Civil Procedure Code, 1908 – Relief not claimed – Grant of compensation in place of mandatory injunction – Legality. Held, where the plaintiff sought only mandatory and permanent injunctions for removal of encroachment and illegal construction, and had not claimed damages or compensation, the Court could not compel the plaintiff or his legal heirs to accept monetary compensation in substitution of the decree. A Court cannot create and grant a relief never prayed for, particularly against the wishes of the successful party. (Para 5(a), (c))

 RAJAT KUMAR & ORS. v. S.D. ADARSH JAIN KANYA MAHA VIDYALAYA SADHAURA & ORS.

2026 INSC 648 (SC)

HEAD NOTES 

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 – Section 100 – Second Appeal – Scope of jurisdiction – Reversal of concurrent findings without framing substantial question of law – Impermissibility.

Held, the High Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC, cannot reverse concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Trial Court and affirmed by the First Appellate Court without framing and deciding substantial questions of law. Reversal of decrees without adherence to the mandatory requirements of Section 100 CPC is unsustainable. (Paras 3, 5(d), 6)

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Civil Procedure Code, 1908 – Relief not claimed – Grant of compensation in place of mandatory injunction – Legality.

Held, where the plaintiff sought only mandatory and permanent injunctions for removal of encroachment and illegal construction, and had not claimed damages or compensation, the Court could not compel the plaintiff or his legal heirs to accept monetary compensation in substitution of the decree. A Court cannot create and grant a relief never prayed for, particularly against the wishes of the successful party. (Para 5(a), (c))

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Mandatory Injunction – Encroachment – Decree in plaintiff’s favour – Substitution by compensation without consent.

Held, a decree directing removal of encroachment and illegal construction cannot be replaced by an order directing payment of compensation merely because the construction has existed for a long period. In the absence of consent of the decree-holder and in the absence of a prayer for compensation, such substitution is legally impermissible. (Para 5(a), (c))

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Execution Proceedings – Order XXI CPC – Scope.

Held, once the decree granting mandatory injunction is set aside, there remains no executable decree. Consequently, the Executing Court cannot be directed to assess the value of the disputed construction for payment of compensation. Such a direction is outside the scope of execution proceedings and is unsupported by Order XXI CPC. (Para 5(b))

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Findings based on erroneous factual premise – Effect.

Held, the High Court proceeded on the incorrect assumption that the Trial Court had held the wall to be a common wall. No such finding existed. On the contrary, the Trial Court had decreed removal of the offending wall. A judgment founded upon a factually erroneous premise cannot be sustained. (Para 5(d))

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Injunction – Encroachment and illegal construction – Protection of property rights.

Plaintiff obtained decrees directing removal of (i) a wall allegedly erected by defendants on common open space and (ii) a lintel of a school building constructed on the plaintiff’s wall. Both decrees were affirmed in first appeal.

Held, the High Court erred in setting aside the decrees on equitable considerations and substituting them with compensation. The matter required adjudication strictly in accordance with Section 100 CPC and on the merits of the Second Appeals. (Paras 5, 6)

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Ratio Decidendi

1. Relief not sought in pleadings cannot ordinarily be imposed by the Court as a substitute for the relief actually claimed.
2. Compensation cannot be forced upon a successful plaintiff in place of a decree for mandatory injunction in the absence of consent.
3. An Executing Court cannot undertake valuation proceedings when no executable decree survives.
4. A Second Appeal can be decided only upon properly framed substantial questions of law under Section 100 CPC.
5. Findings based on incorrect factual assumptions vitiate the judgment. (Paras 5(a)–(d), 6)

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Final Order

Impugned judgment of the High Court dated 02.05.2016 in RSA Nos. 363 and 364 of 2008 set aside. Matter remanded to the High Court for fresh consideration of both Second Appeals in accordance with Section 100 CPC and on their own merits. Appeals allowed. No order as to costs. (Paras 6, 7)

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Motor Accident Compensation – Death of minor child...

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Motor Accident Compensation – Death of minor child...: advocatemmmohan MANIYAR ILIYAZ @ SHAIK RIYAZ v. P. AYYAPPAN & ORS. 2026 INSC 647 (SC) HEAD NOTES (AIR Style) Constitution of India – ...

