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Wednesday, November 27, 2013

Sec.138 N.I.Act - Sec.201 of Cr.p.c. - Power of magistrate to recall it's orders - Jurisdiction of court for cheque bounce case = (i) Whether the Magistrate after having found sufficient ground for proceeding in case and issued summons under Section 204 Cr.P.C. has the jurisdiction to recall or review the order by exercising its power under Section 201 Cr.P.C.; = Apex court held - No. (ii) Whether the petition under Section 138 of the N.I. Act was maintainable at Mumbai on the ground that goods were supplied from Mumbai to Delhi and cheques were handed over at Mumbai and legal notice was issued from Mumbai. = Apex court held - Yes = DEVENDRA KISHANLAL DAGALIA … APPELLANT VERUS DWARKESH DIAMONDS PVT. LTD. AND ORS. … RESPONDENTS = published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40991

 Sec.138 N.I.Act - Sec.201 of Cr.p.c. - Power of magistrate to recall it's orders - Jurisdiction of court for cheque bounce case =
(i)   Whether the Magistrate after having found sufficient ground  for
      proceeding in case and issued summons under Section  204  Cr.P.C.  has
      the jurisdiction to recall or review the order by exercising its power
      under Section 201 Cr.P.C.;  = Apex court held - No.

 (ii)  Whether the      petition under Section 138 of the N.I. Act  was
      maintainable at Mumbai on the ground that  goods  were  supplied  from
      Mumbai to Delhi and cheques were  handed  over  at  Mumbai  and  legal
      notice was issued from Mumbai.      = Apex court held  - Yes =

(i)   Whether the Magistrate after having found sufficient ground  for
      proceeding in case and issued summons under Section  204  Cr.P.C.  has
      the jurisdiction to recall or review the order by exercising its power
      under Section 201 Cr.P.C.;
Ans :- Once  the  Magistrate  taking  cognizance  of  an
offence forms his opinion that there is  sufficient  ground  for  proceeding and issues summons under Section 204 Cr.P.C., there is no question of  going back following the procedure under Section 201 Cr.P.C.  In  absence  of  any power of review or recall the order of issuance of summons,  the  Magistrate
cannot recall the summon in exercise of power under Section 201 Cr.P.C.  The first  question  is  thus  answered  in  negative  and   in  favour  of  the appellant.

      (ii)  Whether the      petition under Section 138 of the N.I. Act  was
      maintainable at Mumbai on the ground that  goods  were  supplied  from
      Mumbai to Delhi and cheques were  handed  over  at  Mumbai  and  legal
      notice was issued from Mumbai.     
Ans :-

in  Nishant
            Aggarwal vs. Kailash Kumar Sharma, [2013(7) Scale 753] 
Therein
            it has been concluded, that 
the Court  within  the  jurisdiction
            whereof, the dishonoured cheque was  presented  for  encashment,
            would have the jurisdiction to  entertain  the  complaint  filed
            under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
   in  M/s.  Escorts  Limited
vs. Rama Mukherjee(Criminal Appeal No.1457 of 2013), 2013  (11)  Scale  487.
 K. Bhaskaran  vs.
Shankaran Vaidhyam Balan & Anr., (1999) 7 SCC 510    
 language used in Section 138 of the Act, 
the Court found five components  in
Section 138 of the Act, namely,
           (1)   drawing of the cheque;
           (2)   presentation of the cheque to the bank;
           (3)   returning the cheque unpaid by the drawee bank;
           (4)   giving notice in writing  to  the  drawer  of  the  cheque
                 demanding payment of the cheque amount; and
           (5)   failure of the drawer to make payment within  15  days  of
                 the receipt of the notice.”          
 It is not necessary that all the above five acts  should
               have been perpetrated at the same locality. It  is  possible
               that each of those five acts could be done  at  5  different
               localities. But concatenation of all the  above  five  is  a
               sine qua non for the completion of the offence under Section
               138 of the Act.

