one Big latrine out of the two and that my wife Veeraraghavamma
shall enjoy for life the small latrine covered by D.No.6/870 and after her
life time my son Narasimha Rao shall have the property with absolute right.
The said Veeraraghavamma is entitled to fetch water from the well situated
in back yard of house bearing D.No.6/870. My eldest so Maniyarao shall
have absolute rights such as gift and sale etc., in respect of ac
15.17 cents of Zeroyiti wet land of Rustumbada Village Narasapuram Taluk
and my eldest son Maniyarao shall pay Rs.650/- which I am liable to pay to
her and thus either Nagarathnamma or any one has got no right in the said
property.
The amount receivable from the Insurance Company referred above shall
be recovered and my two sons, daughter and my wife, all the four shall
share the same equally and that the ornaments lying with them shall take
the same absolutely and that one shall not claim or demand for any oweties
against another.
(Emphasis given)
This Will I have executed with full and good consciousness and the
same shall come into force after my life time. The properties mentioned in
this Will are all my self acquired properties and I did not get any
ancestral properties.
I reserve my right to change the contents of the Will during my life
time.
Signed Pularvati Venkata Subba Rao
Attesting Witnesses
Modali Subbarayudu
Yendi Surayya
Scribed by Pularvati Venkata Subba Rao
With his own handwriting
The contents of the said will shall come into force after my life time.
Signed by Pularvati Venkata Subbarao”
9. The trial court although noticed the decision of this Court in the
case of V. Tulasamma and others vs. Sesha Reddy (dead) by Lrs. (AIR 1977
SC 1944) but held that in that case on the basis of compromise the Hindu
widow was allotted immoveable properties expressly in lieu of her
maintenance, and hence, Section 14(1) of the Act was readily applicable to
that case. Whereas, the trial court held that the decision of this Court
in the case of Mst Karmi vs. Amru & Ors., (AIR 1971 SC 745), is applicable
because in that case the Hindu widow succeeded the properties of her
husband on the strength of Will where under she was given life estate in
the properties. For better appreciation paragraphs 25, 26 and 27 of the
trial court’s judgment are quoted thus:-
“25. The first defendant’s counsel placed heavy reliance on the decision
reported in Palchuri Hanumayamma vs. Tadikamalla Kotilingam (1986 (1)
ALT.546), it is only in that decision it was held that it is not necessary
that the will or other documents under which property is given to a Hindu
female should expressly specify that the property is given to a Hindu
female should expressly specify that the property is a given in lieu of a
pre-existing right or right of maintenance and that it is sufficient if
only a right was in existence in favour of the Hindu female on the date
when the document was executed. It is a judgment rendered by a single
judge of the High Court. It is a case where the High Court was considering
the bequest of property to a Hindu widow under a will as life estate.
26. In Vaddeboyina Tulasamma vs. Vaddeboyina Sesha Reddi (A.I.R. 1977 SC
1944) a Hindu widow obtained a decree for maintenance against the brothers
of her deceased husband and was executing the said decree for maintenance.
During that time, the Hindu Widow and the brothers of her deceased husband
entered into a compromise where under the Hindu widow was allotted
immovable properties to be enjoyed only as limited owner power of
alienation. It was a case where the Hindu Widow was allotted properties
expressly in lieu of her maintenance and satisfaction of her maintenance
decree. Therefore, Sec. 14 (1) of the Act is readily applicable to that
case. On the other hand, in the decision reported in Mst Karmi vs. Amro (
A.I.R. 1971 SC 745) a Hindu widow succeeded to the properties of her
husband on the strength of a Will where under she was given life estate in
the properties. In those circumstances the Supreme Court held that the
Hindu widow having succeeded to the properties of her husband on the
strength of that will cannot claim any rights in these properties over and
above that given to her under that will and that the life estate given to
her under the will cannot become an absolute estate under the provisions of
the Hindu Succession Act. It was a decision rendered by three Judges of
Supreme Court. This decision was not referred to in the subsequent
decision of the year 1977 referred to above. The decision of the year 1977
was also rendered by three judges of the Supreme Court. When the latter
decision of the Supreme Court is in all fours with the facts in the case
on hand, the former decision of the Supreme Court of the year 1977 cannot
be applied to the facts of the present case.
