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Monday, August 26, 2013

MODVAT- The respondent-company availed deemed MODVAT credit of Rs.77,546/- during the quarter of March, 2000 on the strength of invoices issued by M/s. Sawan Mal Shibhu Mal Steel Re-Rolling Mills, Mandi Govindgarh. During MODVAT verification it was found that the supplier of inputs had not discharged full duty liability for the period covered by the invoices. = Sub-rule (6) of Rule 57A in exercise of which the notification has been issued is as follows: - “(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (1), the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare the inputs on which the duty of excise paid under section 3A of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (1 of 1944), shall be deemed to have been paid at such rate or equivalent to such amount as may be specified in the said notification, and allow the credit of such duty in respect of the said inputs at such rates or such amount and subject to such conditions as may be specified in the said notification: Provided that the manufacturer shall take all reasonable steps to ensure that the inputs acquired by him are goods on which the appropriate duty of excise as indicated in the documents accompanying the goods, has been paid under section 3A of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (1 of 1944).”= “Whether the manufacturer of final products is entitled to deemed credit, under Notification 58/97-CE dated 30.8.97 when the manufacturer-supplier of inputs has not paid Central Excise Duty and given a wrong certificate on the body of invoices about duty dischargement under Rule 96ZP of Central Excise Rules, 1944?” = there is no dispute that a declaration was given by the manufacturer of the inputs indicating that the excise duty had been paid on the said inputs under the Act. It is also not in dispute that the said inputs were directly received from the manufacturer but not purchased from the market. There is no cavil over the fact that the manufacturer of the inputs had declared the invoice price of the inputs correctly in the documents. It is perceivable from the factual matrix that the only allegation is that at the time of MODVAT verification it was found that the supplier of the inputs had not discharged full duty liable for the period covered under the invoices. This lapse of the seller is different and not a condition or rather a pre-condition postulated in the notification. 25. Mr. Prasad, learned counsel for the revenue has vehemently urged that it was requisite and, in a way imperative, on the part of the assessee to verify from the concerned authority of the department whether the excise duty had actually been paid or not. The aforesaid submission leaves us unimpressed. As we notice Rule 57A (6) requires the manufacturer of final products to take reasonable care that the inputs acquired by him are goods on which the appropriate duty of excise as indicated in the documents accompanying the goods, has been paid. The notification has been issued in exercise of the power under the said Rule. The notification clearly states to which of those inputs it shall apply and to which of the inputs it shall not apply and what is the duty of the manufacturer of final inputs. Thus, when there is a prescribed procedure and that has been duly followed by the manufacturer of final products, we do not perceive any justifiable reason to hold that the assessee-appellant had not taken reasonable care as prescribed in the notification. Due care and caution was taken by the respondent. It is not stated what further care and caution could have been taken. The proviso postulates and requires “reasonable care” and not verification from the department whether the duty stands paid by the manufacturer-seller. When all the conditions precedent have been satisfied, to require the assessee to find out from the departmental authorities about the payment of excise duty on the inputs used in the final product which have been made allowable by the notification would be travelling beyond the notification, and in a way, transgressing the same. This would be practically impossible and would lead to transactions getting delayed. We may hasten to explicate that we have expressed our opinion as required in the present case pertaining to clauses 4 and 5 of the notification. 26. Consequently, we concur with the view expressed by the High Court and accordingly the appeals, being devoid of merit, stand dismissed without any order as to costs.

                      published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40690
  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL No. 7031 of 2009

Commissioner of Central Excise, Jalandhar               … Appellant

                                   Versus

M/s. Kay Kay Industries                                   … Respondent

                                    WITH

                        CIVIL APPEAL No. 7032 of 2009

                                    WITH

                        CIVIL APPEAL No. 7034 of 2009

                                    WITH

                        CIVIL APPEAL No. 7392 of 2010

                                    WITH

                        CIVIL APPEAL No. 7393 of 2010

                                    WITH

                        CIVIL APPEAL No. 7148 of 2013
                (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 26499 of 2008)



                               J U D G M E N T


Dipak Misra, J.


      Leave granted in Special Leave Petition (C) No. 26499 of 2008.

2. The controversy that emerges for consideration in this batch of  appeals,
   being consubstantial, was heard together and is disposed of by  a  common
   judgment.  For the sake of convenience the facts from  Civil  Appeal  No.
   7031 of 2009 are set out herein.

3. The  respondent-company  availed  deemed  MODVAT  credit  of  Rs.77,546/-
   during the quarter of March, 2000 on the strength of invoices  issued  by
   M/s. Sawan Mal Shibhu  Mal  Steel  Re-Rolling  Mills,  Mandi  Govindgarh.
   
During MODVAT verification it was found that the supplier of  inputs  had
   not discharged  full  duty  liability  for  the  period  covered  by  the
   invoices.
The Competent Authority was of the view that appropriate  duty
   of excise had not been paid by  the  manufacturer  of  inputs  under  the
   invoices on the strength of which the  respondent  took  the  benefit  of
   deemed MODVAT credit and it was obligatory on the part of the  respondent
   to take all reasonable steps to  ensure  that  the  appropriate  duty  of
   excise had been paid on the inputs used in the manufacture of their final
   product as required under Rule 57A(6) of the Central Excise  Rules,  1944
   (for short “the Rules”) read with  notification  No.  58/97-CE(NT)  dated
   30.8.1997 and the aforesaid opinion of the Competent Authority  persuaded
   him to issue a show-cause  notice  on  19.1.2001  proposing  recovery  of
   deemed MODVAT credit of  Rs.77,546/-  and  imposition  of  penalty.   
The
   adjudicating authority, after receipt of  the  reply  to  the  show-cause
   notice, by order dated 22.3.2002, disallowed the  deemed  MODVAT  benefit
   earlier availed and ordered for recovery  of  the  said  sum  along  with
   interest, and, further imposed penalty of Rs.40,000/-.

4. Being aggrieved by  the  aforesaid  order  the  respondent  preferred  an
   appeal before
the Commissioner (Appeals), Central Excise, Jalandhar,  who
   ruled that the credit of deemed  duty  paid  by  the  manufacturer  under
   Section 3A of the Central Excise Act, 1944, (for brevity “the  Act”)  was
   available subject to the condition that the inputs were received directly
   from the factory of manufacturer under  cover  of  an  invoice  declaring
   therein that the appropriate duty of excise had been paid on such  inputs
   under the provisions of the Act.  
The appellate authority referred to the
   provisions of sub-rule (6) of Rule 57A and notification No.  58/97-CE(NT)
   dated 1.9.1997 and opined that the manufacturer of  the  inputs  had  not
   discharged the appropriate duty liability against the goods cleared  vide
   the  invoices  and  the  respondent  had  not  furnished  the   requisite
   documentary evidence which could  controvert  the  said  allegation  made
   against the manufacturer of inputs.   
The  appellate  authority  observed
   that unless and until payment of appropriate  duty  had  been  made,  the
   assessee could not have availed the benefit.  Expressing such an opinion,
   it concurred with the view taken by the adjudicating authority.  However,
   it reduced the penalty from Rs.40,000/- to Rs.20,000/-.

5. The unsuccess in appeal compelled the respondent  to  prefer  Appeal  No.
   E/1474/04-SM  before
the  Customs,  Excise  and  Service  Tax  Appellate
   Tribunal (for short “the tribunal”) and the tribunal placing reliance  on the decision in Vikas Pipes v. CCE[1] came to hold that  the  declaration given by the appellant therein satisfied the conditions enumerated in the  notification for claiming the  deemed  MODVAT  credit  and,  accordingly,  quashed the orders passed by the adjudicating authority and that  of  the
 appellate authority.

6. Questioning the justifiability of the aforesaid order, Revenue  preferred
   Civil Appeal No. 65 of 2006  before  the  High  Court.   The  High  Court
   reproduced the proposed  substantial  question  of  law  which  reads  as
   follows: -

      “Whether the manufacturer of final  products  is  entitled  to  deemed credit,  under  Notification   58/97-CE   dated   30.8.97   when   the manufacturer-supplier of inputs has not paid Central Excise  Duty  and  given  a  wrong  certificate  on  the  body  of  invoices  about  duty  dischargement under Rule 96ZP of Central Excise Rules, 1944?”