 In  this  context  a  reference  to  Section
               178(d) of the Code is useful. It is extracted below:




                 “Where  the  offence  consists  of  several  acts  done  in
                 different local areas, it may be inquired into or tried  by
                 a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas.” 
= the respondent, however,  relied
              on the decision of this Court in
 Harman  Electronics  Private
              Limited and Another  v.  National   Panasonic  India  Private
              Limite,d, (2009) 1 SCC 720,
whether  sending  of  a
              notice from Delhi itself would give rise to a cause of action
              for taking cognizance of a case  under  Section  138  of  the
              Negotiable Instruments Act when the parties had been carrying
              on business at Chandigarh, the Head Office of the respondent-
              complainant was at Delhi but it had a  branch  at  Chandigarh
              and  all  the  transactions  were  carried  out   only   from
              Chandigarh. On these facts, this Court held that  Delhi  from
              where  the  notice  under  Section  138  of  the   Negotiable
              Instruments Act was issued by the respondent would  not  have
              had jurisdiction to entertain the complaint under Section 138
              of the Negotiable Instruments Act.  
This  question  does  not
              arise in the facts of the present case.=
In the case in hand it is admitted that the business dealing was  held
at Mumbai;  
the products were supplied from Mumbai  to  New  Delhi,  
cheques
were handed over at Mumbai and 
the cheques were dishounoured by the  bankers
of respondents at New Delhi, and 
legal notice was issued from Mumbai.  
Thus,
at least one act out of the five ingredients  of  Section  138  of  the  Act
having committed at Mumbai,  
the  complaint  preferred  by  the  complainant
before the Magistrate at Mumbai was maintainable.  
The  second  question  is
thereby, answered in affirmative and in favour of the appellant.

   REPORTABLE
                    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                   CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 1997-1998 OF 2013
              (arising out of SLP(Crl.)Nos.2595-2596  of 2013)


DEVENDRA KISHANLAL DAGALIA                    … APPELLANT

                                  VERUS

DWARKESH DIAMONDS PVT. LTD. AND ORS.        … RESPONDENTS


                               J U D G M E N T


SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.

      Leave granted. These appeals have been  preferred  by  the  appellant-
complainant against the judgment and order dated 6th December,  2012  passed
by the High  Court  of  Judicature  at  Bombay  in  Criminal  Writ  Petition
Nos.3992 and 3993 of 2011.  By the impugned  judgment  the  High  Court  set
aside the order passed by Sessions Judge in CRA No.301 of  2010  and  upheld
the order passed by the Special Metropolitan Magistrate.
2.    The  appellant  filed  complaints  being  CC  No.3142/SS/2008  and  CC
No.3286/SS/2008  under   Section   138   of   Negotiable   Instruments   Act
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the N.I. Act’) in  the  Court  of  the  Special
Metropolitan Magistrate at Small Causes Court on 28th July,  2008  and  18th
August, 2008. Learned Metropolitan Magistrate after recording  of  the  pre-
summoning evidence issued summons on the accused under Section  204  Cr.P.C.
The accused-respondents 1, 2 & 3 then filed application  under  Section  201
Cr.P.C. for return of complaint for want of jurisdiction. They alleged  that
the entire transaction took place at New Delhi and  only  the  legal  notice
was issued from Mumbai and hence the learned Magistrate has no  jurisdiction
to try and entertain the complaint. A similar application was filed  by  the
accused in CC No.3286/SS/2008. Thereafter, the learned Magistrate  by  order
dated 5th January, 2010 allowed the application under  Section  201  Cr.P.C.
and returned the complaint for want of jurisdiction.  A  similar  order  was
passed by the learned Magistrate in CC No.3286/SS/2008.
3.    Being aggrieved, the  appellant-complainant  filed  Criminal  Revision
Applications Nos.301 & 302  of  2010  before  the  Sessions  Court,  Greater
Bombay.
 Learned  Sessions  Judge  by  the  judgment  and  order  dated  2nd
November, 2011 allowed the criminal revision applications and set aside  the
orders of learned Magistrate  and  the  matter  was  remitted  back  to  the
Magistrate. 
However, at the instance of Respondent Nos.1, 2 &  3  the  order
passed by the Sessions Judge was set aside by the High Court  by  the  order
impugned.
4.    Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the  appellant  submitted  that
the Magistrate after finding sufficient  ground  for  proceeding  and  after
issuance of  summons under Section  204  Cr.P.C.,  has  no  jurisdiction  to
recall or review the order by exercising power under Section 201 Cr.P.C.  It
is further contended that the High Court failed to  consider  the  aforesaid
fact and has no answer to the  issue  as  was  raised  and  decided  by  the
learned Magistrate. Further,  according  to  the  learned  counsel  for  the
appellant, in the matter under Section 138  of  the  N.I.Act  the  appellant
having  been  issued  legal  notice  from   Mumbai,   the   Magistrate   has
jurisdiction to try and entertain the complaint.
5.    Per contra, according to the learned counsel for the respondents,  the
High Court of Bombay has taken due course  and  settled  all  the  questions
raised in the complaint filed by the appellant.
The complaint filed  by  the
appellant is silent with regard to place where 
(a) the order  was  given  by
the respondent; 
(b) goods were supplied; 
(c) the payment was  agreed  to  be
made: 
(d) the cheques in question were issued:
(e) the cheques  in  question
were dishonoured and 
(f) the parties to the petition intended  to  make  and
receive the same. 
It is accepted that the  notice  in  question  was  issued
from Mumbai. It is contended that issuance of notice  would  not  by  itself
give rise to a cause of action for filing the complaint at Mumbai.
6.    Further, according to the respondents the appellant has concealed  the
relevant   facts  purposefully,  particularly  the  fact  that  the   entire
transaction had taken place at Delhi and,   therefore,  the  Magistrate  has
returned the complaint under Section 201 Cr.P.C.
7.    We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the  record.



