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Wednesday, January 29, 2014

Accident claim - M.V.Act - Claimed Rs.53 lakhs - Tribunal awarded Rs. three lakhs and High court enhanced to eight lakhs - apex court enhanced to Rs. 19 lakhs - self-employed the actual income at the time of death should be taken into account for determining the loss of income unless there are extraordinary and exceptional circumstances. = SANJAY VERMA ... APPELLANT (S) VERSUS HARYANA ROADWAYS ... RESPONDENT (S)= 2014 (January part ) judis.nic.in/supreme court/filename=41184

Accident claim - M.V.Act - Claimed Rs.53 lakhs - Tribunal awarded Rs. three lakhs and High court enhanced to eight lakhs - apex court enhanced to Rs. 19 lakhs - self-employed the actual income at the time of death should  be  taken  into account for determining the loss of income unless  there  are  extraordinary and exceptional  circumstances. =
According  to
the claimant, apart from other injuries, he had suffered a fracture  of  the
spinal  cord  resulting  in  paralysis  of  his  whole   body.    In   these
circumstances the claimant filed an application before  the  Motor  Accident
Claim Tribunal claiming compensation of a total sum of Rs.53,00,000/-  under
different heads enumerated below:
|(i)     |Pecuniary loss                        |Rs. 24,00,000.00    |
|(ii)    |Expenditure incurred in               |Rs.   2,00,000.00   |
|        |treatment till now                    |                    |
|        |                                      |                    |
|(iii)   |Expenses which shall be               |Rs.  3,00,000.00    |
|        |incurred in future in treatment       |                    |
|(iv)    |Cost of attendant from the            |Rs.  2,00,000.00    |
|        |date of accident till he remains      |                    |
|        |alive                                 |                    |
|(v)     |Passage and diet money                | Rs.  2,00,000.00   |
|(vi)    |Pain and suffering and                |Rs. 20,00,000.00    |
|        |mental agony                          |                    |
|        |Total                                 |Rs.53,00,000.00     |

 “………At the time of issuance of  handicapped  certificate  I  had  also
      given 100% disability certificate but thinking that he might  improve,
      I had given a  certificate  80%  disability.   The  cutting  over  the
      certificate No.16 G has been done by  me  which  bears  my  signature.
      This cutting was also done at the time of issuance of the certificate.
       As per the prescribed standard, at the time when patient was examined
      by the medical board, he was also suffering from the  total  paralysis
      and 100% disability  but  because  patient’s  toe  was  having  slight
      movement, therefore, it was unanimously  decided  that  for  the  time
      being his disability is 80%.”
   It is also established by the materials on record that  the  age  of
the claimant at the time of the accident was 25 years and  he  was  married.
The age of his wife was 22 years  and  at  the  time  of  the  accident  the
claimant had one son who was 1½ years of age.  Apart from  the  above,  from
the deposition of the claimant himself (PW-2) it transpires that  after  the
accident he is not able to do any work and “one person is always  needed  to
look after him”.
 The appellant was a self employed person. Though he  had  claimed  a
monthly  income  of  Rs.5,000/-,  the  Income  Tax  Returns  filed  by   him
demonstrate that he had paid income tax on an annual income of  Rs.41,300/-.
 No fault, therefore, can be found in the order  of  the  High  Court  which
proceeds on the basis that the annual income of the claimant at the time  of
the accident was Rs.41,300/-.
Reshma Kumari and Ors. vs. Madan  Mohan  and  Anr.[5]  reiterated  the  view
taken in Sarla Verma (supra) to the effect that in respect of a  person  who
was on a fixed salary without provision for annual  increments  or  who  was
self-employed the actual income at the time of death should  be  taken  into
account for determining the loss of income unless  there  are  extraordinary
and exceptional  circumstances.
  Undoubtedly, the same principle  will  apply  for  determination  of
loss of income on account of an accident resulting in the  total  disability
of the victim as in the present case.  Therefore, taking  into  account  the
age of the claimant (25 years) and the fact that he had a steady income,  as
evidenced by the income-tax returns, we are of the view that an addition  of
50% to the income that the claimant was earning at the time of the  accident
would be justified.

we  hold  that  the
claimant is entitled to enhanced compensation                        as  set
out in the table below:


|Sl. |Head                        |Amt. as per High   |Amt. as per this  |
|No. |                                |Court                      |Court             |
|    |                                   |(in Rs.)                    |(in Rs.)          |
|(i) |Loss of Income          |6,19,500.00           |10,53,150.00      |
|(ii)|Medical Expenses     |      1,38,552.00    |1,38,552.00       |
|(iii|Future Treatment      |                   |         3,00,000.00       |
|)   |                                    |                   |                  |
|    |                                    |50,000.00          |                  |
|    |                                    |                            |3,00,000.00       |
|(iv)|Pain and suffering and  |                   |                  |
|    |mental agony            |                   |                  |
|(v) |Cost of attendant from  |                       |2,00,000.00       |
|    |the                     |                   |                  |
|    |date of accident till he|                   |                  |
|    |remains                 |                   |                  |
|    |alive                   |                   |                  |
|    |Total=                        |8,08,052.00        |19,91,702.00      |


22.     In view of the enhancement  made  by  us,  we  do  not  consider  it
necessary to modify the rate of interest awarded by the High Court  i.e.  6%
from the date of the application i.e. 24.08.1999  to  the  date  of  payment
which will also be payable on the enhanced amount of compensation.

23.     The appeal filed by the claimant is allowed as indicated above.

 2014 (January part ) judis.nic.in/supreme court/filename=41184
P SATHASIVAM, RANJAN GOGOI, SHIVA KIRTI SINGH

                      REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                       CIVIL APPEAL  NO. 5256 OF 2008


SANJAY VERMA                    ...     APPELLANT (S)

                                   VERSUS

HARYANA ROADWAYS                ...     RESPONDENT (S)



                               J U D G M E N T


RANJAN GOGOI, J.


1.      This quantum appeal is by the claimant seeking  further  enhancement
of the compensation awarded by the High Court of Uttaranchal at Nainital  by
its Order dated 27.03.2006.

2.      The facts relevant for the purpose of the present  adjudication  may
be noticed at the outset.

      On 12.08.1998 the appellant-claimant was  travelling  from  Ambala  to
Kurukshetra  in  a  bus  belonging  to  the  Haryana  Roadways  and  bearing
registration No. HR-07PA-0197. On  the  way  the  driver  of  the  bus  lost
control over the vehicle resulting in an accident in  the  course  of  which
the claimant suffered multiple injuries.  He was initially  treated  in  the
civil hospital Pehwa and thereafter transferred to  the  PGIMER,  Chandigarh
on  14.08.1998.   The  appellant  underwent  surgery   on   16.09.1998   and
eventually  he  was  released  from  the  hospital  and  referred   to   the
Rehabilitation Centre, Jawaharlal Nehru  Hospital,  Aligarh.   According  to
the claimant, apart from other injuries, he had suffered a fracture  of  the
spinal  cord  resulting  in  paralysis  of  his  whole   body.    In   these
circumstances the claimant filed an application before  the  Motor  Accident
Claim Tribunal claiming compensation of a total sum of Rs.53,00,000/-  under
different heads enumerated below:
|(i)     |Pecuniary loss                        |Rs. 24,00,000.00    |
|(ii)    |Expenditure incurred in               |Rs.   2,00,000.00   |
|        |treatment till now                    |                    |
|        |                                      |                    |
|(iii)   |Expenses which shall be               |Rs.  3,00,000.00    |
|        |incurred in future in treatment       |                    |
|(iv)    |Cost of attendant from the            |Rs.  2,00,000.00    |
|        |date of accident till he remains      |                    |
|        |alive                                 |                    |
|(v)     |Passage and diet money                | Rs.  2,00,000.00   |
|(vi)    |Pain and suffering and                |Rs. 20,00,000.00    |
|        |mental agony                          |                    |
|        |Total                                 |Rs.53,00,000.00     |


3.      The learned Tribunal by its Award dated  12.06.2000  held  that  the
accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the bus and  that
the claimant is entitled to compensation.   The  total  amount  due  to  the
claimant was quantified at Rs. 3,00,000/- under the heads “Loss of  Income”,
“reimbursement of medical expenses” and “pain and suffering”.   The  learned
Tribunal also awarded interest at the rate of 9% from  24.08.1999  i.e.  the
date of filing of the claim application till date of payment.

