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Constitutional Law — Article 370 — Scope and Continuance — Reference to larger Bench — When warranted. A coordinate Bench may refer a question to a larger Bench where there is an irreconcilable conflict in the ratios of earlier decisions of this Court, or where a proposition of law has become unworkable or is contrary to a well-established principle. The doctrine of stare decisis and precedent compels restraint; references to larger Benches should not be made for minor or contextual inconsistencies. (Paras 17–24, 27) Precedent — Binding force of coordinate Bench rulings — Distinction between ratio decidendi and obiter. Decisions of a coordinate Bench are binding on subsequent Benches of equal or lesser strength unless the subsequent Bench concludes that the prior decision is per incuriam or expresses doubt warranting a reference. Only the ratio decidendi (the principle necessary to the decision) is binding; obiter dicta do not bind. (Paras 23–26) Doctrine of per incuriam — Scope and application. The rule of per incuriam is an exception that denudes a prior decision of its precedential value where a judgment was rendered in ignorance of a relevant statutory provision or binding authority, or where the later decision is irreconcilable with an earlier binding decision. The rule applies strictly and only to ratio decidendi; it is to be invoked sparingly because of the importance of legal certainty. A failure to mention or discuss an earlier decision does not, by itself, render a judgment per incuriam unless the omission produces an irreconcilable conflict in ratio. (Paras 28–33, 46) Article 370 — Historical context and interpretation — Constituent Assembly role. Article 370 was enacted as a temporary/transitory provision to govern the special relationship between Jammu & Kashmir and the Union pending the decision of the State Constituent Assembly. The Constituent Assembly’s decisions under Article 370(2) carried finality with respect to antecedent State government actions placed before it. However, whether Article 370 would cease to operate on dissolution of the Constituent Assembly depends upon the text and context of Article 370 and the subsequent practice and orders made thereunder. (Paras 34–36, 42–44) Case law examined — Prem Nath Kaul v. State of Jammu & Kashmir; Sampat Prakash v. State of Jammu & Kashmir; Mohd. Maqbool Damnoo. Prem Nath Kaul: observations emphasised the importance of the Constituent Assembly and made remarks reflecting Article 370’s transitory character in context of the yuvaraj’s legislative competence. Sampat Prakash: held Article 370 continued to operate after dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and validated continuation of Constitution Orders issued under Article 370; the Constituent Assembly had not recommended cessation of Article 370. The Court held that when read in context there is no irreconcilable conflict between the two Constitution-Bench decisions. (Paras 38–46) Reference refused — Application to petitions challenging Constitution Orders C.O. 272/2019 & C.O. 273/2019. On the preliminary question whether the present petitions raising constitutional challenges to Constitution Orders issued under Article 370 should be referred to a larger Bench because of alleged conflicting precedents, the Court held there was no such conflict in ratio requiring reference. The Court further held Sampat Prakash is not per incuriam. Consequently, the prayer for a reference to a larger Bench was rejected. (Paras 41–47) Principles on overruling and judicial restraint. Overruling established precedent is an exceptional exercise; courts should exercise restraint and only in cases where the earlier decision is manifestly wrong, unworkable, or contrary to established principles or when societal/constitutional/economic changes compel evolution of law. References or overruling should not be done lightly because of the public-interest value of certainty and reliance. (Paras 17–22)

Constitutional Law — Article 370 — Scope and Continuance — Reference to larger Bench — When warranted.

A coordinate Bench may refer a question to a larger Bench where there is an irreconcilable conflict in the ratios of earlier decisions of this Court, or where a proposition of law has become unworkable or is contrary to a well-established principle. The doctrine of stare decisis and precedent compels restraint; references to larger Benches should not be made for minor or contextual inconsistencies. (Paras 17–24, 27)

Precedent — Binding force of coordinate Bench rulings — Distinction between ratio decidendi and obiter.

Decisions of a coordinate Bench are binding on subsequent Benches of equal or lesser strength unless the subsequent Bench concludes that the prior decision is per incuriam or expresses doubt warranting a reference. Only the ratio decidendi (the principle necessary to the decision) is binding; obiter dicta do not bind. (Paras 23–26)

Doctrine of per incuriam — Scope and application.

The rule of per incuriam is an exception that denudes a prior decision of its precedential value where a judgment was rendered in ignorance of a relevant statutory provision or binding authority, or where the later decision is irreconcilable with an earlier binding decision. The rule applies strictly and only to ratio decidendi; it is to be invoked sparingly because of the importance of legal certainty. A failure to mention or discuss an earlier decision does not, by itself, render a judgment per incuriam unless the omission produces an irreconcilable conflict in ratio. (Paras 28–33, 46)

Article 370 — Historical context and interpretation — Constituent Assembly role.

Article 370 was enacted as a temporary/transitory provision to govern the special relationship between Jammu & Kashmir and the Union pending the decision of the State Constituent Assembly. The Constituent Assembly’s decisions under Article 370(2) carried finality with respect to antecedent State government actions placed before it. However, whether Article 370 would cease to operate on dissolution of the Constituent Assembly depends upon the text and context of Article 370 and the subsequent practice and orders made thereunder. (Paras 34–36, 42–44)

Case law examined — Prem Nath Kaul v. State of Jammu & Kashmir; Sampat Prakash v. State of Jammu & Kashmir; Mohd. Maqbool Damnoo.

Prem Nath Kaul: observations emphasised the importance of the Constituent Assembly and made remarks reflecting Article 370’s transitory character in context of the yuvaraj’s legislative competence. Sampat Prakash: held Article 370 continued to operate after dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and validated continuation of Constitution Orders issued under Article 370; the Constituent Assembly had not recommended cessation of Article 370. The Court held that when read in context there is no irreconcilable conflict between the two Constitution-Bench decisions. (Paras 38–46)

Reference refused — Application to petitions challenging Constitution Orders C.O. 272/2019 & C.O. 273/2019.

On the preliminary question whether the present petitions raising constitutional challenges to Constitution Orders issued under Article 370 should be referred to a larger Bench because of alleged conflicting precedents, the Court held there was no such conflict in ratio requiring reference. The Court further held Sampat Prakash is not per incuriam. Consequently, the prayer for a reference to a larger Bench was rejected. (Paras 41–47)

Principles on overruling and judicial restraint.