8.    The main questions involved in the present case are :
      (i)   Whether the Magistrate after having found sufficient ground  for
      proceeding in case and issued summons under Section  204  Cr.P.C.  has
      the jurisdiction to recall or review the order by exercising its power
      under Section 201 Cr.P.C.; and


      (ii)  Whether the      petition under Section 138 of the N.I. Act  was
      maintainable at Mumbai on the ground that  goods  were  supplied  from
      Mumbai to Delhi and cheques were  handed  over  at  Mumbai  and  legal
      notice was issued from Mumbai.


9.     To  decide  the  issue,  it  is  necessary  to  notice  the  relevant
provisions of the  Cr.P.C.  as discussed hereunder:
      Chapter XV of Cr.P.C. relates to complaints to the Magistrates whereas
Chapter XVI relates to commencement of proceedings before the Magistrates.
10.   Section  200  of  Cr.P.C.  relates  to  examination  of  complaint.  A
Magsitrate taking cognizance of an  offence  on  complaint  is  required  to
examine the complaint and both the  complainant  and  witness  present,   if
any.  On  such  examination  of  the  complaint  and  the  witness,  if  the
Magistrate is of the opinion that there is no ground for proceeding, he  has
to dismiss the complaint under Section 203 Cr.P.C.
11.   Section 201 Cr.P.C. lays down the procedure  to  be  followed  by  the
Magistrate  not  competent  to  take  cognizance  of  the  offence.  If  the
complaint is made to a Magistrate who is not competent  to  take  cognizance
of the complaint he shall return the written complaint for its  presentation
before a proper court and if the complaint is not  in  writing,  direct  the
complainant to move before the proper court.
12.   Section  202  contemplates  “postponement  of  issue  of  process”  on
receipt of a complaint  in  the  circumstances  mentioned  therein.  If  the
Magistrate is of  the  opinion  that  there  is  no  sufficient  ground  for
proceeding, under Section 203  Cr.P.C.  he  can  dismiss  the  complaint  by
briefly recording his reasons.
13.   The commencement of proceedings before the  Magistrate  under  Chapter
XVI starts with issue of  process  under  Section  204  Cr.P.C.  If  in  the
opinion  of  a  Magistrate  taking  cognizance  of  the  offence  there   is
sufficient ground for proceeding, and the case  appears  to  be  a  summons-
case, he shall issue his summons for the attendance of the accused,  but  if
it is a warrant-case, he may issue a  warrant,  or,  if  he  thinks  fit,  a
summons, for causing the accused to be brought or to  appear  at  a  certain
time before such Magistrate or (if he  has  no  jurisdiction  himself)  some
other Magistrate having jurisdiction. No summons or warrant shall be  issued
against the accused under sub-section (1) until a list  of  the  prosecution
witnesses has been filed.  In a proceeding instituted upon a complaint  made
in writing, every summons or warrant issued under sub-section (1)  shall  be
accompanied by a copy of such complaint.
14.   The  aforesaid  provisions  make  it  clear  that  the  Magistrate  is
required to issue summons for attendance of the accused only on  examination
of the complaint and on satisfaction that there  is  sufficient  ground  for
taking cognizance of the offence and that  it  is  competent  to  take  such
cognizance of offence.  Once the decision is taken and summon is issued,  in
the absence of a power of review including inherent power to do  so,  remedy
lies before the High Court under Section 482 Cr. P.C  or under  Article  227
of the Constitution of India and not before the Magistrate.
15.    Issue with regard to the power of Magistrate  to  recall  process  of
summons fell for consideration before a three-Judge Bench of this  Court  in
Adalat Prasad vs. Rooplal Jindal and others, (2004) 7 SCC 338.  Therein  the
following observation was made by this Court:
               “15. It is true that if a Magistrate takes cognizance  of  an
            offence, issues  process  without  there  being  any  allegation
            against the accused or any material implicating the  accused  or
            in contravention of provisions of  Sections  200  and  202,  the
            order of the Magistrate may be vitiated, but then the relief  an
            aggrieved accused can obtain at that stage is  not  by  invoking
            Section 203 of the Code because the Criminal Procedure Code does
            not contemplate a review of an order. Hence in  the  absence  of
            any review power or inherent power with the subordinate criminal
            courts, the remedy lies in invoking Section 482 of the Code.”



