Circumstantial Evidence - Suspecting the paternity of child - Husband took the child and walked away - child disappeared - after 20 minutes - over heard from the husband while saying that he threw the child in well to his mother - she was threatened with dire consequences - on the next day after arrival of her relatives - she lodged complaint - Harassment proved - motive proved - last seen proved - chain completed - nothing to suggest any thing about the innocence of the accused = REVUTAPPA … APPELLANT Versus STATE OF KARNATAKA … RESPONDENT = 2014 ( January - Vol - 1) Judis.nic.in/ S.C./ file name =41178

Circumstantial Evidence - Suspecting the paternity of child - Husband took the child and walked away - child disappeared - after 20 minutes - over heard from the husband while saying that he threw the child in well to his mother - she was threatened with dire consequences - on the next day after arrival of her relatives - she lodged complaint - Harassment proved - motive proved - last seen proved - chain completed - nothing to suggest any thing about the innocence of the accused =

On
27/8/2000, when her close relatives came from Jadarbabaladi to console  her,
she mustered courage and told them that the appellant had thrown  her  child
in the well which resulted in his death.  
They immediately took her  to  the
Police Station and lodged a complaint.  Offences under  Sections  323,  302,
201, 506 read with Section 34 of the IPC were registered.  
The body  of  the
deceased child was exhumed after getting appropriate permission.   The  dead
body was sent for post-mortem examination.  
The  post-mortem  report  stated
the cause of death as “asphyxia as a result of drowning”.

3.    On completion of investigation, the appellant was  charged  and  tried
for offences punishable under Sections 498A, 323, 302, 201,  506  read  with
Section 34 of the IPC along with his mother Kallawwa who  was  arraigned  as
Accused 2. 
whether the death was homicidal or accidental.  
PW-1 Siddakka  has,  in  her
evidence, described how she was ill-treated in her matrimonial  house.   The
appellant disowned the paternity of the  child.   After  the  birth  of  the
child, PW-1 Siddakka was not allowed to perform  ‘Simant’  ceremony  of  her
child.  She went to her parent’s house.  Her father performed  the  ceremony
and named the child ‘Arun Kumar’.  Thereafter, for one year, she was in  her
parent’s house.  She went to her matrimonial house along with her uncle  PW-
13 Ishwarappa.  She was not allowed to stay there.  She  went  back  to  her
parent’s house.  Thereafter, demand for money  was  made.   PW-1  Siddakka’s
parents paid the amount.  PW-1 Siddakka went back to the  appellant’s  house
because the appellant assured  her  that  he  would  treat  her  well.   The
appellant took her and the child to stay with him  in  the  farmhouse.   The
harassment, however, continued.  On  the  day  of  the  incident,  when  the
appellant and PW-1 Siddakka  were  working  in  their  field,  she  saw  the
appellant taking the child towards their  hut.   After  15-20  minutes,  she
went to the hut to see  where  her  child  was.   She  heard  the  appellant
telling his mother that he had thrown the child in the well.  She rushed  to
the well and removed the dead child from the well. The appellant  threatened
her and told her not to disclose the true story to anyone.  He asked her  to
tell the people that the child died due to snake bite.  Out  of  fear,  PW-1
Siddakka did not inform anyone about the incident.  The  child  was  buried.
It is only when her relatives came to console her that  she  told  them  the
true story.  A complaint was,  then,  lodged.   Investigation  was  started.
After completion of investigation, the appellant was tried as aforesaid.
We have gone through the evidence  of  PW-1  Siddakka.   Her  evidence
inspires confidence.  We have noted that after  seeing  her  son’s  clothes,
she began to weep in the court and sat  down  for  sometime  without  saying
anything.  A mother would never  allow  the  person  who  killed  her  child
escape punishment.  She would also not involve a  wrong  person.   We  place
implicit reliance on PW-1 Siddakka’s evidence.

8.    PW-1 Siddakka’s evidence  is  corroborated  by  the  evidence  of  her
brother PW-10 Chanabasappa and her uncle PW-13 Ishwarappa, in all  respects.
 We have noted that some of the witnesses have  turned  hostile.   But  that
does not, in any way, affect the substratum of the prosecution  story.   The
prosecution has successfully proved that there was a strong motive  to  kill
the child because the appellant suspected the  fidelity  of  PW-1  Siddakka.
He had disowned the paternity  of  the  child.   The  prosecution  has  also
proved that the child and the  appellant  were  last  seen  together.   Most
clinching circumstance in this case is the conduct of the  appellant.   PW-1
Siddakka’s parents were informed about the death  of  the  child  after  the
burial.  She was threatened and told not to tell the true story  to  anyone.
She was asked to tell everyone that the child died due to snake bite.   This
conduct of the appellant, examined in the background of  the  strong  motive
and the fact that he was last seen with the child, establish that it is  he,
who threw the  child  in  the  well.   The  medical  evidence  supports  the
prosecution case that the child died due to drowning and not  due  to  snake
bite.

2014 ( January - Vol - 1) Judis.nic.in/ S.C./ file name  =41178
SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI

NON-REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 760  OF 2005


REVUTAPPA                         …          APPELLANT

                                   Versus

STATE OF KARNATAKA                  …        RESPONDENT



                                  JUDGMENT


(SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.



1.     This appeal is forwarded to this Court by the Jail  Authorities.   It
is directed against the judgment and order dated 8/10/2012,  passed  by  the
Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in  Criminal  Appeal  No.1721  of
2001, whereby the High Court confirmed the judgment of  the  Sessions  Court
convicting the appellant for offences punishable under  Sections  302,  323,
506, 201 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code and  sentencing  him,  inter
alia, to life imprisonment.

