CRIMINAL LAW — Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 — Ss.3(1)(r) & 3(1)(s) — Essential ingredient — “In any place within public view” — Meaning and scope — Alleged caste-based abuses inside residential house amidst family dispute — FIR not disclosing presence of public persons or public gaze — Held, basic ingredient of offence under SC/ST Act absent — Mere allegation of casteist abuses within four walls of residential premises without public view insufficient to constitute offence — Charges and FIR liable to be quashed. (Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, Ss.3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) — Penal Code, 1860, Ss.34, 503, 506)

 APEX COURT HELD THAT 

CRIMINAL LAW — Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 — Ss.3(1)(r) & 3(1)(s) — Essential ingredient — “In any place within public view” — Meaning and scope — Alleged caste-based abuses inside residential house amidst family dispute — FIR not disclosing presence of public persons or public gaze — Held, basic ingredient of offence under SC/ST Act absent — Mere allegation of casteist abuses within four walls of residential premises without public view insufficient to constitute offence — Charges and FIR liable to be quashed.
(Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, Ss.3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) — Penal Code, 1860, Ss.34, 503, 506)

Expression “place within public view” — Distinction between “public place” and “place within public view” — Even private place may satisfy requirement if occurrence visible to or witnessed by public — However, occurrence inside residential house without public presence or public gaze does not satisfy statutory requirement.

FIR — Quashing — Where FIR on bare reading fails to disclose essential ingredients of alleged offence — Criminal proceedings liable to be quashed — FIR must itself reveal foundational facts constituting offence.

Criminal intimidation — Mere threats insufficient — “Intent to cause alarm” is sine qua non — Absence of allegations showing alarm or common intention — Charge under S.506 r/w S.34 IPC unsustainable.

Held :
To constitute offence under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act, insult, intimidation or caste-based abuse must occur “in any place within public view”, which is a sine qua non for applicability of said provisions. Paras 5.1 to 5.9 and 9.1.

Though a private place may also fall within expression “place within public view”, such place must be exposed to public gaze or witnessed by members of public. Incident occurring within four walls of residential house without public presence would not satisfy requirement. Paras 5.5 to 5.9.

In present case, FIR and charge-sheet nowhere disclosed that alleged casteist abuses were uttered in presence of public persons or at place exposed to public gaze. Material on record indicated that alleged occurrence took place inside residential house amongst family members. Paras 6.1 to 6.7.

Requirement that occurrence must be “in any place within public view” substantiates and intensifies ingredients of humiliation and insult under SC/ST Act and is therefore principal and indispensable requirement of offence. Para 9.1.

For offence under Section 506 IPC, “intent to cause alarm” is pivotal ingredient. Mere allegations of threats without material showing intention to cause alarm do not constitute criminal intimidation. Further, no material disclosed existence of common intention to attract Section 34 IPC. Paras 10 to 10.2.

Accordingly, charges framed under Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) of SC/ST Act and Section 506 read with Section 34 IPC, as well as FIR and charge-sheet, were quashed. Paras 11 to 13. 

CONTEMPT OF COURT — Criminal contempt — Scandalising Court — Public allegations by Senior Advocate and President of High Court Advocates’ Association against High Court and Registry — Remarks describing High Court as “gambling den” and alleging preferential treatment to wealthy litigants — Apology — Repeated acts of similar misconduct — Distinction between contempt jurisdiction and withdrawal of senior designation — Held, allegations made by appellant had tendency to lower authority and dignity of High Court and shake public confidence in justice delivery system — Conviction for criminal contempt justified — However, considering overall circumstances, emotional stress during COVID-19 period, repeated remorse and substantial professional consequences already suffered by appellant by withdrawal of senior designation, Court inclined to take compassionate view on sentence. (Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, Ss.2(c), 12 — Constitution of India, Arts.129, 142, 215)

