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since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws. This blog is only for information but not for legal opinions

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Monday, January 5, 2015

WRIT PETITION (Civil) NO. 853 OF 2014 VARUN SAINI & ORS. ... PETITIONERS VERSUS GURU GOBIND SINGH INDRAPRASTHA UNIVERSITY ... RESPONDENT

                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                         CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION


                    WRIT PETITION (Civil) NO. 853 OF 2014



VARUN SAINI & ORS.                      ...  PETITIONERS

                                   VERSUS

GURU GOBIND SINGH INDRAPRASTHA
UNIVERSITY                              ...        RESPONDENT



                                    WITH

                        WRIT PETITION(C) NO. 854/2014
                        WRIT PETITION(C) NO. 855/2014
                        WRIT PETITION(C) NO. 857/2014
                        WRIT PETITION(C) NO. 883/2014
                        WRIT PETITION(C) NO. 867/2014
                        WRIT PETITION(C) NO. 884/2014


                               J U D G M E N T

Dipak Misra, J


            Education  is  the  spine  of  any  civilised  society.   Formal
education has its own significance, for it depends upon  systemic  imparting
of learning regard being had to the syllabus prescribed for the  course  and
further allowing  space  for  cultivation  by  individual  endeavour.    The
sacrosanctity of formal education gains more  importance  in  the  field  of
technical studies because theory, practical training and application in  the
field cumulatively operate to make a student an asset to  the  country  and,
in a way, enables him to achieve excellence as  contemplated  under  Article
51A of the Constitution.  The natural corollary, in the ultimate  eventuate,
is the acceleration of the growth of the nation.  But, a pregnant one,  when
an  attitude  of  apathy  or  lackadaisical  propensity  or  proclivity   of
procrastination of the statutory authorities creeps in as a  consequence  of
which the time schedule meant for approval of the  educational  institutions
and commencement of the courses is not adhered to, a  feeling  of  devouring
darkness seems to reign supreme as if  “things  fall  apart”.   There  is  a
feeling of discomfiture - how to find  out  a  solvation  to  the  agonizing
problem  in  exercise  of  the  jurisdiction  under  Article   32   of   the
Constitution of India, for there are some compelling reasons  to  do  so  to
protect the national interest as well as not to scuttle the  aspirations  of
young students or to comatose their hopes stating that all  cannot  be  well
in the State of Denmark and there should not be a Sisyphean  endeavour.   We
are constrained to commence with such a prologue as  the  present  batch  of
writ petitions pertains to counselling and admission in  certain  categories
of courses which are approved and controlled from  many  a  spectrum  regard
being had to the sustenance of  standard  in  education  by  the  All  India
Council for Technical  Education  (for  brevity,  “AICTE”),  and  also  some
categories of courses which  are  directly  governed  by  the  statutes  and
regulations of  the  University,  namely,  Guru  Gobind  Singh  Indraprastha
University (hereinafter referred to as “the University”) in the backdrop  of
extension of time schedule fixed by  this  Court  in  respect  of  technical
courses.
The controversy involved in this batch of cases has a past,  which  requires
to be exposited with requisite respect  for  chronology.   We  have  already
indicated at the beginning that in all these cases, we  are  concerned  with
the adherence to schedule pertaining to approval by AICTE,  counselling  and
admission by the authorities of the University.  That being the  centripodal
issue, our advertence shall remain restricted to the said  arena.   At  this
juncture, we may state that at the appropriate  stage,  we  shall  refer  to
some necessitous facts from W.P.(C) No. 853/2014.
We are obligated to sit in a time machine to  appreciate  how  the  schedule
was fixed by the AICTE under the All India Council for  Technical  Education
Act,  1987  (for  brevity,  “the  1987  Act)  and  the  Regulations   framed
thereunder and how the said schedule was appositely re-fixed by  this  Court
in  Parshvanath  Charitable  Trust  Vs.  All  India  Council  for  Technical
Education[1].  In the said decision, a two-Judge Bench scanning the  anatomy
of the 1987 Act, observed thus:

 “17. The provisions of the All India Council for Technical  Education  Act,
1987 (for short ‘the AICTE Act’)  are  intended  to  improve  the  technical
education system throughout the country. The various authorities  under  the
AICTE Act  have  been  given  exclusive  responsibility  to  coordinate  and
determine the standards of higher education. It is a general power given  to
evaluate, harmonise  and  secure  proper  relationship  to  any  project  of
national importance.  Such  coordinated  action  in  higher  education  with
proper standard is of paramount importance to the national progress.

18.   The provisions of the AICTE  Act,  including  its  Preamble,  make  it
abundantly  clear  that  AICTE  has  been  established  under  the  Act  for
coordinated and integrated development of the technical education system  at
all levels throughout the country and is  enjoined  to  promote  qualitative
improvement of such education in relation to  planned  quantitative  growth.
The AICTE is required to regulate and ensure  proper  maintenance  of  norms
and standards in technical education system.  AICTE  is  to  further  evolve
suitable  performance  appraisal  system  for  technical  institutions   and
universities  incorporating  norms  and  mechanisms   in   enforcing   their
accountability.  It is required  to  provide  guidelines  for  admission  of
students and has the  power  to  withhold  or  discontinue  grants  to  such
technical institutions where  norms  and  standards  laid  down  by  it  and
directions given by it from time to time are  not  followed.  The  duty  and
responsibility cast on AICTE implies that the norms and standards to be  set
should be such as would prevent isolated development  of  education  in  the
country.

19.   Section 10 of the AICTE Act enumerates various  powers  and  functions
of  AICTE  as  also  its  duties  and  obligations  to  take  steps  towards
fulfilment of the same. One such power as envisaged in Section 10(k) is to

“grant  approval  for  starting   new   technical   institutions   and   for
introduction of new courses or programmes in consultation with the  agencies
concerned”.

It is important to see that AICTE  is  empowered  to  inspect  or  cause  to
inspect any technical institution in clause (p)) of Section 10  without  any
reservation  whatsoever.  However,  when  it  comes  to  the   question   of
universities, it is confined  and  limited  to  ascertaining  the  financial
needs  or  its  standards  of  teaching,  examination  and   research.   The
inspection  may  be  made  or  caused  to  be  made  of  any  department  or
departments only and that too, in such  manner  as  may  be  prescribed,  as
envisaged in Section 11 of the AICTE Act.

20.   All these vitally important  aspects  go  to  show  that  the  Council
(AICTE) created under the AICTE Act is  not  intended  to  be  an  authority
either superior to or to supervise and control the universities and  thereby
superimpose itself upon such universities merely for the  reason  that  they
are imparting teaching in technical education or programmes in any of  their
departments or units. A careful scanning of the provisions of the AICTE  Act
and the  provisions  of  the  University  Grants  Commission  Act,  1956  in
juxtaposition, will show that the role of AICTE vis-à-vis  the  universities
is only advisory, recommendatory and  one  of  providing  guidance,  thereby
subserving the cause of maintaining appropriate  standards  and  qualitative
norms and not as an authority empowered to issue and enforce  any  sanctions
by itself. Reference can be made to the judgments of this Court in the  case
of Adarsh Shiksha Mahavidyalaya v. Subhash Rahangdale [(2012)  2  SCC  425],
State of Tamil Nadu v. Adhiyaman Educational & Research Institute [(1995)  4
SCC 104] and Bharathidasan University v. All  India  Council  for  Technical
Education [(2001) 8 SCC 676].”

The Court referred to  various  other  facets  and  adverted  to  All  India
Council  For  Technical  Education  (Grant  of  Approval  for  Starting  New
Technical Institutions, Introduction of Courses or Programmes  and  Approval
of Intake Capacity of Seats for  the  Courses  or  Programmes)  Regulations,
1994 and noted the Schedule to said Regulations which read as under:-

|Sl.  No. |Stage of processing application        |Last date by     |
|         |                                       |which the        |
|         |                                       |processing should|
|         |                                       |be completed.    |
|(1)      |(2)                                    |(3)              |
|1.       |For receiving proposals by Bureau RC   |31st December    |
|2.       |For Bureau RC to screen the application|                 |
|         |and (a) to return the incomplete       |                 |
|         |applications to the applicants, and (b)|                 |
|         |to forward the applications to (i)     |                 |
|         |State Government concerned (ii)        |                 |
|         |University or State Board concerned,   |                 |
|         |for their comments (iii) Regional      |                 |
|         |Officer to arrange visits by Expert    |                 |
|         |Committees, and (iv) Bureaus MPCD, BOS |                 |
|         |and RA for their comments              |                 |
|3.       |For receiving the comments from (I) the|15th March       |
|         |State Government (ii) the University or|                 |
|         |the State Board, and (iii) the Regional|                 |
|         |committee based on the Expert          |                 |
|         |Committee's report, and (iv) from the  |                 |
|         |Bureaus MPCD, BOS and RA               |                 |
|4.       |For consideration of the comments from |31st March       |
|         |the State Governments, Universities or |                 |
|         |State Boards, Regional Committees, and |                 |
|         |Bureaus of the Council by the State    |                 |
|         |level Committee                        |                 |
|5.       |For recommendations to be made by the  |15th April       |
|         |Central Task Force                     |                 |
|6.       |For communicating the final decision to|30th April       |
|         |the State Government or the University |                 |
|         |Grants Commission, under intimation to |                 |
|         |the Regional Office, Director of       |                 |
|         |Technical Education, applicant,        |                 |
|         |University or State Board              |                 |



After reproducing the schedule, the Court ruled that adherence to  the  same
is mandatory and not  directory,  for  non-adherence  of  the  schedule  can
result in serious consequences and can jeopardise not only the  interest  of
the college students  but  also  the  maintenance  of  proper  standards  of
technical education.  It further observed that  the  authorities  concerned,
particularly  AICTE  should  ensure  proper  and  timely  action  upon   the
application submitted to it and it must respond to the  applicant  within  a
reasonable time period and should not allow the matter to  be  dragged  till
the final date giving rise to avoidable peculiarities by  all  stakeholders.
After so stating, the Court also took note of the act that there seem to  be
some variation in the schedule issued under Regulation 8(15) and the  duties
reflected in the Handbook.  After noticing that, the two-Judge Bench  opined
that the admission schedule should be declared once and for all rather  than
making it a yearly declaration.  Emphasis was laid on  the  consistency  and
smoothness in admission process.  It has also been stated that there has  to
be a fixed and unaltered time schedule for  admission  to  the  colleges  so
that the students know with certainty and  well  in  advance  the  admission
schedule that is to be followed and on the basis of which they can  exercise
their choice relating to college or the course.  The Court referred  to  the
schedule that was submitted before it for admission for  the  academic  year
2013-2014. Eventually, the Court fixed an appropriate schedule which  is  as
follows:
“The appropriate Schedule, thus, would be as follows:




|Event                            |Schedule                      |
|Conduct of entrance examination  |In the month of May           |
|(AIEEE/State CET/Management quota|                              |
|exams, etc.)                     |                              |
|Declaration of result of         |On or before 5th June         |
|qualifying examination (12th exam|                              |
|or similar) and entrance         |                              |
|examination                      |                              |
|1st round of counselling/        |To be completed on or before  |
|admission for allotment of seats |30th July                     |
|2nd round of counselling for     |To be completed on or before  |
|allotment of seats               |10th July                     |
|Last round of counselling for    |To be completed on or before  |
|allotment of seats               |20th July                     |
|Last date for admitting          |30th July                     |
|candidates in seats other than   |However, any number of rounds |
|allotted above                   |for counselling could be      |
|                                 |conducted depending on local  |
|                                 |requirements, but all the     |
|                                 |rounds shall be completed     |
|                                 |before 30th July              |
|Commencement of academic session |1st August                    |
|Last date up to which students   |15th August                   |
|can be admitted against vacancies|                              |
|arising due to any reason (no    |                              |
|student should be admitted in any|                              |
|institution after the last date  |                              |
|under any quota)                 |                              |
|Last date of granting or refusing|10th April                    |
|approval by AICTE                |                              |
|Last date of granting or refusing|15th May                      |
|approval by University/State     |                              |
|Government                       |                              |

After fixing the schedule, the Court thought it appropriate to rule that:
“42.  The admission to academic courses should start, as  proposed,  by  1st
August of the relevant year.  The seats remaining  vacant  should  again  be
duly notified and advertised. All seats should be filled positively by  15th
August after which there shall be no admission, whatever be  the  reason  or
ground.

