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Sunday, July 26, 2015

Knocking the doors of this Court in the first instance under the garb of a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, instead of approaching the High Court, for the enforcement of right claimed in these writ petitions is the preliminary question we are deciding herein. 2. In these two writ petitions, the petitioners have invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India challenging the refusal of the Medical Council of India (MCI) to recommend the renewal of permission for admitting students for the academic year 2015- 16 in the MBBS Course of the petitioner institutes and the consequent refusal of the Union Government to renew such permission.The jurisdiction of MCI or the Central Government to grant or refuse to grant permission has not been challenged. Hence, it is well within the jurisdiction of MCI which is statutory body to take a decision based on the inspection of the college to satisfy itself the compliance of various provisions of the acts, rules and regulations. 27. Under Article 32 of the Constitution, this Court is not supposed to go into finding of facts recorded by the authorities and to come to a different conclusion. Moreover, having regard to the law settled by Constitution Bench of this Court in number of decisions, in our considered opinion, the rights so claimed by the petitioners are not fundamental rights; hence the same cannot be agitated directly before this Court under Article 32 of the constitution.


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                         CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

                      WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 441 OF 2015

DM Wayanad Institute of
Medical Sciences                        …..Petitioner(s)
Union of India and another              …..Respondent(s)


                      WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 448 OF 2015

P. Krishna Das and another              …..Petitioner(s)
Union of India and others                          …..Respondent(s)

                               J U D G M E N T


 Knocking the doors of this Court in the first instance under the garb of  a
petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, instead  of  approaching  the
High Court, for the enforcement of right claimed in these writ petitions  is
the preliminary question we are deciding herein.

2.    In  these  two  writ  petitions,  the  petitioners  have  invoked  the
jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 of  the  Constitution  of  India
challenging the refusal of the Medical Council of India (MCI)  to  recommend
the renewal of permission for admitting students for the academic year 2015-
16 in the MBBS Course  of  the  petitioner  institutes  and  the  consequent
refusal of the Union Government to renew such permission.

W.P. (Civil) No. 441 of 2015:

3.    The petitioner institute was said to have been granted permission  for
admitting 150 students in the MBBS course for the academic year 2013-14  and
permission was  renewed  for  the  academic  year  2014-15.  The  petitioner
applied for renewal of permission for the academic year 2015-16 pursuant  to
which the assessors from the MCI conducted an inspection on  12th  and  13th
December,  2014  and  submitted  a  report  dated  15.12.2014  in  which  no
deficiencies were alleged to have been pointed out.

4.    However, the assessors from MCI were  alleged  to  have  made  another
surprise inspection on 6th February, 2015 at 3.00 PM and directed  the  Dean
to call for a faculty meeting at 3.30 PM.  Many teachers  could  not  attend
the meeting alleged to have left the college for lunch or Friday prayers  or
having gone home for the weekend while many others who came  after  3.30  PM
from different parts of the campus were not allowed to attend  the  meeting.
Many of the Resident Doctors were stated to have been absent on  account  of
the  imminent  State  Level  PG  Entrance  Test.   Another  inspection   was
conducted on 7th February, 2015. The inspection report was alleged  to  have
been inaccurate and signed in protest by the Dean.

5.    The aforesaid report was considered by the Executive Committee of  the
MCI on 10th February, 2015 and it was decided not to recommend  the  renewal
of the permission of the petitioner and the same  was  communicated  to  the
Union Government, which sent letter dated 04.03.2015 to  the  petitioner  to
appear for a hearing. After the hearing where the  petitioner  was  said  to
have  justified  the  deficiencies  that  were  pointed  out,  the   Central
Government sent letter dated 22.05.2015  directing  the  MCI  to  conduct  a
reassessment. However, the MCI was alleged to have not done a  re-inspection
as directed on the ground that a decision  had  already  been  made  not  to
recommend  the  renewal  by  invoking  Regulation  8  (3)  (1)  (a)  of  the
Establishment of Medical College Regulations, 1999.

6.    Thereafter, the  Union  Government  published  a  list  on  17.06.2015
stating that the permission of the petitioner college for the academic  year
2015-16 had not been renewed and a letter dated 15.06.2015 was sent  to  the
petitioner informing the same.

