Writ Petition - Territorial Jurisdiction - Disability compensation - was refused while he was in Gaya - As per interim order compensation was paid at Patna - at final hearing Patna High court dismissed the Writ - Apex court held that Prima facie, therefore, considering all the facts together, a part or fraction of cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Patna High Court where he received a letter of refusal disentitling him from disability compensation.in our considered opinion, the writ petition ought not to have been dismissed for want of
territorial jurisdiction. As noticed above, at the time when the writ petition was heard for the purpose of grant of interim relief, the respondents instead of raising any objection with regard to territorial jurisdiction opposed the prayer on the ground that the writ petitioner-
appellant was offered an amount of Rs.2.75 lakhs, but he refused to accept the same and challenged the order granting severance compensation by filing the writ petition. The impugned order, therefore, cannot be sustained in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case.=
We have perused the facts pleaded in the writ petition and the
documents relied upon by the appellant.
Indisputably, the appellant
reported sickness on account of various ailments including difficulty in
breathing. He was referred to hospital.
Consequently, he was signed off
for further medical treatment. Finally, the respondent permanently
declared the appellant unfit for sea service due to dilated cardiomyopathy
(heart muscles disease).
As a result, the Shipping Department of the
Government of India issued an order on 12.4.2011 cancelling the
registration of the appellant as a seaman. A copy of the letter was sent
to the appellant at his native place in Bihar where he was staying after he
was found medically unfit.
It further appears that the appellant sent a
representation from his home in the State of Bihar to the respondent
claiming disability compensation.
The said representation was replied by
the respondent, which was addressed to him on his home address in Gaya,
Bihar rejecting his claim for disability compensation.
It is further
evident that when the appellant was signed off and declared medically
unfit, he returned back to his home in the District of Gaya, Bihar and,
thereafter, he made all claims and filed representation from his home
address at Gaya and those letters and representations were entertained by
the respondents and replied and a decision on those representations were
communicated to him on his home address in Bihar.
Admittedly, appellant
was suffering from serious heart muscles disease (Dilated Cardiomyopathy)
and breathing problem which forced him to stay in native place, wherefrom
he had been making all correspondence with regard to his disability
compensation.
Prima facie, therefore, considering all the facts together,
a part or fraction of cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the
Patna High Court where he received a letter of refusal disentitling him
from disability compensation.
21. Apart from that, from the counter affidavit of the respondents and
the documents annexed therewith, it reveals that after the writ petition
was filed in the Patna High Court, the same was entertained and notices
were issued.
Pursuant to the said notice, the respondents appeared and
participated in the proceedings in the High Court.
It further reveals that
after hearing the counsel appearing for both the parties, the High Court
passed an interim order on 18.9.2012 directing the authorities of Shipping
Corporation of India to pay at least a sum of Rs.2.75 lakhs, which shall be
subject to the result of the writ petition.
Pursuant to the interim order,
the respondent Shipping Corporation of India remitted Rs.2,67,270/- (after
deduction of income tax) to the bank account of the appellant.
However,
when the writ petition was taken up for hearing, the High Court took the
view that no cause of action, not even a fraction of cause of action, has
arisen within its territorial jurisdiction.
22. Considering the entire facts of the case narrated hereinbefore
including the interim order passed by the High Court, in our considered
opinion, the writ petition ought not to have been dismissed for want of
territorial jurisdiction.
As noticed above, at the time when the writ
petition was heard for the purpose of grant of interim relief, the
respondents instead of raising any objection with regard to territorial
jurisdiction opposed the prayer on the ground that the writ petitioner-
appellant was offered an amount of Rs.2.75 lakhs, but he refused to accept
the same and challenged the order granting severance compensation by filing
the writ petition. The impugned order, therefore, cannot be sustained in
the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case.
23. In the aforesaid, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order passed
by the High Court is set aside and the matter is remitted to the High Court
for deciding the writ petition on merits.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.7414 OF 2014
(arising out of SLP (C) No.19549 of 2013)
Nawal Kishore Sharma ….Appellant(s)
Versus
Union of India and Others …Respondent(s)
JUDGMENT
M.Y. EQBAL, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. Aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 16.4.2013 passed by learned
Single Judge of Patna High Court dismissing appellant’s writ petition for
want of territorial jurisdiction, this appeal by special leave has been
preferred by the appellant, who in November, 1988 had joined the off-shore
Department of the Shipping Corporation of India (in short, “the
Corporation”) and after about eight years he was transferred from the off-
shore duty to a main fleet in the Foreign Going Department.
3. It is the case of the appellant that he was found medically fit in
the medical test conducted by the Marine Medical Services in February, 2009
and thereafter, on 29.9.2009, an agreement known as the articles of
agreement for employment of seafarers was executed for appellant’s off-
shore duty. On 18.6.2010, when the appellant reported sickness i.e. cough,
abdominal pain, swelling in leg and difficulty in breathing, he was sent
for medical treatment ashore at Adani, Mundra Port. The Medical Officer
ashore advised him for admission in the Hospital and accordingly he was
signed off for further medical treatment. Thereafter, he was considered
permanently unfit for sea service due to dilated cardiomyopathy (heart
muscle disease) as per certificate dated 18.3.2011 issued by Corporation’s
Assistant Medical Officer. Consequently, the Shipping Department of the
Government of India, Mumbai issued order dated 12.4.2011 cancelling
registration of the appellant as a Seaman.
4. It is contended by the appellant that after he settled at his native
place Gaya, Bihar, he sent several letters/ representations from there to
the respondents for his financial claims as per statutory provisions and
terms of contract. On the disability compensation claim, Respondent no.2-
Corporation communicated vide letter dated 7.10.2011 that since the
appellant was declared unfit for sea service due to heart problem (organic
ailment) he will be entitled to receive severance compensation of
Rs.2,75,000/-, which was although offered, but not accepted by the
appellant. It was also informed that he is not entitled to receive
disability compensation, which becomes payable only in case a seaman
becomes incapacitated as a result of the injury.
