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NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 2970-2971 OF 2012
Maniben Devraj Shah … Appellant(s)
Versus
Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai … Respondent
J U D G M E N T
G. S. Singhvi, J.
1. Whether the cause shown by Municipal Corporation of Brihan
Mumbai (for short, ‘the Corporation’) for condonation of 7 years and 108
days delay in filing appeals against judgments and decrees dated 2.5.2003
passed by the City Civil Court (hereinafter referred to as ‘the trial Court’) in
L.C. Suit Nos. 2726, 2727, 2728 of 1999 was sufficient cause within the
meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act and the learned Single Judge of
the Bombay High Court was justified in condoning the delay is the question
which arises for consideration in these appeals.Page 2
2. At the outset, it deserves to be mentioned that the respondent had
withdrawn one of the three appeals filed before the High Court and, as such,
the impugned order makes a reference to the two appeals only.
3. The appellants filed suits for grant of a declaration that notices issued
by the Corporation under Section 314 of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation
Act, 1888 (for short, ‘the Act’) for demolition of the properties specified in
the plaints are illegal and not binding on them. They pleaded that the action
taken by the Corporation is discriminatory and liable to be annulled because
some persons whose structures were taken for road widening were allowed
to construct mezzanine floor in the remaining portions of their respective
properties and were also allotted alternative accommodation in the new
building but they were not given similar benefit. The appellants further
pleaded that they had entered into development agreements with Shamji D.
Shah and Popatbhai Baghbhai Bharwad for developing the property and they
will construct market for and on behalf of the Corporation. They prayed for
issue of a direction to the respondent to provide shops in the market
proposed to be constructed on C.T.S. No.997, Near Purnapragya High
School, Bharucha Marg, Dahisar (E), Bombay.
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4. In the written statement filed on behalf of the Corporation, an
objection was taken to the maintainability of the suit on the ground that
notice under Section 527 of the Act had not been given by the appellants. On
merits, it was pleaded that the appellants had raised construction on a
portion of the road and it had become necessary to demolish the same for
widening the existing road.
5. On the pleadings of the parties the trial Court framed identical issues
in all the suits. For the sake of reference, the issues framed in LC Suit No.
2726 of 1999 titled Smt. Maniben Devraj Shah v. The Municipal
Corporation of Greater Bombay are reproduced below:
“ ISSUES FINDINGS
1. Does the plaintiff prove that
notice issued u/s. 314 of BMC
Act is illegal, bad in law,
malafides and inexcitable?
In the affirmative
2. Does the plaintiff prove that she is
entitled for alternate
accommodation in lieu of
structure affected by road
widening?
In the affirmative
3. Does the plaintiff prove that suit
is maintainable for the want of
notice u/s. 527 of BMC Act?
In the affirmative
4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled As per final order
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for any relief?
5. What order? As per final order”
6. After considering the pleadings of the parties and evidence produced
by them, the trial Court decreed the suits by separate but identical judgments
dated 2.5.2003.
7. The Corporation did not challenge the judgments of the trial Court
within the prescribed period of limitation and filed appeals sometime in
September, 2010 along with the applications for condonation of 7 years and
108 days delay. In support of its prayer for condonation of delay the
Corporation also filed the affidavits of Shri Ranindra Y. Sirsikar, Junior Law
Officer. For the sake of reference, paragraph 3 of the application for
condonation of delay and paragraphs 2, 3 and 5 of the affidavit of Shri
Ranindra Y. Sirsikar filed in First Appeal No. 3691 of 2010 titled Municipal
Corporation of Brihan Mumbai v. Smt. Maniben Devraj Shah are
reproduced below:
APPLICATION FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY
“3) The applicants herein have filed the present first appeal
against the order dated 2.5.2003 and applied for certified copy
of judgment on 23.8.2010 and same was made available on
6.9.2010 and collected on 6.9.2010. The applicant corporation
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being the administrative and statutory body, certain requisitions
and formalities for preferring an first appeal in the Hon’ble
High Court has to be complied with. The applicant submit that
the said papers which were required for the preferring the first
appeal were misplaced and not traceable in spite of good
efforts. The applicant submit that meanwhile concerned
advocate who has appeared in the above suit was transferred
from the city civil section to criminal section in the month of
June 2004 and therefore loss the tract of matter and the said
first appeal remained to be filed due to oversight and heavy
work load. The applicant submit that concerned advocate was
also transferred from criminal section to high court suit section
in the month of October, 2005. The applicant submit that the
concerned advocate who has appeared in the suit came to know
that plaintiff has fraudulently obtained alternate
accommodation under order passed by Hon’ble City Civil
Court on 2.5.2003 even when respondent was given permission
for constructing the mezzanine floor to the extent of structure
affected by road widening. The applicant say and submit that
the concerned development and thereafter immediate steps were
taken to reconstruct the brief and preferred the first appeal
immediately. The applicant therefore say and submit that there
is delay of days in preferring the present first appeal. The
applicant submit that delay in preferring the appeal is not
deliberate and intentional. The same is caused due to
circumstances narrated herein above. Therefore delay be
condoned.”
