Proof of a specific dowry demand, continued dowry-related harassment and reiteration of that demand immediately before the unnatural death of a married woman within seven years of marriage satisfies the requirement of “soon before her death” under Section 304-B IPC. Once such foundational facts are proved, the presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act arises. Minor contradictions in witness testimony, an isolated statement that the deceased was living happily, or the poverty of the accused cannot displace otherwise consistent and credible evidence of dowry harassment. Further, the Dowry Prohibition Act does not distinguish between dowry demands made before and after marriage.

 

STATE OF U.P. v. AJMAL BEG ETC.

2025 INSC 1435
Criminal Appeal Nos. 132–133 of 2017
Supreme Court of India
Sanjay Karol and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, JJ.

---

HEADNOTES

1. Dowry death — Section 304-B IPC — Ingredients — “Soon before her death” — Reasonable nexus between dowry harassment and death.

[Para 14.1] — To attract Section 304-B IPC, the prosecution has to establish that (i) the death of the woman was caused by burns or bodily injury or occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances; (ii) such death occurred within seven years of marriage; (iii) soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relative; and (iv) such cruelty or harassment was for, or in connection with, a demand for dowry. The expression “soon before her death” does not contemplate a fixed or restricted period; the Court has to ascertain whether there was a reasonable nexus between the dowry-related cruelty or harassment and the death. [Para 14.1]

2. Dowry death — Reiteration of dowry demand one day before death — Sufficient to satisfy “soon before” requirement.

[Para 20] — Where the demand for dowry, namely a motorcycle, colour television and ₹15,000/-, was proved beyond reasonable doubt and the demand was reiterated by the husband one day before the deceased's death, coupled with evidence of continuous harassment, the requirement of cruelty or harassment “soon before her death” stood satisfied.

3. Presumption of dowry death — Section 113-B, Evidence Act — Once foundational facts established, presumption arises — Accused required to rebut.

[Paras 14.2 & 20] — Once the prosecution establishes that the woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, dowry soon before her death, Section 113-B of the Evidence Act mandates a presumption that the accused caused the dowry death. The presumption is rebuttable. In the present case, the presumption arose on proof of the requisite cruelty and remained unrebutted, as the defence led no evidence.

4. Section 498-A IPC — Cruelty — Scope — Not confined to dowry-related harassment.

[Para 14.3] — Section 498-A encompasses both wilful conduct likely to drive a woman to suicide or cause grave injury or danger to her physical or mental health and harassment intended to coerce her or her relatives to meet an unlawful demand for property or valuable security. Cruelty under Section 498-A is therefore wider than cruelty connected exclusively with dowry.

5. Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 — Section 2 — Demand after marriage — Whether dowry.

[Para 23] — The Dowry Prohibition Act does not distinguish between a demand made before marriage and one made after marriage. Property or valuable security given or agreed to be given at, before or at any time after marriage, when connected with the marriage, falls within the statutory definition of dowry. Consequently, a demand made after marriage may constitute dowry.

6. Muslim parties — Mahr/dower distinguished from dowry — Demand for articles and cash constitutes dowry.

[Para 23] — Although Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act excludes dower or mahr applicable to persons governed by Muslim Personal Law, that exclusion does not extend to a demand for articles or money made in connection with the marriage. The demand for a colour TV, motorcycle and ₹15,000/- cash unquestionably constituted dowry.

7. Section 4, Dowry Prohibition Act — Mere demand — Sufficient to constitute offence.

[Para 14.4] — Under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, the mere demand for dowry is sufficient to attract the statutory offence. Actual receipt of the demanded property is not necessary.

8. Evidence — Contradictions and discrepancies — Entire prosecution evidence not liable to rejection.

[Para 19.1] — Minor discrepancies, contradictions, omissions, exaggerations or embellishments do not justify rejection of the prosecution evidence in its entirety. The Court must sift the evidence carefully and separate the truthful and material portions from exaggeration or embellishment. The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not a sound rule of evidence.