27. In Smt. Culwant Kaur vs. Mohinder Singh (A.I.R. 1987 SC 2251) the
provisions of Section 14(1) of the Act were applied because it was a case
where the Hindu female was put in possession of the property expressly in
pursuance to and in recognition of the maintenance in her. Similarly, in
the decision reported in Gurdip Singh vs. Amar Singh (1991 (1) L.W.15) the
Supreme Court applied the provisions of Section 14(1) of the Act where the
wife acquired property by way of gift from her husband explicitly in lieu
of maintenance. In Bai Vajia vs. Thakorbhai Chelabhai (A.I.R. 1979 SC 993)
also the Hindu widow obtained possession of the property in default of
payment of maintenance to her. So, the Supreme Court applied the
provisions of Section 14(1) of the Act to that case.”
10. On the basis of the ratio decided by this Court in the decision
quoted hereinabove and also other decisions of the High Court, the trial
court held that the life estate of Veeraghavamma under Exhibit A-2 will not
become enlarge into absolute estate under Section 14(1) of the Hindu
Succession Act and did not extinguish vested remainders interest of
Narasimha Rao in the suit property.
11. In appeal, the High Court, after discussing the ratio decided by this
Court in the decisions noted by the trial court and also other decisions of
this Court, reversed the finding of the trial court and held that the case
falls under Section 14(1) of the Act and Veeraghavamma became the absolute
owner of the suit property and she had every right to bequeath the said
property in favour of the first defendant P. Subba Rao under Exhibits B-1
and B-2. The High Court held that:-
“In view of the aforesaid authoritative judgment of Hon'ble Justice
Jagannadha Rao following several judgments of the Apex Court, I am of the
opinion that the reasoning given by the trial Court, that as there is no
specific wording in the instrument Ex.A2 that life estate has been given in
lieu of a pre-existing right or right of maintenance the same do not become
enlarged into absolute estate, is not relevant and is quite contrary to the
aforesaid judgment.
Merely because Veeraraghavamma was appointed as the guardian of P.
Narasimha Rao - vendor of the plaintiff it could not be said that
Veeraraghavamma had no pre-existing right or right of maintenance in
respect of the property in which a limited interest had been created in her
favour. As the vendor of plaintiff was also having properties other than
the property in question, after the death of his natural father,
Veeraraghavamma was appointed as his guardian. Immediately after the
vendor of the plaintiff attained majority the guardianship was discharged
and he used to manage his own movable and immovable properties
individually. It cannot be said that for the first time the life estate
has been created under Ex.A2 Will in favour of Veeraraghavamma, as
undoubtedly, she was having a pre-existing right to be maintained by her
husband, therefore, it is the duty of her husband to maintain her during
her lifetime. Though no specific words have been mentioned in Ex.A2 that
in lieu of maintenance the life estate has been created, under Section
14(1) in whatever form a limited interest is created in favour of a Hindu
female, who is having a pre-existing right of maintenance, it becomes
absolute right after 1956 Act came into force.
As Veeraraghavamma became absolute owner by virtue of Section 14(1) of the
Act she had right to bequeath the said property in favour of the first
defendant under Exs.B1 and B2. Therefore, as the vested remainder of P.
Narasimha Rao got nullified, he had no right or authority to sell the said
property under Ex.A1 sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. As the limited
interest of Veeraraghavamma blossomed into absolute right, bequeathing the
said property in favour of the first defendant under Exs.B1 and B2 is legal
and valid. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, I
am of the opinion that the limited interest to enjoy the property during
the lifetime of Veeraraghavamma blossomed into an absolute right in
accordance with Section 14(1), after the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came
into force and the vested remainder created in favour of the vendor of the
plaintiff is nullified.”
12. Mr. K.V. Viswanathan, learned senior advocate appearing for the
appellant, confined his argument to the question of law as to whether the
High Court erred in law in holding that Section 14(1) of the Act will be
attracted and the widow Veeraghavamma have acquired absolute interest in
the properties. Learned counsel made the following submissions:-
“(i) Section 14(1) cannot be interpreted to mean that each and every Will
granting a limited/life interest in a property to a widow is deemed/assumed
to be in lieu of her maintenance. If the testator in his Will specifically
provides that he is granting only life interest in the property to his
widow, his right to limit his widow’s right in the property is recognized
by Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Further, the
testator’s right to dispose off his property by will or other testamentary
disposition is recognized by Section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
Therefore, Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 cannot be
interpreted in a manner that renders Section 14(2) and Section 30 of the
same Act otiose.