43.    We  find  that  the  above  Schedule  is  in  conformity   with   the
affiliation/recognition  schedule  aforenoticed.  They  both  can  co-exist.
Thus, we approve these admission dates and declare it to be  the  law  which
shall be strictly adhered to by all concerned and none  of  the  authorities
shall have the power or jurisdiction  to  vary  these  dates  of  admission.
Certainty in this field is bound to serve the ends of fair, transparent  and
judicious method of grant of admission and  commencement  of  the  technical
courses.  Any variation is bound to  adversely  affect  the  maintenance  of
higher  standards  of  education  and  systemic  and  proper  completion  of
courses.”

At  this  stage,  it  is  seemly  to  refer  to  a  subsequent  decision  in
Association of Management of Private Colleges  Vs.  All  India  Council  for
Technical  Education  and  others[2].  In   the   said   decision,   certain
educational institutions, being aggrieved by an order  passed  by  the  High
Court of Judicature of Madras, had approached this Court on  the  foundation
that the High Court had erroneously interpreted the 1987 Act, for  the  High
Court had opined that the University is  not  required  to  take  permission
from AICTE, but its affiliated colleges are required to  do  so.   The  High
Court has further ruled that  the  appellant  colleges  therein  should  get
their course of MCA ratified by AICTE as per the  prescribed  format,  which
according to the appellants, was in contravention of the settled  principles
of interpretation of statutes as stated in Bharathidasan University  V.  All
India Council for Technical Education[3]. The two-Judge  Bench  referred  to
Parshvanath  Charitable  Trust(supra),  T.M.  Pai  Foundation  V.  State  of
Karnataka[4],  the  definition  of  'technical  education'  and   'technical
institution' in the dictionary clause of the Act and certain  provisions  of
University Grants Commission Act, 1956, the  Regulations  framed  under  the
said Act and came to hold as follows:

“52.  .......the AICTE Act  does  not  intend  to  be  an  authority  either
superior  or  to  supervise  or  control  the   universities   and   thereby
superimpose itself upon the said universities merely for the reason that  it
is  laying  down  certain  teaching  standards  in  technical  education  or
programmes formulated in any of the department or units. It is evident  that
while enacting the AICTE Act, Parliament was fully alive  to  the  existence
of the provisions of the UGC Act, 1956  particularly,  the  said  provisions
extracted above. Therefore, the definition  of  “technical  institution”  in
Section 2(h) of the AICTE Act which authorizes  AICTE to do certain  things,
special care has consciously and deliberately been taken  to  make  specific
mention of university, wherever and whenever  AICTE alone  was  expected  to
interact with a university  and  its  departments  as  well  as  constituent
institutions and units.  It  was  held  after  analyzing  the  provision  of
Sections 10, 11 and 12 of the AICTE Act that  the  role  of  the  inspection
conferred upon the AICTE vis-a-vis universities is limited  to  the  purpose
of ensuring proper maintenance of  norms  and  standards  in  the  technical
education system so as to conform to the standard laid down by  it  with  no
further or direct control over such universities or  scope  for  any  direct
action except bringing it to the notice of UGC.  In  that  background,  this
Court in Bharathidasan University case made it  very  clear  by  making  the
observation that it has examined the scope of the enactment  as  to  whether
the AICTE Act prevails over the UGC Act or the  fact  of  competent  entries
fall in Entry 66 List I vis-a-vis Entry 25 of List III of the  VII  Schedule
of the Constitution.

53.      A cumulative reading of the aforesaid paragraphs  of  Bharathidasan
University case which are extracted above makes  it  very  clear  that  this
Court has exempted universities, its colleges, constituent institutions  and
units from seeking prior approval from AICTE.  Also,  from  the  reading  of
paragraphs 19 and 20 of Parashvanath  Chartitable  Trust  case  it  is  made
clear after careful scanning of the provisions of  the  AICTE  Act  and  the
University Grants Commission Act, 1956 that  the  role  of  AICTE  vis-a-vis
universities is only advisory, recommendatory and one of providing  guidance
and has no authority empowering it to issue  or  enforce  any  sanctions  by
itself.”

After the aforesaid judgment was delivered, a  writ  petition  No.  895/2013
was filed which was taken up on  24.3.2014  wherein  the  Court  passed  the
following order:
      “Rule nisi.

        Having regard to the important issue involved in the Writ  Petition,
we think that it will be appropriate if the matter is heard by  a  Bench  of
three Judges.

              The matter may be listed accordingly within  six  months  from
today.”

In SLP(C) No. 7277/2014, on 17.4.2014, the following order came to be
passed:
       “In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent  No.1,  i.e.,
All India Council  for  Technical  Education  (AICTE),  it  is  stated  that
Approval Process Handbook (2013-14) is presently in force and the  same  has
been extended and made applicable for the Academic Year 2014-15 as well.

      AICTE shall now  proceed  in  accordance  with  the  Approval  Process
Handbook for the Academic  Year  2014-15  insofar  as  the  members  of  the
petitioner Association and all colleges and institutions situated  similarly
to the members of the petitioner Association  are  concerned  and  necessary
orders shall be issued by AICTE within ten days.

      Prayer for interim relief is ordered accordingly.”

In  SLP(C)  No.  7277/14,  IA  No.  2-3/2014  were  filed.   In   the   said
applications, on  09.05.2014,  a  four-Judge  bench,  passed  the  following
order:
        “The order dated 17.4.2014 passed by this Court is clarified and  it
is  directed  that  prior  approval  of  All  India  Council  for  Technical
Education (AICTE) is compulsory and mandatory for  conduct  of  a  technical
course  including  the  MBA/Management  course  by  an  existing  affiliated
Technical  College  and  also  new  Technical  College  which  will  require
affiliation by a University for conduct of its Technical  Courses/Programmes
for the academic year 2014-15.

        The  time  given  in  the  order  dated  17.4.2014  is  extended  by
10.6.2014.

      IA Nos. 2 & 3 of 2014 stand disposed of as above.”

Thereafter, a bunch of writ petitions and I.A. No.6 in SLP(C) No.  7277/2014
were filed.  The Court referred to the schedule  in  Parshvanath  Charitable
Trust (supra) and taking note  of  the  stand  of  the  AICTE,  directed  as
follows:
       “In the application, the AICTE has averred that it has received  7280
applications from existing technical institutions in the country,  of  which
6751  applications  have  been  processed  already  and  the  remaining  529
applications are pending consideration as  on  4th  June,  2014.  Since  the
exercise was of this magnitude, all applications could not be  processed  so
as to comprehensively respond to the directions of  this  Court,  reproduced
above. Mr. L. Nageswara Rao, learned Additional  Solicitor  General,  states
that if time is extended by one week, all the remaining  applications  shall
also  be  processed  by  AICTE.  The  prayer  in  the  Writ   Petitions   is
substantially the same since the stand of the AICTE is that although,  after
due consideration, EOA for Academic year 2014-15 is recommended, because  of
the deadline given by this Court, the approval cannot be granted.

       There can be no gainsaying that  every  eligible  student/  candidate
desirous of participating in further education, especially  where  resources
and institutions are available, should be accommodated so long  as  academic
standards are not undermined.

      We are satisfied that if the respondent - AICTE is granted seven  more
days within which to  decide  all  pending  applications,  these  overriding
interests shall be addressed.  It is in these circumstances that  we  modify
previous orders in the following manner:

        The AICTE is granted seven days within which to take a  decision  on
all the  applications  pending  before  it.  It  shall  first  take  up  the
applications  in  which  it  has  already  expressed  willingness  to  grant
approvals, but have not done so in deference of the Orders  of  this  Court.
Thereafter, the concerned Universities/State Authorities/Bodies  which  have
the powers of granting affiliation shall take a  decision  on  that  subject
within one  week.   It  is  for  these  reasons  that  the  first  round  of
counselling/admission for allotment of seats which was to  be  completed  by
30th June, 2014 will now be completed by 15th July, 2014.  The second  round
of counselling shall be completed by 22nd July, 2014 and the last  round  of
counselling shall be completed by 29th July,  2014.   In  this  manner,  the
date of commencement of the Academic Session, as laid  down  by  this  Court
above, shall not be disturbed.

      It is made clear that all the  Colleges  who  have  been  cleared  for
intake of students for the Academic Year  2014-2015,  as  envisaged  in  the
process above, shall be cleared and considered for  admitting  students  for
the  current  Academic  Year.  Learned  Senior  Counsel  appearing  for  the
petitioners in some of the Writ Petitions apprehends  that  the  respondents
may adhere to Annexure P-7. We think that that would not be  appropriate  in
view of the orders contained herein.”

In spite of the aforesaid order, the grievance, as submitted  by  Mr.  Mukul
Rohtagi, learned Attorney General for Union of India appearing on behalf  of
AICTE as well  as  for  the  University  still  subsisted.   In  SLP(C)  No.
21901/2014,  a  two-Judge  Bench,  appreciating  the  core   fact  that  the
concerned institution had  been  granted  approval  way  back  in  2011  and
struggling to commence the first academic session, directed as follows:-

“...We  find  it  appropriate  to  direct  the  respondents  to  allow   the
petitioner to commence the academic session within one week  from  today  by
adhering to the different steps laid down by this  Court.   The  counselling
shall be conducted on the basis of the merit list prepared by the  concerned
competent authority, for which a Notification shall positively be issued  by
tomorrow i.e. 14.08.2014.  The students who have already  been  admitted  to
other institutions, will not have  the  option  to  seek  admission  in  the
petitioner-institution.

      The counselling process, in terms of the  directions  issued  by  this
Court shall  be  completed  by  19.08.2014,  and  the  admissions  shall  be
finalised under all circumstances by 20.08.2014.”

Further substantiating the reason, the Court observed:
        “The reason for us to extend the schedule expressed  by  this  Court
in its earlier orders, is  based  on  the  fact,  that  the  institution  in
question i.e. the petitioner before this Court had assailed  the  action  of
the Anna University before the High Court by filing a writ petition  as  far
back in 2013.  It is only because,  the  judicial  process  extended  up  to
21.07.2014 (when the impugned order was  passed)  that  the  deadlines  have
been crossed.  The last date for finalising admissions has yet not  crossed.
The denial of commencement of the academic  session  would  cause  extensive
financial loss to the petitioner, despite the fulfilment  of  all  essential
norms.  It is in these peculiar circumstances that  the  instant  order  has
been passed.”

As the chronology of events would  further  uncurtain  IA  No.  46/2014  was
filed in Parshvanath Charitable Trust (supra) for extension of time and  the
Court, on 11.08.2014, while dealing with the  Schedule  in  respect  of  the
State of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, directed as follows:
       “Having heard the learned counsel for the  parties  and  taking  into
consideration the fact that State of Telangana has been created recently  on
2.6.2014 and both the States i.e. newly created State of Telangana  and  the
State of Andhra Pradesh may face some difficulty to complete  the  admission
process within the time stipulated.

     We allow the prayer.  Both the States of Telangana and  Andhra  Pradesh
and the competent authorities will complete the  counselling  and  admission
in engineering colleges and other  institutions  by  31st  August,  2014  in
accordance with law.  The extension of time will be applicable to the  State
of Andhra Pradesh and newly created State of Telangana  and  not  the  other
State.”

Be it noted, IA Nos. 50-56/2014 were filed in Parshvanath  Charitable  Trust
(supra) case and the Court adverting to the  earlier  table  and  the  table
submitted by the AICTE, issued the following directions:
“Earlier when the matter was taken up by this court on 19th August, 2014  in
I.A. No. 50,51 & 52, the following order was passed:

        “The petitioners may file an additional affidavit enclosing a  chart
showing the date they intend to (i) get counselling of students, (ii)  admit
the students,(iii) start the course, (iv) number of classes to  be  attended
as per law (iv)the day when the course will be completed as per  the  norms,
(v) the month in which admit card will be issued and  (vi)  the  examination
schedule to commence.

     Post the matter on 25th August, 2014.”

       The aforesaid order was passed  with  a  view  to  know  whether  the
students will suffer if the period of counselling an admission  is  extended
and whether the petitioners will be in a position to complete  the  sessions
within time schedule.