7. While dealing with the aforesaid substantial question of  law,  the  High
   Court referred to  its  earlier  decision  in  Vikas  Pipes  (supra)  and
   distinguished the decision in Collector of Central  Excise,  Vadodara  v.
   Dhiren Chemical Industries[2] and ultimately  concurring  with  the  view
   expressed by the tribunal  dismissed  the  appeal.
Hence,  the  present
   appeal by the Revenue.

8. Assailing the legal substantiality of the impugned judgment it  is  urged
   by Mr. Arjit Prasad, learned counsel for the appellant that the  tribunal
   as well as the High Court has fallen into error in  their  interpretation
   of
Rule  57A(6)  of  the  Rules  and  the  notification  which   imposes conditions, for as per the conditions enumerated in the  notification  it is obligatory on the part of the manufacturer of the  final  products  to satisfy the adjudicating authority that appropriate duty  of  excise  had been paid.
 The learned counsel would submit that the “appropriate  duty”
   has been squarely dealt with by the Constitution Bench  in  the  case  of
   Dhiren Chemical Industries (supra) but  the  High  Court  has  failed  to
   appreciate the ratio laid down therein and distinguished the same  in  an
   extremely cryptic manner which makes the verdict sensitively susceptible.

9. Resisting the aforesaid submissions, Mr. Ajay Aggarwal,  learned  counsel
   for the respondent, has contended that the tribunal and  the  High  Court
   have appositely relied upon the  decision  in  Vikas  Pipes  (supra)  and
   correctly  opined  that  the  respondent  had  satisfied  the  conditions
   enshrined in the notification and, therefore, there  was  no  warrant  to
   proceed for recovery of the benefit availed of by the final manufacturer.
    The learned  counsel  would  submit  that  the  “appropriate  duty”,  as
   interpreted by this Court in Dhiren Chemical Industries (supra), supports
   the  case  of  the  respondent  and  the  conditions  prescribed  in  the
   notification having been satisfied, the adjudicating authority as well as
   the first appellate authority has erred  in  holding  that  there  was  a
   failure on the part of the respondent to satisfy the conditions.

10. To appreciate the rival submissions raised  at  the  Bar  and  the  bold
   assertion by Mr. Prasad, learned counsel for the Revenue, that it was the
   duty of the assessee-respondent, the manufacturer of the final  products,
   to see that  the  manufacturer  of  the  inputs  had  actually  paid  the
   appropriate duty on the inputs on the bedrock of law  laid  down  by  the
   Constitution Bench in Dhiren Chemical Industries (supra), it is necessary
   to understand how and under what circumstances the controversy  travelled
   to the Constitution Bench.  Be  it  noted,  the  Constitution  Bench  was
   required to resolve the conflict between the two pronouncements,  namely,
   Collector of Central Excise,  Patna  v.  Usha  Martin  Industries[3]  and
   Motiram Tolaram and another v. Union of India and another[4].

11. In Usha  Martin  Industries  (supra)  the  Court  was  interpreting  the
   exemption notification dated 30.11.1963 as amended on  7.4.1981  and  the
   question before the three learned  Judges  was  
whether  the  benefit  of
   excise duty exemption (granted by the Central Government as  per  certain
   notifications) could be claimed in respect of commodities made out of raw
   material on which no excise duty was payable.
The Central Government had
   exempted iron or steel products falling under a particular category  made
   from certain materials or combination thereof.  One  of  them  was  fresh
   unused re-rollable scrap on which  the  appropriate  amount  of  duty  of
   excise had already been paid.  
The Bench adverted to various aspects and,
   eventually, came to hold that the duty could legitimately be  claimed  by
   the assessee in respect of those goods referred to  in  the  notification
   under consideration the raw material of which were not  exigible  to  any
   excise duty at all.
12.   In Motiram Tolaram (supra),  another  three-Judge  Bench  was  dealing
with notification No. 185 of 1983.
 It  was  a  notification  pertaining  to
exemption of alcohol falling under item 15-A of the First  Schedule  to  the
Central Excises and Salt Act,  1944  and  manufactured  from  vinyl  acetate
monomer, from so much of the duty of excise leviable thereon under the  said
Act at the rate specified in the First Schedule, as in excess of the  amount
calculated at the rate of 10% ad valorem.
The proviso to  the  notification
stipulated that such polyvinyl alcohol was required to be manufactured  from
vinyl acetate monomer on which the appropriate  amount  of  duty  of  excise
under Section 3 of the Central Excises and Salt Act or the  additional  duty
under Section 3 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, as the  case  may  be,  had
been paid.
A contention was raised before the Court  that  in  India  there
was only  one  manufacturer  of  polyvinyl  alcohol  and  the  commodity  in
question could be produced only from vinyl acetate monomer  and  the  Indian
manufacturer was, in fact, paying duty at the rate of  10%  ad  velorem  and
that was the only duty which could be charged from the  appellants  therein.
It was urged before the Court that the appellants  were  manufacturing  that
item in India from vinyle acetate  monomer  on  which  appropriate  duty  of
excise had been  paid  and,  therefore,  the  concessional  duty  should  be
charged from them.  
The learned Judges referred to the language employed  in
the exemption notification and opined that  onus  was  on  the  assessee  to
prove  and  show  that  the  conditions,  as  imposed   in   the   exemption
notification, had been satisfied.  
In that context the  Bench  proceeded  to
state that the condition for getting the benefit of the lower rate  of  duty
is that on the raw material used appropriate amount of duty has  been  paid.
If perchance or for any reason, the manufacturer  of  polyvinyl  alcohol  in
India is unable to prove or show that the same has  been  manufactured  from
vinyl acetate monomer on which appropriate amount  of  duty  of  excise  has
been paid, then the said manufacturer would  not  be  entitled  to  get  the
benefit of the said notification.
13.   Thereafter, the Court referred to Section  3  of  the  Customs  Tariff
Act, 1975 and  observed  that  one  has  to  assume  that  the  importer  of
polyvinyl alcohol had actually manufactured  the  same  in  India.  One  can
further assume, possibly without any difficulty,  that  the  said  polyvinyl
alcohol has been manufactured from vinyl acetate  monomer,  but  it  is  not
possible to assume or presume or imagine that the raw material used  is  the
one on which appropriate amount of duty of excise has  been  paid  in  India
and hence, the condition which is contained in the said notification has  to
be fulfilled in order to get the benefit of the notification.

14.   The Court  further  stressing  on  the  purpose  of  the  notification
expressed thus: -
      “11.  It appears to us that Excise Notification No. 185  of  1983  was
      deliberately worded in such a  way  that  the  importer  of  polyvinyl
      alcohol, who may not be  able  to  prove  that  on  the  raw  material
      appropriate duty in India has been paid, will not be able to  get  the
      benefit of the concessional rate of duty. It has to be borne  in  mind
      that the normal duty which is payable on  polyvinyl  alcohol  is  40%.
      That is the rate of excise duty which would be payable  by  an  Indian
      manufacturer of polyvinyl alcohol who is unable to show  that  he  has
      complied with the condition contained in the proviso, namely,  use  in
      the manufacture of vinyl acetate monomer on which  appropriate  amount
      of duty has been paid. Similarly  an  importer  of  polyvinyl  alcohol
      would be required to pay under Section 3  duty  at  the  rate  of  40%
      because on the polyvinyl alcohol imported duty under Section 3 of  the
      Central Excises and Salt Act or additional duty under Section 3 of the
      Customs Tariff Act has not been paid on the vinyl acetate monomer used
      in the manufacture of polyvinyl alcohol. If it was  possible  to  have
      shown that duty-paid vinyl  acetate  monomer  had  been  used  in  the
      manufacture of imported polyvinyl alcohol, then the benefit of  Excise
      Notification No. 185 of 1983 would have been available.”



15. Eventually, the  Court  ruled  that  appropriate  duty  means  the  duty
   payable under the Central Excise and  Salt  Act  or  under  the  Customs
   Tariff Act and the condition had not been satisfied in the said case.

