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Sunday, January 26, 2020

When the Accused not denied his signature on the recovery memo or alleged that his signature was obtained by threat, duress or coercion - the absence of any FSL report may at best be considered as Defective Investigation. The pistol was recovered on the confession of the appellant from under the earth in the courtyard, the earth was freshly dug. The High Court disbelieved the recovery because the independent witness PW2 went hostile. But the High Court missed the reasoning by the trial court that PW­2 did not deny his signature on the recovery memo nor did he state that his signature was obtained by threat, duress or coercion. The absence of any FSL report may at best be defective investigation.

When the Accused not denied his signature on the recovery memo or alleged that his signature was obtained by threat, duress or coercion - the absence of any FSL report may at best be considered as Defective Investigation.

The pistol was recovered on the confession   of   the   appellant   from   under   the   earth   in   the
courtyard,   the   earth   was   freshly   dug.   The   High   Court disbelieved the recovery because the independent witness PW2 went hostile.  
But the High Court missed the reasoning by the trial court that PW­2 did not deny his signature on the
recovery   memo   nor   did   he   state   that   his   signature   was obtained by threat, duress or coercion. The absence of any FSL report may at best be defective investigation.


NON­REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
    CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.884 OF 2013
NAWAB                     ....APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
STATE OF UTTARAKHAND                ...RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
NAVIN SINHA, J.
The   appellant   is   aggrieved   by   his   conviction   under
Section  302  IPC sentencing  him to  life  imprisonment,  and
under Section 25 of the Arms Act for one year.
2. The appellant submitted a written report to the police
that   in   the   night   intervening   between   24/25.03.2002,     at
about 01:30 AM, three hooligans entered his house to abduct
him.  His wife was shot dead by the miscreants after a scuffle
when she tried to prevent them from doing so. One firearm
injury was found on the person of the deceased, with an entry
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and   exit   wound.     On   consideration   of   the   evidence,   the
appellant was convicted by the trial court and which has been
upheld by the High Court.
3. Dr.   Surender   Singh   Hooda,   learned   counsel   for   the
appellant,   submitted   that   the   present   is   a   case   of
circumstantial evidence.   Relying on  Sharad   Birdhichand
Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra, 1984 (4) SCC 116, it was
submitted that the links in the chain of circumstances had not
been established pointing conclusively towards the guilt of the
appellant   alone.     Mere   suspicion,   no   matter   how   strong,
cannot   be   the   basis   of   conviction.   No   incriminating
circumstances were put to the appellant under Section 313
Cr.P.C. The High Court has disbelieved the recovery of the
country made pistol on the alleged confession of the appellant
under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872. The conviction of
the appellant is unsustainable and he is entitled to acquittal.
4. Mr. Jatinder Kumar Bhatia, learned counsel appearing
for the State and Mr. Sanjay Kumar Dubey, learned counsel
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appearing on behalf of the relative of the deceased, whom we
permitted   to   address   us   allowing   his   application   for
impleadment,   submitted   that   the   motive   of   the   appellant
stands  clearly established to obtain the benefit of the  Life
Insurance Policy ( LIC) taken few days earlier in the name of
the   deceased.     The   plea   of   entry   by   outsiders   has   been
completely   disbelieved   in   absence   of   any   evidence.   The
occurrence   having   taken   place   at   past   midnight   when   the
appellant  was  alone  at home with  the  deceased, the  onus
shifts on him under Section 106 of the Evidence Act to explain
the   circumstances   under   which   his   wife   met   a   homicidal
death. The appellant failed to furnish any plausible defence.
5. We have considered the submissions on behalf of the
parties   and   also   perused   the   evidence   on   record.     The
appellant had taken an LIC policy in the name of his deceased
wife on 23.03.2002, barely few days before the occurrence.
PW­4, brother of the deceased, deposed that they reached at
six in the morning after being informed of the death of his
sister by others and not the appellant. The mother of the
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deceased   PW­6   deposed   that   the   appellant   was   greedy   for
money   and   prior   to   the   occurrence   he   had   demanded
Rs.10,000 from the witness. 
6. The   appellant   initially   stated   in   the   FIR   that   three
persons entered his house at midnight to abduct him. In his
evidence as DW­1 he stated that there were five persons. If the
intruders had come to abduct the appellant and his wife had
been shot dead after she tried to prevent his abduction, it
would have been all the more convenient for the intruders to
take the appellant away with them. No explanation has been
furnished by the appellant in this regard. The appellant has
not   mentioned   any   reason   or   named   any   on   suspicion   of
enmity or otherwise why the intruders wished to abduct him.
No   details   of   the   physical   features   and   approximate   age,
height, built of the intruders has been mentioned even if they
had their faces covered despite the fact that the spot map
proved by PW­9 and PW­13 establishes the light of an electric
bulb.   The   appellant   initially   took   the   defence   that   he
