HINDU MINORITY AND GUARDIANSHIP ACT, 1956
S. 8(2) & (3) — Alienation by natural guardian without court’s permission — Nature of transaction — Whether void or voidable — Manner of repudiation — Whether filing of suit necessary
Held, under S. 8(2) a natural guardian has no authority to mortgage, sell, gift or otherwise transfer any part of the immovable property of a minor without the previous permission of the court.
Any disposal of a minor’s immovable property in contravention of sub-ss. (1) or (2) is voidable at the instance of the minor or any person claiming under him, and not void.
The statute does not require that such a voidable transaction be avoided only by instituting a suit.
A minor, on attaining majority, may repudiate the transaction either by instituting a suit or by his unequivocal conduct, such as by transferring the property himself within the prescribed period of limitation.
Such avoidance by conduct is permissible, as (i) the minor may be unaware of the transaction, or (ii) the transferee may not be in possession, leaving the property apparently intact in the minor’s hands.
Once a voidable transaction is avoided, it becomes void ab initio, and the avoidance relates back to the date of the transaction.
Referred to/Followed:
Abdul Rahman v. Sukhdayal Singh, 1905 SCC OnLine All 106;
G. Annamalai Pillai v. District Revenue Officer, Cuddalore, 1984 SCC OnLine Mad 185;
Chacko Mathew v. Ayyappan Kutty, 1961 SCC OnLine Ker 24;
Madhegowda v. Ankegowda, (2002) 1 SCC 178;
Vishwambhar v. Laxminarayan, (2001) 6 SCC 163;
Nangali Amma Bhavani Amma v. Gopalkrishnan Nair, (2004) 8 SCC 785;
Murugan v. Kesava Gounder, (2019) 20 SCC 633;
G. Annamalai Pillai v. District Revenue Officer, (1993) 2 SCC 402.
Principle reaffirmed: A transaction entered into by a guardian in contravention of S. 8(2) is voidable, and the minor, on attaining majority, may avoid or repudiate it either by suit or by conduct. Filing a suit is not mandatory.
LIMITATION ACT, 1963 — Art. 60 — Avoidance of transfer by guardian — Limitation
Where the minor, on attaining majority, executes a sale deed of the same property within the limitation period, that act constitutes valid repudiation of the earlier sale made by the guardian. Such conduct satisfies the requirement of avoidance under Art. 60, and the purchaser under the guardian’s sale acquires no valid title.
EVIDENCE ACT, 1872 — Ss. 101 & 114 — Proof of title — Plaintiff not entering witness box — Effect
The plaintiff, claiming title and seeking declaration and possession, must prove her own title.
Failure of the plaintiff to enter the witness box and to prove the sale deed or the title of her vendor is fatal.
A power-of-attorney holder cannot depose to facts within the principal’s personal knowledge.
(Followed: Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani v. IndusInd Bank Ltd., (2005) 2 SCC 217; Rajesh Kumar v. Anand Kumar, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 981.)
Where plaintiff neither proves her vendor’s title nor testifies personally, no right or title is established.
HELD
(i) It is not always necessary for a minor to institute a suit for cancellation of a voidable sale executed by his guardian; such transaction can be repudiated by conduct.
(ii) The minors herein, on attaining majority, executed a fresh sale deed of the property, thereby validly repudiating the earlier sale by their father without court’s permission.
(iii) The plaintiff failed to establish her title and did not depose personally.
Hence, no valid right or title stood transferred to her vendor, and the suit must fail.
Appeal allowed.
Judgments of the High Court (19-03-2013) and First Appellate Court (30-06-2005) set aside.
Trial Court decree restored.
No order as to costs.
2025 INSC 1195
1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 11342 OF 2013
K. S. SHIVAPPA …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
SMT. K. NEELAMMA …RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
PANKAJ MITHAL, J.
1. One Mahadevappa, son of Waderahalli Basappa of Village
Shamanur was the owner of sites measuring 42 ft. x 30 ft.
and 41 ½ ft. x 30 ft., which were carved out of Survey Nos.
