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Defamation – Defamation suits against media platform and/or journalists – Interim relief/interim injunctions – Interim order by the trial judge directing the appellants-media platform, its editor, and the journalists to take down an article published on their online platform against the respondent as also restrained them from posting, circulating or publishing the article in respect of the respondent on any online or offline platform till the next date of hearing – Upheld by the High Court – Correctness:

* Author

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 994 : 2024 INSC 255

Bloomberg Television Production Services

India Private Limited & Ors.

v.

Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited

(Civil Appeal No. 4602 of 2024)

22 March 2024

[Dr. Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud,* CJI, J B Pardiwala and

Manoj Misra, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

Matter pertains to the order of the High Court upholding the interim

order passed by the trial judge directing the appellants-media

platform to take down an article published on their online platform

against the respondent as also restrained them from posting,

circulating or publishing the article in respect of the respondent on

any online or offline platform till the next date of hearing.

Headnotes

Defamation – Defamation suits against media platform and/or

journalists – Interim relief/interim injunctions – Interim order

by the trial judge directing the appellants-media platform, its

editor, and the journalists to take down an article published

on their online platform against the respondent as also

restrained them from posting, circulating or publishing the

article in respect of the respondent on any online or offline

platform till the next date of hearing – Upheld by the High

Court – Correctness:

Held: Order of the trial judge does not discuss, even cursorily,

the prima facie strength of the plaintiff’s case, the balance of

convenience or the irreparable hardship that is caused – Trial

judge needed to have analysed why such an ex parte injunction

was essential – Such order amounts to unreasoned censorship

and cannot be accepted – Grant of an ex parte interim injunction

by way of an unreasoned order, definitely necessitates interference

by the High Court – Impact of the injunction on the constitutionally

protected right of free speech further warranted intervention – High

Court ought to have prima facie assessed whether the test for the

grant of an injunction was duly established after an evaluation of

facts – Error committed by the trial judge perpetuated by the Single 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 995

Bloomberg Television Production Services India Private Limited & Ors.

v. Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited

Judge of the High Court – Merely recording that a prima facie case

exists, that the balance of convenience is in favour of the grant of

injunction and that an irreparable injury would be caused, would

not amount to an application of mind to the facts of the case – In

the absence thereof, orders of the trial judge and the Single Judge

of the High Court set aside. [Paras 11-13]

Defamation – Defamation suits against media platform and/

or journalists – Interim relief/interim injunctions – Grant of –

Application of three fold test:

Held: Three-fold test is of establishing a prima facie case, balance

of convenience and irreparable loss or harm, for the grant of

interim relief – This test is equally applicable to the grant of interim

injunctions in defamation suits – Three-fold test must not be applied

mechanically, to the detriment of the other party and in the case

of injunctions against journalistic pieces, often to the detriment of

the public – While granting interim relief, the court must provide

detailed reasons and analyze how the test is satisfied and how the

precedents cited apply to the facts of the case – Also balancing

the fundamental right to free speech with the right to reputation

and privacy must be borne in mind – Constitutional mandate of

protecting journalistic expression cannot be understated, and courts

must tread cautiously while granting pre-trial interim injunctions –

Courts should not grant ex-parte injunctions except in exceptional

cases where the defence advanced by the respondent would

undoubtedly fail at trial – In all other cases, injunctions against the

publication of material should be granted only after a full-fledged

trial is conducted or in exceptional cases, after the respondent is

given a chance to make their submissions. [Paras 5, 7, 9]

Suits – ‘SLAPP Suits’– Concept of :

Held: Term ‘SLAPP’ stands for ‘Strategic Litigation against Public

Participation’ – It is an umbrella term used to refer to litigation

predominantly initiated by entities that wield immense economic

power against members of the media or civil society, to prevent

the public from knowing about or participating in important affairs

in the public interest – Grant of an interim injunction, before the

trial commences, often acts as a ‘death sentence’ to the material

sought to be published, well before the allegations have been

proven – While granting ad-interim injunctions in defamation suits,

the potential of using prolonged litigation to prevent free speech and

public participation must also be kept in mind by courts. [Para 10]

996 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

Case Law Cited

Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction

Co. (P) Ltd [1996] Suppl. 2 SCR 295 : (1996) 4 SCC

622; Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund v. Kartick Das [1994]

Suppl. 1 SCR 136 : (1994) 4 SCC 225; R. Rajagopal

v. State of Tamil Nadu [1994] Suppl. 4 SCR 353 :

(1994) 6 SCC 632; Ramdev Food Products Pvt. Ltd. v.