2.    The prosecution story could be shortly stated.  
Complainant  Siddakka
was married to the appellant, five years prior to 25/8/2000  i.e.  from  the
date  of  the    incident.  
After  the  marriage,  the  appellant  started
suspecting Siddakka’s fidelity and when she  gave birth to   a  male  child,
he  told her that the child is not of his lineage  and  is  an  illegitimate
child.   
Prosecution story further  goes on to say that during the  relevant
time, Siddakka and the appellant were staying in a hut situated in the  land
belonging to the appellant  along  with  their  child.
On  25/8/2000,  when
Siddakka was plucking the green gram fodder  along  with  her  son  and  the
appellant was ploughing the other portion of the field, she  saw  the  child
going towards the appellant.  
The appellant stopped ploughing and  took  the
child towards the farmhouse. 
After sometime, when Siddakka  could  not  find
her child, she went near the hut.  She overheard the appellant  telling  his
mother that he had thrown the child in  the  well  of  Allisab.  
On  hearing
this, she ran towards the well of Allisab, picked up  the  dead  child  from
the well and returned to the hut.  
The appellant threatened  her  with  dire
consequences if she disclosed the incident to  anyone.  She  was  forced  to
tell others that the child died of snake bite.   Thereafter  the  child  was
buried.   Out of fear she did not  disclose  the  incident  to  anyone.  
On
27/8/2000, when her close relatives came from Jadarbabaladi to console  her,
she mustered courage and told them that the appellant had thrown  her  child
in the well which resulted in his death.  
They immediately took her  to  the
Police Station and lodged a complaint.  Offences under  Sections  323,  302,
201, 506 read with Section 34 of the IPC were registered.  
The body  of  the
deceased child was exhumed after getting appropriate permission.   The  dead
body was sent for post-mortem examination.  
The  post-mortem  report  stated
the cause of death as “asphyxia as a result of drowning”.

3.    On completion of investigation, the appellant was  charged  and  tried
for offences punishable under Sections 498A, 323, 302, 201,  506  read  with
Section 34 of the IPC along with his mother Kallawwa who  was  arraigned  as
Accused 2.
The prosecution examined 19  witnesses.  
It’s  most  important
witness is PW-1 Siddakka, who lost her one-and-half year old son because  of
the appellant’s cruel act.  Her evidence is corroborated by her brother  PW-
10 Chanabasappa and uncle PW-13 Ishwarappa.  The appellant  did  not  adduce
any evidence.  He denied all allegations.
 The defence  suggested  that  the
child saw a peacock; followed it; went to  the  field  where  the  well  was
situated, fell into it and died.

4.    The trial court acquitted Accused 2, the mother of  the  appellant  of
the  offence  punishable  under  Section  302  of  the  IPC.   It,  however,
convicted the appellant for the said  offence  and  sentenced  him  to  life
imprisonment. 
 Both of them were found guilty of offences  punishable  under
Sections 323, 506, 201 read with Section 34 of the IPC  and  were  sentenced
for the said offences.  
On appeal, the High Court set aside  the  conviction
and sentence of Accused 2.  
The appellant’s  conviction  and  sentence  was,
however, confirmed in its entirety. Hence, this appeal.

5.    Shri Mithilesh Singh, learned counsel for  the  appellant    submitted
that the prosecution case is based on circumstantial evidence. However,  the
circumstances do not point unerringly to the guilt of the  appellant.   They
may at the most raise some suspicion, but suspicion, however, strong  cannot
take the place of proof. Counsel submitted  that  the  court  will  have  to
cautiously examine each circumstance for the purpose of recording a  verdict
of guilty or giving benefit of doubt to the  accused.   In  support  of  his
submissions, counsel relied on
Padala  Veera  Reddy   v.   State  of  Andhra
Pradesh & Ors.[1] and Tarseem Kumar  v.  Delhi Administration[2]. Shri  V.N.
Raghupathy learned counsel for the State of Karnataka, on  the  other  hand,
submitted that the evidence adduced by the prosecution leaves no  scope  for
doubt about the appellant’s involvement in the crime  in  question.  Counsel
submitted that the appeal be, therefore, dismissed.

6.    There is no dispute  about  the  fact  that  the  child  died  due  to
drowning.  Medical evidence  is  clear  on  this  point.   The  question  is
whether the death was homicidal or accidental.  
PW-1 Siddakka  has,  in  her
evidence, described how she was ill-treated in her matrimonial  house.   The
appellant disowned the paternity of the  child.   After  the  birth  of  the
child, PW-1 Siddakka was not allowed to perform  ‘Simant’  ceremony  of  her
child.  She went to her parent’s house.  Her father performed  the  ceremony
and named the child ‘Arun Kumar’.  Thereafter, for one year, she was in  her
parent’s house.  She went to her matrimonial house along with her uncle  PW-
13 Ishwarappa.  She was not allowed to stay there.  She  went  back  to  her
parent’s house.  Thereafter, demand for money  was  made.   PW-1  Siddakka’s
parents paid the amount.  PW-1 Siddakka went back to the  appellant’s  house
because the appellant assured  her  that  he  would  treat  her  well.   The
appellant took her and the child to stay with him  in  the  farmhouse.   The
harassment, however, continued.  On  the  day  of  the  incident,  when  the
appellant and PW-1 Siddakka  were  working  in  their  field,  she  saw  the
appellant taking the child towards their  hut.   After  15-20  minutes,  she
went to the hut to see  where  her  child  was.   She  heard  the  appellant
telling his mother that he had thrown the child in the well.  She rushed  to
the well and removed the dead child from the well. The appellant  threatened
her and told her not to disclose the true story to anyone.  He asked her  to
tell the people that the child died due to snake bite.  Out  of  fear,  PW-1
Siddakka did not inform anyone about the incident.  The  child  was  buried.
It is only when her relatives came to console her that  she  told  them  the
true story.  A complaint was,  then,  lodged.   Investigation  was  started.
After completion of investigation, the appellant was tried as aforesaid.

7.    We have gone through the evidence  of  PW-1  Siddakka.   Her  evidence
inspires confidence.  We have noted that after  seeing  her  son’s  clothes,
she began to weep in the court and sat  down  for  sometime  without  saying
anything.  A mother would never  allow  the  person  who  killed  her  child
escape punishment.  She would also not involve a  wrong  person.   We  place
implicit reliance on PW-1 Siddakka’s evidence.

8.    PW-1 Siddakka’s evidence  is  corroborated  by  the  evidence  of  her
brother PW-10 Chanabasappa and her uncle PW-13 Ishwarappa, in all  respects.
 We have noted that some of the witnesses have  turned  hostile.   But  that
does not, in any way, affect the substratum of the prosecution  story.   The
prosecution has successfully proved that there was a strong motive  to  kill
the child because the appellant suspected the  fidelity  of  PW-1  Siddakka.
He had disowned the paternity  of  the  child.   The  prosecution  has  also
proved that the child and the  appellant  were  last  seen  together.   Most
clinching circumstance in this case is the conduct of the  appellant.   PW-1
Siddakka’s parents were informed about the death  of  the  child  after  the
burial.  She was threatened and told not to tell the true story  to  anyone.
She was asked to tell everyone that the child died due to snake bite.   This
conduct of the appellant, examined in the background of  the  strong  motive
and the fact that he was last seen with the child, establish that it is  he,
who threw the  child  in  the  well.   The  medical  evidence  supports  the
prosecution case that the child died due to drowning and not  due  to  snake
bite.