16. As a conflict was perceived in  the  aforesaid  two  judgments,  it  was
   referred  to  the  Constitution  Bench  in  Dhiren  Chemical  Industries
   (supra).  The Constitution Bench adverted to the law laid down  in  Usha
   Margin Industries and Motiram Tolaram (supra)  and,  eventually,  opined
   thus: -
      “6. In the case of Motiram Tolaram reliance was placed upon  the  case
      of Usha Martin to contend that the appropriate duty being nil, because
      the raw material was not manufactured in India, it must be taken  that
      appropriate duty had been paid and the appellants would be entitled to
      the benefit of the exemption notification in question, which used  the
      said phrase. The Court was unable to  agree.  It  said  that  the  raw
      material being an item which was manufactured  in  India,  a  rate  of
      excise duty was leviable thereon. On the raw material which  had  been
      imported, the appropriate amount of duty had not  been  paid.  It  was
      only if this payment had been made  that  the  exemption  notification
      would be applicable.


      7. In our view, the correct interpretation of the said phrase has  not
      been placed in the judgment in the case of Usha Martin. The stress  on
      the  word  “appropriate”  has  been  mislaid.  All   that   the   word
      “appropriate” in the context means is the  correct  or  the  specified
      rate of excise duty.

       8.   An exemption notification that uses the said phrase  applies  to
      goods which have been made  from  duty-paid  material.   In  the  said
      phrase, due emphasis must be given to  the  words  “has  already  been
      paid”.  For the purposes of getting the benefit of the exemption under
      the notification, the goods must be made from raw  material  on  which
      excise duty has, as a matter of fact, been paid, and has been paid  at
      the “appropriate” or correct rate.  Unless the manufacturer  has  paid
      the correct amount of excise duty, he is not entitled to  the  benefit
      of the exemption notification.”

17. At this juncture, we are obliged to state that  the  factual  and  legal
   matrix in the case at hand is quite different.  The  decision  proceeded
   on the language of the notifications.  Moreover, we are not dealing with
   a  notification  for  exemption.   The  controversy  pertains   to   the
   interpretation of the notification No. 58/97-CE  dated  30.8.1997  which
   has been issued in exercise of powers conferred by sub-rule (6) of  Rule
   57A of the Rules dealing with availing of MODVAT  credit  under  certain
   circumstances subject to satisfaction of certain conditions precedent.

18. Before we advert to the notification it is necessary to  refer  to  Rule
   57A(1) and (6).  The relevant part of Rule 57A(1) reads as follows: -

      “57A: Applicability. –
(1) The provisions of this section shall  apply
      to such finished excisable  goods  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  the
      ‘final products’) as the Central Government may,  by  notification  in
      the Official Gazette, specify in  this  behalf,  for  the  purpose  of
      allowing credit of any duty of excise or  the  additional  duty  under
      Section 3 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 (51  of  1975),  as  may  be
      specified in the said notification (hereinafter  referred  to  as  the
      ‘specified duty’) paid on the goods used in  or  in  relation  to  the
      manufacture of the said final products whether directly or  indirectly
      and whether  contained  in  the  final  product  or  not  (hereinafter
      referred to as the ‘inputs’) and for utilizing the credit  so  allowed
      towards payment of duty of excise  leviable  on  the  final  products,
      whether under the Act or under any other Act, as may be  specified  in
      the said notification, subject to the provisions of this  section  and
      the  conditions  and  restrictions  that  may  be  specified  in   the
      notification:

              i) Provided that the Central Government may specify the  goods
                 or classes of goods in  respect  of  which  the  credit  of
                 specified duty may be restricted.”

19. Sub-rule (6) of Rule 57A in exercise of which the notification has  been
   issued is as follows: -

      “(6)  Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (1), the  Central
      Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette,  declare  the
      inputs on which the duty of  excise  paid  under  section  3A  of  the
      Central Excise Act, 1944 (1 of 1944), shall be  deemed  to  have  been
      paid at such rate or equivalent to such amount as may be specified  in
      the said notification, and allow the credit of such duty in respect of
      the said inputs at such rates or  such  amount  and  subject  to  such
      conditions as may be specified in the said notification:

            Provided that the manufacturer shall take all  reasonable  steps
      to ensure that the inputs acquired by  him  are  goods  on  which  the
      appropriate duty of excise as indicated in the documents  accompanying
      the goods, has been paid under section 3A of the Central  Excise  Act,
      1944 (1 of 1944).”

                                                         [Emphasis supplied]

20. On a careful reading of Rule 57A(1), it  is  clear  as  crystal  that  a
   manufacturer of final products can avail  the  credit  of  any  duty  of
   excise or the additional duty under Section 3 of the Customs Tariff Act,
   1975, as may be specified by the notification in  the  Official  Gazette
   subject to provisions of the Section and the conditions and restrictions
   that  may  be  specified  in  the  notification.   The  proviso  further
   stipulates that the Central Government may specify the goods or  classes
   of goods in respect of  which  the  credit  of  specified  duty  may  be
   restricted.  Thus, the conditions and restrictions have been left to  be
   prescribed by way of notification  in  respect  of  certain  classes  of
   goods.

21. Sub-rule (6) of Rule 57A commences with a  non-obstente  clause  and  it
   empowers the Central Government  to  issue  notification  declaring  the
   inputs on which the duty of excise paid under Section 3A of the  Act  to
   be deemed to have been paid at such rate or equivalent to such amount as
   may be specified in the said notification and allow the credit  of  such
   duty in respect of the said inputs at such rates or such amount and such
   conditions as may be specified in the notification.  It is pertinent  to
   state here that the  proviso  to  the  said  Rule  stipulates  that  the
   manufacturer shall take all reasonable steps to ensure that  the  inputs
   acquired by him are goods on which the appropriate duty  of  excise,  as
   indicated in the documents accompanying the goods, has been paid.  Thus,
   what is expected of  an  assessee  is  to  take  reasonable  steps  that
   appropriate duty, as indicated in the documents, has been paid.

22. At this juncture, it is relevant to refer  to  the  notification  issued
   under sub-rule (6) of Rule 57A on 30.8.1997.  In the  said  notification
   iron and steel have been mentioned as goods notified for the purposes of
   credit of duty under MODVAT.  The relevant clauses of  the  notification
   for the present purpose are clauses 2, 4 and  5  and,  hence,  they  are
   reproduced below: -

      “2.   The Central Government further declares that the duty of  excise
      under the Central Excise Act, 1944 (1 of 1944)  (hereinafter  referred
      to as said Act), shall  be  deemed  to  have  been  paid  (hereinafter
      referred to as deemed duty), on the inputs  declared  herein  and  the
      same shall be equivalent to the  amount  calculated  at  the  rate  of
      twelve per cent of the price, as declared by the manufacturer, in  the
      invoice accompanying the  said  inputs  (hereinafter  referred  to  as
      invoice price), and credit of the deemed duty so determined  shall  be
      allowed to the manufacturer of the final products.

                           xxx         xxx         xxx       xxx
      4.    The provisions of this notification shall apply  to  only  those
      inputs which have been received directly by the  manufacturer  of  the
      final products from the factory of the manufacturer of the said inputs
      under the cover of an invoice declaring that the appropriate  duty  of
      excise has been paid on such inputs under the provisions of section 3A
      of the said Act.

      5.    The provisions of this notification shall not  apply  to  inputs
      where the manufacturer of the said inputs has not declared the invoice
      price of the said inputs correctly in the documents issued at the time
      of their clearance from his factory.”

