Order XVIII, Rule 17 CPC – Suit for partition – PW.1 was examined and cross-examined by some of the defendants – counsel for defendant Nos.1 and 2 remained absent and their cross-examination was recorded as 'nil' – thereafter, on change of counsel, an application was filed under Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC seeking recall of PW.1 for cross-examination – Trial Court, in the interest of affording a fair opportunity for effective adjudication, allowed the application – Challenging the same, Civil Revision Petition filed – Held, though it is settled law that Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC cannot be invoked to fill up lacunae in evidence or cross-examination, where the principal contesting defendants had not cross-examined the plaintiff at all, the partition suit could not be effectively adjudicated on merits without such cross-examination – the power of recall can be exercised where it is necessary to secure a fair trial and effective adjudication of the real controversy between the parties – the decisions of the Supreme Court prohibiting recall to fill up lacunae were distinguishable on facts – order permitting recall upheld – Civil Revision Petition dismissed. (2026: APHC: 7181).

Order XVIII, Rule 17 CPC – Suit for partition – PW.1 was examined and cross-examined by some of the defendants – counsel for defendant Nos.1 and 2 remained absent and their cross-examination was recorded as 'nil' – thereafter, on change of counsel, an application was filed under Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC seeking recall of PW.1 for cross-examination – Trial Court, in the interest of affording a fair opportunity for effective adjudication, allowed the application – Challenging the same, Civil Revision Petition filed – Held, though it is settled law that Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC cannot be invoked to fill up lacunae in evidence or cross-examination, where the principal contesting defendants had not cross-examined the plaintiff at all, the partition suit could not be effectively adjudicated on merits without such cross-examination – the power of recall can be exercised where it is necessary to secure a fair trial and effective adjudication of the real controversy between the parties – the decisions of the Supreme Court prohibiting recall to fill up lacunae were distinguishable on facts – order permitting recall upheld – Civil Revision Petition dismissed. (2026: APHC: 7181).

Section 22 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 applies to agricultural land inherited by Class I heirs and confers upon co-heirs a statutory preferential right to acquire the interest proposed to be transferred by another heir. The provision is an incident of intestate succession enacted under Entry 5 of List III of the Seventh Schedule and is constitutionally distinct from Section 15 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act. The Constitution Bench decision in Atam Prakash does not invalidate or dilute Section 22 of the Hindu Succession Act. Further, where a co-heir asserts the preferential right before completion of the transfer, subsequent execution of the sale deed does not defeat that right nor require an independent challenge to the conveyance. 2026 INSC 698

 

Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – Section 22 – Preferential Right of Pre-emption – Agricultural Land – Constitution of India – Seventh Schedule, List III Entry 5; List II Entries 14 & 18 – Whether Section 22 of the Hindu Succession Act applies to agricultural land inherited by Class I heirs, and whether the provision is constitutionally valid? – Held, Yes.

The plaintiff and the defendants, being Class I heirs of their deceased father, inherited agricultural land. Certain co-heirs proposed to alienate their respective shares to a third party. Before execution of the sale deed, the plaintiff invoked Section 22 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, claiming the preferential right to acquire the shares proposed to be transferred. The Trial Court dismissed the suit by applying the Constitution Bench decision in Atam Prakash v. State of Haryana, holding that Section 22 was analogous to Section 15 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act. The First Appellate Court reversed the decree relying upon Babu Ram v. Santokh Singh, and the High Court affirmed the same. Whether Section 22 of the Hindu Succession Act is applicable to agricultural land and whether the Constitution Bench decision in Atam Prakash renders Section 22 unconstitutional or inapplicable? – Held, Yes; No.

The Supreme Court held that Section 22 of the Hindu Succession Act applies equally to agricultural land inherited by Class I heirs. The Court clarified that Atam Prakash merely invalidated Section 15 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act because the classification of pre-emptors based upon consanguinity violated Article 14. It did not declare the concept of pre-emption itself unconstitutional, nor did it examine the constitutional validity of Section 22 of the Hindu Succession Act. Section 22 is fundamentally different in character, being a succession-based statutory preference confined exclusively to Class I heirs inheriting property from the same intestate. It is neither a free-standing right of pre-emption nor comparable to the broad pre-emption rights created under the Punjab Act. The Court reaffirmed the decision in Babu Ram v. Santokh Singh, holding that Section 22 derives legislative competence from Entry 5 of List III (intestacy and succession), which expressly empowers Parliament to legislate regarding succession without excluding agricultural land. The provision merely imposes a succession-related qualification upon an heir proposing to transfer inherited property and is not legislation relating to transfer of agricultural land under Entry 18 of List II. Since the plaintiff had asserted the statutory right before execution of the sale deed, no separate challenge to the subsequent conveyance was necessary. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Section 22 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 applies to agricultural land inherited by Class I heirs and confers upon co-heirs a statutory preferential right to acquire the interest proposed to be transferred by another heir. The provision is an incident of intestate succession enacted under Entry 5 of List III of the Seventh Schedule and is constitutionally distinct from Section 15 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act. The Constitution Bench decision in Atam Prakash does not invalidate or dilute Section 22 of the Hindu Succession Act. Further, where a co-heir asserts the preferential right before completion of the transfer, subsequent execution of the sale deed does not defeat that right nor require an independent challenge to the conveyance.  2026 INSC 698