Overruling established precedent is an exceptional exercise; courts should exercise restraint and only in cases where the earlier decision is manifestly wrong, unworkable, or contrary to established principles or when societal/constitutional/economic changes compel evolution of law. References or overruling should not be done lightly because of the public-interest value of certainty and reliance. (Paras 17–22)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

    WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1099 OF 2019

DR. SHAH FAESAL AND ORS.            …PETITIONER(S)

VERSUS

UNION OF INDIA AND ANR.     …RESPONDENT(S)

And

    WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1013 OF 2019

    WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 722 OF 2014

    WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 871 OF 2015

    WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 396 OF 2017

    SLP (CIVIL) NO. 19618 OF 2017

    WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 756 OF 2017

    WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 398 OF 2018

    WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 924 OF 2018

    WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1092 OF 2018

    WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1162 OF 2018

    WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1082 OF 2019

    WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1048 OF 2019

    WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1068 OF 2019

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REPORTABLE

    WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1037 OF 2019

    WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1062 OF 2019

    WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1070 OF 2019

    WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1104 OF 2019

    WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1165 OF 2019

    WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1210 OF 2019

    WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1222 OF 2019

    WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1268 OF 2019

    WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1368 OF 2019

    O R D E R

1. These cases pertain to the constitutional challenge before

this Court as regards to two Constitution Orders issued by the

President of India in exercise of his powers under Article 370 of

the Constitution of India. 

2. At the outset, learned senior counsel appearing for one of

the Petitioners in W.P. (C) No. 1013/19 and Petitioner in W.P.

(C)   1368/19   raised   the   contention   that   the   present   matter

needs to be referred to a larger Bench as there were contrary

opinions   by   two   different   Constitution   Benches   on   the

interpretation of Article 370 of the Constitution. This order is

confined to the limited preliminary issue of whether the matter

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should be referred to a larger Bench. We have not  considered

any issue on the merits of the dispute.

3. A brief introduction to the issue to set the context for this

order is that after the late Maharaja of Kashmir had entered

into a treaty of accession with the Indian State, Article 370 was

incorporated   into   the   Indian   Constitution,   which   states   as

follows:

370. Temporary provisions with respect 

to the State of Jammu and Kashmir

(1) Notwithstanding   anything   in   this

Constitution,—

(a)   the   provisions   of   article   238   shall   not

apply in relation to the State of Jammu and

Kashmir; 

(b) the power of Parliament to make laws for

the said State shall be limited to—

(i)   those   matters   in   the Union   List and

the Concurrent   List which,   in   consultation

with   the Government   of   the   State,   are

declared   by   the President to   correspond   to

matters   specified   in   the Instrument   of

Accession governing   the   accession   of   the

State   to   the Dominion   of   India as   the

matters with respect to which the Dominion

Legislature may make laws for that State;

and

(ii) such other matters in the said Lists as,

with the concurrence of the Government of

the   State,   the   President   may   by   order

specify.

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Explanation [1950   wording]:   For   the

purposes of this article, the Government of

the   State   means   the   person   for   the   time

being   recognised   by   the   President   as   the

Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir acting on

the advice of the Council of Ministers for the

time   being   in   office   under   the   Maharaja's

Proclamation dated the fifth day of March,

1948;

Explanation [1952   wording]:   For   the

purposes of this article, the Government of

the   State   means   the   person   for   the   time

being   recognized   by   the   President   on   the

recommendation of the Legislative Assembly

of   the   State   as   the Sadar­i­Riyasat (now

Governor) of Jammu and Kashmir, acting on

the advice of the Council of Ministers of the

State for the time being in office. 

(c) The provisions of article 1 and of this

article shall apply in relation to that State;

(d)   Such   of   the   other   provisions   of   this

Constitution shall apply in relation to that

State   subject   to   such   exceptions   and

modifications as the President may by order

specify:

Provided that no such order which relates to

the matters specified in the Instrument of

Accession   of   the   State   referred   to   in

paragraph   (i)   of   sub­clause   (b)   shall   be

issued   except   in   consultation   with   the

Government of the State:

Provided further that no such order which

relates to matters other than those referred

to   in   the   last   preceding   proviso   shall   be

issued except with the concurrence of that

Government.

(2) If the concurrence of the Government of

the State referred to in paragraph (ii) of subclause   (b)   of   clause   (1)   or   in   the   second

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provision to sub­clause (d) of that clause be

given   before   the   Constituent   Assembly   for

the purpose of framing the Constitution of

the   State   is   convened,   it   shall   be   placed

before such Assembly for such decision as it

may take thereon.

(3) Notwithstanding   anything   in   the

foregoing   provisions   of   this   article,   the

President   may,   by   public   notification,

declare   that   this   article   shall   cease   to   be

operative   or   shall   be   operative   only  with

such exceptions and modifications and from

such   date   as   he   may   specify:

Provided   that   the   recommendation   of   the

Constituent Assembly of the State referred to

in clause (2) shall be necessary before the

President issues such a notification. 

Since India’s independence, this Article has remained in the

Constitution and has been invoked as and when required. 

4. On 20.12.2018, President’s Rule was imposed in exercise

of powers under Article 356 of the Constitution of India in the

State   of   Jammu   and   Kashmir,   which   was   subsequently

extended on 03.7.2019. 

5. On August 5, 2019, two Constitution Orders were issued

by the President in exercise of his power under Article 370,

being C.O. Nos. 272 and 273, which are extracted below:

C.O. 272 of 2019

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MINISTRY OF LAW AND JUSTICE

(Legislative Department) NOTIFICATION

New Delhi, the 5th August, 2019

G.S.R .551(E).— the following Order made

by   the   President   is   published   for   general

information:­ 

THE CONSTITUTION (APPLICATION TO

JAMMU AND KASHMIR) ORDER, 2019

C.O. 272

In exercise of the powers conferred by clause

(1)   of   article   370   of   the   Constitution,   the

President,   with   the   concurrence   of   the

Government   of   State   of   Jammu   and

Kashmir, is pleased to make the following

Order:—

1.   (1)   This   Order   may   be   called   the

Constitution   (Application   to   Jammu   and

Kashmir) Order, 2019. 

(2) It shall come into force at once, and shall

thereupon   supersede   the   Constitution

(Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order,

1954 as amended from time to time. 

2. All the provisions of the Constitution, as

amended from time to time, shall apply in

relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir

and   the   exceptions   and   modifications

subject to which they shall so apply shall be

as follows:—

To   article   367,   there   shall   be   added   the

following clause, namely:— 

“(4) For the purposes of this Constitution as

it applies in relation to the State of Jammu

and Kashmir— 

(a) references to this Constitution or to

the provisions thereof shall be construed as

references   to   the   Constitution   or   the

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provisions thereof as applied in relation to

the said State;

  (b)   references   to   the   person   for   the

time being recognized by the President on

the   recommendation   of   the   Legislative

Assembly of the State as the Sadar­i­Riyasat

of Jammu and Kashmir, acting on the advice

of the Council of Ministers of the State for

the time being in office, shall be construed

as references to the Governor of Jammu and

Kashmir; 

(c) references to the Government of the

said State shall be construed as including

references to the Governor of Jammu and

Kashmir acting on the advice of his Council

of Ministers; 

and 

(d) in proviso to clause (3) of article 370

of   this   Constitution,   the   expression

“Constituent Assembly of the State referred

to   in   clause   (2)”   shall   read   “Legislative

Assembly of the State”.” 