5. By filing a writ petition, the appellant approached Patna High Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for grant of various reliefs
including 100% disability compensation and pecuniary damages. However, at
the time of hearing, respondents raised the question of maintainability of
the writ petition on the ground that no cause of action or even a fraction
of cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the Patna
High Court and contended that the appellant was appointed by the
Corporation on the post of Seaman for off-shore services and he discharged
his duty outside the territory of the State of Bihar. It is the case of
the respondent that the order declaring the appellant permanently unfit as
well as the letter/order dated 7.10.2011 was passed by an authority of the
respondent Corporation at Mumbai. Per contra, it is the case of the
appellant that he is a permanent resident of Bihar and he asserted his
rights in the State of Bihar and all communications with respect to
rejection of his claims were made at his residential address in the State
of Bihar.
6. After hearing learned counsel appearing for the parties and
considering entire materials on record, learned Single Judge of the Patna
High Court dismissed the writ petition of the appellant holding that no
cause of action, not even a fraction of cause of action, arose within its
territorial jurisdiction. Hence, the present appeal by special leave.
7. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties.
8. The short question that falls for consideration in the facts of the
present case is that as to whether the Patna High Court is correct in
taking the view that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition.
For answering the said question we would like to consider the provision of
Article 226 of the Constitution as it stood prior to amendment.
Originally, Article 226 of the Constitution read as under:-
“Art.226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs. – (1)
Notwithstanding anything in article 32, every High Court shall have power,
throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction,
to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any
Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including
writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto
and certiorari, or any of them or the enforcement of any of the rights
conferred by Part III and for any other purpose.
(2) The power conferred on a High Court by clause (1) shall not be in
derogation of the power conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (2) of
article 32”.
9. While interpreting the aforesaid provision the Constitution Bench of
this Court in the case of Election Commission, India vs. Saka Venkata Rao,
AIR 1953 SC 210, held that the writ court would not run beyond the
territories subject to its jurisdiction and that the person or the
authority affected by the writ must be amenable to court’s jurisdiction
either by residence or location within those territories. The rule that
cause of action attracts jurisdiction in suits is based on statutory
enactment and cannot apply to writs issued under Article 226 of the
Constitution which makes no reference to any cause of action or where it
arises but insist on the presence of the person or authority within the
territories in relation to which High Court exercises jurisdiction. In
another Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in K.S. Rashid and Son
vs. Income tax Investigation Commission Etc., AIR 1954 SC 207, this Court
took the similar view and held that the writ court cannot exercise its
power under Article 226 beyond its territorial jurisdiction. The Court was
of the view that the exercise of power conferred by Article 226 was subject
to a two-fold limitation viz., firstly, the power is to be exercised in
relation to which it exercises jurisdiction and secondly, the person or
authority on whom the High Court is empowered to issue writ must be within
those territories. These two Constitution Bench judgments came for
consideration before a larger Bench of seven Judges of this Court in the
case of Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh vs. Union of India and another, AIR 1961
SC 532. The Bench approved the aforementioned two Constitution Bench
judgments and opined that unless there are clear and compelling reasons,
which cannot be denied, writ court cannot exercise jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution beyond its territorial jurisdiction.
10. The interpretation given by this Court in the aforesaid decisions
resulted in undue hardship and inconvenience to the citizens to invoke writ
jurisdiction. As a result, Clause 1(A) was inserted in Article 226 by the
Constitution (15th) Amendment Act, 1963 and subsequently renumbered as
Clause (2) by the Constitution (42nd) Amendment Act, 1976. The amended
Clause (2) now reads as under:-
“226. Power of the High Courts to issue certain writs – (1) Notwithstanding
anything in article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the
territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any
person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within
those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the
nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and
certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights
conferred by Part III and for any other purpose.
(2) The power conferred by Clause (1) to issue directions, orders or
writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any
High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within
which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of
such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority
or the residence of such person is not within those territories.
(3) xxxxx
(4) xxxxx”
11. On a plain reading of the amended provisions in Clause (2), it is
clear that now High Court can issue a writ when the person or the authority
against whom the writ is issued is located outside its territorial
jurisdiction, if the cause of action wholly or partially arises within the
court’s territorial jurisdiction. Cause of action for the purpose of
Article 226 (2) of the Constitution, for all intent and purpose must be
assigned the same meaning as envisaged under Section 20(c) of the Code of
Civil Procedure. The expression cause of action has not been defined
either in the Code of Civil Procedure or the Constitution. Cause of action
is bundle of facts which is necessary for the plaintiff to prove in the
suit before he can succeed.
12. The term ‘cause of action’ as appearing in Clause (2) came for
consideration time and again before this Court.
13. In the case of State of Rajasthan and Others vs. M/s Swaika
Properties and Another, (1985) 3 SCC 217, the fact was that the respondent-
Company having its registered office in Calcutta owned certain land on the
outskirts of Jaipur City was served with notice for acquisition of land
under Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959. Notice was duly served on the
Company at its registered office at Calcutta. The Company, first appeared
before the Special Court and finally the Calcutta High Court by filing a
writ petition challenging the notification of acquisition. The matter
ultimately came before this Court to answer a question as to whether the
service of notice under Section 52(2) of the Act at the registered office
of the Respondent in Calcutta was an integral part of cause of action and
was it sufficient to invest the Calcutta High Court with a jurisdiction to
entertain the petition challenging the impugned notification. Answering
the question this Court held:-
“7. Upon these facts, we are satisfied that the cause of action neither
wholly nor in part arose within the territorial limits of the Calcutta High
Court and therefore the learned Single Judge had no jurisdiction to issue a
rule nisi on the petition filed by the respondents under Article 226 of the
Constitution or to make the ad interim ex parte prohibitory order
restraining the appellants from taking any steps to take possession of the
land acquired. Under sub-section (5) of Section 52 of the Act the
appellants were entitled to require the respondents to surrender or deliver
possession of the lands acquired forthwith and upon their failure to do so,
take immediate steps to secure such possession under sub-section (6)
thereof.
[pic]8. The expression “cause of action” is tersely defined in Mulla’s Code
of Civil Procedure:
“The ‘cause of action’ means every fact which, if traversed, it would be
necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a
judgment of the court.”