(ii) In Mst. Karmi vs. Amru & Ors. (1972)4 SCC 86), a 3-Judge Bench of
this Court held to the effect that a widow who succeeded to the property
of her deceased husband on the strength of his will cannot claim any rights
in the property other than those conferred by the will.. “The life estate
given to her under the Will cannot become an absolute estate under the
provisions of the Hindu Succession Act”
(iii) In V. Tulsamma vs. Sesha Reddy (1977) 3 SCC 99, this Court clarified
the difference between sub-section (1) and (2) of Section 14, thereby
restricting the right of a testator to grant a limited life interest in a
property to his wife. Learned counsel referred para 62 of the judgment in
Tulsamma case.
(iv) V. Tulsamma’s case involved a compromise decree arising out of decree
for maintenance obtained by the widow against her husband’s brother in a
case of intestate succession. It did not deal with situations of
testamentary succession. Therefore, strictly on facts, it may not be
applicable to cases of testamentary succession. However, in terms of law
declared therein, a doubt may arise whether Section 14(1) may apply to
every instance of a Will granting a limited/life interest in a property to
the widow on the ground that the widow has a pre-existing right of
maintenance.
(v) This doubt was resolved by the Supreme Court in Sadhu Singh vs.
Gurdwara Sahib Narike, (2006) 8 SCC 75, where it was held at paras 13 and
14 that the right under section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 cannot
be rendered otiose by a wide interpretation of Section 14(1) and that these
two provisions have to be balanced.
(vi) The above view has been subsequently affirmed by this Court. In
Sharad Subramanayan vs. Soumi Mazumdar & Ors. (2006) 8 SCC 91 (at para 20),
this Court upheld the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents
therein that there was no proposition of law that all dispositions of
property made to a female Hindu were necessarily in recognition of her
right to maintenance whether under the Shastric Hindu law or under the
statutory law.
(vii) Learned counsel referred para 14 in the case of Shivdev Kaur vs.
R.S. Grewal.
(viii) The position of law as recorded in Sadhu Singh’s case and
followed subsequently, therefore, appears to be that the question as to
whether Section 14(1) applies to a Will granting life interest to a widow
hinges on the finding by the Court that the grant was in lieu of
maintenance. This leads to the second arguments.”
13. Mr. Viswanathan, learned senior counsel. submitted the fact that the
life interest in property granted to the widow by way of a Will was
actually in lieu of her maintenance needs to be specifically pleaded,
proved and decided by the Court based on examination of evidence and
material on record.
14. Further, referring paragraph nos. 17, 22 and 24 of the decision in G.
Rama vs. TG Seshagiri Rao, (2008) 12 SCC 392, learned counsel submitted
that issues are required to be framed and evidence has to be led to
specifically show that the Will granted interest in property in lieu of
maintenance.
15. It is well settled that under the Hindu Law, the husband has got a
personal obligation to maintain his wife and if he is possessed of
properties then his wife is entitled to a right to be maintained out of
such properties. It is equally well settled that the claim of Hindu widow
to be maintained is not a mere formality which is to be exercised as a
matter of concession, grace or gratis but is a valuable, spiritual and
moral right. From the judicial pronouncement, the right of a widow to be
maintained, although does not create a charge on the property of her
husband but certainly the widow can enforce her right by moving the Court
and for passing a decree for maintenance by creating a charge.
16. The Hindu Married Women’s Right to Separate, Maintenance and
Residence Act, 1946 was enacted giving statutory recognition of such right
and, therefore, there can be no doubt that the right to maintenance is a
pre-existing right.