       The additional affidavit has been filed on behalf  of  the  Applicant
I.A. NO.  50/2014  showing  therein  details  of  the  existing  v  Academic
Calendar Year 2014-2015 which reads as follows :


|State of academic     |1st of August (University |No. of Days considering |
|session as per Supreme|started their classes on  |5 days a week –         |
|Court                 |19th August, 2014         |Holidays*               |
|Actual date of start  |20th of August            |71-06 = 65 teaching days|
|of classes            |                          |                        |
|Last of teaching      |29th of November          |                        |
|Issue of Admit Card   |1st of Dec (Admit Card are|                        |
|                      |issued on line)           |                        |
|Preparation Leave for |1st Dec – 14th Dec        |14 Days                 |
|Exam                  |                          |                        |
|Start of Semester     |15th of December, 2014    |                        |
|examination           |                          |                        |
|End of Semester       |10th of Jan., 2015        |                        |
|examination           |                          |                        |
|Start of second       |15th of January, 2015     |                        |
|semester              |                          |                        |

       The Applicants have now proposed the academic calendar for  admission
in their  Colleges/Institutions,  without  loss  of  teaching  days,  making
Saturdays as teaching days :

|Start of academic   |1st of September          |No. of Days considering 6 |
|session             |                          |days a week – Holidays*   |
|Last day of teaching|29th of November          |78-6 = 72 teaching days   |
|Issue of Admit Card |1st of Dec. (Admit card   |                          |
|                    |are issued on line)       |                          |
|Preparation, Leave  |1st Dec – 14th Dec        |14 Days                   |
|for Exam            |                          |                          |
|Start of Semester   |15th of December, 2014    |                          |
|examination         |                          |                          |
|End of Semester     |10th of Jan., 2015        |                          |
|examination         |                          |                          |
|Start of second     |15th of January, 2015     |                          |
|semester            |                          |                          |

      The learned counsel appearing on behalf of other applicants and  AICTE
submits that there is no objection if the Academic Calendar Year proposed  b
the applicant – International Institute of Technology  &  Business,  Sonepat
and others in I.A. No. 50/2014 is allowed. It may be allowed to  be  applied
to other institutions who have filed similar applications.

            Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, we  direct  to
implead the applicants as party to C.A. No. 9048/2012,  extend  the  cut-off
for counselling and admission as fixed  by  the  final  judgment  and  order
dated 13th December, 2012 passed in C.A. NO.9048/2012 by one week  i.e.  5th
September, 2014 with clear understanding that they will admit  the  students
and complete the Session as per the time schedule shown and recorded  above.


      This  extension  of  time  for  Counselling  and  Admission  shall  be
applicable to the Colleges/Institutions who have filed the applications  for
impleading as the parties  to  the  present  appeal  and  the  Colleges  and
Institutions for whom permission has been sought by AICTE.”


We have referred to the orders passed by this Court in a  sequential  manner
only to highlight that for the academic year 2014-15 there  was  some  cavil
with regard to the jurisdiction of AICTE till the four-Judge Bench by  order
dated  9.5.2014  clarified  prior  approval  of  AICTE  is  compulsory   and
mandatory for conduct of technical course  including  MBA/Management  course
by  exiting  affiliated  technical  college  and  also  including  technical
college which would require affiliation by a university for conduct  of  its
technical process/programmes  for  the  academic  year  2014-15.   The  time
schedule originally postulated in the Parshvanath case was  extended  regard
being had to the special features of each case.
 In the case at hand it is submitted by Mr. Rohatgi that the university  had
issued a notification on 28.8.2014 to provide a fresh round  of  counselling
(supplementary counselling) after 15.8.2014  which  was  the  cut-off  date.
The said notification issued by the university challenged  before  the  High
Court of Delhi.   The  learned  Single  Judge  issued  notice  in  the  Writ
Petition but did not pass an  interim  order.   In  Intra-Court  Appeal  the
Division Bench by an order dated 3.9.2014 gave liberty to the university  to
go ahead with the supplementary counselling for non-AICTE courses/  non-NCTE
courses and granted liberty to  move  this  court  for  extension  of  time.
Assailing the aforesaid order Special Leave Petition (C) No. 24442  of  2014
was filed and this court on 8.9.2014 passed the following order:-
      “Issue notice.

Ms. Asha Jain Madan, Advocate for the respondent,  on  caveat,  has  entered
appearance and accepts notice.
We have been apprised, in the course of hearing of  this  petition  for  the
purposes of admission, that the University has issued a  notification  dated
28.08.2014, which is prior to the order passed by the High Court.  The  said
notification, as submitted by Mr. Sibal, is likely to  affect  the  schedule
fixed by this Court for AICTE and other statutory  authorities  like,  NCTE,
etc. It is also urged at the  Bar  by  virtue  of  this  notification  being
worked out, the students who have been admitted to a particular course,  may
be dislodged or try their option for  other  courses  as  a  consequence  of
which the educational institutions would likely to face a  hazard.  Be  that
as it may, Mr. Maninder Singh, learned ASG  shall  explain  the  impact  and
effect of the notification issued on 28.08.2014.
As an ad interim measure, it is directed there shall be  stay  of  operation
of the order dated 3.09.2014 passed by the High Court of Delhi at New  Delhi
in LPA No. 576/2014 and the Notification referred to hereinabove.

List on 12.09.2014.”
When the matter was listed thereafter, a statement was made by  the  counsel
appearing for the university that the  notification  dated  28.8.2014  which
was the  subject  matter  of  the  writ  petition  in  the  High  Court  was
withdrawn.  Taking note of the said submission, the following order came  to
be passed.
       “Heard  Mr.  Maninder  Singh  learned  Additional  Solicitor  General
appearing for the University. It is  submitted  by  the  learned  Additional
Solicitor General that the University has taken a decision to  withdraw  the
Notification dated 28th August, 2014.
       In view of the aforesaid, the impugned order passed by  the  Division
Bench of the High Court is set aside and the Writ  Petition  ©  No.5696/2014
pending in the High Court of Delhi, is deemed to have been disposed of.”


Thereafter  the  present  batch  of   writ   petitions   have   been   filed
fundamentally for extension of time  schedule  which  would  logically  give
rise to conducting of another round of counselling.  It is contended in  the
writ petition that more than six thousand seats are  vacant  and  there  are
thousand of students who are qualified in CET and there is no  justification
not to fill up the said seats.  It is asseverated that due to  no  fault  of
the educational institutions which are self-financed are  likely  to  suffer
enormous financial loss and the students who have cleared the entrance  test
and are meritorious would lose one year.  Be  it  stated,  the  notification
issued by the university covered the following courses:-
“(a) B.Tech/M. Tech. (Dual Degree)/B.Tech. CET Code 31;
(b) BBA,CET Code 125
(c) BCA CET Code 114
(d) B. Com., CET Code 146
(e) B.Ed. CET Code 122
(f) BJMC, CET Code 126
(g) BA, LLB/BBA, LL.B. CET Code 121
(h) MBA, CET Code 191
(i) MCA, CET Code 105
(j) LE to B.Tech. CET Code 128 and 129”

It is not disputed that courses covered under (a), (h),  (i)  and   (j)  are
covered by AICTE Regulations.  B.Ed. CET Code 122 is covered under the  NCTE
Act and Regulations framed thereunder.  Courses  covered  under,  (b),  (c),
(d), (f) and (g) are  directly  governed  by  the  university  statutes  and
regulations.  In the present case we are not dealing  with  the  controversy
pertaining to the cases under the NCTE Act, 1993.
First, we shall dwell upon the courses that are regulated by  the  1987  Act
and the 1994 Regulations.  It is submitted by the learned  counsel  for  the
petitioners, namely, the institutions and the students, that AICTE  did  not
adhere to the schedule as far  as  the  counselling  is  concerned  and  the
University played possum with the schedule and further created  a  chaos  by
allowing  the  students  who  had  already  taken  admissions   in   certain
institutions to  participate  in  the  supplementary  counselling  which  is
impermissible on the face of the prospectus issued by the  university.   Mr.
Rohtagi, learned  Attorney  General  would  submit  that  AICTE,  after  the
pronouncement  of  the  judgment  in  Association  Management   of   Private
Colleges’ case was uncertain  of  its  jurisdiction/authority  till  it  was
conferred the power although by an  interim  order  on  9.5.2014  in  Orissa
Technical Colleges Association’s case, and that  uncertainty  caused  delay.
We have been apprised that the matter is pending before a three-Judge  Bench
and the AICTE has proceeded solely on the basis of the  interim  order.   As
far as the issuance of the notification in respect  of  ten  courses  having
access to all candidates  including  the  students  who  had  already  taken
admission, learned Attorney  General  submitted,  that  such  inclusion  was
contrary to the prospectus and also erroneous on many a score.
Let it be clearly stated that we appreciate that for the academic year 2014-
15, there were certain unforeseen circumstances.   First,  a  question  mark
was put on the authority of AICTE, (ii) second,  there  was  bifurcation  of
States of Andhra Pradesh to two states, namely State of Andhra  Pradesh  and
State of Telengana, and (iii) third, number of  seats  had  remained  vacant
despite  students having qualified and desirous of taking of the courses.
In our considered opinion, these are significant special features that  have
occurred in the academic year 2014-15.  There are two ways to  look  at  the
fact situation.   It can be perceived with a myopic attitude or  it  can  be
appreciated, regard being had to multitudinous consequences.  We  have  been
apprised by the learned Attorney General that if time  is  granted  for  on-
line counselling it can commence w.e.f. 20th of October, 2014 and  would  be
over within two days and thereafter classes can start.  He has reproduced  a
letter dated 11th of October, 2014 issued by  the  Vice-Chancellor  how  the
University would carry out the supplementary counselling.  We think  it  apt
to reproduce the same:-
“University would be agreeable to carry out a supplementary counselling  for
admissions for remaining  vacant  seats  from  the  eligible  CET  qualified
candidates.
The University has further decided that only vacant seats will be filled  up
from eligible CET qualified students as  per  their  merits,  who  have  not
taken admissions as yet.
The university also agrees that no further dislocation will be  carried  out
for any  students  who  are  already  admitted  in  the  programmes  at  any
college/institute.”

Weighing the issue on the scales of larger public interest in the  obtaining
factual matrix we are inclined to state  that  the  relief  sought  and  the
plausible solution offered by the University can be accepted as  that  would
subserve the cause of justice.     In  these  courses,  the  university,  as
submitted before us, can keep the pace. The students  who  would  be  taking
admissions subject to our order, be put  in  one  section  in  the  allotted
colleges so that they can attend classes for  an  extra  hour.   That  apart
their holidays shall be curtailed as per the directions of  the  University.
An undertaking to the said effect can be taken  from  the  students.   Every
student shall have the requisite 75% attendance of the  original  number  of
classes.  In case, there will be any shortage  of  attendance  it  shall  be
sternly dealt with.
Be it noted, such an agonizing situation inviting national waste could  have
been avoided had AICTE and the University  would  have  been  more  careful,
cautious and circumspect.  However, to do complete justice, we  have  issued
the aforesaid directions.  This is in the larger public interest.   At  this
juncture we may fruitfully recapitulate an ancient  saying:-
“Yadapi Sidhham, Loka Virudhham
Na Adaraniyam, Na Karaniyam”
As the present  fact  situation  depicts  the  larger  public  interest  and
ultimately subserve the cause of justice we  extend  the  time  for  on-line
counselling till 20th of October, 2014.
At this juncture, we have been apprised by Mr. P.P.  Rao  and  Mr.  Sundram,
learned senior counsel  appearing  for  the  petitioners  that  the  problem
occurs every year, for despite days  for  counselling  are  fixed,  adequate
number of students are not called for counselling, as  a  result  of  which,
many students who have  cleared  the  CET  do  not  get  an  opportunity  to
undertake the counselling and eventually the admission does not take  place.
  We are absolutely conscious  that  it  is  in  the  sphere  of  university
administration.   But  when  the  problem  is  recurrent  we   command   the
University to hold counselling in such a manner within the  stipulated  time
in the schedule so that all the seats are filled up if  there  are  eligible
candidates for such counselling.   The  University  cannot  behave  like  an
alien to the national interest.  Another aspect which requires to  be  noted
is that a blame game has been going on by the  educational  institutions  on
the one hand and the AICTE and the University on the other, and  on  certain
occasions between the AICTE and the University.  All  of  them  function  in
the field of education.  Such kind of cavil  and  narrowness  is  likely  to
create a concavity in the educational culture of  the  country.   Therefore,
all concerned  must  remember  that  education  charters  the  way  where  a
civilized man slaughters his prejudices.  Any  education  properly  imparted
is  a  constant  allurement  to  learn.   It  is  inconceivable   that   the
authorities who are in charge of controlling  the  sphere  of  education  to
behave like  errant  knights  justifying  their  own  fanciful  deeds.   Law
expects a rational perception, logical approach  and  a  studied  and  well-
deliberated decision from all the  authorities.       It  is  imperative  to
state, a concerted effort has to be made by the AICTE and the University  to
avoid  recurrence  of  this  kind  of  piquant  and  agonising   situations.
Perceived from any perspective, it does not augur a healthy situation.   Had
the AICTE functioned within the time frame in respect  of  the  process  the
matter would not have given rise to such a situation.   Similarly,  had  the
University conducted the counselling with utmost responsibility  keeping  in
view the number of seats that were available in  the  approved  institutions
and the number of students that have qualified in the Common Entrance  Test,
possibly the gravity of the problem would have been less.
In a State  of  good  governance,  a  problem  is  taken  note  of  so  that
appropriate and timely steps  are  taken  to  avoid  any  recurrence.    The
authorities  who  are  incharge  of  giving  approval,  preparing  syllabus,
imparting education and carrying on such other activities, are  required  to
behave with responsibility.  Lack of  concern  is  only  indicative  of  the
beginning of destruction.   That cannot be allowed to occur.  Therefore,  we
caution the AICTE and the University to see to it that things  are  done  on
time following the fixed time schedule.   We  ingeminate,  at  the  cost  of
repetition, that we have extended the time because  of  the  situation  that
has prevailed this year but if due efforts are taken, we  are  certain  that
same would not  be  required.   We  hasten  to  clarify  the  time  schedule
originally fixed in  Parshvanath Charitable Trust case has to be treated  as
the schedule for all coming years.  Any modification that has been done,  as
is manifest from the various orders which we have  reproduced  hereinbefore,
including the present judgment, have been passed for  the  academic  session
2014-15 in the special features of each case.  Be it  stated,  avoidance  of
unpleasant litigation is a progressive step in a civilised society  governed
by rule of law.
To sum up:
(a)  Time is extended for carrying out the on-line counselling till 21st  of
October, 2014.
(b)   The students who have already taken admission in  colleges  shall  not
be permitted to  participate  in  the  supplementary  counselling,  and  the
students  who  are  attending  classes  in  any  institution   without   the
counseling shall be deemed not to have  been  admitted  and  therefore  they
will be eligible to participate in the on line counseling.
(c)  The students those are selected  for  admission  and  allotted  to  the
respective colleges on merits shall take admission forthwith.
(d)  The students after being allotted to a particular college shall be  put
in a separate Section as they shall  be  required  to  attend  extra-working
classes.  The educational institutions have to  seriously  impart  education
with the help and aid of  teachers,  if  necessary,  by  providing  adequate
means and facilitation for the teachers.
The University shall constitute a team to see whether classes  are  held  or
not.
Unless a student gets the requisite attendance of 75% on the  basis  of  the
computation held, regard being had to the entire  teaching  days,  he  shall
not be permitted to appear in the examination.
The time schedule originally fixed in Parshavnath Charitable  Trust  (supra)
shall remain in force and be religiously followed in the subsequent years.
Ex consequenti, the writ petitions are disposed of on  above  terms.   There
shall be no order as to costs.

