ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Precedent — Coordinate Bench — Divergent view — Re...

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Precedent — Coordinate Bench — Divergent view — Re...: advocatemmmohan 2026 INSC 646 SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 1 of 69 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CI...

RAJESH SHARMA v. NORTH DELHI MUNICIPAL CORPORATION & ANR.
2026 INSC 646 (SC) : Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019
Decided on 19-06-2026
Coram: Justice Manoj Misra

HEADNOTES 

Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 — Ss. 59(d), 92, 95, 98 and 480 — Delhi Municipal Corporation Service (Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1959 — Disciplinary Authority — Category ‘A’ Officer — Commissioner or Corporation.

Executive Engineer (Civil), a Category ‘A’ officer, was dismissed from service by the Commissioner after conviction under the Prevention of Corruption Act. Challenge was on the ground that under the 1959 Regulations, the Corporation and not the Commissioner was the competent disciplinary authority.

Held, by Act 67 of 1993, the Commissioner was made both the appointing authority under S.92 and the disciplinary authority under S.59(d). Legislative intent was to vest disciplinary control in the Commissioner. Consequently, the Commissioner was competent to impose the penalty of dismissal.
(Paras 30, 50-52, 60-63).

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Statutory Interpretation — Amendment by substitution — Principles governing construction.

Held, substitution of a statutory provision does not automatically relate back to the date of the original enactment. Mere use of the words “substitute” or “substitution” does not make the substituted provision retrospective. Unless a contrary legislative intention appears, the substituted provision operates from the date on which it is brought into force.
(Paras 35-44, 47-52).

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Statutory Interpretation — Amendment by substitution — Legal principles summarized.

Held, principles governing amendment by substitution include:

(i) substitution is not necessarily two severable steps of repeal and reenactment;
(ii) use of the expression “substitution” does not by itself confer retrospective effect;
(iii) substituted provision ordinarily operates prospectively from the date of enforcement; and
(iv) legislative intent governs construction of the amended provision.
(Para 44).

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Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 — S.59(d) — Expression “subject to any regulation that may be made in this behalf” — Interpretation.

Held, the expression “subject to any regulation that may be made in this behalf” refers to regulations that may be framed after insertion of S.59(d) by the 1993 Amendment. The provision was intended to operate notwithstanding the earlier regulatory framework and to enable future regulations to modify the position.
(Paras 64-67 and discussion thereunder).

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Service Law — Conflict between statute and regulations — Resolution.

Held, where a statutory provision and subordinate legislation occupy the same field, the statute prevails. Since amended S.59(d) specifically designated the Commissioner as disciplinary authority, the earlier provisions in the 1959 Regulations could not override the statutory mandate.
(Paras 33, 62-64).

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Service Law — Disciplinary Proceedings — Dismissal following conviction in criminal case.

Appellant, a municipal officer, having been convicted under the Prevention of Corruption Act and IPC offences, was dismissed from service by the Commissioner.

Held, dismissal order could not be invalidated on the ground of lack of competence of the Commissioner. The Commissioner was the statutory disciplinary authority after the 1993 amendments.
(Paras 3, 4, 62-64).

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Precedent — Coordinate Bench — Divergent view — Reference to larger Bench.

Held, though judicial discipline ordinarily requires a Bench differing from an earlier coordinate Bench decision to refer the matter to a larger Bench, failure to do so would not warrant interference where the view taken is otherwise legally correct on interpretation of the statute.
(Issue No. III and related discussion).

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Ratio Decidendi

1. Amendment by substitution does not automatically operate retrospectively.
2. Legislative intent behind the 1993 amendment to the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act was to vest appointing and disciplinary powers in the Commissioner.
3. Existing regulations cannot override an express statutory provision.
4. Commissioner is competent to dismiss Category ‘A’ municipal officers after the 1993 amendment.
5. The phrase “subject to any regulation that may be made” contemplates future regulations and does not preserve inconsistent earlier regulations.
   (Paras 44, 52, 62-65).

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Held

High Court rightly held that the Commissioner was competent to dismiss the appellant from service. Order of CAT setting aside dismissal was unsustainable. Appeal dismissed and dismissal order upheld.