17. In V. Tulsamma and others vs. Sesha Reddy, AIR 1977 SC 1944, three
Judges Bench of this Court has elaborately considered the right of a Hindu
woman to maintenance which is a pre-existing right. My Lord Justice Fazal
Ali writing the judgment firstly observed:-
“Thus on a careful consideration and detailed analysis of the authorities
mentioned above and the Shastric Hindu law on the subject, the following
propositions emerge with respect to the incidents and characteristics of a
Hindu woman’s right to maintenance:
(1) that a Hindu woman’s right to maintenance is a personal
obligation so far as the husband is concerned, and it is his duty to
maintain her even if he has no property. If the husband has property then
the right of the widow to maintenance becomes an equitable charge on his
property and any person who succeeds to the property carries with it the
legal obligation to maintain the widow;
(2) though the widow’s right to maintenance is not a right, to
property but it is undoubtedly a pre-existing right in property i.e. it is
a jus ad rem not jus in rem and it can be enforced by the widow who can get
a charge created for her maintenance on the property either by an agreement
or by obtaining a decree from the civil court;
(3) that the right of maintenance is a matter of moment and is of
such importance that even if the joint property is sold and the purchaser
has notice of the widow’s right to maintenance, the purchaser is legally
bound to provide for her maintenance;
(4) that the right to maintenance is undoubtedly a pre-existing
right which existed in the Hindu law long before the passing of the Act of
1937 or the Act of 1946, and is, therefore, a pre-existing right;
(5) that the right to maintenance flows from the social and
temporal relationship between the husband and the wife by virtue of which
the wife becomes a sort of co-owner in the property of her husband, though
her co-ownership is of a subordinate nature; and
(6) that where a Hindu widow is in possession of the property of
her husband, she is entitled to retain the possession in lieu of her
maintenance unless the person who succeeds to the property or purchases the
same is in a position to make due arrangements for her maintenance.”
18. Interpreting the provisions of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession
Act, their Lordships observed: -
“In the light of the above decisions of this Court the following principles
appear to be clear:
“(1) that the provisions of Section 14 of the 1956 Act must be
liberally construed in order to advance the object of the Act which is to
enlarge the limited interest possessed by a Hindu widow which was in
consonance with the changing temper of the times;
(2) it is manifestly clear that sub-section (2) of Section 14 does
not refer to any transfer which merely recognises a pre-existing right
without creating or conferring a new title on the widow. This was clearly
held by this Court in Badri Pershad case.
(3) that the Act of 1956 has made revolutionary and far-reaching
changes in the Hindu society and every attempt should be made to carry out
the spirit of the Act which has undoubtedly supplied a long felt need and
tried to do away with the invidious distinction between a Hindu male and
female in matters of intestate succession;
(4) that sub-section (2) of Section 14 is merely a proviso to sub-
section (1) of Section 14 and has to be interpreted as a proviso and not in
a manner so as to destroy the effect of the main provision.”
19. Lastly, His Lordship after elaborate consideration of the law and
different authorities came to the following conclusions:-
“We would now like to summarise the legal conclusions which we have reached
after an exhaustive considerations of the authorities mentioned above on
the question of law involved in this appeal as to the interpretation of
Sections 14(1) and (2) of the Act of 1956. These conclusions may be stated
thus:
“(1) The Hindu female’s right to maintenance is not an empty formality or
an illusory claim being conceded as a matter of grace and generosity, but
is a tangible right against property which flows from the spiritual
relationship between the husband and the wife and is recognised and
enjoined by pure Shastric Hindu law and has been strongly stressed even by
the earlier Hindu jurists starting from Yajnavalkya to Manu. Such a right
may not be a right to property but it is a right against property and the
husband has a personal obligation to maintain his wife and if he or the
family has property, the female has the legal right to be maintained
therefrom. If a charge is created for the maintenance of a female, the said
right becomes a legally enforceable one. At any rate, even without a charge
the claim for maintenance is doubtless a pre-existing right so that any
transfer declaring or recognising such a right does not confer any new
title but merely endorses or confirms the pre-existing rights.
(2) Section 14(1) and the Explanation thereto have been couched in the
widest possible terms and must be liberally construed in favour of the
females so as to advance the object of the 1956 Act and promote the socio-
economic ends sought to be achieved by this long needed legislation.
(3) Sub-section (2) of Section 14 is in the nature of a proviso and has a
field of its own without interfering with the operation of Section 14(1)
materially. The proviso should not be construed in a manner so as to
destroy the effect of the main provision or the protection granted by
Section 14(1) or in a way so as to become totally inconsistent with the
main provision.
