published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40797
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No. 8288 OF 2013
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 27387 of 2012)
M/s. Monnet Ispat and Energy Limited
....Appellant
versus
Jan Chetna and others ....Respondents
O R D E R
G.S. SINGHVI, J.
1. Whether the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court could have
entertained and allowed the petition filed by respondent No.1 as Public
Interest Litigation for setting aside order dated 31.12.2008 passed by
National Environment Appellate Authority (for short, ‘NEAA’) and remanded
the case to the competent quasi judicial forum for being decided on merits.
2. The appellant is a company incorporated under the Companies Act,
1956. Its registered office is at Raipur (Chhattisgarh). On 27.6.2007, the
appellant submitted an application to Chhattisgarh Environment and
Conservation Board (respondent No.3) for sanctioning the proposed expansion
of its existing plant at Naharpali, Kharsia, Raigarh. Respondent No.3
issued notice dated 4.8.2007 under the Environment Protection Act, 1986 and
the Rules framed thereunder for holding public hearing. As many as 700
persons participated in the public hearing. Thereafter, respondent No.3
sent report dated 4.10.2007 to the Ministry of Environment and Forests
(respondent No.2), which granted environmental clearance for the project of
the appellant.
3. Two days before the date fixed for public hearing, Shri Ramesh
Agrawal and two others, namely, Ms. Ranjana Rajput and Mr. Vinod
Chhaparlya filed Civil Suit No.30-A/ 2007 in the Court of District Judge,
Raigarh (for short, ‘the trial Court’) impleading the appellant as a
defendant and prayed for grant of a declaration that the appellant had
illegally set up industry at Villages Naharpali, Bhupdevpur, Salihabhata
and Singhanpur. They further prayed for ordering closure of the industry
and for issue of a permanent injunction against the holding of public
hearing for expansion of the existing industry and / or establishment of
any new industry by the appellant.
4. Along with the suit, the plaintiffs filed an application under Order
39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC for stay of the public hearing. By order dated
4.8.2007, the trial Court dismissed the application for temporary
injunction. After six days, Shri Ramesh Agrawal and two others filed
another application for injunction but no order appears to have been passed
on that application.
5. After 2 months and 20 days of rejection of the injunction application
filed by Shri Ramesh Agrawal and two others, Shri Ram Kumar Agarwal and
Shri Ramesh Sharma filed Writ Petition No.5534/2007 before the Chhattisgarh
High Court under the name and style of “Ekta Parishad” and prayed that the
State Government may be directed to conduct an inquiry into the correctness
and genuineness of the Environment Impact Assessment Report prepared by
respondent No.3. Later on, the writ petitioners withdrew their cause.
6. The environment clearance granted by respondent No.2 was challenged
by respondent No.1 by filing an appeal under the National Environment
Appellate Authority Act, 1997 (for short, ‘the 1997 Act’). On notice,
respondent No.3 filed reply and pleaded that environment clearance was
granted to the appellant in accordance with law. NEAA dismissed the appeal
of respondent No.1 vide order dated 31.12.2008 by recording the following
observations:
"10. The Counsel for Appellant submitted the proceedings of the draft
constitution of Jan Chetna on 24.11.2008 without supporting affidavit
which was required to be filed under the NEAA Rules, 1997 for taking
responsibility of the authenticity of the facts stated in the
document. The Counsel for the Appellant mentioned that the affidavit
is required to be filed only while filing the Memorandum of Appeal
under the NEAA Rules and not with the subsequent document. The
Authority perused the draft proceedings of the meeting dated 15.2.2005
and observed that only 10 persons have formed the association called
"Jan Chetna". Out of 10 members only two members complete address are
given in the proceedings. From the addresses so given, it may be
inferred that none of the members of "Jan Chetna" belong to Naharpali,
Kharsia, Raigarh, the project area. Further the minutes of the meeting
dated 15.2.2008 shows that Shri Rajesh Tripathi was given
responsibility of preparation of authorization letter in favour of
Ramesh Aggarwal and issue the same to oppose the Environmental
Clearance granted to the Respondent No.3. As per serial number 12 of
the proceedings dated 10.5.2005, Shri Rajesh Tripathi's address for
communication etc., would be No.159, Kelo Vihar, Raigarh. But, it is
found that the Authorisation letter issued by Shri Rajesh Tripathi
bearing the address of Satyam Kunj, Naya Gunj, Raigarh, which was the
address of Shri Ramesh Aggarwal and there was no mention of
designation of Shri Rajesh Tripathi in this letter. This action of the
Appellant creates doubt about the authenticity of the authorization
letter so issued. From the above it is clear that neither of the
members of the "Association" - Jan Chetna as aggrieved persons as
claimed in para 4(iv) above nor it has been authorized by the primary
aggrieved persons.