C.O. 273 of 2019

MINISTRY OF LAW AND JUSTICE

(Legislative Department) NOTIFICATION 

New Delhi, the 6th August, 2019

G.S.R.   562(E).—   The   following   Declaration

made by the President is notified for general

information:— 

DECLARATION UNDER ARTICLE 370(3) OF 

THE CONSTITUTION 

C.O. 273

In exercise of the powers conferred by clause

(3)   of   article   370   read   with   clause   (1)   of

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article 370 of the Constitution of India, the

President,   on   the   recommendation   of

Parliament,   is   pleased   to   declare   that,   as

from the 6th August, 2019, all clauses of the

said article 370 shall cease to be operative

except   the   following   which   shall   read   as

under, namely:— 

"370. All provisions of this Constitution, as

amended   from   time   to   time,   without   any

modifications or exceptions, shall apply to

the   State   of   Jammu   and   Kashmir

notwithstanding   anything   contrary

contained in article 152 or article 308 or any

other article of this Constitution or any other

provision of the Constitution of Jammu and

Kashmir or any law, document, judgment,

ordinance,   order,   by­law,   rule,   regulation,

notification,   custom   or   usage   having   the

force of law in the territory of India, or any

other   instrument,   treaty   or   agreement   as

envisaged under article 363 or otherwise." 

6. These   Constitution   Orders   made   the   Constitution   of   India

applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir in its entirety,

like other States in India. 

7. Challenging the constitutionality of the aforesaid orders, Mr.

Raju Ramachandran, learned senior counsel, has argued on

the validity of the same. However, as mentioned above, Mr.

Dinesh Dwivedi and Mr. Sanjay Parikh, learned senior counsel,

sought a reference to a larger Bench. Therefore, this Court is

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required   to   hear   the   issue   of   reference   as   a   preliminary

question. 

Contentions

8. Learned   senior   advocate   Mr.   Dinesh   Dwivedi,   after   placing

reliance   upon   the   Constituent   Assembly   debates   and

interpreting the language of Article 370, submitted that Article

370 was a transitory provision, which provided for an interim

arrangement between the State of Jammu and Kashmir and

the Union of India. It was the Constituent Assembly of Jammu

and   Kashmir   which   took   a   final   decision   on   the   form   of

Government the State of Jammu and Kashmir should adopt.

The counsel argued that this Court, in the case of Prem Nath

Kaul  v.  State  of  Jammu  and  Kashmir,  AIR 1959 SC 749,

after considering the various issues, held that Article 370 was

temporary in nature, but the subsequent judgment of Sampat

Prakash   v.   State   of   Jammu   and   Kashmir, AIR 1970 SC

1118 reversed the aforesaid position, recognizing Article 370 as

a permanent provision giving perennial power to the President

to regulate the relationship between the Union and the State.

Learned   senior   counsel   contended   that   this   conflict   needs

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reconsideration by a larger Bench.

9. Learned   senior   advocate   Mr.   Sanjay   Parikh   submitted   that

after the framing of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir,

the first judgment rendered by this Court was by a Bench of

five­judges in Prem Nath Kaul (supra). This Court, after widely

discussing the historical background and objective behind the

introduction   of   Article   370,   held   that   the   constitutional

relationship between the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the

Union of India should be finally decided by the Constituent

Assembly   of   the   State   and,   therefore,   the   same   has   to   be

treated as a temporary provision.

10. The   learned   senior   counsel   further   submitted   that,   the

subsequent   cases   of  Sampat   Prakash  (supra)  and  Mohd.

Maqbool Damnoo v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, (1972) 1

SCC 536, have not considered the earlier judgment of  Prem

Nath  Kaul  (supra).  On the contrary, this Court in  Sampat

Prakash  (supra) held that neither the Constituent Assembly

nor the President ever made any declaration that Article 370

has   ceased   to   be   operative.   Moreover,   this   Court   in   the

aforesaid case further held that in the light of the proviso to

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Article   368,   the   President   under   Article   370   is   required   to

exercise his powers from time to time in order to bring into

effect constitutional amendments in the State of Jammu and

Kashmir,   under   Article   368.   Therefore,   by   virtue   of   the

aforesaid mechanism, it cannot be said that Article 370 was

temporary.

11. Furthermore, in the case of Mohd. Maqbool Damnoo (supra),

this   Court,   while   interpreting   Article   370,   ignored   the

interpretation   rendered   in  Prem   Nath   Kaul  (supra).  The

aforesaid case also did not decide as to whether Article 370 can

continue after the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir was

enacted.   The   learned   senior   counsel   finally   submitted   that

concurrence under Article 370(1)(d) was subject to ratification

by   the   Constituent   Assembly   and   therefore,   upon   the

dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, this power cannot be

exercised.

12. Learned   senior   advocate,   Mr.   Zafar   Shah,   representing   the

Jammu   and   Kashmir   High   Court   Bar   Association   on   the

necessity of reference submitted that while there is no direct

conflict between the aforesaid two five­judge Bench decisions of

Prem   Nath   Kaul  (supra)  and  Sampat   Prakash (supra)

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however if it is held that Prem Nath Kaul (supra) declared that

Article 370 as temporary, then there exists a conflict with the

subsequent holding of Sampat Prakash (supra).

13. The learned Attorney General submitted that the challenge on

the ground of an inconsistency between the decisions in Prem

Nath   Kaul  (supra) and  Sampat   Prakash  (supra) is   not

sustainable. The judgments must be read in their context. The

earlier   decision   of  Prem   Nath   Kaul  (supra)  was   regarding

legislative capacity of the Yuvaraj and the Court never intended

on deciding upon the nature of Article 370. However, this Court

for the first time in the case of Sampat Prakash (supra) dealt

with the issue of continuance of powers under Article 370 after

the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly of the State. In

order   to   substantiate   his   contentions,   he   relied   upon   the

subsequent   decision   of  State   Bank   of   India   v.   Santosh

Gupta,  (2017) 2 SCC 538 wherein this Court, after placing

reliance   upon   the   earlier   decisions,   concluded   that   the

Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir is subordinate to that of

the Constitution of India.