(4) Sub-section (2) of Section 14 applies to instruments, decrees, awards,
gifts, etc. which create independent and new titles in favour of the
females for the first time and has no application where the instrument
concerned merely seeks to confirm, endorse, declare or recognise pre-
existing rights. In such cases a restricted estate in favour of a female is
legally permissible and Section 14(1) will not operate in this sphere.
Where, however, an instrument merely declares or recognises a pre-existing
right, such as a claim to maintenance or partition or share to which the
female is entitled, the sub-section has absolutely no application and the
female’s limited interest would automatically be enlarged into an absolute
one by force of Section 14(1) and the restrictions placed, if any, under
the document would have to be ignored. Thus where a property is allotted or
transferred to a female in lieu of maintenance or a share at partition, the
instrument is taken out of the ambit of sub-section (2) and would be
governed by Section 14(1) despite any restrictions placed on the powers of
the transferee.
(5) The use of express terms like ‘property acquired by a female Hindu at a
partition’, ‘or in lieu of maintenance’, ‘or arrears of maintenance’, etc.
in the Explanation to Section 14(1) clearly makes sub-section (2)
inapplicable to these categories which have been expressly excepted from
the operation of sub-section (2).
(6) The words ‘possessed by’ used by the Legislature in Section 14(1) are
of the widest possible amplitude and include the state of owning a property
even though the owner is not in actual or physical possession of the same.
Thus, where a widow gets a share in the property under a preliminary decree
before or at the time when the 1956 Act had been passed but had not been
given actual possession under a final decree, the property would be deemed
to be possessed by her and by force of Section 14(1) she would get absolute
interest in the property. It is equally well settled that the possession of
the widow, however, must be under some vestige of a claim, right or title,
because the section does not contemplate the possession of any rank
trespasser without any right or title.
(7) That the words ‘restricted estate’ used in Section 14(2) are wider than
limited interest as indicated in Section 14(1) and they include not only
limited interest, but also any other kind of limitation that may be placed
on the transferee.”
20. Mr. Vishwanathan put heavy reliance on the decision of this Court in
the case of Mst. Karmi vs. Amru (1972 Vol. 4 SCC 86). In our considered
opinion, the ratio decided in that case will not apply in the facts of the
present case. In Mst. Karmi case (Supra), one Jaimal, who was the owner of
the property, had executed a Will directing that on his death, his entire
estate would devolve upon his widow Nihali during her life and thereafter,
the same would devolve upon his collaterals on the death of Jaimal. The
properties were mutated in the name of Nihali who eventually died in 1960.
On her death, the collaterals claimed the properties on the basis of Will,
but the appellant claimed the properties as their sole legatee from Nihali
under her Will of 1958. On these facts, it was held that Nihali having
succeeded to the properties of Jaimal on the strength of Will cannot claim
any right in those properties over and above that was given to her under
the Will. The Court observed that the life estate given to her under the
Will cannot become an absolute estate under the provisions of Hindu
Succession Act, 1956.
21. The facts in Karmi’s case (supra) and that of the present case are
fully distinguishable. In the instant case, the Will was executed in 1920
in which Subba Rao has mentioned that his first wife died, the second wife
got two sons and one daughter. Thereafter, second wife also died. He,
then, married to Veeraraghavamma as a third wife, who is alive. The
executant of the Will have also mentioned the description of the properties
owned by him. He, very specifically mentioned in the Will that his third
wife Veeraraghavamma shall enjoy for life one tiled house situated in the
compound wall. For that enjoyment, it was also mentioned in the Will that
the widow Veeraraghavamma shall also be entitled to fetch water from the
well situated in the backyard of a different house. In other words, the
executant of the Will made arrangements for his third wife to maintain her
enjoyment in the suit schedule property till her life. The intention of
the executant is therefore clear that he gave the suit schedule property to
his third wife Veeraraghavamma in order to hold and enjoy the suit property
for her maintenance during her lifetime. It is not a case like Karmi case
that by executing a Will, the executant directed that his entire estate
will devolve upon his widow Veeraraghavamma.