AFFIDAVIT OF SHRI RANINDRA Y. SIRSIKAR
“2. I say that the present suits bearing No. (1) 2726 of 1999,
2727 of 1999 and 2728 of 1999 was decreed on 02.05.2003 by
Hon’ble City Civil Court. I say that I was on leave from
30.4.2003 till 11.5.2003. I resumed my office by 12.5.2003. A
copy of leave application is annexed herewith and marked as
Exhibit-A. I say that as per the office procedure, the necessary
intimation was also forwarded to the concerned department and
informed them about the court orders dated 2.5.2003. A copy of
dispatch extract regarding intimation to the concerned ward on
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12.5.2003 is annexed herewith and marked as Exhibit B. I say
that thereafter, from the record it seems that concerned
department misplaced the papers and were not traceable so
nobody followed up on the matter. I say that from 2.1.2004, I
was transferred to Miscellaneous Court. A copy of the office
order regarding transfer is annexed and marked as Exhibit – C.
I say that I was again transferred from Miscellaneous Court to
Criminal Court from 5.6.2004. A copy of the office order
regarding transfer is annexed herewith and marked as Exhibit –
D. I was with the Criminal Section from 5.6.2004 to 28.9.2005.
I was again transferred from Criminal Court to High Court
Original Side w.e.f. 28.9.2005 till date. A copy of the office
order regarding transfer is annexed herewith and market as
Exhibit – E. I say that in view of the facts, I was transferred
from City Civil Court, and various courts, I could not follow up
with the matter.
3. I say that in the instant case, the Local Councillor Shri
Prakash Karkar wrote a letter on 20.7.2010 to the concerned
Additional Municipal Commissioner requesting for joint
meeting regarding widening of road and expediting the
development and construction of Municipal Market, i.e.,
property under reference. A copy of letter dt. 20.7.2010 of
Local Councillor Shri Prakash Karkar is annexed herewith and
marked as Exhibit – F. I say that accordingly joint meeting was
held in the Chamber of Addl. M.C. on 2.8.2010, when all
concerned officers along with Jt. Law Officer (City Civil Court
Section) of Legal Department of the appellant was also present
in the said meeting. In the course of said meeting, it came to the
notice that the respondents are claiming the right of alternative
accommodation pursuant to impugned order in view of that
matter, respective Addl. Municipal Commissioner directed Jt.
Law Officer (City Civil Court Section) of Legal Department to
study entire matters and also ascertain above appeal and its
stage against the judgment and order dated 2.5.2003 passed by
City Civil Court. A copy of minutes dated 2.8.2010 is annexed
herewith and marked as Exhibit – G.
5. I say that though papers were misplaced and not traceable, I
personally inquired with the staff of High Court (Appellate Side
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High Court Section of the Legal Department) on 17.8.2010,
whether any appeal has been filed against the order and
judgment dated 2.5.2003. I came to know on 19.8.2010, that
appeal has not been filed as neither the said proceedings nor
copy of order dated 2.5.2003 were put up before undersigned
for drafting an appeal. I immediately directed to the concerned
Managing Clerk on 19.8.2010 to file an application for certified
copy of judgment and order dated 2.5.2003. Accordingly, an
application for certified copy was made on 23.8.2010 and same
was made available on 6.9.2010 and certified copy of order
dated 2.5.2010 was also delivered on 6.9.2010 and accordingly,
appeal has been filed on 16.9.2010.”
