For Taking cognizance under sec. 504 of I.P.C.- NO VERBATIM NECESSARY = The appellant then preferred Criminal Revision Application No. 1124 of 2011 challenging the order issuing the process for offence punishable under Section 504 IPC. It was contented that the allegation that she had indulged in any action with an intention to provoke the complainant to break breach of public peace or commit any other offence, was totally unfounded. Further, it was also pointed out that no details had been furnished in that complaint to show in what manner the appellant had attempted to provoke the complainant, so as to attract Section 504 IPC .Further, it was pointed out that the complaint ought to have disclosed the actual words if, at all, used by the appellant, which would have provoked her to commit any other offence. It was also pointed out that the learned Magistrate has not properly understood the scope of Section 202 Cr.P.C. in issuing the process to the appellant. = “504. Intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of the peace.- Whoever intentionally insults, and thereby gives provocation to any person, intending or knowing it to be likely that such provocation will cause him to break the public peace, or to commit any other offence, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.”= Section 504 IPC comprises of the following ingredients, viz., (a) intentional insult, (b) the insult must be such as to give provocation to the person insulted, and (c) the accused must intend or know that such provocation would cause another to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. = the actual words or language should figure in the complaint. One has to read the complaint as a whole and, by doing so, if the Magistrate comes to a conclusion, prima facie, that there has been an intentional insult so as to provoke any person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence, that is sufficient to bring the complaint within the ambit of Section 504 IPC. It is not the law that a complainant should verbatim reproduce each word or words capable of provoking the other person to commit any other offence. The background facts, circumstances, the occasion, the manner in which they are used, the person or persons to whom they are addressed, the time, the conduct of the person who has indulged in such actions are all relevant factors to be borne in mind while examining a complaint lodged for initiating proceedings under Section 504 IPC.

                         published in    http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40683                               
    REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1231 OF 2013
                 [Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 382 of 2013]


Fiona Shrikhande                                   .. Appellant

                                   Versus

State of Maharashtra and Another                   .. Respondents


                               J U D G M E N T


K. S. Radhakrishnan, J.


      Leave granted


2.    We are, in this case, concerned with an  incident  which  happened  in
Flat No. 5, 2nd Floor, Goolestan, East Wing,  Cuffe  Parade,  Mumbai,  which
led to the filing of a complaint alleging offences under  Sections  294  and
504 IPC.

3.    The Complainant (2nd respondent herein) is the  sister-in-law  of  the
accused, being the wife of the  complainant’s  brother.     Complainant  and
her brother are the sole surviving heirs of their parents who are  no  more.
 Facts indicate that the father had the tenancy rights over the  flat  where
the incident is alleged to have taken place.

4.    Complaint Case No.  4701623/SS/11  was  filed  before  the  Additional
Chief Metropolitan Magistrate,  47th  Court  at  Esplanade  Mumbai  alleging
offences punishable under Sections 298  and  504  IPC.   Complainant  stated
that she moved into the above mentioned flat on 23.04.2011  along  with  her
husband, her servants and necessary household belongings.   Having  come  to
know of the same, her brother along with accused came to India from USA  and
occupied one out of the four bedrooms in  the  flat  and  then  indulged  in
several unlawful acts with a view to push the complainant out of  the  flat.
On 8.5.2011, the accused accompanied by her daughter (born to her  from  her
first marriage) came to the flat at  about  4.00  p.m.  and  then  left  for
filing a complaint before  the  Cuffe  Parade  Police  Station  against  the
complainant stating that she had broken the locks  of  their  rooms  in  the
flat.  After lodging the complaint, she came back to  the  flat  and  rushed
into the room where the idols are  kept  and  shouted  that  she  would  not
permit anyone to enter the Puja room.  The  complainant  has  described  the
incident as follows:

      “….As I and my husband were explaining to S.I. Pawar that she  had  no
      right whatsoever to deny or prevent our access to the  Puja  Room  the
      Accused shouted that if I was so keen on doing Puja,  she  would  move
      the Devara outside.   She ran to the Devara  and  began  to  push  it.
      Finding it a little heavy, she  then  ran  in  frenzy,  picked  up  my
      clothes and that I had left on the bed, took them to the  living  room
      and threw them on the sofa. She then came back to the Puja Room and in
      a premeditated fashion made a second attempt to push the Devara out of
      the room.  She proceeded to drag the Devara in a rough manner  thereby
      dislodging all the frames and idols of our Kula  Devatas  making  them
      fall to the floor.  The lamp that I had lit also fell  to  the  ground
      and the flame was extinguished.  She  did  this  with  the  deliberate
      intention of wounding the religious feelings  of  me  and  my  husband
      knowing fully well that it would not only wound our religious feelings
      but will cause us a lot of hurt and anguish at this sacrilege  at  her
      hands.  At this point of time, even S.I. Pawar tried  to  reason  with
      her not to indulge in  such  a  sacrilegious  act.    Even  then,  the
      Accused ignored the pleas of her own daughter and  of  S.I.  Pawar  to
      stop indulging in such sacrilege to our Gods, and  intentional  insult
      to me and my husband.  Thereafter, Marisha shouted at the Accused  and
      asked her to stop indulging in such acts.”
                                                         (emphasis supplied)

5.    On the basis of the above allegations,  the  complainant  preferred  a
complaint  on  18.5.2011,  which  was  registered  as  Complaint  Case   No.
4701623/SS/11.   Learned Additional Chief Magistrate, after perusal  of  the
complaint, found a prima facie case to take  cognizance  under  Section  504
IPC against the accused and, consequently, issued  process  to  the  accused
vide his order dated 23.8.2011.

