REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1020 OF 2010
[Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 407 of 2006]
Rangappa ... Appellant
Versus
Sri Mohan ... Respondent
JUDGMENT
K.G. Balakrishnan, C.J.I.
1. Leave granted.
2. In the present case, the trial court had acquitted the
appellant-accused in a case related to the dishonour of a
cheque under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,
1881 [Hereinafter `Act']. This finding of acquittal had been
made by the Addl. JMFC at Ranebennur, Karnataka in
Criminal Case No. 993/2001, by way of a judgment dated
30-5-2005. On appeal by the respondent-complainant, the
High Court had reversed the trial court's decision and
1
recorded a finding of conviction while directing that the
appellant-accused should pay a fine of Rs. 75,000, failing
which he would have to undergo three months simple
imprisonment (S.I.). Aggrieved by this final order passed by the
High Court of Karnataka [in Criminal Appeal No. 1367/2005]
dated 26-10-2005, the appellant-accused has approached this
Court by way of a petition seeking special leave to appeal. The
legal question before us pertains to the proper interpretation of
Section 139 of the Act which shifts the burden of proof on to
the accused in respect of cheque bouncing cases. More
specifically, we have been asked to clarify the manner in which
this statutory presumption can be rebutted.
3. Before addressing the legal question, it would be apt to
survey the facts leading up to the present litigation.
Admittedly, both the appellant-accused and the respondent-
claimant are residents of Ranebennur, Karnataka. The
appellant-accused is a mechanic who had engaged the services
of the respondent-complainant who is a Civil Engineer, for the
purpose of supervising the construction of his house in
2
Ranebennur. The said construction was completed on 20-10-
1998 and this indicates that the parties were well acquainted
with each other.
4. As per the respondent-complainant, the chain of facts
unfolded in the following manner. In October 1998, the
accused had requested him for a hand loan of Rs. 45,000 in
order to meet the construction expenses. In view of their
acquaintance, the complainant had paid Rs. 45,000 by way of
cash. On receiving this amount, the appellant-accused had
initially assured repayment by October 1999 but on the failure
to do so, he sought more time till December 2000. The
accused had then issued a cheque bearing No. 0886322,
post-dated for 8-2-2001 for Rs. 45,000 drawn on Syndicate
Bank, Kudremukh Branch. Consequently, on 8-2-2001, the
complainant had presented this cheque through Karnataka
Bank, Ranebennur for encashment. However, on 16-2-2001
the said Bank issued a return memo stating that the `Payment
has been stopped by the drawer' and this memo was handed
over to the complainant on 21-2-2001. The complainant had
3
then issued notice to the accused in this regard on 26-2-2001.
On receiving the same, the accused failed to honour the
cheque within the statutorily prescribed period and also did
not reply to the notice sent in the manner contemplated under
Section 138 of the Act. Following these developments, the
complainant had filed a complaint (under Section 200 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure) against the accused for the
offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act.
5. The appellant-accused had raised the defence that the
cheque in question was a blank cheque bearing his signature
which had been lost and that it had come into the hands of
the complainant who had then tried to misuse it. The
accused's case was that there was no legally enforceable debt
or liability between the parties since he had not asked for a
hand loan as alleged by the complainant.
6. The trial judge found in favour of the accused by taking
note of some discrepancies in the complainant's version. As
per the trial judge, in the course of the cross-examination the
4
complainant was not certain as to when the accused had
actually issued the cheque. It was noted that while the
complaint stated that the cheque had been issued in
December 2000, at a later point it was conceded that the
cheque had been handed over when the accused had met the
complainant to obtain the work completion certificate for his
house in March 2001. Later, it was stated that the cheque had
been with the complainant about 15-20 days prior to the
presentation of the same for encashment, which would place
the date of handing over of the cheque in January 2001.
Furthermore, the trial judge noted that in the complaint it had
been submitted that the complainant had paid Rs. 45,000 in
cash as a hand loan to the accused, whereas during the
cross-examination it appeared that the complainant had spent
this amount during the construction of the accused's house
from time to time and that the complainant had realised the
extent of the liability after auditing the costs on completion of
the construction. Apart from these discrepancies on part of the
complainant, the trial judge also noted that the accused used
to pay the complainant a monthly salary in lieu of his services
5
as a building supervisor apart from periodically handing over
money which was used for the construction of the house. In
light of these regular payments, the trial judge found it
unlikely that the complainant would have spent his own
money on the construction work. With regard to these
observations, the trial judge held that there was no material to
substantiate that the accused had issued the cheque in
relation to a legally enforceable debt. It was observed that the
accused's failure to reply to the notice sent by the complainant
did not attract the presumption under Section 139 of the Act
since the complainant had failed to prove that he had given a
hand loan to the accused and that the accused had issued a
cheque as alleged. Furthermore, the trial judge erroneously
decided that the offence made punishable by Section 138 of
the Act had not been committed in this case since the alleged
dishonour of cheque was not on account of insufficiency of
funds since the accused had instructed his bank to stop
payment. Accordingly, the trial judge had recorded a finding of
acquittal.
6
7. However, on appeal against acquittal, the High Court
reversed the findings and convicted the appellant-accused.
The High Court in its order noted that in the course of the trial
proceedings, the accused had admitted that the signature on
the impugned cheque (No. 886322, dated 8-2-2001) was
indeed his own. Once this fact has been acknowledged,
Section 139 of the Act mandates a presumption that the
cheque pertained to a legally enforceable debt or liability. This
presumption is of a rebuttal nature and the onus is then on
the accused to raise a probable defence. With regard to the
present facts, the High Court found that the defence raised by
the accused was not probable. In respect of the accused's
stand that he had lost a blank cheque bearing his signature,
the High Court noted that in the instructions sent by the
accused to his Bank for stopping payment, there is a reference
to cheque No. 0886322, dated 20-7-1999. This is in conflict
with the complainant's version wherein the accused had given
instructions for stopping payment in respect of the same
cheque, albeit one which was dated 8-2-2001. The High Court
also noted that if the accused had indeed lost a blank cheque
7
bearing his signature, the question of his mentioning the date
of the cheque as 20-7-1999 could not arise. At a later point in
the order, it has been noted that the instructions sent by the
accused to his bank for stopping payment on the cheque do
not mention that the same had been lost. However, the
correspondence does refer to the cheque being dated
20-7-1999. Furthermore, during the cross-examination of the
complainant, it was suggested on behalf of the accused that
the complainant had the custody of the cheque since 1998.