MANIYAR ILIYAZ @ SHAIK RIYAZ v. P. AYYAPPAN & ORS.
2026 INSC 647 (SC)

HEAD NOTES 

Constitution of India – Articles 19(1)(a), 19(1)(b), 19(1)(c), 19(1)(d) and 21 – Fundamental Right to Walk – Recognition of right to demarcated footpaths.

Held, the right to walk is a fundamental right under Part III of the Constitution. It is an integral component of the freedom of movement guaranteed under Article 19(1)(d), read with Articles 19(1)(a), 19(1)(b), 19(1)(c) and 21. The right necessarily includes the right to safe, demarcated and well-maintained footpaths. Such right is primary and enjoys priority over movement by motorised vehicles. (Paras 3, 4, 8, 20(a))

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Constitution of India – Fundamental Rights – Right to Walk – Correlative public duty – Duty of local authorities to provide and maintain footpaths.

Held, where a road exists, there is a corresponding obligation to provide, demarcate, maintain and safeguard footpaths for pedestrians. Urban Development Authorities, Municipal Corporations, Municipalities and Panchayats are duty bearers responsible for ensuring pedestrian infrastructure. The duty is enforceable in law. (Paras 9, 10, 20(b))

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Constitutional Law – Enforcement of Fundamental Rights – Violation of pedestrian rights – Restitutionary remedies.

Held, violation of the fundamental right to walk on demarcated footpaths entitles citizens to seek constitutional and legal remedies including restitution and compensation against public authorities responsible for the breach. Such remedies are independent of and in addition to remedies available under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. (Paras 15, 20(c))

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Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Scope and object – Pedestrian rights.

Held, the Motor Vehicles Act is primarily a legislation regulating motor vehicles and motor transport. It does not recognise or secure the fundamental right to walk on demarcated footpaths. Existing provisions and driving regulations merely impose duties upon drivers to exercise care towards pedestrians and cannot substitute a comprehensive statutory framework protecting pedestrian rights. (Paras 6, 14)

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Constitutional Governance – Need for legislation – Right to walk.

Held, despite the constitutional foundation of the right to walk, there is no dedicated legislation declaring the right, identifying duty bearers, providing remedies and establishing a regulatory framework. Directions issued to forward the judgment to the Ministries concerned and the Law Commission for consideration of an appropriate statutory framework protecting pedestrian rights and footpath infrastructure. (Paras 11, 12, 13, 16, 21)

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Motor Accident Compensation – Death of minor child – Assessment of compensation.

Five-year-old child died after being run over by a tanker while walking to school with his father. MACT awarded compensation of Rs.7,82,000/-. High Court reduced compensation to Rs.4,70,000/-.

Held, High Court erred in reducing the compensation. Applying principles laid down in Karuna Parmar v. Prakash Sinha, compensation recalculated by adopting notional income based on minimum wages, adding future prospects, deducting personal expenses and applying multiplier method. Total compensation enhanced to Rs.11,44,628/- with direction for payment within two months. (Paras 17–19)

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Ratio Decidendi

1. The right to walk is a constitutionally protected fundamental right flowing from Articles 19 and 21.
2. The right includes access to demarcated and safe footpaths.
3. Public authorities have an enforceable duty to create and maintain pedestrian infrastructure.
4. Breach of such duty gives rise to independent constitutional and legal remedies.
5. Pedestrian rights are not adequately protected by the Motor Vehicles Act and require a dedicated statutory framework. (Paras 20(a)–(c))

Final Order

Appeals partly allowed. Compensation enhanced to Rs. 11,44,628/- payable within two months. Matter directed to be renumbered as “Re: Fundamental Right to Walk and Footpath” under Article 32 of the Constitution. (Paras 19, 21, 22) 

Compensation – Death of Homemaker – Valuation of Domestic Services – Homemaker as “Nation Builder” and Economic Entity – Enhancement of Compensation. The deceased, a homemaker, died in a motor vehicle accident. The Tribunal awarded compensation which was enhanced by the High Court after nearly two decades. The claimants sought further enhancement before the Supreme Court. Held: The contribution of a homemaker cannot be viewed merely as dependency upon earning members of the family. A homemaker performs indispensable economic, social, emotional and caregiving functions which sustain the household and contribute substantially to society and national development. Such contribution possesses measurable economic value and cannot be undervalued while determining compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act.