                                              [Emphasis supplied]

23. We have referred  to  the  aforesaid  notification  in  extenso  as  the
   controversy really rests on the understanding of the  language  employed
   in the notification.
Clause (2) spells  about  the  concept  of  deemed
   payment of duty on the inputs and further prescribes that  it  shall  be
   equivalent to the amount calculated at the rate of twelve  per  cent  of
   the price, as declared by the manufacturer, in the invoice  accompanying
   the said inputs.
Clause (3) deals with a different fact situation  and,
   hence, it need not be dwelled upon.
Clauses  (4)  and  (5)  are  really
   relevant for the present purpose.
On  a  plain  reading  of  the  said
   clauses it is clear to us that there  are  two  mandates  to  avail  the
   benefit  of  the  said  notification.   One  part  is  couched  in   the
   affirmative language and the other part is in the negative.
As per  the
   first part it is obligatory on the part of the assessee to  produce  the
   invoice declaring that the appropriate duty of excise has been  paid  on
   such inputs under the provision of section 3-A of the  Act  
The  second
   command, couched in the negative, is that the  provisions  of  the  said
   notification shall not apply to inputs where  the  manufacturer  of  the
   said inputs has not declared  the  invoice  price  of  the  said  inputs
   correctly in the documents at the  time  of  their  clearance  from  his
   factory.
24. In the case at hand,
there is no dispute that a  declaration  was  given
   by the manufacturer of the inputs indicating that the  excise  duty  had
   been paid on the said inputs under the Act.  
It is also not  in  dispute
   that the said inputs were directly received from  the  manufacturer  but
   not purchased from the market.  
There is no cavil over the fact that the
   manufacturer of the inputs had declared the invoice price of the  inputs
   correctly in the documents.  
 It is perceivable from the factual  matrix
   that the only allegation is that at the time of MODVAT  verification  it
   was found that the supplier of the inputs had not discharged  full  duty
   liable for the period covered under the invoices.   
This  lapse  of  the
   seller is different and  not  a  condition  or  rather  a  pre-condition
   postulated in the notification.
25. Mr. Prasad, learned counsel for the revenue has  vehemently  urged  that
   it was requisite and, in a way imperative, on the part of  the  assessee
   to verify from the concerned authority of  the  department  whether  the
   excise duty had actually been paid or  not.   The  aforesaid  submission
   leaves  us  unimpressed.   As  we  notice
 Rule  57A  (6)  requires  the
   manufacturer of final products to take reasonable care that  the  inputs
   acquired by him are goods on which the appropriate  duty  of  excise  as
   indicated in the documents accompanying the goods, has been  paid.   
The
   notification has been issued in exercise of the  power  under  the  said
   Rule.   
The notification clearly states to  which  of  those  inputs  it
   shall apply and to which of the inputs it shall not apply  and  what  is
   the duty of the manufacturer of final inputs.  
Thus,  when  there  is  a
   prescribed procedure and that has been duly followed by the manufacturer
   of final products, we do not perceive any  justifiable  reason  to  hold
   that the assessee-appellant had not taken reasonable care as  prescribed
   in the notification.  
Due care and caution was taken by the  respondent.
   It is not stated what further care and caution could  have  been  taken.
   
The  proviso  postulates  and  requires  “reasonable   care”   and   not
   verification from the department whether the duty  stands  paid  by  the
   manufacturer-seller.   
When  all  the  conditions  precedent  have  been
   satisfied, to require the assessee to find  out  from  the  departmental
   authorities about the payment of excise duty on the inputs used  in  the
   final product which have been made allowable by the  notification  would
   be travelling beyond the notification, and in a way,  transgressing  the
   same.   
This  would  be  practically  impossible  and  would   lead   to
   transactions getting delayed.  
We may hasten to explicate that  we  have
   expressed our opinion as required in  the  present  case  pertaining  to
   clauses 4 and 5 of the notification.

26. Consequently, we concur with the view expressed by the  High  Court  and
   accordingly the appeals, being devoid of merit, stand dismissed  without
   any order as to costs.

                                                   ……………………….J.
                                                   [Anil R. Dave]

                                                   ……………………….J.
                                                   [Dipak Misra]


New Delhi
August 26, 2013

-----------------------
[1]    2003 (158) ELT 680 (P&H)
[2]    (2002) 2 SCC 127
[3]    (1997) 7 SCC 47
[4]    (1999) 6 SCC 375


Cryptic orders - Remand for fresh consideration = “It was necessary for the High Court to consider whether the trial court’s assessment of the evidence and its opinion that the appellant must be convicted deserve to be confirmed. This exercise is necessary because the personal liberty of an accused is curtailed because of the conviction. The High Court must state its reasons why it is accepting the evidence on record. The High Court’s concurrence with the trial court’s view would be acceptable only if it is supported by reasons. In such appeals it is a court of first appeal. Reasons cannot be cryptic. By this, we do not mean that the High Court is expected to write an unduly long treatise. The judgment may be short but must reflect proper application of mind to vital evidence and important submissions which go to the root of the matter.” 12. Tested on the touchstone of the aforesaid principles we find that there is total lack of deliberation and proper ratiocination. There has been really no assessment of evidence on record. The credibility of the witnesses has not appositely been adjudged. Affirmative satisfaction recorded by the High Court is far from being satisfactory. We are pained to say so, as we find that the learned trial Judge has written an extremely confused judgment replete with repetitions and in such a situation it becomes absolutely obligatory on the part of the High Court to be more careful to come to a definite conclusion about the guilt of the accused persons, for their liberty is jeopardized. It may be stated at the cost of repetition that it is the sacrosanct duty of the appellate court, while sitting in appeal against the judgment of the trial Judge, to be satisfied that the guilt of the accused has been established beyond all reasonable doubt after proper re-assessment, re-appreciation and re-scrutiny of the material on record. 13. It can be stated with certitude that appreciation of evidence and proper re-assessment to arrive at the conclusion is imperative in a criminal appeal. That is the quality of exercise which is expected of the appellate court to be undertaken and when that is not done, the cause of justice is not subserved, for neither an innocent person should be sent to prison without his fault nor a guilty person should be let off despite evidence on record to assure his guilt. Ergo, the emphasis is on the duty of the appellate court. 14. Consequently, the impugned judgment and order passed in Criminal Appeal No. 531 of 2004 by the High Court is set aside and the appeal preferred by the appellants is remitted for fresh disposal. The High Court is requested to dispose of the appeal as expeditiously as possible so that the Sword of Damocles is not kept hanging on the head of the appellants. As the appellants are on bail, they shall continue to remain on bail on same terms and conditions till the disposal of the appeal by the High Court.

                     published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40689
   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1517 OF 2007


Kamlesh Prabhudas Tanna & Another       ... Appellants

                                   Versus

State of Gujarat                               ...Respondent

                               J U D G M E N T


Dipak Misra, J.


      Assailing the legal acceptability of the judgment and order passed  by
the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Criminal Appeal No.  531  of  2004
whereby the Division Bench of the High Court has given  endorsement  to  the
judgment passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast  Track  Court
No. 1, Jamnagar in Sessions Case No. 158 of 2001 wherein the  learned  trial
Judge had found the appellants guilty of the offences under  Sections  304B,
306 and 498A read with Section 34  of  the  Indian  Penal  Code  (for  short
“IPC”) and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition  Act,  1961  and  imposed  the
sentence of rigorous imprisonment of seven years and a  fine  of  Rs.1,000/-
on the  first  score,  five  years  rigorous  imprisonment  and  a  fine  of
Rs.1,000/- on the second score, eighteen months rigorous imprisonment and  a
fine of Rs.500/- on the third count and  six  months  rigorous  imprisonment
and a fine of Rs.250/- on the fourth count with the default clause  for  the
fine amount in respect of each of the offences.   The  learned  trial  Judge
stipulated that all the sentences shall be concurrent.

   2. Filtering the unnecessary details, the prosecution case, in brief,  is
      that the marriage between the appellant No. 1  and  deceased  Sandhya,
      sister of the informant, PW-2, was solemnized on 24.9.1997.  After the
      marriage the deceased stayed with her husband and  the  mother-in-law,
      the appellant No.2 herein, at the matrimonial home situate at Jamnagar
      in Patel Colony Sheri No. 1.  In the wedlock, two  children,  one  son
      and a daughter were born.  On 11.9.2001, the informant, brother of the
      deceased, got a telephonic call from the accused No. 1 that his sister
      Sandhya had committed suicide.  On receipt of the  telephone  call  he
      travelled from Goa along with his friend, Sandil Kumar, PW-20, and  at
      that juncture, the husband of  Sandhya,  Kamlesh,  informed  that  the
      deceased was fed up with the constant ill-health of her  children  and
      the said frustration  had  led  her  to  commit  suicide  by  tying  a
      ‘dupatta’ around her neck.   The  brother  of  the  deceased  did  not
      believe the version of Kamlesh, and lodged an FIR  alleging  that  the
      husband and the mother-in-law of the deceased, after the marriage, had
      been constantly asking for dowry of Rs.2 lacs from the father  of  the
      deceased, but as the said demand could not be  satisfied  due  to  the
      financial condition of the father, the husband and his mother  started
      ill-treating her in the matrimonial home and being unable to  tolerate
      the physical and mental torture she was compelled to  commit  suicide.
      Be it noted, as the death was unnatural, the police had sent the  dead
      body for post mortem and the doctor conducting the autopsy opined that
      the death was due to suicide.  After  the  criminal  law  was  set  in
      motion on the base of the FIR lodged by the brother, the investigating
      officer examined number of witnesses  and  after  completing  all  the
      formalities laid the charge sheet under Sections 304B,  306  and  498A
      read with Section 34 IPC and under Section 4 of the Dowry  Prohibition
      Act, 1961 before the competent Court,  who,  in  turn,  committed  the
      matter to the Court of Session.