9. Evidence — Witness not eyewitness to actual act of burning — Evidence not thereby rendered unreliable.

[Para 21] — PW2 was rightly relied upon notwithstanding that he did not actually see the accused setting the deceased ablaze. His evidence established that he reached the spot, saw the deceased after she had been set ablaze and saw the accused persons fleeing. The fact that PW1 described PW2 as an eyewitness did not justify discarding PW2's own testimony.

10. Evidence — Statement that deceased was living “happily” — Isolated statement cannot outweigh consistent evidence of dowry harassment.

[Para 22] — The statement of PW6 that the deceased lived happily in her matrimonial home could not be read in isolation or treated as sufficient to discredit the consistent evidence of dowry demands and harassment. An isolated expression such as “happily” cannot override the tenor of the evidence as a whole.

11. Dowry demand — Poverty of accused — No ground to reject prosecution case.

[Para 23] — The High Court erred in treating the alleged poverty of Ajmal and his family as a reason for disbelieving the dowry demand. The financial status of the accused does not make a proved demand for a colour television, motorcycle and cash inherently improbable.

12. Criminal appeal against acquittal — Article 136 — Opposite findings by Trial Court and High Court — Supreme Court entitled to analyse evidence.

[Paras 15, 15.1 & 15.2] — Though the Supreme Court ordinarily exercises restraint in reappreciating evidence where there are concurrent findings, such restraint does not prevent examination of the evidence where the Trial Court and High Court have arrived at opposite conclusions. In such circumstances, the Supreme Court is required to analyse the evidence to determine whether conviction or acquittal is justified.

13. Acquittal — Reversal of Trial Court findings — High Court must assign proper reasons.

[Para 23] — While reversing the findings of fact recorded by the Trial Court, the High Court had not expressly demonstrated that those findings were erroneous, perverse or illegal. Its reasoning for acquitting the accused was therefore unsustainable.

14. Sentencing — Advanced age — Humanitarian considerations — Conviction may be maintained while incarceration avoided.

[Para 24] — In sentencing a convict of advanced age, the Court may take into account humanitarian considerations, including physical frailty, medical dependency, reduced capacity to endure imprisonment and the dignity protected by law. Accordingly, although Jamila's conviction was restored, the Supreme Court, considering that she was 94 years of age, refrained from incarcerating her.

15. Dowry prohibition — Constitutional and social dimension — Need for effective implementation.

[Paras 25–27] — The Court emphasised that dowry remains a deep-rooted social evil notwithstanding statutory prohibition. It directed measures including greater public awareness through educational curricula, effective functioning of Dowry Prohibition Officers, periodic training of police and judicial officers, expeditious disposal of Section 304-B/498-A cases, and grassroots awareness programmes through District Administration and Legal Services Authorities.

---

CASE FACTS

1. Marriage and death

Nasrin was married to Ajmal Beg and was the daughter-in-law of Jamila Beg. The marriage had lasted only a little over one year when Nasrin died. [Para 10(i)]

2. Dowry demands

Ajmal, Jamila and other family members repeatedly demanded from Nasrin and her father Taslim Beg (PW1):

• a colour television;
• a motorcycle; and
• ₹15,000/- in cash.

Ajmal reiterated the demand before PW1 on 4 June 2001. PW1 expressed his inability to meet the demand. [Para 10(ii)–(iii)]

3. Death by burning

On 5 June 2001, Ajmal, Jamila and other accused allegedly assaulted Nasrin and threatened to kill her if their demands were not fulfilled. When she cried for help, PW2 Khaliq Beg and another person reached the spot. By then Nasrin had been set on fire after kerosene was poured over her, and she could not be saved. [Para 10(iv)–(vi)]

