1
NONREPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 10571 OF 2018
(arising out of SLP(C) No.6599 of 2018)
MOHAMMED IMRAN ….APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS ….RESPONDENT(S)
JUDGMENT
NAVIN SINHA, J.
Leave granted.
2. The appellant, a successful aspirant for judicial service, is
aggrieved by the order dated 04.06.2010 cancelling his selection for
appointment due to the character verification report of the police, and
the refusal of the High Court to interfere with the same.
3. Mr. Huzefa Ahmadi, learned senior counsel appearing for the
appellant, submits that the denial of appointment on grounds of moral
turpitude is wrong and unsustainable. The appellant has been
2
acquitted of the charge under Sections 363, 366, 34, I.P.C. on
28.10.2004 much before he cleared the examination for appointment in
the year 2009. He had truthfully and honestly disclosed his prosecution
and acquittal by the Sessions Court, Sangli. According to the
allegations, the appellant was in an autorickshaw along with another,
following the autorickshaw in which the main accused was travelling
with the girl. The main accused has also been acquitted of the charge
under Section 376. In similar circumstances, another aspirant Sudhir
Gulabrao Barde, who was prosecuted in Case No.3022 of 2007 under
Sections 294, 504, 34, I.P.C. but acquitted on 24.11.2009, has been
appointed. The appellant has therefore been subjected to arbitrary and
hostile discrimination. Reliance in support of the submissions was
placed on Joginder Singh vs. Union Territory of Chandigarh and
others, 2015 (2) SCC 377.
4. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the appellant
being an aspirant for judicial service, the standards of behaviour and
conduct, to consider suitability for appointment will have to be different
from any other service. He was involved in an act of moral turpitude in
kidnapping of the girl in question. The acquittal, because the
3
prosecutrix turned hostile, cannot come to the aid of the appellant. The
candidate referred to, for contending hostile discrimination, was not
involved in an act of moral turpitude. Mere empanelment for
appointment creates no rights to seek mandamus for appointment. The
fact that he may have disclosed the alleged involvement in the
attestation form, cannot be considered sufficient to ignore his conduct
involving moral turpitude.
5. We have considered the submissions on behalf of the parties. The
only allegation against the appellant in Sessions Case No.173 of 2000 is
that he along with another was travelling in an autorickshaw that was
following the autorickshaw in which the prime accused Bilal, who was
charged under Section 376, IPC, was travelling with the girl in question.
All the accused were acquitted because the prosecutrix did not support
the allegations. The appellant was 21 years of age on the date of
occurrence i.e. 25.05.2000.
6. Employment opportunities is a scarce commodity in our country.
Every advertisement invites a large number of aspirants for limited
number of vacancies. But that may not suffice to invoke sympathy for
grant of relief where the credentials of the candidate may raise serious
4
questions regarding suitability, irrespective of eligibility. Undoubtedly,
judicial service is very different from other services and the yardstick of
suitability that may apply to other services, may not be the same for a
judicial service. But there cannot be any mechanical or rhetorical
incantation of moral turpitude, to deny appointment in judicial service
simplicitor. Much will depend on the facts of a case. Every individual
deserves an opportunity to improve, learn from the past and move
ahead in life by selfimprovement. To make past conduct, irrespective of
all considerations, an albatross around the neck of the candidate, may
not always constitute justice. Much will, however depend on the fact
situation of a case.
7. That the expression “moral turpitude” is not capable of precise
definition was considered in Pawan Kumar vs. State of Haryana and
another, (1996) 4 SCC 17, opining:
“12. “Moral turpitude” is an expression which is used
in legal as also societal parlance to describe conduct
which is inherently base, vile, depraved or having
any connection showing depravity….”
8. The appellant by dint of hard academic labour was successful at
the competitive examination held on 16.08.2009 and after viva voce was
5
selected and recommended for appointment by the Maharashtra Public
Service Commission on 14.10.2009. In his attestation form, he had
duly disclosed his prosecution and acquittal. Mere disclosure in an
appropriate case may not be sufficient to hold for suitability in
employment. Nonetheless the nature of allegations and the conduct in
the facts of a case would certainly be a relevant factor. While others so
recommended came to be appointed, the selection of the appellant was
annulled on 04.06.2010 in view of the character verification report of
the police.