113/2 and 114/1. These revenue sites were described as
plots Nos. 56 and 57 respectively. The aforesaid plots Nos. 56
and 57 were purchased by Rudrappa on 15.09.1971, in the
name of his three minor sons, namely, Maharudrappa,
2
Basavaraj and Mungeshappa. Thus, all the three minors
became the joint owners of the aforesaid two plots.
2. Rudrappa, the father and the natural guardian of the three
minors, transferred one of the two plots i.e. plot No. 56 in
favour of one S.I. Bidari by a registered sale deed without the
court’s permission. The said S.I. Bidari further transferred
the said plot i.e. plot No. 56 to one Smt. B.T. Jayadevamma
vide sale deed dated 31.01.1983. Subsequently, when the
two surviving minors (as one of them died) attained majority,
they along with their mother transferred the aforesaid plot in
favour of one K.S. Shivappa vide sale deed dated 03.11.1989.
Acting in furtherance of the above registered sale deed, K.S.
Shivappa started working on the said land due to which Smt.
B.T. Jayadevamma thought there was interference with her
rights on the said land.
3. As a result, Smt. B.T. Jayadevamma filed an Original Suit
No. 120/1997 in the Court of II Additional Civil Judge (Sr.
Div.), Davanagere for declaration, possession and permanent
injunction. The Trial Court decreed the suit in favour of B.T.
Jayadevamma holding that the minors on attaining majority
3
failed to file a suit to get the sale deed executed by their father
repudiated. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order,
K.S. Shivappa filed Regular First Appeal No. 1522/2003
before the High Court. The appeal was allowed, and the
judgment and order passed by the Trial Court was reversed,
holding that the sale deed of the said plot executed by the
father of the minors was voidable at the instance of the
minors and that the minors can repudiate the same within
the prescribed time, upon attaining majority either by filing
a suit or by unequivocal conduct, such as, by transferring
the property to a third party. Thus, the transfer of the
property by the minors, on attaining majority within the
period of limitation, amounted to repudiation of the contract
of sale of the property executed by their father without
seeking the permission of the District Judge.
4. In a similar fashion, as above, Rudrappa, the father and
natural guardian of the minors, transferred the second plot,
i.e. plot No. 57 through a registered sale deed dated
13.12.1971 in favour of one Krishnoji Rao without taking any
permission from the court. The said purchaser Krishnoji Rao
4
vide Sale Deed dated 17.02.1993 transferred the said plot in
favour of Smt. K. Neelamma. On the other hand, the
surviving minors on attaining majority, along with their
mother within the prescribed time sold the property, i.e., plot
No. 57 to K. S. Shivappa, the purchaser of the earlier plot No.
56. The said Shivappa clubbed both the properties, i.e. plot
Nos. 56 and 57 and built a house to live therein.
5. In the above background of the facts and circumstances,
Smt. K. Neelamma, the purchaser of plot No. 57 who
purchased it from Krishnoji Rao, as a plaintiff instituted O.S.
No. 76/1997 in the Court of Additional Civil Judge, (Jr. Div.),
Davanagere against K.S. Shivappa. The said suit was
dismissed on 14.02.2003 by the Trial Court holding that the
sale deed under which the predecessor-in-title of the plaintiff
had purchased the aforesaid plot from the father and natural
guardian of the minors was voidable as no permission of the
court was taken for its sale. The minors could repudiate the
same on attaining majority, which in fact, has been done by
them by executing the sale deed in favour of K.S. Shivappa.
5
Therefore, the plaintiff, Smt. K. Neelamma derives no legal
rights in the said plot.
6. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment, order and decree, the
plaintiff Smt. K. Neelamma preferred Regular Appeal No.
67/2003 before the Principal Civil Judge (Sr. Div.),
Davangere. The said appeal was allowed, and the judgment
and order of the Trial Court was reversed. It was held that
since the minors have not challenged the earlier sale deed
executed by their guardian, they could not have sold the plot
subsequently on attaining majority.
7. The Second Appeal preferred by K.S. Shivappa against the
aforesaid judgment and order was dismissed by the High
Court vide judgment and order dated 19.03.2013 on the
same reasoning that since no suit for cancellation of the
earlier sale deed was filed by the minors on attaining
majority, the sale deed executed by their natural guardian
had attained finality. Thus, the plaintiff Smt. K. Neelamma is
the valid title holder of the plot No. 57.