7.    The petitioner filed the present petition praying  for  declaring  the
second inspection conducted on 6th and 7th February, 2015 to be illegal  and
for directing the MCI to recommend  the  renewal  of  the  approval  of  the
petitioner college for the academic year 2015-16 on the basis of  the  first
inspection conducted on 12th and 13th December,  2014.  A  prayer  has  also
been made for directing the  Central  Government  to  issue  the  letter  of
renewal accordingly.

W.P. (Civil) No.448 of 2015

8.     The  petitioner-college  was  granted  provisional  affiliation   for
starting  the  MBBS  course  for  the  academic  session  2014-15  with  150
students.  It appears that a surprise inspection was made by  MCI  and  many
deficiencies were  pointed  out.   The  Executive  Committee  of  MCI  after
considering the inspection report recommended disapproval  of  the  college.
The Central Government directed the MCI to reconsider the matter.   However,
the MCI reiterated its stand of not recommending the renewal  of  permission
for the sessions 2015-16. The petitioner has challenged the decision of  the
Medical Council of India.

9.    We have heard Mr. Kapil Sibal, learned  senior  counsel  appearing  in
W.P. (Civil) No.441  of  2015  and  Mr.  V.  Giri,  learned  senior  counsel
appearing in W.P.(Civil) No. 448 of 2015  on  the  maintainability   of  the
writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.

10.   Mr. Sibal,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  the  petitioner,
submitted that because of the time schedule fixed  in  Priya  Gupta’s  case,
2012 (7) SCC 433, the petitioner has no option but to  move  this  Court  in
order to get the  relief  by  issuance  of  appropriate  directions  to  the
respondents.  Learned senior counsel also drawn our attention to para 13  of
the judgment rendered by this Court  in  Priyadarshini  Dental  College  and
Hospital vs. Union of India & Ors., (2011) 4 SCC 623.

11.   Mr. V. Giri, learned senior counsel  appearing  in  one  of  the  writ
petitions, advanced the same arguments for filing the writ  petition  before
this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution instead of  approaching  the
High Court.

12.    Both  the  learned  senior  counsel,  however,  claimed  their  right
guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.

13.   At the very outset,  we  wish  to  extract  the  relevant  portion  of
Article 19 of the Constitution which reads as under:-

“19. Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech etc
(1) All citizens shall have the right
(a) to freedom of speech and expression;
(b) to assemble peaceably and without arms;
(c) to form associations or unions;
(d) to move freely throughout the territory of India;
(e) to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India; and
(f) omitted
(g) to practise any profession, or to carry  on  any  occupation,  trade  or
(2) -----------------
(3) ------------------
(4) ---------------------
(5) ---------------------
(6) Nothing in sub clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the  operation
of any existing law in so far as it  imposes,  or  prevent  the  State  from
making any law imposing, in the interests of the general public,  reasonable
restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub  clause,
and, in particular,  nothing  in  the  said  sub  clause  shall  affect  the
operation of any existing law in so far as it relates  to,  or  prevent  the
State from making any law relating to,
(i) the professional or technical qualifications  necessary  for  practising
any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business, or
(ii) the carrying on by the State, or by a corporation owned  or  controlled
by the State, of any trade, business, industry or service,  whether  to  the
exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise.”

14.    From a bare reading of the provision contained  in  Article  19(1)(g)
it is evidently clear  that the citizens have been conferred with the  right
to practice any profession or carry on any occupation,  trade  or  business,
but such right is subject to the restriction and imposition of condition  as
provided under Article 19(6) of the Constitution.

15.   In Unni Krishnan’s case, 1993 (1) SCC 645, the right guaranteed  under
Article  19(1)(g)  has  been  elaborately  discussed  by  the  five   Judges
Constitution Bench.  The Court  held  that  imparting  education  cannot  be
treated as a trade or business.  Trade  or  business  normally  connotes  an
activity carried  on  with  a  profit  motive.   This  Court  observed  that
education has never been nor can it be allowed to become  commerce  in  this
country.  Education has always been treated in  this  country  as  religious
and charitable activity and making it commercial is opposed  to  the  ethos,
tradition and sensibilities of this nation.  A citizen of this  country  may
have a right to establish an educational institution but no citizen,  person
or institution has a right much less of fundamental right to affiliation  or
recognition.  Their Lordships observed:-

“67. Even on general principles, the matter could be  approached  this  way.
Educational institutions can be classified under two categories:
1. Those requiring recognition by the State and
2. Those who do not require such a recognition.

