Sec. 304 B and Sec.306 I.P.C.- Sec.319 Cr.P.C - summoning a person who is not a relative of the Husband to face trial as his name was mentioned in FIR and in Evidence - High court set aside the order of trial court - Apex court held that the word “relative of the husband” in Section 304 B of the IPC would mean such persons, who are related by blood, marriage or adoption. When we apply this principle the respondent herein is not related to the husband of the deceased either by blood or marriage or adoption. Hence, in our opinion, the High Court did not err in passing the impugned order. We hasten to add that a person, not a relative of the husband, may not be prosecuted for offence under Section 304B IPC but this does not mean that such a person cannot be prosecuted for any other offence viz. Section 306 IPC, in case the allegations constitute offence other than Section 304B IPC. =
High court held that
“Even the dictionary meaning of a relative is one who is related by blood
or marriage. Gurmit Singh is certainly not related to Paramjit Singh
either by blood or by marriage. Gurmit Singh would not fall in the
category of relative of the husband. Therefore, Gurmit Singh must be
excluded from the array of the accused. It is not necessary to try him
under Section 304B I.P.C. for the dowry death of Paramjit Singh’s wife.=
We do
not find anything in context to deviate from the general rule of
interpretation. Hence, we have no manner of doubt that the word “relative
of the husband” in Section 304 B of the IPC would mean such persons, who
are related by blood, marriage or adoption. When we apply this principle
the respondent herein is not related to the husband of the deceased either
by blood or marriage or adoption. Hence, in our opinion, the High Court
did not err in passing the impugned order. We hasten to add that a person,
not a relative of the husband, may not be prosecuted for offence under
Section 304B IPC but this does not mean that such a person cannot be
prosecuted for any other offence viz. Section 306 IPC, in case the
allegations constitute offence other than Section 304B IPC.
In the result, we do not find any merit in the appeal and it is
dismissed accordingly.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1278 OF 2014
(@SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) No.1696 of 2006)
STATE OF PUNJAB ..... APPELLANT
VERSUS
GURMIT SINGH .... RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
Chandramauli Kr. Prasad
State of Punjab aggrieved by the order dated 7th of September, 2005, passed
by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Criminal Revision No. 320 of 2000
whereby it has set aside the order of the trial court dated 24th of
January, 2000 summoning the respondent Gurmit Singh to face trial under
Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, has preferred this special
leave petition.
Leave granted.
Facts lie in a very short compass. On the basis of a report a case
under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code (for short ‘IPC’) was
registered at Police Station, Kharar. In the first information report, the
names of various accused persons figured including Gurmit Singh, the
respondent herein. Police after usual investigation, submitted the charge-
sheet in which the respondent did not figure as an accused. However, the
respondent along with some other accused persons who were not charge-
sheeted were summoned to face the trial. They challenged the said order
before the High Court in Criminal Misc. No. 1584-M of 1999 and the High
Court by its order dated 25th of February, 1999 set aside the order
summoning those accused persons including the respondent but while doing so
gave liberty to take recourse to the provisions of Section 319 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, hereinafter referred to as the ‘Code’, at an
appropriate stage of the trial. During the course of trial, evidence of
one Shakuntla Rani, PW-1 was recorded, who averred that the respondent
herein was also responsible for the death of Gurjit Kaur, the wife of
Paramjit Singh. Thereafter, an application was filed by the prosecution
for summoning aforesaid Gurmit Singh and other accused persons before the
trial court in exercise of the power under Section 319 of the Code. The
trial court by its order dated 24th of January, 2000, summoned the
respondent besides other accused persons to face trial, for commission of
offence under Section 304B IPC, inter alia, observing that the names of
those persons figured in the FIR, statement of the witnesses recorded under
Section 161 of the Code and the evidence of Shakuntla Rani, PW-1.
Respondent challenged the aforesaid order in a revision application filed
before the High Court inter alia on the ground that he cannot be tried for
offence under Section 304B of the Code because he is not a relative of the
husband of the deceased. It was pointed out that Paramjit Singh happened
to be the husband of the deceased whereas the respondent is the brother of
his aunt (chachi) and, therefore, cannot be said to be a relative of the
deceased’s husband. Aforesaid submission found favour with the High Court
and, accordingly, it quashed the order summoning the respondent to face the
trial. While doing so, the High Court observed as follows:
“Even the dictionary meaning of a relative is one who is related by blood
or marriage. Gurmit Singh is certainly not related to Paramjit Singh
either by blood or by marriage. Gurmit Singh would not fall in the
category of relative of the husband. Therefore, Gurmit Singh must be
excluded from the array of the accused. It is not necessary to try him
under Section 304B I.P.C. for the dowry death of Paramjit Singh’s wife.