8. The appellants contested the prayer made by the Corporation for
condonation of delay by asserting that the story of misplacement of the
papers is unbelievable and is liable to be discarded because the applications
for condonation of delay do not mention as to when the misplaced papers
were traced out by the concerned department. They also pleaded that the
transfer of Shri Ranindra Y. Sirsikar from one section to the other has no
bearing on the issue of condonation of delay because the Corporation has
employed several advocates and no explanation whatsoever has been offered
for not filing the applications for certified copies of the judgment of the trial
Court till 23.8.2010.
9. The learned Single Judge of the High Court referred to the judgments
of this Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst.Katiji (1987)
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2 SCC 107 and State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO (2005) 3 SCC 752 and
condoned the delay by recording the following observations:
“Having regard to over all facts and circumstances of the case,
the cause shown by the Corporation for condonation of delay,
in my opinion, is sufficient and the delay deserves to be
condoned. I is well settled that the expression “sufficient cause”
is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a
meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice. The
court are expected to take liberal approach in such matters
where refusal to condone delay is likely to result in a
meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold.
Taking the law laid down by the Supreme Court in view and
considering over all facts and circumstances of the case, so also
the fact that if the delay is not condoned the meritorious appeal
is likely to be thrown at the very threshold, I am inclined to
condone the delay in filing these appeals. Hence, the Civil
Application Nos. 3625 of 2010 and 3691 of 2010 are allowed in
terms of prayer clause (a).”
10. Shri A.S. Bhasme, learned counsel for the appellants argued that the
reasons assigned by the learned Single Judge for condoning more than 7
years and 3 months delay in filing the appeals are legally unsustainable and
the impugned order is liable to be set aside because the explanation given by
the Corporation lacked bonafides and was wholly unsatisfactory. Learned
counsel emphasized that in the absence of any denial by the Corporation that
it has a battery of advocates to deal with the litigation, the transfer of Shri
Ranindra Y. Sirsikar in January, 2004 to Miscellaneous Court and,
thereafter, to other Courts has no bearing on the issue of delay because the
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suits filed by the appellants had been decided in May, 2003 and no
explanation has been given as to why applications for certified copies could
not be filed for 7 years and 5 months. Shri Bhasme submitted that even if
one advocate / law officer was transferred from one department / division to
another, nothing prevented the Corporation from taking steps to apply for
certified copies of the judgment. Shri Bhasme further submitted that the
story of misplacement of papers was concocted by the Corporation and the
same ought to have been rejected by the High Court because the assertion
made in that regard was vague to the core and no indication was given as to
when the papers were traced and by whom. In support of his argument, Shri
Bhasme relied upon the judgments of this Court in Oriental Aroma
Chemical Industries Limited v. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation
(2010) 5 SCC 459.
11. Shri Pallav Shishodia, learned senior counsel appearing for the
Corporation argued that the discretion exercised by the learned Single Judge
of the High Court to condone the delay does not suffer from any legal
infirmity and the mere possibility that this Court may, on a fresh analysis of
the pleadings of the parties, form a different opinion does not furnish a valid
ground for exercise of power under Article 136 of the Constitution. Shri
Shishodia submitted that in last more than two decades the Courts have time
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and again emphasized that while considering the question of condonation of
delay, the pleadings of the parties should be construed liberally and the
genuine cause of a party should not be defeated by refusing to condone the
delay. In support of his argument, Shri Shishodia relied upon the often cited
judgments in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji (supra)
and State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO (supra). Shri Shishodia also pointed out
that the appellants had raised illegal construction and if the challenge to the
decrees passed by the trial Court was aborted by the High Court by refusing
to condone the delay, serious injury would have been caused to the public
interest.
12. We have considered the respective arguments / submissions and
carefully scrutinized the record. The law of limitation is founded on public
policy. The Limitation Act, 1963 has not been enacted with the object of
destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they approach the Court
for vindication of their rights without unreasonable delay. The idea
underlying the concept of limitation is that every remedy should remain
alive only till the expiry of the period fixed by the Legislature. At the same
time, the Courts are empowered to condone the delay provided that
sufficient cause is shown by the applicant for not availing the remedy within
the prescribed period of limitation. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ used in
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Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and other statutes is elastic enough to
enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which serve the
ends of justice. No hard and fast rule has been or can be laid down for
deciding the applications for condonation of delay but over the years this
Court has advocated that a liberal approach should be adopted in such
matters so that substantive rights of the parties are not defeated merely
because of delay.