4.      Aggrieved, the claimant filed an appeal before the High Court  which
enhanced the compensation to Rs.8,08,052/-.  The High Court  quantified  the
amount due to the  claimant  towards  “loss  of  income”  at  Rs.6,19,500/-;
Rs.1,38,552/- on account of “medical expenses” and an amount of  Rs.50,000/-
“for future treatment” and “pain and suffering”.  The High  Court,  however,
reduced the interest payable to 6% per annum from the date of the filing  of
the application.  Aggrieved, this appeal has been filed.

5.      We have heard Dr. Manish Singhvi, learned counsel for the appellant-
claimant and Dr. Monika Gusain, learned counsel for the respondent.

6.      Learned counsel for the appellant has contended  that  in  computing
the amount due to the  appellant  on  account  of  loss  of  income,  future
prospects of increase of income had not been taken into account by the  High
Court; the multiplier adopted by the courts below is 15 whereas the  correct
multiplier should have been 18.  In so far as the amount awarded         for
“future treatment” and “pain and suffering” is  concerned,  learned  counsel
has submitted that not only the amount of Rs.50,000/- is grossly  inadequate
but High Court has committed an error in clubbing  the  two  heads  together
for award of compensation.  In this regard the  learned  counsel  has  drawn
the attention of the Court to the amounts  claimed  in  the  claim  petition
under the aforesaid two  heads,  as  already  noticed  hereinabove.   It  is
submitted by the learned counsel that the amount of compensation  is  liable
to be enhanced.

7.      Controverting the submissions advanced on behalf of  the  appellant,
Dr. Monika Gusain learned counsel for the  respondent-Haryana  Roadways  has
submitted that the enhancement made by the High Court to the extent of  over
Rs.5,00,000/- is more than an adequate measure of  the  “just  compensation”
that the  Motor  Vehicles  Act,  1988  (hereinafter  for  short  the  “Act”)
contemplate.  It is also the submission  of  the  learned  counsel  for  the
respondent that in awarding the enhanced amount the  High  Court  has  taken
into account all the relevant  circumstances  for  due  computation  of  the
amount of compensation payable under the Act.



8.      Before proceeding any further it would be appropriate to  take  note
of the evidence tendered by PW-1,  Dr.  Shailendra  Kumar  Mishra,  who  was
examined in the case on behalf of the claimant.  The relevant  part  of  the
evidence of PW-1 is extracted below:

      “………..Medical Board granted 80% disability of Sanjay Verma during  the
      course of examination.  Today I re-examined Mr. Sanjay  Verma  in  the
      Court, at the time of issuance of certificate, it was the opinion that
      his condition may improve, but even after such  a  long  duration  his
      condition has deteriorated, in place of improvement.

         Today he has become cent percent paralyzed.  Now  Sanjay  Verma  is
      unable to perform his day to day needs such as latrine  and  urination
      could not be done of his own.  A  tube  has  been  inserted  into  his
      urinary tract along with a bag which he has to use entire life.  There
      will be no control over his toilet and urine which he might have  been
      doing on his bed.

         He will not be  able  to  move  throughout  his  life  due  to  the
      paralysis below waist and he is now not been able to do any work.  The
      Spinal chord will be pressurized due to the facture of back  bone  and
      he will have to bear the pain throughout his life.  Sanjay Verma  will
      not be able to lead his normal life and will have remain in  the  same
      condition throughout his life.  Due to his laying position he will  be
      effected by bed sores which will be excessive painful.  Due to lack of
      urination in  normal  course  his  kidney  may  be  damaged  and  this
      possibility will always remain.”

      “………At the time of issuance of  handicapped  certificate  I  had  also
      given 100% disability certificate but thinking that he might  improve,
      I had given a  certificate  80%  disability.   The  cutting  over  the
      certificate No.16 G has been done by  me  which  bears  my  signature.
      This cutting was also done at the time of issuance of the certificate.
       As per the prescribed standard, at the time when patient was examined
      by the medical board, he was also suffering from the  total  paralysis
      and 100% disability  but  because  patient’s  toe  was  having  slight
      movement, therefore, it was unanimously  decided  that  for  the  time
      being his disability is 80%.”




9.      It is also established by the materials on record that  the  age  of
the claimant at the time of the accident was 25 years and  he  was  married.
The age of his wife was 22 years  and  at  the  time  of  the  accident  the
claimant had one son who was 1½ years of age.  Apart from  the  above,  from
the deposition of the claimant himself (PW-2) it transpires that  after  the
accident he is not able to do any work and “one person is always  needed  to
look after him”.

10.     Having noticed the evidence of PW-1 Dr. Shailendra Kumar Mishra  and
the other facts and  circumstances  of  the  case  we  may  now  proceed  to
determine as to whether the compensation awarded by  the  High  Court  under
the different heads noticed above is just and fair compensation  within  the
meaning of Section 168 of the Act.

11.     The appellant was a self employed person. Though he  had  claimed  a
monthly  income  of  Rs.5,000/-,  the  Income  Tax  Returns  filed  by   him
demonstrate that he had paid income tax on an annual income of  Rs.41,300/-.
 No fault, therefore, can be found in the order  of  the  High  Court  which
proceeds on the basis that the annual income of the claimant at the time  of
the accident was Rs.41,300/-.  Though in Sarla Verma (Smt.) and  Others  vs.
Delhi Transport Corporation and Another[1] this Court had held that in  case
of a  self  employed  person,  unless  there  are  special  and  exceptional
circumstances, the annual income at the time of death is to  be  taken  into
account, a Coordinate Bench in Santosh Devi vs. National  Insurance  Company
Ltd. and Others[2] has taken a different view  which  is  to  the  following
effect:
        “14. We find it extremely difficult to fathom any rationale for the
        observation made in para 24 of the judgment  in  Sarla  Verma  case
        that where the deceased was self-employed or was on a fixed  salary
        without provision for  annual  increment,  etc.,  the  courts  will
        usually take only the actual income at the  time  of  death  and  a
        departure  from  this  rule  should  be  made  only  in  rare   and
        exceptional cases involving special circumstances. In our view,  it
        will be naïve to say that the wages or total emoluments/income of a
        person who is self-employed or who is employed on  a  fixed  salary
        without provision for annual increment, etc., would remain the same
        throughout his life.”



12.     The view taken in Santosh Devi (supra)  has  been  reiterated  by  a
Bench of three Judges in Rajesh and Others vs. Rajbir  Singh  and  Others[3]
by holding as follows :

        “8. Since, the Court in Santosh  Devi  case  actually  intended  to
        follow the principle in the case of salaried persons as  laid  down
        in Sarla Verma case and to make it applicable  also  to  the  self-
        employed and persons on fixed  wages,  it  is  clarified  that  the
        increase in the case of those groups is not  30%  always;  it  will
        also have a reference to the age. In other words, in  the  case  of
        self-employed or persons with fixed wages, in  case,  the  deceased
        victim was below 40 years, there must be an addition of 50% to  the
        actual income of the deceased  while  computing  future  prospects.
        Needless to say that the  actual  income  should  be  income  after
        paying the tax, if any. Addition should be 30% in case the deceased
        was in the age group of 40 to 50 years.




        9. In Sarla Verma case, it has been stated  that  in  the  case  of
        those above 50 years, there shall be no addition. Having regard  to
        the fact that in the case of those self-employed or on fixed wages,
        where there is normally no age of superannuation,  we  are  of  the
        view that it will only be just and equitable to provide an addition
        of 15% in the case where the victim is between the age group of  50
        to 60 years so as to make the compensation  just,  equitable,  fair
        and reasonable. There shall normally be no addition thereafter.”




13.     Certain parallel developments will now have to  be  taken  note  of.
In Reshma Kumari and Others vs.  Madan Mohan and  Another[4],  a  two  Judge
Bench of this Court while considering the following questions took the  view
that the issue(s) needed resolution by a larger Bench
      “(1) Whether the multiplier specified in the Second Schedule  appended
      to the Act should be scrupulously applied in all the cases?


      (2) Whether for determination of the multiplicand,  the  Act  provides
      for any criterion, particularly as  regards  determination  of  future
      prospects?”



14.     Answering the above reference a three Judge Bench of this  Court  in
Reshma Kumari and Ors. vs. Madan  Mohan  and  Anr.[5]  reiterated  the  view
taken in Sarla Verma (supra) to the effect that in respect of a  person  who
was on a fixed salary without provision for annual  increments  or  who  was
self-employed the actual income at the time of death should  be  taken  into
account for determining the loss of income unless  there  are  extraordinary
and exceptional  circumstances.   Though  the  expression  “exceptional  and
extraordinary circumstances” is not capable of any  precise  definition,  in
Shakti Devi vs. New India Insurance Company Limited  and  Another[6]   there
is a practical application of the aforesaid principle.  The  near  certainty
of the regular  employment  of  the  deceased  in  a  government  department
following the retirement of his father was held to  be  a  valid  ground  to
compute the loss of income  by  taking  into  account  the  possible  future
earnings. The said loss of income, accordingly,  was  quantified  at  double
the amount that the deceased was earning at the time of his death.