9. It is an undisputed fact that one Shri Sudhir Gulabrao Barde, who
had been acquitted on 24.11.2009 in Case No.3022 of 2007 under
Sections 294, 504, 34, IPC, has been appointed. We are not convinced,
that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the appellant
could be discriminated and denied appointment arbitrarily when both
the appointments were in judicial service, by the same selection
procedure, of persons who faced criminal prosecutions and were
acquitted. The distinction sought to be drawn by the respondents, that
the former was not involved in a case of moral turpitude does not leave
us convinced. In Joginder Singh (supra), it was observed as follows:
6
“25. Further, apart from a small dent in the name of
this criminal case in which he has been honourably
acquitted, there is no other material on record to
indicate that the antecedents or the conduct of the
Appellant was not up to the mark to appoint him to
the post….”
10. In the present proceedings, on 23.03.2018, this Court had called
for a confidential report of the character verification as also the
antecedents of the appellant as on this date. The report received reveals
that except for the criminal case under reference in which he has been
acquitted, the appellant has a clean record and there is no adverse
material against him to deny him the fruits of his academic labour in a
competitive selection for the post of a judicial officer. In our opinion, no
reasonable person on the basis of the materials placed before us can
come to the conclusion that the antecedents and character of the
appellant are such that he is unfit to be appointed as a judicial officer.
An alleged single misadventure or misdemeanour of the present nature,
if it can be considered to be so, cannot be sufficient to deny
appointment to the appellant when he has on all other aspects and
parameters been found to be fit for appointment. The Law is well settled
in this regard in Avtar Singh vs. Union of India and others, (2016) 8
7
SCC 471. If empanelment creates no right to appointment, equally
there can be no arbitrary denial of appointment after empanelment.
11. In the entirety of the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of
the considered opinion that the consideration of the candidature of the
appellant and its rejection are afflicted by a myopic vision, blurred by
the spectacle of what has been described as moral turpitude, reflecting
inadequate appreciation and application of facts also, as justice may
demand.
12. We, therefore, consider the present a fit case to set aside the order
dated 04.06.2010 and the impugned order dismissing the writ petition,
and direct the respondents to reconsider the candidature of the
appellant. Let such fresh consideration be done and an appropriate
decision be taken in light of the present discussion, preferably within a
maximum period of eight weeks from the date of receipt and production
of the copy of the present order. In order to avoid any future litigation
on seniority or otherwise, we make it clear that in the event of
appointment, the appellant shall not be entitled to any other reliefs.
8
13. The appeal is allowed as above.
.....……………………….J.
(Kurian Joseph)
.…………………………...J.
(Sanjay Kishan Kaul)
….………………………..J.
(Navin Sinha)
New Delhi,
October 12, 2018.
NONREPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 10571 OF 2018
(arising out of SLP(C) No.6599 of 2018)
MOHAMMED IMRAN ….APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS ….RESPONDENT(S)
JUDGMENT
NAVIN SINHA, J.
Leave granted.
2. The appellant, a successful aspirant for judicial service, is
aggrieved by the order dated 04.06.2010 cancelling his selection for
appointment due to the character verification report of the police, and
the refusal of the High Court to interfere with the same.
3. Mr. Huzefa Ahmadi, learned senior counsel appearing for the
appellant, submits that the denial of appointment on grounds of moral
turpitude is wrong and unsustainable. The appellant has been
2
acquitted of the charge under Sections 363, 366, 34, I.P.C. on
28.10.2004 much before he cleared the examination for appointment in
the year 2009. He had truthfully and honestly disclosed his prosecution
and acquittal by the Sessions Court, Sangli. According to the
allegations, the appellant was in an autorickshaw along with another,
following the autorickshaw in which the main accused was travelling
with the girl. The main accused has also been acquitted of the charge
under Section 376. In similar circumstances, another aspirant Sudhir
Gulabrao Barde, who was prosecuted in Case No.3022 of 2007 under
Sections 294, 504, 34, I.P.C. but acquitted on 24.11.2009, has been
appointed. The appellant has therefore been subjected to arbitrary and
hostile discrimination. Reliance in support of the submissions was
placed on Joginder Singh vs. Union Territory of Chandigarh and
others, 2015 (2) SCC 377.
4. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the appellant
being an aspirant for judicial service, the standards of behaviour and
conduct, to consider suitability for appointment will have to be different
from any other service. He was involved in an act of moral turpitude in
kidnapping of the girl in question. The acquittal, because the
3
prosecutrix turned hostile, cannot come to the aid of the appellant. The
candidate referred to, for contending hostile discrimination, was not
involved in an act of moral turpitude. Mere empanelment for
appointment creates no rights to seek mandamus for appointment. The
fact that he may have disclosed the alleged involvement in the
attestation form, cannot be considered sufficient to ignore his conduct
involving moral turpitude.
5. We have considered the submissions on behalf of the parties. The
only allegation against the appellant in Sessions Case No.173 of 2000 is
that he along with another was travelling in an autorickshaw that was
following the autorickshaw in which the prime accused Bilal, who was
charged under Section 376, IPC, was travelling with the girl in question.
