Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 – Section 20 – Civil Contempt – Writ Court directed implementation of Tribunal's order within three months – respondents allegedly failed to comply – Contempt Case filed beyond one year from the expiry of the period stipulated in the writ order – petitioner contended that the cause of action was a continuing wrong and limitation would not apply – Held, Section 20 mandates initiation of contempt proceedings within one year from the date on which the alleged contempt is committed – a plea of "continuing wrong/breach/offence" does not automatically extend limitation and can be accepted only if specifically pleaded with grounds seeking exemption from limitation in accordance with the principles flowing from Order VII Rule 6 CPC – stale claims camouflaged as continuing breach cannot be entertained – subsequent challenge to the Tribunal's order does not suspend or extend the limitation prescribed for initiating contempt proceedings unless the writ Court's order had been stayed – the period of limitation, once commenced, runs its full course – the contempt petition, having been filed beyond the prescribed period without any pleading or material to claim exemption from limitation, is barred by limitation – Contempt Case dismissed. (2026: APHC: 24762).

 

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 – Section 20 – Civil Contempt – Writ Court directed implementation of Tribunal's order within three months – respondents allegedly failed to comply – Contempt Case filed beyond one year from the expiry of the period stipulated in the writ order – petitioner contended that the cause of action was a continuing wrong and limitation would not apply – Held, Section 20 mandates initiation of contempt proceedings within one year from the date on which the alleged contempt is committed – a plea of "continuing wrong/breach/offence" does not automatically extend limitation and can be accepted only if specifically pleaded with grounds seeking exemption from limitation in accordance with the principles flowing from Order VII Rule 6 CPC – stale claims camouflaged as continuing breach cannot be entertained – subsequent challenge to the Tribunal's order does not suspend or extend the limitation prescribed for initiating contempt proceedings unless the writ Court's order had been stayed – the period of limitation, once commenced, runs its full course – the contempt petition, having been filed beyond the prescribed period without any pleading or material to claim exemption from limitation, is barred by limitation – Contempt Case dismissed. (2026: APHC: 24762).

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 & 2019 – Complaint against Advocate alleging deficiency in legal service – Complaint before District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission dismissed – Appeal before State Commission and Revision before National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission also dismissed – Writ Petition filed challenging the said orders – Held, services rendered by an Advocate in the course of legal profession are rendered under a contract of personal service and stand excluded from the definition of "service" under Section 2(42) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 – complaint alleging deficiency in legal service against an Advocate is not maintainable under the Consumer Protection Act – the law declared by the Supreme Court in Bar of Indian Lawyers v. D.K. Gandhi PS National Institute of Communicable Diseases, (2024) 8 SCC 430, squarely applies – no interference warranted with the orders of the Consumer Fora – Writ Petition dismissed. (2026: APHC: 24761).

 Consumer Protection Act, 1986 & 2019 – Complaint against Advocate alleging deficiency in legal service – Complaint before District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission dismissed – Appeal before State Commission and Revision before National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission also dismissed – Writ Petition filed challenging the said orders – Held, services rendered by an Advocate in the course of legal profession are rendered under a contract of personal service and stand excluded from the definition of "service" under Section 2(42) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 – complaint alleging deficiency in legal service against an Advocate is not maintainable under the Consumer Protection Act – the law declared by the Supreme Court in Bar of Indian Lawyers v. D.K. Gandhi PS National Institute of Communicable Diseases, (2024) 8 SCC 430, squarely applies – no interference warranted with the orders of the Consumer Fora – Writ Petition dismissed. (2026: APHC: 24761).

Order XVIII, Rule 17 CPC – Suit for partition – PW.1 was examined and cross-examined by some of the defendants – counsel for defendant Nos.1 and 2 remained absent and their cross-examination was recorded as 'nil' – thereafter, on change of counsel, an application was filed under Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC seeking recall of PW.1 for cross-examination – Trial Court, in the interest of affording a fair opportunity for effective adjudication, allowed the application – Challenging the same, Civil Revision Petition filed – Held, though it is settled law that Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC cannot be invoked to fill up lacunae in evidence or cross-examination, where the principal contesting defendants had not cross-examined the plaintiff at all, the partition suit could not be effectively adjudicated on merits without such cross-examination – the power of recall can be exercised where it is necessary to secure a fair trial and effective adjudication of the real controversy between the parties – the decisions of the Supreme Court prohibiting recall to fill up lacunae were distinguishable on facts – order permitting recall upheld – Civil Revision Petition dismissed. (2026: APHC: 7181).