suspected his wife of having an illicit relationship. The defence
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of unknown intruders having entered by scaling the northern
side wall built of mud and cement is belied by the spot map
and evidence that no damage or marks were found on the wall.
Not a single brick was found disturbed and neither were there
any foot marks in the muddy courtyard of the house.  We see
no reason to differ with the conclusion of the Trial Judge that
there ought to have been some marks or signs of scaling the
wall, if not shifting of bricks especially when three to five
persons are said to have done so. 
7.  In his defence under Section 313 Cr.P.C., the appellant
stated that he had made a complaint against the police to the
superintendent of police and that is why he had been falsely
implicated.     But   no   evidence   was   laid   much   less   copy
furnished of any such complaint.  A bald statement was made
that   he   has   been   falsely   implicated   at   the   behest   of   his
mother­in­law and father­in­law in collusion with department
officials.
8. The appellant as DW­1 stated that villagers came to his
house when he raised hue and cry after the occurrence. He
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has further deposed that eight to ten persons had gone with
him to the police station. But the appellant apart from himself
did not lead any independent defence evidence.  The mere fact
of broken bangles or a thumb injury on the deceased is not
sufficient to absolve the appellant in view of the nature of the
other evidence against him. We find it very difficult to accept
the explanation of the appellant that despite the presence of
five persons, when one of them could have easily over powered
the lady, there was any need for them to shoot her as an
obstruction in the abduction of the appellant.  We have gone
through the  statement  of the  appellant  under Section  313
Cr.P.C. and find that all relevant questions were put to him
including from the spot map.
9. The wife of the appellant met a homicidal death in her
own house past mid night when the appellant was alone with
her.  His defence has completely been disbelieved with regard
to the intruders and we find no reason not to uphold the
same. The prosecution had therefore established a prima facie
case and the onus shifted to the appellant under Section 106
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of the Evidence Act,1872 to explain the circumstances how his
wife met a homicidal death. The appellant failed to furnish any
plausible   defence   and   on   the   contrary   tried   to   lead   false
evidence   which   is   an   additional   aggravating   factor   against
him.
10.  In Trimukh Maroti Kirkan vs. State of Maharashtra,
(2006) 10 SCC 681, it was observed as follows :
“14. If an offence takes place inside the privacy
of a house and in such circumstances where
the assailants have all the opportunity to plan
and   commit   the   offence   at   the   time   and   in
circumstances   of   their   choice,   it   will   be
extremely difficult for the prosecution to lead
evidence to establish the guilt of the accused if
the strict principle of circumstantial evidence,
as   noticed   above,   is   insisted   upon   by   the
courts.   A   judge   does   not   preside   over   a
criminal trial merely to see that no innocent
man is punished. A judge also presides to see
that a guilty man does not escape. Both are
public duties. The law does not enjoin a duty
on the prosecution to lead evidence of such
character which is almost impossible to be led
or at any rate extremely difficult to be led. The
duty   on   the   prosecution   is   to   lead   such
evidence which it is capable of leading, having
regard to the facts and circumstances of the
case.   Here   it   is   necessary   to   keep   in   mind
Section 106 of the Evidence Act which says
that   when   any   fact   is   especially   within   the
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knowledge of any person, the burden of proving
that fact is upon him….
15. Where an offence like murder is committed
in secrecy inside a house, the initial burden to
establish the case would undoubtedly be upon
the prosecution, but the nature and amount of
evidence to be led by it to establish the charge
cannot be of the same degree as is required in
other   cases   of   circumstantial   evidence.   The
burden   would   be   of   a   comparatively   lighter
character.   In   view   of   Section   106   of   the
Evidence   Act   there   will   be   a   corresponding
burden on the inmates of the house to give a
cogent explanation as to how the crime was
committed. The inmates of the house cannot
get away by simply keeping quiet and offering
no explanation on the supposed premise that
the burden to establish its case lies entirely
upon the prosecution and there is no duty at
all on an accused to offer any explanation."
 
11. The deceased had only one entry and exit wound. The
bullet apparently exited her body and thus the likelihood of its
recovery from the place of occurrence with  the round end
damaged after it was fired. The pistol was recovered on the
confession   of   the   appellant   from   under   the   earth   in   the
courtyard,   the   earth   was   freshly   dug.   The   High   Court
disbelieved the recovery because the independent witness PW2 went hostile.  But the High Court missed the reasoning by
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the trial court that PW­2 did not deny his signature on the
recovery   memo   nor   did   he   state   that   his   signature   was
obtained by threat, duress or coercion. The absence of any
FSL report may at best be defective investigation.
12.  We find no reason to interfere with the conviction of the
appellant. All the links in the chain of circumstances point to
the guilt of the appellant alone. The appeal is dismissed.
…………...................J.
[ASHOK BHUSHAN]
…………...................J.
[NAVIN SINHA]
NEW DELHI;
JANUARY 22, 2020
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