 APEX COURT HELD THAT 

CONTEMPT OF COURT — Criminal contempt — Scandalising Court — Public allegations by Senior Advocate and President of High Court Advocates’ Association against High Court and Registry — Remarks describing High Court as “gambling den” and alleging preferential treatment to wealthy litigants — Apology — Repeated acts of similar misconduct — Distinction between contempt jurisdiction and withdrawal of senior designation — Held, allegations made by appellant had tendency to lower authority and dignity of High Court and shake public confidence in justice delivery system — Conviction for criminal contempt justified — However, considering overall circumstances, emotional stress during COVID-19 period, repeated remorse and substantial professional consequences already suffered by appellant by withdrawal of senior designation, Court inclined to take compassionate view on sentence.
(Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, Ss.2(c), 12 — Constitution of India, Arts.129, 142, 215)

Contempt jurisdiction — Apology — Acceptance or rejection — Mere tendering of apology does not entitle contemnor to acceptance as matter of right — Discretion rests with Court exercising contempt jurisdiction — High Court justified in observing that apology lacked bona fides and appeared to be “paper apology” in light of repeated past conduct of appellant — Nevertheless, Supreme Court entitled to consider subsequent remorse, surrounding circumstances and overall proportionality while moulding relief.

Senior Advocate — Withdrawal of designation — Distinct from punishment for contempt — Recall of senior designation under High Court Rules and punishment for criminal contempt under Contempt of Courts Act operate in separate fields though arising from same incident — Withdrawal of designation cannot by itself obliterate contempt jurisdiction.

Held :
The statements made by appellant in press conference dated 05.06.2020, including branding the High Court as a “gambling den” and alleging favouritism towards affluent litigants, were wholly unwarranted and had clear tendency to scandalise institution and erode public confidence in judiciary. Paras 2, 3, 9 and 44.

The Supreme Court agreed with High Court that proceedings for criminal contempt and proceedings for recall of senior designation are distinct and independent in nature. Mere withdrawal of senior designation could not be treated as substitute for contempt jurisdiction. Paras 33 and 34.

Though High Court rejected apology as lacking sincerity in view of repeated past conduct of appellant, Supreme Court took note of appellant’s repeated remorse, emotional turmoil during COVID-19 period, pressure faced as President of Bar Association, and professional consequences already suffered owing to deprivation of senior designation. Paras 37 to 44.

Power under contempt jurisdiction must preserve majesty of institution while also balancing possibility of reform and redemption where circumstances so justify. Paras 35 and 36

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: ELECTION — Panchayat Elections — Recounting of vot...

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: ELECTION — Panchayat Elections — Recounting of vot...: advocatemmmohan APEX COURT HELD THAT  ELECTION — Panchayat Elections — Recounting of votes — Nature of recount order — Final order or interi...

APEX COURT HELD THAT 

ELECTION — Panchayat Elections — Recounting of votes — Nature of recount order — Final order or interim order — Doctrine of functus officio — Distinction between present case and Raj Kumari v. Asha Devi — Prescribed Authority allowing election petition and simultaneously directing recount — Thereafter declaring election petitioner elected after recount — Legality — Held, unlike in Raj Kumari v. Asha Devi, where recount order was held to be interlocutory in nature, order in present case expressly allowed election petition and rejected objections of returned candidate and therefore constituted final order — Consequently, Prescribed Authority became functus officio and lacked jurisdiction to pass subsequent order declaring appellant elected after recount — High Court rightly setting aside subsequent proceedings.
(U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947, S.12-C — Constitution of India, Art.243-O)

Held :
In Raj Kumari v. Asha Devi, Supreme Court held that recount order therein was merely interlocutory and final order was passed subsequently. However, in present case, order dated 05.11.2022 itself finally allowed election petition. Therefore, Prescribed Authority became functus officio upon passing said order and could not thereafter continue proceedings or declare appellant elected on basis of recount. Paras 18 to 21.

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 166 — Compensat...

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 166 — Compensat...: advocatemmmohan Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 166 — Compensation — Minor victim suffering 100% permanent disability — Assessment of not...

