Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act embodies a mandatory procedural safeguard requiring the Collector to afford an opportunity of hearing and fairly consider the objections of affected landowners before recommending acquisition. However, where the acquiring authority substantially complies with the statutory procedure and the landowners themselves fail to diligently pursue their objections despite adequate opportunity, the acquisition cannot be invalidated on the ground of denial of hearing. Acquisition for a metro rail depot constitutes a valid public purpose, and courts will not interfere with the executive's choice of land in the absence of mala fides, arbitrariness or substantial procedural illegality.

 

2026 INSC 682

Alok Kotahwala & Ors. v. Jaipur Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. & Ors.

HEAD NOTES 

A. Land Acquisition Act, 1894 — Section 5A — Right of objection and hearing — Valuable statutory safeguard.

(Paras 38–40)

Held, Section 5A embodies a valuable statutory right flowing from the principles of natural justice. A landowner has a right to file objections, receive an opportunity of personal hearing, and obtain fair consideration of such objections before issuance of a declaration under Section 6.

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B. Section 5A — Hearing — Duty of Collector.

(Paras 38, 40)

Held, once objections under Section 5A(1) are filed, it is the statutory duty of the Collector to afford an opportunity of hearing. The landowner need not specifically demand such hearing. To the extent contrary observations were made in Sam Hiring Co., they were not accepted.

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C. Land Acquisition — Opportunity of hearing — Conduct of objector.

(Paras 42–50)

Held, where the objectors repeatedly participated in the proceedings, were aware of the dates fixed, failed to appear on the scheduled date, neither sought adjournment nor pursued the objections thereafter, the acquisition cannot be invalidated on the ground of denial of hearing. A party cannot take advantage of its own lack of diligence.

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D. Collector under Section 5A — Nature of function.

(Paras 38, 51)

Held, the Collector acts as an administrative authority and not as a judicial or quasi-judicial authority. He is required to consider every objection, assign brief reasons and forward recommendations to the Government; elaborate adjudicatory orders are not contemplated.

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E. Land Acquisition — Public purpose — Judicial review.

(Paras 39, 68 onwards)

Held, selection of a particular parcel of land for a public project ordinarily falls within the executive domain. Courts do not substitute their opinion regarding suitability of alternative lands unless mala fides, colourable exercise of power or absence of public purpose is established.

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F. Acquisition proceedings — Metro Rail Project — Public purpose.

(Paras 63 onwards)

Held, acquisition of land for construction of a Metro Rail depot is unquestionably for a public purpose. Allegations regarding availability of alternative sites or future commercial utilisation do not invalidate the acquisition in the absence of arbitrariness or mala fides.

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G. Property Rights — Article 300A — Procedural safeguards.

(Paras 31–40)

Held, compulsory acquisition of private property must conform to fair procedure. The statutory safeguards under Section 5A constitute an essential component of the constitutional protection available under Article 300A.

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H. Judicial Review — Acquisition proceedings.

(Paras 45–51)

Held, courts interfere with acquisition proceedings only where there is flagrant violation of mandatory statutory safeguards. Mere technical or insubstantial procedural deviations, without prejudice, do not vitiate the acquisition.

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Analysis of Facts

The appellants owned approximately 27 hectares of agricultural land proposed to be acquired for construction of the Jaipur Metro Rail Depot under Phase-II of the Jaipur Metro Project.

After issuance of the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, the landowners filed objections under Section 5A. The Land Acquisition Officer repeatedly fixed dates, received replies from the Jaipur Metro Rail Corporation and granted opportunity to the appellants to file rejoinders. However, the appellants neither appeared nor filed rejoinders on the last scheduled date and thereafter remained inactive until the Land Acquisition Officer forwarded his report recommending acquisition.

The Single Judge quashed the acquisition proceedings holding that an effective hearing under Section 5A had not been granted.

The Division Bench reversed that decision and upheld the acquisition.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Division Bench, holding that although Section 5A confers a valuable statutory right, the appellants themselves failed to diligently pursue their objections. There was substantial compliance with the statutory procedure and no prejudice warranting invalidation of the acquisition.