6
8. This is how, K.S. Shivappa, the purchaser of the two plot Nos.
56 and 57 has come up before this Court by way of this
appeal.
9. It may be pertinent to clarify herein itself that the dispute in
the present appeal is confined to plot No. 57 only. The dispute
regarding plot No. 56 stands conclusively settled by the
judgment and order of the High Court, which was never
challenged by either party before any higher forum. No
material is on record to indicate that any special leave
petition or appeal was filed against it.
10. Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties, the moot
question which falls for our consideration in this appeal is:
whether it is necessary for the minors to have filed a suit
upon attaining majority within the prescribed time period, to
set aside the earlier sale deed executed by their natural
guardian, with respect to plot no.57 or such a sale deed could
be repudiated through their conduct within three years of
attaining majority.
11. In order to answer the above question of law, it would be
beneficial to refer and quote the relevant provisions of Section
7
8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 19561. The
relevant provisions are sub-Section (2) and sub-Section (3) of
Section 8 of the Act, which are being reproduced hereinbelow:
“8. Powers of natural guardian.—(1) The natural
guardian of a Hindu minor has power, subject to
the provisions of this section, to do all acts which
are necessary or reasonable and proper for the
benefit of the minor or for the realisation, protection
or benefit of the minor's estate; but the guardian
can in no case bind the minor by a personal
covenant.
(2) The natural guardian shall not, without the
previous permission of the court,—
(a) mortgage or charge, or transfer by sale, gift,
exchange or otherwise, any part of the immovable
property of the minor, or
(b) lease any part of such property for a term
exceeding five years or for a term extending more
than one year beyond the date on which the minor
will attain majority.
(3) Any disposal of immovable property by a
natural guardian, in contravention of sub-section
(1) or sub-section (2), is voidable at the instance of
the minor or any person claiming under him.
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ”
1 Hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’
8
12. A simple reading of the aforesaid provisions makes it
abundantly clear that a natural guardian of a minor has no
authority in law to mortgage, sell, gift or otherwise transfer
any part of the immovable property of the minor or even to
lease out any part of such property for a term exceeding five
years or for a term extending more than one year beyond the
date on which the minor will attain majority without the prior
permission of the court. Therefore, prior permission of the
court is a sine qua non for a guardian of a minor to transfer
the property of the minor in any of the manners provided
under sub-Section (2) of Section 8 of the Act.
13. Sub-Section (3) of Section 8 of the Act in unequivocal terms
provides that the disposal of any immovable property by the
natural guardian in contravention of sub-Section (1) or subSection (2) is voidable at the instance of the minor or any
person claiming under him. In other words, if the natural
guardian or a minor disposes of the immovable property of a
minor in contravention of sub-Section (1) and sub-Section (2)
particularly without the permission of the court, such a
transaction would be voidable at the instance of the minor.
9
14. The aforesaid provision, however, nowhere categorically
provide the manner in which such a transaction of disposal
of the property of a minor by a guardian without the
permission of the court would be a voidable. Such a
transaction can be avoided or repudiated by the minor
expressly by filing a suit for the cancellation of such a
transaction or impliedly by his conduct namely by
transferring the property himself on attaining the majority
within the time prescribed. The avoidance of such a
transaction by conduct appears to be permissible for two
reasons. First, at times the minor may not be aware of such
a transaction and as such may not be in a position to
institute any suit; secondly, the transaction of such a nature,
if any, may not have been given effect to and the party
acquiring right in the property may not be having possession
of the property giving an impression that the property is
intact in the hands of the minor, in which case also the minor
on attaining majority may not deem it proper to institute a
suit.
10
15. ‘Travellyan’ in his well-known book on Minors 5th Edition, on
Page No.202 stated:
“A transaction which is voidable at the instance
of the minor may be repudiated by any act or
omission of the late minor, by which he intends to
communicate the repudiation, or which has the
effect of repudiating it, for instance, a transfer of
land by him avoids a transfer of the same land
made by his guardian before he attained the age
of majority. It is not necessary that he should
bring a suit.”