67a. It is not merely an establishment of educational institution,  that  is
urged by the petitioners, but, to run the educational institution  dependent
on recognition by the State. There is absolutely  no  fundamental  right  to
recognition  in  any  citizen.  The  right  to  establishment  and  run  the
educational institution with State’s recognition arises only  on  the  State
permitting, pursuant to a policy  decision  or  on  the  fulfilment  of  the
conditions  of  the  statute.  Therefore,  where  it  is  dependent  on  the
permission under the statute or the  exercise  of  an  executive  power,  it
cannot qualify to be a fundamental right. Then again, the State  policy  may
dictate a different course.
                                 xxx xxx xxx
72. Accordingly, it is  held  that  there  is  no  fundamental  right  under
Article 19(1)(g) to establish an educational institution, if recognition  or
affiliation is sought for such an educational institution. It  may  be  made
clear that anyone  desirous  of  starting  an  institution  purely  for  the
purposes of educating the students could do so but Sections  22  and  23  of
the University Grants Commission Act which prohibits the  award  of  degrees
except by a University must be kept in mind.”

16.   Considering the facts of the case as averred by  the  petitioners  and
the rights claimed therein, we  are  of  the  considered  opinion  that  the
petitioners,  even  though  have  a  right  to  establish  institutions  for
imparting medical and technical education, such right is not  a  fundamental

17.   From reading of Article 32,  it  is  manifest  that  clause  1(i)   of
Article  32  guarantees  the  right  to  move  the  Supreme  Court  for   an
appropriate writ  for  the  purpose  of  enforcing  the  Fundamental  Rights
included in Part-III of the Constitution. The sole object of Article  32  is
the enforcement of Fundamental Rights guaranteed  by  the  Constitution.  It
follows that no question other than relating to the Fundamental  Right  will
be determined in a proceeding under Article 32  of  the  Constitution.   The
difference between Article 32 and 226 of the Constitution is that  while  an
application under Article 32 lies only for the  enforcement  of  Fundamental
Rights, the High Court under Article 226 has a wider power to  exercise  its
jurisdiction not only for the enforcement of  Fundamental  Rights  but  also
ordinary legal right.

18.  It is equally well settled that this Court under Article  32  will  not
interfere with an administrative order where the  constitutionality  of  the
statute or the order made thereunder is not  challenged  on  the  ground  of
contravention of Fundamental Rights.  At the same time if  the  validity  of
the provisions of statute  is  challenged  on  the  ground  other  than  the
contravention of Fundamental Rights, this  Court  will  not  entertain  that
challenge in a proceeding under Article 32 of the Constitution.

19.  In the case of Northern Corporation vs. Union of India,  (1990)  4  SCC
239, a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India was  moved  by
the transferee licence  holder.   The  maintainability  of  the  application
under Article 32 of the Constitution of India was seriously objected by  the
Union of India.  Writing the judgment,  Hon’ble  Sabyasachi  Mukherjee,  the
then CJI, held:-