The Appellant has not disclosed all material
facts for the purpose of adjudication of the Appeal. While considering
the legality of secondary public injury complaints by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in S.P. Gupta Vs. UOI (1981), See SCC 87 held as follow:
".......... in such cases a member of the public having
sufficient interest can certainly maintain an action challenging
the legality of such acts or omissions but if the person or
specific class or group of persons who are primarily injured by
such acts or omissions, do not wish to claim any relief and
accept such act or omission willingly and without protest, the
member of public who complaints of a secondary public injury
cannot maintain the action."
The Appellant has failed to prove that its association is acting on
behalf and in the interest of people who are or may be affected by the
grant of Environmental Clearance by Respondent No.1.
Having perused all the submissions and the documents filed by the
Appellant and the Respondents, the Authority conclude that the
Appellant organization - Jan Chetna is not an association of persons
likely to be affected by the order of the Environmental Clearance
granted to Respondent No.3 by Respondent No.1. Therefore, the
Appellant organization - Jan Chetna is not qualified to file an Appeal
before this Authority under Section 11(2)(c) of the NEAA Act, 1997.
Accordingly, the Appeal filed by the Appellant is not maintainable.”
7. Respondent No.1 challenged the aforesaid order in Writ Petition (C)
No. 8399 of 2009, which was described as a Public Interest Litigation and
prayed that order dated 31.12.2008 passed by NEAA may be set aside and a
direction be issued to NEAA to decide the appeal on merits. Respondent
No.1 claimed that it was a representative body of those affected by the
environmental clearance granted in favour of the appellant and, therefore,
it had the locus to challenge the decision taken by respondent No.2.
8. In the counter affidavit filed by the appellant, several objections
were taken to the maintainability of the petition. It was pleaded that in
the garb of filing a Public Interest Litigation, respondent No.1 was
seeking annulment of the order passed by NEAA and such relief could be
claimed only by filing a regular petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution, which is required to be heard and decided by a Single Judge.
The appellant also referred to the pendency of Writ Petition(C)
No.5534/2007 before the Chhattisgarh High Court and pleaded that the writ
petition filed before the Delhi High Court was an abuse of the process of
the Court. Another plea taken by the appellant was that the entire cause
of action for filing the petition had accrued in Chhattisgarh and the Delhi
High Court did not have the jurisdiction to entertain the petition filed by
respondent No.1.
9. The Division Bench of the High Court did take cognizance of the
objections taken by the appellant but did not deal with the same except the
one relating to territorial jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court and
overruled the same. On merits, the Division Bench relied upon judgment
dated 14.9.2009 passed by a coordinate Bench in LPA No.277/2009 Vedanta
Alumina Ltd. v. Prafulla Samantra and others wherein it was held that an
organisation, which is working in the area and is closely following the
issue of setting up of industries and impact thereof on the environment
falls in the category of a ‘person aggrieved’ and concluded that NEAA
committed serious error by dismissing the appeal of respondent No.1 on the
ground of lack of locus.
10. We have heard Dr. A.M. Singhvi, learned senior counsel for the
appellant and Shri Sanjay Parikh, learned counsel for respondent No.1 and
perused the record.