16. Mulla’s Hindu Law, 12th Edition, on Page No.276 observes as
under:
“An alienation made by a Hindu widow……….
without legal necessity and without the consent
of the next reversioners is ………. voidable at their
option. They may affirm it, or treat it as a nullity
without the intervention of a court, and they show
their election to do the latter by commencing an
action to recover possession of the property.”
17. Both the above texts indicate that the transfer which is
voidable, can be repudiated by the minor on attaining
majority by his action and not necessarily by the intervention
of the court.
11
18. In a century and quarter old case of Abdul Rahman vs.
Sukhdayal Singh,
2 a property of the minor was leased out
by the guardian but not for the benefit of the minor. The
minor sold the property on attaining majority. The court
observed that it is not necessary that a suit should be
instituted to set aside the lease which was executed by the
guardian of the minor and that the act of the minor of selling
the property on attaining majority is enough to repudiate the
lease deed.
19. In G. Annamalai Pillai vs The District Revenue Officer,
Cuddalore3, Madras a lease deed of minor’s land was
executed by his father in contravention of Section 8 (1) and
(2) of the Act. The transferee moved an application for
registering himself as a cultivating tenant on the basis of the
above lease. The minor on attaining majority resisted the
application on the ground that the lease is not valid and is in
violation of sub-Section (2) of Section 8 of the Act. It was held
that the lease having been avoided by the minor after
2 1905 SCC OnLine All 106
3 1984 SCC OnLine Mad 185
12
attaining the age of majority, there was no valid lease and as
such the transferee under the lease cannot claim the status
of a cultivating tenant.
20. The above decision is certainly not binding upon this Court,
nonetheless, it has some persuasive value. It in clear term
reveals that the minor on attaining majority can avoid a
transaction which is voidable under sub-Section (2) of
Section 8 by his conduct such as by resisting the application
of the transferee to register him as a cultivating tenant. It
means that it is not mandatory to file a suit for the
cancellation of the lease deed.
21. In another case reported in Chacko Mathew v. Ayyappan
Kutty4, it was held thus:
“It is not always necessary that a party entitled to
avoid a transaction not binding on him should sue
for its rescission. He can himself avoid it by an
unequivocal act repudiating it”.
The opinion so expressed throw enough light to support the
view that a transaction which is in violation or contravention
of sub-Section (2) of Section 8 of the Act can be avoided by
4 1961 SCC OnLine Ker 24
13
the minor not only by suing for the recession of such a
transaction but by otherwise also.
22. In view of the legal opinion expressed by Travellyan, Mulla
and the High Courts of Allahabad, Madras and Kerala, it is
amply clear that a transaction in relation to the property of a
minor executed in contravention of the express provisions of
Section 8 of the Act is voidable at the option of the minor or
any person claiming under him and such an option to avoid
a transaction of the above nature can be by initiating a law
suit or may be by conduct as enumerated above.
23. In Madhegowda vs Ankegowda5, this Court in paragraph
25 held as under:
“25. …The minor, on attaining majority, can
repudiate the transfer in any manner as and when
occasion for it arises. After attaining majority if
he/she transfers his/her interest in the property in
a lawful manner asserting his/her title to the same
that is sufficient to show that the minor has
repudiated the transfer made by the “de facto
guardian/manager”.”
5 (2002) 1 SCC 178
14
24. In Vishwambhar and Ors. vs Laxminarayan (Dead)
through Lrs. and Anr.6 a Division Bench in a matter where
the minor filed a suit for possession contending that the sale
deeds executed by their guardian (mother) were inoperative
and not binding upon them as the same were affected
without the permission of the court in contravention of
Section 8 (2) of the Act, and wherein the relief for setting aside
the sale deeds was added after the period of limitation had
expired, the Court held that though the sale deeds were
executed without legal necessity and in contravention of
Section 8 (2), but the suit was rightly dismissed as the relief
for cancellation of the sale deeds could not have been added
after the expiry of the limitation.
25. The aforesaid decision is not one which lays down that the
filing of a suit by the minor on attaining majority for the
cancellation of the sale deeds executed by the guardian is
mandatory. It only lays down that the relief of cancellation of
sale deeds, if added after expiry of limitation period, cannot
be granted. The said decision, therefore, has no application
6 (2001) 6 SCC 163
15
to the facts and circumstances of the case at hand to answer
the question whether a voidable transaction can be
repudiated by the minor only by filing a civil suit or otherwise
by his conduct also.