15.     Undoubtedly, the same principle  will  apply  for  determination  of
loss of income on account of an accident resulting in the  total  disability
of the victim as in the present case.  Therefore, taking  into  account  the
age of the claimant (25 years) and the fact that he had a steady income,  as
evidenced by the income-tax returns, we are of the view that an addition  of
50% to the income that the claimant was earning at the time of the  accident
would be justified.

16.     Insofar as the multiplier is  concerned,  as  held  in  Sarla  Verma
(supra) (para 42) or as prescribed under the Second  Schedule  to  the  Act,
the correct multiplier in the present case cannot be 15 as held by the  High
Court.    We are of the view that the  adoption  of  the  multiplier  of  17
would be appropriate. Accordingly, taking into account the addition  to  the
income and the higher multiplier the total amount  of  compensation  payable
to the claimant under the head “loss of income” is  Rs.  10,53,150/-    (Rs.
41300 + Rs. 20650= Rs. 61,950 x 17).

17.     In so far as the  medical  expenses  is  concerned  as  the  awarded
amount of  Rs.1,38,552/-  has  been  found  payable  on  the  basis  of  the
bills/vouchers etc. brought on record  by  the  claimant  we  will  have  no
occasion to cause any alteration  of  the  amount  of  compensation  payable
under the head “medical expenses”.  Accordingly, the  finding  of  the  High
Court in this regard is maintained.

18.     This will bring us to the grievance of the  appellant-claimant  with
regard to award of  compensation  of  Rs.50,000/-  under  the  head  “future
treatment” and “pain and suffering”. In view of the decisions of this  Court
in Raj Kumar  vs.  Ajay  Kumar  and  Another[7]   and   Sanjay  Batham   vs.
Munnalal Parihar and Others[8] there can be no  manner  of  doubt  that  the
above two heads of compensation are distinct and  different  and  cannot  be
clubbed together.  We will, therefore, have to severe the  two  heads  which
have been clubbed together by the High Court.

      In so far as “future treatment” is concerned we have no doubt that the
claimant will be required to take  treatment  from  time  to  time  even  to
maintain the present condition of his health. In fact, the claimant  in  his
deposition has  stated  that  he  is  undergoing  treatment  at  the  Apollo
Hospital  at  Delhi.   Though  it  is  not  beyond  our  powers   to   award
compensation beyond what has been claimed [Nagappa vs. Gurudayal  Singh  and
others[9]], in the facts of the present case we are of  the  view  that  the
grant  of  full  compensation,  as  claimed  in  the  claim  petition   i.e.
Rs.3,00,000/- under the head “future treatment”,  would  meet  the  ends  of
justice.  We, therefore, order accordingly.

19.     The claimant had claimed an amount of Rs.20,00,000/- under the  head
“pain and suffering and mental agony”.  Considering the  injuries  sustained
by the claimant which had left him paralyzed for life and  the  evidence  of
PW-1 to the effect that the claimant is likely to suffer  considerable  pain
throughout his life, we are of the view that the claimant should be  awarded
a further sum of Rs. 3,00,000/-  on account of “pain  and  suffering”.    We
must,  however,  acknowledge  that  monetary  compensation  for   pain   and
suffering is at best a palliative, the correct dose of which,  in  the  last
analysis, will have to be determined on a case to case basis.

20.      In the  claim  petition  filed  before  the  Motor  Accident  Claim
Tribunal the claimant has prayed for an amount of  Rs.2,00,000/-  being  the
cost of attendant from the date of accident  till  he  remains  alive.   The
claimant in his deposition had stated that “he needs one person to  be  with
him all the  time”.   The  aforesaid  statement  of  the  claimant  is  duly
supported by the evidence of PW-1 who has described  the  medical  condition
of the claimant in detail.  From the aforesaid materials, we  are  satisfied
that  the  claim  made  on  this  count  is  justified  and  the  amount  of
Rs.2,00,000/- claimed by the claimant under the  aforesaid  head  should  be
awarded in full. We order accordingly.

21.     In view of the discussions that have  preceded,  we  hold  that  the
claimant is entitled to enhanced compensation                        as  set
out in the table below:


|Sl. |Head                    |Amt. as per High   |Amt. as per this  |
|No. |                        |Court              |Court             |
|    |                        |(in Rs.)           |(in Rs.)          |
|(i) |Loss of Income          |6,19,500.00        |10,53,150.00      |
|(ii)|Medical Expenses        |      1,38,552.00  |1,38,552.00       |
|(iii|Future Treatment        |                   |3,00,000.00       |
|)   |                        |                   |                  |
|    |                        |50,000.00          |                  |
|    |                        |                   |3,00,000.00       |
|(iv)|Pain and suffering and  |                   |                  |
|    |mental agony            |                   |                  |
|(v) |Cost of attendant from  |                   |2,00,000.00       |
|    |the                     |                   |                  |
|    |date of accident till he|                   |                  |
|    |remains                 |                   |                  |
|    |alive                   |                   |                  |
|    |Total=                  |8,08,052.00        |19,91,702.00      |


22.     In view of the enhancement  made  by  us,  we  do  not  consider  it
necessary to modify the rate of interest awarded by the High Court  i.e.  6%
from the date of the application i.e. 24.08.1999  to  the  date  of  payment
which will also be payable on the enhanced amount of compensation.

23.     The appeal filed by the claimant is allowed as indicated above.


                                       ...…………………………CJI.
                                        [P. SATHASIVAM]



                                        .........………………………J.
                                        [RANJAN GOGOI]




                                                       …..........……………………J.
                                        [SHIVA KIRTI SINGH]
NEW DELHI,
JANUARY  29, 2014.
-----------------------
[1]      (2009) 6 SCC 121
[2]      (2012) 6 SCC 421
[3]      (2013) 9 SCC 54
[4]      (2009) 13 SCC 422
[5]      (2013) 9 SCC 65 (para 36)
[6]      (2010) 14 SCC 575
[7]      (2011) 1 SCC 343
[8]      (2011) 10 SCC 665
[9]      (2003) 2 SCC 274

-----------------------
16


Sections 148, 302 read with Section 149 and Section 307 read with Section 149 of the IPC. and read with sec.34 of I.P.C. - Appreciation of Evidence - simply because , four accused out of 8 were acquitted as they are falsely implicated - does not discredit the evidence on other accused too - It is trite that the maxim ‘falsus in uno falsus in omnibus’ has no application in India. It is merely a rule of caution. It does not have the status of rule of law. - When exaggerations are separable from main evidence and Where the chaff can be separated from the grain, it would be open to the court to convict an accused notwithstanding the fact that evidence has been found to be deficient to prove guilt of other accused persons. - Apex court held nothing to interfere = SHEESH RAM AND ORS. …APPELLANTS Versus THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN …RESPONDENT = 2014 ( January Part ) judis.nic.in/supreme court/filename=41183

 Sections 148, 302 read with Section 149 and Section 307 read with Section 149 of  the
IPC. and read with sec.34 of I.P.C. -   Appreciation of Evidence - simply because  , four accused out of 8 were acquitted as they are falsely implicated - does not discredit the evidence on other accused too - It  is  trite that the maxim ‘falsus in uno falsus  in  omnibus’  has  no  application  in India.  It is merely a rule of caution.  It does  not  have  the  status  of rule of law.  - When exaggerations are separable from main evidence and Where the chaff can be separated from the grain,  it  would be open to the court to convict an accused  notwithstanding  the  fact that evidence has been found to be deficient to prove guilt  of  other accused persons. - Apex court held nothing to interfere =