   3. The accused persons denied the allegations and claimed  to  be  tried.
      The prosecution, in order to establish the  charges  levelled  against
      the accused persons, examined 22 witnesses and got  marked  number  of
      documents.  The defence chose not to adduce any evidence.

   4. The learned trial Judge  principally  posed  four  questions,  namely,
     
whether the accused persons had inflicted unbearable  torture  on  the
      deceased as well as caused mental harassment to make themselves liable
      for punishment under Section 498A IPC; 
whether the material brought on
      record established the offence under Section 304B read with Section 34 IPC; 
whether the physical and mental torture on the deceased compelled
      her to commit suicide on 11.9.2001  as  a  consequence  of  which  the
      accused persons had become liable to be convicted  under  Section  306
      read with Section 34 IPC; and 
whether the accused persons had demanded
      a sum of Rs.2 lacs towards dowry from the parents of Sandhya so as  to
      be found guilty under Section 4 of the  Dowry  Prohibition  Act.   
The
      learned trial Judge answered all the questions in the affirmative  and
      opined that the prosecution had been able to prove the offences to the
      hilt and, accordingly, imposed the sentence as stated hereinbefore.

   5. Grieved by the judgment of conviction and the order  of  sentence  the
      appellants preferred Criminal Appeal No. 531 of 2004.
The High  Court
      at the stage of admission had suo motu issued notice  for  enhancement
      of sentence  which  was  eventually  converted  to  Criminal  Revision
      Application No. 444 of 2007.
The State had preferred Criminal  Appeal
      No. 1889 of 2004 for the  self-same  purpose.  
The  appeals  and  the
      revision application were disposed  of  by  a  common  judgment  dated
      6.9.2007 whereby the Division Bench of the High Court  concurred  with
      the view expressed  by  the  learned  trial  Judge  and,  accordingly,
      dismissed the appeals preferred by the accused as well as by the State
      and resultantly Criminal Revision initiated suo motu by the High Court
      also stood dismissed.
The non-success in the appeal has compelled the
      accused-appellants to prefer this appeal by special leave.

   6. We have  heard  Mr.  Ranbir  Singh  Yadav,  learned  counsel  for  the
      appellant No. 1, Ms. Nidhi, learned counsel for the appellant  No.  2,
      and Ms. Pinky Behera, learned counsel appearing  for  the  respondent-
      State.

   7. In the present appeal we are constrained to note that the  High  Court
      has really not appreciated and analysed the evidence on record and  it
      is perceptible that it has narrated the prosecution version,  referred
      to the names of witnesses examined and the documents exhibited  during
      the trial, reproduced the  findings  recorded  by  the  learned  trial
      Judge, recorded the submissions of learned counsel for the  respective
      parties and thereafter, referred to the post mortem  report,  the  FSL
      report,  inquest  panchnama  and  other  documentary   evidence   and,
      ultimately referring to the deposition of prosecution witnesses  in  a
      cryptic manner, has come to hold that there is no lacuna in  the  oral
      evidence and the same has been duly corroborated  by  the  documentary
      evidence.  The High Court has dealt with the factum of suicide at some
      length which was not disputed.  Thereafter, there has been  advertence
      to the issue of enhancement of sentence in the appeal preferred by the
      State and how the said appeal did  not  merit  consideration.   As  we
      perceive, the High Court, while dealing with a statutory appeal  under
      the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  has  failed  to  appreciate   and
      scrutinize  the  evidence  in  proper  perspective,  and  the  reasons
      ascribed by it for accepting the evidence and concurring with the view
      of the trial court is not supported by any acceptable reason.

   8. At this juncture, we are obliged  to  state  that  though  it  may  be
      difficult to state that the judgment suffers from sans reasons, yet it
      is not at all difficult to say that the reasons  ascribed  are  really
      apology for reasons.  If we allow ourselves to say so, one may ascribe
      certain reasons which seem to be reasons but the  litmus  test  is  to
      give seemly and condign reasons either  to  sustain  or  overturn  the
      judgment.   The  filament  of  reasoning  must  logically  flow   from
      requisite analysis, but, unfortunately, the said exercise has not been
      carried out.  In this  context,  we  may  refer  with  profit  to  the
      decision in Padam Singh v.  State  of  U.P.[1],  wherein  a  two-Judge
      Bench, while dealing  with  the  duty  of  the  appellate  court,  has
      expressed thus: -
      “It is the duty of an  appellate  court  to  look  into  the  evidence
      adduced in the case and arrive at  an  independent  conclusion  as  to
      whether the said evidence can be relied upon or not and even if it can
      be relied upon, then whether the prosecution can be said to have  been
      proved beyond reasonable doubt on the said evidence.  The  credibility
      of a witness has to be adjudged by  the  appellate  court  in  drawing
      inference from proved and admitted facts.  It must be remembered  that
      the appellate court,  like  the  trial  court,  has  to  be  satisfied
      affirmatively that the prosecution case is substantially true and  the
      guilt of the accused has been proved beyond all  reasonable  doubt  as
      the presumption of innocence with which the accused starts,  continues
      right through until he is held guilty by the final court of appeal and
      that presumption is neither strengthened by an acquittal nor  weakened
      by a conviction in the trial court.”
                                                         [Emphasis supplied]
   9. In Rama and others v. State of  Rajasthan[2],  the  Court  has  stated
      about the duty of the appellate court in the following terms: -
      “It is well settled that in a criminal appeal, a duty is enjoined upon
      the appellate court to reappraise the evidence itself  and  it  cannot
      proceed to dispose of the appeal upon appraisal  of  evidence  by  the
      trial court alone especially when the appeal has been already admitted
      and placed for final hearing.  Upholding such a procedure would amount
      to negation of valuable right of appeal of an accused, which cannot be
      permitted under law.”

  10. In Iqbal Abdul Samiya Malek v. State of  Gujarat[3],  relying  on  the
      pronouncements in Padam Singh (supra)  and  Bani  Singh  v.  State  of
      U.P.[4], this Court has reiterated the  principle  pertaining  to  the
      duty of the appellate court.

  11. Recently, a three-Judge Bench in Majjal v.  State  of  Haryana[5]  has
      ruled thus: -
      “It was necessary for the High Court to  consider  whether  the  trial
      court’s assessment of the evidence and its opinion that the  appellant
      must be convicted deserve to be confirmed.  
This exercise is necessary
      because the personal liberty of an accused is curtailed because of the
      conviction.  
The High Court must state its reasons why it is accepting
      the evidence on record.  
The High Court’s concurrence with  the  trial
      court’s view would be acceptable only if it is supported  by  reasons.
      In such appeals it is a court of  first  appeal.   
Reasons  cannot  be cryptic.  
By this, we do not mean that the High Court is  expected  to
      write an unduly long treatise.  
The judgment may  be  short  but  must
      reflect proper application of mind to  vital  evidence  and  important
      submissions which go to the root of the matter.”

  12. Tested on the touchstone of the  aforesaid  principles  we  find  that
      there is total lack of deliberation and proper  ratiocination.   
There
      has been really no assessment of evidence on record.  
The  credibility
      of the  witnesses  has  not  appositely  been  adjudged.   Affirmative
      satisfaction  recorded  by  the  High  Court   is   far   from   being
      satisfactory.  
We are pained to say so, as we find  that  the  learned
      trial Judge has written an extremely confused  judgment  replete  with
      repetitions and in such a situation it becomes  absolutely  obligatory
      on the part of the High Court to be more careful to come to a definite
      conclusion about the guilt of the accused persons, for  their  liberty
      is jeopardized.  
It may be stated at the cost of repetition that it is
      the sacrosanct duty of the appellate court, while  sitting  in  appeal
      against the judgment of the trial Judge,  to  be  satisfied  that  the
      guilt of the accused has been established beyond all reasonable  doubt
      after proper re-assessment, re-appreciation  and  re-scrutiny  of  the
      material on record.