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14. The   learned   Solicitor   General   supported   the   arguments

rendered by the learned Attorney General and submitted that a

co­ordinate Bench cannot refer the matter to a larger Bench on

minor inconsistencies. Rather, the decisions rendered by an

earlier   co­ordinate   Bench   are   always   binding   on   the

subsequent   Benches   of   equal   strength.   However,   if   the

subsequent Bench expresses doubt on the correctness of the

earlier decision rendered by a Bench of equal strength, the

same has to be referred to a larger Bench.

15. Learned senior advocate, Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, appearing for the

Petitioner in W.P. (C) No. 1165 of 2019, while opposing the

reference, submitted that it is not legally tenable to argue that

Sampat   Prakash  (supra)  is  per   incuriam  as   it   has   not

considered the earlier decision of Prem Nath Kaul  (supra) as

the decisions should be studied in their context and hence

have limited application. Moreover, the present case deals with

various other issues which have not been considered by the

previous Bench. The submissions made by Dr. Rajeev Dhavan,

learned   senior   counsel   were   supported   by   learned   senior

advocates   C.U.   Singh,   Shekhar   Naphade   and   Gopal

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Sankaranarayanan, who submitted that the alleged conflict in

the aforesaid judgments do not mandate reference.

16. Based on the submissions of the learned senior counsel, the

following questions of law which can be formulated herein are

as follows.

i. When can a matter be referred to a larger Bench?

ii. Whether there is a requirement to refer the present

matter   to   a   larger   Bench   in   view   of   the   alleged

contradictory   views   of   this   Court   in  Prem   Nath

Kaul  case(supra)   and  Sampat   Prakash  case

(supra)?

iii. Whether  Sampat   Prakash  case   (supra)   is  per

incuriam  for   not   taking   into   consideration   the

decision   of   the   Court   in  Prem   Nath   Kaul  case

(supra)?

17. This Court’s jurisprudence has shown that usually the Courts

do not overrule the established precedents unless there is a

social, constitutional or economic change mandating such a

development. The numbers themselves speak of restraint and

the value this Court attaches to the doctrine of precedent. This

Court regards the use of precedent as indispensable bedrock

upon   which   this   Court   renders   justice.   The   use   of   such

precedents,   to   some   extent,   creates   certainty   upon   which

individuals can rely and conduct their affairs. It also creates a

basis  for the  development  of  the  rule  of  law.  As  the  Chief

Justice   of   the   Supreme   Court   of   the   United   States,   John

14

Roberts observed during his Senate confirmation hearing, “It is

a   jolt   to   the   legal   system   when   you   overrule   a   precedent.

Precedent plays an important role in promoting stability and

even­handedness.”

1

18. Doctrine of precedents and stare decisis are the core values of

our legal system. They form the tools which further the goal of

certainty,   stability   and   continuity   in   our   legal   system.

Arguably, judges owe a duty to the concept of certainty of law,

therefore they often justify their holdings by relying upon the

established tenets of law.

19. When   a   decision   is   rendered   by   this   Court,   it   acquires   a

reliance interest and the society organizes itself based on the

present   legal   order.   When   substantial   judicial   time   and

resources are spent on references, the same should not be

made   in   a   casual   or   cavalier   manner.   It   is   only   when   a

proposition is contradicted by a subsequent judgment by a

Bench of same strength, or it is shown that the proposition laid

down has become unworkable or contrary to a well­established

principle, that a reference will be made to a larger Bench. In

this   context,  a   five­Judge  Bench   of  this   Court  in Chandra

1 Congressional Record—Senate, Vol. 156, Pt. 7, 10018 (June 7, 2010)

15

Prakash v. State of U.P., (2002) 4 SCC 234, after considering

series of earlier ruling reiterated that: 

“22. … The doctrine of binding precedent is

of utmost importance in the administration

of   our   judicial   system.  It   promotes

certainty   and   consistency   in   judicial

decisions.  Judicial  consistency  promotes

confidence in the system, therefore, there

is   this   need   for   consistency   in   the

enunciation   of   legal   principles   in   the

decisions of this Court.”

(emphasis supplied)

20. At the extreme end of this doctrine, we have the example of the

House   of   Lords,   wherein   until   1966   it   never   overruled   its

decisions but only distinguished them. It was said that an

erroneous decision of the House of Lords could be set right

only   by   an   Act   of   Parliament   (refer  Street   Tramways   v.

London   County   Council,  [1898] A.C. 375 and  Radcliffe   v.

Ribbel Motor Service Ltd., [1939] A.C. 215).

21. It is only after 1966, due to pressure and the prevailing socioeconomic structure that the House of Lords finally decided to

exercise the power of overruling. From then on, there has been

a continuous evolution of guidelines which have modified the

16

basis as to when the House of Lords could overrule its earlier

decisions.

22. It   may   be   necessary   to   quote   the   opinion   of   Chief   Justice

Griffith   of   the   High   Court   of   Australia   in   the  Ex   Parte

Brisbane Tramways Co. Ltd. (No. 1), [1914] 18 C.L.R 54:

"In my opinion, it is impossible to maintain as

an abstract proposition that Court is either

legally   or   technically   bound   by   previous

decisions. Indeed, it may, in a proper case,

be its duty to disregard them. But the rule

should   be   applied   with   great   caution,   and

only when the previous decision is manifestly

wrong, as, for instance, if it proceeded upon

the mistaken assumption of the continuance

of   a   repealed   or   expired   Statute,   or   is

contrary to a decision of another Court which

this  Court  is  bound  to  follow; not, I  think,

upon a mere suggestion, that some or all of

the members of the later Court might arrive at

a different conclusion if the matter was res

integra.   Otherwise   there   would   be   great

danger   of   want   of   continuity   in   the

interpretation of law."

In the same case, Barton, J. observed as follows:

" ....I would say that I never thought that it

was   not   open   to   this   Court   to   review   its

previous   decisions   upon   good   cause.   The

question is not whether the Court can do so,

but whether it will, having due regard to the

need   for   continuity   and   consistency   in   the

judicial decision. Changes in the number of

appointed   Justices   can,   I   take   it,   never   of

themselves furnish a reason for review... But

17

the Court can always listen to argument as to

whether   it   ought   to   review   a   particular

decision,   and   the   strongest   reason   for   an

overruling   is   that   a   decision   is   manifestly

wrong and its continuance is injurious to the

public interest".

23. This brings us to the question, as to whether a ruling of a

co­ordinate Bench binds subsequent co­ordinate Benches. It is

now a settled principle of law that the decisions rendered by a

coordinate Bench is binding on the subsequent Benches of

equal or lesser strength. The aforesaid view is reinforced in the

National   Insurance   Company   Limited   v.   Pranay   Sethi,

(2017) 16 SCC 680 wherein this Court held that:

59.1. The   two­Judge   Bench   in Santosh

Devi [Santosh Devi v. National Insurance Co.