The trial court convicted all the accused  under  Sections
148, 302 read with Section 149 and Section 307 read with Section 149 of  the
IPC.  
On appeal, the High Court acquitted Hansey,  Har  Sahai,  Rajdhar  and
Ram Kunwar.  
The High Court acquitted Accused Battu  of  the  charges  under
Sections 148 and 307 of the IPC.  
His conviction and sentence under  Section
302 of the IPC was  confirmed.   
He  has  not  appealed  against  the  order
convicting and sentencing him. 
Appellant–Sheesh Ram  was  acquitted  of  the
charges under Sections 148, 302  and  307  of  the  IPC.   
Instead,  he  was
convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section  307 read with Section 34 of the IPC.  He was sentenced  to  suffer  imprisonment
for life and a fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default, to further suffer six  months
rigorous imprisonment and to suffer rigorous  imprisonment  for  five  years
and fine of Rs.2,000/-, in default, to further  suffer  simple  imprisonment
for three months, respectively. 
Appellant–Rameshwar  was  acquitted  of  the
charges under Sections 148, 307 and 302 read with Section 149  of  the  IPC.
Instead, he was convicted  under  Section  302  read  with  Section  34  and
Section 307 read with Section 34 of the IPC.  He  was  sentenced  to  suffer
imprisonment for life and a  fine  of  Rs.1,000/-,  in  default,  to  suffer
further  six  months  rigorous   imprisonment   and   to   suffer   rigorous
imprisonment for five years  and  a  fine  of  Rs.2,000/-,  in  default,  to
further  suffer  simple  imprisonment   for   three   moths,   respectively.
Appellant-Radhey was acquitted of charges under Sections 148,  302  and  307
read with Section 149 of the IPC.  Instead, he was convicted  under  Section
302 read with Section 34 and Section 307 read with Section 34  of  the  IPC.
He was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life and a fine  of  Rs.1,000/-,
in default, to  suffer  six  months  rigorous  imprisonment  and  to  suffer
rigorous imprisonment for five years and a fine of Rs.2,000/-,  in  default,
to further suffer simple imprisonment for three months, respectively.   This
judgment is challenged in the instant appeal. =
out  of  the  eight  accused,  the  High  Court
acquitted four accused.  The High Court has,  in  fact,  observed  that  the
four acquitted accused have  been  falsely  implicated. 
All  these  witnesses  stated  that   the
acquitted accused had lathis and they dealt  lathi  blows  on  PW-5  Bhagwan
Singh.  This part of their evidence is disbelieved.  It is true  that  these
witnesses have improved the prosecution story to  some  extent.   But,  that
improvement or that exaggerated version can be  safely  separated  from  the
main case of the prosecution. =
It  is  trite
that the maxim ‘falsus in uno falsus  in  omnibus’  has  no  application  in
India.  It is merely a rule of caution.  It does  not  have  the  status  of
rule of law.  
In Balaka Singh  v.  State of Punjab[2], this Court  has  said
that where it is not feasible to separate truth from falsehood, because  the
grain and the chaff are  inextricably  mixed  up,  and  in  the  process  of
separation, an absolutely new case has  to  be  reconstructed  by  divorcing
essential details presented by the prosecution completely from  the  context
and background against which  they  are  made,  the  Court  cannot  make  an
attempt to separate truth from falsehood. But, as  we  have  already  noted,
this is not a case where the grain and  chaff  are  inextricably  mixed  up.
The evidence of eye-witnesses is not discrepant on the  material  aspect  of
the prosecution case.   Reliance can, therefore,  be  placed  on  them.   In
this connection, reliance placed by the counsel for the State  on  Rizan  is
apt.  The same principle is reiterated by  this  Court  in  Rizan.   We  may
quote the relevant paragraph from Rizan.

      “Even if a major portion of evidence is found to be deficient, in case
      residue is sufficient to prove guilt of  an  accused,  notwithstanding
      acquittal of a number of other co-accused persons his  conviction  can
      be maintained. It is the duty of the court to separate the grain  from
      the chaff. Where the chaff can be separated from the grain,  it  would
      be open to the court to convict an accused  notwithstanding  the  fact
      that evidence has been found to be deficient to prove guilt  of  other
      accused persons. Falsity of a particular material witness or  material
      particular would not ruin it from the  beginning  to  end.  The  maxim
      falsus in uno falsus in omnibus has no application in  India  and  the
      witnesses cannot be branded as liars. The maxim falsus in  uno  falsus
      in omnibus has not received general acceptance nor has this maxim come
      to occupy the status of a rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution.
      All that it amounts to,  is  that  in  such  cases  testimony  may  be
      disregarded, and not that it must be disregarded. The doctrine  merely
      involves the question of weight of evidence which a court may apply in
      a given set of circumstances, but it is not  what  may  be  called  “a
      mandatory rule of evidence”. (See Nisar Ali v. State of U.P  AIR  1957
      SC 366.)”

8.    The appellants  examined  defence  witnesses.   Testimony  of  defence
witnesses is not believed by the trial court as well as the High Court.   We
find no reason to take a contrary  view.   It  is  pertinent  to  note  that
Kamal, the brother of the appellants  was  murdered  and  for  that  murder,
complainant Heera and some of the witnesses are  facing  trial.   There  is,
therefore, strong motive to kill Balram, son of Heera.  It is not  possible,
however,  to  come  to  a  conclusion  that  because  of  this  enmity,  the
appellants have been falsely implicated.   We  have  already  discussed  the
evidence  on  record.   The  evidence  of  eye-witnesses,  particularly  the
evidence of PW-5 Bhagwan Singh, the  injured  eye-witness,  is  trustworthy.
Therefore, the argument that on account of previous enmity,  the  appellants
have been involved in this case is rejected.   Taking  an  overall  view  of
the matter and examined in light of Balaka Singh and Rizan, we  are  of  the
opinion that no interference is necessary with the impugned  judgment.   The
appeal is dismissed.


2014 ( January Part )  judis.nic.in/supreme court/filename=41183     

SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI

                                                   REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 191 OF 2004

SHEESH RAM AND ORS.                          …APPELLANTS

                                   Versus

THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN                  …RESPONDENT

                                  JUDGMENT

(SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.


1.    The appellants are original Accused Nos.1, 2  and  4  respectively  in
S.T. No.12 of 1993.   The  appellants  were  convicted,  inter  alia,  under
Section 302 of the IPC for the murder of one Balram and  sentenced  to  life
imprisonment.   They   have challenged judgment and  order  dated  29/5/2003
passed in Criminal Appeal No.322  of  1998  by  the  Rajasthan  High  Court,
confirming their conviction and sentence.

2.      One Heera son of Surajmal lodged a  complaint  (Ex.  P-7)  at  Jagal
Tan, Village Lapawali  on 04/02/1991 at around 3.50 p.m.,  stating  that  on
04/02/1991 at 8.00 a.m., he and his  son  Rameshwar  accompanied  his  other
sons Balram and Bhagwan Singh who were going to Hindaun School to  see  them
off.  They were standing on the road near  the  turn  between  Lapawali  and
Dhara.  While they were waiting for the bus, Rajdhar  of  village  Lapawali,
along with others, arrived  there  in  a  tractor.   Accused-1  Sheesh  Ram,
Accused-2 Radhey, Accused-3 Battu, Accused-4 Rameshwar  (in  S.T.  No.12  of
1993), Accused-Ram Kunwar, Accused-Hansey  and Accused-Har  Sahai  (in  S.T.
No.350 of 1992) stopped the tractor.  Accused-3 Battu exhorted “do  not  let
this opportunity slip  off”.  All  the  persons  jumped  from  the  tractor.
Complainant Heera and his son Rameshwar saved their life by fleeing  towards
the village.  His elder son Balram fled  towards  the  south from the  road.
 The accused followed them. Accused-2  Radhey  caught  hold  of  Balram  and
assaulted him with a Kulhari.  Balram fell down. Later on,  Accused-3  Battu
dealt an axe blow on his throat.  Others too  continued  assaulting  Balram.
Balram was badly injured.  He succumbed to the injuries.   Accused-1  Sheesh
Ram followed Bhagwan Singh, caught hold of him  and  inflicted  injuries  on
him.   Other accused also inflicted injuries on him.  Under  the  impression
that Bhagwan Singh had died, all the accused left the place.  Bhagwan  Singh
was admitted in the hospital at Karauli.  On the basis  of  this  report,  a
case under Sections 147, 148, 324, 326, 302, 307 read with Section  149  and
Section 341 of the IPC was registered. Accused Ram Kunwar  was  arrested  on
23/6/1991.  On completion of investigation, charge-sheet  was  laid  against
Ram Kunwar.  Another charge-sheet was laid against accused Hanse, Har  Sahai
and Rajdhar.  The case was committed to the Sessions Court and  numbered  as
S.T. No.356 of 1992.  Against  the  appellants,  charge-sheet  was  laid  on
3/2/1993. After committal of the said case to the  Sessions  Court,  it  was
numbered as S.T. No. 12 of 1993.  Both the  cases  were  tried  together  as
they arose out of the same FIR.