4. Medical evidence

PW4, Dr. V.K. Mishra, conducted the post-mortem. He deposed that death was caused by asphyxia and shock resulting from extensive burns. The entire body surface had been burnt down to the muscles, and the injuries were consistent with pouring of kerosene. [Para 16.3]

5. Trial Court

The Trial Court relied upon the prosecution evidence and found that the dowry demands and harassment had been established. It convicted Ajmal and Jamila under Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The Trial Court imposed life imprisonment on Ajmal under Section 304-B IPC and corresponding sentences under the other provisions. [Para 11]

6. High Court

The High Court reversed the conviction and acquitted Ajmal and Jamila. It doubted PW2's credibility, relied upon PW6's statement that the deceased lived happily, and considered the dowry demand improbable because the accused were allegedly poor. [Para 12]

7. Appeal before Supreme Court

The State of Uttar Pradesh challenged the acquittal. Since the Trial Court and High Court had reached opposite conclusions, the Supreme Court re-examined the evidence. [Paras 13 & 15.2]

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LAW APPLIED BY THE SUPREME COURT

Section 304-B IPC

The Court applied the five essential requirements of dowry death:

1. unnatural death/burns or bodily injury;
2. death within seven years of marriage;
3. cruelty or harassment by husband or his relative;
4. cruelty or harassment for or in connection with dowry; and
5. such cruelty or harassment soon before death.

[Para 14.1]

The Court held that the expression “soon before” means a reasonable proximity or nexus, not necessarily an immediate or fixed period. [Para 14.1]

Section 113-B, Evidence Act

Once dowry-related cruelty soon before death is established, the Court shall presume that the accused caused the dowry death. The accused may rebut the presumption. [Para 14.2]

In the present case, the presumption arose because the dowry harassment and its proximity to death were proved, and it remained unrebutted because the defence led no evidence. [Para 20]

Section 498-A IPC

Cruelty includes both physical/mental wilful conduct and harassment connected with unlawful demands for property or valuable security. The provision is not confined to dowry harassment alone. [Para 14.3]

Sections 2, 3 and 4, Dowry Prohibition Act

The statutory definition of dowry extends to property or valuable security given or agreed to be given before, at or after marriage, when connected with the marriage. The mere demand itself is punishable under Section 4. [Para 14.4; Para 23]

---

APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

The Supreme Court found that:

• the demand for the motorcycle, colour TV and ₹15,000/- was proved beyond reasonable doubt;
• the deceased had been continuously harassed for dowry;
• Ajmal repeated the demand one day before her death;
• the death was an unnatural death caused by extensive burns;
• the defence led no evidence to rebut the statutory presumption.

Therefore, all the ingredients of Section 304-B IPC were satisfied and the presumption under Section 113-B arose. [Para 20]

The Court further held that the High Court's reliance upon the alleged poverty of the accused and the isolated statement that the deceased lived “happily” was legally unsustainable. [Paras 22–23]

---

CONCLUSION / FINAL DECISION

[Para 24] — The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in setting aside the Trial Court's conviction and acquitting Ajmal and Jamila. The State's appeals were accordingly allowed.

The Trial Court's conviction of Ajmal and Jamila was restored. Ajmal's sentence was also restored, and he was directed to surrender before the concerned Court within four weeks to serve the sentence.

In respect of Jamila, aged 94 years, the Court restored the conviction but, having regard to her advanced age, physical frailty, likely medical dependency and humanitarian considerations, refrained from incarcerating her.

The Court also issued systemic directions for effective implementation of the Dowry Prohibition Act, training of police and judicial officers, appointment and functioning of Dowry Prohibition Officers, awareness programmes and expeditious disposal of pending Section 304-B and 498-A cases. [Paras 25–27]

RATIO DECIDENDI

Proof of a specific dowry demand, continued dowry-related harassment and reiteration of that demand immediately before the unnatural death of a married woman within seven years of marriage satisfies the requirement of “soon before her death” under Section 304-B IPC. Once such foundational facts are proved, the presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act arises. Minor contradictions in witness testimony, an isolated statement that the deceased was living happily, or the poverty of the accused cannot displace otherwise consistent and credible evidence of dowry harassment. Further, the Dowry Prohibition Act does not distinguish between dowry demands made before and after marriage.