26. Another Division Bench of this Court in Nangali Amma
Bhavani Amma vs Gopalkrishnan Nair and Ors.7 while
holding that a transaction entered into by the guardian of a
minor in violation of Section 8 (2) is voidable at the instance
of the minor and is not void and that the minor can avoid the
same on attaining majority. The Division Bench relying upon
Vishwambhar (Supra) observed that a suit must be filed by
minor in order to avoid transaction within period prescribed
under Article 60 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The aforesaid
decision also nowhere rules that there are no other
alternative modes to avoid the transaction which is in
contravention of Section 8 (2) of the Act and that the filing of
the suit alone is the remedy thereof.
7 (2004) 8 SCC 785
16
27. The decision of this Court in Murugan & Ors. vs Kesava
Gounder (Dead) through legal representatives & Ors.8,
though in the facts and circumstances of the said case, states
that alienations which are voidable at the instance of minor
are required to be set aside before relief of possession can be
claimed by such minor but even then the said decision is of
no help to answer the question before us in this appeal.
28. The aforesaid decision is only an authority to the effect that
relief of possession cannot be claimed by the minor without
getting the sale deeds, which are voidable, set aside.
However, the aforesaid decision also falls quite short of laying
down that the suit for setting aside the voidable sale deeds is
mandatory to repudiate a transaction entered into by the
guardian on behalf of the minor in contravention of Section
8 (2) of the Act.
29. Apart from the above decisions of the Apex Court, there is
another important decision of this Court in G. Annamalai
Pillai vs District Revenue Officer and Ors.
9 In the said
8 (2019) 20 SCC 633
9 (1993) 2 SCC 402
17
case, the guardian of a minor who was the owner of the
property, had executed the lease deed of the property of the
minor in contravention of Section 8 of the Act. The lease was
avoided by the minor on attaining majority. The Court held
that the effect of such avoidance would be that though the
lease was voidable but once it is avoided it becomes void from
its very inception and no statutory rights accrue in favour of
the lessee. It was held that the avoidance relates back to the
date of the transaction. The Court quoted Salmond on
Jurisprudence, 12th edition, page no.341 as under:
“… A valid agreement is one which is fully
operative in accordance with the intent of the
parties. A void agreement is one which entirely
fails to receive legal recognition or sanction, the
declared will of the parties being wholly destitute
of legal efficacy. A voidable agreement stands
midway between these two cases. It is not a
nullity, but its operation is conditional and not
absolute. By reason of some defect in its origin it is
liable to be destroyed or cancelled at the option of
one of the parties to it. On the exercise of this power
the agreement not only ceases to have any efficacy
but is deemed to have been void ab initio. The
avoidance of it relates back to the making of it. The
hypothetical or contingent efficacy which has
hitherto been attributed to it wholly disappears, as
if it had never existed. In other words, a voidable
18
agreement is one which is void or valid at the
election of one of the parties to it.”
30. The Court in the aforesaid decision went further ahead to
state that the Privy Council in Satgur Prasad vs Mahant
Har Narain Das10 and in S. N. R. Sundara Rao & Sons,
Madurai vs Commissioner of Income-Tax, Madras11, held
that when a person dissents from the alienation, his dissent
is in relation to the whole transaction and not merely to the
possession. In the result, the effect is to get rid of the
transaction as if the transaction had never taken place.
31. In the light of the above observations, this Court in
G. Annamalai Pillai (supra) went on to record that when
the respondent avoided the lease deed executed by his father,
the lease became void from its inception and no statutory
rights could therefore accrue in favour of the other party.
32. In view of the above discussion, it can safely be concluded
that a voidable transaction executed by the guardian of the
minor can be repudiated and ignored by the minor within
10 1932 SCC OnLine PC 2
11 1956 SCC OnLine Mad 300
19
time on attaining majority either by instituting a suit for
setting aside the voidable transaction or by repudiating the
same by his unequivocal conduct.