Order XVIII, Rule 17 CPC – Suit for partition – PW.1 was examined and cross-examined by some of the defendants – counsel for defendant Nos.1 and 2 remained absent and their cross-examination was recorded as 'nil' – thereafter, on change of counsel, an application was filed under Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC seeking recall of PW.1 for cross-examination – Trial Court, in the interest of affording a fair opportunity for effective adjudication, allowed the application – Challenging the same, Civil Revision Petition filed – Held, though it is settled law that Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC cannot be invoked to fill up lacunae in evidence or cross-examination, where the principal contesting defendants had not cross-examined the plaintiff at all, the partition suit could not be effectively adjudicated on merits without such cross-examination – the power of recall can be exercised where it is necessary to secure a fair trial and effective adjudication of the real controversy between the parties – the decisions of the Supreme Court prohibiting recall to fill up lacunae were distinguishable on facts – order permitting recall upheld – Civil Revision Petition dismissed. (2026: APHC: 7181).

Section 22 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 applies to agricultural land inherited by Class I heirs and confers upon co-heirs a statutory preferential right to acquire the interest proposed to be transferred by another heir. The provision is an incident of intestate succession enacted under Entry 5 of List III of the Seventh Schedule and is constitutionally distinct from Section 15 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act. The Constitution Bench decision in Atam Prakash does not invalidate or dilute Section 22 of the Hindu Succession Act. Further, where a co-heir asserts the preferential right before completion of the transfer, subsequent execution of the sale deed does not defeat that right nor require an independent challenge to the conveyance. 2026 INSC 698

 

Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – Section 22 – Preferential Right of Pre-emption – Agricultural Land – Constitution of India – Seventh Schedule, List III Entry 5; List II Entries 14 & 18 – Whether Section 22 of the Hindu Succession Act applies to agricultural land inherited by Class I heirs, and whether the provision is constitutionally valid? – Held, Yes.

The plaintiff and the defendants, being Class I heirs of their deceased father, inherited agricultural land. Certain co-heirs proposed to alienate their respective shares to a third party. Before execution of the sale deed, the plaintiff invoked Section 22 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, claiming the preferential right to acquire the shares proposed to be transferred. The Trial Court dismissed the suit by applying the Constitution Bench decision in Atam Prakash v. State of Haryana, holding that Section 22 was analogous to Section 15 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act. The First Appellate Court reversed the decree relying upon Babu Ram v. Santokh Singh, and the High Court affirmed the same. Whether Section 22 of the Hindu Succession Act is applicable to agricultural land and whether the Constitution Bench decision in Atam Prakash renders Section 22 unconstitutional or inapplicable? – Held, Yes; No.

The Supreme Court held that Section 22 of the Hindu Succession Act applies equally to agricultural land inherited by Class I heirs. The Court clarified that Atam Prakash merely invalidated Section 15 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act because the classification of pre-emptors based upon consanguinity violated Article 14. It did not declare the concept of pre-emption itself unconstitutional, nor did it examine the constitutional validity of Section 22 of the Hindu Succession Act. Section 22 is fundamentally different in character, being a succession-based statutory preference confined exclusively to Class I heirs inheriting property from the same intestate. It is neither a free-standing right of pre-emption nor comparable to the broad pre-emption rights created under the Punjab Act. The Court reaffirmed the decision in Babu Ram v. Santokh Singh, holding that Section 22 derives legislative competence from Entry 5 of List III (intestacy and succession), which expressly empowers Parliament to legislate regarding succession without excluding agricultural land. The provision merely imposes a succession-related qualification upon an heir proposing to transfer inherited property and is not legislation relating to transfer of agricultural land under Entry 18 of List II. Since the plaintiff had asserted the statutory right before execution of the sale deed, no separate challenge to the subsequent conveyance was necessary. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Section 22 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 applies to agricultural land inherited by Class I heirs and confers upon co-heirs a statutory preferential right to acquire the interest proposed to be transferred by another heir. The provision is an incident of intestate succession enacted under Entry 5 of List III of the Seventh Schedule and is constitutionally distinct from Section 15 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act. The Constitution Bench decision in Atam Prakash does not invalidate or dilute Section 22 of the Hindu Succession Act. Further, where a co-heir asserts the preferential right before completion of the transfer, subsequent execution of the sale deed does not defeat that right nor require an independent challenge to the conveyance.  2026 INSC 698