A challenge to the order of a statutory tribunal may validly be maintained under Article 226, Article 227, or both (where the High Court Rules so permit), and the maintainability of an intra-court appeal depends upon the nature of the jurisdiction actually invoked, not merely upon the form of the prayers. After the deletion of Section 71(4) of the Motor Vehicles Act, there is no statutory ceiling on the number of stage carriage permits that may be held by an operator. Further, rejection of a permit application must be supported by recorded reasons as required by Section 80, and possession of a ready vehicle at the time of application is not a mandatory statutory requirement, though it may be a relevant comparative factor while considering rival applicants. 2026 INSC 733

 

Constitution of India – Articles 226 & 227 – Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Sections 71, 72, 80 & 89 – Stage Carriage Permit – Intra-Court Appeal – Whether an intra-court appeal is maintainable against an order of a Single Judge passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 challenging an order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, and whether a permit application can be rejected merely because the applicant had been granted another permit or had offered the same vehicle? – Held, Yes; No.

The appellant applied for a stage carriage permit on specified routes under the Motor Vehicles Act. The State Transport Authority rejected his application on the ground that he had already been granted another permit. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal affirmed the rejection. The writ petition filed under Article 226 was dismissed by the Single Judge, who held that since the appellant had offered the same vehicle for different routes, the transport authority was justified in allocating another route. The Division Bench dismissed the intra-court appeal as not maintainable, treating the proceedings as one under Article 227. Whether the intra-court appeal was maintainable and whether the authorities were justified in rejecting the permit application without recording legally sustainable reasons? – Held, Yes; No.

The Supreme Court held that the Division Bench committed a fundamental error in treating the writ petition as one under Article 227. Whether jurisdiction is invoked under Article 226 or Article 227 must be determined from the substance of the entire petition, including the pleadings, grounds, reliefs, and the jurisdiction actually invoked, and not merely from the nature of the prayers. Since the appellant had invoked Article 226, the intra-court appeal was maintainable under the applicable High Court Rules. On the merits, the Court held that after the omission of Section 71(4) of the Motor Vehicles Act, there is no statutory restriction on the number of stage carriage permits that may be granted to an individual operator. The transport authorities failed to record reasons as mandated by Section 80 while rejecting the application. The Single Judge also sustained the rejection on a ground never assigned by the statutory authorities. The Court further held that possession of a ready vehicle on the date of applying for a permit is not a statutory pre-condition; the vehicle may be produced after selection but before issuance of the permit, although possession of a ready vehicle may constitute a relevant factor where competing applicants are otherwise similarly situated. The impugned orders were accordingly set aside and the appeal before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal was restored for fresh consideration.

Ratio Decidendi

A challenge to the order of a statutory tribunal may validly be maintained under Article 226, Article 227, or both (where the High Court Rules so permit), and the maintainability of an intra-court appeal depends upon the nature of the jurisdiction actually invoked, not merely upon the form of the prayers. After the deletion of Section 71(4) of the Motor Vehicles Act, there is no statutory ceiling on the number of stage carriage permits that may be held by an operator. Further, rejection of a permit application must be supported by recorded reasons as required by Section 80, and possession of a ready vehicle at the time of application is not a mandatory statutory requirement, though it may be a relevant comparative factor while considering rival applicants.    2026 INSC 733 

A criminal conviction cannot be sustained merely because the prosecution story appears plausible. Where the prosecution fails to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt and the defence adduces credible oral and documentary evidence creating a reasonable and probable hypothesis consistent with innocence, the benefit of doubt must necessarily enure to the accused. Defence evidence stands on the same footing as prosecution evidence and deserves equal judicial evaluation; it cannot be ignored or viewed with suspicion merely because it is led by the accused. 2026 INSC 695

 

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Sections 173, 190 & 173(8) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 498-A & 304-B – Dowry Death – Further Investigation – Defence Evidence – Whether a conviction can be sustained where the prosecution fails to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt and the defence adduces credible evidence creating a probable hypothesis of innocence? – Held, No.

The appellant was prosecuted for offences under Sections 498-A and 304-B IPC in connection with the death of his wife due to burn injuries in her matrimonial home. Initially, the investigating officer found material against all seventeen accused named in the FIR but, acting upon directions of the Superintendent of Police, filed a charge-sheet only against the parents-in-law while continuing investigation against the remaining accused. Subsequently, another final report found no evidence against the remaining accused, resulting in two separate sessions trials arising from the same FIR. Ultimately, the appellant alone was convicted while all other accused were acquitted. The High Court remanded the matter on the ground of procedural irregularity. Whether the conviction could be sustained in the face of an inadequate prosecution investigation and credible defence evidence raising a reasonable doubt regarding the prosecution case? – Held, No.