3.    In support of its case, the prosecution examined 20 witnesses  out  of
which, four are eye-witnesses.  The eye-witnesses are PW-2  Khushiram,  PW-3
Rameshwar, PW-4 Yadram and PW-5 Bhagwan Singh, who is  an  injured  witness.
The accused pleaded not guilty to the charge and  examined  seven  witnesses
in their defence. The trial court convicted all the accused  under  Sections
148, 302 read with Section 149 and Section 307 read with Section 149 of  the
IPC.  
On appeal, the High Court acquitted Hansey,  Har  Sahai,  Rajdhar  and
Ram Kunwar.  
The High Court acquitted Accused Battu  of  the  charges  under
Sections 148 and 307 of the IPC.  
His conviction and sentence under  Section
302 of the IPC was  confirmed.   He  has  not  appealed  against  the  order
convicting and sentencing him. 
Appellant–Sheesh Ram  was  acquitted  of  the
charges under Sections 148, 302  and  307  of  the  IPC.   
Instead,  he  was
convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section  307 read with Section 34 of the IPC.  He was sentenced  to  suffer  imprisonment
for life and a fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default, to further suffer six  months
rigorous imprisonment and to suffer rigorous  imprisonment  for  five  years
and fine of Rs.2,000/-, in default, to further  suffer  simple  imprisonment
for three months, respectively. Appellant–Rameshwar  was  acquitted  of  the
charges under Sections 148, 307 and 302 read with Section 149  of  the  IPC.
Instead, he was convicted  under  Section  302  read  with  Section  34  and
Section 307 read with Section 34 of the IPC.  He  was  sentenced  to  suffer
imprisonment for life and a  fine  of  Rs.1,000/-,  in  default,  to  suffer
further  six  months  rigorous   imprisonment   and   to   suffer   rigorous
imprisonment for five years  and  a  fine  of  Rs.2,000/-,  in  default,  to
further  suffer  simple  imprisonment   for   three   moths,   respectively.
Appellant-Radhey was acquitted of charges under Sections 148,  302  and  307
read with Section 149 of the IPC.  Instead, he was convicted  under  Section
302 read with Section 34 and Section 307 read with Section 34  of  the  IPC.
He was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life and a fine  of  Rs.1,000/-,
in default, to  suffer  six  months  rigorous  imprisonment  and  to  suffer
rigorous imprisonment for five years and a fine of Rs.2,000/-,  in  default,
to further suffer simple imprisonment for three months, respectively.   This
judgment is challenged in the instant appeal.

4.     Mr.  P.C.  Agarwala,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing   for   the
appellants  submitted  that  out  of  the  eight  accused,  the  High  Court
acquitted four accused.  The High Court has,  in  fact,  observed  that  the
four acquitted accused have  been  falsely  implicated.   Counsel  submitted
that it is, therefore, risky to rely on  the  evidence  of  the  prosecution
witnesses to  convict  the  appellants.   These  witnesses  exaggerated  the
prosecution story and involved the acquitted accused.  It is  possible  that
even so far as the appellants are concerned, they have  not  come  out  with
the truth.  This is a case where truth and falsehood are inextricably  mixed
and truth cannot be separated from falsehood.  The doctrine  of  ‘falsus  in
uno falsus in omnibus’, is clearly attracted to this case.  Counsel  pointed
out that the eye-witnesses appear to be tutored.  They are related  to  each
other and, hence, are interested witnesses.  Their evidence will have to  be
read  cautiously.   Moreover,  complainant  Heera  has  not  been  examined.
Admittedly, there is enmity between the two sides.  There is a land  dispute
between complainant Heera and accused Rajdhar.  Ram Kunwar’s son  Kamal  was
murdered and, in that connection, complainant Heera and others,  are  facing
trial.  During the pendency of this trial, complainant  Heera’s  son  Balram
was murdered.  False involvement on account of long standing  enmity  cannot
be ruled out.  The conviction of the appellants, therefore, deserves  to  be
set aside.

5.    Mr. S.S. Shamshery, learned Addl. Advocate General appearing  for  the
State, on the other hand, submitted that the evidence of four  eye-witnesses
is consistent.  PW-2 Khushiram and PW-4 Yadram  are  independent  witnesses.
There is no reason to cast any doubt on their testimony.  Counsel  submitted
that in a catena of  judgments,  this  Court  has  held  that  the  doctrine
‘falsus in uno falsus in omnibus’ is not applicable in India.  Even if  some
portion of the  evidence  of  a  witness  is  found  to  be  deficient,  the
remaining portion can be relied upon,  if  it  is  sufficient  to  establish
prosecution case.  In this connection, he relied on Rizan & Anr.  v.   State
of  Chhattisgarh[1].   Counsel  submitted  that  there  is  enough  credible
evidence on record which bears out the prosecution  case.   The  appeal,  be
therefore, dismissed.

6.    Deceased Balram was most brutally murdered.  According  to  PW-12  Dr.
Meena, the cause of death was haemorrhage  and  shock  due  to  head  injury
leading to injury to brain and injury  to  carotid  artery  in  neck.   PW-5
Bhagwan Singh was also brutally attacked.  He received four incised  wounds.
 He suffered a fracture of left parietal bone.  Being  an  injured  witness,
he is the most  important  witness  in  this  case.  He  has  described  the
incident in question.  The defence has not made any dent in his evidence  by
cross-examining him.  In fact, in the cross-examination, he has  given  more
details about the incident in question, which are consistent  with  what  he
has stated in the examination–in-chief.   He has stated  that  he,  deceased
Balram, his father Heera and his other brother Rameshwar were standing  near
the road near the boundaries of village Dehra and Lapawali.  At  that  time,
a tractor driven by  Rajdhar  came  from  village  Lapawali  side.   Rajdhar
halted the tractor near them.  The  appellants,  who  were  sitting  in  the
tractor, got down.  Accused Battu was armed with an axe.   Appellant  Radhey
was also armed with an axe.  Appellant Sheesh Ram was armed  with  a  sword.
Appellant Rameshwar was armed with a dhariya and others were having  lathis.
 They encircled PW-5 Bhagwan Singh, his father  and  brothers.   His  father
and brother Rameshwar ran towards the village.  Balram also ran towards  the
village.  He ran towards Katara village.  Accused Radhey caught hold of  the
collar of Balram and dealt an axe blow on Balram’s head.  Balram fell  down.
 Appellant Sheesh Ram dealt an axe blow on Balram when he had  fallen  down.
Accused Rameshwar dealt a blow with a dhariya on the right hand  of  Balram.
According to PW-5 Bhagwan Singh, thereafter,  appellant  Sheesh  Ram  caught
hold of him (Bhagwan Singh).  Appellant Rameshwar hit  on  his  left  temple
with a dhariya.  He fell down.  Appellant  Sheesh  Ram  dealt  an  axe  blow
behind his ear when he had fallen down.  Accused Hanse dealt  a  lathi  blow
on his face.   Thereafter, he became unconscious.

7.    PW-2 Khushiram, PW-3 Rameshwar and PW-4 Yadram have corroborated  this
witness.   It  is  submitted  that  all  these  witnesses  are  related  and
therefore their evidence cannot be drelied upon.  Assuming they are  related
to each other and, hence, interested witnesses, it is well settled that  the
evidence of interested witnesses is  not  always  suspect.   It  has  to  be
scrutinized with caution and can  be  accepted  if  it  is  found  reliable.
Presence of PW-5 Bhagwan Singh  at  the  scene  of  offence  can  hardly  be
disputed since he is an injured witness.  His evidence has strengthened  the
prosecution case.  Evidence of PWs-3, 4 and 5 also inspires confidence.   So
far as the acquitted accused are concerned, the evidence of these  witnesses
qua them is found to be exaggerated.  But, on account of that, their  entire
evidence  cannot  be  discarded.   All  these  witnesses  stated  that   the
acquitted accused had lathis and they dealt  lathi  blows  on  PW-5  Bhagwan
Singh.  This part of their evidence is disbelieved.  It is true  that  these
witnesses have improved the prosecution story to  some  extent.   But,  that
improvement or that exaggerated version can be  safely  separated  from  the
main case of the prosecution.  So  far  as  the  main  prosecution  case  is
concerned, all the witnesses are consistent.   This  is  not  a  case  where
truth  and  falsehood  are  inextricably  mixed  up.   Witnesses   tend   to
exaggerate the prosecution story.  If the exaggeration does not  change  the
prosecution story or convert it into an altogether new story, allowance  can
be made for it.  If evidence of  a  witness  is  to  be  disbelieved  merely
because he has made some improvement in his evidence, there would hardly  be
any witness on whom reliance can be placed by  the  courts.    It  is  trite
that the maxim ‘falsus in uno falsus  in  omnibus’  has  no  application  in
India.  It is merely a rule of caution.  It does  not  have  the  status  of
rule of law.  
In Balaka Singh  v.  State of Punjab[2], this Court  has  said
that where it is not feasible to separate truth from falsehood, because  the
grain and the chaff are  inextricably  mixed  up,  and  in  the  process  of
separation, an absolutely new case has  to  be  reconstructed  by  divorcing
essential details presented by the prosecution completely from  the  context
and background against which  they  are  made,  the  Court  cannot  make  an
attempt to separate truth from falsehood. But, as  we  have  already  noted,
this is not a case where the grain and  chaff  are  inextricably  mixed  up.
The evidence of eye-witnesses is not discrepant on the  material  aspect  of
the prosecution case.   Reliance can, therefore,  be  placed  on  them.   In
this connection, reliance placed by the counsel for the State  on  Rizan  is
apt.  The same principle is reiterated by  this  Court  in  Rizan.   We  may
quote the relevant paragraph from Rizan.