9.    It is surprising how defence suggested that the  child  went  after  a
peacock; fell in the well and died. The well was an unused well.  The  scene
of  offence  panchnama  discloses  that  grass  and   thorny   bushes   were
surrounding it.  It would be impossible for a one-and-half  year  old  child
to walk such a distance, jump over the thorny bushes and fall in  the  well.
This is, indeed, a far-fetched and astonishing suggestion.  Besides, in  his
statement under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., the appellant has not  come  out
with this explanation.  The child was last seen with him.  It  was  for  him
to explain how the child fell in the well.  He has not done so.  He has  not
discharged the burden which had shifted to him  under  Section  106  of  the
Evidence Act.  Adverse inference needs to be drawn against  him.   In  fact,
this silence forms an additional link in the chain of circumstances.

10.   It is true that in a case based on circumstantial evidence, the  court
has to be cautious.  Each circumstance  must  be  carefully  examined.   The
chain of circumstances must be complete and it must be unerringly  point  to
the guilt of the accused.  It is also true that suspicion,  however  strong,
cannot take the place of proof.  Having examined this case in light  of  the
settled principles laid down in Padala Veera Reddy  and  Tarseem  Kumar,  we
are of the opinion that the prosecution  has  successfully  established  its
case.  The circumstances  have  been  fully  established.   The  established
facts  are  consistent  only  with  the  hypothesis  of  the  guilt  of  the
appellant.  There is absolutely no scope for any  reasonable  ground  for  a
conclusion consistent with the innocence of the  appellant.    There  is  no
merit in the appeal.  The appeal is dismissed.




                                                      .…………...…………………………..J.
                                               (Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya)


                               .…………………………..J.
                                                     (Ranjana Prakash Desai)
New Delhi;
January 24, 2014.
-----------------------
[1] 1989 Supp. (2) SCC 706
[2] 1994 Supp. (3) SCC 367

The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (for short, ‘2013 Act’) which has come into effect on 01.01.2014, Section 24 - All the acquisition proceedings pending comes under the new act if award was not passed - and if award passed before commencement of this Act old Act applies for all purposes - and if though award passed 5 years or more back itself but compensation was not paid and no possession was taken, then it can be considered as the acquisition proceedings are lapsed once for all after the commencement of this Act - if desires Fresh proceedings to be initiated afreshly as per new Act = Pune Municipal Corporation & Anr. … Appellants Versus Harakchand Misirimal Solanki & Ors. … Respondents = 2014 ( January - Vol - 1) Judis.nic.in/ S.C./ file name =41177

  The Right  to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,  Rehabilitation  and
Resettlement Act, 2013 (for short, ‘2013 Act’) which has  come  into  effect
on 01.01.2014, Section 24 - All the acquisition proceedings pending comes under the new act if award was not passed - and if award passed before commencement of this Act old Act applies for all purposes - and if though award passed 5 years or more back itself but compensation was not paid and no possession was taken, then it can be considered as the acquisition proceedings are lapsed once for all after the commencement of  this Act - if desires Fresh proceedings to be initiated afreshly as per new Act =

 in view of Section 24(2) of The Right  to
Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,  Rehabilitation  and
Resettlement Act, 2013 (for short, ‘2013 Act’) which has  come  into  effect
on 01.01.2014, the subject land acquisition proceedings initiated under  the
Land Acquisition Act,  1894  (for  short,  ‘1894  Act’)  have  lapsed.  
The
question  for  decision  relates  to  true  meaning   of   the   expression:
“compensation has not been paid” occurring in  Section  24(2)  of  the  2013
Act.

   2013 Act puts  in  place  entirely  new  regime  for  compulsory
acquisition  of  land  and  provides  for  new  scheme   for   compensation, rehabilitation and resettlement to the  affected  families  whose  land  has been acquired or proposed to be acquired or affected by such acquisition.
9.          To turn, now, to the meaning  of  the  expression  “compensation
has not been paid” in Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act and its  effect  on  the
subject acquisition, it is necessary to refer to Section 24 which  reads  as
follows:
      “24. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in  any  case
      of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the  Land  Acquisition
      Act, 1894, -

        a) Where no award under section 11 of the said Land Acquisition Act
           has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to  the
           determination of compensation shall apply; or


        b) Where an award under said section 11 has been  made,  then  such
           proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Land
           Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been repealed.


      (2)   Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1),  in  case
      of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the  Land  Acquisition
      Act, 1894, where an award under the said section 11 has been made five
      years or more prior to the commencement of this Act but  the  physical
      possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has  not
      been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and  the
      appropriate  Government,  if  it  so  chooses,  shall   initiate   the
      proceedings of such land acquisition afresh  in  accordance  with  the
      provisions of this Act:


           Provided that where an award has been made and  compensation  in
      respect of a majority of land holding has not been  deposited  in  the
      account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the
      notification  for  acquisition  under  section  4  of  the  said  Land
      Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance  with
      the provisions of this Act.”



 Now,  this  is  admitted  position  that  award  was  made   on
31.01.2008.  Notices  were  issued  to  the  landowners   to   receive   the
compensation and since they did not receive  the  compensation,  the  amount
(Rs.27 crores) was deposited in the government treasury.   Can  it  be  said
that deposit of the amount of compensation in  the  government  treasury  is
equivalent to the amount of  compensation  paid  to  the  landowners/persons
interested? We do not think so.  In a comparatively  recent  decision,  this
Court in Agnelo Santimano Fernandes[2], relying upon  the  earlier  decision
in Prem Nath Kapur[3], has held that  the  deposit  of  the  amount  of  the
compensation in  the  state’s  revenue  account  is  of  no  avail  and  the
liability of the state to pay interest subsists  till  the  amount  has  not
been deposited in court.
20.         From the above, it is clear that the  award  pertaining  to  the
subject land has been made by the  Special  Land  Acquisition  Officer  more
than five years prior to the commencement of  the  2013  Act.   It  is  also
admitted position that compensation so awarded has neither been paid to  the
landowners/persons interested nor deposited in the  court.  The  deposit  of
compensation amount in the government treasury is of no avail and cannot  be
held to  be  equivalent  to  compensation  paid  to  the  landowners/persons
interested.We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that  the  subject land acquisition proceedings shall be deemed to have  lapsed  under  Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act.
21.         The argument on behalf of the Corporation that the subject  land
acquisition proceedings have been concluded in all respects under  the  1894
Act and that they are not affected at all in view of Section 114(2)  of  the
2013 Act, has no merit at all, and is noted to be rejected.  
Section  114(1)
of the 2013 Act repeals 1894 Act.  Sub-section (2) of Section 114,  however,
makes Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 applicable with  regard  to
the effect of repeal but this is subject to the provisions in the 2013  Act.
Under Section 24(2) land acquisition proceedings initiated  under  the  1894
Act, by legal fiction, are deemed to have lapsed  where award has been  made
five years or more prior to the commencement of 2013 Act and  possession  of
the land is not taken or compensation has not been paid.  
The legal  fiction
under Section 24(2) comes  into  operation  as  soon  as  conditions  stated
therein are satisfied.  
The  applicability  of  Section  6  of  the  General
Clauses Act being subject to  Section  24(2),  there  is  no  merit  in  the
contention of the Corporation.