16.   Section 201 Cr.P.C., as noticed earlier, can  be  applied  immediately
on receipt of a complaint, if  the  Magistrate  is  not  competent  to  take
cognizance of the offence.
Once  the  Magistrate  taking  cognizance  of  an
offence forms his opinion that there is  sufficient  ground  for  proceeding and issues summons under Section 204 Cr.P.C., there is no question of  going back following the procedure under Section 201 Cr.P.C.  In  absence  of  any power of review or recall the order of issuance of summons,  the  Magistrate
cannot recall the summon in exercise of power under Section 201 Cr.P.C.  The first  question  is  thus  answered  in  negative  and   in  favour  of  the appellant.
17.   The question  concerning  the  jurisdiction  of  Magistrate  to  issue
summons 
fell for consideration before this Court 
 in  M/s.  Escorts  Limited
vs. Rama Mukherjee(Criminal Appeal No.1457 of 2013), 2013  (11)  Scale  487.
In the said case the Court noticed the earlier decision in K. Bhaskaran  vs.
Shankaran Vaidhyam Balan & Anr., (1999) 7 SCC 510.  
In  the  light  of  the
language used in Section 138 of the Act, 
the Court found five components  in
Section 138 of the Act, namely,
           (1)   drawing of the cheque;
           (2)   presentation of the cheque to the bank;
           (3)   returning the cheque unpaid by the drawee bank;
           (4)   giving notice in writing  to  the  drawer  of  the  cheque
                 demanding payment of the cheque amount; and
           (5)   failure of the drawer to make payment within  15  days  of
                 the receipt of the notice.”


      After saying so, this Court held that offence  under  Section  138  of
the Act can be completed only  with  the  concatenation  of  all  the  above
components and for that it is not necessary that all  the  above  five  acts
should have perpetrated at the same locality; it is possible  that  each  of
those five acts were done at five different localities, but a  concatenation
of all the above five is a sine qua non for the completion  of  the  offence
under Section 138 of the Act.
Having noticed the aforesaid provisions,  this
court in Escorts Ltd. held as follow:
            “5.  It is apparent, that  the  conclusion  drawn  by  the  High
            Court,  in  the  impugned  order  dated  27.4.2012,  is  not  in
            consonance with the decision rendered by this Court
 in  Nishant
            Aggarwal vs. Kailash Kumar Sharma, [2013(7) Scale 753] .
Therein
            it has been concluded, that 
the Court  within  the  jurisdiction
            whereof, the dishonoured cheque was  presented  for  encashment,
            would have the jurisdiction to  entertain  the  complaint  filed
            under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

            6.   In addition to the  judgment  rendered  by  this  Court  in
            Nishant Aggarwal’s case, another bench of this  Court  has  also
            arrived at the conclusion drawn in Nishant Aggarwal’s  case,  on
            the pointed issue under consideration. In this behalf, reference
            may be made to the decision rendered in
 FIL  Industries  Limited
            vs. Imtiyaz  Ahmed  Bhat,  Criminal  Appeal  No.  1168  of  2013
            (arising  out  of  SLP  (Crl.)  No.8096  of  2012),  decided  on
            12.8.2013.
This Court in the above matter held as under:




               “3. The facts very briefly are that the respondent delivered
               a  cheque  dated  23rd  December,  2010  for  an  amount  of
               `29,69,746/-(Rupees Twenty Nine lakhs  sixty  nine  thousand
               seven hundred forty six only)  on  Jammu  and  Kashmir  Bank
               Limited,  Branch  Imam  Saheb,  Shopian,  to  the  appellant
               towards some business dealings and the  appellant  deposited
               the same in UCO Bank, Sopore. 
When the cheque amount was not
               encashed and collected in the account of  the  appellant  in
               UCO Bank Sopore,  the  appellant  filed  a  complaint  under
               Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,  1881  before
               the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sopore. 
The respondent sought
               dismissal of the complaint on  the  ground  that  the  Chief
               Judicial  Magistrate  had  no  territorial  jurisdiction  to
               entertain the complaint. 
By order dated 29th November, 2011,
               the learned Chief  Judicial  Magistrate,   Sopore,  however,
               held  that  he  had  the  jurisdiction  to   entertain   the
               complaint.  
 Aggrieved,   the   appellant   filed   Criminal
               Miscellaneous Petition  No. 431 of 2011 under  Section  561A
               of the Jammu and Kashmir Criminal Procedure Code and by  the
               impugned order dated 2nd June, 2012, the High Court  quashed
               the complaint  saying  that  the  Court  at  Sopore  had  no
               jurisdiction to receive and entertain the complaint.




               4. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and we find
               that in K.Bhaskaran  v.  Sankaran  Vidyabalan  and  Another,
               (1999) 7 SCC 510, this Court had the occasion to consider as
               to which Court would have the jurisdiction to entertain  the
               complaint under Section 138 of the  Negotiable   Instruments
               Act and in paras 14, 15  and  16  of  the  judgment  in  the
               aforesaid case held as under:-




               “14. The offence  under  Section  138  of  the  Act  can  be
               completed only  with the concatenation of a number of  acts.
               Following are the acts which  are  components  of  the  said
               offence: (1) Drawing of the cheque, (2) Presentation of  the
               cheque to the bank, (3) Returning the cheque unpaid  by  the
               drawee bank, (4) Giving notice in writing to the  drawer  of
               the cheque demanding  payment  of  the  cheque  amount,  (5)
               failure of the drawer to make payment within 15 days of  the
               receipt of the notice.

               15. It is not necessary that all the above five acts  should
               have been perpetrated at the same locality. It  is  possible
               that each of those five acts could be done  at  5  different
               localities. But concatenation of all the  above  five  is  a
               sine qua non for the completion of the offence under Section
               138 of the Act.
 In  this  context  a  reference  to  Section
               178(d) of the Code is useful. It is extracted below:




                 “Where  the  offence  consists  of  several  acts  done  in
                 different local areas, it may be inquired into or tried  by
                 a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas.”




                 16. Thus it is clear, if the five different acts were done
               in  five  different  localities  any  one  of   the   courts
               exercising jurisdiction in one of the five local  areas  can
               become the place of trial for the offence under Section  138
               of the Act. In other words, the complainant can  choose  any
               one of those courts having jurisdiction over any one of  the
               local areas within the territorial limits of which  any  one
               of those five acts was done.  As  the  amplitude  stands  so
               widened and so expansive it is an  idle  exercise  to  raise
               jurisdictional question regarding the offence under  Section
               138 of the Act.”




              5. It will be clear from  the  aforesaid  paragraphs  of  the
              judgment in K. Bhaskaran’s case (Supra) that  five  different
              acts compose the offence under Section 138 of the  Negotiable
              Instruments Act and if any one of these five  different  acts
              was  done  in  a  particular  locality   the   Court   having
              territorial jurisdiction on  that  locality  can  become  the
              place of trial for the  offence  under  Section  138  of  the
              Negotiable Instruments Act and,  therefore,  the  complainant
              can choose any one of those courts having  jurisdiction  over
              any one of the local area within the  territorial  limits  of
              which any one of the five acts was done. In the facts of  the
              present  case,  it  is  not  disputed  that  the  cheque  was
              presented to the UCO Bank at Sopore in  which  the  appellant
              had an  account  and,  therefore  the  Court  at  Sopore  had
              territorial jurisdiction to entertain and try the complaint.