6.    The appellant then preferred Criminal Revision  Application  No.  1124
of 2011 challenging the order issuing the  process  for  offence  punishable
under Section 504 IPC.  It was contented that the allegation  that  she  had
indulged in any action with an  intention  to  provoke  the  complainant  to
break breach of public peace  or  commit  any  other  offence,  was  totally
unfounded.   Further, it was also pointed  out  that  no  details  had  been
furnished in that complaint  to  show  in  what  manner  the  appellant  had
attempted to provoke the complainant, so as  to  attract  Section  504  IPC.
Further, it was pointed out that the complaint ought to have  disclosed  the
actual words if, at all, used by the appellant, which  would  have  provoked
her to commit any other offence.  It was also pointed out that  the  learned
Magistrate has not properly understood the scope of Section 202  Cr.P.C.  in
issuing the process to the appellant.

7.    The Revision Application was  resisted  to  by  the  complainant  and,
referring to various statements made in  the  complaint,  it  was  submitted
that  the  ingredients  of  Section  504  IPC  have  been  fully  satisfied.
Further, it was  also  pointed  out  that  it  is  not  necessary  that  the
complaint should verbatim reproduce the words spoken by  the  appellant  and
that once the complaint makes  out  a  prima  facie  case  for  issuing  the
process and the Court is satisfied of the same, the Court has got the  power
to issue the process under Section 202 Cr.P.C.

8.     Learned  Additional  Sessions  Judge,  after  examining   the   rival
contentions, found no merits in the application and dismissed the same  vide
his order dated 27.7.2012.   Aggrieved by the same,  the  accused  preferred
Criminal Writ Petition  No.  2944  of  2012  for  quashing  the  proceedings
initiated under Section 504 IPC before the  High  Court.     Learned  single
Judge of the High Court, after perusing the rival  contentions,  also  found
no merits in the said petition and dismissed the same,  against  which  this
appeal has been preferred.

9.    Shri C.U. Singh, learned senior counsel appearing for  the  appellant,
submitted that the learned Magistrate  has  committed  an  error  in  taking
cognizance of an offence under Section  504  IPC,  in  the  absence  of  any
material specifying the insulting words actually used by the accused,  which
would  have  provocated  the  complainant  to  commit  any  other   offence.
Learned senior counsel submitted that the learned Magistrate  ought  not  to
have taken the cognizance and issued the process on  a  complaint  which  is
nothing but verbatim reproduction  of  the  language  of  Section  504  IPC,
without any particulars.

10.    Mr.  Uday  U.  Lalit,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for   the
respondents, on the other  hand,  contended  that  the  complaint  discloses
sufficient materials leading to the offence under Section 504  IPC  and  the
learned Magistrate has correctly taken cognizance of  the  same  and  issued
the process and the Sessions Judge as well as the  High  Court  has  rightly
rejected the prayer for quashing the  proceedings  initiated  under  Section
504 IPC.  Learned senior counsel submitted that  if  the  averments  in  the
complaint prima facie make out a  case,  the  Magistrate  can  always  taken
cognizance of the same and it is not necessary  that  the  complaint  should
verbatim reproduce all the ingredients of the offence nor  is  it  necessary
that the complaint should state in so many words that the intention  of  the
accused was fraudulent.

11.   We are, in this case, concerned only with the question as to  whether,
on a reading of the complaint, a prima facie case has been made out  or  not
to issue process by the  Magistrate.     The  law  as  regards  issuance  of
process in criminal cases is well settled.   At  the  complaint  stage,  the
Magistrate is  merely  concerned  with  the  allegations  made  out  in  the
complaint and has only to prima facie satisfy whether there  are  sufficient
grounds to proceed against the accused and it is not  the  province  of  the
Magistrate to enquire into a detailed discussion on the merits  or  demerits
of the case.  The scope of enquiry under Section 202  is  extremely  limited
in the sense that the Magistrate, at this  stage,  is  expected  to  examine
prima  facie  the  truth  or  falsehood  of  the  allegations  made  in  the
complaint.  Magistrate is not expected to embark upon a detailed  discussion
of the merits or demerits of  the  case,  but  only  consider  the  inherent
probabilities apparent on the statement made in the complaint.   In  Nagawwa
v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi and Others (1976) 3 SCC 736,  this  Court
held that once the Magistrate has exercised his  discretion  in  forming  an
opinion that there is ground for  proceeding,  it  is  not  for  the  Higher
Courts to substitute its own discretion for that of  the  Magistrate.    The
Magistrate has to decide the question purely from the point of view  of  the
complaint, without at all adverting to any  defence  that  the  accused  may
have.