11. Shri Parikh made strenuous efforts to convince the Court that the
hypertechnical objection raised by the appellant should not be entertained
and in view of the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of the High
Court in Vedanta Alumina Ltd. v. Prafulla Samantra (supra), the special
leave petition should be dismissed.
12. We have considered the submission of the learned counsel but have not
felt impressed.
13. Chapter 3 Part A of the Delhi High Court Rules contains rules
relating to the practice of the High Court in the hearing of causes and
other matters. Part B contains rules relating to the jurisdiction of a
Single Judge and of Benches of the Court. The relevant clauses of Rule 1 of
Part B read as under:
“Part B
JURISDICTION OF A SINGLE JUDGE AND OF BENCHES
OF THE COURT
1. Cases ordinarily to be heard by a single Judge—Subject to the
provisos hereinafter set forth the following classes of cases
shall ordinarily be heard and disposed of by a Judge setting
alone:
(i) to (xvii) xxx xxx xxx
(xviii) (a) Application or petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India for the issue of any directions, orders or
writs in the nature of Mandamus, prohibition, quo-warranto or
certiorari for the enforcement of fundamental rights conferred
by Part III of the Constitution of India or for any other
purpose, except:
(i) Petitions where vires of Acts or statutory rules,
regulations, or bye-laws are challenged.
(ii) Petitions where personal liberty is involved.
(iii) Petitions pertaining to all Revenue/tax matters
including entertainment taxes, except Municipal Tax.
(iv) Petitions arising from the orders of the Board for
Industrial and Financial Reconstruction/Appellate Authority
for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction or seeking
directions to them; and
(v) Petitions pertaining to Public Interest litigation.
(vi) Petitions pertaining to the award to Tenders.
(vii) Petitions relating to Co-operative Societies.
(viii) Petitions being service matters of Armed Forces of
the Union.
(ix) Petitions arising out of Land Acquisition.
(x) Petitions concerning orders passed by the High Court on
the administrative side.
Provided that as regards pending cases, the learned single Judge
may hear the part-heard matters.
Explanation: The preliminary hearing for admission and final
disposal of applications and petitions pertaining to matters
mentioned in clause (i) to (x) of sub-rule (xviii)(a) above
shall however be before a Bench of two Judges and before a
Single Bench when there is no sitting of Division Bench.”
Rule 4, which relates to jurisdiction of a Bench of two Judges, also reads
as under:
“4. All cases to be disposed of by a Bench of two Judges save as
provided by law or by these rules—Save as provided by law or by
these rules or by special order of the Chief Justice, all cases
shall be heard and disposed of by a Bench of two Judges.”
14. A bare reading of the above reproduced provisions makes it clear that
the petition filed by respondent No.1 for quashing order dated 31.12.2008
could be heard only by Single Bench of the Delhi High Court. However, by
disguising the petition as a Public Interest Litigation, respondent No.1
succeeded in getting the same listed before the Division Bench of the High
Court. Unfortunately, the Division Bench did not deal with the objection
raised by the appellant to the maintainability of the petition filed by
respondent No.1 and proceeded to decide the matter on merits which, in our
considered view, was legally impermissible.
15. We are not suggesting that respondent No.1 had indulged in Bench
hunting but it needs to be emphasised that every Bench of the High Court
should scrupulously follow the relevant rules and should not violate
statutory provisions specifying its jurisdiction, else the sanctity of the
rules relating to distribution of causes between the Single, the Division
Bench and larger Benches will be lost.
16. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order is set
aside. The writ petition filed by respondent No.1 shall now be listed
before a Single Judge of the High Court, who shall decide the same without
being influenced by the observations contained in the impugned order or
this order.
17. While disposing of the appeal in the manner indicated above, we
consider it necessary to make it clear that this Court has not expressed
any opinion on the merits of the case and the parties shall be free to
advance all legally permissible arguments before the learned Single Judge
of the High Court.
…………………………J.
(G.S.SINGHVI)
…………………………J.
(V. GOPALA GOWDA)
NEW DELHI;
SEPTEMBER 19, 2013.