This suggestion indicates that the accused was aware of the
fact that the complainant had the cheque, thereby weakening
his claim of having lost a blank cheque. Furthermore, a
perusal of the record shows that the accused had belatedly
taken up the defence of having lost a blank cheque at the time
of his examination during trial. Prior to the filing of the
complaint, the accused had not even replied to the notice sent
by the complainant since that would have afforded an
opportunity to raise the defence at an earlier stage. All of these
circumstances led the High Court to conclude that the
8
accused had not raised a probable defence to rebut the
statutory presumption. It was held that:
`6. Once the cheque relates to the account of the accused
and he accepts and admits the signatures on the said
cheque, then initial presumption as contemplated under
Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act has to be
raised by the Court in favour of the complainant. The
presumption referred to in Section 139 of the N.I. Act is a
mandatory presumption and not a general presumption,
but the accused is entitled to rebut the said
presumption. What is required to be established by the
accused in order to rebut the presumption is different
from each case under given circumstances. But the fact
remains that a mere plausible explanation is not
expected from the accused and it must be more than a
plausible explanation by way of rebuttal evidence. In
other words, the defence raised by way of rebuttal
evidence must be probable and capable of being accepted
by the Court. The defence raised by the accused was that
a blank cheque was lost by him, which was made use of
by the complainant. Unless this barrier is crossed by the
accused, the other defence raised by him whether the
cheque was issued towards the hand loan or towards the
amount spent by the complainant need not be
considered. ...'
Hence, the High Court concluded that the alleged
discrepancies on part of the complainant which had been
noted by the trial court were not material since the accused
9
had failed to raise a probable defence to rebut the
presumption placed on him by Section 139 of the Act.
Accordingly, the High Court recorded a finding of conviction.
8. In the course of the proceedings before this Court, the
contentions related to the proper interpretation of Sections
118(a), 138 and 139 of the Act. Before addressing them, it
would be useful to quote the language of the relevant
provisions:
118. Presumptions as to negotiable instruments. -
Until the contrary is proved, the following presumptions
shall be made:
(a) of consideration: that every negotiable instrument was
made or drawn for consideration, and that every such
instrument when it has been accepted, endorsed,
negotiated or transferred, was accepted, endorsed,
negotiated or transferred for consideration;
...
138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of
funds in the account. - Where any cheque drawn by a
person on an account maintained by him with a banker
for payment of any amount of money to another person
from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in
part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the
bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money
standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to
honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount
10
arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement
made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to
have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice
to any other provision of this Act, be punished with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years,
or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the
cheque, or with both:
Provided that nothing contained in this section shall
apply unless-
(a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a
period of six months from the date on which it is drawn
or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier.
(b)the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as
the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the
said amount of money by giving a notice, in writing, to
the drawer of the cheque, within thirty days of the receipt
of information by him from the bank regarding the return
of the cheque as unpaid; and
(c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of
the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case
may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within
fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice.
Explanation. - For the purposes of this section, `debt or
other liability' means a legally enforceable debt or other
liability.
139. Presumption in favour of holder.- It shall be
presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of
a cheque received the cheque, of the nature referred to in
Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any
debt, or other liability.
9. Ordinarily in cheque bouncing cases, what the courts have
to consider is whether the ingredients of the offence
11
enumerated in Section 138 of the Act have been met and if so,
whether the accused was able to rebut the statutory
presumption contemplated by Section 139 of the Act. With
respect to the facts of the present case, it must be clarified
that contrary to the trial court's finding, Section 138 of the Act
can indeed be attracted when a cheque is dishonoured on
account of `stop payment' instructions sent by the accused to
his bank in respect of a post-dated cheque, irrespective of
insufficiency of funds in the account. This position was
clarified by this Court in Goa Plast (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Chico Ursula
D'Souza, (2003) 3 SCC 232, wherein it was held:
"Chapter XVII containing Sections 138 to 142 was
introduced in the Act by Act 66 of 1988 with the object of
inculcating faith in the efficacy of banking operations and
giving credibility to negotiable instruments in business
transactions. These provisions were intended to
discourage people from not honouring their commitments
by way of payment through cheques. The court should
lean in favour of an interpretation which serves the object
of the statute. A post-dated cheque will lose its credibility
and acceptability if its payment can be stopped routinely.
The purpose of a post-dated cheque is to provide some
accommodation to the drawer of the cheque. Therefore, it
is all the more necessary that the drawer of the cheque
should not be allowed to abuse the accommodation given
to him by a creditor by way of acceptance of a post-dated
cheque. In view of Section 139, it has to be presumed
12
that a cheque is issued in discharge of any debt or other
liability. The presumption can be rebutted by adducing
evidence and the burden of proof is on the person who
wants to rebut the presumption. This presumption
coupled with the object of Chapter XVII of the Act leads
to the conclusion that by countermanding payment of a
post-dated cheque, a party should not be allowed to get
away from the penal provision of Section 138. A contrary
view would render S. 138 a dead letter and will provide a
handle to persons trying to avoid payment under legal
obligations undertaken by them through their own acts
which in other words can be said to be taking advantage
of one's own wrong. ..."
10. It has been contended on behalf of the appellant-accused
that the presumption mandated by Section 139 of the Act does
not extend to the existence of a legally enforceable debt or
liability and that the same stood rebutted in this case, keeping
in mind the discrepancies in the complainant's version. It was
reasoned that it is open to the accused to rely on the materials
produced by the complainant for disproving the existence of a
legally enforceable debt or liability. It has been contended that
since the complainant did not conclusively show whether a
debt was owed to him in respect of a hand loan or in relation
to expenditure incurred during the construction of the
accused's house, the existence of a legally enforceable debt or
13
liability had not been shown, thereby creating a probable
defence for the accused. Counsel appearing for the appellant-
accused has relied on a decision given by a division bench of
this Court in Krishna Janardhan Bhat v. Dattatraya G.