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 – Relief not claimed – Grant of compensation in place of mandatory injunction – Legality. Held, where the plaintiff sought only mandatory and permanent injunctions for removal of encroachment and illegal construction, and had not claimed damages or compensation, the Court could not compel the plaintiff or his legal heirs to accept monetary compensation in substitution of the decree. A Court cannot create and grant a relief never prayed for, particularly against the wishes of the successful party. (Para 5(a), (c))

 RAJAT KUMAR & ORS. v. S.D. ADARSH JAIN KANYA MAHA VIDYALAYA SADHAURA & ORS.

2026 INSC 648 (SC)

HEAD NOTES 

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 – Section 100 – Second Appeal – Scope of jurisdiction – Reversal of concurrent findings without framing substantial question of law – Impermissibility.

Held, the High Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC, cannot reverse concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Trial Court and affirmed by the First Appellate Court without framing and deciding substantial questions of law. Reversal of decrees without adherence to the mandatory requirements of Section 100 CPC is unsustainable. (Paras 3, 5(d), 6)

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Civil Procedure Code, 1908 – Relief not claimed – Grant of compensation in place of mandatory injunction – Legality.

Held, where the plaintiff sought only mandatory and permanent injunctions for removal of encroachment and illegal construction, and had not claimed damages or compensation, the Court could not compel the plaintiff or his legal heirs to accept monetary compensation in substitution of the decree. A Court cannot create and grant a relief never prayed for, particularly against the wishes of the successful party. (Para 5(a), (c))

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Mandatory Injunction – Encroachment – Decree in plaintiff’s favour – Substitution by compensation without consent.

Held, a decree directing removal of encroachment and illegal construction cannot be replaced by an order directing payment of compensation merely because the construction has existed for a long period. In the absence of consent of the decree-holder and in the absence of a prayer for compensation, such substitution is legally impermissible. (Para 5(a), (c))

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Execution Proceedings – Order XXI CPC – Scope.

Held, once the decree granting mandatory injunction is set aside, there remains no executable decree. Consequently, the Executing Court cannot be directed to assess the value of the disputed construction for payment of compensation. Such a direction is outside the scope of execution proceedings and is unsupported by Order XXI CPC. (Para 5(b))

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Findings based on erroneous factual premise – Effect.

Held, the High Court proceeded on the incorrect assumption that the Trial Court had held the wall to be a common wall. No such finding existed. On the contrary, the Trial Court had decreed removal of the offending wall. A judgment founded upon a factually erroneous premise cannot be sustained. (Para 5(d))

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Injunction – Encroachment and illegal construction – Protection of property rights.

Plaintiff obtained decrees directing removal of (i) a wall allegedly erected by defendants on common open space and (ii) a lintel of a school building constructed on the plaintiff’s wall. Both decrees were affirmed in first appeal.

Held, the High Court erred in setting aside the decrees on equitable considerations and substituting them with compensation. The matter required adjudication strictly in accordance with Section 100 CPC and on the merits of the Second Appeals. (Paras 5, 6)

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Ratio Decidendi

1. Relief not sought in pleadings cannot ordinarily be imposed by the Court as a substitute for the relief actually claimed.
2. Compensation cannot be forced upon a successful plaintiff in place of a decree for mandatory injunction in the absence of consent.
3. An Executing Court cannot undertake valuation proceedings when no executable decree survives.
4. A Second Appeal can be decided only upon properly framed substantial questions of law under Section 100 CPC.
5. Findings based on incorrect factual assumptions vitiate the judgment. (Paras 5(a)–(d), 6)

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Final Order

Impugned judgment of the High Court dated 02.05.2016 in RSA Nos. 363 and 364 of 2008 set aside. Matter remanded to the High Court for fresh consideration of both Second Appeals in accordance with Section 100 CPC and on their own merits. Appeals allowed. No order as to costs. (Paras 6, 7)

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Motor Accident Compensation – Death of minor child...

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Motor Accident Compensation – Death of minor child...: advocatemmmohan MANIYAR ILIYAZ @ SHAIK RIYAZ v. P. AYYAPPAN & ORS. 2026 INSC 647 (SC) HEAD NOTES (AIR Style) Constitution of India – ...

MANIYAR ILIYAZ @ SHAIK RIYAZ v. P. AYYAPPAN & ORS.
2026 INSC 647 (SC)

HEAD NOTES 

Constitution of India – Articles 19(1)(a), 19(1)(b), 19(1)(c), 19(1)(d) and 21 – Fundamental Right to Walk – Recognition of right to demarcated footpaths.