Ltd., (2012) 6 SCC 421 7] should have been

well advised to refer the matter to a larger

Bench as it was taking a different view than

what has been Stated in Sarla Verma [Sarla

Verma v. DTC,   (2009)   6   SCC   121]   ,   a

judgment   by   a   coordinate   Bench.  It   is

because  a  coordinate  Bench  of  the  same

strength cannot take a contrary view than

what has been held by another coordinate

Bench.

(emphasis supplied)

18

24. The impact of non­consideration of an earlier precedent

by a coordinate Bench is succinctly delineated by Salmond2

in

his book in the following manner:

…A   refusal   to   follow   a   precedent,   on   the

other hand, is an act of co­ordinate, not of

superior,   jurisdiction.   Two   courts   of   equal

authority   have   no   power   to   overrule   each

other’s   decisions.    Where   a   precedent   is

merely not followed, the result is not that

the   later  authority   is  substituted   for  the

earlier,   but   that   the   two   stand   side   by

side   conflicting   with   each   other.     The

legal   antinomy   thus   produced   must   be

solved   by   the   act   of   a  higher   authority,

which will in due time decide between the

competing   precedents,   formally

overruling  one  of   them,   and   sanctioning

the other as good law.  In the meantime the

matter   remains   at   large,   and   the   law

uncertain.

(emphasis supplied)

25. In this line, further enquiry requires us to examine, to

what   extent   does   a   ruling   of   co­ordinate   Bench   bind   the

subsequent   Bench.   A   judgment   of   this   Court   can   be

distinguished into two parts:  ratio   decidendi  and the  obiter

dictum. The ratio is the basic essence of the judgment, and the

2Salmond on Jurisprudence (P.J. Fitzgerald ed., 12th edn., 1966), p. 147.

19

same must be understood in the context of the relevant facts of

the case. The principle difference between the ratio of a case,

and the obiter, has been elucidated by a three­Judge Bench

decision of this Court in Union of India v. Dhanwanti Devi,

(1996) 6 SCC 44 wherein this Court held that:

9. …It   is   not   everything   said   by   a   Judge

while   giving   judgment   that   constitutes   a

precedent.  The   only   thing   in   a   Judge's

decision  binding  a  party   is  the  principle

upon  which   the   case   is   decided   and   for

this   reason   it   is   important   to   analyse   a

decision   and   isolate   from   it   the ratio

decidendi.  …  A   decision   is   only   an

authority   for   what   it   actually   decides.

….The   concrete   decision   alone   is   binding

between   the   parties   to   it,   but   it   is   the

abstract ratio   decidendi,   ascertained   on   a

consideration of the judgment in relation to

the   subject­matter   of   the   decision,   which

alone has the force of law and which, when it

is clear what it was, is binding.   It   is  only

the  principle   laid  down   in   the   judgment

that   is  binding   law  under  Article  141  of

the Constitution.

(emphasis supplied)

26. The   aforesaid   principle   has   been   concisely   stated   by   Lord

Halsbury   in Quinn v. Leathem,  1901   AC   495   (HL)   in   the

aforesaid terms:

20

…   that   every   judgment   must   be   read   as

applicable to the particular facts proved, or

assumed to be proved, since the generality of

the expressions which may be found there

are   not   intended   to   be   expositions   of   the

whole law, but governed and qualified by the

particular facts of the case in which such

expressions are to  be found. The  other is

that a case is only an authority for what it

actually decides…

(emphasis supplied)

27. Having discussed the aspect of the doctrine of precedent,

we need to consider another ground on which the reference is

sought,  i.e., the relevance of non­consideration of the earlier

decision of a co­ordinate Bench. In the case at hand, one of the

main submissions adopted by those who are seeking reference

is that, the case of Sampat Prakash  (supra) did not consider

the earlier ruling in the case of Prem Nath Kaul (supra).

28. The rule of per incuriam has been developed as an exception to

the   doctrine   of   judicial   precedent.   Literally,   it   means   a

judgment passed in ignorance of a relevant statute or any other

binding authority [see  Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd.,

1944 KB 718 (CA)]. The aforesaid rule is well elucidated in

Halsbury's Laws of England in the following manner3

:

33rd edn., Vol. 22, para 1687, pp. 799­800.

21

1687. … the court is not bound to follow a

decision of its own if given per incuriam.  A

decision   is  given  per   incuriam  when  the

court has acted in ignorance of a previous

decision   of   its   own   or   of   a   court   of   a

coordinate jurisdiction which covered the

case   before   it,   or   when   it   has   acted   in

ignorance   of   a   decision   of   the  House   of

Lords.  In   the   former   case   it   must   decide

which decision to follow, and in the latter it

is bound  by the decision of the House  of

Lords.

(emphasis supplied)

29. In this context of the precedential value of a judgment rendered

per  incuriam, the opinion of Justice Venkatachaliah, in the

seven­judge Bench decision of  A.R.  Antulay  v.  R.S.  Nayak,

(1988) 2 SCC 602 assumes great relevance:

183. But the point is that the circumstance

that   a   decision   is   reached  per   incuriam,

merely   serves   to  denude   the  decision  of

its precedent value. Such a decision would

not be binding as a judicial precedent. A coordinate   Bench   can   disagree   with   it   and

decline   to   follow   it.   A   larger   Bench   can

overrule   such   decision.  When   a   previous

decision   is   so   overruled   it   does   not

happen  —  nor  has   the  overruling   Bench

any   jurisdiction   so   to   do   —   that   the

finality   of   the   operative   order,   inter

partes,   in   the   previous   decision   is

overturned.   In   this   context   the   word

22

‘decision’  means  only  the  reason   for  the

previous   order   and   not   the   operative

order   in   the   previous   decision,   binding

inter   partes.  …Can   such   a   decision   be

characterised as one reached per incuriam?

Indeed, Ranganath Misra, J. says this on the

point: (para 105)

“Overruling   when   made   by   a

larger Bench of an earlier decision

of   a   smaller   one   is   intended   to

take away the precedent value of

the decision without effecting the

binding   effect   of   the   decision   in

the   particular   case.   Antulay,

therefore,  is   not   entitled   to  take

advantage   of   the   matter   being

before a larger Bench.”

(emphasis supplied)

30. The counsel arguing against the reference have asserted that

the rule of  per incuriam  is limited in its application and is

contextual in nature. They further contend that there needs to

be   specific   contrary   observations   which   were   laid   without

considering the relevant decisions on the point, in which case

alone the principle of per incuriam applies.