In other words, it is a bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable
to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. The
mere service of notice under Section 52(2) of the Act on the respondents at
their registered office at 18-B, Brabourne Road, Calcutta i.e. within the
territorial limits of the State of West Bengal, could not give rise to a
cause of action within that territory unless the service of such notice was
an integral part of the cause of action. The entire cause of action
culminating in the acquisition of the land under Section 52(1) of the Act
arose within the State of Rajasthan i.e. within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Rajasthan High Court at the Jaipur Bench. The answer to
the question whether service of notice is an integral part of the cause of
action within the meaning of Article 226(2) of the Constitution must depend
upon the nature of the impugned order giving rise to a cause of action. The
notification dated February 8, 1984 issued by the State Government under
Section 52(1) of the Act became effective the moment it was published in
the Official Gazette as thereupon the notified land became vested in the
State Government free from all encumbrances. It was not necessary for the
respondents to plead the service of notice on them by the Special Officer,
Town Planning Department, Jaipur under Section 52(2) for the grant of an
appropriate writ, direction or order under Article 226 of the Constitution
for quashing the notification issued by the State Government under Section
52(1) of the Act. If the respondents felt aggrieved by the acquisition of
their lands situate at Jaipur and wanted to challenge the validity of the
notification issued by the State Government of Rajasthan under Section
52(1) of the Act by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the
remedy of the respondents for the grant of such relief had to be sought by
filing such a petition before the Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, where
the cause of action wholly or in part arose.”
14. This provision was again considered by this Court in the case of Oil
and Natural Gas Commission vs. Utpal Kumar Basu and others, (1994) 4 SCC
711. In this case the petitioner Oil and Natural Gas Commission (ONGC)
through its consultant Engineers India Limited (EIL) issued an
advertisement in the newspaper inviting tenders for setting up of Kerosene
Recovery Processing Unit in Gujarat mentioning that the tenders containing
offers were to be communicated to EIL, New Delhi. After the final decision
was taken by the Steering Committee at New Delhi, the respondent NICCO
moved the Calcutta High Court praying that ONGC be restrained from awarding
the contract to any other party. It was pleaded in the petition that NICCO
came to know of the tender from the publication in the “Times of India”
within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. This Court by setting
aside the order passed by the Calcutta High Court came to the following
conclusion :-
“6. Therefore, in determining the objection of lack of territorial
jurisdiction the court must take all the facts pleaded in support of the
cause of action into consideration albeit without embarking upon an enquiry
as to the correctness or otherwise of the said facts. In other words the
question whether a High Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a
writ petition must be answered on the basis of the averments made in the
petition, the truth or otherwise whereof being immaterial. To put it
differently, the question of territorial jurisdiction must be decided on
the facts pleaded in the petition. Therefore, the question whether in the
instant case the Calcutta High Court had jurisdiction to entertain and
decide the writ petition in question even on the facts alleged must depend
upon whether the averments made in paragraphs 5, 7, 18, 22, 26 and 43 are
sufficient in law to establish that a part of the cause of action had
arisen within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court.”
15. In Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. vs. Union of India and Another, (2004)
6 SCC 254, this Court elaborately discussed Clause (2) of Article 226 of
the Constitution, particularly the meaning of the word ‘cause of action’
with reference to Section 20(c) and Section 141 of the Code of Civil
Procedure and observed:-
“9. Although in view of Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure the
provisions thereof would not apply to writ proceedings, the phraseology
used in Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure and clause (2) of
Article 226, being in pari materia, the decisions of this Court rendered on
interpretation of Section 20(c) CPC shall apply to the writ proceedings
also. Before proceeding to discuss the matter further it may be pointed out
that the entire bundle of facts pleaded need not constitute a cause of
action as what is necessary to be proved before the petitioner can obtain a
decree is the material facts. The expression material facts is also known
as integral facts.
10. Keeping in view the expressions used in clause (2) of Article 226 of
the Constitution of India, indisputably even if a small fraction of cause
of action accrues within the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court will have
jurisdiction in the matter.”
Their Lordships further observed as under:-
“29. In view of clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, now
if a part of cause of action arises outside the jurisdiction of the High
Court, it would have jurisdiction to issue a writ. The decision in Khajoor
Singh has, thus, no application.
30. We must, however, remind ourselves that even if a small part of cause
of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, the
same by itself may not be considered to be a determinative factor
compelling the High Court to decide the matter on merit. In appropriate
cases, the Court may refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction by
invoking the doctrine of forum conveniens.”
16. In the case of Union of India and others vs. Adani Exports Ltd. and
another, (2002) 1 SCC 567, this Court held that in order to confer
jurisdiction on a High Court to entertain a writ petition it must disclose
that the integral facts pleaded in support of the cause of action do
constitute a cause so as to empower the court to decide the dispute and the
entire or a part of it arose within its jurisdiction. Each and every fact
pleaded by the respondents in their application does not ipso facto lead to
the conclusion that those facts give rise to a cause of action within the
Court’s territorial jurisdiction unless those facts are such which have a
nexus or relevance with the lis i.e. involved in the case. This Court
observed:
“17. It is seen from the above that in order to confer jurisdiction on a
High Court to entertain a writ petition or a special civil application as
in this case, the High Court must be satisfied from the entire facts
pleaded in support of the cause of action that those facts do constitute a
cause so as to empower the court to decide a dispute which has, at least in
part, arisen within its jurisdiction. It is clear from the above judgment
that each and every fact pleaded by the respondents in their application
does not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that those facts give rise to a
cause of action within the court’s territorial jurisdiction unless those
facts pleaded are such which have a nexus or relevance with the lis that is
involved in the case. Facts which have no [pic]bearing with the lis or the
dispute involved in the case, do not give rise to a cause of action so as
to confer territorial jurisdiction on the court concerned. If we apply this
principle then we see that none of the facts pleaded in para 16 of the
petition, in our opinion, falls into the category of bundle of facts which
would constitute a cause of action giving rise to a dispute which could
confer territorial jurisdiction on the courts at Ahmedabad.”