APEX COURT HELD THAT

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 166 — Compensation — Minor victim suffering 100% permanent disability — Assessment of notional income — Minimum wages basis — Substantial enhancement granted.

Claimant, aged about fourteen years, while travelling as pillion rider on motorcycle, sustained grievous injuries to neck, head and backbone when motorcycle driven rashly and negligently hit rear portion of tractor trolley. Claimant remained hospitalised for about 203 days and suffered 100% permanent disability. Motor Accident Claims Tribunal awarded compensation of ₹7,76,543/-, which was partially enhanced by High Court to ₹12,17,543/-. Claimant sought further enhancement before Supreme Court contending that notional income, attendant charges and compensation under various heads were inadequately assessed.

Held, for minor victim suffering permanent disability, notional income must be assessed on basis of minimum wages payable to skilled workman prevailing at relevant time. High Court erred in taking annual notional income at ₹30,000/-. Since minimum wages payable to skilled workman in Rajasthan in year 2016 were ₹5,746 per month, monthly income was rightly rounded off to ₹5,800 and future prospects at 40% added. Applying multiplier of 18, compensation towards loss of future income was recalculated at ₹17,53,920/-. Compensation was substantially enhanced considering permanent disability and lifelong impact upon claimant. (Paras 3 to 10)

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Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Permanent disability — Attendant charges — Lifelong requirement of attendants — Multiplier method applicable.

Minor claimant suffered 100% permanent disability rendering him dependent on continuous assistance for rest of his life. High Court awarded only ₹1,21,800 towards attendant charges.

Held, where victim suffers total permanent disability and requires round-the-clock assistance, attendant charges must be realistically assessed keeping in view lifelong dependency. Applying principles laid down in Kajal v. Jagdish Chand, minimum wages payable to semi-skilled workman could be taken as basis for calculating attendant charges. Since claimant required assistance of two attendants throughout life, monthly attendant charges of ₹10,000 for two attendants were taken and multiplier of 18 applied, resulting in compensation of ₹21,60,000 under said head. Court further directed that substantial portion of amount be invested in fixed deposit to ensure future attendant expenses are adequately met. (Paras 6, 9 and 11)

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Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Compensation — Pain and suffering — Loss of amenities — Future medical expenses — Marriage prospects — Liberal and realistic approach.

Claimant suffered catastrophic injuries resulting in complete permanent disability at age of fourteen years. High Court awarded limited amounts under heads of mental agony, future medical treatment and loss of marriage prospects.

Held, compensation in cases involving total permanent disability of minor must be just, fair and realistic, having regard to lifelong physical suffering, emotional trauma, social deprivation and loss of normal amenities of life. Considering severity of injuries and complete disability suffered at young age, Supreme Court enhanced compensation to ₹10,00,000 towards mental pain, suffering and loss of amenities, ₹3,00,000 towards future medical expenses, ₹3,00,000 towards loss of marriage prospects and ₹1,00,000 towards special diet and transportation. (Paras 6, 10 and 11)

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Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Just compensation — Duty of Court — Compensation must account for future care and rehabilitation of permanently disabled victim.

Supreme Court considered adequacy of compensation awarded to permanently disabled minor claimant requiring lifelong medical support and attendant assistance.

Held, while awarding compensation under Motor Vehicles Act, Court must adopt humane and pragmatic approach ensuring that permanently disabled victim is financially secured for future care, rehabilitation and dignified existence. Compensation should not be illusory or symbolic but sufficient to meet recurring expenses arising from disability. Directions for structured investment of compensation amount may be issued to safeguard long-term interests of victim. (Paras 9 to 11)

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Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Interest on compensation — Award of interest from date of claim petition till realization.

Held, enhanced compensation of ₹56,83,663 awarded to claimant shall carry interest at rate of 6% per annum from date of filing of claim petition till actual payment after adjusting amounts already paid. (Paras 10 and 11)

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Compensation — Structured disbursement — Protection of interests of permanently disabled claimant.

While awarding ₹21,60,000 towards attendant charges, Supreme Court considered long-term financial protection of permanently disabled claimant.