Held, the right to walk is a fundamental right under Part III of the Constitution. It is an integral component of the freedom of movement guaranteed under Article 19(1)(d), read with Articles 19(1)(a), 19(1)(b), 19(1)(c) and 21. The right necessarily includes the right to safe, demarcated and well-maintained footpaths. Such right is primary and enjoys priority over movement by motorised vehicles. (Paras 3, 4, 8, 20(a))

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Constitution of India – Fundamental Rights – Right to Walk – Correlative public duty – Duty of local authorities to provide and maintain footpaths.

Held, where a road exists, there is a corresponding obligation to provide, demarcate, maintain and safeguard footpaths for pedestrians. Urban Development Authorities, Municipal Corporations, Municipalities and Panchayats are duty bearers responsible for ensuring pedestrian infrastructure. The duty is enforceable in law. (Paras 9, 10, 20(b))

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Constitutional Law – Enforcement of Fundamental Rights – Violation of pedestrian rights – Restitutionary remedies.

Held, violation of the fundamental right to walk on demarcated footpaths entitles citizens to seek constitutional and legal remedies including restitution and compensation against public authorities responsible for the breach. Such remedies are independent of and in addition to remedies available under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. (Paras 15, 20(c))

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Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Scope and object – Pedestrian rights.

Held, the Motor Vehicles Act is primarily a legislation regulating motor vehicles and motor transport. It does not recognise or secure the fundamental right to walk on demarcated footpaths. Existing provisions and driving regulations merely impose duties upon drivers to exercise care towards pedestrians and cannot substitute a comprehensive statutory framework protecting pedestrian rights. (Paras 6, 14)

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Constitutional Governance – Need for legislation – Right to walk.

Held, despite the constitutional foundation of the right to walk, there is no dedicated legislation declaring the right, identifying duty bearers, providing remedies and establishing a regulatory framework. Directions issued to forward the judgment to the Ministries concerned and the Law Commission for consideration of an appropriate statutory framework protecting pedestrian rights and footpath infrastructure. (Paras 11, 12, 13, 16, 21)

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Motor Accident Compensation – Death of minor child – Assessment of compensation.

Five-year-old child died after being run over by a tanker while walking to school with his father. MACT awarded compensation of Rs.7,82,000/-. High Court reduced compensation to Rs.4,70,000/-.

Held, High Court erred in reducing the compensation. Applying principles laid down in Karuna Parmar v. Prakash Sinha, compensation recalculated by adopting notional income based on minimum wages, adding future prospects, deducting personal expenses and applying multiplier method. Total compensation enhanced to Rs.11,44,628/- with direction for payment within two months. (Paras 17–19)

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Ratio Decidendi

1. The right to walk is a constitutionally protected fundamental right flowing from Articles 19 and 21.
2. The right includes access to demarcated and safe footpaths.
3. Public authorities have an enforceable duty to create and maintain pedestrian infrastructure.
4. Breach of such duty gives rise to independent constitutional and legal remedies.
5. Pedestrian rights are not adequately protected by the Motor Vehicles Act and require a dedicated statutory framework. (Paras 20(a)–(c))

Final Order

Appeals partly allowed. Compensation enhanced to Rs. 11,44,628/- payable within two months. Matter directed to be renumbered as “Re: Fundamental Right to Walk and Footpath” under Article 32 of the Constitution. (Paras 19, 21, 22) 

Compensation – Death of Homemaker – Valuation of Domestic Services – Homemaker as “Nation Builder” and Economic Entity – Enhancement of Compensation. The deceased, a homemaker, died in a motor vehicle accident. The Tribunal awarded compensation which was enhanced by the High Court after nearly two decades. The claimants sought further enhancement before the Supreme Court. Held: The contribution of a homemaker cannot be viewed merely as dependency upon earning members of the family. A homemaker performs indispensable economic, social, emotional and caregiving functions which sustain the household and contribute substantially to society and national development. Such contribution possesses measurable economic value and cannot be undervalued while determining compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act.

 

Shishu Pal @ Shish Ram & Ors. v. Surjeet & Ors.

2026 INSC 634 – Supreme Court of India
Coram: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sanjay Karol
Decided in 2026

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MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988

Compensation – Death of Homemaker – Valuation of Domestic Services – Homemaker as “Nation Builder” and Economic Entity – Enhancement of Compensation.