17. In Om Prakash Srivastava vs. Union of India and Another (2006) 6
SCC 207, answering a similar question this Court observed that on a plain
reading of Clause(2) of Article 226 it is manifestly clear that the High
Court can exercise power to issue direction, order or writs for the
enforcement of any of the fundamental rights or for any other purpose if
the cause of action in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction
notwithstanding that the seat of the Government or authority or the
residence of the person against whom the direction, order or writ is issued
is not within the said territory. In para 7 this Court observed:-
“7. The question whether or not cause of action wholly or in part for
filing a writ petition has arisen within the territorial limits of any High
Court has to be decided in the light of the nature and character of the
proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. In order to maintain a
writ petition, a writ petitioner has to establish that a legal right
claimed by him has prima facie either been infringed or is threatened to be
infringed by the respondent within the territorial limits of the Court’s
jurisdiction and such infringement may take place by causing him actual
injury or threat thereof.”
igh Courts
18. In the case of Rajendran Chingaravelu vs. R.K. Mishra,
Additional Commissioner of Income Tax and Others, (2010) 1 SCC 457, this
Court while considering the scope of Article 226(2) of the Constitution,
particularly the cause of action in maintaining a writ petition, held as
under:
“9. The first question that arises for consideration is whether the Andhra
Pradesh High Court was justified in holding that as the seizure took place
at Chennai (Tamil Nadu), the appellant could not maintain the writ petition
before it. The High Court did not examine whether any part of cause of
action arose in Andhra Pradesh. Clause (2) of Article 226 makes it clear
that the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories
within which the cause of action arises wholly or in part, will have
jurisdiction. This would mean that even if a small fraction of the cause of
action (that bundle of facts which gives a petitioner, a right to sue)
accrued within the territories of Andhra Pradesh, the High Court of that
State will have jurisdiction.
xxxxxx
11. Normally, we would have set aside the order and remitted the matter to
the High Court for decision on merits. But from the persuasive submissions
of the appellant, who appeared in person on various dates of hearing, two
things stood out. Firstly, it was clear that the main object of the
petition was to ensure that at least in future, passengers like him are not
put to unnecessary harassment or undue hardship at the airports. He wants a
direction for issuance of clear guidelines and instructions to the
inspecting officers, and introduction of definite and efficient
verification/investigation procedures. He wants changes in the present
protocol where the officers are uncertain of what to do and seek
instructions and indefinitely wait for clearances from higher-ups for each
and every routine step, resulting in the detention of passengers for hours
and hours. In short, he wants the enquiries, verifications and
investigations to be efficient, passenger-friendly and courteous. Secondly,
he wants the Department/officers concerned to acknowledge that he was
unnecessarily harassed.”
19. Regard being had to the discussion made hereinabove, there cannot be
any doubt that the question whether or not cause of action wholly or in
part for filing a writ petition has arisen within the territorial limit of
any High Court has to be decided in the light of the nature and character
of the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. In order to
maintain a writ petition, the petitioner has to establish that a legal
right claimed by him has been infringed by the respondents within the
territorial limit of the Court’s jurisdiction.
20. We have perused the facts pleaded in the writ petition and the
documents relied upon by the appellant. Indisputably, the appellant
reported sickness on account of various ailments including difficulty in
breathing. He was referred to hospital. Consequently, he was signed off
for further medical treatment. Finally, the respondent permanently
declared the appellant unfit for sea service due to dilated cardiomyopathy
(heart muscles disease). As a result, the Shipping Department of the
Government of India issued an order on 12.4.2011 cancelling the
registration of the appellant as a seaman. A copy of the letter was sent
to the appellant at his native place in Bihar where he was staying after he
was found medically unfit. It further appears that the appellant sent a
representation from his home in the State of Bihar to the respondent
claiming disability compensation. The said representation was replied by
the respondent, which was addressed to him on his home address in Gaya,
Bihar rejecting his claim for disability compensation. It is further
evident that when the appellant was signed off and declared medically
unfit, he returned back to his home in the District of Gaya, Bihar and,
thereafter, he made all claims and filed representation from his home
address at Gaya and those letters and representations were entertained by
the respondents and replied and a decision on those representations were
communicated to him on his home address in Bihar. Admittedly, appellant
was suffering from serious heart muscles disease (Dilated Cardiomyopathy)
and breathing problem which forced him to stay in native place, wherefrom
he had been making all correspondence with regard to his disability
compensation. Prima facie, therefore, considering all the facts together,
a part or fraction of cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the
Patna High Court where he received a letter of refusal disentitling him
from disability compensation.
21. Apart from that, from the counter affidavit of the respondents and
the documents annexed therewith, it reveals that after the writ petition
was filed in the Patna High Court, the same was entertained and notices
were issued. Pursuant to the said notice, the respondents appeared and
participated in the proceedings in the High Court. It further reveals that
after hearing the counsel appearing for both the parties, the High Court
passed an interim order on 18.9.2012 directing the authorities of Shipping
Corporation of India to pay at least a sum of Rs.2.75 lakhs, which shall be
subject to the result of the writ petition. Pursuant to the interim order,
the respondent Shipping Corporation of India remitted Rs.2,67,270/- (after
deduction of income tax) to the bank account of the appellant. However,
when the writ petition was taken up for hearing, the High Court took the
view that no cause of action, not even a fraction of cause of action, has
arisen within its territorial jurisdiction.
22. Considering the entire facts of the case narrated hereinbefore
including the interim order passed by the High Court, in our considered
opinion, the writ petition ought not to have been dismissed for want of
territorial jurisdiction. As noticed above, at the time when the writ
petition was heard for the purpose of grant of interim relief, the
respondents instead of raising any objection with regard to territorial
jurisdiction opposed the prayer on the ground that the writ petitioner-
appellant was offered an amount of Rs.2.75 lakhs, but he refused to accept
the same and challenged the order granting severance compensation by filing
the writ petition. The impugned order, therefore, cannot be sustained in
the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case.
23. In the aforesaid, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order passed
by the High Court is set aside and the matter is remitted to the High Court
for deciding the writ petition on merits.