33. In the case at hand, undisputedly the surviving minors on
attainment of majority had repudiated the transaction of sale
executed by their father by entering into a fresh contract of
sale of the property in question. It is admitted on record that
on the basis of the sale deed executed by the father of the
minors, the purchaser or the subsequent purchasers have
not entered into possession and the name of the minors
continued to appear in the revenue records. There is no
material on record that the minors had the knowledge of the
execution of the sale deed by their father. In the facts and
circumstances, if they have avoided the sale executed by their
father on attaining majority, it is sufficient repudiation of the
said sale and it was not necessary for them to have instituted
the suit for the cancellation of such a sale rather the
purchasers of the property of the minors through the
guardian on acquiring knowledge of the sale executed by the
minors on attaining majority ought to have instituted a suit
20
either for the cancellation of the sale deed executed by the
minors or for declaration of their right, title and interest in
the property.
34. The above discussion leads us conclusively to hold that it is
not always necessary for a minor to institute a suit for
cancellation of a voidable sale transaction executed by his
guardian on attaining majority within the limitation provided
and that such a transaction can be avoided or repudiated by
his conduct. The question stands answered accordingly.
35. There is one another issue which goes in favour of K.S.
Shivappa.
36. The plaintiff, Smt. K. Neelamma in instituting the original
suit in the plaint simply pleaded that she had purchased the
property vide registered sale deed dated 17.12.1993 for a
valuable consideration from Krishnoji Rao. She has nowhere
stated or pleaded that she had verified the title of the vendor
or that the vendor, Krishnoji Rao, was having a valid title over
the property so as to transfer it in her favour.
37. She further pleaded that the cause of action for the suit arose
on 27.01.1997 when she noted certain waste products on the
21
suit land and requested the defendant, K.S. Shivappa to
remove them, who refused to clear the same denying the title
of the plaintiff.
38. The aforesaid plaintiff, Smt. K. Neelamma had not entered
the witness box to prove her plaint case or to assert her title
over the suit property. She had not even proved the sale deed
dated 17.12.1993 under which she has allegedly purchased
the suit land from Krishnoji Rao or to state that Krishnoji Rao
was having a valid title over the said land to transfer her. In
fact, she could not even upon entering the witness box could
have proved the valid title of Krishnoji Rao in the absence of
any plaint allegations to the above effect. It is settled that the
evidence either ocular or documentary cannot travel beyond
the pleadings.
39. The power-of-attorney holder of the plaintiff, Smt. K.
Neelamma namely Shivaji Rao Salanki, PW-1 was not
competent to depose or to prove anything which was not
within his personal knowledge or was otherwise personally
known to the plaintiff, Smt. K. Neelamma. The testimony of
such a witness i.e. a power-of-attorney holder is inadmissible
22
with regard to the facts within the personal knowledge of the
plaintiff who has failed to enter the witness box. This is
settled by this Court in Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani vs.
IndusInd Bank Ltd.12 In the recent case of Rajesh Kumar
vs Anand Kumar and Ors.,
13 a Division Bench of this Court
in which one of us (P. Mithal, J. was a member) reaffirmed
the principle that where the plaintiff refuses to testify, the
proxies cannot substitute his personal testimony on key
issues within the personal knowledge of the plaintiff. A
Power-of-Attorney holder is thus, not entitled to depose in
place of the principal.
40. In the overall facts and circumstances of the case, firstly for
the reason that the plaintiff failed to enter the witness box so
as to testify and prove her plaint case; and secondly for the
reason that the sale deed executed by the father of the minors
was repudiated by the minors within time on attaining
majority, no valid right or title stood transferred to Krishnoji
12 (2005) 2 SCC 217
13 2024 SCC OnLine SC 981
23
Rao from whom Smt. K. Neelamma had allegedly purchased
the suit land. Therefore, the suit as instituted has to fail.
41. Accordingly, the judgment and order of the High Court dated
19.03.2013 and that of the First Appellate Court dated
30.06.2005 are set aside and that of the Trial Court is
restored so as to decree the suit.
42. The appeal is allowed accordingly with no order as to costs.
.............……………………………….. J.
(PANKAJ MITHAL)
.............……………………………….. J.
(PRASANNA B. VARALE)
NEW DELHI;
OCTOBER 07, 2025.