      “Even if a major portion of evidence is found to be deficient, in case
      residue is sufficient to prove guilt of  an  accused,  notwithstanding
      acquittal of a number of other co-accused persons his  conviction  can
      be maintained. It is the duty of the court to separate the grain  from
      the chaff. Where the chaff can be separated from the grain,  it  would
      be open to the court to convict an accused  notwithstanding  the  fact
      that evidence has been found to be deficient to prove guilt  of  other
      accused persons. Falsity of a particular material witness or  material
      particular would not ruin it from the  beginning  to  end.  The  maxim
      falsus in uno falsus in omnibus has no application in  India  and  the
      witnesses cannot be branded as liars. The maxim falsus in  uno  falsus
      in omnibus has not received general acceptance nor has this maxim come
      to occupy the status of a rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution.
      All that it amounts to,  is  that  in  such  cases  testimony  may  be
      disregarded, and not that it must be disregarded. The doctrine  merely
      involves the question of weight of evidence which a court may apply in
      a given set of circumstances, but it is not  what  may  be  called  “a
      mandatory rule of evidence”. (See Nisar Ali v. State of U.P  AIR  1957
      SC 366.)”

8.    The appellants  examined  defence  witnesses.   Testimony  of  defence
witnesses is not believed by the trial court as well as the High Court.   We
find no reason to take a contrary  view.   It  is  pertinent  to  note  that
Kamal, the brother of the appellants  was  murdered  and  for  that  murder,
complainant Heera and some of the witnesses are  facing  trial.   There  is,
therefore, strong motive to kill Balram, son of Heera.  It is not  possible,
however,  to  come  to  a  conclusion  that  because  of  this  enmity,  the
appellants have been falsely implicated.   We  have  already  discussed  the
evidence  on  record.   The  evidence  of  eye-witnesses,  particularly  the
evidence of PW-5 Bhagwan Singh, the  injured  eye-witness,  is  trustworthy.
Therefore, the argument that on account of previous enmity,  the  appellants
have been involved in this case is rejected.   Taking  an  overall  view  of
the matter and examined in light of Balaka Singh and Rizan, we  are  of  the
opinion that no interference is necessary with the impugned  judgment.   The
appeal is dismissed.

                                                          ……………………………………….J.
                                               (Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya)

                                                            ………………………………….J.
                                                     (Ranjana Prakash Desai)
New Delhi;
January 29, 2014.
-----------------------
[1]    (2003) 2 SCC 661
[2]    (1975) 4 SCC 511

-----------------------
12


Land Acquisition Act - Sec.5 A and sec. 6 - on objections under sec. 5 A the land acquisition collector exempted the land from acquisition as the buildings are in existence as per policy- Despite of the report with out furnishing valid reasons, the Govt. proceeded with acquisition of lands is not valid and Acquisition is void - but High court come to wrong conclusion that the buildings are not approved buildings with out giving any validity of report of collector which is final one as per settled law - Apex court set aside the orders of High court = VINOD KUMAR ……… APPELLANT Vs. STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. ……… RESPONDENTS = 2014 ( January part)judis.nic.in/supreme court/filename=41186

   Land Acquisition Act - Sec.5 A and sec. 6 - on objections under sec. 5 A the land acquisition collector exempted the land from acquisition as the buildings are in existence as per policy- Despite of the report with out furnishing valid reasons, the Govt. proceeded with acquisition of lands is not valid and Acquisition is void - but High court  come to wrong conclusion that the buildings are not approved buildings with out giving any validity of report of collector which is final one as per settled law - Apex court set aside the orders of High court =

The  appellant  filed  a
      detailed objection under Section 5A of the Act  categorically  stating
      that the appellant has raised an A Class construction on the concerned
      area in the year 1999-2000 and therefore, inclusion of  the  land  for
      the purpose of acquisition is not  justified.  In  the  meanwhile,  on
      10.03.2008, the said land was released by the Authority in  favour  of
      Ritwiz Builders and Developers Pvt. Ltd. However, on  15.09.2008,  the
      Land Acquisition Collector  considered  the  objection  filed  by  the
      appellant under Section 5A of the Act and as per his report,  exempted
      the land of the appellant from acquisition since there was  already  a
      residential building on the land on the date of the  notification.  
In
      spite of the report produced by the Land  Acquisition  Collector,  the
      Haryana Urban Development Authority vide notification dated 06.02.2009
      made a declaration that the appellant’s land is to be acquired for the
      development of residential and commercial Sector Nos. 76,77 and 78 for
      which the notification was initially issued on 07.02.2008. =

  Shyam Nandan Prasad & Ors. v.  State
      of Bihar & Ors.[4], this Court observed that compliance of Section  5A
      of the Act is a sine qua non for acquisition of land. This Court  held
      that:
             “10.…..The decision of the Collector is supposedly final unless
             the appropriate Government chooses  to  interfere  therein  and
             cause affectation, suo motu or on the application of any person
             interested in the land. These requirements  obviously  lead  to
             the  positive  conclusion  that  the  proceeding   before   the
             Collector is a blend of  public  and  individual  enquiry.  The
             person interested, or known to be interested, in the land is to
             be served  personally  of  the  notification,  giving  him  the
             opportunity of objecting to the acquisition and  awakening  him
             to such right. That the objection  is  to  be  in  writing,  is
             indicative of the fact that the enquiry into the  objection  is
             to focus his individual cause as well as public cause…..”


      10.   In the light of the foregoing cases,  it  is  evident  that  the
      government  has  to  consider  the  report  of  the  Land  Acquisition
      Collector while  making  declaration  of  acquisition  of  land  under
      Section 6 of the Act. Further,  if  the  government  is  coming  to  a
      conclusion which is contrary to the report, then the government has to
      provide  appropriate  reason  for  the  same.  The  report   of   Land
      Acquisition Collector is extracted hereunder:-


      “REPORT U/S 5-A OF SECTOR 76, 77, 78 FARIDABAD-U/S 4 DATED 7.2.2008


|S. |Name of |Name  |Khasra |Total     |Type of|Whether  |Objec|Reco-mmen|
|No.|Place   |of the|No.    |constructe|Const-r|constru-c|tion |dation   |
|of |and     |Object|total  |d area    |uction |tion     |of   |of L.A.O.|
|Obj|Sector  |or    |land   |          |       |before or|the  |         |
|.  |        |      |       |          |       |after u/s|Petit|         |
|   |        |      |       |          |       |4        |ioner|         |
|1  |2       |3     |4      |5         |6      |7        |8    |9        |
|4  |Farid-pu|      |       |          |       |         |     |         |
|   |r       |      |       |          |       |         |     |         |
|   |76,77,  |      |       |          |       |         |     |         |
|   |78      |      |       |          |       |         |     |         |
|5  |-do-    |Vinod |18/13/3|1200      |A-Class|Prior    |The  |A well   |
|   |        |son of|(4-10) |Sq.yds.   |       |         |appli|laiden   |
|   |        |Birbal|8/2/3  |Residentia|       |         |cant |beautiful|
|   |        |      |(1-16)/|l Kothi   |       |         |has  |residence|
|   |        |      |6-6    |swimming  |       |         |reque|. Hence, |
|   |        |      |       |Pool      |       |         |sted |may not  |
|   |        |      |       |Boundary  |       |         |to   |be       |
|   |        |      |       |Wall      |       |         |get  |acquired.|
|   |        |      |       |          |       |         |his  |         |
|   |        |      |       |          |       |         |house|         |
|   |        |      |       |          |       |         |relea|         |
|   |        |      |       |          |       |         |sed  |         |
|   |        |      |       |          |       |         |from |         |
|   |        |      |       |          |       |         |acqui|         |
|   |        |      |       |          |       |         |sitio|         |
|   |        |      |       |          |       |         |n    |         |



                                                    Sd/-L.A.C.
                                                    15.09.2008”

11.   Hence, the declaration made by the Government for acquisition of  land
of the appellant under Section 6 of the Act does not provide any reason  for
arriving at a decision contrary to that of the report produced by  the  Land
Acquisition  Collector.  Therefore,  the  basic  protection  to  which   the
landowners are entitled to under the Act through  Section  5A  is  violated.
Consequently, the process of acquisition of the land  of  the  appellant  is
tainted with mala-fide and therefore, the same is liable to  be  set  aside.
Accordingly, the impugned acquisition notifications under Sections 4  and  6
of the Act in relation to the appellant’s land and the action taken  thereon
are hereby quashed. The impugned judgment and orders of the High  Court  are
set aside.  The appeals are allowed. No costs.