                                               …..........................J.
                                                               (DIPAK MISRA)

                                              .....…......................J.
                                                          (UDAY UMESH LALIT)
NEW DELHI
OCTOBER 16, 2014





-----------------------
[1]   (2013) 3 SCC 385
[2]   (2013) 8 SCC 271
[3]   (2001) 8 SCC 676
[4]   (2002) 8 SCC 481

-----------------------


35


SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO…28195-96 OF 2014 (CC NO.1707 OF 2014) RAUNAQ EDUCATION FOUNDATION .... PETITIONER VERSUS STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. ..... RESPONDENTS

      REPORTABLE




                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION



                SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO. 28189 OF 2014
                            (CC NO.2940 OF 2014)

                                    WITH

               SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO…28195-96  OF 2014
                            (CC NO.1707 OF 2014)




RAUNAQ EDUCATION FOUNDATION       .... PETITIONER

VERSUS

STATE OF HARYANA & ORS.                     ..... RESPONDENTS


                                  O R D E R


ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.

1.    Delay condoned.  Heard on merits.
2.    These petitions have been preferred against  the  Judgment  and  Order
dated 27th September, 2013 passed in LPA No.1687 of 2013,  Order dated  16th
September, 2013  passed  in  LPA  No.1618  of  2013  and  Order  dated  16th
December, 2013 passed in RA LP No.133 of 2013 in LPA No.1618 of 2013 by  the
High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh, upholding the order  of  the
learned  Single  Judge,  declining  to  interfere  with  the  Order  of  the
Government of Haryana dated
18th September, 1998, resuming land  measuring  76  acres  5  kanals  and  5
marlas, except land measuring 7 acres left to be retained by the  petitioner
foundation.
3.    The case of the petitioner is that it gave a proposal  on  1st  April,
1972 to start a educational complex for the benefit of the residents of  the
State of Haryana.   Accordingly, the State of Haryana released
76 acres of land from the Forest Department and acquired the same under  the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 vide notifications dated
15th May, 1972 and 28th August, 1972 under Sections 4  and  6  respectively.
Award for compensation was given on 21st  February,  1973.   Possession  was
delivered to the  petitioner  on  24th  January,  1974  subject  to  certain
conditions  including  the  requirement  to  make  construction  within  the
specific time.  Since the land was not utilized as  expected,  in  terms  of
agreement dated 18th February, 1988 under which the land was  given  to  the
petitioner subject to  certain  conditions,  the  Village  Panchayat  sought
return of the land by passing a resolution dated 20th  October,  1989.    On
that basis, after due enquiry, resumption Order dated 18th  September,  1998
came to be  finally  passed  after  various  proceedings  holding  that  the
petitioner failed to comply with the conditions subject to  which  land  was
given to it.   It was held that the petitioner failed to  utilize  the  land
for the purpose for which it was given, except a part of it.
4.    The petitioner called in question the said  order  by  filing  a  writ
petition.  Learned single Judge, after due consideration, did not  find  any
merit in the contentions  raised  on  behalf  of  the  petitioner.   It  was
observed :
“It is appropriate to notice that actual  running  of  the  school  was  the
primary consideration of the State of Haryana in allotting 76 acres of  land
to the foundation.  The petitioners  have  not  produced  any  documents  in
regard to admission of children, the  year  in  which  the  admissions  were
started, the classes in which  the  admissions  were  made,  the  number  of
children admitted in a particular class,  the  number  of  faculty  members,
their  date  of  appointment,  qualifications  etc.  and   above   all   the
performance  of  the  school  children  in  academics   or   extracurricular
activities.  It is also doubtful if the school had been affiliated with  any
educational board.  I have no hesitation to hold that the  petitioners  have
intentionally  withheld  this  information  as  revelation   thereof   would
completely shake their tall claim to start an educational institutions,  one
of the best in the area to impart quality education.

Admittedly, the petitioners did  not  start  construction  of  stated  third
phase by the time, they  filed  the  petition.   The  joint  inspection  was
conducted in October/November 1997.  A Local Commissioner was  appointed  by
this  Court  in  August  1999.   Shri  Sanjeev  Sharma,  Local  Commissioner
inspected the site in the presence of the petitioners and  made  a  detailed
report in compliance with order dated 16.08.1999.  The petitioners have  not
challenged  the  correctness  of  this  report  with  regard  to  extent  of
construction.  The joint  inspection,  in  no  circumstances,  could  reveal
something  more  than  what  is  contained  in  the  report  of  the   Local
Commissioner.  Under these circumstances, the supply or non-supply of  joint
inspection  report  also  loses  its  significance.   In  other  words,   no
prejudice has been caused to the petitioners for want  of  supply  of  joint
inspection report.

The petitioners have tried to justify their failure to complete the  project
for want of adequate funds due to financial difficulties  of  their  funding
sources.  The possession  of  land  was  delivered  in  January  1974.   The
foundation should have  shown  keenness  to  complete  the  project  at  the
earliest.  It remained silent for 12 years.  Thereafter  also,  it  did  not
complete the project within  three  years  of  entering  into  agreement  in
February 1988.  The plea of inadequacy of funds more  than  25  years  after
their approaching the State of Haryana for allotment  of  land  cannot  hold
ground.  Rather the foundation should have,  on  its  own,  surrendered  the
land to the State of Haryana if it was not able to complete the project  due
to inadequacy of funds.
……………
The State of Haryana acquired more than 76 acres of land  belonging  to  the
Gram  Panchayat,  Village  Bari.   The  Gram  Panchayat’s  land  necessarily
denotes land meant for common purposes of the village.  The  people  of  the
village have been deprived of the benefits of this  common  land  due  to  a
false promise made by the foundation.  As the foundation utterly  failed  to
achieve the object for which the Gram Panchayat was deprived of land of  its
ownership, no fault can be found in the decision of  the  State  Government.
Rather, the officer who passed the impugned order has taken a  very  liberal
and reasonable view of the matter and left 7 acres of land at  the  disposal
of foundation, though the entire land could be  resumed.   In  view  of  the
above, the  contention  of  the  petitioners  that  the  impugned  order  is
vitiated for want of supply of documents,  joint  inspection  report  or  an
opportunity of personal hearing  is  devoid  of  merit  and  is  accordingly
rejected.  Similarly, the other plea that  resumption  order  could  not  be
passed in the circumstances of the present case is untenable.

Before parting with this order, it is appropriate to mention that  the  land
resumed by the impugned order has been re-vested in the Gram  Panchayat.   A
mutation has been sanctioned in favour of  the  Gram  Panchayat,  which  has
been challenged in CWP No.13676 of 2007.  The land  after  resumption  would
now be available for common benefit of the villagers.

As an upshot of the discussion made hereinabove, the  foundation  is  guilty
of using the land for personal gain,  failed  to  complete  construction  in
compliance with terms and conditions of the agreement even uptill  1999  and
further defaulted in proving true to its promise/representation made to  the
State as back as in the year 1972, rather deprived  the  villagers  of  huge
land meant for their common benefits, therefore, in my  considered  opinion,
allowing the prayer of the petitioners would amount to  putting  premium  on
their failures.  The petitioners, therefore,  cannot  be  held  entitled  to
relief in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution  of
India.”

5.    The Division Bench after thorough consideration reiterated  the  above
findings as follows :
      “19.  Thus, from the reading of the said  affidavit  also,  which  had
been filed on 26.08.2012, nothing has been brought on record  to  show  that
any  such  utilization  has  been  done  regarding  the  setting  up  of  an
educational complex.  The  affidavit  only  pertains  to  the  efforts  made
regarding  the  administration  of  the  school  and  does  not  talk  about
utilization of the huge chunk of land for  any  further  expansion  for  the
purpose of setting  of an educational complex.   The  site  plan  which  has
been attached alongwith the said affidavit goes on to show that there  is  a
proposed boys and girls hostel to be set up, a proposed Apollo Institute  of
Management and Studies.   Thus,  the  submission  of  the  counsel  for  the
appellants that in pursuance of the interim  order  passed,  the  Foundation
had complied with the terms of the allotment, is  also  without  any  basis.
The observations of the Learned Single Judge that the objects for which  the
land was acquired were not met and the Gram Panchayat was  deprived  of  its
ownership due to the false  promise  made  by  the  Foundation  for  brining
education  to  the  residents  of  the  State  of  Haryana,  are  absolutely
justified.

20.   Another factor which is to be taken  into  consideration  is  that  in
pursuance of the resumption, the Gram Panchayat had also  submitted  a  bank
draft of 2,76,548/- vide letter dated 16.10.1998, regarding the cost of  the
land which had been resumed and in pursuance of  which,  mutation  had  also
been entered in favour of the Gram Panchayat.  As per the written  statement
of respondent No.5 – Gram Panchayat, the said amount had  been  accepted  by
the appellants and  they  had  taken  possession.   No  replication  to  the
written statement, filed by respondent No.5 – Gram Panchayat, was filed  and
thus, the Trust has also retained the said amount for all this period.

21.   Accordingly, there is no infirmity or illegality in the order  of  the
Learned  Single  Judge,  upholding  the  resumption,  which  would   warrant
interference in appeal.  The present appeal is,  accordingly,  dismissed  in
limine.”

6.    When the matter came up before this Court on 24th February, 2014,  the
following order was passed :
“In the meantime, the petitioner may file  additional  affidavit  indicating
how much area of the land is still an open land and what are the  nature  of
construction which have been done by the petitioner after allotment  of  the
land.”

      The affidavit filed in pursuance of the above order was not  found  to
be satisfactory and on 11th April, 2014, the following order was passed :
“Counsel for the petitioner is directed to file a better affidavit within  a
period of one week explaining as to how the area which has been alleged  not
have been used by the petitioner for the school purposes have been  utilized
and also whether the construction was undertaken  after  the  interim  order
was passed by the High Court.”