  13. It can be stated with certitude  that  appreciation  of  evidence  and
      proper re-assessment to arrive at the conclusion is  imperative  in  a
      criminal appeal.  
That is the quality of exercise which is expected of
      the appellate court to be undertaken and when that is  not  done,  the
      cause of justice is not subserved,  for  neither  an  innocent  person
      should be sent to prison without his fault nor a guilty person  should
      be let off despite evidence on record to assure his guilt.  Ergo,  the
      emphasis is on the duty of the appellate court.

  14. Consequently, the impugned  judgment  and  order  passed  in  Criminal
      Appeal No. 531 of 2004 by the High Court is set aside and  the  appeal
      preferred by the appellants is remitted for fresh disposal.  
The  High
      Court is requested to  dispose  of  the  appeal  as  expeditiously  as
      possible so that 
the Sword of Damocles is not kept hanging on the head
      of the appellants.  
As the appellants are on bail, they shall continue
      to remain on bail on same terms and conditions till  the  disposal  of the appeal by the High Court.

  15. The appeal stands disposed of accordingly.


                                     ……………………………….J.
                            [K. S. Radhakrishnan]



                                                             ……………………………….J.
                                                          [Dipak Misra]
New Delhi;
August 26, 2013.
-----------------------
[1]    (2000) 1 SCC 621
[2]    (2002) 4 SCC 571
[3]    (2012) 11 SCC 312
[4]    (1996) 4 SCC 720
[5]    (2013) 6 SCC 798

-----------------------
11


Friday, August 23, 2013

When sec. 304 Part II applies - “ 300. Murder.- xx xx xx Exception 4.- Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. Explanation.- It is immaterial in such cases which party offers the provocation or commits the first assault.” The help of Exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused (a) without premeditation; (b) in a sudden fight; (c) without the offender’s having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and (d) the fight must have been with the person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the “fight” occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is defined in IPC. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must be no time for the passions to cool down and in this case, the parties have worked themselves into a fury on account of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat between two and more persons whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case…..“ In this background when we consider the facts of the present case, we have no manner of doubt that Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC is not at all attracted. In the case in hand, the convicts had entered the room of the daughter of the deceased in midnight, molested her and the poor father, perhaps because of his age, could not do anything other than to abuse the convicts. He gave choicest abuses but did not fight with the convicts. Verbal abuses are not fight as it is well settled that at least two persons are needed to fight. Therefore, this ingredient is not satisfied. Then, can it be said that the crime has been committed in a heat of passion? If time is taken to cool down, then the crime cannot be said to have been committed in a heat of passion. It is the specific case of the prosecution, which in fact, has also been accepted by the High Court that “when her father Tikeswar abused them, the accused Khageswar being annoyed brought a budia from his house, which is nearby, and dealt blows to her father and accused Dusasan brought a lathi and assaulted her father.” This clearly shows that both the convicts had sufficient time to cool down and therefore, it cannot be said that the crime was committed in a heat of passion. So far as the convict, Kampa @ Sricharan Naik is concerned, he is convicted with the aid of Section 34 of the IPC. All of them have come together and participated in the crime which goes to show that these convicts shared the common intention. In the face of what we have observed above, it is clear that the High Court erred in holding that the offence for which the convicts can be held guilty shall be Section 304 Part II of the IPC. In the result, we allow this appeal, set aside that portion of the judgment of the High Court whereby it had altered the conviction of the respondents from Section 302/34 of the IPC to that of Section 304/34 of the IPC and restore that of the trial court. The respondents, if have not already undergone the sentence awarded by the trial court, shall forthwith be taken into custody to serve out the remainder of the sentence.

                        published in    http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40685                                     
 REPORTABLE


                       IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1249 OF 2013
               (@SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL) No.4928 of 2011)


           STATE OF ORISSA                         … APPELLANT

                                   VERSUS

           KHAGA @ KHAGESWAR NAIK & ORS.               …RESPONDENTS


                               J U D G M E N T



           CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.

                       State of Orissa, aggrieved by the judgment and order
           dated 1st September, 2009 passed in Criminal  Appeal  No.274  of
           1997 whereby the Division Bench of the High  Court  has  altered
           the conviction of the respondents from Section 302/34 to Section
           304 Part II of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter to be referred
           to as ‘the IPC’), has preferred this Special Leave Petition.


                       Leave granted.


                       In the present appeal, as we are concerned with  the
           nature of the  offence  said  to  have  been  committed  by  the
           respondents (hereinafter to be referred to as  ‘the  convicts’),
           we shall refer to only  those  facts  which  are  necessary  for
           decision on the said issue.  Occurrence in the present case  had
           taken place in Raghunathpali, a hamlet within  the  district  of
           Sambalpur in the State of Orissa. As  usual,  on  11th  October,
           1995 Mohini Naik and her father, Tikeshwar Naik were sleeping at
           their home in separate rooms  adjoining  each  other.  When  the
           entire village was fast asleep, the convicts came to their house
           at 11.00 P.M. and knocked the door in which Mohini,  the  rustic
           villager was sleeping. She was asked to open  the  door  of  her
           room. She could recognize the convict Khageswar from  his  voice
           and on enquiry as  to  who  was  knocking  the  door,  Khageswar
           disclosed his name. She  opened  the  door  and  saw  the  three
           convicts standing at the door.  Two of them i.e.  Khageswar  and
           Kampa entered into her room and molested her. She  raised  alarm
           whereupon her father, Tikeshwar woke up and arrived at the  spot
           and abused the convicts  in  obscene  language.  All  the  three
           convicts caught hold of her father, assaulted him by  kicks  and
           blows and dragged him towards the orchard. He  was  followed  by
           his daughter,  Mohini,  the  informant  of  the  case.  She  was
           threatened that if she will come out, they will kill her. Mohini
           saw her father being assaulted from a distance by Khageswar  and
           Dusasan. While Tikeswar  was  abusing  the  convicts,  Khageswar
           brought one ‘budia’ from  his  house  and  gave  blows  to  him.
           Similarly, convict Dusasan brought a ‘lathi’ from his  home  and
           assaulted her father. Ultimately, Mohini could see the dead body
           of her father lying  in  ‘Nala’  at  about  3.00  P.M.  on  12th
           October, 1995.


                        Police  after  usual  investigation  submitted  the
           charge-sheet and the convicts were ultimately committed  to  the
           Court of Session to face the trial. The  convicts  were  charged
           for commission of the offences  under  Sections  457,354,506,302
           and 201/34 of the IPC.  They pleaded not guilty and  claimed  to
           be tried. Their defence is  false  implication  but  no  defence
           witness has been examined.


                 The trial court on appreciation of  evidence  came  to  the
           conclusion that the prosecution has been able to prove its  case
           beyond  all  reasonable   doubt   against   the   convicts   and
           accordingly, it  convicted  them  for  offences  under  Sections
           457,354,506,302, 201/34 of the IPC. On appeal,  the  High  Court
           accepted  the  case  of  the  prosecution  but  held  that   the
           allegations proved construed an offence under Section 304Part-II
           of the IPC. Accordingly, while maintaining the conviction of the
           respondents under Sections 457,354,506 and 201/34  of  the  IPC,
           the High Court altered their conviction from Section  302/34  of
           the IPC to that of Section 304 Part II of the IPC and  sentenced
           them to undergo rigorous imprisonment  for  a  period  of  eight
           years for offence under Section 304, Part II of the  IPC.  While
           doing so, the High Court observed as follows:


                                   “  17.  We,  however,  find   that   the
                          prosecution has  failed  to  establish  that  the
                          accused  persons  had   any   prior   motive   or
                          pre-meditation to  kill  deceased   Tikeswar  and
                          admittedly, the prosecution has not been able  to
                          establish  that  there  was  any  enmity  between
                          deceased Tikeswar or his daughter Mohini  (P.W.4)
                          with the accused persons. It appears, the accused
                          persons who had gone to the  house  of  P.W.4  to
                          commit sexual act, on being abused by Tikeswar in
                          obscene  language,  got  provoked  and   attacked
                          Tikeswar  in a fit of anger and on  the  spur  of
                          the moment, without any prior planning or design.
                          The act of the accused persons appears to be more
                          by way of  sudden  retaliation  in  the  heat  of
                          passion, on being abused by deceased Tikeswar  in
                          obscene language and was not      pre-planned  or
                          intentional. Accordingly, we feel,  the  interest
                          of  justice  would  be  best   served,   if   the
                          conviction of the accused persons  under  Section
                          302/34 IPC is modified and reduced to  one  under
                          Section 304 Part II IPC. The  conviction  of  the
                          accused persons under Sections 457/354/506/201/34
                          IPC needs no interference.”