“11. However, there is a far more serious  objection  in  entertaining  this
application under  Article  32  of  the  Constitution,  Article  32  of  the
Constitution guarantees the right to move the Supreme Court for  enforcement
of fundamental rights. If there is breach of  the  fundamental  rights,  the
petitioner can certainly have recourse to Article  32  of  the  Constitution
provided other conditions are satisfied. But we must, in all such cases,  be
circumventive of what is the right claimed. In this case, the petitioner  as
such has no fundamental right to clear the  goods  imported  except  in  due
process of law. Now in the facts of this case, such clearance  can  only  be
made on payment of duty as enjoined by the  Customs  Act.  In  a  particular
situation whether customs duty  is  payable  at  the  rate  prevalent  on  a
particular date or not has to be determined within the four corners  of  the
Customs Act, 1962. The petitioner has no fundamental right as such to  clear
any goods imported without payment of duties in  accordance  with  the  law.
There is procedure provided by law  for  determination  of  the  payment  of
customs duty. The revenue  has  proceeded  on  that  basis.  The  petitioner
contends that duty at a particular rate prevalent at a particular  date  was
not payable. The petitioner cannot seek to remove the goods without  payment
at that rate or without  having  the  matter  determined  by  the  procedure
envisaged and enjoined by the law for  that  determination.  The  petitioner
without seeking to take any relief within the procedure envisaged under  the
Act had moved this Court for  breach  of  fundamental  right.  This  is  not
permissible and should never be entertained. In  a  matter  of  this  nature
where  liability  of  a  citizen  to  pay  a  particular  duty  depends   on
interpretation of law and determination of facts  and  the  provision  of  a
particular statute for which elaborate procedure is  prescribed,  it  cannot
conceivably be contended that enforcing  of  those  provisions  of  the  Act
would breach fundamental right which entitle a citizen to seek  recourse  to
Article 32 of the Constitution. We are, therefore, clearly  of  the  opinion
that relief under Article 32 of the Constitution is wholly inappropriate  in
the facts and  the  circumstances  of  this  case.  It  has  further  to  be
reiterated that for enforcement of  fundamental  right  which  is  dependent
upon adjudication or determination of questions of law as well  as  question
of fact without taking any resort to the provisions of the Act,  it  is  not
permissible to move this Court  on  the  theoretical  basis  that  there  is
breach of the fundamental right. Whenever  a  person  complains  and  claims
that there is a violation of law, it does not automatically  involve  breach
of fundamental right for the enforcement of which alone Article  32  of  the
Constitution is attracted. It appears that the facts of this nature  require
elaborate procedural investigation and this Court should not  be  moved  and
should not entertain on these averments (sic)  of  the  Article  32  of  the
Constitution. This position is clearly well settled, but  sometimes  we  are
persuaded to accept that an allegation of breach of  law  is  an  action  in
breach of fundamental right.”

20.   In the case of Kanubhai Brahmbhatt vs. State of Gujarat, AIR  1987  SC
1159, this Court took serious concern of the litigants coming to this  Court
under  Article  32  of  the  Constitution  instead  of  first   moving   the
appropriate High Court for the redressal of their  grievances.   This  Court
observed as under:
“3. If this Court takes upon itself to do everything  which  even  the  High
Court can do, this Court will not be able to do what this  Court  alone  can
do under Article 136 of the Constitution  of  India,  and  other  provisions
conferring exclusive jurisdiction on this  Court.  There  is  no  reason  to
assume that the concerned High Court will  not  do  justice.  Or  that  this
Court alone can do justice. If this Court entertains writ petitions  at  the
instance of parties who approach this Court directly instead of  approaching
the concerned High Court in the first instance, tens of  thousands  of  writ
petitions would in course of time be instituted in this Court directly.  The
inevitable result will be that the arrears pertaining to matters in  respect
of which this Court exercises exclusive jurisdiction under the  Constitution
will assume more alarming proportions. As it is, more  than  ten  years  old
civil appeals and criminal  appeals  are  sobbing  for  attention.  It  will
occasion  great  misery  and  immense  hardship  to  tens  of  thousands  of
litigants if the seriousness of this aspect is  not  sufficiently  realized.
And this is no imaginary phobia. A dismissed government servant has to  wait
for nearly ten years for redress in this Court. Kashinth Dikshita  v.  Union
of India, (1986) 3 SCC 229: (AIR 1986) SC 2118).  A  litigant  whose  appeal
has been dismissed by wrongly refusing to condone delay has to wait  for  14
years  before  his  wrong  is  righted  by   this   Court.   Shankarrao   v.
Chandrasenkunwar, Civil Appeal No.1335(N) of 1973  decided  on  January  29,
1987. The time for imposing self-discipline has already  come,  even  if  it
involves shedding of some amount of institutional ego, or  raising  of  some
eyebrows. Again, it is as important to do  justice  at  this  level,  as  to
inspire confidence in the litigants that justice will be meted out  to  them
at the High Court level, and other levels. Faith must  be  inspired  in  the
hierarchy of courts and the institution as a whole, not only in  this  Court
alone. And this objective can be achieved only this Court showing  trust  in
the High Court by directing the litigants to approach the High Court in  the
first instance. Besides, as a matter of fact, if matters  like  the  present
one are instituted in the High Court, there is  a  likelihood  of  the  same
being disposed of much more quickly, and equally effectively, on account  of
the decentralisation of the process of administering justice. We are of  the
opinion that the petitioner should be directed  to  adopt  this  course  and
approach the High Court.”