-----------------------
9
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No. 8288 OF 2013
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 27387 of 2012)
M/s. Monnet Ispat and Energy Limited
....Appellant
versus
Jan Chetna and others ....Respondents
O R D E R
G.S. SINGHVI, J.
1. Whether the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court could have
entertained and allowed the petition filed by respondent No.1 as Public
Interest Litigation for setting aside order dated 31.12.2008 passed by
National Environment Appellate Authority (for short, ‘NEAA’) and remanded
the case to the competent quasi judicial forum for being decided on merits.
2. The appellant is a company incorporated under the Companies Act,
1956. Its registered office is at Raipur (Chhattisgarh). On 27.6.2007, the
appellant submitted an application to Chhattisgarh Environment and
Conservation Board (respondent No.3) for sanctioning the proposed expansion
of its existing plant at Naharpali, Kharsia, Raigarh. Respondent No.3
issued notice dated 4.8.2007 under the Environment Protection Act, 1986 and
the Rules framed thereunder for holding public hearing. As many as 700
persons participated in the public hearing. Thereafter, respondent No.3
sent report dated 4.10.2007 to the Ministry of Environment and Forests
(respondent No.2), which granted environmental clearance for the project of
the appellant.
3. Two days before the date fixed for public hearing, Shri Ramesh
Agrawal and two others, namely, Ms. Ranjana Rajput and Mr. Vinod
Chhaparlya filed Civil Suit No.30-A/ 2007 in the Court of District Judge,
Raigarh (for short, ‘the trial Court’) impleading the appellant as a
defendant and prayed for grant of a declaration that the appellant had
illegally set up industry at Villages Naharpali, Bhupdevpur, Salihabhata
and Singhanpur. They further prayed for ordering closure of the industry
and for issue of a permanent injunction against the holding of public
hearing for expansion of the existing industry and / or establishment of
any new industry by the appellant.
4. Along with the suit, the plaintiffs filed an application under Order
39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC for stay of the public hearing. By order dated
4.8.2007, the trial Court dismissed the application for temporary
injunction. After six days, Shri Ramesh Agrawal and two others filed
another application for injunction but no order appears to have been passed
on that application.
5. After 2 months and 20 days of rejection of the injunction application
filed by Shri Ramesh Agrawal and two others, Shri Ram Kumar Agarwal and
Shri Ramesh Sharma filed Writ Petition No.5534/2007 before the Chhattisgarh
High Court under the name and style of “Ekta Parishad” and prayed that the
State Government may be directed to conduct an inquiry into the correctness
and genuineness of the Environment Impact Assessment Report prepared by
respondent No.3. Later on, the writ petitioners withdrew their cause.
6. The environment clearance granted by respondent No.2 was challenged
by respondent No.1 by filing an appeal under the National Environment
Appellate Authority Act, 1997 (for short, ‘the 1997 Act’). On notice,
respondent No.3 filed reply and pleaded that environment clearance was
granted to the appellant in accordance with law. NEAA dismissed the appeal
of respondent No.1 vide order dated 31.12.2008 by recording the following
observations:
"10. The Counsel for Appellant submitted the proceedings of the draft
constitution of Jan Chetna on 24.11.2008 without supporting affidavit
which was required to be filed under the NEAA Rules, 1997 for taking
responsibility of the authenticity of the facts stated in the
document. The Counsel for the Appellant mentioned that the affidavit
is required to be filed only while filing the Memorandum of Appeal
under the NEAA Rules and not with the subsequent document. The
Authority perused the draft proceedings of the meeting dated 15.2.2005
and observed that only 10 persons have formed the association called
"Jan Chetna". Out of 10 members only two members complete address are
given in the proceedings. From the addresses so given, it may be
inferred that none of the members of "Jan Chetna" belong to Naharpali,
Kharsia, Raigarh, the project area. Further the minutes of the meeting
dated 15.2.2008 shows that Shri Rajesh Tripathi was given
responsibility of preparation of authorization letter in favour of
Ramesh Aggarwal and issue the same to oppose the Environmental
Clearance granted to the Respondent No.3. As per serial number 12 of
the proceedings dated 10.5.2005, Shri Rajesh Tripathi's address for
communication etc., would be No.159, Kelo Vihar, Raigarh. But, it is
found that the Authorisation letter issued by Shri Rajesh Tripathi
bearing the address of Satyam Kunj, Naya Gunj, Raigarh, which was the
address of Shri Ramesh Aggarwal and there was no mention of
designation of Shri Rajesh Tripathi in this letter. This action of the
Appellant creates doubt about the authenticity of the authorization
letter so issued. From the above it is clear that neither of the
members of the "Association" - Jan Chetna as aggrieved persons as
claimed in para 4(iv) above nor it has been authorized by the primary
aggrieved persons.