22.         In view of the foregoing discussion,  it  is  not  necessary  to
consider the correctness of the impugned judgment on merits.
23.          The appeals fail and are dismissed with no order as to costs.
2014 ( January - Vol - 1) Judis.nic.in/ S.C./ file name  =41177

R.M. LODHA, MADAN B. LOKUR, KURIAN JOSEPH
                                                           REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
              CIVIL  APPEAL NO. 877                    OF 2014
                  (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 30283 of 2008)




Pune Municipal Corporation & Anr.                  … Appellants

                   Versus

Harakchand Misirimal Solanki & Ors.                      … Respondents

                                    WITH

                  CIVIL  APPEAL NO. 878            OF 2014
                  (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 30455 of 2008)

                                    WITH


                  CIVIL  APPEAL NO. 879            OF 2014
                  (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 30470 of 2008)


                                    WITH


                  CIVIL  APPEAL NO. 880            OF 2014
                  (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 30467 of 2008)


                                    WITH


                  CIVIL  APPEAL NO. 881            OF 2014
                  (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 30465 of 2008)


                                    WITH


                  CIVIL  APPEAL NO. 882            OF 2014
                  (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 30469 of 2008)


                                    WITH


                  CIVIL  APPEAL NO. 883            OF 2014
                  (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 30543 of 2008)


                                    WITH


                  CIVIL  APPEAL NO. 884            OF 2014
                  (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 30546 of 2008)


                                    WITH


                  CIVIL  APPEAL NO. 885            OF 2014
                  (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 30548 of 2008)


                                     AND


             CIVIL  APPEAL NOS.      886-894             OF 2014
              (Arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 15847-15855 of 2010)




                                  JUDGMENT




R.M. LODHA, J.


            Delay condoned in S.L.P.  (C)  Nos.15847-15855  of  2010.  Leave
granted.
2.          In these 18 appeals, by special leave, it is  argued  on  behalf
of the respondents-landowners that
  in view of Section 24(2) of The Right  to
Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,  Rehabilitation  and
Resettlement Act, 2013 (for short, ‘2013 Act’) which has  come  into  effect
on 01.01.2014, the subject land acquisition proceedings initiated under  the
Land Acquisition Act,  1894  (for  short,  ‘1894  Act’)  have  lapsed.  
The
question  for  decision  relates  to  true  meaning   of   the   expression:
“compensation has not been paid” occurring in  Section  24(2)  of  the  2013
Act.
3.          It may not be necessary at all  to  go  into  the  legality  and
correctness of the  impugned  judgment,  if  the  subject  land  acquisition
proceedings are held to have lapsed.  We, therefore, deal with  this  aspect
first.
4.          The  brief  facts  necessary  for  consideration  of  the  above
question  are  these.
On  06.08.2002,  the  proposal   of   the   Municipal
Commissioner, Pune Municipal Corporation  (for  short,  “Corporation”)  duly
approved by the Standing Committee  for  acquisition  of  lands  admeasuring
43.94 acres for development of “Forest Garden” was sent  to  the  Collector,
Pune.
The Collector sanctioned the proposal  and  on  20.02.2003  forwarded
the same to Special Land Acquisition Officer (15), Pune for further  action.
 On 30.09.2004, the notification  under  Section  4  of  the  1894  Act  was
published in the official gazette.  Then notices  under  Section  4(1)  were
served  upon  the  landowners/interested   persons.   On   26.12.2005,   the
declaration under Section 6 was published in the  official  gazette  and  on
02.02.2006, it was also published at the site and on  the  notice  board  of
the  Office  of  Talaltti.   Following  the  notices  under  Section  9,  on
31.01.2008 the  Special  Land  Acquisition  Officer  made  the  award  under
Section 11 of the 1894 Act.
5.          The landowners  challenged  the  above  acquisition  proceedings
before the Bombay High Court in 9 writ petitions.  Of  them,  2  were  filed
before  making  award  and  7  after  the  award.   The  challenge  to   the
acquisition proceedings and the validity of the award was laid   on  diverse
grounds including
(i) absence of resolution  of  the  General  Body  of  the
Corporation;
(ii) non-compliance with the provisions of  Section  5A,
(iii)
non-compliance with the  provisions  of  Section  7,  and
(iv)  lapsing  of
acquisition proceedings under Section 11A.
The High Court  on  consideration
of the arguments advanced before  it  by  the  parties  has  held  that  the
acquisition proceedings for the development of “Forest Garden” could not  be
initiated by the  Commissioner  with  the  mere  approval  of  the  Standing
Committee without resolution of the General Body of  the  Corporation.   The
acquisition proceedings were also held bad  in  law  for  non-compliance  of
Section 7 and other statutory breaches.  Inter  alia,  the  High  Court  has
quashed the acquisition proceedings and gave  certain  directions  including
restoration of possession.
6.          It is argued on behalf of  the  landowners  that  by  virtue  of
Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, the subject acquisition shall  be  deemed  to have been lapsed because the award under Section 11 of the 1894 Act is  made more than  five  years  prior  to  the  commencement  of  2013  Act  and  no compensation has been paid to the owners nor the amount of compensation  has
been deposited in the court by the Special Land Acquisition Officer.
7.          On the other hand, on behalf of the Corporation and so also  for
the Collector, it is argued that the award was  made  by  the  Special  Land
Acquisition Officer on 31.01.2008 strictly in terms of 1894 Act and  on  the
very day the landowners were informed regarding the quantum of  compensation
for their respective lands. Notices were also issued to  the  landowners  to
reach the office of the Special Land Acquisition  Officer  and  receive  the
amount of compensation and since they neither received the compensation  nor
any request came from them to make reference to  the  District  Court  under
Section  18,  the  compensation  amounting  to            Rs.27  crores  was
deposited in the government treasury. It is, thus, submitted that there  was
no default on the part of  the  Special  Land  Acquisition  Officer  or  the
government  and,  hence,  the  acquisition  proceedings  have  not   lapsed.
Moreover, reliance is also placed on Section 114 of the 2013 Act and  it  is
argued that the concluded  land  acquisition  proceedings  are  not  at  all
affected  by  Section  24(2)  and  the  only  right  that  survives  to  the
landowners is to receive compensation.
8.          2013 Act puts  in  place  entirely  new  regime  for  compulsory
acquisition  of  land  and  provides  for  new  scheme   for   compensation, rehabilitation and resettlement to the  affected  families  whose  land  has been acquired or proposed to be acquired or affected by such acquisition.
9.          To turn, now, to the meaning  of  the  expression  “compensation
has not been paid” in Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act and its  effect  on  the
subject acquisition, it is necessary to refer to Section 24 which  reads  as
follows:
      “24. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in  any  case
      of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the  Land  Acquisition
      Act, 1894, -