7.    We have heard  Shri  Kapil  Sibal,  learned  senior  counsel  for  the
petitioner.
8.    He submitted that the petitioner is ready  and  willing  to  construct
and run a school for 500 poor and under privileged children of the  area  at
its cost, within the  time  frame  as  may  be  laid  down  and  subject  to
appropriate conditions.  The petitioner will bear the education  cost,  fees
etc. of such poor and under privileged children for all times to come.
9.    We have  bestowed  our  serious  consideration  to  the  proposal  put
forward.  Though any proposal for advancement of poor and  under  privileged
children is welcome but the background of the  matter  noticed  above  shows
the track record of the petitioner which renders the  proposal  suspect  and
in any case land allowed to be  retained  being  enough  if  the  petitioner
wishes to carry out the proposal  now  given,  no  ground  is  made  out  to
interfere with the impugned order.  The petitioner took prime  land  of  the
State and failed to comply  with  the  conditions  on  which  the  land  was
allotted, for a long time.  Accordingly, the  land  stands  resumed  by  the
State of Haryana and as per order of the High Court,  the  land  stands  re-
vested in the Gram Panchayat.  Mutation has also been sanctioned  in  favour
of the Gram Panchayat and the land is to be used  for  the  benefit  of  the
villagers.
10.   As already noted, the High Court has duly examined all aspects of  the
matter.  On orders of the High Court,  an  Advocate  Commissioner  inspected
the site in the presence of representative of the petitioner,  who  reported
that in the area marked “X” no construction  was  made,  as  claimed.   This
report was not even challenged by the petitioner.  Having taken  huge  track
of prime public land in the name of advancing the  cause  of  education,  it
failed to act as per the agreement and put  forward  the  specious  plea  of
lack of funds.  The people of the village were deprived of  the  benefit  of
the common land due to false promise of the petitioner.  Still, 7  acres  of
land has been allowed to be retained by the petitioner.  If  the  petitioner
wants to serve poor and under privileged children as  now  proposed,  it  is
free to do so on this part of the said land.
11.   We also find that the Division Bench considered  the  contention  that
construction was raised during pendency of proceedings.   It was found  that
interim order dated 14th May, 2001 permitting construction  was  subject  to
result  of  the  writ  petition.   Moreover,  even  thereafter   no   proper
utilization of land was shown to have been  made,  though  the  brochure  of
school painted a rosy picture.   Thus, the track record  of  the  petitioner
is to take private benefit from land of  the  village,  taken  over  by  the
State at petitioner’s instance to advance education – a public cause.   Such
individual and private benefit at the cost of  public  cannot  be  permitted
and is contrary to constitutional values to be  followed  by  the  State  of
advancing welfare of the society.  A finding of fact has  been  recorded  by
the competent authority about the failure of the  petitioner  to  carry  out
the terms and conditions of allotment which finding has  been  duly  upheld,
concurrently by the learned Single Judge  and  the  Division  Bench.   Thus,
public interest will not in any manner be advanced by interference  by  this
Court on a mere offer to serve  poor  children  when  track  record  of  the
petitioner has been to advance  individual  interest  at  the  cost  of  the
village.
12.   We have not been able to discern as to why forest land  was  acquired,
if such land was already vested in the  Government.   There  is  nothing  to
show that the requisite permission was taken for converting forest land  for
non forest purposes.   In B L Wadhera vs.  Union  of  India[1],  this  Court
considered the validity  of  gifting  of  the  village  common  land  for  a
hospital to Shri Chandra Shekhar, former Prime Minister. Quashing  the  said
decision, this Court observed :
“41. Once the land was found to have been used for the purposes  of  forest,
the provisions of the Indian Forest Act  and  the  Forest  Conservation  Act
would be attracted, putting restrictions on dereservation of the  forest  or
use of the land for non-forest purposes. The Forest Conservation  Act,  1980
has  been  enacted  with  the  object  of  preventing   deforestation.   The
provisions of the aforesaid Act are applicable to all forests.  It  is  true
that “forest” has not been defined under the Act  but  this  Court  in  T.N.
Godavarman Thirumulkpad v. Union of India1 has held that the  word  “forest”
must be understood according to its dictionary meaning. It would  cover  all
statutorily recognised forest whether designated as reserved,  protected  or
otherwise for the purposes of Section 2(i) of the Forest  Conservation  Act.
The term “forest land” occurring in Section 2  will  include  not  only  the
forest as understood in the dictionary sense but also any area  regarded  as
forest  in  the  government  record  irrespective  of  the  ownership.   The
provisions of the Forest Conservation Act are applicable to all  forests  so
understood irrespective of the ownership  or  classification  thereof.  This
Court has issued certain directions and guidelines for the  preservation  of
forest and its produce in T.N. Godavarman case1 which are not shown to  have
been implemented by the respondent State.

[pic]42. Section 2 of the Forest Conservation Act  mandates  that  no  State
Government or authority shall make an order directing that any  forest  land
or any portion thereof shall cease to be reserved or any forest land or  any
portion thereof may be used for non-forest purposes or forest  land  or  any
portion thereof may be assigned by way of lease or otherwise to any  private
person or to an authority, corporation, agency  or  any  other  organisation
owned and controlled by the Government or any such land or  portion  thereof
be cleared of trees which have grown therein — without  the  prior  approval
of the Central Government.  The  gifting  of  land,  in  the  instant  case,
cannot, in any way, be termed to be for a forest  purpose.  Learned  counsel
appearing for the State of Haryana showed us a government  order  which  had
declared the area, covered by gift deeds, as forest prohibiting the  cutting
of the trees, declared as forest though for a limited period  of  25  years.
It is submitted that as the period of 25 years was not extended,  the  land,
earlier declared as forest, had ceased to be a forest land. Such a  plea  is
contradictory in terms. The State of Haryana is proved to  be  conscious  of
the fact that the land, intended to be gifted, was either  the  forest  land
or property of  the  Forest  Department  regarding  which  condition  6  was
imposed in its order granting the approval for gifting the land by the  Gram
Panchayat to the Trust. It is too late now in the  day  for  the  respondent
State to urge that as notification declaring the  land  as  forest  was  not
extended after initial period of 25 years, the same be deemed to  not  be  a
forest land or land used for the purpose of the  forest.  In  the  affidavit
filed on behalf of the respondents it is specifically stated:
“It is submitted that the State Government had only given  approval  to  the
Gram Panchayat for gifting the land.  However,  while  permitting  the  Gram
Panchayat to gift  the  land  by  way  of  abundant  precaution,  the  State
Government had imposed  the  condition  to  the  effect  that  the  land  in
question be got released from the Forest Department in accordance with  law.
The permission given by State Government did not mean at all that the  donee
or the donor was authorised in any  way  to  divert  the  user  of  land  in
question.”

The contradictory pleas taken and stands adopted  by  the  respondent  State
strengthens the argument of the petitioner that the  transaction  of  making
the gifts in favour of Respondent 7  is  actuated  by  considerations  other
than those specified under the Act and the Rules made thereunder.

43. Learned counsel, appearing for Respondent 7, has submitted that  as  the
land is being utilised for  the  purpose  of  the  Trust  and  Shri  Chandra
Shekhar is  not  taking  any  advantage  from  the  said  land,  the  action
initiated by way of public interest litigation is not sustainable. There  is
no doubt that the land has  not  been  utilised  by  Respondent  7  for  any
commercial purpose but it is equally true that the land  is  being  utilised
for purposes other than those contemplated under the Act and the Rules  made
thereunder for which the gift was approved to be made by the Gram  Panchayat
in favour of Respondent 7.  We  are  not  impressed  with  the  argument  of
Respondent 7 that the gifted land was acquired for the purposes  of  welfare
of the people and  the  [pic]upliftment  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  Gram
Panchayat. The land appears to be utilised  for  the  personal  leisure  and
pleasure of some individuals including the Chairman of  Respondent  7  which
cannot be termed to  be  used  for  the  upliftment  of  the  poor  and  the
oppressed as claimed. It  cannot  be  disputed  that  in  this  country  the
position of the rural poor  is  worst.  According  to  an  assessment  about
2/3rds of the rural population which consists of  farm  workers,  small  and
marginal farmers, poor artisans and the  unemployed  agricultural  labourers
are possessed of 15 to 20% of  the  total  available  land.  The  number  of
owners of land with less  than  0.2  hectares  is  about  29  million.  When
millions of landless agriculturists are struggling  to  get  some  land  for
feeding  their  families  and  protecting  their  lives,  Respondent  7  has
manoeuvred to usurp about 600 acres of land, apparently for not  any  public
purpose. It is unimaginable  that  for  the  construction  of  a  three-room
dispensary, Respondent 7 would require and the Gram Panchayat  as  also  the
State of Haryana would oblige by conferring  State  largesse  of  about  271
kanals of land. The shocking facts of the case further  disclose  that  even
this three-room dispensary has not been built on the  land  in  controversy.
For a reasonable person, as Respondent 7 is presumed to  be,  the  aforesaid
land  should  have  been  returned  to  the  Gram  Panchayat  after   public
controversy had  risen  culminating  in  the  filing  of  the  present  writ
petition in public interest. This Court cannot  remain  a  silent  spectator
where people’s property is  being  usurped  for  the  personal  leisure  and
pleasure of  some  individuals  under  the  self-created  legal,  protective
umbrella and name of a trust. A politician of the stature  of  Shri  Chandra
Shekhar  cannot  claim  to  minimise  the  sufferings  of  the   people   by
constituting the Trust and utilising the lands taken  by  it  allegedly  for
the upliftment of the poor and the oppressed. The purpose of the  respondent
Trust may be laudable but under the cloak of those purposes the property  of
the people cannot be permitted to be utilised for the aforesaid  objectives,
particularly when the  law  mandates  the  utilisation  of  the  transferred
property in a specified manner and for the benefit  of  the  inhabitants  of
the area, the poor and oppressed  and  the  Scheduled  Castes  and  Backward
Classes. We are not impressed with any of the  pleas  raised  on  behalf  of
Respondent 7 that the land was acquired bona fide for the proclaimed  object
of upliftment of the people of this country in general and of  the  area  in
particular. We fail to understand as to how the country can be  uplifted  by
personal adventures of constituting trusts and acquiring hundreds  of  acres
of lands for the purposes of  that  Trust.  It  is  nothing  except  seeking
personal glorification of the persons concerned.”

13.   We cannot lose sight of above observations in view of  the  fact  that
we are dealing with the issue of allocation of  public  land  to  a  private
entity which requires fair, transparent and non arbitrary exercise of  power
in the light of mandate of Article 14 read with Articles 39 (b) and  (c)  of
the Constitution.  Once it is found that beneficiary of such  allotment  has
abused its position to its advantage and to the disadvantage of the  public,
this Court cannot interfere with  the  fair  order  passed  by  a  competent
authority resuming the land.
14.   Thus, the proposal put forward cannot be taken at its face  value  and
cannot be the basis for interfering with the impugned orders.  The land  has
to be utilised by the competent authority in a  transparent  manner  as  per
applicable policy and law.
 The special leave petitions are dismissed.


                                                          ……..…………………………….J.
                                                         [ V. GOPALA GOWDA ]

                                                         .….………………………………..J.
NEW DELHI                       [ ADARSH KUMAR GOEL ]
October 14, 2014
-----------------------
[1]     (2002) 9 SCC 108

-----------------------
14


CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S).729-732 OF 2010 |RAJIB RANJAN & ORS. |…..APPELLANT(S) | | | | |VERSUS | | |R. VIJAYKUMAR |…..RESPONDENT(S) |

                                                                  REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                    CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S).729-732 OF 2010



|RAJIB RANJAN & ORS.                        |…..APPELLANT(S)                 |
|                                           |                                |
|VERSUS                                     |                                |
|R. VIJAYKUMAR                              |…..RESPONDENT(S)                |



                               J U D G M E N T

A.K. SIKRI, J.


                 These appeals  are  filed  by  four  appellants,  who  were
arrayed as accused persons in the complaint case No.183/2007  filed  by  the
respondent  herein  before  the  Court   of   Judicial   Magistrate   No.II,
Tiruchirapalli, Tamil Nadu.  The complaint has  been  filed  under  Sections
120-B, 468, 420 and 500 of the Indian Penal  Code  (for  short  'the  IPC').
The learned Judicial Magistrate took cognizance of the  said  complaint  and
summoned the appellants.   The  appellants  (who  were  arrayed  as  accused
Nos.3, 4,  5  and  6)  challenged  the  said  summoning  orders  and  sought
quashment of the complaint by filing petition under Section 482 of the  Code
of Criminal Procedure (for short 'the  Cr.P.C.)  inasmuch  as  according  to
them the allegations in the complaint did not make  out  any  offence  under
the aforesaid provisions of the IPC; the complainant had neither  any  locus
standi nor any legal status to prefer any  such  complaint;  the  appellants
being public servants and Gazetted  officers  of  the  State  Government  of
Chhattisgarh, no such criminal proceedings could be initiated  against  them
without prior sanction from the appointing authority as per Section  197  of
the Cr.P.C.; and the complaint was blatant misuse and abuse of  the  process
of Court which was filed by  the  complainant  after  exhausting  the  civil
remedies in which he had failed.   The High Court, after examination of  the
matter, has not found any merit in any of the aforesaid  contentions  raised
by the appellants and, consequently, dismissed their petitions.