Mr. V. Madhukar, learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of
the State submits that the High Court erred in holding that the respondent
is not a relative of the husband of the deceased. He points out that
Balbir Kaur is the wife of Paramjit Singh’s father’s brother and Gurmit
Singh respondent herein happens to be Balbir Kaur’s brother, hence, a
relative of Paramjit Singh. According to him, the High Court erred in
holding that he is not a relative of the husband of the deceased. Mr. C.D.
Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, however,
submits that the respondent cannot be said to be related to the husband of
the deceased in any manner and, therefore, cannot be prosecuted for offence
under Section 304B of the IPC. The rival submission necessitates the
examination of Section 304B of the IPC, same reads as follows:
”304B. Dowry death.—(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns
or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within
seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she
was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of
her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death
shall be called “dowry death”, and such husband or relative shall be deemed
to have caused her death.
Explanation.—For the purpose of this sub-section, “dowry” shall have the
same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of
1961).
(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a
term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to
imprisonment for life.”
(underlining ours)
From a plain reading of the aforesaid provision it is evident that when a
woman dies by any burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under normal
circumstances within seven years of the marriage, her husband or any
relative of her husband shall be deemed to have committed the offence of
dowry death if it is shown that soon before the death the woman was
subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband, or by any relative of
her husband. This section therefore, exposes the husband of the woman or
any relative of her husband for the commission of offence of the dowry
death. Admittedly, the respondent is not the husband of the woman who died
and, therefore, the question which falls for determination is as to whether
he comes within the ambit of “any relative of her husband”. The expression
“relative” has not been defined in the IPC. The provision with which we are
concerned is a penal provision which deserves strict construction. It is
well settled that when the words of a statute are not defined, it has to be
understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense. For this purpose,
it shall be permissible to refer to dictionaries to find out the general
sense in which the word is understood in common parlance. In Ramanatha
Aiyar’s, Advance Law Lexicon (Vol.4, 3rd Edn.), the word relative means any
person related by blood, marriage or adoption. A large number of
dictionaries give this word relative, in context, same meaning.
It is relevant here to state that the expression “relative of the husband”
has been used in Section 498-A of the I.P.C. While interpreting the said
expression, this Court in the case of U. Suvetha vs. State by Inspector of
Police and Anr.(2009) 6 SCC 787 held it to mean a person related by blood,
marriage or adoption. Relevant portion of the judgment reads as follows:
“10. In the absence of any statutory definition, the term “relative” must
be assigned a meaning as is commonly understood. Ordinarily it would
include father, mother, husband or wife, son, daughter, brother, sister,
nephew or niece, grandson or granddaughter of an individual or the spouse
of any person. The meaning of the word “relative” would depend upon the
nature of the statute. It principally includes a person related by blood,
marriage or adoption.”
The expression relative of the husband further came up for consideration in
the case of Vijeta Gajra vs. State of NCT of Delhi (2010)11 SCC 618 and
while approving the decision of this Court in U. Suvetha (Supra), it was
held that the word relative would be limited only to the blood relations or
the relations by marriage. It is appropriate to reproduce the following
passage from the said judgment:
“12. Relying on the dictionary meaning of the word “relative” and further
relying on Ramanatha Aiyar’s, Advance Law Lexicon (Vol.4, 3rd Edn.), the
Court went on to hold that Section 498-A IPC being a penal provision would
deserve strict construction and unless a contextual meaning is required to
be given to the statute, the said statute has to be construed strictly. On
that behalf the Court relied on the judgment in T. Ashok Pai vs. CIT (2007)
7 SCC 162. A reference was made to the decision in Shivcharan Lal Verma
vs. State of M.P. (2007) 15 SCC 369. After quoting from various decisions
of this Court, it was held that reference to the word “relative” in Section
498-A IPC would be limited only to the blood relations or the relations by
marriage.”
It is well known rule of construction that when the Legislature uses same
words in different part of the statute, the presumption is that those words
have been used in the same sense, unless displaced by the context. We do
not find anything in context to deviate from the general rule of
interpretation. Hence, we have no manner of doubt that the word “relative
of the husband” in Section 304 B of the IPC would mean such persons, who
are related by blood, marriage or adoption. When we apply this principle
the respondent herein is not related to the husband of the deceased either
by blood or marriage or adoption. Hence, in our opinion, the High Court
did not err in passing the impugned order. We hasten to add that a person,
not a relative of the husband, may not be prosecuted for offence under
Section 304B IPC but this does not mean that such a person cannot be
prosecuted for any other offence viz. Section 306 IPC, in case the
allegations constitute offence other than Section 304B IPC.