…………………………….J.
(Ranjan Gogoi)
…………………………….J.
(M.Y. Eqbal)
New Delhi,
August 7, 2014.
territorial jurisdiction. As noticed above, at the time when the writ petition was heard for the purpose of grant of interim relief, the respondents instead of raising any objection with regard to territorial jurisdiction opposed the prayer on the ground that the writ petitioner-
appellant was offered an amount of Rs.2.75 lakhs, but he refused to accept the same and challenged the order granting severance compensation by filing the writ petition. The impugned order, therefore, cannot be sustained in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case.=
We have perused the facts pleaded in the writ petition and the
documents relied upon by the appellant.
Indisputably, the appellant
reported sickness on account of various ailments including difficulty in
breathing. He was referred to hospital.
Consequently, he was signed off
for further medical treatment. Finally, the respondent permanently
declared the appellant unfit for sea service due to dilated cardiomyopathy
(heart muscles disease).
As a result, the Shipping Department of the
Government of India issued an order on 12.4.2011 cancelling the
registration of the appellant as a seaman. A copy of the letter was sent
to the appellant at his native place in Bihar where he was staying after he
was found medically unfit.
It further appears that the appellant sent a
representation from his home in the State of Bihar to the respondent
claiming disability compensation.
The said representation was replied by
the respondent, which was addressed to him on his home address in Gaya,
Bihar rejecting his claim for disability compensation.
It is further
evident that when the appellant was signed off and declared medically
unfit, he returned back to his home in the District of Gaya, Bihar and,
thereafter, he made all claims and filed representation from his home
address at Gaya and those letters and representations were entertained by
the respondents and replied and a decision on those representations were
communicated to him on his home address in Bihar.
Admittedly, appellant
was suffering from serious heart muscles disease (Dilated Cardiomyopathy)
and breathing problem which forced him to stay in native place, wherefrom
he had been making all correspondence with regard to his disability
compensation.
Prima facie, therefore, considering all the facts together,
a part or fraction of cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the
Patna High Court where he received a letter of refusal disentitling him
from disability compensation.
21. Apart from that, from the counter affidavit of the respondents and
the documents annexed therewith, it reveals that after the writ petition
was filed in the Patna High Court, the same was entertained and notices
were issued.
Pursuant to the said notice, the respondents appeared and
participated in the proceedings in the High Court.
It further reveals that
after hearing the counsel appearing for both the parties, the High Court
passed an interim order on 18.9.2012 directing the authorities of Shipping
Corporation of India to pay at least a sum of Rs.2.75 lakhs, which shall be
subject to the result of the writ petition.
Pursuant to the interim order,
the respondent Shipping Corporation of India remitted Rs.2,67,270/- (after
deduction of income tax) to the bank account of the appellant.
However,
when the writ petition was taken up for hearing, the High Court took the
view that no cause of action, not even a fraction of cause of action, has
arisen within its territorial jurisdiction.
22. Considering the entire facts of the case narrated hereinbefore
including the interim order passed by the High Court, in our considered
opinion, the writ petition ought not to have been dismissed for want of
territorial jurisdiction.
As noticed above, at the time when the writ
petition was heard for the purpose of grant of interim relief, the
respondents instead of raising any objection with regard to territorial
jurisdiction opposed the prayer on the ground that the writ petitioner-
appellant was offered an amount of Rs.2.75 lakhs, but he refused to accept
the same and challenged the order granting severance compensation by filing
the writ petition. The impugned order, therefore, cannot be sustained in
the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case.
23. In the aforesaid, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order passed
by the High Court is set aside and the matter is remitted to the High Court
for deciding the writ petition on merits.
2014 Aug. Part – http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41814
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.7414 OF 2014
(arising out of SLP (C) No.19549 of 2013)
Nawal Kishore Sharma ….Appellant(s)
Versus
Union of India and Others …Respondent(s)
JUDGMENT
M.Y. EQBAL, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. Aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 16.4.2013 passed by learned
Single Judge of Patna High Court dismissing appellant’s writ petition for
want of territorial jurisdiction, this appeal by special leave has been
preferred by the appellant, who in November, 1988 had joined the off-shore
Department of the Shipping Corporation of India (in short, “the
Corporation”) and after about eight years he was transferred from the off-
shore duty to a main fleet in the Foreign Going Department.
3. It is the case of the appellant that he was found medically fit in
the medical test conducted by the Marine Medical Services in February, 2009
and thereafter, on 29.9.2009, an agreement known as the articles of
agreement for employment of seafarers was executed for appellant’s off-
shore duty. On 18.6.2010, when the appellant reported sickness i.e. cough,
abdominal pain, swelling in leg and difficulty in breathing, he was sent
for medical treatment ashore at Adani, Mundra Port. The Medical Officer
ashore advised him for admission in the Hospital and accordingly he was
signed off for further medical treatment. Thereafter, he was considered
permanently unfit for sea service due to dilated cardiomyopathy (heart
muscle disease) as per certificate dated 18.3.2011 issued by Corporation’s
Assistant Medical Officer. Consequently, the Shipping Department of the
Government of India, Mumbai issued order dated 12.4.2011 cancelling
registration of the appellant as a Seaman.
4. It is contended by the appellant that after he settled at his native
place Gaya, Bihar, he sent several letters/ representations from there to
the respondents for his financial claims as per statutory provisions and
terms of contract. On the disability compensation claim, Respondent no.2-
Corporation communicated vide letter dated 7.10.2011 that since the
appellant was declared unfit for sea service due to heart problem (organic
ailment) he will be entitled to receive severance compensation of
Rs.2,75,000/-, which was although offered, but not accepted by the
appellant. It was also informed that he is not entitled to receive
disability compensation, which becomes payable only in case a seaman
becomes incapacitated as a result of the injury.