                 This is how the appellant- State of Orissa is before us and
           challenges the alteration of conviction from Section  302/34  to
           that of Section 304 Part II of the IPC.




                       Mr. Radha Shyam Jena, learned counsel  appearing  on
           behalf of the appellant submits that the
           allegations proved clearly make out a case of murder  punishable
           under Section 302 of  the  IPC  and  the  High  Court  erred  in
           altering the same to Section  304  Part  II  of  the  IPC.  Mrs.
           Rachana Joshi Issar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of  the
           respondents supports the judgment of the High Court and contends
           that the offence having been committed without pre-meditation in
           a heat of passion, Exception 4 to Section  300  of  the  IPC  is
           clearly attracted and hence the allegation  proved  is  culpable
           homicide not amounting to murder. Accordingly, she submits  that
           the order of the High Court does not call for any interference.


                       The rival  submission  necessitates  examination  of
           Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC, same reads as follows:






                            “ 300. Murder.-


                                  xx         xx         xx


                          Exception 4.- Culpable homicide is not murder  if
                          it is committed without premeditation in a sudden
                          fight in  the  heat  of  passion  upon  a  sudden
                          quarrel and without  the  offender  having  taken
                          undue advantage or acted in a  cruel  or  unusual
                          manner.


                          Explanation.- It  is  immaterial  in  such  cases
                          which party offers the provocation or commits the
                          first assault.”




           From a plain reading of the aforesaid exception  it  is  evident
           that it shall be attracted only  if  the  death  is  caused  (i)
           without premeditation, (ii) in a sudden fight  and  (iii)  in  a
           heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel. If all these  ingredients
           are satisfied, the exception will come into play only  when  the
           Court comes to the conclusion that the offender  had  not  taken
           undue advantage or acted in a cruel  or  unusual  manner.  Above
           all, this section would be attracted when the  fight  had  taken
           place with the person killed.




                 The aforesaid view finds support from a  judgment  of  this
           Court in Pappu vs. State of M.P. (2006) 7 SCC 391  in  which  it
           has been held as follows:


                          “13…… The help of Exception 4 can be  invoked  if
                          death is caused (a) without premeditation; (b) in
                          a sudden fight; (c) without the offender’s having
                          taken undue advantage or  acted  in  a  cruel  or
                          unusual manner; and (d) the fight must have  been
                          with the person killed. To bring  a  case  within
                          Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned  in  it
                          must be found. It is to be noted that the “fight”
                          occurring in Exception 4 to Section  300  IPC  is
                          defined in IPC. It takes two  to  make  a  fight.
                          Heat of passion requires that there  must  be  no
                          time for the passions to cool down  and  in  this
                          case, the parties have worked themselves  into  a
                          fury on account of the verbal altercation in  the
                          beginning. A fight is a combat  between  two  and
                          more persons whether with or without weapons.  It
                          is not possible to enunciate any general rule  as
                          to what shall be deemed to be a  sudden  quarrel.
                          It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is
                          sudden or not must necessarily  depend  upon  the
                          proved facts of each case…..“


                       In this background when we consider the facts of the
           present case, we have no manner of doubt  that  Exception  4  to
           Section 300 of the IPC is not at all attracted. In the  case  in
           hand, the convicts had entered the room of the daughter  of  the
           deceased in midnight, molested her and the poor father,  perhaps
           because of his age, could not do anything other  than  to  abuse
           the convicts. He gave choicest abuses but did not fight with the
           convicts. Verbal abuses are not fight as it is well settled that
           at least two  persons  are  needed  to  fight.  Therefore,  this
           ingredient is not satisfied.


                       Then, can  it  be  said  that  the  crime  has  been
           committed in a heat of passion? If time is taken to  cool  down,
           then the crime cannot be said to have been committed in  a  heat
           of passion. It is the specific case of the prosecution, which in
           fact, has also been accepted by the High Court  that  “when  her
           father Tikeswar abused them, the accused Khageswar being annoyed
           brought a budia from his house, which is nearby, and dealt blows
           to her father and accused Dusasan brought a lathi and  assaulted
           her father.” This clearly  shows  that  both  the  convicts  had
           sufficient time to cool down and therefore, it  cannot  be  said
           that the crime was committed in a heat of passion.


                       So far as the convict, Kampa  @  Sricharan  Naik  is
           concerned, he is convicted with the aid of  Section  34  of  the
           IPC. All of them have come  together  and  participated  in  the
           crime which goes to show that these convicts shared  the  common
           intention.


                       In the face of what we have observed  above,  it  is
           clear that the High Court erred in holding that the offence  for
           which the convicts can be held guilty shall be Section 304  Part
           II of the IPC.


                       In the result, we allow this appeal, set aside  that
           portion of the judgment of the High Court whereby it had altered
           the conviction of the respondents from Section 302/34 of the IPC
           to that of Section 304/34 of the IPC and  restore  that  of  the
           trial court. The respondents, if have not already undergone  the
           sentence awarded by the trial court, shall  forthwith  be  taken
           into custody  to  serve  out  the  remainder  of  the  sentence.







                                             ........................J
                                       [R.M.LODHA]


                                   ........................J
                                       [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD]

           NEW DELHI
           AUGUST 23, 2013.







-----------------------
8


Promotion by considering the period of service done on adhoc basis = No = whether the applicant has any legal right to be considered for the post of Executive Engineer (Mechanical). It is seen he was an ad-hoc appointee for various periods of time from 23.3.1999 till his regularization as Assistant Engineer on 29.4.2005. His orders on 29.4.2005 appointing him as an Assistant Engineer on regular basis also stipulated that he would be on probation for two years. The applicant at the time of such regularization on 29.4.2005 did not challenge the same nor did he make a representation at that time for treating his previous service on ad-hoc basis from 23.3.99 to 29.4.2005 as regular service. He accepted the order as per Annexure-A/1 together with the probation of two years period. Having done this he cannot now come and make a claim that his entire period from 23.3.99 onwards should be regularized so that he can avail of the recruitment rules for being promoted as Executive Engineer on the promotion quota. As per recruitment of Executive Engineer, the applicant is not eligible since 8 years of regular service is required.”= as per the extant rules for promotion to the post of Executive Engineer (Mechanical) 8 years regular service as Assistant Engineer is imperative. The Rules do not provide for any relaxation in this behalf. This is clear from the reading of the said rules which provide for appointment to the post of Executive Engineer (Mechanical). As per the Recruitment Rules, post of Executive Engineer (Mechanical) is a selection post. The mode of recruitment stated in the Rules is as under: “By promotion failing which by transfer on deputation (including short-term contract) and failing both by direct recruitment.” The Recruitment Rules also stipulate eligibility condition in all the three circumstances, namely, promotion, transfer on deputation as well as direct recruitment. In so far as filling up of this post by way of promotion is concerned, following requirements are stipulated for a candidate to be eligible in that category: “PROMOTION: Assistant Engineer (Mechanical) with 8 years regular service in the grade.”- there are three alternate modes of recruitment to the Post, namely, (1) by promotion, failing which (2) by transfer on deputation (including short term contract) and failing both (3) by direct recruitment. No doubt, if some departmental candidate is available and eligible to be considered, the promotion method is to be resorted to in the first instance. However, no departmental candidate was available. Concededly, the respondent had not completed 8 years regular service as Assistant Engineer. In such circumstances only out of sympathy the High Court could not have given the impugned direction. This judicial sympathy resulting into a right in favour of respondent to appoint him contrary to the recruitment rules framed under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India which are statutory in nature is clearly misplaced and needs to be denounced. Such a direction is clearly unsustainable and is accordingly set aside. As a result, the appeal is allowed restoring the order of the Tribunal dismissing the O.A. filed by the respondent. No costs.

                   published in    http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40684                                 
  [REPORTABLE]

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                          CIVIL APPEAL NO.7032/2013
              (arising out of S.L.P.(Civil) No. 20506 OF 2011)

Union of India & Ors.
            ….Appellants

                 Vs.