The Appellant has not disclosed all material
facts for the purpose of adjudication of the Appeal. While considering
the legality of secondary public injury complaints by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in S.P. Gupta Vs. UOI (1981), See SCC 87 held as follow:
".......... in such cases a member of the public having
sufficient interest can certainly maintain an action challenging
the legality of such acts or omissions but if the person or
specific class or group of persons who are primarily injured by
such acts or omissions, do not wish to claim any relief and
accept such act or omission willingly and without protest, the
member of public who complaints of a secondary public injury
cannot maintain the action."
The Appellant has failed to prove that its association is acting on
behalf and in the interest of people who are or may be affected by the
grant of Environmental Clearance by Respondent No.1.
Having perused all the submissions and the documents filed by the
Appellant and the Respondents, the Authority conclude that the
Appellant organization - Jan Chetna is not an association of persons
likely to be affected by the order of the Environmental Clearance
granted to Respondent No.3 by Respondent No.1. Therefore, the
Appellant organization - Jan Chetna is not qualified to file an Appeal
before this Authority under Section 11(2)(c) of the NEAA Act, 1997.
Accordingly, the Appeal filed by the Appellant is not maintainable.”
7. Respondent No.1 challenged the aforesaid order in Writ Petition (C)
No. 8399 of 2009, which was described as a Public Interest Litigation and
prayed that order dated 31.12.2008 passed by NEAA may be set aside and a
direction be issued to NEAA to decide the appeal on merits. Respondent
No.1 claimed that it was a representative body of those affected by the
environmental clearance granted in favour of the appellant and, therefore,
it had the locus to challenge the decision taken by respondent No.2.
8. In the counter affidavit filed by the appellant, several objections
were taken to the maintainability of the petition. It was pleaded that in
the garb of filing a Public Interest Litigation, respondent No.1 was
seeking annulment of the order passed by NEAA and such relief could be
claimed only by filing a regular petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution, which is required to be heard and decided by a Single Judge.
The appellant also referred to the pendency of Writ Petition(C)
No.5534/2007 before the Chhattisgarh High Court and pleaded that the writ
petition filed before the Delhi High Court was an abuse of the process of
the Court. Another plea taken by the appellant was that the entire cause
of action for filing the petition had accrued in Chhattisgarh and the Delhi
High Court did not have the jurisdiction to entertain the petition filed by
respondent No.1.
9. The Division Bench of the High Court did take cognizance of the
objections taken by the appellant but did not deal with the same except the
one relating to territorial jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court and
overruled the same. On merits, the Division Bench relied upon judgment
dated 14.9.2009 passed by a coordinate Bench in LPA No.277/2009 Vedanta
Alumina Ltd. v. Prafulla Samantra and others wherein it was held that an
organisation, which is working in the area and is closely following the
issue of setting up of industries and impact thereof on the environment
falls in the category of a ‘person aggrieved’ and concluded that NEAA
committed serious error by dismissing the appeal of respondent No.1 on the
ground of lack of locus.
10. We have heard Dr. A.M. Singhvi, learned senior counsel for the
appellant and Shri Sanjay Parikh, learned counsel for respondent No.1 and
perused the record.