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Analysis of Law

The Supreme Court laid down the following principles:

1. Section 5A confers a substantive statutory right of objection and hearing before compulsory acquisition.

2. The Collector is duty-bound to afford an opportunity of hearing once objections are filed; the landowner need not specifically request one.

3. The Collector functions administratively and is required only to record brief reasons with recommendations, not a detailed adjudicatory judgment.

4. A landowner's right under Section 5A is subject to corresponding diligence in prosecuting the objections.

5. Failure of the objector to appear despite knowledge of the proceedings cannot later be converted into a plea of denial of natural justice.

6. Courts interfere only where there is substantial or flagrant violation of Section 5A resulting in prejudice.

7. Acquisition for metro rail infrastructure constitutes acquisition for a valid public purpose.

8. Selection of the project site and rejection of alternative locations ordinarily fall within executive discretion and are not matters for judicial substitution.

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Ratio Decidendi

Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act embodies a mandatory procedural safeguard requiring the Collector to afford an opportunity of hearing and fairly consider the objections of affected landowners before recommending acquisition. However, where the acquiring authority substantially complies with the statutory procedure and the landowners themselves fail to diligently pursue their objections despite adequate opportunity, the acquisition cannot be invalidated on the ground of denial of hearing. Acquisition for a metro rail depot constitutes a valid public purpose, and courts will not interfere with the executive's choice of land in the absence of mala fides, arbitrariness or substantial procedural illegality.

Prior to Karnataka Act No. 5 of 2001, the exemption granted to "Sugar" under the Karnataka Sales Tax Act extended to imported sugar as well. Although the Legislature was competent to retrospectively restrict the exemption by confining it to sugar produced or manufactured in India, such retrospective withdrawal of exemption can justify only recovery of the principal tax liability. Dealers who had acted bona fide under the earlier exemption and had not collected tax from purchasers cannot be visited with penalty, and interest can be levied only from the date of lawful reassessment demand.

 

2026 INSC 693

Asia Sugar & Chemical Co., Devangere v. State of Karnataka & Ors.

HEAD NOTES 

A. Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 — Fifth Schedule — Entry relating to Sugar — Imported sugar — Exemption prior to 2001.

(Paras 53–63)

Held, prior to Karnataka Act No. 5 of 2001, the exemption entry referring to "Sugar" covered imported sugar also. The reference to the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957 was only for identification of the commodity and not for importing any territorial restriction limiting exemption to sugar produced or manufactured in India.

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B. Fiscal Statute — Exemption Entry — Interpretation.

(Paras 42–44, 53–63)

Held, while construing an exemption entry, the Court cannot read into the statute words which the Legislature has consciously omitted. A commodity described simply as "Sugar" cannot be judicially restricted to "Sugar produced or manufactured in India" when such words were inserted only by a subsequent amendment.

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C. Karnataka Act No. 5 of 2001 — Retrospective amendment — Validity.

(Paras 64–71)

Held, the retrospective insertion of the words "produced or manufactured in India" is a substantive amendment restricting an existing exemption and not merely clarificatory. Nevertheless, the amendment is within the legislative competence of the State and is constitutionally valid.

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D. Retrospective Taxation — Fairness — Penalty and Interest.

(Paras 72–84)

Held, although the Legislature may retrospectively withdraw an exemption, dealers who acted bona fide under the earlier exemption and did not collect tax from purchasers cannot be subjected to penal consequences. Principal tax liability alone may be recovered, while penalty is impermissible and interest can run only from the date of lawful demand pursuant to reassessment.

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E. Sales Tax — Reassessment — Consequences of retrospective amendment.

(Paras 74–84)

Held, reassessment pursuant to a valid retrospective amendment is permissible for determining principal tax liability. However, retrospective operation should not assume a punitive character by imposing penalty or pre-demand interest upon dealers who had acted in accordance with the law prevailing at the relevant time.

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F. Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 — Section 8(2) — Reassessment.