Held, 25% of amount awarded towards attendant charges shall be immediately released to claimant and remaining 75% invested in fixed deposit so that interest accrual and periodic annual withdrawals may ensure continuous future attendant care and financial stability. (Para 11)

Electricity Act, 2003 — Sections 2(17), 2(19), 14 & 42 — Railways Act, 1989 — Section 11(g) & (h) — Indian Railways not a deemed distribution licensee — Internal consumption of electricity — Liability to pay Cross-Subsidy Surcharge and Additional Surcharge. Indian Railways claimed status of deemed distribution licensee under third proviso to Section 14 of Electricity Act on ground that Railways, being entity of Central Government and “Appropriate Government”, was authorised under Section 11 of Railways Act to erect, maintain and operate electric traction equipment, power supply and distribution installations. Railways contended that it was entitled to non-discriminatory open access without payment of Cross-Subsidy Surcharge (CSS) and Additional Surcharge. Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (APTEL) held that Railways was not a deemed distribution licensee and was liable to pay surcharge under Section 42. Held, mere establishment and operation of “distribution installations” under Section 11(g) of Railways Act does not amount to operation of “distribution system” within meaning of Sections 2(17) and 2(19) of Electricity Act. Distribution system under Electricity Act must ultimately connect to installation of consumers and supply electricity to consumers within area of supply. Railways merely conveys electricity within its self-contained operational network for its own consumption in locomotives, signalling systems and station facilities and does not supply electricity to consumers against consideration. Activities of Railways therefore do not satisfy statutory requirements of a distribution licensee or deemed distribution licensee. Railways remains consumer under Electricity Act and is liable to pay Cross-Subsidy Surcharge and Additional Surcharge when availing open access. (Paras 16 to 37,

 

Electricity Act, 2003 — Sections 2(17), 2(19), 14 & 42 — Railways Act, 1989 — Section 11(g) & (h) — Indian Railways not a deemed distribution licensee — Internal consumption of electricity — Liability to pay Cross-Subsidy Surcharge and Additional Surcharge.

Indian Railways claimed status of deemed distribution licensee under third proviso to Section 14 of Electricity Act on ground that Railways, being entity of Central Government and “Appropriate Government”, was authorised under Section 11 of Railways Act to erect, maintain and operate electric traction equipment, power supply and distribution installations. Railways contended that it was entitled to non-discriminatory open access without payment of Cross-Subsidy Surcharge (CSS) and Additional Surcharge. Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (APTEL) held that Railways was not a deemed distribution licensee and was liable to pay surcharge under Section 42.

Held, mere establishment and operation of “distribution installations” under Section 11(g) of Railways Act does not amount to operation of “distribution system” within meaning of Sections 2(17) and 2(19) of Electricity Act. Distribution system under Electricity Act must ultimately connect to installation of consumers and supply electricity to consumers within area of supply. Railways merely conveys electricity within its self-contained operational network for its own consumption in locomotives, signalling systems and station facilities and does not supply electricity to consumers against consideration. Activities of Railways therefore do not satisfy statutory requirements of a distribution licensee or deemed distribution licensee. Railways remains consumer under Electricity Act and is liable to pay Cross-Subsidy Surcharge and Additional Surcharge when availing open access. (Paras 16 to 37, 51 to 58)

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Electricity Law — Distribution licensee — Essential requirements — Supply to consumers mandatory — Mere internal conveyance of electricity insufficient.

Indian Railways argued that conveyance of electricity from traction substations through its electrical network constituted “distribution” of electricity and that “supply” was not licensed activity under Electricity Act.