21.   In the case of  Ram Jawaya Kapur vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1955 SC  549
= (1955) 2 SCR 225, the petitioner was carrying  on  business  of  printing,
publishing books for sale including text books used in the schools of  State
of Punjab.  The State of Punjab decided in furtherance of  their  policy  of
nationalization of text books for the school  students.   According  to  the
Policy, all recognized schools had to follow the course of studies  approved
by the Government.  The petitioners alleged in support  of  their  petitions
under Article 32 that the  Punjab  Government  has  in  pursuance  of  their
policy of nationalization of text books issued  a  series  of  notifications
regarding the printing, publication and sale  of  these  books  and  thereby
ousted them from the business altogether.  Dismissing the writ  petition,  a
five Judges Constitution Bench, headed by the then Chief Justice observed:-
“21. As in our view  the  petitioners  have  no  fundamental  right  in  the
present case which can be said to have been infringed by the action  of  the
Government, the petition is bound to fail on that  ground.  This  being  the
position,  the  other  two  points  raised  by  Mr  Pathak  do  not  require
consideration at all. As the petitioners have  no  fundamental  right  under
Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, the question  whether  the  Government
could establish a monopoly without any legislation under  Article  19(6)  of
the Constitution is altogether immaterial.
Again a mere chance or prospect of having  particular  customers  cannot  be
said to be a right to property or to any interest in an  undertaking  within
the meaning of Article 31(2) of the Constitution and no question of  payment
of compensation can arise because the petitioners have been deprived of  the
same. The result is that the petition is dismissed with costs.”

22.   In the case of Hindi Hitrakshak Samiti vs. Union of  India,  (1990)  2
SCC 352, a similar question relating to  the  maintainability  of  the  writ
petition under Article 32 of the Constitution came for consideration  before
a three Judges’ Bench of this Court for the enforcement  of  any  Government
policy.  In the writ petition, the petitioner sought  for  issuance  of  the
writ of mandamus directing Central Government to hold pre-medical  and  pre-
dental examination in Hindi and regional languages, which according  to  the
petitioner is mandated by  Article  29(2)  of  the  Constitution  of  India.
While  permitting  the  petitioner  to  withdraw  its  petition,  the  Court
observed that Article 32  of  the  Constitution  guarantees  enforcement  of
Fundamental Rights but violation of Fundamental Right is the  sine  qua  non
for seeking enforcement of those rights by the Supreme Court.  In  order  to
establish the violation of fundamental right, the Court has to consider  the
direct and inevitable consequences of the  action  which  is  sought  to  be
remedied or the guarantee of which is  sought  to  be  enforced.  Where  the
existence of fundamental right has to be  established  by  acceptance  of  a
particular policy, or a course  of  action  for  which  there  is  no  legal
compulsion or statutory imperative and on which there are  divergent  views,
the same cannot be sought to be enforced by Article 32 of the Constitution.

23.   In the case of J. Fernandes & Co. vs. Dy. Chief Controller of  Imports
and Exports, (1975) 1 SCC 716, this Court, while considering  writ  petition
under Article 32  of  the  Constitution,  observed  that  a  petition  under
Article 32 will not be competent to challenge any erroneous decision  of  an
authority.  A wrong application of law would not amount to  a  violation  of
fundamental right. If the provisions of law are good and the  orders  passed
are within the jurisdiction of the authorities, there is  no  infraction  of
fundamental right if the authorities are right or wrong on facts.