Hegde, (2008) 4 SCC 54, the operative observations from
which are reproduced below (S.B. Sinha, J. at Paras. 29-32,
34 and 45):
"29. Section 138 of the Act has three ingredients viz.:
(i) that there is a legally enforceable debt
(ii) that the cheque was drawn from the account
of bank for discharge in whole or in part of any
debt or other liability which presupposes a
legally enforceable debt; and
(iii) that the cheque so issued had been returned
due to insufficiency of funds.
30. The proviso appended to the said section provides for
compliance with legal requirements before a complaint
petition can be acted upon by a court of law. Section 139
of the Act merely raises a presumption in regard to the
second aspect of the matter. Existence of legally
recoverable debt is not a matter of presumption under
Section 139 of the Act. It merely raises a presumption in
favour of a holder of the cheque that the same has been
issued for discharge of any debt or other liability.
31. The courts below, as noticed hereinbefore, proceeded
on the basis that Section 139 raises a presumption in
regard to existence of a debt also. The courts below, in
our opinion, committed a serious error in proceeding on
the basis that for proving the defence the accused is
required to step into the witness box and unless he does
14
so he would not be discharging his burden. Such an
approach on the part of the courts, we feel, is not correct.
32. An accused for discharging the burden of proof
placed upon him under a statute need not examine
himself. He may discharge his burden on the basis of the
materials already brought on record. An accused has a
constitutional right to maintain silence. Standard of proof
on the part of the accused and that of the prosecution in
a criminal case is different.
...
34. Furthermore, whereas prosecution must prove the
guilt of an accused beyond all reasonable doubt, the
standard of proof so as to prove a defence on the part of
the accused is `preponderance of probabilities'. Inference
of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only
from the materials brought on record by the parties but
also by reference to the circumstances upon which he
relies."
(emphasis supplied)
Specifically in relation to the nature of the presumption
contemplated by Section 139 of the Act, it was observed;
"45. We are not oblivious of the fact that the said
provision has been inserted to regulate the growing
business, trade, commerce and industrial activities of the
country and the strict liability to promote greater
vigilance in financial matters and to safeguard the faith
of the creditor in the drawer of the cheque which is
essential to the economic life of a developing country like
India. This however, shall not mean that the courts shall
put a blind eye to the ground realities. Statute mandates
raising of presumption but it stops at that. It does not
say how presumption drawn should be held to have been
15
rebutted. Other important principles of legal
jurisprudence, namely, presumption of innocence as a
human right and the doctrine of reverse burden
introduced by Section 139 should be delicately balanced.
Such balancing acts, indisputably would largely depend
upon the factual matrix of each case, the materials
brought on record and having regard to legal principles
governing the same."
(emphasis supplied)
11. With respect to the decision cited above, counsel appearing
for the respondent-claimant has submitted that the
observations to the effect that the `existence of legally
recoverable debt is not a matter of presumption under Section
139 of the Act' and that `it merely raises a presumption in
favour of a holder of the cheque that the same has been issued
for discharge of any debt or other liability' [See Para. 30 in
Krishna Janardhan Bhat (supra)] are in conflict with the
statutory provisions as well as an established line of
precedents of this Court. It will thus be necessary to examine
some of the extracts cited by the respondent-claimant. For
instance, in Hiten P. Dalal v. Bratindranath Banerjee, (2001)
6 SCC 16, it was held (Ruma Pal, J. at Paras. 22-23):
16
"22. Because both Sections 138 and 139 require that the
Court `shall presume' the liability of the drawer of the
cheques for the amounts for which the cheques are
drawn, ..., it is obligatory on the Court to raise this
presumption in every case where the factual basis for the
raising of the presumption has been established. It
introduces an exception to the general rule as to the
burden of proof in criminal cases and shifts the onus on
to the accused (...). Such a presumption is a presumption
of law, as distinguished from a presumption of fact which
describes provisions by which the court may presume a
certain state of affairs. Presumptions are rules of
evidence and do not conflict with the presumption of
innocence, because by the latter all that is meant is that
the prosecution is obliged to prove the case against the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. The obligation on the
prosecution may be discharged with the help of
presumptions of law or fact unless the accused adduces
evidence showing the reasonable probability of the
non-existence of the presumed fact.
23. In other words, provided the facts required to form
the basis of a presumption of law exists, the discretion is
left with the Court to draw the statutory conclusion, but
this does not preclude the person against whom the
presumption is drawn from rebutting it and proving the
contrary. A fact is said to be proved when, after
considering the matters before it, the Court either
believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable
that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of
the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it
exists. Therefore, the rebuttal does not have to be
conclusively established but such evidence must be
adduced before the Court in support of the defence that
the Court must either believe the defence to exist or
consider its existence to be reasonably probable, the
standard of reasonability being that of the prudent man."
(emphasis supplied)
17
12. The respondent-claimant has also referred to the decision
reported as Mallavarapu Kasivisweswara Rao v. Thadikonda
Ramulu Firm & Ors., 2008 (8) SCALE 680, wherein it was
observed:
"Under Section 118(a) of the Negotiable Instruments Act,
the court is obliged to presume, until the contrary is
proved, that the promissory note was made for
consideration. It is also a settled position that the initial
burden in this regard lies on the defendant to prove the
non-existence of consideration by bringing on record
such facts and circumstances which would lead the
Court to believe the non-existence of the consideration
either by direct evidence or by preponderance of
probabilities showing that the existence of consideration
was improbable, doubtful or illegal. ..."