(Paras 85–87)

Held, while recomputing liability on inter-State sales, the assessing authority must strictly apply the provisions of the Central Sales Tax Act, including Section 8(2), and cannot ignore the statutory rate applicable under the Central legislation.

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G. Validation Laws — Legislative competence.

(Paras 45–51, 64–71)

Held, the Legislature possesses power to retrospectively amend fiscal statutes and withdraw exemptions, provided it acts within its legislative competence. However, constitutional fairness requires that retrospective amendments should not impose oppressive penal consequences on completed transactions.

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Analysis of Facts

The assessees were dealers engaged in the import and sale of sugar in the State of Karnataka during the assessment years 1994–96.

At the relevant time, "Sugar" was included in the Fifth Schedule to the Karnataka Sales Tax Act as an exempt commodity. Proceeding on the basis that imported sugar also enjoyed exemption, the assessees neither collected sales tax from purchasers nor paid tax to the State. The assessing authorities also completed the original assessments granting exemption.

Subsequently, Karnataka Act No. 5 of 2001 retrospectively amended the exemption entry by inserting the words "produced or manufactured in India", thereby restricting the exemption only to indigenous sugar.

On the strength of the retrospective amendment, reassessment proceedings were initiated demanding tax, penalty and interest for the earlier assessment years.

The Single Judge struck down the retrospective operation of the amendment. The Division Bench reversed that decision.

The Supreme Court held that imported sugar was indeed exempt under the unamended law and that the 2001 amendment substantially withdrew the exemption retrospectively. While upholding the constitutional validity of the amendment, the Court held that only the principal tax liability could be recovered. Penalty was disallowed and interest was directed to run only from the date of lawful reassessment demand.

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Analysis of Law

The Supreme Court laid down the following principles:

1. Prior to Karnataka Act No. 5 of 2001, the exemption for "Sugar" included imported sugar.

2. Reference to the Additional Duties of Excise Act merely identified the commodity and did not import territorial restrictions.

3. Courts cannot add words to fiscal statutes which the Legislature itself had not employed.

4. Karnataka Act No. 5 of 2001 constitutes a substantive withdrawal of exemption and not a merely clarificatory amendment.

5. The Legislature is competent to enact retrospective fiscal legislation and withdraw exemptions retrospectively.

6. Retrospective withdrawal of exemption permits reassessment for determination of principal tax liability.

7. Dealers who acted under the existing exemption and did not collect tax from purchasers cannot fairly be subjected to penalty.

8. Interest on tax arising solely due to retrospective legislation should accrue only from the date of lawful reassessment demand.

9. Liability relating to inter-State sales must be recomputed strictly in accordance with the Central Sales Tax Act, particularly Section 8(2).

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Ratio Decidendi

Prior to Karnataka Act No. 5 of 2001, the exemption granted to "Sugar" under the Karnataka Sales Tax Act extended to imported sugar as well. Although the Legislature was competent to retrospectively restrict the exemption by confining it to sugar produced or manufactured in India, such retrospective withdrawal of exemption can justify only recovery of the principal tax liability. Dealers who had acted bona fide under the earlier exemption and had not collected tax from purchasers cannot be visited with penalty, and interest can be levied only from the date of lawful reassessment demand.

The SEBI (Mutual Funds) Regulations, 1996 mandate that close-ended mutual fund schemes must be redeemed and wound up upon their stipulated maturity unless lawfully rolled over in accordance with the prescribed statutory procedure. Asset Management Companies and Trustee Companies are under strict statutory and fiduciary obligations to exercise due diligence, comply with the regulatory framework and make full disclosures to SEBI and investors. A regulatory violation is not excused merely because investors ultimately suffered no loss or earned higher returns, as the SEBI regime enforces compliance rather than consequences, and civil penalties follow upon proof of breach irrespective of mens rea or bona fide intention.

 

2026 INSC 681

Mr. Nilesh Shah & Ors. v. Securities and Exchange Board of India & Ors.