              6.       Learned counsel for the respondent, however,  relied
              on the decision of this Court in Harman  Electronics  Private
              Limited and Another  v.  National   Panasonic  India  Private
              Limite,d, (2009) 1 SCC 720,  to  submit  that  the  Court  at
              Shopian would have  the  territorial  jurisdiction.
We  have
              perused the  aforesaid  decision  of  this  Court  in  Harman
              Electronics Private Limited (Supra) and we find on a  reading
              of paragraphs 11 and 12 of the judgment in the aforesaid case
              that in that case the issue was as to
whether  sending  of  a
              notice from Delhi itself would give rise to a cause of action
              for taking cognizance of a case  under  Section  138  of  the
              Negotiable Instruments Act when the parties had been carrying
              on business at Chandigarh, the Head Office of the respondent-
              complainant was at Delhi but it had a  branch  at  Chandigarh
              and  all  the  transactions  were  carried  out   only   from
              Chandigarh. On these facts, this Court held that  Delhi  from
              where  the  notice  under  Section  138  of  the   Negotiable
              Instruments Act was issued by the respondent would  not  have
              had jurisdiction to entertain the complaint under Section 138
              of the Negotiable Instruments Act.  
This  question  does  not
              arise in the facts of the present case.




              7. For the aforesaid reasons, we allow the appeal, set  aside
              the impugned judgment of the High Court and remand the matter
              to the Chief Judicial  Magistrate,  Sopore  for  decision  in
              accordance with law.”

                                                         (emphasis is ours).




            7.   In view of the above, having taken into  consideration  the
            factual position noticed by the High Court in  paragraph  13  of
            the impugned judgment, we are of the view, that the  High  Court
            erred in concluding that the courts at Delhi, did not  have  the
            jurisdiction to try the petition filed by  the  appellant  under
            Section 138 of the  Negotiable  Instruments  Act.  The  impugned
            order dated 27.4.2012 passed by the High  Court  is  accordingly
            liable to be set aside.  The  same  is,  therefore,  hereby  set
            aside.

            8.   Despite the conclusion drawn by us hereinabove, it would be
            relevant to mention, that our instant determination is based  on
            the factual position expressed by the High Court in paragraph 13
            of the impugned order.
During the course of hearing,  whilst  it
            was the case of the learned counsel for the appellant (based  on
            certain documents available on the file of the present case)  to
            reiterate that
the cheque in question,  which  was  the  subject
            matter of  the  appellant’s  claim  under  Section  138  of  the
            Negotiable Instruments Act,  was  presented  for  encashment  at
            Delhi;
it was the contention of  the  learned  counsel  for  the
            respondent,  that  the  aforesaid  cheque  was   presented   for
            encashment at Faridabad.
It was accordingly submitted, that  the
            jurisdictional issue needed to be decided by accepting, that the
            dishonoured  cheque  was  presented  at  Faridabad.  
It  is  not
            possible for us to entertain  and  adjudicate  upon  a  disputed
            question of fact. 
We have rendered the instant decision, on  the
            factual position taken into consideration by the High Court.
 In
            case, the respondent herein is so advised, it would be  open  to
            him to raise an objection on the issue of jurisdiction, based on
            a factual position now asserted  before  us.
The  determination
            rendered by us must be deemed to  be  on  the  factual  position
            taken into consideration by the High  Court  (in  paragraph  13,
            extracted above), while disposing of the issue of  jurisdiction.
         
 In case the respondent raises such a plea,  the  same  shall  be
            entertained and disposed of in accordance with law.”


18.   In the case in hand it is admitted that the business dealing was  held
at Mumbai;  
the products were supplied from Mumbai  to  New  Delhi,  
cheques
were handed over at Mumbai and 
the cheques were dishounoured by the  bankers
of respondents at New Delhi, and 
legal notice was issued from Mumbai.  
Thus,
at least one act out of the five ingredients  of  Section  138  of  the  Act
having committed at Mumbai,  
the  complaint  preferred  by  the  complainant
before the Magistrate at Mumbai was maintainable.  
The  second  question  is
thereby, answered in affirmative and in favour of the appellant.
19.   In view of the reasons recorded above, we have no other option but  to
interfere  with  the  impugned  order  passed  by  the   High   Court.    We
accordingly, set aside the order dated 6th  December,  2012  passed  by  the
High Court, affirm the order passed by the  Sessions  Judge  and  allow  the
appeals.

                                                       ……………………………………………….J.
                                (SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)




                                                       ……………………………………………….J.
                                        (V. GOPALA GOWDA)






NEW DELHI,
NOVEMBER 25, 2013.

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