Arvindbhai Rambhai Patel [2006] Suppl. 5 SCR 521 :

(2006) 8 SCC 726; Shyam Sel & Power Ltd. v. Shyam

Steel Industries Ltd. [2022] 3 SCR 1173 : (2023) 1 SCC

634 – referred to.

Bonnard v. Perryman (1891) 95 All ER 965; Holley v.

Smyth (1998) 1 All ER 853; Fraser v. Evans (1969) 1

Q.B. 349 – referred to.

Books and Periodicals Cited

Donson, F.J.L. 2000. Legal Intimidation: A SLAPP in

the Face of Democracy. London, New York : Free

Association Books – referred to.

List of Acts

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

List of Keywords

Media platform; Online platform; Defamation; Defamation suits;

Interim relief/interim injunctions; Prima facie case; Balance of

convenience; Irreparable hardship; Ex parte injunction; Adinterim injunction; Unreasoned censorship; Discretionary power;

Unreasoned order; Defamation proceedings against media platform;

Injunction; Right of free speech; Right to reputation and privacy;

Protection of journalistic expression; Pre-trial interim injunctions;

Bonnard standard; Right to freedom of speech of the author;

Public’s right to know; ‘SLAPP Suits’; ‘Strategic Litigation against

Public Participation’; Prolonged trials.

Case Arising From

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 4602 of

2024

From the Judgment and Order dated 14.03.2024 of the High Court

of Delhi at New Delhi in FAO No.79 of 2024

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 997

Bloomberg Television Production Services India Private Limited & Ors.

v. Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited

Appearances for Parties

Mukul Rohatgi, Neeraj Kishan Kaul, Dr. Menaka Guruswamy, Sr.

Advs., Rohit Kochhar, Shiv Sapra, Samiron Borkataky, Ms. Ranjeet

Rohatgi, Rajat Gava, Ikshvaaku Marwah, Vishal Singh, Sanskriti

Shrimali, Keshav Sehgal, Dhruv Sharma,Raghav Agarwal, Utkarsh

Pratap, Lavish Bhambhani, Harshvardhan Thakur, Ms. Suvangana

Agrawal, Advs. for the Appellants.

Mahesh Agarwal, Ms. Madhavi Agarwal, Shashwat Singh, E.C.

Agrawala, Advs. for the Respondent.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI

1. Leave granted.

2. On 01 March 2024, an ex-parte ad interim order was passed by the

ADJ 05 of the South Saket Courts, New Delhi1

 directing the appellants

(a media platform, one of its editors, and the concerned journalists) to

take down an article dated 21 February 2024 published on their online

platform within a week. The appellants were also restrained from posting,

circulating or publishing the article in respect of the respondent-plaintiff

on any online or offline platform till the next date of hearing.

3. The order of the trial Judge indicates that the discussion, after

recording the submission of the respondent, commences at paragraph

7. The only reasoning which is found in the order of the trial Judge

is in paragraphs 8-9, which read as follows:

“8. I have noticed that in Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi

(Supra), Chandra Kochar (Supra), Swami Ramdev

(Supra), ex-parte ad interim injunction was passed,

considering that the contents of the material in question

was per se defamatory.

9. In my view, the plaintiff has made out a prima facie

case for passing ad interim ex-parte orders of injunction,

balance of convenience is also in favour of plaintiff and

1 “trial Judge”

998 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

against the defendant and irreparable loss and injury

may be caused to the plaintiff, if the injunction as prayed

for is not granted. In view thereof, defendant no.1 and

defendant no.2 are directed to take down the article dated

21.02.2024 (page 84 to 86 of the plaintiff’s document)

from online platform within one week of receipt of this

order. The defendants are further restrained from posting,

circulating or publishing the aforesaid article in respect of

the plaintiff on any online or offline platform till the next

date of hearing.”

4. The order of the trial Judge has been upheld by a Single Judge of

the High Court of Delhi by order dated 14 March 2024.2

 The Single

Judge of the High Court seems to have had doubts about the

maintainability of the appeal, but that point need not be laboured any

further having regard to the provisions of Order XLIII of the Code of

Civil Procedure 1908.

5. The three-fold test of establishing (i) a prima facie case, (ii) balance

of convenience and (iii) irreparable loss or harm, for the grant of

interim relief, is well-established in the jurisprudence of this Court.