12.   Having noticed the scope  of  Section  202  Cr.P.C.,  let  us  examine
whether the ingredients of Section 504  IPC  have  been  made  out  for  the
Magistrate to initiate proceedings.   Section  504  is  extracted  for  easy
reference:
            “504.  Intentional insult with intent to provoke breach  of  the
      peace.-  Whoever intentionally insults, and thereby gives  provocation
      to any person,  intending  or  knowing  it  to  be  likely  that  such
      provocation will cause him to break the public peace, or to commit any
      other  offence,  shall  be  punished  with  imprisonment   of   either
      description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or
      with both.”


13.   Section 504 IPC comprises of  the  following  ingredients,  viz.,  (a)
intentional insult, (b) the insult must be such as to  give  provocation  to
the person insulted, and (c) the accused  must  intend  or  know  that  such
provocation would cause another to break the public peace or to  commit  any
other offence.  The intentional insult must be of such a degree that  should
provoke a person to break the public peace or to commit any  other  offence.
The person who intentionally insults intending or knowing it  to  be  likely
that it will give provocation to any other person and such provocation  will
cause to break the public peace or to commit any other offence,  in  such  a
situation, the ingredients of Section  504  are  satisfied.     One  of  the
essential elements constituting the offence is that there should  have  been
an act or conduct amounting to intentional insult and  the  mere  fact  that
the accused abused the complainant, as such, is not sufficient by itself  to
warrant a conviction under Section 504 IPC.

14.   We may also indicate that it is not the law that 
the actual  words  or
language should figure in the complaint.  One has to read the  complaint  as a whole and, by doing so, if the Magistrate comes  to  a  conclusion,  prima facie, that there has been an  intentional  insult  so  as  to  provoke  any person to break the public peace or to commit any  other  offence,  that  is sufficient to bring the complaint within the ambit of Section 504  IPC.  
 It is not the law that a complainant should verbatim  reproduce  each  word  or words capable of provoking the other person to  commit  any  other  offence.
The background facts, circumstances, the occasion, the manner in which  they are used, the person or persons to whom they are addressed,  the  time,  the conduct of the person who has indulged in  such  actions  are  all  relevant factors to  be  borne  in  mind  while  examining  a  complaint  lodged  for initiating proceedings under Section 504 IPC.

15.   We have already extracted the  relevant  portions  of  the  complaint.
If they are so read in the above legal settings, in our view, a prima  facie
case has been made out for initiating proceedings for  the  offence  alleged
under Section 504 IPC.

16.   In such circumstances, we find no reason  to  take  a  different  view
from that of the High Court.   The appeal is accordingly dismissed,  without
expressing any opinion on the merits of the case.




                                       ………………………………J.
                                        (K. S. Radhakrishnan)






                                       …………………………..….J.
                                        (A. K. Sikri)
New Delhi,
August 22, 2013

Novation of Contract = IMS Learning Resources Private Limited, the respondent herein, filed CS (OS) No.2316 of 2011 in the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi for a permanent injunction restraining infringement of a registered trademark, infringement of copyright, passing off of damages, rendition of accounts of profits and also for other consequential reliefs against the appellant herein. Appellant preferred IA No.18 of 2012 under Section 8, read with Section 5 -of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for rejecting the plaint and referring the dispute to arbitration and also for other consequential reliefs. The High Court rejected the application vide its order dated 16.04.2012 holding that that earlier agreements dated 01.04.2007 and 01.04.2010, which contained arbitration clause stood superseded by a new contract dated 01.02.2011 arrived at between the parties by mutual consent. = Exit paper would clearly indicate that it is a mutually agreed document containing comprehensive terms and conditions which -admittedly does not contain an arbitration clause. = We may indicate that so far as the present case is concerned, parties have entered into a fresh contract contained in the Exit paper which does not even indicate any disputes arising under the original contract or about the settlement thereof, it is nothing but a pure and simple novation of the original contract by mutual consent. Above being the factual and legal position, we find no error in the view taken by the High Court. The appeal, therefore, lacks merit and stands dismissed, with no order as to costs.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40682
                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6997 OF 2013
                  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.33459 of 2012)


M/s Young Achievers                          ..... Appellant

                                   Versus

IMS Learning Resources Pvt. Ltd.             ....Respondent



                               J U D G M E N T


K.S. Radhakrishnan, J.


      Leave granted.