        a) Where no award under section 11 of the said Land Acquisition Act
           has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to  the
           determination of compensation shall apply; or


        b) Where an award under said section 11 has been  made,  then  such
           proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Land
           Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been repealed.


      (2)   Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1),  in  case
      of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the  Land  Acquisition
      Act, 1894, where an award under the said section 11 has been made five
      years or more prior to the commencement of this Act but  the  physical
      possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has  not
      been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and  the
      appropriate  Government,  if  it  so  chooses,  shall   initiate   the
      proceedings of such land acquisition afresh  in  accordance  with  the
      provisions of this Act:


           Provided that where an award has been made and  compensation  in
      respect of a majority of land holding has not been  deposited  in  the
      account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the
      notification  for  acquisition  under  section  4  of  the  said  Land
      Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance  with
      the provisions of this Act.”


10.         Insofar as sub-section  (1)  of  Section  24  is  concerned,  it
begins with non obstante clause.  By this, Parliament has  given  overriding
effect to this provision over all other  provisions  of  2013  Act.   It  is
provided in clause (a) that where  the  land  acquisition  proceedings  have
been initiated under the 1894 Act but no award under  Section  11  is  made,
then the provisions of 2013 Act shall apply relating  to  the  determination
of compensation. Clause (b) of Section  24(1)  makes  provision  that  where
land acquisition proceedings have been initiated  under  the  1894  Act  and
award has been made under Section 11,  then such proceedings shall  continue
under the provisions of the 1894 Act as if that Act has not been repealed.
11.         Section  24(2)  also  begins  with  non  obstante  clause.  This
provision has overriding effect over Section  24(1).  Section  24(2)  enacts
that in relation to the land acquisition proceedings  initiated  under  1894
Act, where an  award  has  been  made  five  years  or  more  prior  to  the
commencement of the  2013  Act  and  either  of  the  two  contingencies  is
satisfied, viz; (i) physical possession of the land has not  been  taken  or
(ii) the compensation has not been paid, such acquisition proceedings  shall
be deemed to have lapsed. On the lapse of such acquisition proceedings,   if
the appropriate government still chooses to acquire the land which  was  the
subject matter of acquisition under the 1894 Act then  it  has  to  initiate
the proceedings afresh under the  2013 Act. The proviso appended to  Section
24(2) deals with a situation where in respect of the  acquisition  initiated
under the 1894 Act an award has been made and compensation in respect  of  a
majority of land holdings has not been  deposited  in  the  account  of  the
beneficiaries  then  all  the   beneficiaries   specified   in   Section   4
notification become entitled to compensation under 2013 Act.
12.         To find out the meaning of  the  expression,  “compensation  has
not been paid”, it is necessary to have a look at Section  31  of  the  1894
Act. The said Section, to the extent it is relevant, reads as follows:
      “31.  Payment of compensation or deposit of same in Court.  –  (1)  On
      making an award under section 11, the Collector shall  tender  payment
      of the compensation awarded by him to the persons interested  entitled
      thereto according to the award,  and  shall  pay  it  to  them  unless
      prevented by some one or more of the contingencies  mentioned  in  the
      next sub-section.


      (2)   If they shall not consent to receive  it,  or  if  there  be  no
      person competent to alienate the land, or if there be any  dispute  as
      to the title to receive the compensation or as to the apportionment of
      it, the Collector shall deposit the amount of the compensation in  the
      Court to which a reference under section 18 would be submitted:


            xxxx            xxxx              xxxx               xxxx”




13.         There is amendment in Maharashtra—Nagpur (City)  in  Section  31
whereby in sub-section (1), after  the  words  “compensation”  and  in  sub-
section (2), after the words, “the amount of compensation”, the  words  “and
costs if any” have been inserted.
14.         Section 31(1) of the 1894 Act enjoins upon  the  Collector,   on
making an award under Section 11,  to  tender  payment  of  compensation  to
persons  interested  entitled  thereto  according  to  award.   It   further
mandates the Collector to  make  payment  of  compensation  to  them  unless
prevented by one of the contingencies contemplated in sub-section  (2).  The
contingencies contemplated in Section 31(2) are: (i) the persons  interested
entitled to compensation do not consent to  receive  it  (ii)  there  is  no
person competent to alienate the land and (iii) there is dispute as  to  the
title to receive compensation or as to the apportionment of it.  If  due  to
any of the contingencies contemplated in Section  31(2),  the  Collector  is
prevented from making payment of compensation to the persons interested  who
are entitled to compensation, then the Collector is required to deposit  the
compensation in the court to which  reference under Section 18 may be  made.

