1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.5009 OF 2016
[Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.11621 of 2009]
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX,
MUMBAI ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
AMITABH BACHCHAN ...RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO.5010 OF 2016
[Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.861 of 2013]
J U D G M E N T
RANJAN GOGOI, J.
SLP(C) NO. 11621 OF 2009
1. Leave granted.
2. The appellant - Revenue seeks to challenge the order
of the High Court dated 7th August, 2008 dismissing the appeal
filed by it under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961
(hereinafter referred to as ‘”the Act”) and affirming the order of
the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai Bench (“Tribunal”
2
for short) dated 28th August, 2007 whereby the order dated 20th
March, 2006 passed by the Commissioner of Income Tax-1,
Mumbai (“C.I.T.” for short) under Section 263 of the Act was
reversed. The assessment year in question is 2001-2002 and
the assessment order is dated 30th March, 2004.
3. After the assessment as above was finalized, a show
cause notice dated 7th November, 2005 under Section 263 of
the Act was issued by the learned C.I.T. detailing as many as
eleven (11) issues/grounds on which the assessment order was
proposed to be revised under Section 263 of the Act. The
respondent - assessee filed his reply to the said show cause
notice on consideration of which by order dated 20th March,
2006 the learned C.I.T. set aside the order of assessment dated
30th March, 2004 and directed a fresh assessment to be made.
Aggrieved, the respondent – assessee challenged the said order
before the learned Tribunal which was allowed by the order
dated 28th August, 2007.
4. Aggrieved by the order dated 28th August, 2007 of
the learned Tribunal, the Revenue filed an appeal under
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Section 260A of the Act before the High Court of Bombay. The
aforesaid appeal i.e. ITA No.293 of 2008 was summarily
dismissed by the High Court by the impugned order dated 7th
August, 2008 holding that as the C.I.T. had gone beyond the
scope of the show cause notice dated 7th November, 2005 and
had dealt with the issues not covered/mentioned in the said
notice the revisional order dated 20th March, 2006 was in
violation of the principles of natural justice. So far as the
question as to whether the Assessing Officer had made
sufficient enquiries about the assessee’s claim of expenses
made in the re-revised return of income is concerned, which
question was formulated as question No.2 for the High Court’s
consideration, the High Court took the view that the said
question raised pure questions of fact and, therefore, ought not
to be examined under Section 260A of the Act. The appeal of
the Revenue was consequently dismissed. Aggrieved, this
appeal has been filed upon grant of leave under Article 136 of
the Constitution of India.
5. We have heard Shri Ranjit Kumar, learned Solicitor
General appearing for the appellant Revenue and Shri Shyam
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Divan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent –
assessee.
6. The assessment in question was set aside by the
learned C.I.T. by the order dated 20th March, 2006 on the
principal ground that requisite and due enquiries were not
made by the Assessing Officer prior to finalization of the
assessment by order dated 30th March, 2004. In this
connection, the learned C.I.T. on consideration of the facts of
the case and the record of the proceedings came to the
conclusion that in the course of the assessment proceedings
despite several opportunities the assessee did not submit the
requisite books of account and documents and deliberately
dragged the matter leading to one adjournment after the other.
Eventually, the Assessing Officer, to avoid the bar of limitation,
had no option but to “hurriedly” finalize the assessment
proceedings which on due and proper scrutiny disclosed that
the necessary enquiries were not made. On the said basis the
learned C.I.T. came to the conclusion that the assessment
order in question was erroneous and prejudicial to the
interests of the Revenue warranting exercise of power under
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Section 263 of the Act. Consequently, the assessment for the
year 2001-2002 was set aside and a fresh assessment was
ordered. At this stage, it must be noticed that in the order
dated 20th March, 2006 the learned C.I.T. arrived at findings
and conclusions in respect of issues which were not specifically
mentioned in the show cause notice dated 7th November, 2005.
In fact, on as many as seven/eight (07/08) issues mentioned in
the said show cause notice the learned C.I.T. did not record
any finding whereas conclusions adverse to the assessee were
recorded on issues not specifically mentioned in the said notice
before proceeding to hold that the assessment needs to be set
aside. However, three (03) of the issues, details of which are
noticed herein below, are common to the show cause notice as
well as the revisional order of the learned C.I.T.