2.    IMS Learning Resources Private Limited, the respondent  herein,  filed CS (OS) No.2316 of 2011 in the High Court  of  Delhi  at  New  Delhi  for  a permanent injunction restraining infringement  of  a  registered  trademark, infringement of copyright, passing off of damages, rendition of accounts  of
profits and also for  other  consequential  reliefs  against  the  appellant herein.
Appellant preferred IA No.18 of 2012 under  Section  8,  read  with Section 5 -of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for  rejecting  the plaint  and  referring  the  dispute  to  arbitration  and  also  for  other consequential reliefs.
Respondent-plaintiff raised objection  to  the  said
application stating that the suit  is  perfectly  maintainable.  
The  High
Court rejected the application vide its order dated 16.04.2012 holding  that that earlier agreements dated 01.04.2007  and  01.04.2010,  which  contained arbitration clause stood superseded  by  a  new  contract  dated  01.02.2011
arrived at between the parties by mutual consent.  
Defendant  aggrieved  by
the said order filed FAO (OS) No.290 of 2012 before the  Division  Bench  of
the Delhi High Court, which confirmed the order of the learned Single  Judge
and dismissed the appeal against which this appeal  has  been  preferred  by
special leave.

3.    Mr. Manu T. Ramachandran, learned counsel appearing for the  appellant
raised the following question of law:
      “a)   Whether an arbitration  clause  is  a  collateral  term  in  the
      contract, which relates to resolution of disputes, and not performance
      and even if the performance of the contract comes to an end on account
      of repudiation, frustration of breach  of  contract,  the  arbitration
      agreement would survive for the  purpose  of  resolution  of  disputes
      arising under or in connection with the contract?


      b)    Whether the impugned judgment is contrary to the law settled  by
      this Hon’ble Court in Branch -
      Manager, /s Magma Leasing & Finance Limited  and  another  v.  Potluri
      Madhavilata and another (2009) 10 SCC 103  and  National  Agricultural
      Cooperative Marketing Federation India  Ltd.  V.  Gains  Trading  Ltd.
      (2007) 5 SCC 692?


      c)    Whether the Hon’ble High Court is correct in  holding  that  the
      law settled by this Hon’ble Court in The  Branch  Manager,  M/s  Magma
      Leasing & Finance Limited  and  another  v.  Potluri  Madhavilata  and
      another (2009)  10  SCC  103  and  National  Agricultural  Cooperative
      Marketing Federation India Ltd. V. Gains Trading Ltd. (2007) 5 SCC 692
      is applicable in case of unilateral termination of agreement by one of
      the parties and not in mutual termination for accord and  satisfaction
      of the earlier contract?”

4.     Learned  counsel  also  submitted  that  arbitration  clause   is   a
collateral term in the contract, which relates  to  resolution  of  disputes
and not performance and even if the performance of the contract comes to  an
end on account of  repudiation,  frustration  of  breach  of  contract,  the
arbitration agreement  would  survive  for  the  purpose  of  resolution  of
disputes arising  under  or  in  connection  with  the  contract.    Learned
counsel also submitted that the court has erroneously held that the case  of
the appellant is not a case involving the assertion  by  the  respondent  of
accord and satisfaction in respect of  earlier  contracts,  especially  when
the sole purpose of the Exit paper dated 01.02.2011 was to  put  an  end  to
the contractual relationship  between  them  under  the  -aforesaid  earlier
contracts.  Apart from the decisions  referred  hereinbefore,  reliance  was
also placed on the judgment of the  U.S.  Court  in  Nolde  Bros.,  Inc.  v.
Bakery Workers 430 US 243.

5.     Mr.  Sai  Krishna  Rajgopal,  learned  counsel  appearing   for   the
respondent placing reliance on  the  detailed  counter  affidavit  filed  on
behalf of the respondent  submitted  that  the  arbitration  clause  in  the
agreements dated 01.04.2007 and 01.04.2010 cannot be invoked since both  the
above-mentioned  agreements  were  superseded  and  abrogated  by  the   new
agreement dated 01.02.2011.  Learned counsel also submitted that in the  new
agreement it was mutually decided by the parties that any violation  of  the
respondent’s trade mark IMS would  entitle  the  respondent  to  take  legal
recourse against the appellant.  Reference was  made  to  clause  4  of  the
penultimate paragraph  of  the  new  agreement  dated  01.02.2011.   Learned
counsel also submitted that Suit No. CS (OS)  2316  of  2011  was  based  on
prior trade mark rights and not  on  the  agreements  dated  01.04.2007  and
01.04.2010.  Further it was also pointed out that the  new  agreement  dated
01.02.2011 records  the  mutual  agreement  between  the  parties  that  the
appellant shall not be eligible to use -the trade mark IMS in any  form  and
any breach thereof entitles respondent to seek legal recourse  on  violation
of trade mark IMS.