𝓜𝓾𝓻𝓪𝓵𝓲 𝓜𝓸𝓱𝓪𝓷 .𝓜.(ఎం. మురళీ మోహన్): THE MIND–MIRROR ARCHITECTURE OF HUMAN CONDUCT

𝓜𝓾𝓻𝓪𝓵𝓲 𝓜𝓸𝓱𝓪𝓷 .𝓜.(ఎం. మురళీ మోహన్): THE MIND–MIRROR ARCHITECTURE OF HUMAN CONDUCT: 🌺 मनोदर्पणवर्तनमाला THE MIND–MIRROR ARCHITECTURE OF HUMAN CONDUCT A Seven-Śloka Foundational Treatise on Upstream Cognitive Regulation and ...

Municipal Corporation Act — Encroachment notices — Sections 405 & 406: Notices issued under Sections 405 and 406 of the Andhra Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1955, calling upon alleged encroachers to remove unauthorized constructions within seven days, cannot be sustained where the authorities have not first followed the required procedure of issuing a proper show-cause notice. [Para 1, 4–6]

 

Headnotes — Kongi Chinnaiah & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.

W.P. No.24200 of 2026 — Harinath N., J. — 24.08.2026
2026:APHC:34870

1. Municipal Corporation Act — Encroachment notices — Sections 405 & 406:
   Notices issued under Sections 405 and 406 of the Andhra Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1955, calling upon alleged encroachers to remove unauthorized constructions within seven days, cannot be sustained where the authorities have not first followed the required procedure of issuing a proper show-cause notice. [Para 1, 4–6]
2. Natural justice — Prior show-cause notice mandatory:
   Where the authorities propose action against alleged unauthorized occupants/encroachers, the affected persons must first be called upon to submit their explanation and produce relevant title/possession documents, before any adverse action is taken. [Paras 4–6]
3. Encroachment proceedings — Opportunity to produce documents:
   Affected occupants must be given an opportunity to place before the authorities documents supporting their claim concerning possession and enjoyment of the property. A notice directly requiring removal of the structure, without first calling for such documents, does not satisfy this requirement. [Paras 4–5]
4. Encroachment notice — Cannot be treated as show-cause notice:
   A notice requiring removal of an alleged unauthorized construction cannot be retrospectively treated as a show-cause notice merely because the occupants could have submitted documents in response to it. The notice must itself afford an opportunity to explain the claim and produce supporting documents. [Para 4]
5. Previous judicial directions — Binding procedure:
   Where, in an earlier round of litigation, the High Court had directed the municipal authority to issue a fresh show-cause notice, call for relevant documents and thereafter pass appropriate orders after due notice and hearing, the authorities were required to comply with that procedure before taking further action. [Para 3]
6. Personal hearing — Required before adverse action:
   The authorities were required to afford the petitioners an opportunity of personal hearing before proceeding against them as alleged unauthorized occupants/encroachers. [Para 6]
7. Natural justice — Violation vitiates subsequent action:
   Any action taken by the respondents without issuing show-cause notices and affording an opportunity of hearing would be contrary to the principles of natural justice and the directions of the High Court. [Para 6]
8. Encroachment — Authorities' claim regarding documents does not cure procedural defect:
   The respondents contended that plot owners in the layout had produced documents whereas persons occupying the canal-side area had not produced patta certificates. The Court nevertheless held that the petitioners themselves had not been issued show-cause notices calling upon them to produce documents, and therefore the procedural defect remained. [Paras 4–5]
9. Long possession — Allegation of residence for 50 years:
   The petitioners asserted that they had been residing in the subject property for more than 50 years after constructing residential houses thereon. The Court did not finally adjudicate their title or possession; instead, it directed that their claims and documents be considered through the prescribed show-cause and hearing process. [Para 2]