HEAD NOTES 

A. SEBI (Mutual Funds) Regulations, 1996 — Close-ended mutual fund schemes — Mandatory redemption on maturity.

(Paras 20–35)

Held, a close-ended mutual fund scheme must be fully redeemed and wound up on its maturity date in accordance with Regulations 33(4) and 39 of the SEBI (Mutual Funds) Regulations, 1996. Extension of the maturity of underlying debt instruments resulting in delayed redemption of the scheme, without following the statutory procedure for roll-over, constitutes a clear regulatory breach.

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B. Securities Law — Regulatory compliance — Investor benefit no defence.

(Paras 31–35)

Held, absence of investor loss or the fact that investors ultimately earned higher returns does not absolve a regulated entity from liability for violating the SEBI Act or the Mutual Funds Regulations. The regulatory framework is compliance-oriented and not consequence-oriented.

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C. Mutual Funds — Due diligence — Fiduciary obligations.

(Paras 11–19)

Held, Asset Management Companies are under a statutory obligation to exercise due diligence before investing mutual fund assets. Investment decisions based primarily upon collateral security while ignoring the weak financial condition of the issuer amount to failure of due diligence under the 1996 Regulations.

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D. Trustees of Mutual Funds — Independent fiduciary duty.

(Paras 41–42)

Held, the Trustee Company cannot merely endorse the decisions of the Asset Management Company. It is under an independent fiduciary obligation to ensure that every course of action conforms to the statutory regulations and adequately protects the interests of unit holders.

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E. Securities Regulation — Mandatory disclosures — Duty towards SEBI and investors.

(Paras 38–42)

Held, material departures from the regulatory framework affecting maturity, redemption or management of mutual fund schemes must be promptly disclosed to SEBI and the investors. Failure to make timely disclosure constitutes an independent regulatory violation.

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F. SEBI Act, 1992 — Civil penalties — Mens rea unnecessary.

(Paras 7–9)

Held, once violation of the SEBI Act or the Regulations is established, imposition of civil penalty follows irrespective of intention, bona fides or absence of dishonest motive. Mens rea is not an essential ingredient for levy of penalties under the SEBI Act.

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G. Appeals under Section 15Z, SEBI Act — Scope of interference.

(Paras 6–9, 17)

Held, in an appeal under Section 15Z, the Supreme Court examines only substantial questions of law. Commercial wisdom or business expediency of investment decisions cannot substitute compliance with the statutory regulatory framework.

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H. Regulatory discipline — Market integrity.

(Paras 32–35, 49–57)

Held, permitting regulatory violations merely because they resulted in financial gain would undermine market discipline and encourage future non-compliance. Market integrity requires strict adherence to statutory mandates irrespective of the eventual financial outcome.

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Analysis of Facts

Kotak Mahindra Mutual Fund launched six close-ended Fixed Maturity Plan (FMP) schemes, part of whose corpus was invested in Zero Coupon Non-Convertible Debentures issued by companies belonging to the Essel Group.

When the value of the pledged Zee Entertainment shares declined, the issuers failed to restore the stipulated security cover. Instead of enforcing the pledged securities, Kotak Asset Management Company, with the concurrence of the Trustee Company, restructured the repayment by extending the maturity of the debentures beyond the maturity dates of the mutual fund schemes.

Consequently, the schemes were not fully redeemed on their maturity dates, and substantial portions of the investors' money were withheld until September 2019.

SEBI initiated proceedings alleging lack of due diligence, unlawful extension of maturity, failure to redeem the schemes as mandated by the Regulations, and inadequate disclosure to investors and the regulator.

The Whole Time Member imposed regulatory directions and monetary penalties upon the Asset Management Company, while the Adjudicating Officer imposed penalties upon the Trustee Company and its senior executives. The Securities Appellate Tribunal substantially affirmed the findings.

The Supreme Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, holding that the statutory scheme mandated redemption of close-ended schemes on maturity and that the appellants could not justify their regulatory breaches merely because investors ultimately suffered no monetary loss.