24.   In the case of Ujjam Bai vs. State of U.P, AIR 1962 SC  1621=(1963)  1
SCR 778, before the seven Judges’ Constitution Bench, a  question  came  for
consideration as to whether an assessment made by  an  authority  under  the
taxing statute which is intra vires and in the  undoubted  exercise  of  its
jurisdiction can be challenged under  Article  32  of  the  Constitution  of
India?  Answering the question, Their Lordships held as under:
“21. In my opinion, the correct answer to the two questions which have  been
referred to this  larger  Bench  must  be  in  the  negative.  An  order  of
assessment made by an authority under a taxing statute which is intra  vires
and in the undoubted exercise of its jurisdiction cannot  be  challenged  on
the sole ground that it is passed on a misconstruction  of  a  provision  of
the Act or of a notification issued thereunder.  Nor  can  the  validity  of
such an  order  be  questioned  in  a  petition  under  Article  32  of  the
Constitution. The proper remedy for correcting an error in such an order  is
to proceed by way of appeal, or if the error is an  error  apparent  on  the
face of the record,  then  by  an  application  under  Article  226  of  the
Constitution. It is necessary  to  observe  here  that  Article  32  of  the
Constitution does not give this Court an appellate jurisdiction such  as  is
given  by  Arts  132  to  136.  Article  32  guarantees  the  right   to   a
constitutional remedy and relates only to  the  enforcement  of  the  rights
conferred by Part  III  of  the  Constitution.  Unless  a  question  of  the
enforcement of a fundamental right arises, Article 32 does not apply.  There
can be no question of the enforcement of a fundamental right  if  the  order
challenged is a valid and legal order, in spite of the  allegation  that  it
is erroneous. I have, therefore, come to the conclusion that no question  of
the enforcement of fundamental right  arises  in  this  case  and  the  writ
petition is not maintainable.”

25.         Their Lordships further observed:

“38. As I  have  said  above,  the  submission  of  the  learned  Additional
Solicitor General is well founded. It  has  the  support  of  the  following
decisions of this Court  which  I  shall  now  deal  with.  In  Gulabdas  v.
Assistant Collector of Custom 1957 AIR(SC) 733, 736.) it was  held  that  if
the order impugned is made under the provisions of a statue which  is  intra
vires and the order is within the jurisdiction of the  authority  making  it
then  whether  it  is  right  or  wrong,  there  is  no  infraction  of  the
fundamental rights and it has to be challenged in  the  manner  provided  in
the Statute and not by a  petition  under  Article  32.  In  that  case  the
petitioner was aggrieved by the order of the Assistant Collector of  Customs
who assessed the goods imported under a licence under a different entry  and
consequently a higher Excise  Duty  was  imposed.  The  petitioners  feeling
aggrieved by the order filed a petition under Article 32 and  the  objection
to its maintainability was that  the  application  could  not  be  sustained
because no fundamental right had been violated  by  the  impugned  order  it
having been properly and correctly made  by  the  authorities  competent  to
make it. The petitioner there contended that the goods imported, which  were
called &'Lyra&'  brand  Crayons  were  not  crayons  at  all  and  therefore
imposition  of  a  higher  duty  by  holding  them  to  be  crayons  was  an
infringement of fundamental right under Article 19(1)(f) & (g).”

26.    Coming  back  to  the  instant  writ  petitions,  indisputably,   the
petitioners have challenged the decision of MCI and the  Central  Government
refusing to grant permission or renewal to carry on their  courses  for  the
Academic Session  2015-16.   The  decisions  are  based  on  the  inspection
reports submitted by the teams of MCI.   The  jurisdiction  of  MCI  or  the
Central Government to grant or refuse  to  grant  permission  has  not  been
challenged. Hence, it is well  within  the  jurisdiction  of  MCI  which  is
statutory body to take a decision based on the inspection of the college  to
satisfy itself the compliance of various provisions of the acts,  rules  and

27.   Under Article 32 of the Constitution, this Court is  not  supposed  to
go into finding of facts recorded by  the  authorities  and  to  come  to  a
different conclusion.   Moreover,  having  regard  to  the  law  settled  by
Constitution Bench of this Court in number of decisions, in  our  considered
opinion, the rights so  claimed  by  the  petitioners  are  not  fundamental
rights; hence the same cannot be agitated directly before this  Court  under
Article 32 of the constitution.

28.   We, therefore, dismiss these writ petitions filed under Article 32  of
the Constitution.  However, this  will  not  prevent  the  petitioners  from
agitating their grievances before the appropriate forum including  the  High
Court having jurisdiction to deal with the matter.

                                                                (M.Y. Eqbal)

                                                               (Arun Mishra)
New Delhi
July 23, 2015

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