15.         Simply put, Section 31 of  the  1894  Act  makes  provision  for
payment of  compensation  or  deposit  of  the  same  in  the  court.   This
provision requires that the Collector should tender payment of  compensation
as  awarded  by  him  to  the  persons  interested  who  are   entitled   to
compensation.  If due to happening of any  contingency  as  contemplated  in
Section 31(2), the compensation has not  been  paid,  the  Collector  should
deposit the amount of compensation in the court to which  reference  can  be
made under Section 18.
16.         The mandatory nature of the  provision  in  Section  31(2)  with
regard to deposit of the compensation in the court is further  fortified  by
the provisions contained in Sections 32, 33 and 34. As  a  matter  of  fact,
Section 33 gives  power  to  the  court,  on  an  application  by  a  person
interested or claiming an interest in  such  money,  to  pass  an  order  to
invest the  amount  so  deposited  in  such  government  or  other  approved
securities and may direct  the  interest  or  other  proceeds  of  any  such
investment to be accumulated and paid in such  manner  as  it  may  consider
proper so  that   the  parties  interested  therein  may  have  the  benefit
therefrom as they might have had from  the  land  in  respect  whereof  such
money shall have been deposited or as near thereto as may be.
17.         While enacting Section 24(2), Parliament definitely had  in  its
view Section 31 of the 1894 Act. From that one thing is clear  that  it  did
not intend to equate the word “paid” to “offered” or  “tendered”.    But  at
the same time, we do not think that by use of the  word  “paid”,  Parliament
intended receipt of compensation by the  landowners/persons  interested.  In
our view, it is not appropriate  to  give  a  literal  construction  to  the
expression “paid” used in this sub-section (sub-section (2) of Section  24).
 If a literal construction were  to  be  given,  then  it  would  amount  to
ignoring procedure, mode and manner of deposit provided in Section 31(2)  of
the 1894 Act  in  the  event  of  happening  of  any  of  the  contingencies
contemplated therein which may prevent the   Collector  from  making  actual
payment of compensation.  We are  of  the  view,  therefore,  that  for  the
purposes of Section 24(2), the compensation shall be regarded as  “paid”  if
the compensation  has  been  offered  to  the  person  interested  and  such
compensation has been deposited in the court where reference  under  Section
18 can be made on happening of any of the contingencies  contemplated  under
Section 31(2) of the 1894 Act.  In other  words,  the  compensation  may  be
said to have been “paid” within  the  meaning  of  Section  24(2)  when  the
Collector (or for that matter Land Acquisition Officer) has  discharged  his
obligation and deposited the amount of compensation in court and  made  that
amount available to the interested person to be dealt with  as  provided  in
Sections 32 and 33.
18.         1894 Act being an expropriatory legislation has to  be  strictly
followed. The procedure, mode and manner for  payment  of  compensation  are
prescribed in Part V (Sections 31-34) of the 1894 Act.  The Collector,  with
regard to the payment of  compensation,  can  only  act  in  the  manner  so
provided.  It is settled proposition  of  law  (classic  statement  of  Lord
Roche in Nazir Ahmad[1]) that where a power is given to do a  certain  thing
in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not  at  all.  Other
methods of performance are necessarily forbidden.
19.          Now,  this  is  admitted  position  that  award  was  made   on
31.01.2008.  Notices  were  issued  to  the  landowners   to   receive   the
compensation and since they did not receive  the  compensation,  the  amount
(Rs.27 crores) was deposited in the government treasury.   Can  it  be  said
that deposit of the amount of compensation in  the  government  treasury  is
equivalent to the amount of  compensation  paid  to  the  landowners/persons
interested? We do not think so.  In a comparatively  recent  decision,  this
Court in Agnelo Santimano Fernandes[2], relying upon  the  earlier  decision
in Prem Nath Kapur[3], has held that  the  deposit  of  the  amount  of  the
compensation in  the  state’s  revenue  account  is  of  no  avail  and  the
liability of the state to pay interest subsists  till  the  amount  has  not
been deposited in court.
20.         From the above, it is clear that the  award  pertaining  to  the
subject land has been made by the  Special  Land  Acquisition  Officer  more
than five years prior to the commencement of  the  2013  Act.   It  is  also
admitted position that compensation so awarded has neither been paid to  the
landowners/persons interested nor deposited in the  court.  The  deposit  of
compensation amount in the government treasury is of no avail and cannot  be
held to  be  equivalent  to  compensation  paid  to  the  landowners/persons
interested.  We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that  the  subject land acquisition proceedings shall be deemed to have  lapsed  under  Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act.
21.         The argument on behalf of the Corporation that the subject  land
acquisition proceedings have been concluded in all respects under  the  1894
Act and that they are not affected at all in view of Section 114(2)  of  the
2013 Act, has no merit at all, and is noted to be rejected.
Section  114(1)
of the 2013 Act repeals 1894 Act.  Sub-section (2) of Section 114,  however,
makes Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 applicable with  regard  to
the effect of repeal but this is subject to the provisions in the 2013  Act.
Under Section 24(2) land acquisition proceedings initiated  under  the  1894
Act, by legal fiction, are deemed to have lapsed  where award has been  made
five years or more prior to the commencement of 2013 Act and  possession  of
the land is not taken or compensation has not been paid.  
The legal  fiction
under Section 24(2) comes  into  operation  as  soon  as  conditions  stated
therein are satisfied.  
The  applicability  of  Section  6  of  the  General
Clauses Act being subject to  Section  24(2),  there  is  no  merit  in  the
contention of the Corporation.

22.         In view of the foregoing discussion,  it  is  not  necessary  to
consider the correctness of the impugned judgment on merits.
23.          The appeals fail and are dismissed with no order as to costs.

                                        …..………………………….J.
                                        (R.M. Lodha)


                                       …..………………………….J.
                                        (Madan B. Lokur)


                                       …..………………………….J.
                                        (Kurian Joseph)

New Delhi,
January 24, 2014.




























                                             -----------------------
[1]     Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor; [A.I.R. 1936 Privy Council 253(2)]
[2]     Ivo Agnelo Santimano Fernandes and Others v. State of Goa and
Another; [(2011) 11 SCC 506]
[3]     Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corpn. of India Ltd.;
[(1996) 2 SCC 71]

-----------------------
14

Art.21 of Constitution Section 170 of the Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006 Section 17 of the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953 - Direction by High court to arrest the Director or Occupier of the company till realization of due as certified by the commissioner as per Act - Division Bench declined to grant stay - New plea in Apex court that the Director is Senior citizen of aged 65 , liable from exemption under sec.170 of Revenue Code and already properties of company were attached and as such with out ascertaining reasons , the arrest is against Art.21 of Constitution - the Apex court rejected on 3 Grounds 1. New plea .2. No liquidation mere attachment is not enough and 3. Promised to pay the due amount to the farmers several times declined to stay the arrest order of director and confirmed the orders of D.B. High court = Anand Agro Chem India Ltd. .. Appellant(s) -vs- Suresh Chandra & Ors. .. Respondent(s) = 2014 ( January - Vol - 1) Judis.nic.in/ S.C./ file name =41176