In the result, we do not find any merit in the appeal and it is
dismissed accordingly.
………………………………………………………………J
(CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD)
………………………………………………………………J
(PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE)
NEW DELHI,
July 2, 2014.
-----------------------
11
“Even the dictionary meaning of a relative is one who is related by blood
or marriage. Gurmit Singh is certainly not related to Paramjit Singh
either by blood or by marriage. Gurmit Singh would not fall in the
category of relative of the husband. Therefore, Gurmit Singh must be
excluded from the array of the accused. It is not necessary to try him
under Section 304B I.P.C. for the dowry death of Paramjit Singh’s wife.=
We do
not find anything in context to deviate from the general rule of
interpretation. Hence, we have no manner of doubt that the word “relative
of the husband” in Section 304 B of the IPC would mean such persons, who
are related by blood, marriage or adoption. When we apply this principle
the respondent herein is not related to the husband of the deceased either
by blood or marriage or adoption. Hence, in our opinion, the High Court
did not err in passing the impugned order. We hasten to add that a person,
not a relative of the husband, may not be prosecuted for offence under
Section 304B IPC but this does not mean that such a person cannot be
prosecuted for any other offence viz. Section 306 IPC, in case the
allegations constitute offence other than Section 304B IPC.
In the result, we do not find any merit in the appeal and it is
dismissed accordingly.
2014 – July. Part – http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41737
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1278 OF 2014
(@SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) No.1696 of 2006)
STATE OF PUNJAB ..... APPELLANT
VERSUS
GURMIT SINGH .... RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
Chandramauli Kr. Prasad
State of Punjab aggrieved by the order dated 7th of September, 2005, passed
by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Criminal Revision No. 320 of 2000
whereby it has set aside the order of the trial court dated 24th of
January, 2000 summoning the respondent Gurmit Singh to face trial under
Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, has preferred this special
leave petition.
Leave granted.
Facts lie in a very short compass. On the basis of a report a case
under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code (for short ‘IPC’) was
registered at Police Station, Kharar. In the first information report, the
names of various accused persons figured including Gurmit Singh, the
respondent herein. Police after usual investigation, submitted the charge-
sheet in which the respondent did not figure as an accused. However, the
respondent along with some other accused persons who were not charge-
sheeted were summoned to face the trial. They challenged the said order
before the High Court in Criminal Misc. No. 1584-M of 1999 and the High
Court by its order dated 25th of February, 1999 set aside the order
summoning those accused persons including the respondent but while doing so
gave liberty to take recourse to the provisions of Section 319 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, hereinafter referred to as the ‘Code’, at an
appropriate stage of the trial. During the course of trial, evidence of
one Shakuntla Rani, PW-1 was recorded, who averred that the respondent
herein was also responsible for the death of Gurjit Kaur, the wife of
Paramjit Singh. Thereafter, an application was filed by the prosecution
for summoning aforesaid Gurmit Singh and other accused persons before the
trial court in exercise of the power under Section 319 of the Code. The
trial court by its order dated 24th of January, 2000, summoned the
respondent besides other accused persons to face trial, for commission of
offence under Section 304B IPC, inter alia, observing that the names of
those persons figured in the FIR, statement of the witnesses recorded under
Section 161 of the Code and the evidence of Shakuntla Rani, PW-1.
Respondent challenged the aforesaid order in a revision application filed
before the High Court inter alia on the ground that he cannot be tried for
offence under Section 304B of the Code because he is not a relative of the
husband of the deceased. It was pointed out that Paramjit Singh happened
to be the husband of the deceased whereas the respondent is the brother of
his aunt (chachi) and, therefore, cannot be said to be a relative of the
deceased’s husband. Aforesaid submission found favour with the High Court
and, accordingly, it quashed the order summoning the respondent to face the
trial. While doing so, the High Court observed as follows:
“Even the dictionary meaning of a relative is one who is related by blood
or marriage. Gurmit Singh is certainly not related to Paramjit Singh
either by blood or by marriage. Gurmit Singh would not fall in the
category of relative of the husband. Therefore, Gurmit Singh must be
excluded from the array of the accused. It is not necessary to try him
under Section 304B I.P.C. for the dowry death of Paramjit Singh’s wife.
Mr. V. Madhukar, learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of
the State submits that the High Court erred in holding that the respondent
is not a relative of the husband of the deceased. He points out that
Balbir Kaur is the wife of Paramjit Singh’s father’s brother and Gurmit
Singh respondent herein happens to be Balbir Kaur’s brother, hence, a
relative of Paramjit Singh. According to him, the High Court erred in
holding that he is not a relative of the husband of the deceased. Mr. C.D.
Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, however,
submits that the respondent cannot be said to be related to the husband of
the deceased in any manner and, therefore, cannot be prosecuted for offence
under Section 304B of the IPC. The rival submission necessitates the
examination of Section 304B of the IPC, same reads as follows:
”304B. Dowry death.—(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns
or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within
seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she
was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of
her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death
shall be called “dowry death”, and such husband or relative shall be deemed
to have caused her death.
Explanation.—For the purpose of this sub-section, “dowry” shall have the
same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of
1961).
(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a
term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to
imprisonment for life.”
(underlining ours)
From a plain reading of the aforesaid provision it is evident that when a
woman dies by any burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under normal
circumstances within seven years of the marriage, her husband or any
relative of her husband shall be deemed to have committed the offence of
dowry death if it is shown that soon before the death the woman was
subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband, or by any relative of
her husband. This section therefore, exposes the husband of the woman or
any relative of her husband for the commission of offence of the dowry
death. Admittedly, the respondent is not the husband of the woman who died
and, therefore, the question which falls for determination is as to whether
he comes within the ambit of “any relative of her husband”. The expression
“relative” has not been defined in the IPC. The provision with which we are
concerned is a penal provision which deserves strict construction. It is
well settled that when the words of a statute are not defined, it has to be
understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense. For this purpose,
it shall be permissible to refer to dictionaries to find out the general
sense in which the word is understood in common parlance. In Ramanatha
Aiyar’s, Advance Law Lexicon (Vol.4, 3rd Edn.), the word relative means any
person related by blood, marriage or adoption. A large number of
dictionaries give this word relative, in context, same meaning.
It is relevant here to state that the expression “relative of the husband”
has been used in Section 498-A of the I.P.C. While interpreting the said
expression, this Court in the case of U. Suvetha vs. State by Inspector of
Police and Anr.(2009) 6 SCC 787 held it to mean a person related by blood,
marriage or adoption. Relevant portion of the judgment reads as follows:
“10. In the absence of any statutory definition, the term “relative” must
be assigned a meaning as is commonly understood. Ordinarily it would
include father, mother, husband or wife, son, daughter, brother, sister,
nephew or niece, grandson or granddaughter of an individual or the spouse
of any person. The meaning of the word “relative” would depend upon the
nature of the statute. It principally includes a person related by blood,
marriage or adoption.”
The expression relative of the husband further came up for consideration in
the case of Vijeta Gajra vs. State of NCT of Delhi (2010)11 SCC 618 and
while approving the decision of this Court in U. Suvetha (Supra), it was
held that the word relative would be limited only to the blood relations or
the relations by marriage. It is appropriate to reproduce the following
passage from the said judgment:
“12. Relying on the dictionary meaning of the word “relative” and further
relying on Ramanatha Aiyar’s, Advance Law Lexicon (Vol.4, 3rd Edn.), the
Court went on to hold that Section 498-A IPC being a penal provision would
deserve strict construction and unless a contextual meaning is required to
be given to the statute, the said statute has to be construed strictly. On
that behalf the Court relied on the judgment in T. Ashok Pai vs. CIT (2007)
7 SCC 162. A reference was made to the decision in Shivcharan Lal Verma
vs. State of M.P. (2007) 15 SCC 369. After quoting from various decisions
of this Court, it was held that reference to the word “relative” in Section
498-A IPC would be limited only to the blood relations or the relations by
marriage.”
It is well known rule of construction that when the Legislature uses same
words in different part of the statute, the presumption is that those words
have been used in the same sense, unless displaced by the context. We do
not find anything in context to deviate from the general rule of
interpretation. Hence, we have no manner of doubt that the word “relative
of the husband” in Section 304 B of the IPC would mean such persons, who
are related by blood, marriage or adoption. When we apply this principle
the respondent herein is not related to the husband of the deceased either
by blood or marriage or adoption. Hence, in our opinion, the High Court
did not err in passing the impugned order. We hasten to add that a person,
not a relative of the husband, may not be prosecuted for offence under
Section 304B IPC but this does not mean that such a person cannot be
prosecuted for any other offence viz. Section 306 IPC, in case the
allegations constitute offence other than Section 304B IPC.
In the result, we do not find any merit in the appeal and it is
dismissed accordingly.
………………………………………………………………J
(CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD)
………………………………………………………………J
(PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE)
NEW DELHI,
July 2, 2014.
-----------------------
11