22. A three Judges Bench of this Court in the case of R.B. S.S. Munnalal
and Others vs. S.S. Rajkumar & Others, AIR 1962 SC 1493, while
interpreting the provisions of Section 14(1) of the Act observed:-
“16. By Section 14(1) the legislature sought to convert the interest of a
Hindu female which under the Sastric Hindu law would have been regarded as
a limited interest into an absolute interest and by the Explanation thereto
gave to the expression “property” the widest connotation. The expression
includes property acquired by a Hindu female by inheritance or devise, or
at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by
gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her
marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by
prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever. By Section 14(1)
manifestly it is intended to convert the interest which a Hindu female has
in property however restricted the nature of that interest under the
Sastric Hindu law may be into absolute estate. Pratapmull case undoubtedly
laid down that till actual division of the share declared in her favour by
a preliminary decree for partition of the joint family estate a Hindu wife
or mother, was not recognised as owner, but that rule cannot in our
judgment apply after the enactment of the Hindu Succession Act. The Act is
a codifying enactment, and has made far reaching changes in the structure
of the Hindu law of inheritance, and succession. The Act confers upon Hindu
females full rights of inheritance, and sweeps away the traditional
limitations on her powers of dispositions which were regarded under the
Hindu law as inherent in her estate. She is under the Act regarded as a
fresh stock of descent in respect of property possessed by her at the time
of her death. It is true that under the Sastric Hindu law, the share given
to a Hindu widow on partition between her sons or her grandsons was in lieu
other right to maintenance. She was not entitled to claim partition. But
the Legislature by enacting the Hindu Womens' Right to Property Act, 1937
made a significant departure in that branch of the law; the Act gave a
Hindu widow the same interest in the property which her husband had at the
time of his death, and if the estate was partitioned she became owner in
severalty of her share, subject of course to the restrictions on
disposition and the peculiar rule of extinction of the estate on death
actual or civil. It cannot be assumed having regard to this development
that in enacting Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, the legislature
merely intended to declare the rule enunciated by the Privy Council in
PratapmuIl case. Section 4 of the Act gives an overriding effect to the
provisions of the Act.”
23. Reference may also be made to a three Judges Bench decision of this
Court in the case of Nirmal Chand vs. Vidya Wanti, (1969) 3 SCC 628. In
that case, by a registered document of partition, the related right was
given to the widow - the user of the land with the condition that she will
have no right to alienate in any manner. This Court holding that the case
falls under Section 14(1) of the Act held as under:-
“6. If Subhrai Bai was entitled to a share in her husband’s properties then
the suit properties must be held to have been allotted to her in accordance
with law. As the law then stood she had only a life interest in the
properties taken by her. Therefore the recital in the deed in question that
she would have only a life interest in the properties allotted to her share
is merely recording the true legal position. Hence it is not possible to
conclude that the properties in question were given to her subject to the
condition of her enjoying it for a life time. Therefore the trial court as
well as the first appellate court were right in holding that the facts of
the case do not fall within Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act,
1956. Consequently Subhrai Bai must be held to have had an absolute right
in the suit properties, in view of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession
Act.”
24. In the case of Thota Sesharathamma vs. Thota Manikyamma, (1991) 4 SCC
312, life estate was granted to a Hindu women by a Will as a limited owner
and the grant was in recognition of pre-existing right. Following the
ratio decided in Tulasamma’s case, their Lordships held that the decision
in Mst. Karmi cannot be considered as an authority on the ambit of Section
14(1) and (2) of the Act. The Court held:-
“9. It was clearly held in the above case that Section 14(2) of the Act is
in the nature of a proviso or an exception to Section 14(1) and comes into
operation only if acquisition in any of the methods indicated therein is
made for the first time without there being any pre-existing right in the
female Hindu to the property. The Bench consisted of Hon. J.C. Shah, V.
Ramaswamy and A.N. Grover, JJ.