7. On appeal, the learned Tribunal took the view that
the learned C.I.T. exercising powers under Section 263 of the
Act could not have gone beyond the issues mentioned in the
show cause notice dated 7th November, 2005. The learned
Tribunal, therefore, thought it proper to take the view that in
respect of the issues not mentioned in the show cause notice
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the findings as recorded in the revisional order dated 20th
March, 2006 have to be understood to be in breach of the
principles of natural justice. The learned Tribunal also
specifically considered the three (03) common issues
mentioned above and on such consideration arrived at the
conclusion that the reasons disclosed by the learned C.I.T. in
the order dated 20th March, 2006 for holding the assessment to
be liable for cancellation on that basis are not tenable.
Accordingly, the learned Tribunal allowed the appeal of the
assessee and reversed the order of the suo motu revision dated
20th March, 2006.
8. At this stage, it may be appropriate to reproduce
hereunder the provisions of Section 263 of the Act to
appreciate the arguments advanced and to understand the
contours of the suo motu revisional power vested in the learned
C.I.T. by the aforesaid provision of the Act.
“263 - Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue.-(1)
The Principal Commissioner or
Commissioner may call for and examine the
record of any proceeding under this Act,
and if he considers that any order passed
therein by the Assessing Officer is erroneous
in so far as it is prejudicial to the interests
of the revenue, he may, after giving
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the assessee an opportunity of being heard
and after making or causing to be made
such inquiry as he deems necessary, pass
such order thereon as the circumstances of
the case justify, including an order enhancing
or modifying the assessment, or cancelling
the assessment and directing a fresh
assessment.
Explanation………………………………………...”
9. Under the Act different shades of power have been
conferred on different authorities to deal with orders of
assessment passed by the primary authority. While Section
147 confers power on the Assessing Authority itself to proceed
against income escaping assessment, Section 154 of the Act
empowers such authority to correct a mistake apparent on the
face of the record. The power of appeal and revision is
contained in Chapter XX of the Act which includes Section 263
that confer suo motu power of revision in the learned C.I.T. The
different shades of power conferred on different authorities
under the Act has to be exercised within the areas specifically
delineated by the Act and the exercise of power under one
provision cannot trench upon the powers available under
another provision of the Act. In this regard, it must be
specifically noticed that against an order of assessment, so far
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as the Revenue is concerned, the power conferred under the
Act is to reopen the concluded assessment under Section 147
and/or to revise the assessment order under Section 263 of the
Act. The scope of the power/jurisdiction under the different
provisions of the Act would naturally be different. The power
and jurisdiction of the Revenue to deal with a concluded
assessment, therefore, must be understood in the context of
the provisions of the relevant Sections noticed above. While
doing so it must also be borne in mind that the legislature had
not vested in the Revenue any specific power to question an
order of assessment by means of an appeal.
10. Reverting to the specific provisions of Section 263 of the
Act what has to be seen is that a satisfaction that an order
passed by the Authority under the Act is erroneous and
prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue is the basic
pre-condition for exercise of jurisdiction under Section 263 of
the Act. Both are twin conditions that have to be conjointly
present. Once such satisfaction is reached, jurisdiction to
exercise the power would be available subject to observance of
the principles of natural justice which is implicit in the
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requirement cast by the Section to give the assessee an
opportunity of being heard. It is in the context of the above
position that this Court has repeatedly held that unlike the
power of reopening an assessment under Section 147 of the
Act, the power of revision under Section 263 is not contingent
on the giving of a notice to show cause. In fact, Section 263
has been understood not to require any specific show cause
notice to be served on the assessee. Rather, what is required
under the said provision is an opportunity of hearing to the
assessee. The two requirements are different; the first would
comprehend a prior notice detailing the specific grounds on
which revision of the assessment order is tentatively being
proposed. Such a notice is not required. What is contemplated
by Section 263, is an opportunity of hearing to be afforded to
the assessee. Failure to give such an opportunity would render
the revisional order legally fragile not on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction but on the ground of violation of principles of
natural justice. Reference in this regard may be illustratively
made to the decisions of this Court in Gita Devi Aggarwal vs.
Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal and others1 and
1
(1970) 76 ITR 496
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in The C.I.T., West Bengal, II, Calcutta vs. M/s Electro
House2
. Paragraph 4 of the decision in The C.I.T., West
Bengal, II, Calcutta vs. M/s Electro House (supra) being
illumination of the issue indicated above may be usefully
reproduced hereunder:
“This section unlike Section 34 does not prescribe
any notice to be given. It only requires
the Commissioner to give an opportunity to the
assessee of being heard. The section does not
speak of any notice. It is unfortunate that the
High Court failed to notice the difference in
language between Sections 33-B and 34. For
the assumption of jurisdiction to proceed under
Section 34, the notice as prescribed in that
section is a condition precedent. But no such
notice is contemplated by Section 33-B. The
jurisdiction of the Commissioner to proceed
under Section 33-B is not dependent on the
fulfilment of any condition precedent. All that
he is required to do before reaching his decision
and not before commencing the enquiry,
he must give the assessee an opportunity of
being heard and make or cause to make such
enquiry as he deems necessary. Those requirements
have nothing to do with the jurisdiction
of the Commissioner. They pertain to the region
of natural justice. Breach of the principles
of natural justice may affect the legality of the
order made but that does not affect the jurisdiction
of the Commissioner. At present we are
not called upon to consider whether the order
made by the Commissioner is vitiated because
of the contravention of any of the principles of
2
(1971) 82 ITR 824
11
natural justice. The scope of these appeals is
very narrow. All that we have to see is whether
before assuming jurisdiction the Commissioner
was required to issue a notice and if he was so
required what that notice should have contained?
Our answer to that question has already
been made clear. In our judgment no notice
was required to be issued by the Commissioner
before assuming jurisdiction to proceed
under Section 33-B. Therefore the question
what that notice should contain does not arise
for consideration. It is not necessary nor
proper for us in this case to consider as to the
nature of the enquiry to be held under Section
33-B. Therefore, we refrain from spelling out
what principles of natural justice should be
observed in an enquiry under Section 33-B.
This Court in Gita Devi Aggarwal v. CIT, West
Bengal ruled that Section 33-B does not in express
terms require a notice to be served on
the assessee as in the case of Section 34. Section
33-B merely requires that an opportunity
of being heard should be given to the assessee
and the stringent requirement of service of notice
under Section 34 cannot, therefore, be applied
to a proceeding under Section 33-B.”
(Page 827-828).
[Note: Section 33-B and Section 34 of the Income Tax Act, 1922
corresponds to Section 263 and Section 147 of the Income Tax
Act, 1961]
11. It may be that in a given case and in most cases it is
so done a notice proposing the revisional exercise is given to
the assessee indicating therein broadly or even specifically the
grounds on which the exercise is felt necessary. But there is
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nothing in the section (Section 263) to raise the said notice to
the status of a mandatory show cause notice affecting the
initiation of the exercise in the absence thereof or to require the
C.I.T. to confine himself to the terms of the notice and
foreclosing consideration of any other issue or question of fact.
This is not the purport of Section 263. Of course, there can be
no dispute that while the C.I.T. is free to exercise his
jurisdiction on consideration of all relevant facts, a full
opportunity to controvert the same and to explain the
circumstances surrounding such facts, as may be considered
relevant by the assessee, must be afforded to him by the C.I.T.
prior to the finalization of the decision.