A challenge to the order of a statutory tribunal may validly be maintained under Article 226, Article 227, or both (where the High Court Rules so permit), and the maintainability of an intra-court appeal depends upon the nature of the jurisdiction actually invoked, not merely upon the form of the prayers. After the deletion of Section 71(4) of the Motor Vehicles Act, there is no statutory ceiling on the number of stage carriage permits that may be held by an operator. Further, rejection of a permit application must be supported by recorded reasons as required by Section 80, and possession of a ready vehicle at the time of application is not a mandatory statutory requirement, though it may be a relevant comparative factor while considering rival applicants. 2026 INSC 733

 

Constitution of India – Articles 226 & 227 – Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Sections 71, 72, 80 & 89 – Stage Carriage Permit – Intra-Court Appeal – Whether an intra-court appeal is maintainable against an order of a Single Judge passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 challenging an order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, and whether a permit application can be rejected merely because the applicant had been granted another permit or had offered the same vehicle? – Held, Yes; No.

The appellant applied for a stage carriage permit on specified routes under the Motor Vehicles Act. The State Transport Authority rejected his application on the ground that he had already been granted another permit. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal affirmed the rejection. The writ petition filed under Article 226 was dismissed by the Single Judge, who held that since the appellant had offered the same vehicle for different routes, the transport authority was justified in allocating another route. The Division Bench dismissed the intra-court appeal as not maintainable, treating the proceedings as one under Article 227. Whether the intra-court appeal was maintainable and whether the authorities were justified in rejecting the permit application without recording legally sustainable reasons? – Held, Yes; No.

The Supreme Court held that the Division Bench committed a fundamental error in treating the writ petition as one under Article 227. Whether jurisdiction is invoked under Article 226 or Article 227 must be determined from the substance of the entire petition, including the pleadings, grounds, reliefs, and the jurisdiction actually invoked, and not merely from the nature of the prayers. Since the appellant had invoked Article 226, the intra-court appeal was maintainable under the applicable High Court Rules. On the merits, the Court held that after the omission of Section 71(4) of the Motor Vehicles Act, there is no statutory restriction on the number of stage carriage permits that may be granted to an individual operator. The transport authorities failed to record reasons as mandated by Section 80 while rejecting the application. The Single Judge also sustained the rejection on a ground never assigned by the statutory authorities. The Court further held that possession of a ready vehicle on the date of applying for a permit is not a statutory pre-condition; the vehicle may be produced after selection but before issuance of the permit, although possession of a ready vehicle may constitute a relevant factor where competing applicants are otherwise similarly situated. The impugned orders were accordingly set aside and the appeal before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal was restored for fresh consideration.

Ratio Decidendi

A challenge to the order of a statutory tribunal may validly be maintained under Article 226, Article 227, or both (where the High Court Rules so permit), and the maintainability of an intra-court appeal depends upon the nature of the jurisdiction actually invoked, not merely upon the form of the prayers. After the deletion of Section 71(4) of the Motor Vehicles Act, there is no statutory ceiling on the number of stage carriage permits that may be held by an operator. Further, rejection of a permit application must be supported by recorded reasons as required by Section 80, and possession of a ready vehicle at the time of application is not a mandatory statutory requirement, though it may be a relevant comparative factor while considering rival applicants.    2026 INSC 733