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Analysis of Law

The Supreme Court laid down the following principles:

1. Close-ended mutual fund schemes must be redeemed strictly in accordance with Regulations 33(4) and 39 of the SEBI (Mutual Funds) Regulations, 1996.

2. Roll-over of a close-ended scheme is permissible only by following the statutory procedure and obtaining the prescribed approvals and disclosures.

3. Asset Management Companies owe a statutory duty of due diligence while making investment decisions.

4. Trustee Companies bear an independent fiduciary obligation to ensure compliance with the regulatory framework and cannot merely endorse the Asset Management Company's decisions.

5. Regulatory compliance under the SEBI Act is mandatory irrespective of the financial outcome of the transaction.

6. Investor benefit, absence of complaints or bona fide commercial judgment cannot constitute a legal defence to breach of statutory regulations.

7. Civil penalties under the SEBI Act do not require proof of mens rea.

8. The Supreme Court's jurisdiction under Section 15Z is confined to substantial questions of law and does not extend to reassessing commercial wisdom or investment strategy.

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Ratio Decidendi

The SEBI (Mutual Funds) Regulations, 1996 mandate that close-ended mutual fund schemes must be redeemed and wound up upon their stipulated maturity unless lawfully rolled over in accordance with the prescribed statutory procedure. Asset Management Companies and Trustee Companies are under strict statutory and fiduciary obligations to exercise due diligence, comply with the regulatory framework and make full disclosures to SEBI and investors. A regulatory violation is not excused merely because investors ultimately suffered no loss or earned higher returns, as the SEBI regime enforces compliance rather than consequences, and civil penalties follow upon proof of breach irrespective of mens rea or bona fide intention.

In a commercial suit governed by the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, the mandatory timeline prescribed under the proviso to Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies equally to the filing of a written statement by the plaintiff in answer to a defendant's counter-claim by virtue of Order VIII Rule 6G CPC. Such written statement must ordinarily be filed within 30 days and, for sufficient cause, may be accepted only up to a maximum of 120 days, beyond which the right to file stands forfeited. Further, an order refusing leave to file such delayed written statement is not appealable under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act as it is not an order enumerated under Order XLIII CPC or Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.

 

2026 INSC 684

A.K. Ghosh & Company & Ors. v. Biman Bose & Ors.

HEAD NOTES 

A. Commercial Courts Act, 2015 — Order VIII Rules 1, 6A, 6G & 10 CPC — Written statement to counter-claim — Limitation.

(Paras 27–33)

Held, in a commercial suit, the mandatory timeline prescribed by the proviso to Order VIII Rule 1 CPC applies equally to a written statement filed by the plaintiff in answer to the defendant's counter-claim. Such written statement must ordinarily be filed within 30 days and, for sufficient cause, may be extended up to a maximum of 120 days, beyond which the right to file stands forfeited.

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B. Order VIII Rule 6G CPC — Interpretation.

(Paras 27–33)

Held, Rule 6G expressly extends all rules governing a defendant's written statement to a plaintiff's written statement in answer to a counter-claim. The provision applies not merely to the contents of the written statement but also to the statutory time limits governing its filing.

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C. Order VIII Rule 6A(3) CPC — Court's power to fix time — Effect.

(Paras 29–32)

Held, though Rule 6A(3) empowers the Court to fix the time for filing a written statement to a counter-claim, failure of the Court to prescribe such time does not leave the plaintiff free to file the written statement at any time. In such a situation, Rule 6G read with the proviso to Rule 1 governs the outer limitation.

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D. Commercial Courts Act, 2015 — Object — Expeditious disposal.

(Paras 26–33)

Held, the amendments introduced by the Commercial Courts Act are intended to ensure strict adherence to procedural timelines for speedy adjudication of commercial disputes. Any interpretation diluting the mandatory timeline would defeat the legislative object of expeditious disposal.

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E. Order VIII Rule 10 CPC — Consequence of default.

(Paras 20, 32–33)

Held, failure to file a written statement within the prescribed period attracts the consequences contemplated under Rule 10 CPC, including forfeiture of the right to file the written statement in commercial suits after expiry of 120 days.