6.    We are of the view that survival of the arbitration clause, as  sought
by the appellant in the agreements dated 01.04.2007 and  01.04.2010  has  to
be seen in the light of the terms and conditions of the new agreement  dated
01.02.2011.  An arbitration clause in an agreement  cannot  survive  if  the
agreement containing arbitration clause has  been  superseded/novated  by  a
later agreement.  The agreement dated  01.04.2010  contained  the  following
arbitration clause:
      “20.  Arbitration
      All disputes and questions whatsoever which may arise, either  during
      the substance of this agreement or afterwards,  between  the  parties
      shall be referred to the arbitration of trhe managing director of IMS
      Learning Resources Pvt. Ltd. Or  his  nominee  and  such  arbitration
      shall be in the English language at Mumbai.  The arbitration shall be
      governed by the provisions of the Arbitration and  Conciliation  Act,
      1996 or any other statutory modification or re-enactment thereof  for
      the time being in force and award or awards of such arbitrator  shall
      be binding on all the parties to the said dispute.”

7.    We have now to examine terms of the subsequent agreement titled  “Exit
paper” dated 01.02.2011. It is the common case of the parties that the  Exit
paper/agreement entered into -between  the  parties  does  not  contain  any
arbitration clause.  It is useful to extract the  relevant  portion  of  the
Exit paper, which is as follow:
      “With reference to  your  mail/letter  dated  1st  February,  2011  on
      closing the center, from the aforesaid date  with  mutual  consent  we
      have agreed on the following:


      “1.  Enrolled students
      All enrolled students of IMS with you will be  serviced  by  you  with
      respect to their classes, workshops and conduct of test series,  GD/PI
      and any other servicing required as per the product manual.


      2.    Premises
      IMS will  reserve  the  first  right  of  utilization  to  occupy  the
      premises.  In an eventuality of IMS exercising the right  to  use  the
      premises,  then  IMS  will  reimburse  the  monthly   rent   for   the
      corresponding months before changing the  rental  agreement  onto  IMS
      name.


      3.    Marketing
      From the above-mentioned date you are not eligible to do any marketing
      and promotional activities in the name of IMS.


      4.    Brand
      “From the above-mentioned date you are not eligible to use  IMS  brand
      in any form.


      5.    Monthly claims
      The partner abides to deposit all the course fees collected for any of
      IMS programs till now as per the deposit policy of IMS.   All  monthly
      claims will be settled till 31st January, 2011 and the claims would be
      -
      released after the date of termination of the partner agreement.


      6.    Security Deposit
      The security deposit amount will be refunded back  to  you  after  the
      completion of servicing of all enrolled IMS students.  In case of  any
      due on partner to the company (unsettled fees,  loan  or  advance  for
      centre activities  etc.),  same  amount  will  be  deducted  from  the
      security deposit.


      7.    Non Compete Clause
      The partner has averred that neither he, nor his  family  members  are
      directly  or  indirectly  interested  in  any   business   in   direct
      competition with that of IMS and the partner agrees and undertakes  to
      ensure that neither he nor his family members shall be involved in  or
      connected to any business in direct competition with that  of  IMS  at
      any time during the currency of  this  agreement  and  for  a  further
      period of six months therafter.


      8.    Full and final settlement
      I/We accept all the  above-mentioned  points  and  confirm  that  upon
      receipt of the sum stated hereinafter in full and final settlement  of
      all my/our claims, neither me/we nor any person claiming by or through
      me/us shall have any further claims against IMS whatsoever.


      Any violation of points 1,3,4,5  &  7  from  the  partner’s  end  will
      attract legal course of action and penalties  from  IMS  ranging  from
      forfeiture of the security deposit & pending claims.
      I hereby accept above terms and conditions.”

8.    Exit paper would  clearly  indicate  that  it  is  a  mutually  agreed document containing comprehensive terms  and  conditions  which  -admittedly does not contain an arbitration clause.  
We are of the view  that  the  High
Court is right in taking the view that in the case on hand, is  not  a  case
involving assertion by the respondent of accord a  satisfaction  in  respect
of the earlier contracts dated 01.04.2007 and 01.04.2010.
If  that  be  so,
it could have referred to arbitrator in terms of those two agreements  going
by the dictum in Union of India v. Kishorilal Gupta and Bros.  AIR  1959  SC
1362.  
This Court in Kishorilal Gupta’s case (supra) examined  the  question
whether an arbitration clause can be invoked in the case of a dispute  under a superseded contract.  The principle laid down is that if the  contract  is superseded by another, the arbitration clause, being  a  component  part  of the earlier contract, falls with it.  But where the dispute is whether  such contract is void ab intio, the arbitration clause cannot  operate  on  those disputes, for  its  operative  force  depends  upon  the  existence  of  the contract and its validity.  The various  other  observations  were  made  by
this Court in the above-mentioned judgment  in  respect  of  “settlement  of disputes arising under the original contract, including the  dispute  as  to the breach of the contract and its consequences”.  
Principle laid down  by
the House of Lords in Heyman v. Darwins Limited 1942 (1) All. E.R. -337  was
also relied on by this Court for its conclusion.
The Collective  bargaining
principle laid down by the US Supreme Court  in  Nolde  Bros.  case  (supra)
would not apply to the facts of the present case.