Core Ratio

Before taking coercive action against alleged unauthorized occupants or encroachers under Sections 405 and 406 of the Andhra Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, the municipal authorities must issue a proper show-cause notice calling upon the affected persons to submit their explanation and produce the relevant documents concerning their possession or title, and must afford them an opportunity of hearing. A direct encroachment/removal notice cannot be treated as a substitute for such show-cause notice. Action taken without following this procedure violates the principles of natural justice and the binding directions of the High Court. [Paras 4–6]

Final Order

• W.P.No.24200 of 2026 — Disposed of.
• The impugned Encroachment Notices dated 17.08.2026 — Set aside.
• The respondents were left at liberty to proceed in accordance with the directions of the Division Bench in W.P.(PIL) No.140 of 2022 and batch.
• Respondents must issue show-cause notices to the petitioners and afford them an opportunity of hearing before taking further action.
• Any action without following that procedure would be contrary to natural justice and the Court's directions.
• No order as to costs.
• Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, stood closed. [Paras 6–7]

Suppression of material facts — Allegation requiring adjudication: An allegation that the plaintiffs suppressed an earlier partition and alienations concerning the suit property was a matter requiring adjudication on evidence and could not appropriately be conclusively determined in an appeal against the ex parte decree without affording the defendant an opportunity to contest. [Paras 14–16]

Headnotes — Shaik Jaina Vali v. Shaik Abida Khatoon & Ors.

A.S. No.254 of 2023 — D. Ramesh & Alapati Giridhar, JJ. — 24.08.2026
2026:APHC:34733

1. Ex parte decree — Appeal under Section 96(2) CPC — Maintainability:
   An appeal lies against an ex parte decree under Section 96(2) CPC. The plaintiffs' counsel ultimately conceded the maintainability of the appeal. [Para 21]
2. Ex parte decree — Defendant did not adduce evidence:
   Where the defendant had entered appearance through counsel but subsequently did not adduce evidence, and the suit was ultimately decreed ex parte, the appellate Court may treat the decree as an ex parte decree for purposes of Section 96(2) CPC. [Paras 13, 17–19]
3. Ex parte decree — Final opportunity to contest on merits:
   Where the plaintiff and his witnesses were not cross-examined and the decree was passed ex parte, the appellate Court may, in the interests of justice, afford the defendant a final opportunity to contest the suit and have the matter adjudicated on merits, subject to appropriate terms. [Para 23]
4. Order XLI Rule 27 CPC — Additional evidence — Appeal not to be decided without considering application:
   The appellant had filed an application under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC seeking to adduce several registered documents which allegedly had a direct bearing on the dispute. The Court noted that the appeal was still pending and had not been decided by refusing the application for additional evidence; therefore, the appellant could not rely upon the proposition in Satish Chand Surana concerning miscarriage of justice from dismissal of an appeal without deciding an Order XLI Rule 27 application. [Paras 3, 18]
5. Title dispute — Rival registered documents — Requires trial on merits:
   Where the appellant relied upon several registered documents, including prior sale deeds and partition deeds, alleging suppression of an earlier partition and alienations, while the plaintiffs disputed their validity and effect, the truth of the rival claims required determination on the basis of oral and documentary evidence at trial. [Paras 14–16]
6. Suppression of material facts — Allegation requiring adjudication:
   An allegation that the plaintiffs suppressed an earlier partition and alienations concerning the suit property was a matter requiring adjudication on evidence and could not appropriately be conclusively determined in an appeal against the ex parte decree without affording the defendant an opportunity to contest. [Paras 14–16]
7. Ex parte decree — Natural justice — Opportunity of contest:
   In the circumstances of the case, particularly where the plaintiffs and their witnesses had not been subjected to cross-examination, the Court considered it just to restore the matter to the trial stage so that the defendant could contest the claim and invite a decision on merits. [Para 23]
8. Costs — Condition for remand:
   The indulgence of setting aside the ex parte decree and remanding the suit was granted subject to payment of Rs.50,000/- as costs to the plaintiffs, representing the delay and circumstances attributable to the appellant. [Para 24]
9. Conditional order — Default in payment of costs:
   The order setting aside the ex parte decree and remanding the suit was expressly made conditional upon payment of Rs.50,000/- within three weeks. In default, the appeal would stand dismissed without further reference to the Court. [Para 24]
10. Remand — Expeditious disposal:
    Upon payment of costs, the parties were directed to appear before the Trial Court on 15.09.2026, and the Trial Court was directed to proceed with the evidence and dispose of the suit afresh, preferably within four months from 15.09.2026. [Para 24]
11. Party cooperation — Protraction of proceedings:
    Both parties were directed to assist the Trial Court in completing the trial within the stipulated period. If either party failed to cooperate or attempted to protract the proceedings, the Trial Court was authorised to take the next appropriate procedural step or impose costs according to the stage and circumstances of the case. [Para 24]