Art.21 of Constitution Section 170 of the Uttar Pradesh Revenue  Code,  2006 Section 17 of the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply  and  Purchase) Act, 1953 - Direction by High court to arrest the Director or Occupier of the company till realization of due as certified by the commissioner as per Act - Division Bench declined to grant stay - New plea in Apex court that the Director is Senior citizen of aged 65 , liable from exemption under sec.170 of Revenue Code and already properties of company were attached and as  such with out ascertaining reasons , the arrest is against Art.21 of Constitution - the Apex court rejected on 3 Grounds
1. New plea .2. No liquidation mere attachment is not enough and 3. Promised to pay the due amount to the farmers several timesdeclined to stay the arrest order of director and confirmed the orders of D.B. High court =
 the
property of the sugar mill has already been attached  to  recover  the  dues
and the sale notice has been  issued  and  unless  there  is  proof  of  the
minimal fairness of willful failure to pay in  spite  of  sufficient  means,
the arrest cannot be ordered and it would be violative of Article 21 of  the
Constitution of India and placed reliance on the decision of this  Court  in
Jolly George Varghese and Another  vs.  The Bank  of  Cochin  (1980)  2  SCC
360.  He further contended that 
in any event the Director, whom he -representing, is a senior citizen above 65 years of age and hence he  cannot be arrested as  a  defaulter  in  payment  of  arrear  of  land  revenue  as
stipulated in Section 171 of the Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006.

Section 17 of the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply  and  Purchase)
Act, 1953 stipulates that 
the occupier of the sugar -

factory shall make speedy payment  of  cane   price  and  in  the  event  of
default,  sub-Section  (4)  stipulates  that  the  Cane  Commissioner  shall
forward to the Collector a certificate specifying the amount of  arrears  of
the cane price due from the occupier and  the  Collector  shall  proceed  to
recover the said amount from such occupier as if it were an arrear  of  land
revenue. 
  Section 170 of the Uttar Pradesh Revenue  Code,  2006  prescribes
the process  for  recovery  of  arrears  of  land  revenue,  wherein  it  is
mentioned that it may be recovered  by  anyone  or  more  of  the  processes
mentioned therein which includes by arrest and detention  of  the  defaulter
and attachment and sale of his movable property.
whether  or
not one of the Directors who is said to be 65 years old  could  be  arrested
as a defaulter and committed to  prison  under  Section  171  of  the  Uttar
Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006, could and indeed ought to have  been  raised  by
the appellants either before the High Court or before this Court  in  appeal
preferred against the order passed by the High  Court.  
No  such  contention
was, however, urged at that stage.

Directors -

had assured the Commissioner that they would pay Rs.160 lacs  towards  price
of sugarcane within two weeks besides an amount of Rs.700 lacs  to  be  paid
in installments, the first of which installment was to be paid on 15th  May,
2013. No such payment was, however, made by the company and  its  Directors.
Thirdly, because there is  nothing  before  us  to  suggest  that  the
company and its Directors are incapable of  raising  funds  for  liquidating
the outstanding liability  towards  dues  payable  to  the  farmers. 
 Simply
because the sugar factory has been attached, is no reason for us  to  assume
that the company or its Directors are  in  any  financial  distress  thereby
disabling them from making the payments  recoverable  from  them.  The  fact
situation in the -present case is, therefore, completely different from that in  Jolly  George
Varghese case (supra) relied upon by Mr. Ram Jethmalani.

12.   In the light of the above, we see  no  compelling  reason  for  us  to
interfere with the order passed  by  the  High  Court  in  exercise  of  our
extraordinary jurisdiction. We regret to say that the  amounts  due  to  the
farmers towards price of the sugarcane and incidentals remains  to  be  paid
to them for several years in the past thereby  accumulating  huge  liability
against the company.  That  is  not  a  happy  situation  nor  can  repeated
invocation of the process of law by the appellant be a remedy for it.

13.   The appeal is devoid of merit and is accordingly dismissed.

2014 ( January - Vol - 1) Judis.nic.in/ S.C./ file name  =41176

T.S. THAKUR, C. NAGAPPAN

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                   CIVIL APPEAL NO.   897         OF 2014
      [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.30515 of 2013]



Anand Agro Chem India Ltd.             ..               Appellant(s)



      -vs-



Suresh Chandra & Ors.                  ..             Respondent(s)



                               J U D G M E N T



C. NAGAPPAN, J.



1.    Leave granted.

2.    This appeal is directed against  the  interim  Order  dated  31.7.2013
passed by the High  Court  of  Judicature  at  Allahabad  in  Writ  Petition
no.14936 of 2013 whereby the Division  Bench  rejected  the  prayer  of  the
appellant to  stay  the  arrest  of  the  Directors  and  occupiers  of  the
appellant company.

-

3.    The facts in nutshell are as follows.
Respondents  1  to  3  supplied
sugarcane to the sugar mill of the appellant in the year 2007-08, for  which
the appellant has not paid the price in  spite  of  several  representations
made by the respondents 1 to 3 herein.
This  led  to  the  filing  of  Writ
Petition in Writ-C no.14936 of 2013  by  respondents  1  to  3  seeking  for
issuance of the Writ of Mandamus directing the appellant herein  to  release
the sugarcane price to them.
The Division Bench of  the  High  Court  after
hearing both  sides  directed  the  District  Magistrate,  Hathras  to  take
immediate action against the Directors and occupiers of the  appellant-sugar
mill against whom several orders have been passed under the  U.P.  Sugarcane
(Regulation and Supply) Act, 1913 and it further observed in the order  that
the District Magistrate may in exercise of his powers cause  arrest  of  the
Directors and occupiers of the sugar mill to recover the  dues  and  in  the
event of such arrest, they will not be released until  they  have  paid  the
entire amount due against them.
The appellant-sugar mill aggrieved  by  the
said order preferred a Special Leave Petition in  SLP(C)  no.16633  of  2013
and this Court by order dated 1.5.2013 dismissed the petition  by  observing
thus :

           -
                   “We have heard Shri Sanjay Parikh, learned  counsel  for
           the appellant and perused the record.


                 A reading of the order  under  challenge  shows  that  the
           appellant has not paid Rs.16.12 crores to the  farmers  for  the
           crushing year 2005-06 to 2009-10, which includes  the  price  of
           sugarcane, the cane development commission and the interest.  It
           is also borne  out  from  the  record  that  vide  letter  dated
           24.11.2012, the Director of the appellant had assured  the  Cane
           Commissioner that the company will pay Rs.160 lacs as the  price
           of the cane within two weeks and an amount  of  Rs.700  lacs  in
           installments, the first of which will be paid on 15.01.2013, but
           the company did not fulfill its assurance.


                 In the above backdrop, it is  not  possible  to  find  any
           fault with the direction given by the Division Bench of the High
           Court and there is absolutely no justification for this  Court’s
           interference with the impugned order.