9.    We may indicate that so far as the present case is concerned,  parties have entered into a fresh contract contained in the Exit  paper  which  does not even indicate any disputes arising under the original contract or  about the settlement thereof, it is nothing but a pure and simple novation of  the original contract by mutual consent.  Above  being  the  factual  and  legal
position, we find no error in  the  view  taken  by  the  High  Court.   
The appeal, therefore, lacks merit and stands dismissed, with  no  order  as  to costs.

                                                               ……………………..…J.
                                                        (K.S. Radhakrishnan)



                                                               ………………………….J.
                                                (A.K. Sikri)


New Delhi,
August  22, 2013

Condonation of Delay does not arise under sec.28 A of Land acquisition act = whether limitation for filing the application for re-determination of the compensation under Section 28A of the Act would commence from the date of the award or from the date of knowledge of the court’s award on the basis of which such application is being filed. 6. Though, there is nothing on record to substantiate the appellants’ claim that they could acquire the knowledge of the Court’s award only on 17.7.2006 and immediately took steps to file application for re-determination under Section 28A of the Act. 7. The issue involved herein is no more res-integra. The appellants’ case before the High Court as well as before us has been that the limitation would commence from the date of acquisition of knowledge and not from the date of award. = For the purpose of filing application under Section 28A of the Act, counsel for the appellants applied for a certified copy of the Court award on 17.5.2006, and though the copy of the said award was ready for delivery on 29.5.2006, it was obtained by learned counsel for the appellants only on 3.6.2006. Application for re-determination of the amount of compensation was filed on 18.7.2006 by the appellants, on the basis of the said Court’s award. D. The Special Land Acquisition Collector vide order dated 22.9.2008, rejected the said application on the ground that the same was filed with a delay of 4 days.= The legal maxim “dura lex sed lex” which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” (See : The Martin Burn Ltd. v. The Corporation of Calcutta, AIR 1966 SC 529; and Rohitas Kumar & Ors. v. Om Prakash Sharma & Ors., AIR 2013 SC 30) In view of the above, we are of the candid view that none of the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellants is tenable. 14. As the matters are squarely covered by the above referred to judgments, these appeals are devoid of any merit. The cases do not warrant any interference. The appeals are, accordingly, dismissed.

published in   http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40681
REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                    CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 6976-6980  of 2013




      Popat Bahiru Govardhane Etc.
      …Appellants




                                   Versus




      Special Land Acquisition Officer & Anr.
      …Respondents




                               J U D G M E N T




      Dr. B. S. CHAUHAN, J.




      1.    These appeals have been preferred against the judgment and order
      dated 25.1.2012 passed by the High Court of Judicature  at  Bombay  in
      Writ Petition Nos. 2140-44 of 2009, wherein the High Court has  upheld
      the  judgment  of  the  Land  Acquisition  Collector   rejecting   the
      application under Section  28A  of  the  Land  Acquisition  Act,  1894
      (hereinafter referred to as `the Act’) on the ground of limitation.

      2.    Facts and circumstances giving rise to these appeals are that:

      A.    The land of the appellants stood notified under Sections 4 and 6
      of the Act in 1994-95.  Award in respect of the  said  land  was  also
      made on 14.12.1995.

      B.    Appellants did not file applications under Section 18 of the Act
      rather some other “interested persons” whose land was also covered  by
      the same notification under Section 4 of the Act filed references  and
      one such reference, i.e.  L.A.R.  No.  314  of  1999  was  decided  on
      3.4.2006.

      C.    For the purpose of filing application under Section 28A  of  the
      Act, counsel for the appellants applied for a certified  copy  of  the
      Court award on 17.5.2006, and though the copy of the  said  award  was
      ready for delivery on 29.5.2006, it was obtained  by  learned  counsel
      for the appellants only on 3.6.2006. Application for  re-determination
      of  the  amount  of  compensation  was  filed  on  18.7.2006  by   the
      appellants, on the basis of the said Court’s award.

      D.     The  Special  Land  Acquisition  Collector  vide  order   dated
      22.9.2008, rejected the said application on the ground that  the  same
      was filed with a delay of 4 days.

      E.    Aggrieved, the appellants challenged the said order  before  the
      High Court.  The same stood dismissed vide impugned judgment and order
      dated 25.1.2012.

            Hence, these appeals.