This test is equally applicable to the grant of interim injunctions in

defamation suits. However, this three-fold test must not be applied

mechanically,3

 to the detriment of the other party and in the case of

injunctions against journalistic pieces, often to the detriment of the

public. While granting interim relief, the court must provide detailed

reasons and analyze how the three-fold test is satisfied. A cursory

reproduction of the submissions and precedents before the court is

not sufficient. The court must explain how the test is satisfied and

how the precedents cited apply to the facts of the case.

6. In addition to this oft-repeated test, there are also additional factors,

which must weigh with courts while granting an ex-parte ad interim

injunction. Some of these factors were elucidated by a three-judge

bench of this Court in Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund v. Kartick

Das,

4

 in the following terms:

2 “Impugned Order”

3 Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd., [1996] Suppl. 2 SCR 295 : (1996) 4

SCC 622, para 38.

4 [1994] Suppl. 1 SCR 136 : (1994) 4 SCC 225.

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 999

Bloomberg Television Production Services India Private Limited & Ors.

v. Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited

“36. As a principle, ex parte injunction could be granted

only under exceptional circumstances. The factors which

should weigh with the court in the grant of ex parte

injunction are—

(a) whether irreparable or serious mischief will ensue

to the plaintiff;

(b) whether the refusal of ex parte injunction would

involve greater injustice than the grant of it would

involve;

(c) the court will also consider the time at which the

plaintiff first had notice of the act complained so that

the making of improper order against a party in his

absence is prevented;

(d) the court will consider whether the plaintiff had

acquiesced for sometime and in such circumstances

it will not grant ex parte injunction;

(e) the court would expect a party applying for ex parte

injunction to show utmost good faith in making the

application.

(f) even if granted, the ex parte injunction would be for

a limited period of time.

(g) General principles like prima facie case, balance

of convenience and irreparable loss would also be

considered by the court.”

7. Significantly, in suits concerning defamation by media platforms and/or

journalists, an additional consideration of balancing the fundamental

right to free speech with the right to reputation and privacy must be

borne in mind.5

 The constitutional mandate of protecting journalistic

expression cannot be understated, and courts must tread cautiously

while granting pre-trial interim injunctions. The standard to be followed

may be borrowed from the decision in Bonnard v. Perryman.

6

 This

standard, christened the ‘Bonnard standard’, laid down by the Court

5 R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu, [1994] Suppl. 4 SCR 353 : (1994) 6 SCC 632.

6 (1891) 95 All ER 965.

1000 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

of Appeal (England and Wales), has acquired the status of a common

law principle for the grant of interim injunctions in defamation suits.7

The Court of Appeal in Bonnard (supra) held as follows:

“…But it is obvious that the subject-matter of an action for

defamation is so special as to require exceptional caution

in exercising the jurisdiction to interfere by injunction before

the trial of an action to prevent an anticipated wrong.

The right of free speech is one which it is for the public

interest that individuals should possess, and, indeed,

that they should exercise without impediment, so long as

no wrongful act is done; and, unless an alleged libel is

untrue, there is no wrong committed; but, on the contrary,

often a very wholesome act is performed in the publication

and repetition of an alleged libel. Until it is clear that an

alleged libel is untrue, it is not clear that any right at all

has been infringed; and the importance of leaving free

speech unfettered is a strong reason in cases of libel for

dealing most cautiously and warily with the granting of

interim injunctions.”

(emphasis supplied)

8. In Fraser v. Evans, 8 the Court of Appeal followed the Bonnard

principle and held as follows:

“… in so far as the article will be defamatory of Mr. Fraser,

it is clear he cannot get an injunction. The Court will not

restrain the publication of an article, even though it is

defamatory, when the defendant says he intends to justify it

or to make fair comment on a matter of public interest. That

has been established for many years ever since (Bonnard

v. Ferryman 1891 2 Ch. 269). ‘The reason sometimes given

is that the defences of justification and fair comment are

for the jury, which is the constitutional tribunal, and not

for a Judge. But a better reason is the importance in the

public interest that the truth should out. …”

(emphasis supplied)

7 Holley vs. Smyth, (1998) 1 All ER 853.

8 [1969] 1 Q.B. 349.

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1001

Bloomberg Television Production Services India Private Limited & Ors.

v. Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited

9. In essence, the grant of a pre-trial injunction against the publication

of an article may have severe ramifications on the right to freedom

of speech of the author and the public’s right to know. An injunction,

particularly ex-parte, should not be granted without establishing that

the content sought to be restricted is ‘malicious’ or ‘palpably false’.