5. By filing a writ petition, the appellant approached Patna High Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for grant of various reliefs
including 100% disability compensation and pecuniary damages. However, at
the time of hearing, respondents raised the question of maintainability of
the writ petition on the ground that no cause of action or even a fraction
of cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the Patna
High Court and contended that the appellant was appointed by the
Corporation on the post of Seaman for off-shore services and he discharged
his duty outside the territory of the State of Bihar. It is the case of
the respondent that the order declaring the appellant permanently unfit as
well as the letter/order dated 7.10.2011 was passed by an authority of the
respondent Corporation at Mumbai. Per contra, it is the case of the
appellant that he is a permanent resident of Bihar and he asserted his
rights in the State of Bihar and all communications with respect to
rejection of his claims were made at his residential address in the State
of Bihar.
6. After hearing learned counsel appearing for the parties and
considering entire materials on record, learned Single Judge of the Patna
High Court dismissed the writ petition of the appellant holding that no
cause of action, not even a fraction of cause of action, arose within its
territorial jurisdiction. Hence, the present appeal by special leave.
7. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties.
8. The short question that falls for consideration in the facts of the
present case is that as to whether the Patna High Court is correct in
taking the view that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition.
For answering the said question we would like to consider the provision of
Article 226 of the Constitution as it stood prior to amendment.
Originally, Article 226 of the Constitution read as under:-
“Art.226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs. – (1)
Notwithstanding anything in article 32, every High Court shall have power,
throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction,
to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any
Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including
writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto
and certiorari, or any of them or the enforcement of any of the rights
conferred by Part III and for any other purpose.
(2) The power conferred on a High Court by clause (1) shall not be in
derogation of the power conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (2) of
article 32”.
9. While interpreting the aforesaid provision the Constitution Bench of
this Court in the case of Election Commission, India vs. Saka Venkata Rao,
AIR 1953 SC 210, held that the writ court would not run beyond the
territories subject to its jurisdiction and that the person or the
authority affected by the writ must be amenable to court’s jurisdiction
either by residence or location within those territories. The rule that
cause of action attracts jurisdiction in suits is based on statutory
enactment and cannot apply to writs issued under Article 226 of the
Constitution which makes no reference to any cause of action or where it
arises but insist on the presence of the person or authority within the
territories in relation to which High Court exercises jurisdiction. In
another Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in K.S. Rashid and Son
vs. Income tax Investigation Commission Etc., AIR 1954 SC 207, this Court
took the similar view and held that the writ court cannot exercise its
power under Article 226 beyond its territorial jurisdiction. The Court was
of the view that the exercise of power conferred by Article 226 was subject
to a two-fold limitation viz., firstly, the power is to be exercised in
relation to which it exercises jurisdiction and secondly, the person or
authority on whom the High Court is empowered to issue writ must be within
those territories. These two Constitution Bench judgments came for
consideration before a larger Bench of seven Judges of this Court in the
case of Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh vs. Union of India and another, AIR 1961
SC 532. The Bench approved the aforementioned two Constitution Bench
judgments and opined that unless there are clear and compelling reasons,
which cannot be denied, writ court cannot exercise jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution beyond its territorial jurisdiction.
10. The interpretation given by this Court in the aforesaid decisions
resulted in undue hardship and inconvenience to the citizens to invoke writ
jurisdiction. As a result, Clause 1(A) was inserted in Article 226 by the
Constitution (15th) Amendment Act, 1963 and subsequently renumbered as
Clause (2) by the Constitution (42nd) Amendment Act, 1976. The amended
Clause (2) now reads as under:-
“226. Power of the High Courts to issue certain writs – (1) Notwithstanding
anything in article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the
territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any
person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within
those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the
nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and
certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights
conferred by Part III and for any other purpose.
(2) The power conferred by Clause (1) to issue directions, orders or
writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any
High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within
which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of
such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority
or the residence of such person is not within those territories.
(3) xxxxx
(4) xxxxx”
11. On a plain reading of the amended provisions in Clause (2), it is
clear that now High Court can issue a writ when the person or the authority
against whom the writ is issued is located outside its territorial
jurisdiction, if the cause of action wholly or partially arises within the
court’s territorial jurisdiction. Cause of action for the purpose of
Article 226 (2) of the Constitution, for all intent and purpose must be
assigned the same meaning as envisaged under Section 20(c) of the Code of
Civil Procedure. The expression cause of action has not been defined
either in the Code of Civil Procedure or the Constitution. Cause of action
is bundle of facts which is necessary for the plaintiff to prove in the
suit before he can succeed.
12. The term ‘cause of action’ as appearing in Clause (2) came for
consideration time and again before this Court.
13. In the case of State of Rajasthan and Others vs. M/s Swaika
Properties and Another, (1985) 3 SCC 217, the fact was that the respondent-
Company having its registered office in Calcutta owned certain land on the
outskirts of Jaipur City was served with notice for acquisition of land
under Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959. Notice was duly served on the
Company at its registered office at Calcutta. The Company, first appeared
before the Special Court and finally the Calcutta High Court by filing a
writ petition challenging the notification of acquisition. The matter
ultimately came before this Court to answer a question as to whether the
service of notice under Section 52(2) of the Act at the registered office
of the Respondent in Calcutta was an integral part of cause of action and
was it sufficient to invest the Calcutta High Court with a jurisdiction to
entertain the petition challenging the impugned notification. Answering
the question this Court held:-
“7. Upon these facts, we are satisfied that the cause of action neither
wholly nor in part arose within the territorial limits of the Calcutta High
Court and therefore the learned Single Judge had no jurisdiction to issue a
rule nisi on the petition filed by the respondents under Article 226 of the
Constitution or to make the ad interim ex parte prohibitory order
restraining the appellants from taking any steps to take possession of the
land acquired. Under sub-section (5) of Section 52 of the Act the
appellants were entitled to require the respondents to surrender or deliver
possession of the lands acquired forthwith and upon their failure to do so,
take immediate steps to secure such possession under sub-section (6)
thereof.
[pic]8. The expression “cause of action” is tersely defined in Mulla’s Code
of Civil Procedure:
“The ‘cause of action’ means every fact which, if traversed, it would be
necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a
judgment of the court.”