13. In Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. AIR 1962 SC 361, this Court
while interpreting Section 5 of the Limitation Act, laid down the following
proposition:
“In construing Section 5 (of the Limitation Act), it is relevant to
bear in mind two important considerations. The first
consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation
prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour
of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the
parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed
has expired, the decree-holder has obtained a benefit under the
law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge, and
this legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse
of time should not be light-heartedly disturbed. The other
consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause
for excusing delay is shown, discretion is given to the court to
condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been
deliberately conferred on the court in order that judicial power
and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance
substantial justice.”
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14. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji (supra), this
Court made a significant departure from the earlier judgments and observed:
“The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by
enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order
to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by
disposing of matters on ”merits”. The expression “sufficient
cause” employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to
enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner
which subserves the ends of justice — that being the lifepurpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is
common knowledge that this Court has been making a
justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court.
But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all
the other courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is
adopted on principle as it is realized that:
1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging
an appeal late.
2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious
matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of
justice being defeated. As against this when delay is
condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would
be decided on merits after hearing the parties.
3. “Every day's delay must be explained” does not mean
that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every
hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be
applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.
4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are
pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice
deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to
have vested right in injustice being done because of a nondeliberate delay.
5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned
deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on
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account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by
resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.
6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on
account of its power to legalize injustice on technical
grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and
is expected to do so.
Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there
was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution
of the appeal. The fact that it was the “State” which was
seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether
irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all
litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same
treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed
manner. There is no warrant for according a step-motherly
treatment when the “State” is the applicant praying for
condonation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account
of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is
directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to
appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued
with the note-making, file-pushing and passing-on-the-buck
ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though
more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which
represents the collective cause of the community, does not
deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The courts therefore have to
be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in
the course of the interpretation of the expression “sufficient
cause”. So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its
application to matters at hand with the end in view to do evenhanded justice on merits in preference to the approach which
scuttles a decision on merits.”
15. In N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123, the
Court went a step further and made the following observations:
“It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of
discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not
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say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is
within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter,
acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes
delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want
of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay
of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof
is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as
sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and
normally the superior court should not disturb such finding,
much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of
discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or
perverse. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses
to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be
free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is
open to such superior court to come to its own finding even
untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower court.
Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties.
They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory
tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing
a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal
injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal
remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is
precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux
of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer
persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a
lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for
launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and
consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on
public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae
up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be
put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy
the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do
not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly.
The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a
legislatively fixed period of time.
It must be remembered that in every case of delay, there can be
some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is
not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against
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him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not
put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the court must show
utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable
ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party
deliberately to gain time, then the court should lean against
acceptance of the explanation. While condoning the delay, the
court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be
borne in mind that he is a loser and he too would have incurred
quite large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline
that when courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of
the applicant, the court shall compensate the opposite party for
his loss.”
16. In P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, (1997) 7 SCC 556, this
Court while reversing the order passed by the High Court which had
condoned 565 days delay in filing an appeal by the State against the decree
of the Sub-Court in an arbitration application, observed that the law of
limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with
all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the Courts have no power to
extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. In Vedabai v.
Shantaram Baburao Patil, (2001) 9 SCC 106, the Court observed that a
distinction must be made between a case where the delay is inordinate and a
case where the delay is of few days and whereas in the former case the
consideration of prejudice to the other side will be a relevant factor, in the
latter case no such consideration arises.
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17. In State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO (supra), the Court referred to
several precedents on the subject and observed that the proof of sufficient
cause is a condition precedent for exercise of discretion vested in the Court.
What counts is not the length of the delay but the sufficiency of the cause
and shortness of the delay is one of the circumstances to be taken into
account in using the discretion. The Court also took cognizance of the usual
bureaucratic delays which takes place in the functioning of the State and its
agencies/instrumentalities and observed:
“Experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery
(no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the
judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited
bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, filepushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less
difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. The
State which represents collective cause of the community, does
not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The courts, therefore,
have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the
provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression of
sufficient cause. Merit is preferred to scuttle a decision on
merits in turning down the case on technicalities of delay in
presenting the appeal.”
18. What needs to be emphasised is that even though a liberal and justice
oriented approach is required to be adopted in the exercise of power under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar statutes, the Courts can
neither become oblivious of the fact that the successful litigant has acquired
certain rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of time
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is consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the cost. What colour
the expression ‘sufficient cause’ would get in the factual matrix of a given
case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the
Court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and
the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone
the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is
found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause,
then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay.