31. Therefore, the pertinent question before us is regarding the

application   of   the   rule   of  per   incuriam.   This   Court   while

deciding the Pranay Sethi  case (supra), referred to an earlier

decision rendered by a two­judge Bench in  Sundeep  Kumar

23

Bafna v. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 16 SCC 623, wherein

this Court emphasized upon the relevance and the applicability

of the aforesaid rule:

19. It   cannot   be   overemphasized   that   the

discipline demanded by a precedent or the

disqualification or diminution of a decision

on the application of the per incuriam rule is

of   great   importance,   since   without   it,

certainty of law, consistency of rulings and

comity   of   courts   would   become   a   costly

casualty. A decision or judgment can be per

incuriam any provision in a statute, rule or

regulation,   which   was   not   brought   to   the

notice of the court. A decision or judgment

can   also   be per   incuriam if   it   is   not

possible to reconcile its ratio with that of

a   previously   pronounced   judgment   of   a

co­equal   or   larger   Bench;   or   if   the

decision   of   a   High   Court   is   not   in

consonance with the views of this Court.

It   must   immediately   be   clarified   that

the per   incuriam rule   is   strictly   and

correctly   applicable   to   the ratio

decidendi and not to obiter dicta.

(emphasis supplied)

32. The view that the subsequent decision shall be declared  per

incuriam only if there exists a conflict in the ratio decidendi of

the pertinent judgments was also taken by a five­Judge Bench

decision   of   this   Court   in  Punjab   Land   Development   and

24

Reclamation   Corpn.   Ltd.   v.   Presiding   Officer,   Labour

Court, Chandigarh, (1990) 3 SCC 682:

43. As   regards   the   judgments   of   the

Supreme   Court   allegedly   rendered   in

ignorance   of   a   relevant   constitutional

provision   or   other   statutory   provisions   on

the subjects covered by them, it is true that

the   Supreme   Court   may   not   be   said   to

“declare the  law”  on those subjects if the

relevant provisions were not really present to

its mind. But in this case Sections 25­G and

25­H were not directly attracted and even if

they could be said to have been attracted in

laying down the major premise, they were to

be interpreted consistently with the subject

or context.      The  problem  of   judgment per

    incuriam when   actually   arises,   should

present no difficulty as this Court can lay

down the law afresh, if two or more of its

earlier judgments cannot stand together. 

(emphasis supplied)

33. In order to analyze the contention of the Petitioners that the

judgments   in   question   were  per   incuriam,   we   need   to

understand the context, ratios of the concerned cases and the

interpretation of Article 370. Once we have noted the evolution

of Article 370, we would be able to appreciate the context of the

cases which are sought to be portrayed as being contradictory.

25

34. Under the draft Constitution, Article 370 of the Constitution

was   draft   Article   306A,   which   was   introduced   in   the

Constituent   Assembly   on   17.10.1947,   by   N.   Gopalaswami

Ayyangar, who stated as under:

N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar

Sir, this matter, the matter of this particular

motion, relates to the Jammu and Kashmir

State. The House is fully aware of the fact

that the State has acceded to the Dominion

of India. The history of this accession is also

well know. The accession took place on the

26th October, 1947. Since then, the State

has had a chequered history. Conditions are

not yet normal in the State. The meaning of

this   accession   is   that   at   present   that

State is a unit of a federal State, namely,

the Dominion of India. This  Dominion is

getting   transformed   into   a   Republic,

which   will   be   inaugurated   on   the   26th

January, 1950. The Jammu and Kashmir

State, therefore, has to become a unit of

the new Republic of India.

The last clause refers to what may happen

later on. We have said article 211A will not

apply to the Jammu and Kashmir State. But

that cannot be a permanent feature of the

Constitution of the State, and hope it will

not   be.  So   the   provision   is   made   that

when   the   Constituent   Assembly   of   the

State has met and taken its decision both

on the Constitution for the State and on

the range of federal jurisdiction over the

State,   the   President   may   on   the

recommendation   of   that   Constituent

26

Assembly issue an order that this article

306A shall either cease to be operative, or

shall   be   operative   only   subject   to   such

exceptions   and  modifications   as  may  be

specified by him. But before he issues any

order of that kind the recommendation of

the   Constituent   Assembly   will   be   a

condition   precedent.   That   explains   the

whole of this article.

The effect of this article is that the Jammu

and Kashmir State which is now a part of

India will continue to be a part of India, will

be a unit of the future Federal Republic of

India   and   the   Union   Legislature   will   get

jurisdiction   to   enact   laws   on   matters

specified   either   in   the   Instrument   of

Accession   or   by   later   addition   with   the

concurrence of the Government of the State.

And steps have to be taken for the purpose

of convening a Constituent Assembly in due

course which will go into the matters I have

already referred to. When it has come to a

decision  on   the  different  matters   it  will

make a recommendation to the President

who  will   either  abrogate  article  306A  or

direct   that   it   shall   apply   with   such

modifications   and   exceptions   as   the

Constituent   Assembly   may   recommend.

That, Sir, is briefly a description of the effect

of  this  article, and  I hope  the  House will

carry it.

(emphasis supplied)

27

35. In line with the above observations, Constitution Order 44 was

promulgated   under   Article   370(3)   of   the   Constitution,

modifying   Article   370   of   the   Constitution   by   amending   the

Explanation in Clause 1 of Article 370 in the following terms:

“Explanation.—For   the   purposes   of   this

Article, the Government of the State means

the person for the time being recognised by

the President on the recommendation of the

Legislative   Assembly   of   the   State   as   the

Sadar­I­Riyasat   of   Jammu   and   Kashmir,

acting   on   the   advice   of   the   Council   of

Ministers of the State for the time being on

office” 

36. Further, the President in exercise of the power conferred upon

him by clause (1) of Article 370 of the Constitution, with the

concurrence of the Government of the State of Jammu and

Kashmir, issued the Constitution (Application to Jammu and

Kashmir)   Second   Amendment   Order,   1965,   which   further

brought about change through amendment to Article 367 as

applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The aforesaid

amendment can be observed as under:

“(aa) references to the person for the time

being   recognised   by   the   President   on   the

recommendation of the Legislative Assembly

of the State as the Sadar­i­Riyasat of Jammu

and  Kashmir,  acting on  the  advice of the

Council of Ministers of the State for the time

28

being   in   office,   shall   be   construed   as

references to the Governor of Jammu and

Kashmir;

(b) references to the Government of the said

State   shall   be   construed   as   including

references to the Governor of Jammu and

Kashmir acting on the advice of his Council

of Ministers:

Provided that in respect of any period prior

to   the   10th   day   of   April,   1965,   such

references shall be construed as including

references to the Sadar­i­Riyasat acting on

the advice of his Council of Ministers.”

The aforesaid amendment Order of 1965 was upheld in the

Mohd. Maqbool Damnoo case (supra).