This decision then proceeded to cite an extract from the earlier
decision in Bharat Barrel & Drum Manufacturing Company
v. Amin Chand Pyarelal, (1993) 3 SCC 35 (Para. 12):
"Upon consideration of various judgments as noted
hereinabove, the position of law which emerges is that
once execution of the promissory note is admitted, the
presumption under Section 118(a) would arise that it is
supported by a consideration. Such a presumption is
rebuttable. The defendant can prove the non-existence of
a consideration by raising a probable defence. If the
defendant is proved to have discharged the initial onus of
proof showing that the existence of consideration was
18
improbably or doubtful or the same was illegal, the onus
would shift to the plaintiff who will be obliged to prove it
as a matter of fact and upon its failure to prove would
disentitle him to the grant of relief on the basis of the
negotiable instrument. The burden upon the defendant of
proving the non-existence of the consideration can be
either direct or by bringing on record the preponderance
of probabilities by reference to the circumstances upon
which he relies. In such an event, the plaintiff is entitled
under law to rely upon all the evidence led in the case
including that of the plaintiff as well. In case, where the
defendant fails to discharge the initial onus of proof by
showing the non-existence of the consideration, the
plaintiff would invariably be held entitled to the benefit of
presumption arising under Section 118(a) in his favour.
The court may not insist upon the defendant to disprove
the existence of consideration by leading direct evidence
as the existence of negative evidence is neither possible
nor contemplated and even if led, is to be seen with a
doubt. The bare denial of the passing of the consideration
apparently does not appear to be any defence. Something
which is probable has to be brought on record for getting
the benefit of shifting the onus of proving to the plaintiff.
To disprove the presumption, the defendant has to bring
on record such facts and circumstances upon
consideration of which the court may either believe that
the consideration did not exist or its non-existence was
so probable that a prudent man would, under the
circumstances of the case, act upon the plea that it did
not exist."
(emphasis supplied)
Interestingly, the very same extract has also been approvingly
cited in Krishna Janardhan Bhat (supra).
19
13. With regard to the facts in the present case, we can also
refer to the following observations in M.M.T.C. Ltd. and Anr.
v. Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd., (2002) 1 SCC 234
(Para. 19):
"... The authority shows that even when the cheque is
dishonoured by reason of stop payment instruction, by
virtue of Section 139 the Court has to presume that the
cheque was received by the holder for the discharge in
whole or in part, of any debt or liability. Of course this is
a rebuttable presumption. The accused can thus show
that the `stop payment' instructions were not issued
because of insufficiency or paucity of funds. If the
accused shows that in his account there was sufficient
funds to clear the amount of the cheque at the time of
presentation of the cheque for encashment at the drawer
bank and that the stop payment notice had been issued
because of other valid causes including that there was no
existing debt or liability at the time of presentation of
cheque for encashment, then offence under Section 138
would not be made out. The important thing is that the
burden of so proving would be on the accused. ..."
(emphasis supplied)
14. In light of these extracts, we are in agreement with the
respondent-claimant that the presumption mandated by
Section 139 of the Act does indeed include the existence of a
legally enforceable debt or liability. To that extent, the
impugned observations in Krishna Janardhan Bhat (supra)
20
may not be correct. However, this does not in any way cast
doubt on the correctness of the decision in that case since it
was based on the specific facts and circumstances therein. As
noted in the citations, this is of course in the nature of a
rebuttable presumption and it is open to the accused to raise
a defence wherein the existence of a legally enforceable debt or
liability can be contested. However, there can be no doubt that
there is an initial presumption which favours the complainant.
Section 139 of the Act is an example of a reverse onus clause
that has been included in furtherance of the legislative
objective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments.
While Section 138 of the Act specifies a strong criminal
remedy in relation to the dishonour of cheques, the rebuttable
presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent undue
delay in the course of litigation. However, it must be
remembered that the offence made punishable by Section 138
can be better described as a regulatory offence since the
bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong
whose impact is usually confined to the private parties
involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the
21
test of proportionality should guide the construction and
interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the
accused/defendant cannot be expected to discharge an unduly
high standard or proof. In the absence of compelling
justifications, reverse onus clauses usually impose an
evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden. Keeping this
in view, it is a settled position that when an accused has to
rebut the presumption under Section 139, the standard of
proof for doing so is that of `preponderance of probabilities'.
Therefore, if the accused is able to raise a probable defence
which creates doubts about the existence of a legally
enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. As
clarified in the citations, the accused can rely on the materials
submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence
and it is conceivable that in some cases the accused may not
need to adduce evidence of his/her own.
15. Coming back to the facts in the present case, we are in
agreement with the High Court's view that the accused did not
raise a probable defence. As noted earlier, the defence of the
loss of a blank cheque was taken up belatedly and the accused
22
had mentioned a different date in the `stop payment'
instructions to his bank. Furthermore, the instructions to
`stop payment' had not even mentioned that the cheque had
been lost. A perusal of the trial record also shows that the
accused appeared to be aware of the fact that the cheque was
with the complainant. Furthermore, the very fact that the
accused had failed to reply to the statutory notice under
Section 138 of the Act leads to the inference that there was
merit in the complainant's version. Apart from not raising a
probable defence, the appellant-accused was not able to
contest the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability.
The fact that the accused had made regular payments to the
complainant in relation to the construction of his house does
not preclude the possibility of the complainant having spent
his own money for the same purpose. As per the record of the
case, there was a slight discrepancy in the complainant's
version, in so far as it was not clear whether the accused had
asked for a hand loan to meet the construction-related
expenses or whether the complainant had incurred the said
expenditure over a period of time. Either way, the complaint
23
discloses the prima facie existence of a legally enforceable debt
or liability since the complainant has maintained that his
money was used for the construction-expenses. Since the
accused did admit that the signature on the cheque was his,
the statutory presumption comes into play and the same has
not been rebutted even with regard to the materials submitted
by the complainant.
16. In conclusion, we find no reason to interfere with the final
order of the High Court, dated 26-10-2005, which recorded a
finding of conviction against the appellant. The present appeal
is disposed of accordingly.
...................................... CJI
(K.G. BALAKRISHNAN)
........................................J.
(P. SATHASIVAM)
.......................................J.