12. In the present case, there is no dispute that in the
order dated 20th March, 2006 passed by the learned C.I.T.
under Section 263 of the Act findings have been recorded on
issues that are not specifically mentioned in the show cause
notice dated 7th November, 2005 though there are three (03)
issues mentioned in the show cause notice dated 7th November,
2005 which had specifically been dealt with in the order dated
20th March, 2006. The learned Tribunal in its order dated 28th
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August, 2007 put the aforesaid two features of the case into
two different compartments. Insofar as the first question i.e.
findings contained in the order of the learned C.I.T. dated 20th
March, 2006 beyond the issues mentioned in the show cause
notice is concerned the learned Tribunal taking note of the
aforesaid admitted position held as follows:
“In the case on hand, the CIT has assumed
jurisdiction by issuing show cause notice u/s
263 but while passing the final order he relied
on various other grounds for coming to the
final conclusion. This itself makes the revision
order bad in law and also violative of principles
of natural justice and thus not maintainable.
If, during the course of revision proceedings
the CIT was of the opinion that the order of the
AO was erroneous on some other grounds also
or on any additional grounds not mentioned in
the show cause notice, he ought to have given
another show cause notice to the assessee on
those grounds and given him a reasonable
opportunity of hearing before coming to the
conclusion and passing the final revision
order. In the case on hand, the CIT has not
done so. Thus, the order u/s 263 is violative
of principles of natural justice as far as the
reasons, which formed the basis for the
revision but were not part of the show cause
notice issued u/s 263 are concerned. The
order of the CIT passed u/s 263 is therefore
liable to be quashed in so far as those grounds
are concerned.”
13. The above ground which had led the learned Tribunal to
interfere with the order of the learned C.I.T. seems to be
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contrary to the settled position in law, as indicated above and
the two decisions of this Court in Gita Devi Aggarwal (supra)
and M/s Electro House (supra). The learned Tribunal in its
order dated 28th August, 2007 had not recorded any finding
that in course of the suo motu revisional proceedings, hearing
of which was spread over many days and attended to by the
authorized representative of the assessee, opportunity of
hearing was not afforded to the assessee and that the assessee
was denied an opportunity to contest the facts on the basis of
which the learned C.I.T. had come to his conclusions as
recorded in the order dated 20th March, 2006. Despite the
absence of any such finding in the order of the learned
Tribunal, before holding the same to be legally unsustainable
the Court will have to be satisfied that in the course of the
revisional proceeding the assessee, actually and really, did not
have the opportunity to contest the facts on the basis of which
the learned C.I.T. had concluded that the order of the
Assessing Officer is erroneous and prejudicial to the interests
of the Revenue. The above is the question to which the Court,
therefore, will have to turn to.
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14. To determine the above question we have read and
considered the order of the Assessing Officer dated 30th March,
2004; as well as the order of the learned C.I.T. dated 20th
March, 2006. From the above consideration, it appears that
the learned C.I.T. in the course of the revisional proceedings
had scrutinized the record of the proceedings before the
Assessing Officer and noted the various dates on which
opportunities to produce the books of account and other
relevant documents were afforded to the assessee which
requirement was not complied with by the assessee. In these
circumstances, the revisional authority took the view that the
Assessing Officer, after being compelled to adjourn the matter
from time to time, had to hurriedly complete the assessment
proceedings to avoid the same from becoming time barred. In
the course of the revisional exercise relevant facts, documents,
and books of account which were overlooked in the assessment
proceedings were considered. On such re-scrutiny it was
revealed that the original assessment order on several heads
was erroneous and had the potential of causing loss of revenue
to the State. It is on the aforesaid basis that the necessary
satisfaction that the assessment order dated 30th March, 2004
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was erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the revenue
was recorded by the learned C.I.T. At each stage of the
revisional proceeding the authorized representative of the
assessee had appeared and had full opportunity to contest the
basis on which the revisional authority was proceeding/had
proceeded in the matter. If the revisional authority had come
to its conclusions in the matter on the basis of the record of the
assessment proceedings which was open for scrutiny by the
assessee and available to his authorized representative at all
times it is difficult to see as to how the requirement of giving of
a reasonable opportunity of being heard as contemplated by
Section 263 of the Act had been breached in the present case.
The order of the learned Tribunal insofar as the first issue i.e.
the revisional order going beyond the show cause notice is
concerned, therefore, cannot have our acceptance. The High
Court having failed to fully deal with the matter in its cryptic
order dated 7th August, 2008 we are of the view that the said
orders are not tenable and are liable to be interfered with.