      3.    Shri Gaurav Agarwal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of  the
      appellants  has submitted  that Section 28-A of the Act  was  inserted
      by amendment in 1987 and being a beneficial legislation it should   be
      interpreted liberally and period of limitation  should  be  considered
      and determined on all equitable grounds.  It  is  well-neigh  possible
      for any person to file an  appeal  without  having  knowledge  of  the
      order/award and therefore, the limitation should be counted  from  the
      date of acquisition of knowledge of the  Court  award.  More  so,  the
      delay was only of two days and certainly not of four days. In order to
      fortify his case Shri Gaurav Agarwal  has  placed  reliance  upon  the
      judgments of this Court in Bhagwan Das & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors.,
      AIR 2010 SC 1532; and Premji Nathu v. State of  Gujarat  &  Anr.,  AIR
      2012 SC 1624.

      4.    Ms. Madhavi Divan, learned counsel appearing on  behalf  of  the
      respondents,  has  opposed  the  appeal   contending   that   personal
      inconvenience or hardship of an individual cannot be  a  consideration
      for interpreting statutory provisions in  case  the  language  of  the
      statute is plain and unambiguous.  It  is  to  be  given  only  strict
      literal interpretation.  In the instant case, there is no ambiguity so
      far as the statutory provisions are concerned.  Therefore,  limitation
      is to be taken as prescribed under the statute.   In  support  of  her
      case Ms. Madhavi Divan has placed reliance upon the judgments of  this
      Court in Tota Ram v. State of U.P. & Ors., (1997) 6 SCC 280; Union  of
      India & Ors. etc. v. Mangatu Ram etc., AIR 1997 SC 2704; State of A.P.
      & Anr. v. Marri Venkaiah & Ors., AIR 2003 SC 2949; Des  Raj  (deceased
      by L.Rs.) & Anr. v. Union of India & Anr., AIR 2004 SC 5003; and State
      of Orissa & Ors. v. Chitrasen Bhoi, (2009) 17 SCC 74.

      5.    We have considered the rival submissions made by learned counsel
      for the parties and perused the records.

           The sole question for the consideration of the court is
whether
      limitation for filing the  application  for  re-determination  of  the
      compensation under Section 28A of the Act would commence from the date
      of the award or from the date of knowledge of the court’s award on the basis of which such application is being filed.

      6.     Though,  there  is  nothing  on  record  to  substantiate   the
      appellants’ claim that they could acquire the knowledge of the Court’s
      award only on 17.7.2006 and immediately took steps to file application
      for re-determination under Section 28A of the Act.

      7.     The  issue  involved  herein  is  no  more  res-integra.    
The appellants’  case before the High Court as well as before us has  been that the limitation would commence from the  date  of  acquisition  of knowledge and not from the date of award. 
Though, Shri Gaurav Agarwal,
      learned counsel for the appellants, has fairly conceded that there  is
      no occasion  for  this  Court  to  consider  the  application  of  the
      provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter  called  the  ‘Act
      1963’) inasmuch as the provisions of Section 5 of the said Act.

      8.    Section 28A of the Act reads as under:

           “28-A. Redetermination of the  amount  of  compensation  on  the
           basis of the award of the court.—(1) Where  in  an  award  under
           this Part, the court allows  to  the  applicant  any  amount  of
           compensation in excess of the amount awarded  by  the  Collector
           under Section 11, the persons interested in all the  other  land
           covered by the same notification under Section 4 sub-section (1)
           and who are also aggrieved by the award of  the  Collector  may,
           notwithstanding that they had not made  an  application  to  the
           Collector under  Section  18,  by  written  application  to  the
           Collector within three months from the date of the award of  the
           court require that the amount of compensation  payable  to  them
           may be redetermined on the basis of the amount  of  compensation
           awarded by the court:
              Provided that in computing the period of three months  within
           which an application to the Collector shall be made  under  this
           sub-section, the day on which the award was pronounced  and  the
           time requisite for obtaining  a  copy  of  the  award  shall  be
           excluded.”
                                              (Emphasis added)


      9.    In Raja Harish Chandra Raj  Singh  v.  Deputy  Land  Acquisition
      Officer & Anr., AIR 1961 SC 1500, this Court dealt with the  issue  of
      limitation while dealing with an application under Section 18  of  the
      Act, and it was observed therein that unless a party had knowledge  of
      the  order,  the  question  of  approaching  the   appropriate   forum
      challenging the order, does not arise. Therefore, it is  the  date  of
      the knowledge  from  which  the  limitation  would  start.  The  Court
      observed :
           “.....The knowledge of the party affected by the  award,  either
           actual  or  constructive,  being  an  essential  requirement  of
           fairplay and natural justice the  expression…….In  our  opinion,
           therefore, it would be unreasonable……..where  the  rights  of  a
           person are affected by any order and  limitation  is  prescribed
           for the enforcement  of  the  remedy  by  the  person  aggrieved
           against the said order by reference to the making  of  the  said
           order, the making of  the  order  must  mean  either  actual  or
           constructive communication  of  the  said  order  to  the  party
           concerned…”



      10.   This Court in Union of India  &  Ors.  v.  Mangatu  Ram  &  Ors.
      (supra); and Tota Ram v. State of U.P. & Ors.  (supra), dealt with the
      issue involved herein and held that as the Land Acquisition  Collector
      is not a court and acts as a quasi judicial authority while making the
      award, the provisions of the Act 1963 would not apply and,  therefore,
      the application under Section 28A of the Act, has to be  filed  within
      the period of limitation as prescribed under Section 28A of  the  Act.
      The said provisions require that an application  for  re-determination
      is to be filed within 3 months from the  date  of  the  award  of  the
      court. The proviso further provides that the period of  limitation  is
      to be calculated excluding the date on which the award is made and the
      time requisite for obtaining the copy of the award.