Core Ratio

An appeal lies under Section 96(2) CPC against an ex parte decree. Where the defendant had entered appearance but did not adduce evidence, and the plaintiff and his witnesses were not cross-examined, the appellate Court, in the interests of justice, may set aside the ex parte decree and afford the defendant a final opportunity to contest the suit on merits, particularly where the defendant raises substantial questions concerning prior partitions, registered documents and suppression of material facts. Such relief may be granted on terms, including payment of costs and a time-bound remand. [Paras 21–24]

Final Order

• A.S.No.254 of 2023 — Allowed on terms.
• Ex parte judgment and decree dated 05.01.2023 in O.S.No.59 of 2015 — Set aside.
• Suit remanded to the Trial Court for fresh disposal.
• Appellant directed to pay Rs.50,000/- costs within three weeks.
• On payment, parties to appear before the Trial Court on 15.09.2026.
• Trial Court directed to dispose of the suit preferably within four months from 15.09.2026.
• Failure to pay the stipulated costs within three weeks would result in the appeal standing dismissed.
• Pending miscellaneous applications closed. [Para 24]

Compassionate appointment — Right stands exhausted upon acceptance of appointment: Once a dependent of a deceased employee is offered and accepts compassionate appointment and joins the post offered, the right to compassionate appointment stands consummated. Thereafter, the dependent cannot claim appointment to a higher post merely on the ground that he/she subsequently satisfies the qualifications for that higher post. [Para 12]

 

Headnotes — Tirumala Tirupathi Devasthanams v. Assistant/Shroff Staff & Ors.

W.A. No.609 of 2022 — D. Ramesh & Alapati Giridhar, JJ. — 24.08.2026
2026:APHC:34623

1. Compassionate appointment — Right stands exhausted upon acceptance of appointment:
   Once a dependent of a deceased employee is offered and accepts compassionate appointment and joins the post offered, the right to compassionate appointment stands consummated. Thereafter, the dependent cannot claim appointment to a higher post merely on the ground that he/she subsequently satisfies the qualifications for that higher post. [Para 12]

2. Compassionate appointment — No second consideration for higher post:
   Compassionate appointment is intended to provide immediate relief to the family of a deceased employee. Once that relief has been granted and accepted, a subsequent claim for a higher post would amount to “endless compassion” and is impermissible. [Para 12]

3. Compassionate appointment — Eligibility for higher post distinct from selection/appointment:
   Mere eligibility or acquisition of the qualification prescribed for a higher post does not create a right to compassionate appointment to that post. Eligibility to be appointed is distinct from the process of selection/appointment. [Para 12, referring to State of Rajasthan v. Umrao Singh]