2.    Before we advert to the  submissions  of  the  appellants,  which  are
mirror image of  what  was  argued  before  the  High  Court,  it  would  be
appropriate to traverse through the relevant facts  and  events  leading  to
the filing of the said complaint by the complainant.  These are as under:

                 The Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board  (for  short  'the
CSEB') issued an advertisement inviting tender (NIT) bearing No.  T-136/2004
dated 02.06.2004 for its work at Hasedeo Thermal Power Station (Korba  West)
towards Designing, Engineering, Testing, Supply, Erection  &  Commission  of
HEA Ignition system.  The applications received there  under  were  required
to be processed in three stages successively namely; Part-I  (EMD);  Part-II
(Techno-Commercial Criteria) and  Part  III  (Price  Bid).   The  respondent
herein submitted an application on 26.08.2004 as Chief Executive Officer  of
M/s Control  Electronics India (CEI) requesting  for  Tender  Document.  The
application  was  rejected  on  the  ground  that  it  was  accompanied   by
incomplete documents i.e. non-submission of  documentary  evidence  of  past
performance and  experience  of  the  respondent.   The  respondent  made  a
complaint dated 06.09.2004 against appellant No. 3 herein alleging that  the
Tender Documents were not issued to the  respondent.   It  was  followed  by
several letters  requesting  for  issuance  of  Tender  Documents.   He  was
informed  that  rather  than  pressurising  the  appellants  here  or  other
officials, he should furnish documents as per  pre-qualifying  condition  of
the Tender.  In response thereto, vide  his  letter  dated  05.11.2004,  the
respondent filed a  copy  of  purchase  order  dated  28.01.2002  placed  by
Jharkhand State Electricity Board (for short  'the  JSEB')  and  assured  to
supply other documentary  evidence  (performance  report)  subsequently.  On
such assurance, the Tender Documents were issued  to  the  respondent.   The
respondent vide his letter dated 08.12.2004, mentioned that the  Performance
Report was enclosed in Part-II. However,  the  said  report  was  not  found
enclosed  and  even  after  repeated  requests  from  the  CSEB  to  furnish
documents, respondent did not fulfill the  necessary  requirement.   As  the
respondent did not submit the  necessary  documents,  the  CSEB  sought  the
information from the Chief Engineer of JSEB (arrayed  in  the  complaint  as
accused No.2) vide letter dated 10.12.2004  about  the  performance  of  the
respondent.  Appellant No.2 herein was  also  deputed  to  get  the  desired
information from JSEB.  After meeting the officials of JSEB, appellant  No.2
submitted his report stating that the works carried out  by  the  respondent
were not satisfactory as many  defects  were  found  therein.   As  per  the
appellants, even technical expertise was sought from  SE  (ET&I)  KW  (CSEB)
and found that the respondent  was  not  technically  suitable  as  per  the
technical vetting  and  comparative  data  of  SE  (ET&I)  KW  letter  dated
04.02.2005.  On that basis, tender of  the  respondent  was  rejected.   The
appellants submit that as an outburst, in not  getting  the  Tender  in  his
favour, the respondent made complaints alleging  irregularities  to  various
fora including the State Government, which ordered the CSEB  to  conduct  an
enquiry.  The CSEB submitted its report on  21.02.2006  stating  that  there
were no such irregularities and that the respondent had  not  furnished  the
necessary  documents  despite  repeated  requests.   At  this   stage,   the
respondent filed the Civil Suit (26-A/06) before the Civil  Judge  Class-II,
Korba against the  CSEB.   However,  the  respondent  moved  an  application
seeking to withdraw the said suit.  In any case he did  not  appear  on  the
date fixed and accordingly the suit was  dismissed  for  non-prosecution  on
12.09.2006.  The respondent herein then filed a  Writ  Petition  No.2951  of
2006 before the Chhattisgarh High Court which was dismissed  on  25.06.2007.
Even costs of Rs.25,000/- was imposed while  dismissing  the  writ  petition
with  the  observations  that  it  was  abuse  of  the  process  of   Court.
Thereafter, SLP No.15897 of 2007 was preferred by the respondent which  also
came to be dismissed vide order dated 14.09.2007.  After the  exhaustion  of
these remedies, albeit unsuccessfully,  the  respondent  filed  a  complaint
before  K.K.  Nagar  P.S.,  Thirucharapalli,   Tamil   Nadu.    The   police
authorities refused to register the same on the ground that it  is  a  civil
dispute.  It is, thereafter, that the respondent  filed  the  said  Criminal
Complaint under Sections 120-B, 468, 420 & 500 IPC before the  trial  Court,
which was registered as C.C. No. 183/07 and the trial Court  issued  summons
to the appellants herein and accused No.1  (Successful  Bidder)   &  accused
No. 2 (then Chief Engineer, JSEB).   Petitions  of  the  appellants  seeking
quashing of the said complaint have been dismissed by the order of the  High
Court, which is impugned before us.

3.     A  reading  of  the  said  complaint  reveals  the  following   broad
allegations levelled by the respondent:

(a)  The respondent/complainant alleges  that  the  appellants  and  accused
No.1 (Successful Bidder)  & accused No. 2 (then Chief  Engineer,  JSEB)  had
conspired secretly to disentitle the complainant’s  company  by  creating  a
discredit and for the said purpose, they were in constant  touch  so  as  to
create the said Performance Report Cum  Certificate,  which  was  issued  by
accused No.2.

(b)   The respondent/complainant alleges that the  said  conspiracy  started
with an agreement entered into by the 1st accused and the appellants  herein
and they planned to fabricate the said certificate  dated  28.12.2004.   For
this purpose, accused No. 2 was approached so as to tailor  the  certificate
totally discrediting the CEI (Company of the Complainant) with reference  to
supply and service relationship with  Patratu  Thermal  Power  Station  (for
short 'the PTPS') and JSEB.

(c)   The respondent/complainant  alleges  that  the  said  Certificate  cum
Report is false,  fabricated,  motivated  and  malafide  and  the  same  was
contrary to the minutes of meeting that the complainant  and  his  officials
had with the officials of PTPS and JSEB.  He further alleges  that  for  the
said reasons, the accused No. 2 was demoted from his post.

(d)    The  respondent/complainant  alleges  that  on  suspicion   of   such
Certificate Cum Report, the complainant visited the CSEB  and  on  verifying
about the same, he found that the said tender was being given to Company  of
the 1st accused against the Complainant’s Company and so he wrote  a  letter
to the Chief Secretary and Chairman of JSEB  for  verifying  and  cancelling
such certificate. He also wrote to many officials of the CSEB.

(e)   The respondent/complainant alleges that the said Certificate is  perse
defamatory as against the complainant’s company and is a  crude  attempt  to
favour accused No.1 by spoiling the image of the Complainants  company.   He
further alleges that this  caused  a  wrongful  loss  to  the  complainant’s
company by robbing its due chance to get a contract  for  the  Boiler  Plant
Units at Korba.

4.    After recording preliminary evidence, the Magistrate  took  cognizance
of the complaint which order was challenged in the High Court.   Before  the
High Court, the appellants, inter alia, contended that the allegations  made
by the respondent under Sections 120-B, 468, 420 & 500 of IPC  pertained  to
the award of tender in favour of accused No.1 in which  the  respondent  was
also a competing party.  It was also pleaded that  the  said  complaint  has
been lodged as  an  afterthought,  having  failed  in  the  civil  suit  for
injunction which was dismissed and likewise, after unsuccessful  attempt  to
challenge the award of contract in  favour  of  accused  No.1  as  the  writ
petition of the respondent was dismissed  by  the  High  Court.   Thus,  the
lodging of  complaint  before  Judicial  Magistrate-II,  Tiruchirapalli  was
nothing but abuse of process of law.  The  appellants  also  contended  that
the respondents herein had no locus standi nor any legal  status  to  prefer
the said complaint, as CEI is not  a  registered  company,  having  a  legal
entity.  The appellants further relied on Naresh Kumar  Madan  v.  State  of
M.P., (2007) 4 SCC 766 wherein it has been held that an employee working  in
the Electricity Board is covered under the definition  of  ‘Public  Servant’
and State of Maharashtra v. Dr. Budhikota Subbarao, (1993)  2  SCC  567  for
the proposition that the absence of  sanction  order  from  the  appropriate
authority under  Section  197  Cr.P.C  for  prosecuting  a  public  servant,
vitiates the proceedings.

5.    The respondent refuted the aforesaid submissions by arguing  that  the
appellants herein had deliberately conspired and had committed the  offences
against the complainant and therefore he has a right to  lodge  a  complaint
for the offences committed by  the  appellants  along  with  accused  No.  2
(Chief Engineer, JSEB) in rejecting the tender submitted by the  complainant
with a view to accept the tender of the 1st accused.   It  was  argued  that
they conspired and created false document with  an  idea  of  rejecting  the
claim  of  the  complainant.   The   respondent   further   submitted   that
complainant's locus standi as a company was not questioned  in  the  earlier
proceedings before  the  Chhattisgarh  High  Court  and  that  the  Judicial
Magistrate had applied his  mind  and  after  satisfying  himself  that  the
complainant/respondent has got legal status to  lodge  the  said  complaint,
had taken cognizance of the offences committed by the accused  persons.   It
was also contended that the question of  obtaining  sanction  under  Section
197 Cr.P.C. will not arise in so far as the present complaint is  concerned,
as the accused are charged for  conspiracy,  cheating,  criminal  breach  of
trust and defamation.  He further  submitted  that  his  allegation  in  the
complaint pertained to the fabrication of the  Certificate-cum-Report  dated
28.12.2004 which was used against  him  in  rejecting  his  tender  and  1st
accused was favoured with the award of work.  Therefore, they had  committed
offences  against  the  complainant  and  damaged  the  reputation  of   the
respondent/ complainant.

6.    The High  Court  while  dismissing  the  petition  of  the  appellants
recorded that:
(a)   As far as mandatory provisions of Section  197  Cr.P.C  is  concerned,
the High Court accepted that the appellants are ‘Public Servants’.  It  also
observed that if the accusation against the appellants under  Sections  120-
B, 468, 420 & 500 IPC are connected with the discharge of  their  duty  viz.
if the said acts had reasonable connection with discharge of his  duty  then
applicability of Section 197 cannot be disputed.  However, on going  through
the allegations in the complaint, the High Court held that even  though  the
appellants are “Public Servant’, the alleged offences committed by them  are
cognizable offences are not in discharge of their normal  duties,  in  which
component of criminal breach of trust is found as one of  the  elements  and
hence the provisions of Section 197 Cr.P.C. are not attracted.

(b)   It has also been observed that the evidence regarding the  allegations
made in the complaint have to be recorded and gone into by the  trial  court
after the evidence  have  been  adduced  by  the  complainant.  It  is  only
thereafter the lower Court, can decide as to whether the  allegations  about
the falsity of the Certificate with conspiracy of  accused  No.  2  and  the
appellants herein are correct or not.

7.    It is clear from the above that  primarily  two  questions  arise  for
consideration namely:

(a)   Whether prior sanction of the competent  authority  to  prosecute  the
appellants, who are admittedly public servants, is mandatory  under  Section
197 of the Code?

(b)   Whether, on the facts  of  this  case,  the  complaint  filed  by  the
respondent is motivated and afterthought,  after losing the battle in  civil
litigation and amounts to misuse and abuse of law?

                 We would like to remark that having regard to the facts  of
this case  the  two  issues  are  interconnected  and  narratives  would  be
overlapping, as would become apparent when we proceed  with  the  discussion
hereinafter.