10. The case of Mst Karmi v. Amru on which a reliance has now been placed
by learned counsel for the appellant and petitioners was also decided by a
bench of three Judges Hon. J.C. Shah, K.S. Hegde and A.N. Grover, JJ. It
may be noted that two Hon’ble Judges, namely, J.C. Shah and A.N. Grover
were common to both the cases. In Mst Karmi v. Amru, one Jaimal died in
1938 leaving his wife Nihali. His son Ditta pre-deceased him. Appellant in
the above case was the daughter of Ditta and the respondents were
collaterals of Jaimal. Jaimal first executed a will dated December 18, 1935
and by a subsequent will dated November 13, 1937 revoked the first will. By
the second will a life estate was given to Nihali and thereafter the
property was made to devolve on Bhagtu and Amru collaterals. On the death
of Jaimal in 1938, properties were mutated in the name of Nihali. Nihali
died in 1960/61. The appellant Mst Karmi claimed right on the basis of a
will dated April 25, 1958 executed by Nihali in her favour. It was held
that the life estate given to a widow under the will of her husband cannot
become an absolute estate under the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act.
Thereafter, the appellant cannot claim title to the properties on the basis
of the will executed by the widow Nihali in her favour. It is a short
judgment without adverting to any provisions of Section 14(1) or 14(2) of
the Act. The judgment neither makes any mention of any argument raised in
this regard nor there is any mention of the earlier decision in Badri
Pershad v. Smt Kanso Devi. The decision in Mst Karmi cannot be considered
as an authority on the ambit and scope of Section 14(1) and (2) of the
Act.”
25. Reference may also be made to the decision of three Judges Bench of
this Court in the case of Shakuntala Devi vs. Kamla and Others, (2005) 5
SCC 390, where a Hindu wife was bequeathed life interest for maintenance by
Will with the condition that she would not have power to alienate the same
in any manner. As per the Will, after death of the wife, the property was
to revert back to his daughter as an absolute owner. On this fact their
Lordships following the ratio decided in Tulasamma’s case (supra) held that
by virtue of Section 14(1) a limited right given to the wife under the Will
got enlarged to an absolute right in the suit property.
26. Mr. K.Ramamurty, learned senior counsel appearing for the
respondent, also relied upon the decision in the case of Santosh and Others
vs. Saraswathibai and Another, (2008) 1 SCC 465, Subhan Rao and Others vs.
Parvathi Bai and Others, (2010) 10 SCC 235 and Sri Ramakrishna Mutt vs. M.
Maheswaran and Others, (2011) 1 SCC 68.
27. In Santosh’s case (supra), this Court followed the decision given in
Nazar Singh’s case, (1996) 1 SCC 35, and held that the pre-existing right
of wife was crystallized and her limited interest became an absolute
interest in the property possessed by her in lieu of maintenance.
28. A similar question arose for consideration before this Court in
Subhan Rao case (supra), where a portion of suit property was given to the
plaintiff-wife for her maintenance subject to restriction that she will not
alienate the land which was given to her maintenance. The question arose
as to whether by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act she became the owner of
the suit property. Considering all the earlier decisions of this Court,
their Lordships held that by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act, the pre-
existing right in lieu of her right to maintenance transformed into
absolute estate.
29. In the case of Nazar Singh and Others vs. Jagjit Kaur and Others,
(1996) 1 SCC 35, this Court following the decision in Tulasamma’s case held
as under:-
“9. Section 14 and the respective scope and ambit of sub-sections (1) and
(2) has been the subject-matter of a number of decisions of this Court, the
most important of which is the decision in V. Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddy. The
principles enunciated in this decision have been reiterated in a number of
decisions later but have never been departed from. According to this
decision, sub-section (2) is confined to cases where property is acquired
by a female Hindu for the first time as a grant without any pre-existing
right under a gift, will, instrument, decree, order or award, the terms of
which prescribe a restricted estate in the property. It has also been held
that where the property is acquired by a Hindu female in lieu of right of
maintenance inter alia, it is in virtue of a pre-existing right and such an
acquisition would not be within the scope and ambit of sub-section (2) even
if the instrument, decree, order or award allotting the property to her
prescribes a restricted estate in the property. Applying this principle, it
must be held that the suit lands, which were given to Harmel Kaur by
Gurdial Singh in lieu of her maintenance, were held by Harmel Kaur as full
owner thereof and not as a limited owner notwithstanding the several
restrictive covenants accompany-ing the grant. [Also see the recent
decision of this Court in Mangat Mal v. Punni Devi where a right to
residence in a house property was held to attract sub-section (1) of
Section 14 notwithstanding the fact that the grant expressly conferred only
a limited estate upon her.] According to sub-section (1), where any
property is given to a female Hindu in lieu of her maintenance before the
commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, such property becomes the
absolute property of such female Hindu on the commencement of the Act
provided the said property was ‘possessed’ by her. Where, however, the
property is given to a female Hindu towards her maintenance after the
commencement of the Act, she becomes the absolute owner thereof the moment
she is placed in possession of the said property (unless, of course, she is
already in possession) notwithstanding the limitations and restrictions
contained in the instrument, grant or award whereunder the property is
given to her. This proposition follows from the words in sub-section (1),
which insofar as is relevant read: “Any property possessed by a female
Hindu … after the commencement of this Act shall be held by her as full
owner and not as a limited owner.” In other words, though the instrument,
grant, award or deed creates a limited estate or a restricted estate, as
the case may be, it stands transformed into an absolute estate provided
such property is given to a female Hindu in lieu of maintenance and is
placed in her possession. So far as the expression ‘possessed’ is
concerned, it too has been the subject-matter of interpretation by several
decisions of this Court to which it is not necessary to refer for the
purpose of this case.”