The deceased, a homemaker, died in a motor vehicle accident. The Tribunal awarded compensation which was enhanced by the High Court after nearly two decades. The claimants sought further enhancement before the Supreme Court.

Held: The contribution of a homemaker cannot be viewed merely as dependency upon earning members of the family. A homemaker performs indispensable economic, social, emotional and caregiving functions which sustain the household and contribute substantially to society and national development. Such contribution possesses measurable economic value and cannot be undervalued while determining compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act.

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COMPENSATION LAW

Homemaker – Status and Recognition.

Homemaker is an Economic Entity.

Held: The traditional perception that a homemaker is economically dependent upon earning members is erroneous. The functioning of the household and the productivity of earning members substantially depend upon the unpaid labour of the homemaker. Domestic labour, caregiving, household management, child-rearing and emotional support constitute real economic contributions deserving recognition in compensation jurisprudence.

Homemaker as Nation Builder.

Held: Homemakers contribute to the creation of human capital, transmission of values, social development, emotional stability of families and overall national progress. Their contribution extends beyond biological reproduction and includes shaping future generations. Homemakers are rightly described as “Nation Builders”.

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MOTOR ACCIDENT CLAIMS

Quantification of Homemaker's Contribution.

Held: While quantification of the services rendered by a homemaker in monetary terms is inherently difficult, courts must make a realistic assessment of such contribution. Compensation cannot be computed in a manner that diminishes or trivialises the invaluable services rendered by a wife and mother. The economic worth of unpaid domestic labour deserves appropriate judicial recognition.

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GENDER JUSTICE

Housewife – Homemaker – Appropriate Terminology.

Held: The expression “housewife” reflects outdated stereotypes. The more appropriate and dignified expression is “homemaker”, recognising the multifaceted role performed within the household. Judicial discourse should adopt terminology that reflects equality and acknowledges the actual contribution of women engaged in unpaid domestic labour.

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MOTOR VEHICLES ACT

Just Compensation – Delay in Adjudication.

Inordinate Delay in Motor Accident Cases.

Held: Claims arising out of death and bodily injury under a beneficial legislation should ordinarily receive expeditious adjudication. Pendency of such matters in High Courts for prolonged periods causes additional hardship to victims and dependants and undermines the concept of “just compensation”. Courts must remain vigilant regarding delay and avoid unnecessary adjournments.

Institutional Concern.

Held: Excessive pendency of motor accident compensation appeals across various High Courts reveals a systemic issue requiring institutional attention. Delayed adjudication often results in accumulation of interest and frustrates the objective of prompt and effective compensation to victims and their families.

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PRECEDENTS CONSIDERED

Lata Wadhwa v. State of Bihar

Followed and discussed regarding valuation of services rendered by homemakers and application of compensation principles.

Arun Kumar Agrawal v. National Insurance Co. Ltd.

Reaffirmed. Services rendered by a wife and mother cannot be equated with those of a servant or domestic employee and require broad assessment while awarding compensation.

Rajendra Singh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd.

Referred to.

Kirti v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.

Referred to regarding judicial recognition of unpaid domestic and caregiving work performed by women.

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RATIO DECIDENDI

Unpaid domestic labour and caregiving services rendered by a homemaker constitute substantial economic and social contributions. While determining compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, courts must recognise the homemaker as an economic entity and nation builder, and award compensation that meaningfully reflects the value of such contribution. Mere traditional notions of dependency cannot diminish the worth of a homemaker's services.

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OBSERVATION OF THE COURT

“The homemakers, to put it directly, actually are the nation builders and they ought to be recognised as such.”

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RESULT

Appeal considered in the context of enhancement of compensation payable for the death of a homemaker, with detailed exposition of principles governing valuation of unpaid domestic labour and the effect of prolonged delay in motor accident claim litigation

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: SERVICE LAW – BORDER SECURITY FORCE – DISMISSAL FR...

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: SERVICE LAW – BORDER SECURITY FORCE – DISMISSAL FR...: advocatemmmohan Baksish Ahmad v. Union of India & Anr. 2026 INSC 630 – Supreme Court of India Coram: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dipankar...

Baksish Ahmad v. Union of India & Anr.

2026 INSC 630 – Supreme Court of India
Coram: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dipankar Datta and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Satish Chandra Sharma
Decided on: 09.06.2026

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SERVICE LAW – BORDER SECURITY FORCE – DISMISSAL FROM SERVICE – WRIT JURISDICTION – TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF HIGH COURTS – ARTICLE 226(1) & (2) OF THE CONSTITUTION – DOCTRINE OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS – SCOPE.