8.    For this purpose, we would first like  to  point  out  that  the  High
Court has itself taken note of the judgment of this Court  in  the  Case  of
Naresh Kumar Madan (supra) to hold that the appellants are  covered  by  the
description of public servants within the meaning  of  Section  21  of  IPC.
Following observations therefrom have been quoted:

“The officers of the State Electricity  Board  are  required  to  carry  out
public functions.  They are public authorities.  Their action in one way  or
the other may  entail  civil  or  evil  consequences  to  the  consumers  of
electrical energy.  They may prosecute a  person.   They  are  empowered  to
enter into the house of the Board's consumers.  It is only  for  proper  and
effective exercise of those powers, the statute provides that they would  be
public servants, wherefore a legal fiction has been  created  in  favour  of
those employees, when acting or purported to act in pursuance of any of  the
provisions of the Act within the meaning of Section 21 of the  Indian  Penal
Code.  Indian Penal Code denotes various persons  to  the  public  servants.
It is, however, not exhaustive.  A person may be public servant in terms  of
another statute.  However we may notice that a person, who, inter  alia,  is
in the service or pay of the Government established by or under  a  Central,
Provincial or State  Act,  would  also  come  within  the  purview  thereof.
Section 2 (1) (c) of the 1988 Act also brings within its  embrace  a  person
in the service or pay of a corporation established by  or  under  a  Central
Act.”

9.    The question is of the applicability  of  Section  197  of  the  Code.
Said provision with which we are concerned is reproduced below:

“Prosecution of Judges and public servant. (1) When any  person  who  is  or
was a Judge or Magistrate or a public servant not removable from his  office
save by or with the sanction of the Government  is  accused  of  any  ofence
alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to  act  in
the discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance  of  such
offence except with the previous sanction-

(a)  In the case of a person who is employed, or as the case may be, was  at
the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in  connection  with
the affairs of the Union, of the Central Government;

(b)  in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was  at
the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in  connection  with
the affairs of a State, of the State Government.”

10.   This provision makes it clear that if any offence is alleged  to  have
been committed by a public servant who cannot be  removed  from  the  office
except by or with the sanction of the Government,  the  Court  is  precluded
from taking cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction  of
the competent authority specified in this provision.

11.   The sanction, however, is necessary if  the  offence  alleged  against
public servant is committed by him “while acting or  purporting  to  act  in
the discharge of his official duties”.  In order to find out as  to  whether
the alleged offence is committed while acting or purporting to  act  in  the
discharge of his official duty, following  yardstick  is  provided  by  this
Court in Dr. Budhikota Subbarao (supra) in the following words:

“If on facts, therefore, it is prima facie found that the  act  or  omission
for which the accused was charged had reasonable connection  with  discharge
of his duty then it must be held to be official to  which  applicability  of
Section 197 of the Code cannot be disputed.”

12.   This principle was explained in  some  more  detail  in  the  case  of
Raghunath Anant Govilkar v. State of Maharashtra, which was decided by  this
Court on 08.02.2008 in SLP (Crl.) No.5453 of 2007, in the following manner:

“On the question of  the  applicability  of  Section  197  of  the  Code  of
Criminal  Procedure,  the  principle  laid  down  in  two   cases,   namely,
Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli v. State of Bombay and Amrik Singh  v.  State
of Pepsu was as follows:

It is not every  offence  committed,  by  a  public  servant  that  requires
sanction for prosecution under Section 197 (1) of  Criminal  Procedure  Cod;
nor even every act  done  by  him  while  he  is  actually  engaged  in  the
performance of his  official  duties;  but  if  the  act  complained  of  is
directly concerned with his official  duties  so  that,  if  questioned,  it
could be claimed to have been done by virtue of the  office,  then  sanction
would be necessary.

The real question therefore, is  whether  the  acts  complained  of  in  the
present case were directly concerned with the official duties of  the  three
public servants.  As far as the offence of  criminal  conspiracy  punishable
under Sections 120-B read with Section 409  of  the  Indian  Penal  Code  is
concerned and also Section 5(2) of the Prevention  of  Corruption  Act,  are
concerned they cannot be said to be of the nature mentioned in  Section  197
of the Code of Criminal Procedure.  To put it shortly, it is no part of  the
duty of a public servant, while discharging his official  duties,  to  enter
into a criminal conspiracy or to indulge in criminal  misconduct.   Want  of
sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is,  therefore,
no bar.”

13.   Likewise, in Shambhoo Nath Misra v. State of U.P. and  others,  (1997)
5 SCC 326, the Court dealt with the subject in the following manner:

“5.  The question is when the public servant is alleged  to  have  committed
the offence of fabrication of record  or  misappropriation  of  public  fund
etc. can be said to have acted in discharge of his official  duties?  It  is
not the official duty of the public servant to fabricate  the  false  record
and misappropriate the public  funds  etc.  in  furtherance  of  or  in  the
discharge of his official duties.  The official capacity  only  enables  him
to fabricate the record or misappropriate the public fund etc.  It does  not
mean that it is integrally connected or  inseparably  interlinked  with  the
crime committed in the course of same transaction, as was  believed  by  the
learned Judge.  Under these circumstances, we are of the  opinion  that  the
view expressed by the High Court as well  as  by  the  trial  Court  on  the
question of sanction is clearly illegal and cannot be sustained.”

14.   The ratio of the aforesaid cases, which  is  clearly  discernible,  is
that even while discharging his official duties, if a public servant  enters
into  a  criminal  conspiracy  or  indulges  in  criminal  misconduct,  such
misdemeanor on his part is not to be treated as an act in discharge  of  his
official duties and, therefore, provisions of  Section 197 of the Code  will
not be attracted.  In fact, the  High  Court  has  dismissed  the  petitions
filed  by  the  appellant  precisely  with  these  observations  namely  the
allegations pertain  to  fabricating  the  false  records  which  cannot  be
treated as part of the appellants normal official duties.   The  High  Court
has, thus, correctly spelt out the proposition of law.   The  only  question
is as to whether on the facts  of  the  present  case,  the  same  has  been
correctly applied.  If one looks into the allegations made in the  complaint
as stand alone allegations, probably what the High Court has said  may  seem
to be justified.  However, a little deeper scrutiny into  the  circumstances
under  which  the  complaint  came  to  be  filed  would  demonstrate   that
allegation of fabricating the false record is clearly  an  afterthought  and
it becomes more than apparent that the respondent has chosen to  level  such
a make belief allegation with sole motive to give a shape of criminality  to
the entire dispute, which was otherwise civil in nature.   As  noted  above,
the respondent had in fact initiated civil action in the form  of  suit  for
injunction against the award of the contract in which he failed.   Order  of
civil court was challenged by filing writ petition in the High Court.   Plea
of the respondent was that the action of the  Department  in  rejecting  his
tender and awarding the contract to accused No.1 was illegal and  motivated.
 Writ  petition  was  also  dismissed  with  cost.   These  orders  attained
finality.  It is only  thereafter  criminal  complaint  is  filed  with  the
allegation  that accused No.1 is favoured by creating  a  false  certificate
dated 28.12.2004.  We would dilate this discussion  with  some  elaboration,
hereinafter.

15.   As already pointed above, tender was floated by the CSEB and  the  CEI
herein was one of  the  parties  who  had  submitted  its  bid  through  the
respondent.  However, tender conditions mentioned certain conditions and  it
was necessary to fulfill those conditions to become eligible to  submit  the
bid  and  have  it  considered.   As  per  the  appellants,  tender  of  the
respondent was rejected on the ground that plant and  equipment  erected  by
the respondent at Patratu Thermal Power Station, Patratu, Jharkhand was  not
functioning well.  This information was received  by  the  Tender  Committee
from JSEB.  When the report was  sought  by  CSEB  in  December,  2004,  the
Tender Committee took the view that the respondent did not fulfill the  pre-
qualifying conditions  and  rejected  his  tender.   Before  doing  so,  the
respondent was asked time and again to send the performance report which  he
had promised but he failed to comply even when he  had  assured  to  do  the
needful.  In fact, that itself was sufficient to  reject  that  bid  of  the
respondent as it was non compliant with the tender  conditions.   Still,  in
order to verify the claim of the respondent  and  to  consider  his  bid  on
merits, though not strictly required, the appellant R.C.  Jain  was  deputed
to get the desired information from JSEB.   He met  the  officials  of  JSEB
and submitted his report to the effect that the works  carried  out  by  the
respondent at Patratu Thermal Power Station  was  not  satisfactory.   Even,
Shri B.M. Ram, General Manager of  the  said  Power  Station  furnished  his
report dated 28.12.2004 wherein it was summed up that due to the defects  in
the scanning  system,  supplied  by  the  respondent,  generation  had  been
adversely effected and the said Electricity Board  was  not  satisfied  with
the equipment supplied  by  the  respondent.   In  spite  of  the  aforesaid
material, the tender Committee acted with caution  and  even  the  technical
expertise was sought.   Even  the  report  of  the  technical  experts  went
against the respondent as it opined that the respondent was not  technically
suitable on the technical vetting and comparative data.   On  the  basis  of
the aforesaid material, the respondent's tender document was not opened  and
returned and he was informed accordingly.  All this has clearly happened  in
furtherance of and in discharge of the official  duties  by  the  appellant.
In the facts of the present case, we are of the  view  that  allegations  of
fabricating the records are mischievously made as an afterthought,  just  to
give colour of criminality to a civil case.

16.   As pointed out above, the respondent had even  filed  the  civil  suit
challenging the decision of the Electricity Board in  returning  his  tender
documents on the ground  that  the  same  were  not  as  per  pre-qualifying
conditions of the tender.   He  had  thus  resorted  to  the  civil  remedy.
However, he failed therein as for the reasons best known to him,  he  sought
to withdrew the same  and  accordingly  the  same  was  dismissed  for  non-
prosecution.  It is trite that once the suit  is  withdrawn,  that  acts  as
constructive res judicata having regard to  the  provision  of  Order  XXIII
Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure.  Also, when suit is  dismissed  under
Order IX Rule 8 CPC, fresh suit under Order IX Rule 9 is barred.  The  legal
implication would be of that the attempt of the  respondent  in  challenging
the decision of the Tender Committee in not considering his tender  remained
unfaulted.  Even when the respondent himself invited order of  dismissal  in
the civil suit, curiously enough, he  filed  a  writ  petition  against  the
order passed in the civil court dismissing  his  suit  for  non-prosecution,
but the same was also dismissed by the High Court on 25.06.2007 and  even  a
cost of Rs.25,000/- was imposed on the respondent as the said writ  petition
was perceived by the High Court as 'abuse of process  of  the  court'.   SLP
preferred by the respondent was also dismissed by this Court on  14.09.2007.
 It is only thereafter the respondent filed the criminal  complaint  out  of
which  present  proceedings  emanate.   No  doubt,  the  respondent  in  his
complaint has right to colour his complaint  by  levelling  the  allegations
that the appellants herein fabricated the records.  However,  on  the  facts
of this case,  it  becomes  difficult  to  eschew  this  allegation  of  the
respondent and we get an uncanny feeling  that  the  contents  of  FIR  with
these allegations are a  postscript  of  the  respondent  after  losing  the
battle in civil proceedings which were taken  out  by  him  challenging  the
action of the Department in rejecting his tender.  When he did  not  succeed
in the said attempt, he came out with the allegations  of  forgery.   It  is
thus becomes clear that the action of the respondent in filing the  criminal
complaint is not bonafide and amounts to misuse and abuse of the process  of
law.

17.   In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335,  this  Court
has laid down principles on which Court can quash the  criminal  proceedings
under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.  These are as follows:

“102.(1)  Where the allegations made in the first information report or  the
complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in  their
entirety do not prima facie constitute  any  offence  or  make  out  a  case
against the accused.

(2)   Where the allegations  in  the  first  information  report  and  other
materials, if any,  accompanying  the  FIR  do  not  disclose  a  cognizable
offence, justifying an investigation by police officers  under  Section  156
(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview  of
Section 155 (2) of the Code.

(3)   Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint  and
the  evidence  collected  in  support  of  the  same  do  not  disclose  the
commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4)   Where the allegations in  the  FIR  do  not  constitute  a  cognizable
offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence,  no  investigation  is
permitted  by  a  police  officer  without  an  order  of  a  Magistrate  as
contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the Code.

(5)   Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so  absurd  and
inherently improbable on the basis of  which  no  prudent  person  can  ever
reach a just conclusion that  there  is  sufficient  ground  for  proceeding
against the accused.

(6)   Where  there  is  an  express  legal  bar  engrafted  in  any  of  the
provisions of the  Code  or  the  Act  concerned  (under  which  a  criminal
proceeding  is  instituted)  to  the  institution  and  continuance  of  the
proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the  Code  or  the
Act concerned, providing  efficacious  redress  for  the  grievance  of  the
aggrieved party.

(7)   Where a criminal proceeding is  manifestly  attended  with  mala  fide
and/or where the proceeding  is  maliciously  instituted  with  an  ulterior
motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view  to  spite  him
due to private and personal grudge.”


            Principle Nos.6 and 7 are  clearly  applicable  in  the  present
case.