30. In Sadhu Singh’s case, (2006) 8 SCC 75, the facts of the case were
quite different to that of the present case. In Sadhu Singh’s case, this
Court proceeded on the basis that the widow had no pre-existing right in
the property, and therefore, the life estate given to her in the Will
cannot get enlarged into absolute estate under Section 14(1) of the Act.
31. Mr. Vishwanathan, learned senior counsel for the appellant’s last
contention was that in the absence of any pleading and proof from the side
of the appellant to substantiate the plea that Veeraraghavamma was
occupying the property in lieu of maintenance, Section 14 will not be
automatically attracted. We do not find any substance in the submission
made by the learned counsel. Indisputably, Exhibit A-2 is a document which
very categorically provided that the property in question was given to
Veeraraghavamma to enjoy the same till her life. Neither the genuineness
of the said Exhibit A-2 was disputed nor it was disputed that
Veeraraghavamma was enjoying the property by way of maintenance. In our
considered opinion, unless the factum of bequeathing the property in favour
of the wife and her continuous possession are disputed, the question of
pleading and proof does not arise. In other words, no one disputed the
arrangement made in the Will and Veeraraghavamma continued to enjoy the
said property in lieu of maintenance. Hence, the ratio decided in G. Rama’s
case (supra) does not apply.
32. Further, indisputably, Mr. P. Venkata Subba Rao, the original owner of
the property, realized the fact that his wife Veeraraghavamma was issueless
and she has a pre-existing right to be maintained out of his property. He
further realized that physically he was weak and may not survive for long
period. He therefore, decided to give his properties to his family
members. For the maintenance of his third wife Veeraraghavamma, he gave
the tiled house with site and compound wall with the stipulation that she
shall enjoy the property for life in lieu of maintenance. She will also be
entitled to fetch water from the well and use other facilities.
Admittedly, no one disputed the arrangements made in the Will and
Veeraraghavamma continued to enjoy the said property. In view of the
admitted position, we have no doubt to hold that by virtue of Section 14(1)
of the Act, her limited right became absolute right to the suit property.
33. In the impugned judgment, the High Court has elaborately discussed
the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto and came to the
conclusion that the trial court committed serious error of law in holding
that by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Act, her limited right has not
become absolute.
34. Though no specific word has been mentioned in Exhibit A-2 that in
lieu of maintenance life interest has been created in favour of
Veeraraghavamma, in our opinion in whatever form a limited interest is
created in her favour who was having a pre-existing right of maintenance,
the same has become an absolute right by the operation of Section 14(1) of
the Hindu Succession Act.
35. After giving our anxious consideration to the matter and the judicial
pronouncements of this Court in a series of decisions, we hold that the
impugned judgment of the High Court is perfectly in accordance with law and
needs no interference by this Court.
36. For the reasons aforesaid, this appeal has no merit and dismissed.
However, there shall be no order as to costs.
…………………………….J.
(M.Y. Eqbal)
…………………………….J.
(C. Nagappan)
New Delhi
November 06, 2015