Granting interim injunctions, before the trial commences, in a cavalier

manner results in the stifling of public debate. In other words, courts

should not grant ex-parte injunctions except in exceptional cases

where the defence advanced by the respondent would undoubtedly

fail at trial. In all other cases, injunctions against the publication of

material should be granted only after a full-fledged trial is conducted

or in exceptional cases, after the respondent is given a chance to

make their submissions.

10. Increasingly, across various jurisdictions, the concept of ‘SLAPP

Suits’ has been recognized either by statute or by courts. The term

‘SLAPP’ stands for ‘Strategic Litigation against Public Participation’

and is an umbrella term used to refer to litigation predominantly

initiated by entities that wield immense economic power against

members of the media or civil society, to prevent the public from

knowing about or participating in important affairs in the public

interest.9

 We must be cognizant of the realities of prolonged trials.

The grant of an interim injunction, before the trial commences, often

acts as a ‘death sentence’ to the material sought to be published, well

before the allegations have been proven. While granting ad-interim

injunctions in defamation suits, the potential of using prolonged

litigation to prevent free speech and public participation must also

be kept in mind by courts.

11. The order of the trial Judge does not discuss, even cursorily, the

prima facie strength of the plaintiff’s case, nor does it deal with the

balance of convenience or the irreparable hardship that is caused.

The trial Judge needed to have analysed why such an ex parte

injunction was essential, after setting out the factual basis and the

contentions of the respondent made before the trial Judge. The trial

Judge merely states, in paras 7-8, that the court has “gone through

the record available as on date” and noticed certain precedents

9 Donson, F.J.L. 2000. Legal Intimidation: A SLAPP in the Face of Democracy. London, New York: Free

Association Books.

1002 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

where an ad-interim injunction was granted. Without even cursorily

dwelling on the merits of the plaint, the ad-interim injunction granted

by the trial Judge amounts to unreasoned censorship which cannot

be countenanced.

12. Undoubtedly, the grant of an interim injunction is an exercise of

discretionary power and the appellate court (in this case, the High

Court) will usually not interfere with the grant of interim relief. However,

in a line of precedent, this Court has held that appellate courts must

interfere with the grant of interim relief if the discretion has been

exercised “arbitrarily, capriciously, perversely, or where the court has

ignored settled principles of law regulating the grant or refusal of

interlocutory injunctions.”10 The grant of an ex parte interim injunction

by way of an unreasoned order, definitely falls within the above

formulation, necessitating interference by the High Court. This being

a case of an injunction granted in defamation proceedings against

a media platform, the impact of the injunction on the constitutionally

protected right of free speech further warranted intervention.

13. In view of the above, the High Court ought to have, in our view,

also at least prima facie assessed whether the test for the grant of

an injunction was duly established after an evaluation of facts. The

same error which has been committed by the trial Judge has been

perpetuated by the Single Judge of the High Court. Merely recording

that a prima facie case exists, that the balance of convenience is

in favour of the grant of injunction and that an irreparable injury

would be caused, would not amount to an application of mind to

the facts of the case. The three-fold test cannot merely be recorded

as a mantra without looking into the facts on the basis of which an

injunction has been sought. In the absence of such a consideration

either by the trial Judge or by the High Court, we have no option but

to set aside both the orders of the trial Judge dated 1 March 2024

and of the Single Judge of the High Court dated 14 March 2024.

We do so accordingly.

14. Since the proceedings are now listed before the trial Judge on 26

March 2024, we direct that it would be open to the respondents to

10 Ramdev Food Products Pvt. Ltd. v. Arvindbhai Rambhai Patel, [2006] Suppl. 5 SCR 521 : (2006) 8 SCC

726, para 128; Shyam Sel & Power Ltd. v. Shyam Steel Industries Ltd., [2022] 3 SCR 1173 : (2023) 1

SCC 634, para 37.

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1003

Bloomberg Television Production Services India Private Limited & Ors.

v. Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited

renew their application for injunction, on which the trial Judge shall

pass fresh orders after hearing the parties and bearing in mind

the observations which are contained in the above segment of the

judgment and order. All the rights and contentions of the parties are

kept open in that regard. In the event that the appellants seek to

contest the application for injunction, they shall file their reply before

the trial Judge before the next date of listing.

15. It is clarified that the above segment of the judgment and order

may not be construed as a comment on the merits of the present

case. The purpose of the above segment is to provide the broad

parameters to be kept in mind while hearing the application for an

interim injunction.

16. The appeal is accordingly disposed of in the above terms.

17. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.

Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain Result of the case:

Appeal disposed of.