                 The special leave petition is accordingly  dismissed.……..”




 Thereafter the appellant-sugar mill filed an  application  in  the  pending
Writ Petition in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad seeking for  stay
of arrest of the Directors pursuant to the order  dated  26.4.2013  and  the
Division Bench of the High Court after -

hearing both sides and after referring to the earlier orders  held  that  no
modification/vacation  of  the  order  dated  26.4.2013  is  required   and,
accordingly, rejected the prayer of stay of arrest.   Challenging  the  said
order the appellant-sugar mill has preferred the present appeal.

4.    We have heard Mr.  Ram  Jethmalani   and  Dr.  Rajeev  Dhawan,  Senior
Advocates appearing on behalf of the appellant,  Ms.  Shobha  Dixit,  Senior
Advocate appearing on behalf of  the  respondents  and  Mr.  Prabodh  Kumar,
Advocate appearing on behalf of the intervenor.

5.    The contention of Mr. Ram Jethmalani,  Senior  Advocate  is  that  the
property of the sugar mill has already been attached  to  recover  the  dues
and the sale notice has been  issued  and  unless  there  is  proof  of  the
minimal fairness of willful failure to pay in  spite  of  sufficient  means,
the arrest cannot be ordered and it would be violative of Article 21 of  the
Constitution of India and placed reliance on the decision of this  Court  in
Jolly George Varghese and Another  vs.  The Bank  of  Cochin  (1980)  2  SCC
360.  He further contended that
in any event the Director, whom he -representing, is a senior citizen above 65 years of age and hence he  cannot be arrested as  a  defaulter  in  payment  of  arrear  of  land  revenue  as
stipulated in Section 171 of the Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006.

6.    When the matter was listed before this Court on 7.10.2013, Dr.  Rajeev
Dhawan, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellant  said  that  the
Directors of the mill undertake to pay  Rs.4.55  crores  representing  fifty
per cent of the total amount to the concerned authority within a  period  of
six weeks and this Court stayed the arrest subject  to  fulfillment  of  the
condition.  Again the  matter  was  listed  on  19.11.2013  and  Dr.  Rajeev
Dhawan, learned senior counsel said that by  mistake  he  made  a  statement
about the total amount payable by the writ petitioner but the amount is  far
less than that and requested  for  time  to  file  additional  affidavit  on
behalf of the appellant.  In the next two hearings the matter was  adjourned
on the request made by the appellant and thereafter the matter was heard.

7.    Section 17 of the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply  and  Purchase)
Act, 1953 stipulates that 
the occupier of the sugar -

factory shall make speedy payment  of  cane   price  and  in  the  event  of
default,  sub-Section  (4)  stipulates  that  the  Cane  Commissioner  shall
forward to the Collector a certificate specifying the amount of  arrears  of
the cane price due from the occupier and  the  Collector  shall  proceed  to
recover the said amount from such occupier as if it were an arrear  of  land
revenue. 
  Section 170 of the Uttar Pradesh Revenue  Code,  2006  prescribes
the process  for  recovery  of  arrears  of  land  revenue,  wherein  it  is
mentioned that it may be recovered  by  anyone  or  more  of  the  processes
mentioned therein which includes by arrest and detention  of  the  defaulter
and attachment and sale of his movable property.

8.    The Division Bench of the Allahabad High  Court  in  its  order  dated
26.4.2013  has  directed  the  District  Magistrate,  Hathras,  namely,  the
Collector to take immediate action against the Directors  and  occupiers  of
the appellant-sugar mill against whom several orders have been passed  under
the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation and Supply) Act,  1913  and  this  Court  has
confirmed the said order.  The Division Bench  in  the  present  application
considered the plea of the - appellant for the stay of arrest and after hearing both sides  rejected  the
said plea by the impugned order and we find no error in it.

9.    We say so firstly because order dated 26th April, 2013 passed  by  the
Division  Bench  of  the  Allahabad  High  Court  directing   the   District
Magistrate to take immediate action against the Directors of the sugar  mill
has already been affirmed by this Court in appeal.  The question
whether  or
not one of the Directors who is said to be 65 years old  could  be  arrested
as a defaulter and committed to  prison  under  Section  171  of  the  Uttar
Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006, could and indeed ought to have  been  raised  by
the appellants either before the High Court or before this Court  in  appeal
preferred against the order passed by the High  Court.  
No  such  contention
was, however, urged at that stage.

10.   Secondly, because the company and its Directors have  not  made  their
promises good by paying even the amounts which they had offered  to  pay.  A
plain reading of order dated 1st May, 2013 passed by this Court in  SLP  (C)
No.16633 of 2013 extracted  above  would  show  that  the  company  and  its
Directors -

had assured the Commissioner that they would pay Rs.160 lacs  towards  price
of sugarcane within two weeks besides an amount of Rs.700 lacs  to  be  paid
in installments, the first of which installment was to be paid on 15th  May,
2013. No such payment was, however, made by the company and  its  Directors.
That apart, the statement made at the  bar  on  7th  October,  2013  by  Dr.
Rajeev Dhawan, learned senior counsel, for the appellant that the  Directors
would pay Rs.4.55 crores is also sought to be withdrawn on the  ground  that
the same was made under a mistake. It is evident that the  company  and  its
Directors have been despite promises made on their behalf committing  breach
of such assurances on one pretext or the other.

11.   Thirdly, because there is  nothing  before  us  to  suggest  that  the
company and its Directors are incapable of  raising  funds  for  liquidating
the outstanding liability  towards  dues  payable  to  the  farmers.
 Simply
because the sugar factory has been attached, is no reason for us  to  assume
that the company or its Directors are  in  any  financial  distress  thereby
disabling them from making the payments  recoverable  from  them.  The  fact
situation in the -present case is, therefore, completely different from that in  Jolly  George
Varghese case (supra) relied upon by Mr. Ram Jethmalani.

12.   In the light of the above, we see  no  compelling  reason  for  us  to
interfere with the order passed  by  the  High  Court  in  exercise  of  our
extraordinary jurisdiction. We regret to say that the  amounts  due  to  the
farmers towards price of the sugarcane and incidentals remains  to  be  paid
to them for several years in the past thereby  accumulating  huge  liability
against the company.  That  is  not  a  happy  situation  nor  can  repeated
invocation of the process of law by the appellant be a remedy for it.

13.   The appeal is devoid of merit and is accordingly dismissed.



                                                  …………………………….J.
                                             (T.S. Thakur)




                                             ……………………………J.
                                             (C. Nagappan)
New Delhi;
January 24, 2014.