In other words, it is a bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable
to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. The
mere service of notice under Section 52(2) of the Act on the respondents at
their registered office at 18-B, Brabourne Road, Calcutta i.e. within the
territorial limits of the State of West Bengal, could not give rise to a
cause of action within that territory unless the service of such notice was
an integral part of the cause of action. The entire cause of action
culminating in the acquisition of the land under Section 52(1) of the Act
arose within the State of Rajasthan i.e. within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Rajasthan High Court at the Jaipur Bench. The answer to
the question whether service of notice is an integral part of the cause of
action within the meaning of Article 226(2) of the Constitution must depend
upon the nature of the impugned order giving rise to a cause of action. The
notification dated February 8, 1984 issued by the State Government under
Section 52(1) of the Act became effective the moment it was published in
the Official Gazette as thereupon the notified land became vested in the
State Government free from all encumbrances. It was not necessary for the
respondents to plead the service of notice on them by the Special Officer,
Town Planning Department, Jaipur under Section 52(2) for the grant of an
appropriate writ, direction or order under Article 226 of the Constitution
for quashing the notification issued by the State Government under Section
52(1) of the Act. If the respondents felt aggrieved by the acquisition of
their lands situate at Jaipur and wanted to challenge the validity of the
notification issued by the State Government of Rajasthan under Section
52(1) of the Act by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the
remedy of the respondents for the grant of such relief had to be sought by
filing such a petition before the Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, where
the cause of action wholly or in part arose.”
14. This provision was again considered by this Court in the case of Oil
and Natural Gas Commission vs. Utpal Kumar Basu and others, (1994) 4 SCC
711. In this case the petitioner Oil and Natural Gas Commission (ONGC)
through its consultant Engineers India Limited (EIL) issued an
advertisement in the newspaper inviting tenders for setting up of Kerosene
Recovery Processing Unit in Gujarat mentioning that the tenders containing
offers were to be communicated to EIL, New Delhi. After the final decision
was taken by the Steering Committee at New Delhi, the respondent NICCO
moved the Calcutta High Court praying that ONGC be restrained from awarding
the contract to any other party. It was pleaded in the petition that NICCO
came to know of the tender from the publication in the “Times of India”
within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. This Court by setting
aside the order passed by the Calcutta High Court came to the following
conclusion :-
“6. Therefore, in determining the objection of lack of territorial
jurisdiction the court must take all the facts pleaded in support of the
cause of action into consideration albeit without embarking upon an enquiry
as to the correctness or otherwise of the said facts. In other words the
question whether a High Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a
writ petition must be answered on the basis of the averments made in the
petition, the truth or otherwise whereof being immaterial. To put it
differently, the question of territorial jurisdiction must be decided on
the facts pleaded in the petition. Therefore, the question whether in the
instant case the Calcutta High Court had jurisdiction to entertain and
decide the writ petition in question even on the facts alleged must depend
upon whether the averments made in paragraphs 5, 7, 18, 22, 26 and 43 are
sufficient in law to establish that a part of the cause of action had
arisen within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court.”
15. In Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. vs. Union of India and Another, (2004)
6 SCC 254, this Court elaborately discussed Clause (2) of Article 226 of
the Constitution, particularly the meaning of the word ‘cause of action’
with reference to Section 20(c) and Section 141 of the Code of Civil
Procedure and observed:-
“9. Although in view of Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure the
provisions thereof would not apply to writ proceedings, the phraseology
used in Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure and clause (2) of
Article 226, being in pari materia, the decisions of this Court rendered on
interpretation of Section 20(c) CPC shall apply to the writ proceedings
also. Before proceeding to discuss the matter further it may be pointed out
that the entire bundle of facts pleaded need not constitute a cause of
action as what is necessary to be proved before the petitioner can obtain a
decree is the material facts. The expression material facts is also known
as integral facts.
10. Keeping in view the expressions used in clause (2) of Article 226 of
the Constitution of India, indisputably even if a small fraction of cause
of action accrues within the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court will have
jurisdiction in the matter.”
Their Lordships further observed as under:-
“29. In view of clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, now
if a part of cause of action arises outside the jurisdiction of the High
Court, it would have jurisdiction to issue a writ. The decision in Khajoor
Singh has, thus, no application.
30. We must, however, remind ourselves that even if a small part of cause
of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, the
same by itself may not be considered to be a determinative factor
compelling the High Court to decide the matter on merit. In appropriate
cases, the Court may refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction by
invoking the doctrine of forum conveniens.”
16. In the case of Union of India and others vs. Adani Exports Ltd. and
another, (2002) 1 SCC 567, this Court held that in order to confer
jurisdiction on a High Court to entertain a writ petition it must disclose
that the integral facts pleaded in support of the cause of action do
constitute a cause so as to empower the court to decide the dispute and the
entire or a part of it arose within its jurisdiction. Each and every fact
pleaded by the respondents in their application does not ipso facto lead to
the conclusion that those facts give rise to a cause of action within the
Court’s territorial jurisdiction unless those facts are such which have a
nexus or relevance with the lis i.e. involved in the case. This Court
observed:
“17. It is seen from the above that in order to confer jurisdiction on a
High Court to entertain a writ petition or a special civil application as
in this case, the High Court must be satisfied from the entire facts
pleaded in support of the cause of action that those facts do constitute a
cause so as to empower the court to decide a dispute which has, at least in
part, arisen within its jurisdiction. It is clear from the above judgment
that each and every fact pleaded by the respondents in their application
does not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that those facts give rise to a
cause of action within the court’s territorial jurisdiction unless those
facts pleaded are such which have a nexus or relevance with the lis that is
involved in the case. Facts which have no [pic]bearing with the lis or the
dispute involved in the case, do not give rise to a cause of action so as
to confer territorial jurisdiction on the court concerned. If we apply this
principle then we see that none of the facts pleaded in para 16 of the
petition, in our opinion, falls into the category of bundle of facts which
would constitute a cause of action giving rise to a dispute which could
confer territorial jurisdiction on the courts at Ahmedabad.”