 

Shishu Pal @ Shish Ram & Ors. v. Surjeet & Ors.

2026 INSC 634 – Supreme Court of India
Coram: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sanjay Karol
Decided in 2026

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MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988

Compensation – Death of Homemaker – Valuation of Domestic Services – Homemaker as “Nation Builder” and Economic Entity – Enhancement of Compensation.

The deceased, a homemaker, died in a motor vehicle accident. The Tribunal awarded compensation which was enhanced by the High Court after nearly two decades. The claimants sought further enhancement before the Supreme Court.

Held: The contribution of a homemaker cannot be viewed merely as dependency upon earning members of the family. A homemaker performs indispensable economic, social, emotional and caregiving functions which sustain the household and contribute substantially to society and national development. Such contribution possesses measurable economic value and cannot be undervalued while determining compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act.

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COMPENSATION LAW

Homemaker – Status and Recognition.

Homemaker is an Economic Entity.

Held: The traditional perception that a homemaker is economically dependent upon earning members is erroneous. The functioning of the household and the productivity of earning members substantially depend upon the unpaid labour of the homemaker. Domestic labour, caregiving, household management, child-rearing and emotional support constitute real economic contributions deserving recognition in compensation jurisprudence.

Homemaker as Nation Builder.

Held: Homemakers contribute to the creation of human capital, transmission of values, social development, emotional stability of families and overall national progress. Their contribution extends beyond biological reproduction and includes shaping future generations. Homemakers are rightly described as “Nation Builders”.

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MOTOR ACCIDENT CLAIMS

Quantification of Homemaker's Contribution.

Held: While quantification of the services rendered by a homemaker in monetary terms is inherently difficult, courts must make a realistic assessment of such contribution. Compensation cannot be computed in a manner that diminishes or trivialises the invaluable services rendered by a wife and mother. The economic worth of unpaid domestic labour deserves appropriate judicial recognition.

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GENDER JUSTICE

Housewife – Homemaker – Appropriate Terminology.

Held: The expression “housewife” reflects outdated stereotypes. The more appropriate and dignified expression is “homemaker”, recognising the multifaceted role performed within the household. Judicial discourse should adopt terminology that reflects equality and acknowledges the actual contribution of women engaged in unpaid domestic labour.

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MOTOR VEHICLES ACT

Just Compensation – Delay in Adjudication.

Inordinate Delay in Motor Accident Cases.

Held: Claims arising out of death and bodily injury under a beneficial legislation should ordinarily receive expeditious adjudication. Pendency of such matters in High Courts for prolonged periods causes additional hardship to victims and dependants and undermines the concept of “just compensation”. Courts must remain vigilant regarding delay and avoid unnecessary adjournments.

Institutional Concern.

Held: Excessive pendency of motor accident compensation appeals across various High Courts reveals a systemic issue requiring institutional attention. Delayed adjudication often results in accumulation of interest and frustrates the objective of prompt and effective compensation to victims and their families.

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PRECEDENTS CONSIDERED

Lata Wadhwa v. State of Bihar

Followed and discussed regarding valuation of services rendered by homemakers and application of compensation principles.

Arun Kumar Agrawal v. National Insurance Co. Ltd.

Reaffirmed. Services rendered by a wife and mother cannot be equated with those of a servant or domestic employee and require broad assessment while awarding compensation.

Rajendra Singh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd.

Referred to.

Kirti v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.

Referred to regarding judicial recognition of unpaid domestic and caregiving work performed by women.

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RATIO DECIDENDI

Unpaid domestic labour and caregiving services rendered by a homemaker constitute substantial economic and social contributions. While determining compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, courts must recognise the homemaker as an economic entity and nation builder, and award compensation that meaningfully reflects the value of such contribution. Mere traditional notions of dependency cannot diminish the worth of a homemaker's services.