   2014 ( January part)judis.nic.in/supreme court/filename=41186       

SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, V. GOPALA GOWDA

  NON-REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                      CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 973-974 OF 2014
              (ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NOS. 14383-14384 OF 2012)






VINOD KUMAR                             ……… APPELLANT

                                     Vs.

STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS.               ……… RESPONDENTS







                               J U D G M E N T



      V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.



           Delay condoned. Leave granted.


      2.    These  appeals  are  filed  by  the  appellant  questioning  the
      correctness of the judgment and final Order dated 05.04.2011 passed in
      C.W.P. No. 7746 of 2009 and order dated 16.12.2011  passed  in  Review
      Application No. 388 of 2011 by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at
      Chandigarh,  urging   various   facts   and   legal   contentions   in
      justification of his claim.


      3.    Necessary relevant facts are stated hereunder to appreciate  the
      case of the appellant and also to find out whether  the  appellant  is
      entitled for the relief as prayed in this appeal.


           The appellant is the owner of 5 Kanals 6 Marlas of land  out  of
      which  934  square  yards  have  been  left  out  of  acquisition.  On
      07.02.2008, under the Haryana Urban Development Authority  Act,  1977,
      the   Haryana  Urban  Development  Authority  issued  a   notice   for
      acquisition of land including that of the appellant for public purpose
      namely, for the development and utilization of the land as residential
      and commercial purposes. The notification was issued under  Section  4
      of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (in short ‘the Act’)  and  the  Land
      Acquisition Collector, Urban Estate, Faridabad, Haryana was authorized
      to issue public notice on the substance of notification at  convenient
      places in the locality. He was also authorized to survey upon the land
      and take necessary action regarding the same. The  appellant  filed  a
      detailed objection under Section 5A of the Act  categorically  stating
      that the appellant has raised an A Class construction on the concerned
      area in the year 1999-2000 and therefore, inclusion of  the  land  for
      the purpose of acquisition is not  justified.  In  the  meanwhile,  on
      10.03.2008, the said land was released by the Authority in  favour  of
      Ritwiz Builders and Developers Pvt. Ltd. However, on  15.09.2008,  the
      Land Acquisition Collector  considered  the  objection  filed  by  the
      appellant under Section 5A of the Act and as per his report,  exempted
      the land of the appellant from acquisition since there was  already  a
      residential building on the land on the date of the  notification.
In
      spite of the report produced by the Land  Acquisition  Collector,  the
      Haryana Urban Development Authority vide notification dated 06.02.2009
      made a declaration that the appellant’s land is to be acquired for the
      development of residential and commercial Sector Nos. 76,77 and 78 for
      which the notification was initially issued on 07.02.2008.


      4.    It  is  the  case  of  the  appellant  that  while  issuing  the
      notification under Section 6 of the   Act, the property  adjoining  to
      the land of the appellant, which belongs to one  M/s.  Harpreet  Food,
      was released. Though the respondent Authority has released  a  portion
      of the appellant’s property, some part of the built-up and constructed
      portion of the house was not released.


      5.    The appellant therefore, filed a writ petition before  the  High
      Court of Punjab and Haryana registered as Writ Petition  No.  7746  of 2009,
      challenging the acquisition of his land by  the  Authority.  The  said
      petition got tagged  along  with  other  similar  petitions  filed  by
      different affected parties and the Writ Petition  No.  7711  of  2009,
      titled New Vidya Niketan Educational Society Vs. State  of  Haryana  &
      Ors. was made the lead case.


      6.    The High Court, after hearing both the parties concluded that in
      all the writ petitions, construction was  raised  in  an  unauthorized
      manner without getting any permission either under the  provisions  of
      the  Punjab  Scheduled  Roads  and  Controlled  Areas  Restriction  of
      Unregulated Development Act, 1963  or  under  the  relevant  Municipal
      laws. 
Even then in some cases, relief was granted  by  releasing  some
      portion of the land under construction  and  ordering  acquisition  of
      vacant land. 
The action taken by  the  Authority  was  held  perfectly
      justified. 
The Review  Application  No.  388  of  2011  filed  by  the
      appellant against dismissal of his C.W.P. No. 7746 of  2009  was  also
      dismissed on 16.12.2011.  Hence, these appeals.


      7.    The learned senior counsel  Mr.  Pallav  Sisodia,  appearing  on
      behalf  of  the  appellant  argued  that  the  High  Court  failed  to
      appreciate that there was a construction already made by the appellant
      for  residential  purpose.  Therefore,  as  per  the  policy  of   the
      Government of Haryana, the constructed portion including the amenities
      and other built up areas are required to be released from the  process
      of acquisition. It is the further case of the appellant that the  High
      Court erred in not appreciating the fact  that  the  Land  Acquisition
      Collector in his report has mentioned that the land of  the  appellant
      may not be acquired since it has a  well–laiden  beautiful  residence.
      The State Government, as per the learned senior counsel, illegally and
      in an unauthorized manner, has acquired the land. It is also the  case
      of the appellant that in a different case having  similar  facts,  the
      High Court has passed an Order releasing the lands over which built up
      houses were situated. The learned  senior  counsel  of  the  appellant
      further argues that the Government has adopted the ‘pick  and  choose’
      methodology  for  acquiring  land  thereby  exempting  the  commercial
      establishments  from  acquisition  and  discriminating   against   the
      appellant.


      8.    The  learned  Additional  Advocate  General  Mr.  Manjit  Singh,
      appearing on behalf of the State  contended  that  the  appellant  had
      illegally raised construction on this land without permission  of  the
      concerned authority. Hence, the appellant cannot  now  seek  exemption
      from  acquisition  on  the  ground  that  there   is   a   residential
      construction on the land and therefore, the land cannot be acquired.


      9.    We are inclined to observe that the  High  Court  has  erred  in
      dismissing the writ petition of the appellant as the same is  contrary
      to the principle laid down by this Court in the following cases :-


           In Kamal Trading (P) Ltd. v. State of  West  Bengal[1],  it  has
      been held as under:-
             “14. It must be borne in mind that the proceedings under the LA
             Act are based on the principle of eminent domain and Section 5-
             A is the only protection available to a person whose lands  are
             sought to be acquired. It is a minimal  safeguard  afforded  to
             him by law to protect himself  from  arbitrary  acquisition  by
             pointing out to the authority concerned, inter alia,  that  the
             important ingredient, namely, "public purpose" is absent in the
             proposed acquisition or the acquisition is mala  fide.  The  LA
             Act being an expropriatory  legislation,  its  provisions  will
             have to be strictly construed.


             15. Hearing contemplated under Section 5-A(2) is  necessary  to
             enable the Collector to deal effectively  with  the  objections
             raised against the proposed acquisition and make a report.  The
             report of the Collector referred to in this provision is not an
             empty formality because it is required to be placed before  the
             appropriate   Government   together   with   the    Collector's
             recommendations and the record of the case.  It  is  only  upon
             receipt of the said report that the Government can take a final
             decision on the  objections.  It  is  pertinent  to  note  that
             declaration under Section 6 has  to  be  made  only  after  the
             appropriate Government is satisfied on the consideration of the
             report, if any, made by the Collector under Section 5-A(2).  As
             said by this Court in  Hindustan  Petroleum  Corpn.  Ltd.,  the
             appropriate Government while issuing declaration under  Section
             6 of the LA Act is required to apply its mind not only  to  the
             objections filed by the owner of the land in question, but also
             to the report which is submitted by the Collector  upon  making
             such further inquiry thereon as he thinks  necessary  and  also
             the recommendations made by him in that behalf.