15. This will bring us to a consideration of the second
limb of the case as dealt with by the learned Tribunal, namely,
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that tenability of the order of the learned C.I.T. on the three
(03) issues mentioned in the show cause notice and also dealt
with in the revisional order dated 20th March, 2006. The
aforesaid three (03) issues are:
“i) Assessee maintaining 5 bank accounts
and AO not examining the 5th bank
account, books of account and any other
bank account where receipts related to
KBC were banked.
ii) Regarding claim of deposits of Rs.52.06
lakhs in Special Bench A/c No.11155
under the head “Receipts on behalf of
Mrs. Jaya Bachchan and
iii) Regarding the claim of additional
expenses in the re-revised return.”
16. On the above issues the learned Tribunal had given
detailed reasons for not accepting the grounds cited in the
revisional order for setting aside the assessment under Section
263 of the Act. The reasons cited by the learned Tribunal
insofar as the first two issues are concerned may not justify a
serious relook and hence need not be gone into. The third
question would, however, require some detailed attention. The
said question is with regard to the claim of additional expenses
made by the assessee in its re-revised return which was
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subsequently withdrawn.
17. The assessee in the re-revised return dated 31st
March, 2003 had made a claim of additional expenses of 30%
of the gross professional receipts (Rs.3.17 crores). It appears
that the Assessing Officer required the assessee to file requisite
details in this regard. The assessee responded by letter dated
13th February, 2004 stating as follows:
“With regard to the 30% estimated expenses
claimed, we have to submit that these are the
expenses which are spent for security purposes
by employing certain Agencies, guards etc. for
the personal safety of Shri Bachchan as he has
to protect himself from various threats to his
life received by him and to avoid extortion of
money from gangsters. The names of such
Agencies cannot be disclosed/divulged as there
is a possibility of leakage of information of
Agencies’ names from the office staff, which will
obviously be detrimental to the interests of Shri
Bachchan. The payments have been made out
of cash balances available and lot of
outstanding expenses are to be paid which
could not be paid for want of income.”
18. Thereafter by letter dated 13th March, 2004 the assessee
informed the learned C.I.T. that the claim was made on a belief
that the same is allowable but as it will not be feasible for the
assessee to substantiate the same, the re-revised return of
19
income may be taken to the withdrawn. It appears that
thereafter the Assessing Officer issued a notice to show cause
as to why the provisions of Section 69-C should not be invoked
and the expenses claimed should not be treated as unexplained
expenditure. In reply, the assessee by letter dated 24th March,
2004 submitted that the claim was made as a standard
deduction and that the assessee had been wrongly advised to
make the said claim and as the same has been withdrawn,
Section 69-C will have no application. The record of the
assessment proceedings disclose that the said stand was
accepted by the Assessing Officer and the matter was not
pursued any further.
19. The learned C.I.T. took the view that
notwithstanding the withdrawal of the claim by the assessee, in
view of the earlier stand taken that the said expenses were
incurred for security purposes of the assessee, the Assessing
Officer ought to have proceeded with the matter as the
assessee was following the cash system of accounting and the
filing of the re-revised return, prima facie, indicated that the
additional expenses claimed had been incurred. In this regard,
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the following findings/reasons recorded by the learned C.I.T. in
the order dated 20th March, 2006 would be of particular
relevance:
“Withdrawal of claim by assessee can be for
variety of reasons and this does not mean that
Assessing Officer should abandon enquiries
regarding sources for incurring expenses.
Assessee follows cash system of accounting
and the claim regarding additional expenses
was made through duly verified revised return.
The claim was pressed during assessment
proceedings carried on by A.O. after filing
revised return and it was specially stated in
letter dated 13.02.2004 that expenses were for
security purposes and that payments have
been made out of cash balances available etc.
Under the circumstances, the Assessing
Officer was expected to examine the matter
further to arrive at a definite finding whether
assessee incurred expenses or not and in case,
actually incurred, then what were sources for
incurring these expenses. Assessing Officer
was satisfied on withdrawal of the claim and in
my view, his failure to decide the matter
regarding actual incurring of additional
expenses and sources thereof resulted into
erroneous order which is prejudicial to the
interest of revenue.”