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F. Commercial Courts Act — Appeal — Section 13 — Maintainability.

(Paras 34–37)

Held, an appeal under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act is maintainable only against orders specifically enumerated under Order XLIII CPC or Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. An order refusing permission to file a belated written statement under Order VIII CPC is not appealable.

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G. Appeal — Statutory right.

(Paras 35–37)

Held, the right of appeal is purely statutory. Where the Commercial Courts Act constitutes a self-contained code restricting appellate remedies, no appeal lies except in the manner expressly provided by the statute.

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Analysis of Facts

The plaintiffs instituted a commercial suit for recovery of money against the defendants.

The contesting defendants filed their written statement together with a counter-claim, copies whereof were served upon the plaintiffs. Despite receipt of the counter-claim, the plaintiffs did not file their written statement within the statutory period and sought leave to do so after a delay of 238 days.

The Commercial Division of the Calcutta High Court rejected the application, holding that the mandatory time limit under the proviso to Order VIII Rule 1 CPC applied equally to a written statement filed in answer to a counter-claim.

The Commercial Appellate Division dismissed the appeal both on the ground of maintainability and on merits.

Before the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs contended that Order VIII Rule 6A(3) CPC left the matter entirely to the discretion of the Court and, since no time had been fixed by the Court, the statutory period of 120 days could not apply.

Rejecting the contention, the Supreme Court held that Rule 6G expressly incorporates all rules governing written statements, including the mandatory timeline prescribed under Rule 1. The Court further held that failure of the Court to specify the period under Rule 6A(3) does not suspend the statutory outer limit of 120 days.

The Court also affirmed that an order refusing permission to file a delayed written statement under Order VIII CPC is not appealable under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act.

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Analysis of Law

The Supreme Court laid down the following principles:

1. A counter-claim is treated as a cross-suit and the plaintiff's reply thereto is a written statement.

2. Order VIII Rule 6G applies the entire scheme governing written statements, including limitation, to replies filed against counter-claims.

3. In commercial suits, the plaintiff must ordinarily file the written statement to the counter-claim within 30 days.

4. For sufficient cause, the Court may extend the period, but not beyond 120 days from service of summons or receipt of the counter-claim.

5. Failure of the Court to prescribe a timeline under Rule 6A(3) does not eliminate the statutory limitation prescribed by Rule 1 read with Rule 6G.

6. The Commercial Courts Act mandates strict procedural discipline to ensure speedy disposal of commercial litigation.

7. Orders refusing leave to file a delayed written statement are not appealable under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, as they are not covered by Order XLIII CPC or Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.

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Ratio Decidendi

In a commercial suit governed by the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, the mandatory timeline prescribed under the proviso to Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies equally to the filing of a written statement by the plaintiff in answer to a defendant's counter-claim by virtue of Order VIII Rule 6G CPC. Such written statement must ordinarily be filed within 30 days and, for sufficient cause, may be accepted only up to a maximum of 120 days, beyond which the right to file stands forfeited. Further, an order refusing leave to file such delayed written statement is not appealable under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act as it is not an order enumerated under Order XLIII CPC or Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.

An application for probate is governed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, but the right to apply does not necessarily accrue on the death of the testator. It accrues when circumstances make it necessary for the executor to obtain probate, such as upon assertion of hostile rights against the Will. Since determination of such accrual ordinarily involves mixed questions of law and fact, a probate petition cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC on the ground of limitation, nor can the Court examine the merits or suspicious circumstances of the Will at the threshold stage.

 

2026 INSC 708

Sanjay Sharma @ Sanjay Bhardwaj v. Krishnadhan Khaware & Ors.

HEAD NOTES 

A. Indian Succession Act, 1925 — Probate — Limitation — Article 137, Limitation Act, 1963 — Right to apply.

(Paras 3–6)

Held, the Indian Succession Act prescribes no specific period of limitation for filing an application for probate. Consequently, Article 137 of the Limitation Act applies. However, the right to apply for probate does not necessarily accrue on the death of the testator; it accrues when it becomes necessary for the executor to seek probate, such as when the Will is disputed or hostile claims are asserted.