17. In Om Prakash Srivastava vs. Union of India and Another (2006) 6
SCC 207, answering a similar question this Court observed that on a plain
reading of Clause(2) of Article 226 it is manifestly clear that the High
Court can exercise power to issue direction, order or writs for the
enforcement of any of the fundamental rights or for any other purpose if
the cause of action in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction
notwithstanding that the seat of the Government or authority or the
residence of the person against whom the direction, order or writ is issued
is not within the said territory. In para 7 this Court observed:-
“7. The question whether or not cause of action wholly or in part for
filing a writ petition has arisen within the territorial limits of any High
Court has to be decided in the light of the nature and character of the
proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. In order to maintain a
writ petition, a writ petitioner has to establish that a legal right
claimed by him has prima facie either been infringed or is threatened to be
infringed by the respondent within the territorial limits of the Court’s
jurisdiction and such infringement may take place by causing him actual
injury or threat thereof.”
igh Courts
18. In the case of Rajendran Chingaravelu vs. R.K. Mishra,
Additional Commissioner of Income Tax and Others, (2010) 1 SCC 457, this
Court while considering the scope of Article 226(2) of the Constitution,
particularly the cause of action in maintaining a writ petition, held as
under:
“9. The first question that arises for consideration is whether the Andhra
Pradesh High Court was justified in holding that as the seizure took place
at Chennai (Tamil Nadu), the appellant could not maintain the writ petition
before it. The High Court did not examine whether any part of cause of
action arose in Andhra Pradesh. Clause (2) of Article 226 makes it clear
that the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories
within which the cause of action arises wholly or in part, will have
jurisdiction. This would mean that even if a small fraction of the cause of
action (that bundle of facts which gives a petitioner, a right to sue)
accrued within the territories of Andhra Pradesh, the High Court of that
State will have jurisdiction.
xxxxxx
11. Normally, we would have set aside the order and remitted the matter to
the High Court for decision on merits. But from the persuasive submissions
of the appellant, who appeared in person on various dates of hearing, two
things stood out. Firstly, it was clear that the main object of the
petition was to ensure that at least in future, passengers like him are not
put to unnecessary harassment or undue hardship at the airports. He wants a
direction for issuance of clear guidelines and instructions to the
inspecting officers, and introduction of definite and efficient
verification/investigation procedures. He wants changes in the present
protocol where the officers are uncertain of what to do and seek
instructions and indefinitely wait for clearances from higher-ups for each
and every routine step, resulting in the detention of passengers for hours
and hours. In short, he wants the enquiries, verifications and
investigations to be efficient, passenger-friendly and courteous. Secondly,
he wants the Department/officers concerned to acknowledge that he was
unnecessarily harassed.”
19. Regard being had to the discussion made hereinabove, there cannot be
any doubt that the question whether or not cause of action wholly or in
part for filing a writ petition has arisen within the territorial limit of
any High Court has to be decided in the light of the nature and character
of the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. In order to
maintain a writ petition, the petitioner has to establish that a legal
right claimed by him has been infringed by the respondents within the
territorial limit of the Court’s jurisdiction.
20. We have perused the facts pleaded in the writ petition and the
documents relied upon by the appellant. Indisputably, the appellant
reported sickness on account of various ailments including difficulty in
breathing. He was referred to hospital. Consequently, he was signed off
for further medical treatment. Finally, the respondent permanently
declared the appellant unfit for sea service due to dilated cardiomyopathy
(heart muscles disease). As a result, the Shipping Department of the
Government of India issued an order on 12.4.2011 cancelling the
registration of the appellant as a seaman. A copy of the letter was sent
to the appellant at his native place in Bihar where he was staying after he
was found medically unfit. It further appears that the appellant sent a
representation from his home in the State of Bihar to the respondent
claiming disability compensation. The said representation was replied by
the respondent, which was addressed to him on his home address in Gaya,
Bihar rejecting his claim for disability compensation. It is further
evident that when the appellant was signed off and declared medically
unfit, he returned back to his home in the District of Gaya, Bihar and,
thereafter, he made all claims and filed representation from his home
address at Gaya and those letters and representations were entertained by
the respondents and replied and a decision on those representations were
communicated to him on his home address in Bihar. Admittedly, appellant
was suffering from serious heart muscles disease (Dilated Cardiomyopathy)
and breathing problem which forced him to stay in native place, wherefrom
he had been making all correspondence with regard to his disability
compensation. Prima facie, therefore, considering all the facts together,
a part or fraction of cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the
Patna High Court where he received a letter of refusal disentitling him
from disability compensation.
21. Apart from that, from the counter affidavit of the respondents and
the documents annexed therewith, it reveals that after the writ petition
was filed in the Patna High Court, the same was entertained and notices
were issued. Pursuant to the said notice, the respondents appeared and
participated in the proceedings in the High Court. It further reveals that
after hearing the counsel appearing for both the parties, the High Court
passed an interim order on 18.9.2012 directing the authorities of Shipping
Corporation of India to pay at least a sum of Rs.2.75 lakhs, which shall be
subject to the result of the writ petition. Pursuant to the interim order,
the respondent Shipping Corporation of India remitted Rs.2,67,270/- (after
deduction of income tax) to the bank account of the appellant. However,
when the writ petition was taken up for hearing, the High Court took the
view that no cause of action, not even a fraction of cause of action, has
arisen within its territorial jurisdiction.
22. Considering the entire facts of the case narrated hereinbefore
including the interim order passed by the High Court, in our considered
opinion, the writ petition ought not to have been dismissed for want of
territorial jurisdiction. As noticed above, at the time when the writ
petition was heard for the purpose of grant of interim relief, the
respondents instead of raising any objection with regard to territorial
jurisdiction opposed the prayer on the ground that the writ petitioner-
appellant was offered an amount of Rs.2.75 lakhs, but he refused to accept
the same and challenged the order granting severance compensation by filing
the writ petition. The impugned order, therefore, cannot be sustained in
the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case.
23. In the aforesaid, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order passed
by the High Court is set aside and the matter is remitted to the High Court
for deciding the writ petition on merits.
…………………………….J.
(Ranjan Gogoi)
…………………………….J.
(M.Y. Eqbal)
New Delhi,
August 7, 2014.