(J.M. PANCHAL)
NEW DELHI
MAY 07, 2010
24
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1020 OF 2010
[Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 407 of 2006]
Rangappa ... Appellant
Versus
Sri Mohan ... Respondent
JUDGMENT
K.G. Balakrishnan, C.J.I.
1. Leave granted.
2. In the present case, the trial court had acquitted the
appellant-accused in a case related to the dishonour of a
cheque under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,
1881 [Hereinafter `Act']. This finding of acquittal had been
made by the Addl. JMFC at Ranebennur, Karnataka in
Criminal Case No. 993/2001, by way of a judgment dated
30-5-2005. On appeal by the respondent-complainant, the
High Court had reversed the trial court's decision and
1
recorded a finding of conviction while directing that the
appellant-accused should pay a fine of Rs. 75,000, failing
which he would have to undergo three months simple
imprisonment (S.I.). Aggrieved by this final order passed by the
High Court of Karnataka [in Criminal Appeal No. 1367/2005]
dated 26-10-2005, the appellant-accused has approached this
Court by way of a petition seeking special leave to appeal. The
legal question before us pertains to the proper interpretation of
Section 139 of the Act which shifts the burden of proof on to
the accused in respect of cheque bouncing cases. More
specifically, we have been asked to clarify the manner in which
this statutory presumption can be rebutted.
3. Before addressing the legal question, it would be apt to
survey the facts leading up to the present litigation.
Admittedly, both the appellant-accused and the respondent-
claimant are residents of Ranebennur, Karnataka. The
appellant-accused is a mechanic who had engaged the services
of the respondent-complainant who is a Civil Engineer, for the
purpose of supervising the construction of his house in
2
Ranebennur. The said construction was completed on 20-10-
1998 and this indicates that the parties were well acquainted
with each other.
4. As per the respondent-complainant, the chain of facts
unfolded in the following manner. In October 1998, the
accused had requested him for a hand loan of Rs. 45,000 in
order to meet the construction expenses. In view of their
acquaintance, the complainant had paid Rs. 45,000 by way of
cash. On receiving this amount, the appellant-accused had
initially assured repayment by October 1999 but on the failure
to do so, he sought more time till December 2000. The
accused had then issued a cheque bearing No. 0886322,
post-dated for 8-2-2001 for Rs. 45,000 drawn on Syndicate
Bank, Kudremukh Branch. Consequently, on 8-2-2001, the
complainant had presented this cheque through Karnataka
Bank, Ranebennur for encashment. However, on 16-2-2001
the said Bank issued a return memo stating that the `Payment
has been stopped by the drawer' and this memo was handed
over to the complainant on 21-2-2001. The complainant had
3
then issued notice to the accused in this regard on 26-2-2001.
On receiving the same, the accused failed to honour the
cheque within the statutorily prescribed period and also did
not reply to the notice sent in the manner contemplated under
Section 138 of the Act. Following these developments, the
complainant had filed a complaint (under Section 200 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure) against the accused for the
offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act.
5. The appellant-accused had raised the defence that the
cheque in question was a blank cheque bearing his signature
which had been lost and that it had come into the hands of
the complainant who had then tried to misuse it. The
accused's case was that there was no legally enforceable debt
or liability between the parties since he had not asked for a
hand loan as alleged by the complainant.
6. The trial judge found in favour of the accused by taking
note of some discrepancies in the complainant's version. As
per the trial judge, in the course of the cross-examination the
4
complainant was not certain as to when the accused had
actually issued the cheque. It was noted that while the
complaint stated that the cheque had been issued in
December 2000, at a later point it was conceded that the
cheque had been handed over when the accused had met the
complainant to obtain the work completion certificate for his
house in March 2001. Later, it was stated that the cheque had
been with the complainant about 15-20 days prior to the
presentation of the same for encashment, which would place
the date of handing over of the cheque in January 2001.
Furthermore, the trial judge noted that in the complaint it had
been submitted that the complainant had paid Rs. 45,000 in
cash as a hand loan to the accused, whereas during the
cross-examination it appeared that the complainant had spent
this amount during the construction of the accused's house
from time to time and that the complainant had realised the
extent of the liability after auditing the costs on completion of
the construction. Apart from these discrepancies on part of the
complainant, the trial judge also noted that the accused used
to pay the complainant a monthly salary in lieu of his services
5
as a building supervisor apart from periodically handing over
money which was used for the construction of the house. In
light of these regular payments, the trial judge found it
unlikely that the complainant would have spent his own
money on the construction work. With regard to these
observations, the trial judge held that there was no material to
substantiate that the accused had issued the cheque in
relation to a legally enforceable debt. It was observed that the
accused's failure to reply to the notice sent by the complainant
did not attract the presumption under Section 139 of the Act
since the complainant had failed to prove that he had given a
hand loan to the accused and that the accused had issued a
cheque as alleged. Furthermore, the trial judge erroneously
decided that the offence made punishable by Section 138 of
the Act had not been committed in this case since the alleged
dishonour of cheque was not on account of insufficiency of
funds since the accused had instructed his bank to stop
payment. Accordingly, the trial judge had recorded a finding of
acquittal.
6
7. However, on appeal against acquittal, the High Court
reversed the findings and convicted the appellant-accused.
The High Court in its order noted that in the course of the trial
proceedings, the accused had admitted that the signature on
the impugned cheque (No. 886322, dated 8-2-2001) was
indeed his own. Once this fact has been acknowledged,
Section 139 of the Act mandates a presumption that the
cheque pertained to a legally enforceable debt or liability. This
presumption is of a rebuttal nature and the onus is then on
the accused to raise a probable defence. With regard to the
present facts, the High Court found that the defence raised by
the accused was not probable. In respect of the accused's
stand that he had lost a blank cheque bearing his signature,
the High Court noted that in the instructions sent by the
accused to his Bank for stopping payment, there is a reference
to cheque No. 0886322, dated 20-7-1999. This is in conflict
with the complainant's version wherein the accused had given
instructions for stopping payment in respect of the same
cheque, albeit one which was dated 8-2-2001. The High Court
also noted that if the accused had indeed lost a blank cheque
7
bearing his signature, the question of his mentioning the date
of the cheque as 20-7-1999 could not arise. At a later point in
the order, it has been noted that the instructions sent by the
accused to his bank for stopping payment on the cheque do
not mention that the same had been lost. However, the
correspondence does refer to the cheque being dated
20-7-1999. Furthermore, during the cross-examination of the
complainant, it was suggested on behalf of the accused that
the complainant had the custody of the cheque since 1998.