             16. Sub-section (3)  of  Section  6  of  the  LA  Act  makes  a
             declaration under Section 6 conclusive evidence that  the  land
             is needed for a public purpose. Formation  of  opinion  by  the
             appropriate Government as regards the public  purpose  must  be
             preceded by application of mind  as  regards  consideration  of
             relevant factors and  rejection  of  irrelevant  ones.  It  is,
             therefore, that the hearing contemplated under Section 5-A  and
             the report  made  by  the  Land  Acquisition  Officer  and  his
             recommendations assume  importance.  It  is  implicit  in  this
             provision that before making declaration under Section 6 of the
             LA Act, the State Government must have the benefit of a  report
             containing recommendations of  the  Collector  submitted  under
             Section 5A(2) of the LA Act. The recommendations must  indicate
             objective application of mind.”
                                 (Emphasis laid by this Court)

            In the case of Usha Stud and Agricultural  Farms  Pvt.  Ltd.  v.
      State of Haryana[2], it was held as under:
             “30…..Section 6(1) provides that if the appropriate  Government
             is satisfied, after considering the report, if any, made by the
             Collector under Section 5-A(2) that particular land  is  needed
             for the specified public purpose then a declaration  should  be
             made. This necessarily implies that  the  State  Government  is
             required to apply mind to the report of the Collector and  take
             final decision on the objections filed by  the  landowners  and
             other interested persons. Then and then only, a declaration can
             be made under Section 6(1).”
                           (Emphasis laid by this Court)


            Further, in the case of Women’s  Education  Trust  and  Anr.  v.
      State of Haryana & Ors.[3], this Court has held as under:-

             “20. What is most surprising is that the  High  Court  did  not
             even deal with the issue relating to application of mind by the
             Government to the report  submitted  by  the  Land  Acquisition
             Collector under Section 5A(2) along with  his  recommendations.
             The documents produced before the High Court and this Court  do
             not show that the State Government had objectively applied mind
             to the recommendations made by the Land  Acquisition  Collector
             and felt satisfied that the land in  question  deserves  to  be
             acquired for the purpose specified in the  notification  issued
             under Section 4(1).  The  record  also  does  not  contain  any
             indication as to why the State Government did not  consider  it
             proper to accept the recommendations of  the  Land  Acquisition
             Collector. Therefore, there is no escape  from  the  conclusion
             that the impugned acquisition is  ultra  vires  the  provisions
             contained in Section 6 of the Act.”
                            (Emphasis laid by this Court)


            Also, in an earlier case in Shyam Nandan Prasad & Ors. v.  State
      of Bihar & Ors.[4], this Court observed that compliance of Section  5A
      of the Act is a sine qua non for acquisition of land. This Court  held
      that:
             “10.…..The decision of the Collector is supposedly final unless
             the appropriate Government chooses  to  interfere  therein  and
             cause affectation, suo motu or on the application of any person
             interested in the land. These requirements  obviously  lead  to
             the  positive  conclusion  that  the  proceeding   before   the
             Collector is a blend of  public  and  individual  enquiry.  The
             person interested, or known to be interested, in the land is to
             be served  personally  of  the  notification,  giving  him  the
             opportunity of objecting to the acquisition and  awakening  him
             to such right. That the objection  is  to  be  in  writing,  is
             indicative of the fact that the enquiry into the  objection  is
             to focus his individual cause as well as public cause…..”


      10.   In the light of the foregoing cases,  it  is  evident  that  the
      government  has  to  consider  the  report  of  the  Land  Acquisition
      Collector while  making  declaration  of  acquisition  of  land  under
      Section 6 of the Act. Further,  if  the  government  is  coming  to  a
      conclusion which is contrary to the report, then the government has to
      provide  appropriate  reason  for  the  same.  The  report   of   Land
      Acquisition Collector is extracted hereunder:-


      “REPORT U/S 5-A OF SECTOR 76, 77, 78 FARIDABAD-U/S 4 DATED 7.2.2008


|S. |Name of |Name  |Khasra |Total     |Type of|Whether  |Objec|Reco-mmen|
|No.|Place   |of the|No.    |constructe|Const-r|constru-c|tion |dation   |
|of |and     |Object|total  |d area    |uction |tion     |of   |of L.A.O.|
|Obj|Sector  |or    |land   |          |       |before or|the  |         |
|.  |        |      |       |          |       |after u/s|Petit|         |
|   |        |      |       |          |       |4        |ioner|         |
|1  |2       |3     |4      |5         |6      |7        |8    |9        |
|4  |Farid-pu|      |       |          |       |         |     |         |
|   |r       |      |       |          |       |         |     |         |
|   |76,77,  |      |       |          |       |         |     |         |
|   |78      |      |       |          |       |         |     |         |
|5  |-do-    |Vinod |18/13/3|1200      |A-Class|Prior    |The  |A well   |
|   |        |son of|(4-10) |Sq.yds.   |       |         |appli|laiden   |
|   |        |Birbal|8/2/3  |Residentia|       |         |cant |beautiful|
|   |        |      |(1-16)/|l Kothi   |       |         |has  |residence|
|   |        |      |6-6    |swimming  |       |         |reque|. Hence, |
|   |        |      |       |Pool      |       |         |sted |may not  |
|   |        |      |       |Boundary  |       |         |to   |be       |
|   |        |      |       |Wall      |       |         |get  |acquired.|
|   |        |      |       |          |       |         |his  |         |
|   |        |      |       |          |       |         |house|         |
|   |        |      |       |          |       |         |relea|         |
|   |        |      |       |          |       |         |sed  |         |
|   |        |      |       |          |       |         |from |         |
|   |        |      |       |          |       |         |acqui|         |
|   |        |      |       |          |       |         |sitio|         |
|   |        |      |       |          |       |         |n    |         |



                                                    Sd/-L.A.C.
                                                    15.09.2008”

11.   Hence, the declaration made by the Government for acquisition of  land
of the appellant under Section 6 of the Act does not provide any reason  for
arriving at a decision contrary to that of the report produced by  the  Land
Acquisition  Collector.  Therefore,  the  basic  protection  to  which   the
landowners are entitled to under the Act through  Section  5A  is  violated.
Consequently, the process of acquisition of the land  of  the  appellant  is
tainted with mala-fide and therefore, the same is liable to  be  set  aside.
Accordingly, the impugned acquisition notifications under Sections 4  and  6
of the Act in relation to the appellant’s land and the action taken  thereon
are hereby quashed. The impugned judgment and orders of the High  Court  are
set aside.  The appeals are allowed. No costs.
                       ………………………………………………………………………J.
                                    [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA]



                                        ………………………………………………………………………J.
                                     [V. GOPALA GOWDA]
 New Delhi,
 January 28, 2014
  ITEM NO.1A                COURT NO.11          SECTION IVB
(For Judgment)


              S U P R E M E   C O U R T   O F   I N D I A
                           RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
  Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No(s).14383-14384/2012


  VINOD KUMAR                                  Petitioner(s)
                      VERSUS
  STATE OF HARYANA & ORS.                      Respondent(s)


  Date: 28/01/2014  These matters were called on for Judgment today.


  For Petitioner(s)
                            Mr. Pawan Upadhyay, Adv.
                            Ms. Anisha Upadhyay, Adv.
                            Mr. Param Mishra, Adv.
                            Ms. Sharmila Upadhyay,Adv.
  For Respondent(s)
                            Ms. Jyoti Mendiratta,Adv.
                            Mr. Rajan K.Chourasia ,Adv.
                            Ms. Anubha Agrawal ,Adv.



           Hon'ble Mr. Justice V. Gopala Gowda pronounced the  judgment  of
  the Bench comprising of Hon'ble Mr. Justice  Sudhansu  Jyoti  Mukhopadhya
  and His Lordship.
            Delay condoned.
            Leave granted.
            The appeals are allowed with no order as to costs  in  terms  of
   the signed non-reportable judgment.


            Photocopy of the Original Record, if any, submitted  during  the
   hearing of the matter by the learned counsel for the respondent-State  be
   returned to the learned counsel for the respondent-State.






             [ Neeta ]                         [S.S.R. Krishna]
           Sr. P.A.                           Court Master
        (Signed non-reportable judgment is placed on the file)

-----------------------
[1]     (2012) 2 SCC 25
[2]     (2013) 4 SCC 210
[3]     (2013) 8 SCC 99
[4]     (1993) 4 SCC 255

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