A BSF constable was dismissed from service for contracting a second marriage during the subsistence of his first marriage without obtaining permission from the competent authority. His statutory petition was rejected. Challenging the dismissal and rejection order, he filed a writ petition before the Delhi High Court. The Delhi High Court declined to entertain the petition applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens, holding that no part of the cause of action had arisen within Delhi and that the appropriate forums were elsewhere.

Held: The Delhi High Court possesses territorial jurisdiction under Article 226(1) of the Constitution where the Union of India and the Director General of BSF are situated within its territorial limits. In matters relating to members of Central Armed Police Forces, the situs of the offices of the Union of India and the Director General furnishes jurisdiction to the Delhi High Court notwithstanding that the cause of action may have arisen elsewhere. The doctrine of forum non conveniens cannot ordinarily be invoked to defeat a constitutional remedy under Article 226 when the Court otherwise possesses jurisdiction. The Delhi High Court erred in declining to exercise jurisdiction merely on the ground that other High Courts could also entertain the matter. The writ petition was directed to be restored and decided on merits.

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A. CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950

Article 226(1) and Article 226(2) – Distinction.

Article 226(1) confers jurisdiction upon a High Court where the person or authority against whom relief is sought is located within its territorial limits.

Article 226(2) confers jurisdiction where the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court.

The two clauses operate independently and confer distinct bases of jurisdiction. A writ petition may be maintainable either because the respondent authority is situated within the jurisdiction of the High Court or because part of the cause of action has arisen therein.

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B. CENTRAL ARMED POLICE FORCES – BSF – SERVICE MATTERS.

Territorial Jurisdiction – Delhi High Court.

Held: In cases involving members of the BSF and other Central Armed Police Forces, the Delhi High Court would have territorial jurisdiction under Article 226(1) because the Union of India and the Director General of the concerned force are situated in Delhi. Such jurisdiction exists even if:

• the disciplinary proceedings were conducted elsewhere;
• the dismissal order was passed outside Delhi; and
• the events constituting misconduct occurred outside Delhi.

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C. FORUM NON CONVENIENS.

Applicability in Writ Proceedings.

Doctrine explained.

The doctrine applies where multiple competent forums are available and enables a court to decline jurisdiction if another forum is demonstrably more convenient and better suited to decide the dispute.

However, in proceedings under Article 226, particularly where jurisdiction is invoked under Article 226(1), the doctrine has only a limited role and should be applied sparingly. A litigant invoking a constitutional remedy before a High Court having jurisdiction cannot ordinarily be non-suited merely because another High Court may also entertain the matter.

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D. PRECEDENTS – EXPLAINED AND APPLIED.

1. Abrar Ali v. CISF – Approved.

Held that the Delhi High Court possesses jurisdiction under Article 226(1) where the headquarters of the concerned Central Armed Police Force are located in Delhi. The principle laid down therein was affirmed.

2. Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India, (2004) 6 SCC 254.

Explained. The doctrine of forum conveniens discussed therein related to situations where cause of action arises in more than one State under Article 226(2) and does not govern cases founded upon jurisdiction under Article 226(1).

3. Arif Azim Co. Ltd. v. Micromax Informatics FZE.

Explained. The doctrine of forum non conveniens is applicable where multiple forums are available and a court must determine the more appropriate forum; however, the decision did not arise out of writ proceedings under Article 226.

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E. HELD.

1. Delhi High Court had territorial jurisdiction under Article 226(1).
2. Application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens by the Delhi High Court was legally unsustainable.
3. Order dismissing the writ petition was set aside.
4. Writ petition stood restored to the file of the Delhi High Court for decision on merits.
5. Appeal against dismissal of review petition was dismissed as not maintainable.

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Ratio Decidendi

Where the Union of India and the Director General of a Central Armed Police Force are situated within Delhi, the Delhi High Court possesses territorial jurisdiction under Article 226(1) to entertain a challenge to disciplinary or termination orders passed against members of such forces, and the doctrine of forum non conveniens cannot ordinarily be invoked to deny exercise of such constitutional jurisdiction.

Result

Civil Appeal allowed. Impugned judgment of the Delhi High Court set aside. Writ Petition restored for adjudication on merits.