This suggestion indicates that the accused was aware of the
fact that the complainant had the cheque, thereby weakening
his claim of having lost a blank cheque. Furthermore, a
perusal of the record shows that the accused had belatedly
taken up the defence of having lost a blank cheque at the time
of his examination during trial. Prior to the filing of the
complaint, the accused had not even replied to the notice sent
by the complainant since that would have afforded an
opportunity to raise the defence at an earlier stage. All of these
circumstances led the High Court to conclude that the
8
accused had not raised a probable defence to rebut the
statutory presumption. It was held that:
`6. Once the cheque relates to the account of the accused
and he accepts and admits the signatures on the said
cheque, then initial presumption as contemplated under
Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act has to be
raised by the Court in favour of the complainant. The
presumption referred to in Section 139 of the N.I. Act is a
mandatory presumption and not a general presumption,
but the accused is entitled to rebut the said
presumption. What is required to be established by the
accused in order to rebut the presumption is different
from each case under given circumstances. But the fact
remains that a mere plausible explanation is not
expected from the accused and it must be more than a
plausible explanation by way of rebuttal evidence. In
other words, the defence raised by way of rebuttal
evidence must be probable and capable of being accepted
by the Court. The defence raised by the accused was that
a blank cheque was lost by him, which was made use of
by the complainant. Unless this barrier is crossed by the
accused, the other defence raised by him whether the
cheque was issued towards the hand loan or towards the
amount spent by the complainant need not be
considered. ...'
Hence, the High Court concluded that the alleged
discrepancies on part of the complainant which had been
noted by the trial court were not material since the accused
9
had failed to raise a probable defence to rebut the
presumption placed on him by Section 139 of the Act.
Accordingly, the High Court recorded a finding of conviction.
8. In the course of the proceedings before this Court, the
contentions related to the proper interpretation of Sections
118(a), 138 and 139 of the Act. Before addressing them, it
would be useful to quote the language of the relevant
provisions:
118. Presumptions as to negotiable instruments. -
Until the contrary is proved, the following presumptions
shall be made:
(a) of consideration: that every negotiable instrument was
made or drawn for consideration, and that every such
instrument when it has been accepted, endorsed,
negotiated or transferred, was accepted, endorsed,
negotiated or transferred for consideration;
...
138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of
funds in the account. - Where any cheque drawn by a
person on an account maintained by him with a banker
for payment of any amount of money to another person
from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in
part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the
bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money
standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to
honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount
10
arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement
made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to
have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice
to any other provision of this Act, be punished with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years,
or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the
cheque, or with both:
Provided that nothing contained in this section shall
apply unless-
(a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a
period of six months from the date on which it is drawn
or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier.
(b)the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as
the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the
said amount of money by giving a notice, in writing, to
the drawer of the cheque, within thirty days of the receipt
of information by him from the bank regarding the return
of the cheque as unpaid; and
(c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of
the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case
may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within
fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice.
Explanation. - For the purposes of this section, `debt or
other liability' means a legally enforceable debt or other
liability.
139. Presumption in favour of holder.- It shall be
presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of
a cheque received the cheque, of the nature referred to in
Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any
debt, or other liability.
9. Ordinarily in cheque bouncing cases, what the courts have
to consider is whether the ingredients of the offence
11
enumerated in Section 138 of the Act have been met and if so,
whether the accused was able to rebut the statutory
presumption contemplated by Section 139 of the Act. With
respect to the facts of the present case, it must be clarified
that contrary to the trial court's finding, Section 138 of the Act
can indeed be attracted when a cheque is dishonoured on
account of `stop payment' instructions sent by the accused to
his bank in respect of a post-dated cheque, irrespective of
insufficiency of funds in the account. This position was
clarified by this Court in Goa Plast (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Chico Ursula
D'Souza, (2003) 3 SCC 232, wherein it was held:
"Chapter XVII containing Sections 138 to 142 was
introduced in the Act by Act 66 of 1988 with the object of
inculcating faith in the efficacy of banking operations and
giving credibility to negotiable instruments in business
transactions. These provisions were intended to
discourage people from not honouring their commitments
by way of payment through cheques. The court should
lean in favour of an interpretation which serves the object
of the statute. A post-dated cheque will lose its credibility
and acceptability if its payment can be stopped routinely.
The purpose of a post-dated cheque is to provide some
accommodation to the drawer of the cheque. Therefore, it
is all the more necessary that the drawer of the cheque
should not be allowed to abuse the accommodation given
to him by a creditor by way of acceptance of a post-dated
cheque. In view of Section 139, it has to be presumed
12
that a cheque is issued in discharge of any debt or other
liability. The presumption can be rebutted by adducing
evidence and the burden of proof is on the person who
wants to rebut the presumption. This presumption
coupled with the object of Chapter XVII of the Act leads
to the conclusion that by countermanding payment of a
post-dated cheque, a party should not be allowed to get
away from the penal provision of Section 138. A contrary
view would render S. 138 a dead letter and will provide a
handle to persons trying to avoid payment under legal
obligations undertaken by them through their own acts
which in other words can be said to be taking advantage
of one's own wrong. ..."
10. It has been contended on behalf of the appellant-accused
that the presumption mandated by Section 139 of the Act does
not extend to the existence of a legally enforceable debt or
liability and that the same stood rebutted in this case, keeping
in mind the discrepancies in the complainant's version. It was
reasoned that it is open to the accused to rely on the materials
produced by the complainant for disproving the existence of a
legally enforceable debt or liability. It has been contended that
since the complainant did not conclusively show whether a
debt was owed to him in respect of a hand loan or in relation
to expenditure incurred during the construction of the
accused's house, the existence of a legally enforceable debt or
13
liability had not been shown, thereby creating a probable
defence for the accused. Counsel appearing for the appellant-
accused has relied on a decision given by a division bench of
this Court in Krishna Janardhan Bhat v. Dattatraya G.