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OBSERVATION OF THE COURT

“The homemakers, to put it directly, actually are the nation builders and they ought to be recognised as such.”

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RESULT

Appeal considered in the context of enhancement of compensation payable for the death of a homemaker, with detailed exposition of principles governing valuation of unpaid domestic labour and the effect of prolonged delay in motor accident claim litigation

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: SERVICE LAW – BORDER SECURITY FORCE – DISMISSAL FR...

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: SERVICE LAW – BORDER SECURITY FORCE – DISMISSAL FR...: advocatemmmohan Baksish Ahmad v. Union of India & Anr. 2026 INSC 630 – Supreme Court of India Coram: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dipankar...

Baksish Ahmad v. Union of India & Anr.

2026 INSC 630 – Supreme Court of India
Coram: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dipankar Datta and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Satish Chandra Sharma
Decided on: 09.06.2026

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SERVICE LAW – BORDER SECURITY FORCE – DISMISSAL FROM SERVICE – WRIT JURISDICTION – TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF HIGH COURTS – ARTICLE 226(1) & (2) OF THE CONSTITUTION – DOCTRINE OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS – SCOPE.

A BSF constable was dismissed from service for contracting a second marriage during the subsistence of his first marriage without obtaining permission from the competent authority. His statutory petition was rejected. Challenging the dismissal and rejection order, he filed a writ petition before the Delhi High Court. The Delhi High Court declined to entertain the petition applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens, holding that no part of the cause of action had arisen within Delhi and that the appropriate forums were elsewhere.

Held: The Delhi High Court possesses territorial jurisdiction under Article 226(1) of the Constitution where the Union of India and the Director General of BSF are situated within its territorial limits. In matters relating to members of Central Armed Police Forces, the situs of the offices of the Union of India and the Director General furnishes jurisdiction to the Delhi High Court notwithstanding that the cause of action may have arisen elsewhere. The doctrine of forum non conveniens cannot ordinarily be invoked to defeat a constitutional remedy under Article 226 when the Court otherwise possesses jurisdiction. The Delhi High Court erred in declining to exercise jurisdiction merely on the ground that other High Courts could also entertain the matter. The writ petition was directed to be restored and decided on merits.

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A. CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950

Article 226(1) and Article 226(2) – Distinction.

Article 226(1) confers jurisdiction upon a High Court where the person or authority against whom relief is sought is located within its territorial limits.

Article 226(2) confers jurisdiction where the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court.

The two clauses operate independently and confer distinct bases of jurisdiction. A writ petition may be maintainable either because the respondent authority is situated within the jurisdiction of the High Court or because part of the cause of action has arisen therein.

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B. CENTRAL ARMED POLICE FORCES – BSF – SERVICE MATTERS.

Territorial Jurisdiction – Delhi High Court.

Held: In cases involving members of the BSF and other Central Armed Police Forces, the Delhi High Court would have territorial jurisdiction under Article 226(1) because the Union of India and the Director General of the concerned force are situated in Delhi. Such jurisdiction exists even if:

• the disciplinary proceedings were conducted elsewhere;
• the dismissal order was passed outside Delhi; and
• the events constituting misconduct occurred outside Delhi.

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C. FORUM NON CONVENIENS.

Applicability in Writ Proceedings.

Doctrine explained.

The doctrine applies where multiple competent forums are available and enables a court to decline jurisdiction if another forum is demonstrably more convenient and better suited to decide the dispute.

However, in proceedings under Article 226, particularly where jurisdiction is invoked under Article 226(1), the doctrine has only a limited role and should be applied sparingly. A litigant invoking a constitutional remedy before a High Court having jurisdiction cannot ordinarily be non-suited merely because another High Court may also entertain the matter.

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D. PRECEDENTS – EXPLAINED AND APPLIED.

1. Abrar Ali v. CISF – Approved.

Held that the Delhi High Court possesses jurisdiction under Article 226(1) where the headquarters of the concerned Central Armed Police Force are located in Delhi. The principle laid down therein was affirmed.

2. Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India, (2004) 6 SCC 254.