Shri G.R.Rama Krishna & Anr.
…..Respondents



                               J U D G M E N T



A.K.SIKRI,J.

1.    Leave granted.

2.     The  respondent  No.1  herein  (hereinafter  referred   to   as   the
respondent) was appointed as Engineering Assistant  (Mechanical) in  Andaman
Lakshdeep Harbour Works (ALHW) on ad-hoc basis with effect  from  17.4.1979.
Though this ad-hoc period was of one year, the respondent continued to  work
in the capacity even  thereafter  without  obtaining  the  approval  of  the
Department of Personnel and Training.   The    services  were  continued  as
ALHW was facing lots of  problems  due  to  shortage  of  staff  at  various
levels.  He was later on promoted as  Inspector  of  Works  on  ad-hoc  with
effect from 11.11.1984.  This post was later on merged with that  of  Junior
Engineer  and  thus  the  respondent  was  accorded  the  status  of  Junior
Engineer.

3.    Next promotion from Junior  Engineer  is  to  the  post  of  Assistant
Engineer.  Again on  ad-hoc basis, the respondent was promoted as  Assistant
Engineer with effect from 23.9.1999.  He  was  given  regular  promotion  as
Assistant Engineer (Mechanical) on 2.6.2005 and was put on probation  for  a
period  of  two  years  from  that  date.   The  respondent  submitted   his
representation dated 13.10.2008 for treating the ad-hoc period of  Assistant
Engineer from the 23.9.1999 to 24.8.2005 as regular  service  for  promotion
to  the  next  higher  post  i.e.  Executive  Engineer  (Mechanial).    This
representation was turned down by the authorities with the result  that  the
respondent was treated as regularly appointed Assistant Engineer  only  from
24.8.2005.

4.     On 10/16.1.2009, the   U.P.S.C.  advertised  the  post  of  Executive
Engineer (Mechanical) for filling up on direct recruitment basis  and  fixed
the date of interview as 27.2.2009.  This move for filling up  of  the  post
of Executive Engineer (Mechanical) adopting the mode of  direct  recruitment
was taken on the  premise  that  no  departmental  candidate  was  available
inasmuch as 8 years regular service as Assistant  Engineer  was  needed  for
promotion to the post of Executive Engineer, and  no  departmental  employee
fulfilled this condition.

5.    The respondent filed O.A. before the Central  Administrative  Tribunal
challenging the proposal of the UPSC to fill the post on direct  recruitment
basis contending that he was eligible to be considered for such a  promotion
as after counting the ad-hoc period he had completed  the  requisite  number
of years as Assistant Engineer.

6.     This  O.A.  was  dismissed  by  the  Tribunal  taking  note  of   the
recruitment rules as per which regular service of 8 years  is  mentioned  as
qualifying service to become eligible for the post  of  Executive  Engineer.
The relevant portion of the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal  in
this behalf reads as under:

                 “The point to be considered here is
  whether the  applicant
           has any legal right to be considered for the post  of  Executive
           Engineer (Mechanical).  It is seen he was  an  ad-hoc  appointee
           for  various  periods  of   time   from   23.3.1999   till   his
           regularization as Assistant Engineer on 29.4.2005.   His  orders
           on 29.4.2005 appointing him as an Assistant Engineer on  regular
           basis also stipulated that he would  be  on  probation  for  two
           years. The applicant at  the  time  of  such  regularization  on
           29.4.2005  did  not  challenge  the  same  nor  did  he  make  a
           representation at that time for treating his previous service on
           ad-hoc basis from 23.3.99 to 29.4.2005 as regular  service.   He
           accepted  the  order  as  per  Annexure-A/1  together  with  the
           probation of two years period. Having done this  he  cannot  now
           come and make a  claim  that  his  entire  period  from  23.3.99
           onwards should be regularized  so  that  he  can  avail  of  the
           recruitment rules for being promoted as  Executive  Engineer  on
           the promotion quota.  As per recruitment of Executive  Engineer,
           the applicant is not eligible since 8 years of  regular  service
           is required.”



The Tribunal thus opined that the respondent  had  not  made  any  case  for
quashing  the steps taken by the U.P.S.C. for filling up  the  post  of  the
Executive Engineer (Mechanical) through direct  recruitment  as  recruitment
rules.

7.    Against the judgment of the Tribunal, the respondent  filed  the  Writ
Petition in the High Court of  Calcutta  (District  :  Andaman).   The  High
Court has allowed the Writ Petition and modified the order of  the  Tribunal
by directing that the respondent be appointed as  Executive  Engineer  after
observing all other formalities.  This direction is given by the High  Court
as a special case, without setting it as precedence,  as is clear  from  the
operative portion of this order:

            “In this case the petitioner by way of a  stop  gap  arrangement
           worked in an ad-hoc basis which in  other  words  amounted  to  a
           permanent arrangement since he was allowed to perform for a  long
           time since the post is still vacant.  There is no  reason  as  to
           why the petitioner who had put in such a length of service should
           be denied an opportunity of being promoted in the absence of  any
           adverse situation against him.

            Keeping in view peculiar facts and circumstances of the  present
           case, without setting it as a precedence and as  a  very  special
           case more so as the Petitioner has been working since  1990  till
           date in the capacity of Assistant Engineer which is a feeder post
           of the Executive Engineer (Mechanical), we would direct  that  he
           be  appointed  as  Executive   Engineer   (Mechanical)   in   the
           establishment of the Respondent No.1 after  observing  all  other
           formalities.”







8.    We are unable to appreciate the aforesaid approach of the High  Court.
 It is not disputed before us that as per the extant rules for promotion  to
the post of Executive Engineer  (Mechanical)  8  years  regular  service  as
Assistant Engineer  is  imperative.   
The  Rules  do  not  provide  for  any
relaxation in this behalf.  This is clear  from  the  reading  of  the  said
rules which provide for  appointment  to  the  post  of  Executive  Engineer
(Mechanical).  As per the Recruitment  Rules,  post  of  Executive  Engineer
(Mechanical) is a selection post.  The mode of  recruitment  stated  in  the
Rules is as under:

            “By promotion failing which by transfer on deputation (including
          short-term contract) and failing both by direct recruitment.”




      The Recruitment Rules also stipulate eligibility condition in all  the
 three circumstances, namely, promotion, transfer on deputation as  well  as
 direct recruitment.  In so far as  filling  up  of  this  post  by  way  of
 promotion  is  concerned,  following  requirements  are  stipulated  for  a
 candidate to be eligible in that category:

      “PROMOTION:
      Assistant Engineer (Mechanical) with 8 years regular  service  in  the
 grade.”




9.     From  the  aforesaid,  it  becomes  apparent  that
there  are  three
alternate modes of recruitment  to  the  Post,  namely,  
(1)  by  promotion, failing which 
(2) by transfer on deputation (including short term  contract) and failing both 
(3) by direct recruitment.  
No doubt, if some  departmental
candidate is available and eligible to be considered, the  promotion  method
is to be resorted to  in  the  first  instance.   
However,  no  departmental candidate was available.  
Concededly, the respondent  had  not  completed  8 years regular service   as Assistant Engineer.  In such  circumstances  only
out of sympathy the High Court could not have given the impugned  direction.
  
This judicial sympathy resulting into a right in favour of  respondent  to
appoint him contrary to  the  recruitment  rules  framed  under  proviso  to
Article 309 of the Constitution of India which are statutory  in  nature  is
clearly misplaced and needs to be denounced.    
Such a direction is  clearly
unsustainable and is accordingly set aside.  
As  a  result,  the  appeal  is
allowed restoring the order of the Tribunal dismissing  the  O.A.  filed  by
the respondent.  No costs.



                                         ……………………………….J.
                                           (K.S.Radhakrishnan)



                                        …………………………………J.
                                           (A.K. Sikri)
New Delhi,
Dated: 23rd   August, 2013