37. After   alluding   to   the   Constituent   Assembly   Debates   and

developments subsequent to the coming of the Constitution, we

need   to  look  at   the   cases   indicated  by  the   counsel,  which

according to them have interpreted the aforesaid provision in a

contradictory manner. 

38. The first case which needs to be looked at is the Prem Nath

Kaul  case (supra) which dealt with the validity of the Jammu

and Kashmir Big Landed Estate (Abolition) Act, 2007 (17 of

2007   smvt.).   The   main   contention   on   which   the   Act   was

impugned was that the Yuvaraj did not have the constitutional

authority to promulgate the said Act. One of the arguments

29

canvassed by the Petitioner in that case related to the effect of

Article 370 of the Constitution of India on the powers of the

Yuvaraj. The Constitution Bench, in deciding that it would be

unreasonable to hold that Article 370 could have affected, or

was intended to affect, the plenary powers of the Maharaja,

made   certain   observations   relating   to   Article   370   of   the

Constitution,   which   the   counsel   before   us   arguing   for   a

reference   have   relied   upon.   The   observations   of   the

Constitution   Bench   in   the  Prem   Nath   Kaul  case  (supra)

regarding   Article   370   therefore   merit   reproduction   in   their

entirety:

32. Since Mr Chatterjee has strongly relied

on   the   application   of   Article   370   of   the

Constitution to the State in support of his

argument   that   the   Yuvaraj   had   ceased   to

hold   the   plenary   legislative   powers,   it   is

necessary to examine the provisions of this

article   and   their   effect.   This   article   was

intended to make temporary provisions with

respect to the State of Jammu & Kashmir. It

reads thus:

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Clause (1)(b) of this Article deals with the

legislative power of Parliament to make laws

for the State; and it prescribes limitation in

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that behalf. Under para (1) of sub­clause (b)

of clause (1) Parliament has power to make

laws for the State in respect of matters in

the   Union   List   and   the   Concurrent   List

which the President in consultation with the

Government   of   the   State   declares   to

correspond   to   matters   specified   in   the

Instrument of Accession; whereas in regard

to other matters in the said Lists Parliament

may, under para (ii), have power to legislate

for the State after such other matters have

been specified by his order by the President

with the concurrence of the Government of

the State. It is significant that para (i) refers

to consultation with the Government of the

State while para (ii) requires its concurrence.

Having thus provided for consultation with,

and the concurrence of, the Government of

the State, the explanation shows what the

Government   of   the   State   means   in   this

context. It means according to the appellant,

not the Maharaja acting by himself in his

own   discretion,   but   the   person   who   is

recognised as the Maharaja by the President

acting   on   the   advice   of   the   Council   of

Ministers for the time being in office. It is on

this   explanation   that   the   appellant   has

placed considerable reliance.

33. Sub­clauses (c) and (d) of clause (1) of

the   Article   provide   respectively   that   the

provisions  of Article 1 and of  the  present

article shall apply in relation to the State;

and   that   the   other   provisions   of   the

Constitution   shall   apply   in   relation   to   it

subject   to   exceptions   and   modifications

specified   by   the   Presidential   order.   These

provisions   are   likewise   made   subject   to

consultation   with,   or   concurrence   of,   the

Government of the State respectively.

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34. Having provided for the legislative power

of Parliament and for the application of the

articles   of   the   Constitution   of   the   State,

Article 370 clause (2) prescribes that if the

concurrence of the Government of the State

required   by   the   relevant   sub­clauses   of

clause   (1)   has   been   given   before   the

Constituent Assembly of Kashmir has been

convened, such concurrence shall be placed

before such Assembly for such decision as it

may take thereon.  This   clause   show   that

the   Constitution­makers   attached   great

importance   to   the   final   decision   of   the

Constituent   Assembly,   and   the

continuance   of   the   exercise   of   powers

conferred   on   Parliament   and   the

President   by   the   relevant   temporary

provisions   of   Article   370(1)   is   made

conditional  on  the   final   approval  by   the

said   Constituent   Assembly   in   the   said

matters.

35. Clause   (3)   authorises   the   President   to

declare by public notification that this article

shall   cease   to   be   operative   or   shall   be

operative only with specified exceptions or

modifications;   but   this   power   can   be

exercised   by   the   President   only   if   the

Constituent   Assembly   of   the   State   makes

recommendation   in   that   behalf.  Thus   the

proviso to clause (3) also emphasises the

importance   which   was   attached   to   the

final   decision   of   the   Constituent

Assembly   of   Kashmir   in   regard   to   the

relevant matters covered by Article 370.

(emphasis supplied)

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39. Learned senior counsel, Mr. Dinesh Dwivedi and Mr. Sanjay

Parikh, have given much importance to the above observations

of the Court, and have submitted that the implication of the

above Statements, in line with the observations made in the

Constituent Assembly Debates, is that the exercise of power

under Article 370 of the Constitution of India was contingent

on the existence of the Constituent Assembly of the State of

Jammu and Kashmir, as the Constituent Assembly had the

“final   decision”   on   the   matters   pertaining   to   Article   370.

Therefore, according to the learned senior counsel, when the

Constituent Assembly of the State was dissolved subsequent to

the drafting and adoption of the Constitution of Jammu and

Kashmir, the application of Article 370 automatically came to

an end, with no further recourse to the same being possible,

even without any declaration to that effect being made under

Article 370(3) of the Constitution.

40. On this interpretation of the decision in the Prem Nath Kaul

case   (supra),   the   learned   senior   counsel   submit   that   there

exists a conflict with the dicta of another Constitution Bench of

this   Court   in   the  Sampat   Prakash  case  (supra).   In   the

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Sampat   Prakash  case (supra), this Court was seized of a

matter pertaining to the detention of the petitioner in that case

under the Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act 13 of

1964. The main point canvassed before the Constitution Bench

was   whether   the   continuation   of   Article   35(c)   of   the

Constitution   (as   applicable   to   the   State   of   Jammu   and

Kashmir),   which   gave   protection   to   any   law   relating   to

preventive   detention   in   Jammu   and   Kashmir,   through

successive   Constitution   Orders   passed   in   exercise   of   the

powers of the President under Article 370 of the Constitution,

in   1959   and   1964,   was   valid.   The   Court   held   that   the

Constitution   Orders   were   validly   passed   in   exercise   of   the

power under Article 370 of the Constitution, which continued

beyond the date of dissolution of the Constituent Assembly. In

this regard, this Court held as follows:

5. We are not impressed by either of these

two   arguments   advanced   by   Mr

Ramamurthy.   So   far   as   the   historical

background   is   concerned,   the   AttorneyGeneral   appearing   on   behalf   of   the

Government also relied on it to urge that the

provisions of Article 370 should be held to

be continuing in force, because the situation

that   existed   when   this   article   was

34

incorporated   in   the   Constitution   had   not

materially   altered,   and   the   purpose   of

introducing this article was to empower the

President   to   exercise   his   discretion   in

applying the Indian Constitution while that

situation   remained   unchanged.   There   is

considerable force in this submission.  The

legislative  history  of  this  article  cannot,

in   these   circumstances,   be   of   any

assistance   for   holding   that   this   article

became   ineffective  after  the  Constituent

Assembly   of   the   State   had   framed   the

Constitution for the State.