Held, conjoint reading of Sections 2(17), 2(19) and 42(1) of Electricity Act establishes that distribution licensee must fulfil twin requirements: (i) operate and maintain distribution system, and (ii) supply electricity to consumers within area of supply. Mere internal transmission or conveyance of electricity for self-consumption does not amount to “distribution” under Electricity Act. Distribution necessarily contemplates last-mile connectivity to consumers and supply of electricity against consideration. Railways’ internal operational network for traction, locomotives, signals and stations is only captive self-consumption infrastructure and not a statutory distribution system. (Paras 16 to 25, 28 to 33)

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Railways Act, 1989 — Section 11 — Non-obstante clause — Scope and extent — Does not override Electricity Act licensing framework.

Railways contended that non-obstante clause in Section 11 of Railways Act conferred unfettered authority to distribute electricity independent of Electricity Act and exempted Railways from regulatory framework under Electricity Act.

Held, Section 11 of Railways Act cannot be read so expansively as to dispense with mandatory licensing framework under Sections 12 and 14 of Electricity Act. Non-obstante clause operates only in event of direct and irreconcilable inconsistency and cannot function as blanket exemption from applicability of subsequent regulatory statute. No inconsistency exists between Railways Act and Electricity Act since Railways can exercise operational powers under Section 11 while simultaneously complying with Electricity Act. Judicial endeavour must be to harmoniously construe both enactments. (Paras 26, 27, 29)

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Electricity Act, 2003 — Section 2(5) — “Appropriate Government” — Railways falls within control of Central Government — Yet not entitled to deemed distribution licensee status.

Question arose whether Indian Railways, being instrumentality of Union Government, falls within ambit of “Appropriate Government” under Section 2(5)(a) of Electricity Act.

Held, Railways operates under pervasive fiscal, administrative and operational control of Central Government and for limited purpose falls within ambit of “Appropriate Government”. However, mere status as Government entity does not automatically confer deemed distribution licensee status. Such status depends upon actual performance of statutory functions of distribution licensee, namely supply of electricity to consumers. Railways’ electrical infrastructure exists exclusively for self-consumption and not for supply to consumers. Hence, despite satisfying limited governmental test, Railways cannot claim benefits of deemed distribution licensee under third proviso to Section 14. (Paras 38 to 50)

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Electricity Act, 2003 — Section 42 — Open access — Cross-Subsidy Surcharge (CSS) and Additional Surcharge — Object and rationale.

Railways claimed exemption from payment of Cross-Subsidy Surcharge and Additional Surcharge while procuring electricity through open access.

Held, Cross-Subsidy Surcharge under Section 42(2) compensates distribution licensees for loss of revenue required to subsidise weaker consumer categories, while Additional Surcharge under Section 42(4) offsets stranded costs arising from existing supply obligations. Open-access consumers procuring electricity from alternate sources remain liable to bear such statutory charges. Even deemed distribution licensee procuring electricity exclusively for its own consumption is liable to pay CSS and Additional Surcharge. Since Railways procures electricity solely for captive consumption, it remains liable for payment of such charges. (Paras 51 to 58)

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Statutory Interpretation — Executive clarifications — Ministry letters — No binding statutory force.

Railways relied upon Ministry of Power letters dated 06.05.2014 and 03.04.2023 declaring Railways to be deemed distribution licensee under Electricity Act.

Held, executive communications or administrative clarifications issued by Ministry of Power neither amend nor override statutory provisions of Electricity Act and carry no binding legal force. Jurisdictional status and statutory rights must flow from legislation and not from executive correspondence. Such letters therefore cannot confer status of deemed distribution licensee upon Railways. (Para 49)

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Electricity Law — Functional test — Consumer vis-à-vis distribution licensee — Self-consumption decisive.

Railways asserted that it was not merely consumer but distribution entity because of its extensive nationwide electricity network.

Held, functionality test determines whether entity actually supplies electricity to consumers or merely consumes electricity for itself. Railways operates closed and self-contained electrical network only for traction, signalling and operational purposes and supplies electricity to no independent consumers. Railways therefore functions as consumer and not distribution licensee. Claim to deemed distribution licensee status was merely attempt to avoid liability towards Cross-Subsidy Surcharge and Additional Surcharge without assuming corresponding statutory obligations. (Paras 31 to 37, 57, 58)