Hegde, (2008) 4 SCC 54, the operative observations from
which are reproduced below (S.B. Sinha, J. at Paras. 29-32,
34 and 45):
"29. Section 138 of the Act has three ingredients viz.:
(i) that there is a legally enforceable debt
(ii) that the cheque was drawn from the account
of bank for discharge in whole or in part of any
debt or other liability which presupposes a
legally enforceable debt; and
(iii) that the cheque so issued had been returned
due to insufficiency of funds.
30. The proviso appended to the said section provides for
compliance with legal requirements before a complaint
petition can be acted upon by a court of law. Section 139
of the Act merely raises a presumption in regard to the
second aspect of the matter. Existence of legally
recoverable debt is not a matter of presumption under
Section 139 of the Act. It merely raises a presumption in
favour of a holder of the cheque that the same has been
issued for discharge of any debt or other liability.
31. The courts below, as noticed hereinbefore, proceeded
on the basis that Section 139 raises a presumption in
regard to existence of a debt also. The courts below, in
our opinion, committed a serious error in proceeding on
the basis that for proving the defence the accused is
required to step into the witness box and unless he does
14
so he would not be discharging his burden. Such an
approach on the part of the courts, we feel, is not correct.
32. An accused for discharging the burden of proof
placed upon him under a statute need not examine
himself. He may discharge his burden on the basis of the
materials already brought on record. An accused has a
constitutional right to maintain silence. Standard of proof
on the part of the accused and that of the prosecution in
a criminal case is different.
...
34. Furthermore, whereas prosecution must prove the
guilt of an accused beyond all reasonable doubt, the
standard of proof so as to prove a defence on the part of
the accused is `preponderance of probabilities'. Inference
of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only
from the materials brought on record by the parties but
also by reference to the circumstances upon which he
relies."
(emphasis supplied)
Specifically in relation to the nature of the presumption
contemplated by Section 139 of the Act, it was observed;
"45. We are not oblivious of the fact that the said
provision has been inserted to regulate the growing
business, trade, commerce and industrial activities of the
country and the strict liability to promote greater
vigilance in financial matters and to safeguard the faith
of the creditor in the drawer of the cheque which is
essential to the economic life of a developing country like
India. This however, shall not mean that the courts shall
put a blind eye to the ground realities. Statute mandates
raising of presumption but it stops at that. It does not
say how presumption drawn should be held to have been
15
rebutted. Other important principles of legal
jurisprudence, namely, presumption of innocence as a
human right and the doctrine of reverse burden
introduced by Section 139 should be delicately balanced.
Such balancing acts, indisputably would largely depend
upon the factual matrix of each case, the materials
brought on record and having regard to legal principles
governing the same."
(emphasis supplied)
11. With respect to the decision cited above, counsel appearing
for the respondent-claimant has submitted that the
observations to the effect that the `existence of legally
recoverable debt is not a matter of presumption under Section
139 of the Act' and that `it merely raises a presumption in
favour of a holder of the cheque that the same has been issued
for discharge of any debt or other liability' [See Para. 30 in
Krishna Janardhan Bhat (supra)] are in conflict with the
statutory provisions as well as an established line of
precedents of this Court. It will thus be necessary to examine
some of the extracts cited by the respondent-claimant. For
instance, in Hiten P. Dalal v. Bratindranath Banerjee, (2001)
6 SCC 16, it was held (Ruma Pal, J. at Paras. 22-23):
16
"22. Because both Sections 138 and 139 require that the
Court `shall presume' the liability of the drawer of the
cheques for the amounts for which the cheques are
drawn, ..., it is obligatory on the Court to raise this
presumption in every case where the factual basis for the
raising of the presumption has been established. It
introduces an exception to the general rule as to the
burden of proof in criminal cases and shifts the onus on
to the accused (...). Such a presumption is a presumption
of law, as distinguished from a presumption of fact which
describes provisions by which the court may presume a
certain state of affairs. Presumptions are rules of
evidence and do not conflict with the presumption of
innocence, because by the latter all that is meant is that
the prosecution is obliged to prove the case against the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. The obligation on the
prosecution may be discharged with the help of
presumptions of law or fact unless the accused adduces
evidence showing the reasonable probability of the
non-existence of the presumed fact.
23. In other words, provided the facts required to form
the basis of a presumption of law exists, the discretion is
left with the Court to draw the statutory conclusion, but
this does not preclude the person against whom the
presumption is drawn from rebutting it and proving the
contrary. A fact is said to be proved when, after
considering the matters before it, the Court either
believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable
that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of
the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it
exists. Therefore, the rebuttal does not have to be
conclusively established but such evidence must be
adduced before the Court in support of the defence that
the Court must either believe the defence to exist or
consider its existence to be reasonably probable, the
standard of reasonability being that of the prudent man."
(emphasis supplied)
17
12. The respondent-claimant has also referred to the decision
reported as Mallavarapu Kasivisweswara Rao v. Thadikonda
Ramulu Firm & Ors., 2008 (8) SCALE 680, wherein it was
observed:
"Under Section 118(a) of the Negotiable Instruments Act,
the court is obliged to presume, until the contrary is
proved, that the promissory note was made for
consideration. It is also a settled position that the initial
burden in this regard lies on the defendant to prove the
non-existence of consideration by bringing on record
such facts and circumstances which would lead the
Court to believe the non-existence of the consideration
either by direct evidence or by preponderance of
probabilities showing that the existence of consideration
was improbable, doubtful or illegal. ..."