20. An argument has been made on behalf of the
assessee that notice under Section 69-C was issued by the
Assessing Officer and thereafter on withdrawal of the claim by
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the assessee the Assessing Officer thought that the matter
ought not to be investigated any further. This, according to the
learned counsel for the assessee, is a possible view and when
two views are possible on an issue, exercise of revisional power
under Section 263 would not be justified. Reliance in this
regard has been placed on a judgment of this Court in
Malabar Industrial Co. Ltd. vs. CIT3 which has
been approved in Commissioner of Income-tax vs. Max
India Ltd. 4
21. There can be no doubt that so long as the view taken
by the Assessing Officer is a possible view the same ought not
to be interfered with by the Commissioner under Section 263 of
the Act merely on the ground that there is another possible
view of the matter. Permitting exercise of revisional power in a
situation where two views are possible would really amount to
conferring some kind of an appellate power in the revisional
authority. This is a course of action that must be desisted
from. However, the above is not the situation in the present
case in view of the reasons stated by the learned C.I.T. on the
3
(2000) 243 ITR 83 (SC)
4
(2007) 295 ITR 282 (SC)
22
basis of which the said authority felt that the matter needed
further investigation, a view with which we wholly agree.
Making a claim which would prima facie disclose that the
expenses in respect of which deduction has been claimed has
been incurred and thereafter abandoning/withdrawing the
same gives rise to the necessity of further enquiry in the
interest of the Revenue. The notice issued under Section 69-C
of the Act could not have been simply dropped on the ground
that the claim has been withdrawn. We, therefore, are of the
opinion that the learned C.I.T. was perfectly justified in coming
to his conclusions insofar as the issue No.(iii) is concerned and
in passing the impugned order on that basis. The learned
Tribunal as well as the High Court, therefore, ought not to have
interfered with the said conclusion.
22. In the light of the discussions that have preceded
and for the reasons alluded we are of the opinion that the
present is a fit case for exercise of the suo motu revisional
powers of the learned C.I.T. under Section 263 of the Act. The
order of the learned C.I.T., therefore, is restored and those of
the learned Tribunal dated 28th August, 2007 and the High
23
Court dated 7th August, 2008 are set aside. The appeal of the
Revenue is allowed.
SLP(C) No.861 of 2013
23. Leave granted.
24. Pursuant to the revisional order dated 20th March,
2006 under Section 263 of the Income Tax Act setting aside the
assessment order for the assessment year 2001-2002 and
directing fresh assessment, a fresh assessment had been made
by the Assessing Officer by order dated 29th December, 2006.
Against the said order the respondent assessee filed an appeal
before the learned Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals). By
order dated 18th October, 2007 the learned Commissioner of
Income Tax (Appeals) had set aside the assessment order dated
29th December, 2006 as in the meantime, by order dated 28th
August, 2007 of the learned Income Tax Appellate Tribunal the
revisional order dated 20th March, 2006 under Section 263 of
the Act was set aside. The Revenue’s appeal before the learned
Tribunal against the order dated 18th October, 2007 was
dismissed on 11th January, 2000 and by the High Court on 29th
February, 2012. Against the aforesaid order of the High Court
24
this appeal has been filed by the Revenue. As by the order
passed today in the Civil Appeal arising out of Special Leave
Petition (Civil) No.11621 of 2009 we have restored the suo motu
revisional order dated 20th March, 2006 passed by the learned
C.I.T., we allow this appeal filed by the Revenue and set aside
the order dated 11th January, 2010 passed by the learned
Tribunal and the order dated 29th February, 2012 passed by
the High Court referred to above. However, we have to add that
as the re-assessment order dated 29th December, 2006 had not
been tested on merits the assessee would be free to do so, if he
is so inclined and so advised.
25. The appeals are disposed of in the above terms.
….……......................,J.
[RANJAN GOGOI]
….……......................,J.
[PRAFULLA C. PANT]
NEW DELHI
MAY 11, 2016
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