Explained. The doctrine of forum conveniens discussed therein related to situations where cause of action arises in more than one State under Article 226(2) and does not govern cases founded upon jurisdiction under Article 226(1).

3. Arif Azim Co. Ltd. v. Micromax Informatics FZE.

Explained. The doctrine of forum non conveniens is applicable where multiple forums are available and a court must determine the more appropriate forum; however, the decision did not arise out of writ proceedings under Article 226.

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E. HELD.

1. Delhi High Court had territorial jurisdiction under Article 226(1).
2. Application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens by the Delhi High Court was legally unsustainable.
3. Order dismissing the writ petition was set aside.
4. Writ petition stood restored to the file of the Delhi High Court for decision on merits.
5. Appeal against dismissal of review petition was dismissed as not maintainable.

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Ratio Decidendi

Where the Union of India and the Director General of a Central Armed Police Force are situated within Delhi, the Delhi High Court possesses territorial jurisdiction under Article 226(1) to entertain a challenge to disciplinary or termination orders passed against members of such forces, and the doctrine of forum non conveniens cannot ordinarily be invoked to deny exercise of such constitutional jurisdiction.

Result

Civil Appeal allowed. Impugned judgment of the Delhi High Court set aside. Writ Petition restored for adjudication on merits.

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Where agricultural land was governed by the Delhi ...Where agricultural land was governed by the Delhi Land Reforms Act and succession opened prior to 09.09.2005, rights devolve exclusively in accordance with Section 50 of the Act and become crystallised on the date of death of the Bhumidhar. Such vested rights are not affected by the subsequent amendment to the Hindu Succession Act, acquisition of land, or urbanisation. Further, a mere bald assertion that the property forms part of an HUF, unsupported by material pleadings showing when and how the HUF came into existence and how the property acquired HUF character, does not disclose a cause of action. A plaint founded upon such illusory pleadings is liable to rejection under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Paras 33–49.

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Where agricultural land was governed by the Delhi ...: advocatemmmohan DELHI LAND REFORMS ACT, 1954 – Section 50 – Succession to agricultural land – Death of Bhumidhar prior to 09.09.2005 – Right...

DELHI LAND REFORMS ACT, 1954 – Section 50 – Succession to agricultural land – Death of Bhumidhar prior to 09.09.2005 – Rights crystallise under DLR Act.

Where succession to agricultural land opened upon the death of a Bhumidhar prior to 09.09.2005, succession is governed by Section 50 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 and not by the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Rights of successors become crystallised on the date of death and cannot be disturbed by the subsequent amendment to the Hindu Succession Act in 2005. Paras 19–22, 27–33.

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Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 – Section 50(a) – Male Bhumidhar – Succession by male lineal descendants.

Under Section 50(a) of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, where a male Bhumidhar dies leaving male lineal descendants, the agricultural holding devolves upon such male descendants in the male line of descent. Other heirs can succeed only in the absence of heirs falling within the superior category prescribed by the statute. Paras 19, 20, 21.

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Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – Section 4(2) (prior to omission) – Agricultural holdings – Exclusion of HSA.

Prior to its omission by the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, Section 4(2) preserved special laws governing devolution of agricultural holdings. Consequently, succession to Bhumidhari rights was governed by Section 50 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act and not by the Hindu Succession Act. Paras 22–25.

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Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 – Prospective operation – Agricultural land.

The omission of Section 4(2) of the Hindu Succession Act by the 2005 Amendment operates prospectively. The amendment applies only to successions opening on or after 09.09.2005 and does not reopen or alter successions that had already vested prior thereto. Paras 28–33.

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Agricultural Land – Succession completed prior to 2005 Amendment – Rights not affected by subsequent urbanisation.

Where succession to agricultural land had already taken place under the Delhi Land Reforms Act, subsequent acquisition of the land or urbanisation of the village does not create or revive rights in favour of persons who had no inheritable interest at the time succession opened. Para 48.

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ORDER VII RULE 11 CPC – Rejection of plaint – Agricultural land – Plaintiff having no inheritable right under governing succession law.