11. Shri Parikh made strenuous efforts to convince the Court that the
hypertechnical objection raised by the appellant should not be entertained
and in view of the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of the High
Court in Vedanta Alumina Ltd. v. Prafulla Samantra (supra), the special
leave petition should be dismissed.
12. We have considered the submission of the learned counsel but have not
felt impressed.
13. Chapter 3 Part A of the Delhi High Court Rules contains rules
relating to the practice of the High Court in the hearing of causes and
other matters. Part B contains rules relating to the jurisdiction of a
Single Judge and of Benches of the Court. The relevant clauses of Rule 1 of
Part B read as under:
“Part B
JURISDICTION OF A SINGLE JUDGE AND OF BENCHES
OF THE COURT
1. Cases ordinarily to be heard by a single Judge—Subject to the
provisos hereinafter set forth the following classes of cases
shall ordinarily be heard and disposed of by a Judge setting
alone:
(i) to (xvii) xxx xxx xxx
(xviii) (a) Application or petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India for the issue of any directions, orders or
writs in the nature of Mandamus, prohibition, quo-warranto or
certiorari for the enforcement of fundamental rights conferred
by Part III of the Constitution of India or for any other
purpose, except:
(i) Petitions where vires of Acts or statutory rules,
regulations, or bye-laws are challenged.
(ii) Petitions where personal liberty is involved.
(iii) Petitions pertaining to all Revenue/tax matters
including entertainment taxes, except Municipal Tax.
(iv) Petitions arising from the orders of the Board for
Industrial and Financial Reconstruction/Appellate Authority
for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction or seeking
directions to them; and
(v) Petitions pertaining to Public Interest litigation.
(vi) Petitions pertaining to the award to Tenders.
(vii) Petitions relating to Co-operative Societies.
(viii) Petitions being service matters of Armed Forces of
the Union.
(ix) Petitions arising out of Land Acquisition.
(x) Petitions concerning orders passed by the High Court on
the administrative side.
Provided that as regards pending cases, the learned single Judge
may hear the part-heard matters.
Explanation: The preliminary hearing for admission and final
disposal of applications and petitions pertaining to matters
mentioned in clause (i) to (x) of sub-rule (xviii)(a) above
shall however be before a Bench of two Judges and before a
Single Bench when there is no sitting of Division Bench.”
Rule 4, which relates to jurisdiction of a Bench of two Judges, also reads
as under:
“4. All cases to be disposed of by a Bench of two Judges save as
provided by law or by these rules—Save as provided by law or by
these rules or by special order of the Chief Justice, all cases
shall be heard and disposed of by a Bench of two Judges.”
14. A bare reading of the above reproduced provisions makes it clear that
the petition filed by respondent No.1 for quashing order dated 31.12.2008
could be heard only by Single Bench of the Delhi High Court. However, by
disguising the petition as a Public Interest Litigation, respondent No.1
succeeded in getting the same listed before the Division Bench of the High
Court. Unfortunately, the Division Bench did not deal with the objection
raised by the appellant to the maintainability of the petition filed by
respondent No.1 and proceeded to decide the matter on merits which, in our
considered view, was legally impermissible.
15. We are not suggesting that respondent No.1 had indulged in Bench
hunting but it needs to be emphasised that every Bench of the High Court
should scrupulously follow the relevant rules and should not violate
statutory provisions specifying its jurisdiction, else the sanctity of the
rules relating to distribution of causes between the Single, the Division
Bench and larger Benches will be lost.
16. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order is set
aside. The writ petition filed by respondent No.1 shall now be listed
before a Single Judge of the High Court, who shall decide the same without
being influenced by the observations contained in the impugned order or
this order.
17. While disposing of the appeal in the manner indicated above, we
consider it necessary to make it clear that this Court has not expressed
any opinion on the merits of the case and the parties shall be free to
advance all legally permissible arguments before the learned Single Judge
of the High Court.
…………………………J.
(G.S.SINGHVI)
…………………………J.
(V. GOPALA GOWDA)
NEW DELHI;
SEPTEMBER 19, 2013.
-----------------------
9