This decision then proceeded to cite an extract from the earlier
decision in Bharat Barrel & Drum Manufacturing Company
v. Amin Chand Pyarelal, (1993) 3 SCC 35 (Para. 12):
"Upon consideration of various judgments as noted
hereinabove, the position of law which emerges is that
once execution of the promissory note is admitted, the
presumption under Section 118(a) would arise that it is
supported by a consideration. Such a presumption is
rebuttable. The defendant can prove the non-existence of
a consideration by raising a probable defence. If the
defendant is proved to have discharged the initial onus of
proof showing that the existence of consideration was
18
improbably or doubtful or the same was illegal, the onus
would shift to the plaintiff who will be obliged to prove it
as a matter of fact and upon its failure to prove would
disentitle him to the grant of relief on the basis of the
negotiable instrument. The burden upon the defendant of
proving the non-existence of the consideration can be
either direct or by bringing on record the preponderance
of probabilities by reference to the circumstances upon
which he relies. In such an event, the plaintiff is entitled
under law to rely upon all the evidence led in the case
including that of the plaintiff as well. In case, where the
defendant fails to discharge the initial onus of proof by
showing the non-existence of the consideration, the
plaintiff would invariably be held entitled to the benefit of
presumption arising under Section 118(a) in his favour.
The court may not insist upon the defendant to disprove
the existence of consideration by leading direct evidence
as the existence of negative evidence is neither possible
nor contemplated and even if led, is to be seen with a
doubt. The bare denial of the passing of the consideration
apparently does not appear to be any defence. Something
which is probable has to be brought on record for getting
the benefit of shifting the onus of proving to the plaintiff.
To disprove the presumption, the defendant has to bring
on record such facts and circumstances upon
consideration of which the court may either believe that
the consideration did not exist or its non-existence was
so probable that a prudent man would, under the
circumstances of the case, act upon the plea that it did
not exist."
(emphasis supplied)
Interestingly, the very same extract has also been approvingly
cited in Krishna Janardhan Bhat (supra).
19
13. With regard to the facts in the present case, we can also
refer to the following observations in M.M.T.C. Ltd. and Anr.
v. Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd., (2002) 1 SCC 234
(Para. 19):
"... The authority shows that even when the cheque is
dishonoured by reason of stop payment instruction, by
virtue of Section 139 the Court has to presume that the
cheque was received by the holder for the discharge in
whole or in part, of any debt or liability. Of course this is
a rebuttable presumption. The accused can thus show
that the `stop payment' instructions were not issued
because of insufficiency or paucity of funds. If the
accused shows that in his account there was sufficient
funds to clear the amount of the cheque at the time of
presentation of the cheque for encashment at the drawer
bank and that the stop payment notice had been issued
because of other valid causes including that there was no
existing debt or liability at the time of presentation of
cheque for encashment, then offence under Section 138
would not be made out. The important thing is that the
burden of so proving would be on the accused. ..."
(emphasis supplied)
14. In light of these extracts, we are in agreement with the
respondent-claimant that the presumption mandated by
Section 139 of the Act does indeed include the existence of a
legally enforceable debt or liability. To that extent, the
impugned observations in Krishna Janardhan Bhat (supra)
20
may not be correct. However, this does not in any way cast
doubt on the correctness of the decision in that case since it
was based on the specific facts and circumstances therein. As
noted in the citations, this is of course in the nature of a
rebuttable presumption and it is open to the accused to raise
a defence wherein the existence of a legally enforceable debt or
liability can be contested. However, there can be no doubt that
there is an initial presumption which favours the complainant.
Section 139 of the Act is an example of a reverse onus clause
that has been included in furtherance of the legislative
objective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments.
While Section 138 of the Act specifies a strong criminal
remedy in relation to the dishonour of cheques, the rebuttable
presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent undue
delay in the course of litigation. However, it must be
remembered that the offence made punishable by Section 138
can be better described as a regulatory offence since the
bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong
whose impact is usually confined to the private parties
involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the
21
test of proportionality should guide the construction and
interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the
accused/defendant cannot be expected to discharge an unduly
high standard or proof. In the absence of compelling
justifications, reverse onus clauses usually impose an
evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden. Keeping this
in view, it is a settled position that when an accused has to
rebut the presumption under Section 139, the standard of
proof for doing so is that of `preponderance of probabilities'.
Therefore, if the accused is able to raise a probable defence
which creates doubts about the existence of a legally
enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. As
clarified in the citations, the accused can rely on the materials
submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence
and it is conceivable that in some cases the accused may not
need to adduce evidence of his/her own.
15. Coming back to the facts in the present case, we are in
agreement with the High Court's view that the accused did not
raise a probable defence. As noted earlier, the defence of the
loss of a blank cheque was taken up belatedly and the accused
22
had mentioned a different date in the `stop payment'
instructions to his bank. Furthermore, the instructions to
`stop payment' had not even mentioned that the cheque had
been lost. A perusal of the trial record also shows that the
accused appeared to be aware of the fact that the cheque was
with the complainant. Furthermore, the very fact that the
accused had failed to reply to the statutory notice under
Section 138 of the Act leads to the inference that there was
merit in the complainant's version. Apart from not raising a
probable defence, the appellant-accused was not able to
contest the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability.
The fact that the accused had made regular payments to the
complainant in relation to the construction of his house does
not preclude the possibility of the complainant having spent
his own money for the same purpose. As per the record of the
case, there was a slight discrepancy in the complainant's
version, in so far as it was not clear whether the accused had
asked for a hand loan to meet the construction-related
expenses or whether the complainant had incurred the said
expenditure over a period of time. Either way, the complaint
23
discloses the prima facie existence of a legally enforceable debt
or liability since the complainant has maintained that his
money was used for the construction-expenses. Since the
accused did admit that the signature on the cheque was his,
the statutory presumption comes into play and the same has
not been rebutted even with regard to the materials submitted
by the complainant.
16. In conclusion, we find no reason to interfere with the final
order of the High Court, dated 26-10-2005, which recorded a
finding of conviction against the appellant. The present appeal
is disposed of accordingly.
...................................... CJI
(K.G. BALAKRISHNAN)
........................................J.
(P. SATHASIVAM)
.......................................J.
(J.M. PANCHAL)
NEW DELHI
MAY 07, 2010
24