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B. Probate Proceedings — Continuous right — Delay in filing.

(Paras 5–6)

Held, the executor's right to seek probate is a continuing right which survives so long as the object of the Will remains to be executed. Mere delay in seeking probate does not create an absolute bar of limitation, though unexplained delay may invite greater judicial scrutiny regarding the genuineness of the Will.

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C. Order VII Rule 11(d), Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Rejection of plaint/petition — Limitation — Mixed question of law and fact.

(Para 7)

Held, where limitation depends upon the date on which the right to apply accrued or the date of knowledge of hostile action, the issue becomes a mixed question of law and fact. Such questions cannot be decided summarily under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC without permitting parties to lead evidence.

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D. Order VII Rule 11 CPC — Scope — Merits of Will.

(Para 7)

Held, while deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, the Court cannot adjudicate upon the genuineness, validity or suspicious circumstances surrounding a Will. Such issues require full trial after appreciation of evidence and lie beyond the limited jurisdiction under Order VII Rule 11.

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E. Probate — Cause of action — Hostile assertion of rights.

(Paras 5–6)

Held, where the executor remains undisputed, limitation begins only when a hostile act inconsistent with the Will necessitates obtaining probate. In the present case, execution of a General Power of Attorney contrary to the Will constituted the event giving rise to the right to apply.

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F. Rejection under Order VII Rule 11 — Impropriety.

(Paras 7–8)

Held, rejection of the probate petition at the threshold on the ground of limitation was legally unsustainable since the issue required adjudication on evidence. The Courts below exceeded their jurisdiction by entering into the merits of the Will while exercising powers under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.

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Analysis of Facts

The executor under a Will dated 15 April 1995 filed an application for probate on 31 August 2005 before the District Judge, Deoghar.

The objectors sought rejection of the probate petition under Order VII Rule 11 CPC contending that the application was barred by limitation because it had been filed nearly ten years after the death of the testator.

Accepting the objection, the District Judge rejected the probate petition. The High Court affirmed the order.

Before the Supreme Court, it was contended that the necessity to seek probate arose only when the widow of the testator executed a General Power of Attorney on 8 August 2005 asserting rights inconsistent with the Will.

The Supreme Court accepted this contention. It held that probate proceedings are governed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act, but limitation commences only when the right to apply accrues, namely, when obtaining probate becomes necessary. Since the probate petition was filed shortly after the hostile act, it was within limitation.

The Court further held that both the Trial Court and the High Court had exceeded the limited scope of Order VII Rule 11 CPC by making observations on the suspicious nature and merits of the Will without recording evidence. The orders were therefore set aside and the matter was remanded for trial.

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Analysis of Law

The Supreme Court laid down the following principles:

1. The Indian Succession Act contains no prescribed limitation period for filing a probate petition.

2. Article 137 of the Limitation Act governs probate applications.

3. The right to apply for probate is a continuing right and does not automatically arise on the death of the testator.

4. Limitation begins when circumstances make it necessary for the executor to seek probate, particularly upon hostile assertion of rights adverse to the Will.

5. Delay in seeking probate is not an absolute legal bar, though it may require satisfactory explanation.

6. Order VII Rule 11 CPC permits rejection only where the bar is apparent on the face of the pleadings.

7. Questions relating to accrual of cause of action or limitation involving disputed facts cannot be decided summarily.

8. The validity, genuineness or suspicious circumstances surrounding a Will cannot be examined while deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.

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Ratio Decidendi

An application for probate is governed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, but the right to apply does not necessarily accrue on the death of the testator. It accrues when circumstances make it necessary for the executor to obtain probate, such as upon assertion of hostile rights against the Will. Since determination of such accrual ordinarily involves mixed questions of law and fact, a probate petition cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC on the ground of limitation, nor can the Court examine the merits or suspicious circumstances of the Will at the threshold stage.