4. Compassionate appointment — Cannot be used as a ladder for career advancement:
   Compassionate appointment is an exceptional measure intended to relieve the family from financial hardship caused by the death of its earning member. It cannot subsequently be used as a mechanism for climbing to a higher post or gaining seniority merely because the employee later becomes qualified for that post. [Para 12]

5. Negative equality — Illegal benefit cannot be claimed as precedent:
   A person cannot claim a higher post merely because a similarly situated employee was wrongly granted such benefit. An illegality committed in favour of one employee cannot be validated or perpetuated by extending the same illegality to others. [Para 12]

6. Article 14 — No equality in illegality:
   A wrong or illegal order passed in favour of a similarly situated person does not confer a corresponding enforceable right upon another person on the ground of discrimination. Authorities cannot be compelled to perpetuate an earlier wrong. [Para 12]

7. Compassionate appointment — Subsequent circular cannot reopen concluded appointment:
   Where employees accepted appointment as Assistant/Shroff under the circular applicable at the time of their appointment and continued in that post for several years without challenging either their appointments or the governing circular, they could not subsequently claim the benefit of a later Board Resolution or circular providing a route to appointment as Junior Assistant. [Para 8]

8. Service law — Applicable conditions at time of appointment:
   Respondent Nos.1 to 10 had been appointed as Assistant/Shroff under the TTD Executive Officer's Circular dated 28.12.2010, which was in force when their appointments were made. Having accepted those appointments and continued without protest, they could not retrospectively invoke the subsequent Resolution No.364 dated 28.08.2018 and Circular dated 05.10.2018. [Para 8]

9. Compassionate appointment — Higher qualification acquired subsequently:
   The fact that some employees subsequently acquired graduation or other qualifications required for Junior Assistant did not, by itself, entitle them to appointment to the higher post after they had already accepted compassionate appointment to another post. [Para 12]

10. TTD Board Resolution No.364 — Cannot confer retrospective entitlement:
    Resolution No.364 dated 28.08.2018 and the consequential TTD Circular dated 05.10.2018 could not be invoked by persons who had already accepted compassionate appointments as Assistant/Shroff under the earlier regime. [Para 13]

11. Government Circular dated 12.08.2003 — Validity not adjudicated:
    The Division Bench expressly declined to examine the validity of the Government Circular Memo dated 12.08.2003 or the appointments made pursuant thereto, observing that the issue had been implemented throughout the State and the present controversy could be resolved on the narrower question concerning the subsequent claim for a higher post. [Para 11]

12. Writ appeal — Single Judge's direction for Junior Assistant appointment set aside:
    The learned Single Judge had directed appointment of the writ petitioners as Junior Assistants with consequential benefits by applying Board Resolution No.364 dated 28.08.2018 and TTD Circular dated 05.10.2018. The Division Bench set aside that order. [Paras 5 & 13]

Important governing proposition

Once compassionate appointment is accepted and the appointee joins the post offered, the right to compassionate appointment is exhausted. Subsequent acquisition of qualification for a higher post does not create a fresh right to compassionate appointment to that higher post; otherwise, it would result in “endless compassion.” [Para 12]

Negative equality — Particularly important

“An illegality committed by an authority cannot be validated and further perpetuated by its extension to other similarly placed persons.” Thus, even if another employee was granted appointment to a higher post in similar circumstances, that erroneous benefit cannot be demanded by others under Article 14. [Para 12]

Final Order

• W.A.No.609 of 2022 — Allowed.

• Order dated 26.04.2022 in W.P.No.7490 of 2019 — Set aside.

• Respondent Nos.1–10 were held not entitled to any benefits under Resolution No.364 dated 28.08.2018 and Circular dated 05.10.2018.

• The notices issued to Respondent Nos.13–64 were set aside.

• The reversion order dated 25.12.2023 concerning Respondent No.12 was set aside.

• The Division Bench expressly stated that it was not deciding the validity of Circular Memo dated 12.08.2003 or the appointments made thereunder.

• No order as to costs. [Para 13]