The Supreme Court held that although the Superintendent of Police had no authority to direct filing of a partial charge-sheet and continuation of investigation in the manner adopted, the irregularity did not by itself vitiate the cognizance taken by the Court, since the power to take cognizance rests exclusively with the Magistrate. However, on the merits, the prosecution utterly failed to establish the essential ingredients of cruelty or dowry death beyond reasonable doubt. There was no post-mortem examination, no effective investigation at the places where the victim was treated, no production of crucial medical evidence, and the prosecution witnesses merely repeated general allegations of dowry demand without independent corroboration. On the other hand, the defence produced independent witnesses, medical records, documentary proof of treatment, evidence of investments made jointly in the names of the spouses, and an Executive Magistrate's dying declaration indicating that the burn injuries were accidental. The defence evidence remained substantially unshaken and raised a probable hypothesis consistent with innocence. The Court reiterated that defence evidence must receive the same judicial consideration as prosecution evidence and cannot be discarded merely because it emanates from the accused. Since the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the conviction was set aside and the appellant was acquitted.

Ratio Decidendi

A criminal conviction cannot be sustained merely because the prosecution story appears plausible. Where the prosecution fails to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt and the defence adduces credible oral and documentary evidence creating a reasonable and probable hypothesis consistent with innocence, the benefit of doubt must necessarily enure to the accused. Defence evidence stands on the same footing as prosecution evidence and deserves equal judicial evaluation; it cannot be ignored or viewed with suspicion merely because it is led by the accused. 2026 INSC 695

Appointments to recognised aided Madrasahs made during the period when the constitutional validity of the West Bengal Madrasah Service Commission Act, 2008 was under challenge do not automatically become valid merely because they were made in the interregnum. Every appointment must independently satisfy the mandatory statutory recruitment procedure, including appointment against a sanctioned vacancy by a competent authority through a transparent selection process. Findings of a Court-appointed Verification Committee rejecting such claims, after individual scrutiny, are not liable to be interfered with in judicial review absent manifest perversity or patent illegality. 2026 INSC 691

  

Constitution of India – Articles 30(1), 32 & 142 – West Bengal Madrasah Service Commission Act, 2008 – Appointment of Teachers and Non-Teaching Staff in Recognised Aided Madrasahs – Verification Committee – Whether appointments made during the interregnum after the High Court declared the Act unconstitutional and before the Supreme Court upheld its validity automatically confer a right to approval and service benefits? – Held, No.

The petitioners, comprising teaching and non-teaching staff of various recognised aided Madrasahs in West Bengal, claimed approval of their appointments and consequential service benefits on the ground that they had been appointed during the period when the High Court had declared certain provisions of the West Bengal Madrasah Service Commission Act, 2008 unconstitutional. Pursuant to the decision in Snehasis Giri, this Court had constituted a Committee headed by a former High Court Judge to verify the legality of such appointments. The Committee, after examining each individual claim, found that none of the appointments satisfied the prescribed statutory requirements. The petitioners challenged the Committee's report under Article 32, contending that the appointments stood protected by the earlier decision in Sk. Mohd. Rafique and that the Committee had arbitrarily rejected all claims. Whether appointments made during the interregnum automatically acquire validity and entitle the appointees to approval and service benefits irrespective of compliance with the prescribed recruitment procedure? – Held, No.

The Supreme Court held that the observations in Sk. Mohd. Rafique did not dispense with the requirement of verifying whether appointments had been made in accordance with the governing recruitment notifications and statutory procedure. The Committee constituted in Snehasis Giri was specifically entrusted with examining the legality and genuineness of each appointment, including the existence of sanctioned vacancies, validity of the Managing Committee, prescribed qualifications, publication of proper advertisements, constitution of the Selection Committee, observance of recruitment procedure, and actual appointment against approved posts. Judicial review over such factual findings is limited and interference is warranted only upon demonstration of manifest perversity or arbitrariness. On an independent examination of the representative cases projected by the petitioners, the Court found repeated violations of the mandatory recruitment procedure, including appointments by incompetent authorities, absence of sanctioned vacancies, non-publication of advertisements in State-level newspapers, failure to follow prescribed selection norms, appointments after the stay granted by this Court, and appointments made contrary to statutory notifications. Since none of the selected cases established a legally valid appointment, the petitioners acquired no enforceable right to approval, salary or continuation in service. The writ petitions were accordingly dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Appointments to recognised aided Madrasahs made during the period when the constitutional validity of the West Bengal Madrasah Service Commission Act, 2008 was under challenge do not automatically become valid merely because they were made in the interregnum. Every appointment must independently satisfy the mandatory statutory recruitment procedure, including appointment against a sanctioned vacancy by a competent authority through a transparent selection process. Findings of a Court-appointed Verification Committee rejecting such claims, after individual scrutiny, are not liable to be interfered with in judicial review absent manifest perversity or patent illegality.    2026 INSC 691