In cases involving the State and its agencies/instrumentalities, the Court can
take note of the fact that sufficient time is taken in the decision making
process but no premium can be given for total lethargy or utter negligence
on the part of the officers of the State and / or its agencies / instrumentalities
and the applications filed by them for condonation of delay cannot be
allowed as a matter of course by accepting the plea that dismissal of the
matter on the ground of bar of limitation will cause injury to the public
interest.
19. In the light of the above, it is to be seen whether the explanation given
by the respondent for condonation of more than 7 years and 3 months delay
was satisfactory and whether the learned Single Judge of the High Court had
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correctly applied the principles laid down by this Court for the exercise of
power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
20. Though it may appear repetitive, we consider it necessary to notice the
following salient features of the applications filed by the respondent and the
affidavit of Shri Ranindra Y. Sirsikar:
1. As per the office procedure, Shri Ranindra Y. Sirsikar had given
intimation to the concerned department about the trial Court’s
judgment dated 2.5.2003. This statement is supported by copy of
the despatch extract dated 12.5.2003 (Ext. B) filed with his
affidavit.
2. According to the Corporation, the papers required for filing the
first appeals were misplaced and not traceable in spite of good
efforts. In this context, Shri Sirsikar has made the following
statement:
“I say that thereafter, from the record it seems that the
concerned department misplaced the papers and were not
traceable. So nobody followed up on the matter”
3. As per the averments contained in the application, Shri Sirsikar
was transferred from Civil Section to Criminal Section in June,
2004 and, therefore, lost tract of the matter and the first appeals
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remained to be filed due to oversight and heavy work load. As
against this, Shri Sirsikar states that he was transferred to
Miscellaneous Court on 2.1.2004 and from Miscellaneous Court to
Criminal Court on 5.6.2004, where he worked up to 28.9.2005.
Thereafter, he was transferred to High Court on original side and
was working there on the date of filing the affidavit.
4. As per the averments contained in the application, the advocate
came to know that appellant fraudulently obtained alternative
accommodation under the judgment of the trial Court even though
she was given permission for constructing mezzanine floor to the
extent of structure affected by road widening. In this context, Shri
Sirsikar has disclosed that the issue relating to the claim made by
the appellant for alternative accommodation was considered in the
meeting held on 2.8.2010 in the chamber of Additional Municipal
Commissioner and, on the basis of discussion held in that meeting,
direction was given by him to the Managing Clerk on 19.8.2010 to
file application for certified copy of the judgment. According to
Shri Sirsikar, the application was made on 23.8.2010 and the
certified copy was made available on 6.9.2010.
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21. The applications filed for condonation of delay and the affidavits of
Shri Sirsikar are conspicuously silent on the following important points:
(a) The name of the person who was having custody of the
record has not been disclosed.
(b) The date, month and year when the papers required for filing
the first appeals are said to have been misplaced have not
been disclosed.
(c) The date on which the papers were traced out or recovered
and name of the person who found the same have not been
disclosed.
(d) No explanation whatsoever has been given as to why the
applications for certified copies of the judgments of the trial
Court were not filed till 23.8.2010 despite the fact that Shri
Sirsikar had given intimation on 12.5.2003 about the
judgments of the trial Court.
(e) Even though the Corporation has engaged battery of lawyers
to conduct cases on its behalf, nothing has been said as to
how the transfer of Shri Ranindra Y. Sirsikar operated as an
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impediment in the making of applications for certified
copies of the judgments sought to be appealed against.
22. Unfortunately, the learned Single Judge of the High Court altogether
ignored the gapping holes in the story concocted by the Corporation about
misplacement of the papers and total absence of any explanation as to why
nobody even bothered to file applications for issue of certified copies of
judgment for more than 7 years. In our considered view, the cause shown by
the Corporation for delayed filing of the appeals was, to say the least, wholly
unsatisfactory and the reasons assigned by the learned Single Judge for
condoning more than 7 years delay cannot but be treated as poor apology for
the exercise of discretion by the Court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
23. In the result, the appeals are allowed. The impugned order is set aside
and the appeals filed by the respondent against the judgments of the trial
Court are dismissed. The parties are left to bear their own costs.
……………..…..……..…..………………..J.
[G.S. SINGHVI]
……………..…..……..…..………………..J.
[SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA]
New Delhi
April 09, 2012.
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