6. The second submission based on clause

(2) of Article 370 does not find support even

from the language of that clause which only

refers   to   the   concurrence   given   by   the

Government   of   the   State   before   the

Constituent   Assembly   was   convened,   and

makes no mention at all of the completion of

the work of the Constituent Assembly or its

dissolution.

7. There   are,   however,  much   stronger

reasons for holding that the provisions of

this   article   continued   in   force   and

remained   effective   even   after   the

Constituent   Assembly   of   the   State   had

passed the Constitution of the State. The

most important provision in this connection

is that contained in clause (3) of the article

which lays down that this article shall cease

to   be   operative   or   shall   be   operative   only

with such exceptions and modifications and

from such date as the President may specify

by   public   notification,   provided   that   the

recommendation   of   the   Constituent

35

Assembly of the State referred to in clause

(2) shall be necessary before the President

issues   such   a   notification.   This   clause

clearly   envisages   that   the   article   will

continue to be operative and can cease to be

operative only if, on the recommendation of

the Constituent Assembly of the State, the

President makes a direction to that effect. In

fact, no such recommendation was made by

the Constituent Assembly of the State, nor

was   any   order   made   by   the   President

declaring that the article shall cease to be

operative. On the contrary, it appears that

the Constituent Assembly of the State made

a recommendation that the article should be

operative   with   one   modification   to   be

incorporated in the Explanation to clause (1)

of the article. This modification in the article

was notified by the President by Ministry of

Law   Order   CO   44   dated   15th   November,

1952,   and   laid   down   that,   from   17th

November,   1952,   the   article   was   to   be

operative   with   substitution   of   the   new

Explanation   for   the   old   Explanation   as   it

existed at that time. This makes it very clear

that the Constituent Assembly of the State

did not desire that this article should cease

to be operative and, in fact, expressed its

agreement to the continued operation of this

article by making a recommendation that it

should be operative with this modification

only.

(emphasis supplied)

41. The learned senior counsel urge that these two judgments by

Constitution Benches of this Court are in direct conflict with

one another, and as such, the present petitions require to be

36

referred to a larger Bench. However, we are not in agreement

with this submission of the learned senior counsel.

42. First,   it   is   worth   highlighting   that   judgments   cannot   be

interpreted in a vacuum, separate from their facts and context.

Observations made in a judgment cannot be selectively picked

in order to give them a particular meaning. The Court in the

Prem Nath Kaul  case (supra) had to determine the legislative

competence of the Yuvaraj, in passing a particular enactment.

The   enactment   was   passed   during   the  interregnum  period,

before the formulation of the Constitution of State of Jammu

and Kashmir, but after coming into force of the Constitution of

India. The observations made by the Constitution Bench in this

case, regarding the importance given to the decision of the

Constituent   Assembly   of  the   State  of   Jammu   and  Kashmir

needs to be read in the light of these facts. 

43. Second,   the   framework   of   Article   370(2)   of   the   Indian

Constitution was such that any decision taken by the State

Government, which was not an elected body but the Maharaja

of the State acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers

which was in office by virtue of the Maharaja’s proclamation

dated March 5, 1948, prior to the sitting of the Constituent

37

Assembly of the State, would have to be placed before the

Constituent   Assembly,   for   its   decision   as   provided   under

Article 370(2) of the Constitution. The rationale for the same is

clear, as the task of the Constituent Assembly was to further

clarify the scope and ambit of the constitutional relationship

between   the   Union   of   India   and   the   State   of   Jammu   and

Kashmir, on which the State Government as defined under

Article 370 might have already taken some decisions, before

the   convening   of   the   Constituent   Assembly,   which   the

Constituent Assembly in its wisdom, might ultimately not agree

with. Hence, the Court in the case of Prem Nath Kaul (supra)

indicated   that   the   Constituent   Assembly’s   decision   under

Article 370(2) was final. This finality has to be read as being

limited   to   those   decisions   taken   by   the   State   Government

under Article 370 prior to the convening of the Constituent

Assembly  of  the  State,  in  line  with  the  language of   Article

370(2).

44. Third, the Constitution Bench in the  Prem  Nath  Kaul  case

(supra) did not discuss the continuation or cessation of the

operation of Article 370 of the Constitution after the dissolution

of the Constituent Assembly of the State. This was not an issue

38

in question before the Court, unlike in the Sampat Prakash

case (supra) where the contention was specifically made before,

and refuted by, the Court. This Court sees no reason to read

into the Prem Nath Kaul case (supra) an interpretation which

results in it being in conflict with the subsequent judgments of

this   Court,   particularly   when   an   ordinary   reading   of   the

judgment does not result in such an interpretation.

45. Thus, this Court is of the opinion that there is no conflict

between the judgments in the  Prem  Nath  Kaul  case (supra)

and the Sampat Prakash case (supra). The plea of the counsel

to refer the present matter to a larger Bench on this ground is

therefore rejected.

46. An additional ground canvassed by the learned senior counsel

is that the judgment of the Court in the Prem Nath Kaul case

(supra) was not considered by the Court in its subsequent

decision in Sampat Prakash  case (supra), which is therefore

per incuriam. At the cost of repetition, we note that the rule of

per incuriam being an exception to the doctrine of precedents is

only applicable to the ratio of the judgment. The same having

an impact on the stability of the legal precedents must be

applied   sparingly,   when   there   is   an   irreconcilable   conflict

39

between the opinions of two co­ordinate Benches. However, as

indicated above there are no contrary observations made in the

Sampat   Prakash case  (supra) to that of  Prem   Nath   Kaul

(supra), accordingly, the case of  Sampat  Prakash  (supra) is

not per incuriam.

47. In light of the aforesaid discussion, we do not see any reason to

refer   these   petitions   to   a   larger   Bench   on   the   questions

considered.

..............................................J.

(N.V. RAMANA)

..............................................J.

(SANJAY KISHAN KAUL)

.............................................J.

(R. SUBHASH REDDY)

..............................................J.

 (B. R. GAVAI)

..............................................J.

 (SURYA KANT)

NEW DELHI;

MARCH 02, 2020

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