All the accused were acquitted because the prosecutrix did not support
the allegations. The appellant was 21 years of age on the date of
occurrence i.e. 25.05.2000.
6. Employment opportunities is a scarce commodity in our country.
Every advertisement invites a large number of aspirants for limited
number of vacancies. But that may not suffice to invoke sympathy for
grant of relief where the credentials of the candidate may raise serious
4
questions regarding suitability, irrespective of eligibility. Undoubtedly,
judicial service is very different from other services and the yardstick of
suitability that may apply to other services, may not be the same for a
judicial service. But there cannot be any mechanical or rhetorical
incantation of moral turpitude, to deny appointment in judicial service
simplicitor. Much will depend on the facts of a case. Every individual
deserves an opportunity to improve, learn from the past and move
ahead in life by selfimprovement. To make past conduct, irrespective of
all considerations, an albatross around the neck of the candidate, may
not always constitute justice. Much will, however depend on the fact
situation of a case.
7. That the expression “moral turpitude” is not capable of precise
definition was considered in Pawan Kumar vs. State of Haryana and
another, (1996) 4 SCC 17, opining:
“12. “Moral turpitude” is an expression which is used
in legal as also societal parlance to describe conduct
which is inherently base, vile, depraved or having
any connection showing depravity….”
8. The appellant by dint of hard academic labour was successful at
the competitive examination held on 16.08.2009 and after viva voce was
5
selected and recommended for appointment by the Maharashtra Public
Service Commission on 14.10.2009. In his attestation form, he had
duly disclosed his prosecution and acquittal. Mere disclosure in an
appropriate case may not be sufficient to hold for suitability in
employment. Nonetheless the nature of allegations and the conduct in
the facts of a case would certainly be a relevant factor. While others so
recommended came to be appointed, the selection of the appellant was
annulled on 04.06.2010 in view of the character verification report of
the police.
9. It is an undisputed fact that one Shri Sudhir Gulabrao Barde, who
had been acquitted on 24.11.2009 in Case No.3022 of 2007 under
Sections 294, 504, 34, IPC, has been appointed. We are not convinced,
that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the appellant
could be discriminated and denied appointment arbitrarily when both
the appointments were in judicial service, by the same selection
procedure, of persons who faced criminal prosecutions and were
acquitted. The distinction sought to be drawn by the respondents, that
the former was not involved in a case of moral turpitude does not leave
us convinced. In Joginder Singh (supra), it was observed as follows:
6
“25. Further, apart from a small dent in the name of
this criminal case in which he has been honourably
acquitted, there is no other material on record to
indicate that the antecedents or the conduct of the
Appellant was not up to the mark to appoint him to
the post….”
10. In the present proceedings, on 23.03.2018, this Court had called
for a confidential report of the character verification as also the
antecedents of the appellant as on this date. The report received reveals
that except for the criminal case under reference in which he has been
acquitted, the appellant has a clean record and there is no adverse
material against him to deny him the fruits of his academic labour in a
competitive selection for the post of a judicial officer. In our opinion, no
reasonable person on the basis of the materials placed before us can
come to the conclusion that the antecedents and character of the
appellant are such that he is unfit to be appointed as a judicial officer.
An alleged single misadventure or misdemeanour of the present nature,
if it can be considered to be so, cannot be sufficient to deny
appointment to the appellant when he has on all other aspects and
parameters been found to be fit for appointment. The Law is well settled
in this regard in Avtar Singh vs. Union of India and others, (2016) 8
7
SCC 471. If empanelment creates no right to appointment, equally
there can be no arbitrary denial of appointment after empanelment.
11. In the entirety of the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of
the considered opinion that the consideration of the candidature of the
appellant and its rejection are afflicted by a myopic vision, blurred by
the spectacle of what has been described as moral turpitude, reflecting
inadequate appreciation and application of facts also, as justice may
demand.
12. We, therefore, consider the present a fit case to set aside the order
dated 04.06.2010 and the impugned order dismissing the writ petition,
and direct the respondents to reconsider the candidature of the
appellant. Let such fresh consideration be done and an appropriate
decision be taken in light of the present discussion, preferably within a
maximum period of eight weeks from the date of receipt and production
of the copy of the present order. In order to avoid any future litigation
on seniority or otherwise, we make it clear that in the event of
appointment, the appellant shall not be entitled to any other reliefs.
8
13. The appeal is allowed as above.
.....……………………….J.
(Kurian Joseph)
.…………………………...J.
(Sanjay Kishan Kaul)
….………………………..J.
(Navin Sinha)
New Delhi,
October 12, 2018.