Where the averments in the plaint itself establish that the property was agricultural land, that the deceased Bhumidhar died in 2002 and that succession stood governed by Section 50 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, the suit claiming partition on the basis of equal inheritance is barred by law and the plaint is liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Paras 16–21, 33, 49.

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ORDER VII RULE 11 CPC – Scope of enquiry – Court confined to plaint and documents filed therewith.

For deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, the Court is required to examine the plaint and the documents annexed thereto. If on a meaningful reading thereof the suit appears barred by law or discloses no cause of action, the plaint is liable to be rejected at the threshold. Paras 12, 41, 49.

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HINDU UNDIVIDED FAMILY (HUF) – Mere assertion of existence of HUF – Insufficient.

A bare or bald averment that a property belongs to an HUF or that a deceased ancestor was Karta of an HUF does not create a cause of action. Specific pleadings must disclose when and how the HUF came into existence and how each property acquired the character of HUF property. Paras 35, 37, 38, 40.

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HUF Property – Post-1956 position – No presumption of HUF from ancestral inheritance.

After enactment of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, there is no presumption that inherited ancestral property automatically assumes the character of HUF property. Detailed pleadings are necessary to establish creation or existence of an HUF and the manner in which the property became HUF property. Paras 35, 45.

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Cause of Action – HUF Claim – Material facts mandatory.

A plaint asserting HUF rights must contain material facts constituting the cause of action, including particulars regarding creation of the HUF, source of acquisition, and circumstances by which the property became HUF property. Omission of such material facts renders the plaint devoid of a cause of action. Paras 39, 40.

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Order VII Rule 11 CPC – Clever drafting – Illusory cause of action.

A plaint cannot be permitted to survive merely because it contains a cleverly drafted assertion intended to create an illusion of a cause of action. Courts must examine whether a real right to sue is disclosed and reject plaints founded upon vague, unsupported or illusory pleadings. Paras 42, 43, 44.

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HUF – Absence of documentary support – Claim liable to rejection.

Where no document evidencing existence of an HUF is produced, the revenue records do not record any HUF, and the plaint contains only a bald assertion regarding HUF status, the plea of HUF cannot furnish a valid cause of action for a partition suit. Paras 38, 46.

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Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma – Applicability.

The principles relating to coparcenary rights of daughters under amended Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act apply only where coparcenary/HUF property is established. In the absence of pleadings and material establishing existence of an HUF, reliance upon Vineeta Sharma is misconceived. Paras 45, 47.

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Ratio Decidendi

Where agricultural land was governed by the Delhi Land Reforms Act and succession opened prior to 09.09.2005, rights devolve exclusively in accordance with Section 50 of the Act and become crystallised on the date of death of the Bhumidhar. Such vested rights are not affected by the subsequent amendment to the Hindu Succession Act, acquisition of land, or urbanisation. Further, a mere bald assertion that the property forms part of an HUF, unsupported by material pleadings showing when and how the HUF came into existence and how the property acquired HUF character, does not disclose a cause of action. A plaint founded upon such illusory pleadings is liable to rejection under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Paras 33–49.

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Cases Referred

1. Nathu v. Hukam Singh – followed – Paras 23, 25.
2. Ram Mehar v. Mst. Dakhan – followed – Paras 24, 25.
3. Nirmala v. Government of NCT of Delhi – followed – Paras 29, 30.
4. Har Naraini Devi v. Union of India – relied upon – Para 31.
5. Surender Kumar v. Dhani Ram – followed – Paras 35, 45.
6. Kuldeep Mansukhani v. Indira Jhangiani – followed – Para 36.
7. Popat and Kotecha Property v. State Bank of India Staff Association – relied upon – Paras 39, 40.
8. ITC Ltd. v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal – relied upon – Para 42.
9. T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal – relied upon – Para 43.
10. Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma – distinguished – Paras 45, 47.
11. CWT v. Chander Sen – referred – Para 35.
12. Yudhishter v. Ashok Kumar – referred – Paras 35, 36.

Santra Devi v. Santosh Kaushik & Ors., CS(OS) 188/2024, decided on 30.05.2026, Delhi High Court (Mini Pushkarna, J.).