18.   Having regard to the circumstances narrated and  explained  above,  we
are also of the view that attempt is made by the  respondent  to  convert  a
case with civil nature into criminal prosecution.   In  a  case  like  this,
High Court  would  have  been  justified  in  quashing  the  proceedings  in
exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code.  It would  be
of benefit to refer to the judgment in the case  of  Indian  Oil  Corpn.  v.
NEPC India Ltd. and others, (2006) 6 SCC 736, wherein  the  Court  adversely
commented upon this very tendency of  filing  criminal  complaints  even  in
cases  relating  to  commercial  transaction  for  which  civil  remedy   is
available is available or  has  been  availed.   The  Court  held  that  the
following observations of the Court in this behalf are taken note of:

“13.  While on this issue, it is necessary  to  take  notice  of  a  growing
tendency in business circles to convert purely civil disputes into  criminal
cases.  This is obviously on account of a prevalent  impression  that  civil
law remedies are time consuming and do not adequately protect the  interests
of lenders/creditors.  Such a tendency is seen in  several  family  disputes
also, leading to irretrievable breakdown of  marriages/families.   There  is
also an impression that  if  a  person  could  somehow  be  entangled  in  a
criminal prosecution, there is a likelihood  of  imminent  settlement.   Any
effort to settle civil  disputes  and  claims,  which  do  not  involve  any
criminal offence, by applying pressure through criminal  prosecution  should
be deprecated and discouraged.  In G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P., (2000)  2
SCC 636, this Court observed: (SCC p. 643, para 8)

“It is to be seen if a matter, which is essentially of a civil  nature,  has
been given a cloak of criminal offence.   Criminal  proceedings  are  not  a
short cut of other remedies available in  law.   Before  issuing  process  a
criminal court has to exercise a great deal of caution.  For the accused  it
is a serious matter.  This Court has laid certain principles  on  the  basis
of which the High Court is to exercise its jurisdiction  under  Section  482
of the Code.  Jurisdiction  under  this  section  has  to  be  exercised  to
prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to  secure  the  ends
of justice.”

14.  While no one with a legitimate cause or grievance should  be  prevented
from  seeking  remedies  available  in  criminal  law,  a  complainant   who
initiates or persists  with  a  prosecution,  being  fully  aware  that  the
criminal proceedings are unwarranted and his remedy lies only in civil  law,
should himself  be  made  accountable,  at  the  end  of  such  misconceived
criminal proceedings, in accordance with law.  One positive  step  that  can
be taken by the courts, to curb unnecessary prosecutions and  harassment  of
innocent parties, is to exercise their power under  Section  250  CrPC  more
frequently, where they discern malice or frivolousness or  ulterior  motives
on the part of the complainant.  Be that as it may.”


19.   In Inder Mohan  Goswami  and  another  v.  State  of  Uttaranchal  and
others, (2007) 12 SCC 1, the Court reiterated the scope and ambit  of  power
of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code in the following words:

“23.  This Court in a number of cases has laid down the scope and  ambit  of
courts' powers under Section 482 CrPC.  Every High Court has inherent  power
to act ex debito justitiae to do  real  and  substantial  justice,  for  the
administration of which alone it exists, or to prevent abuse of the  process
of the court.  Inherent power under Section 482 CrPC can be exercised:

            (i)   to give effect to an order under the Code;
            (ii)  to prevent abuse of the process of court, and
            (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice.

24.  Inherent  powers  under  Section  482  CrPC  though  wide  have  to  be
exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution  and  only  when  such
exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down  in  this  section
itself.  Authority of the court exists for the advancement of  justice.   If
any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to  the  notice  of
the court, then the could would be  justified  in  preventing  injustice  by
invoking inherent powers in absence of specific provisions in the statute.

Discussion of decided cases

25.  Reference to the following cases would  reveal  that  the  courts  have
consistently taken the view that they must use this extraordinary  power  to
prevent injustice and secure the ends of justice.  The English  courts  have
also used inherent power to achieve the same  objective.   It  is  generally
agreed that the Crown Court has inherent power to protect its  process  from
abuse.  In Connelly v. DPP, 1 1964 AC 1254 Lord  Devlin  stated  that  where
particular criminal proceedings constitute an abuse of  process,  the  court
is empowered to refuse to allow the indictment to proceed  to  trial.   Lord
Salmon in DPP v.  Humphrys,  1977  AC  1  stressed  the  importance  of  the
inherent power when he observed that it is only if the  prosecution  amounts
to an abuse of the process of the court  and  is  oppressive  and  vexatious
that the judge has the power to intervene.  He further  mentioned  that  the
court's power to prevent such abuse is of  great  constitutional  importance
and should be jealously preserved.

46.  The court must ensure that criminal  prosecution  is  not  used  as  an
instrument of  harassment  or  for  seeking  private  vendetta  or  with  an
ulterior  motive  to  pressurise  the   accused.    On   analysis   of   the
aforementioned cases, we are of the opinion that it is neither possible  nor
desirable to lay down an inflexible rule that would govern the  exercise  of
inherent jurisdiction.  Inherent  jurisdiction  of  the  High  Courts  under
Section 482 CrPC though wide has to be exercised  sparingly,  carefully  and
with caution and only when it is justified by the  tests  specifically  laid
down in the statute itself and in the aforementioned cases.  In view of  the
settled legal position, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained.”

20.   As a result, these appeals are allowed.  Order of the  High  Court  is
set aside.  Consequently, cognizance taken by  the  learned  Magistrate  and
orders summoning the appellants as accused is  hereby  set  aside  resulting
into the dismissal of the said complaint. There shall however  be  no  order
as to costs.

                                   …......................................J.
                                                            (J. Chelameswar)


                                   …......................................J.
                                                                (A.K. Sikri)
New Delhi;
October 14, 2014.

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9693 OF 2014 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO.3969 OF 2011) K.R. SUNDRAM @ SUNDARARAJAN & ORS. ..... APPELLANTS VERSUS THE LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER & SPC. TAHIS ..... RESPONDENTS


                                                              NON-REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION



                   CIVIL APPEAL NO.  9688         OF 2014
                (ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO.22163 OF 2010)

                                    WITH

                  CIVIL APPEAL NOS.  9689-9690      OF 2014
            (ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NOS.25939-25940 OF 2010)

                                    WITH

                   CIVIL APPEAL NO.    9691       OF 2014
                (ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO.3568 OF 2011)

                                    WITH

                   CIVIL APPEAL NO.    9692        OF 2014
                (ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO.3570 OF 2011)

                                    WITH

                    CIVIL APPEAL NO.   9693       OF 2014
                (ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO.3969 OF 2011)



K.R. SUNDRAM @ SUNDARARAJAN & ORS.     ..... APPELLANTS

VERSUS

THE LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER
&    SPC.     TAHIS                                                    .....
RESPONDENTS



                               J U D G M E N T

ADARSH KUMAR GOEL J.


1.    Leave granted.
2.    These appeals have been preferred against common judgment  dated  21st
December, 2009 of the High Court of Judicature at Madras arising out of  the
proceedings for determination of compensation for the land acquired  by  the
Tamil  Nadu  Housing  Board,  Coimbatore  Housing  Unit  in   pursuance   of
Notification  dated  18th  August,  1983  under  Section  4  of   the   Land
Acquisition Act (for short “the Act”).  In the group of cases heard  by  the
High Court, in some of the cases Notifications under Section 4  of  the  Act
are dated 25th February, 1983, 7th March, 1983 and 7th September, 1983.
3.    The Collector, vide Award dated 25th November,  1988,  determined  the
compensation @ Rs.200/- per cent.  The Reference  Court  gave  six  separate
awards.  In four of the awards, compensation was determined @  6,000/-   per
cent.  In fifth award, the rate fixed was Rs.400/- per  cent  while  in  the
sixth award, the rate fixed was Rs.7,000/- per cent.  High Court  determined
market  value  to  be  Rs.2,000/-  per  cent,  apart  from  other  statutory
benefits.
4.    We have heard learned counsel for the parties.
5.    From the impugned judgment of the High Court, we  find  that  in  A.S.
No.780 of 2004,  the Reference Court relied upon  sale  instance  at  Serial
No.123 in Exhibit R 2 dated 30th September, 1981.  At  Serial  No.124   sale
of 50 cents of land was for Rs.1,21,212/-  @ Rs.6,06,060/- per  acre.    The
High Court pointed out that an error was committed in treating the value  to
be Rs.1,71,211/- instead of Rs.1,21,212/-.  On that ground, the  High  Court
left out the said sale instance from  consideration  and  by  excluding  the
said material, determined compensation @ Rs.2,000/- per cent.
6.    It is pointed out that the mere mistake was no ground to  exclude  the
sale instances from consideration and after correction of the  said  mistake
the  transaction  should  have  been  considered.   Since  undisputed  value
disclosed in the said instance was Rs.6,06,060/- per acre, the  compensation
should be held to be Rs.6,000/- per cent as determined in the  four  of  the
six awards of the Reference Court.
6.    It has also been pointed out that  the  acquired  land  was  of  prime
location and was easily accessible to facilities like railway  station,  bus
stand, market etc.  There were  lot  of  industries  and  other  educational
institutions in the  vicinity.   The  land  was  acquired  for  the  housing
colony.  These aspects ought to be given due consideration.
7.    We notice the following finding in the  impugned  order  of  the  High
Court :

“However, it has to be noted that having  regard  to  the  location  of  the
lands, which is easily accessible to various other facilities, like  railway
station, bus stand, market etc., it cannot be held that  there  is  a  total
lack of facilities  or  amenities  relating  to  the  land.   In  fact,  the
evidence let in before the Court below disclose that in the vicinity of  the
acquired  land  there  were  lot  of  industries   and   other   educational
institutions.”

8.     We  have  also  noticed  the  discussion  in  the  impugned  judgment
excluding the crucial evidence which has been relied upon on behalf  of  the
land owners, which is as follows :

“Mr. S. Parthasarathy, learned senior counsel appearing for  the  respondent
in A.S. No.780/2004, in his submissions, pointed out that  the  court  below
relied upon Serial No.123 in Ex. R.2.   Learned senior counsel  pointed  out
that the said sale was in respect of the land in S.No.59 and  the  sale  was
also on 30.09.1981 conveying 20 cents of lands for a sum  of  Rs.1,71,211/-.
Learned senior counsel therefore contended  that  when  in  a  part  of  the
acquired land viz., the land in S.No.59, there was  a  sale  more  than  one
year prior to the acquisition and with  reference  to  the  said  sale  when
there was no dispute, there was  every  justification  in  the  court  below
having adopted the value of the said sale for the  purpose  of  arriving  at
the market value to pay the compensation.  We examined Ex. R.2.  As  against
Serial No.123, we find that while the document number is  219/28,  the  sale
was on 28.01.1981 and  the  Survey  number  was  58.   The  sale  value  was
Rs.20,000/- and the value per acre was  Rs.8,000/-.   The  total  extent  of
land was 2 acres and 50 cents.    On further examination, we  find  that  in
Serial No.124, there was a  sale  of  land  in  S.No.226  on  30.09.1981  by
Document No.256.  That was a sale of  50  cents  of  land  for  a  value  of
Rs.1,21,212/-, which works out to Rs.6,06,060/- per acre.   In  fact,  there
appears to have been an obvious mistake committed by the court  below  while
referring to the details of the sale mentioned  in  Serial  No.123.   Though
Serial No.123 related to S. No.58, which is  part  of  the  acquired  lands,
which has been correctly noted by the court below, the court below seems  to
have recorded the sale mentioned in Serial No.124 and even  while  recording
the purchase value, the court below seem  to  have  committed  an  error  in
that, instead of mentioning Rs.1,21,212/-, it has  mentioned  Rs.1,71,211/-.
 We are therefore convinced that the reference to  Ex.R.2  and  the  details
mentioned in Serial No.123 were obvious mistakes and therefore  we  are  not
inclined to accept any  conclusion  reached  by  the  court  below  on  that
basis.”


9.    We are of the opinion that even if mistake pointed  out  by  the  High
Court that value of transaction at  Sr.  No.124  was  wrongly  mentioned  as
Rs.1,71,211/- instead of Rs.1,21,212/- which  worked  out  to  Rs.6,06,060/-
per acre was correct, the view taken by the Reference Court  in  determining
compensation @ Rs.6,000/- per cent did not call for any interference.
10.   Accordingly, we allow these appeals and enhance the  compensation  for
the acquired land to Rs.6,000/- per cent in addition to statutory benefits.
11.   The appeals are disposed of accordingly.


                                                          ……..…………………………….J.
                                                         [ V. GOPALA GOWDA ]


                                                         .….………………………………..J.
NEW DELHI                            [ ADARSH KUMAR GOEL ]
October 14, 2014