      11.   In State of A.P. & Anr. v. Marri Venkaiah & Ors.  (Supra),  this
      Court reconsidered the aforesaid judgments including the  judgment  in
      Raja Harish Chandra Raj  Singh  (supra)  and  held  that  the  statute
      provides limitation of 3 months from the date of award  by  the  court
      excluding the time required for obtaining the copy from  the  date  of
      award.  It has no relevance so far  as  the  date  of  acquisition  of
      knowledge by the applicant is  concerned.   In  view  of  the  express
      language of the statute, the question of knowledge did not arise  and,
      therefore, the plea of the applicants  that  limitation  of  3  months
      would begin from the date of knowledge, was clearly unsustainable  and
      could not be accepted.  The Court also rejected the contention of  the
      applicants that a beneficial legislation should  be  given  a  liberal
      interpretation observing that whosoever wants to take advantage of the
      beneficial legislation has to be vigilant and has to take  appropriate
      action within  time  limit  prescribed  under  the  statute.  Such  an
      applicant must at least be vigilant in  making  efforts  to  find  out
      whether the other land owners have filed any reference application and
      if so, what is the result thereof.  If that is not done then  the  law
      cannot help him.   The ratio of the judgment in  Raja  Harish  Chandra
      Raj Singh (supra) was held to be non-applicable in case of Section 28-
      A of the Act.  The Court observed:

           “…….In that case, the Court interpreted the proviso  to  Section
           18 of the Act and held that clause (a) of the  proviso  was  not
           applicable in the  said  case  because  the  person  making  the
           application was not present or was not  represented  before  the
           Collector at the time when he made his  award.  The  Court  also
           held that notice from the Collector under Section 12(2) was also
           not issued, therefore, that part of clause (b)  of  the  proviso
           would not be applicable. The Court, therefore, referred  to  the
           second part of the proviso which provides that such  application
           can be made within six months from the date of  the  Collector’s
           award. In the context of the scheme of Section 18  of  the  Act,
           the Court held that the award by the Land Acquisition Officer is
           an offer of market price  by  the  State  for  purchase  of  the
           property. Hence,  for  the  said  offer,  knowledge,  actual  or
           constructive,  of  the  party  affected  by  the  award  was  an
           essential  requirement  of  fair  play  and   natural   justice.
           Therefore, the second part of the proviso  must  mean  the  date
           when either the award was communicated to the party or was known
           by him either actually or constructively.
                The  aforesaid  reasoning  would  not  be  applicable   for
           interpretation of Section 28-A because there is no  question  of
           issuing notice to such an applicant as he is not a party to  the
           reference proceeding before the court. The award passed  by  the
           court cannot be termed as an offer for market price for purchase
           of the land. There is no duty  cast  upon  the  court  to  issue
           notice to the landowners who have not initiated proceedings  for
           enhancement of compensation by  filing  reference  applications;
           maybe, that their lands are acquired by  a  common  notification
           issued under Section 4  of  the  Act.  As  against  this,  under
           Section 18 it is the duty  of  the  Collector  to  issue  notice
           either under Section 12(2) of the Act at the time of passing  of
           the award or in any  case  the  date  to  be  pronounced  before
           passing of the award and if this is not  done  then  the  period
           prescribed for filing application under Section 18 is six months
           from     the     date     of     the     Collector’s     award.”
           (Emphasis added)


      A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in  Des  Raj  (supra)
      and Chitrasen Bhoi (supra).

      12.   In view of above, there is no occasion for us  to  consider  the
      judgments cited at the bar on behalf of the appellants in  support  of
      its case. More so, the said judgments  have  been  delivered  by  this
      Court while dealing with the applications under Section 18 of the Act.
       If there are directly applicable precedents on the  issue,  the  same
      have to be followed rather than to search  for  a  new  interpretation
      unless  it  is  established  that  the   earlier   judgments   require
      reconsideration.  The suggestion of reconsideration  has  specifically
      been rejected by this Court in Marri Venkaiah (supra).

      13.   It is a settled legal proposition that  law  of  limitation  may
      harshly affect a particular party but it has to be  applied  with  all
      its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no  power  to
      extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds.   The  statutory
      provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to  a  particular  party
      but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving  full  effect  to
      the same.  The legal maxim “dura lex sed lex” which means “the law  is
      hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It  has
      consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive  factor
      to be considered while interpreting a statute.  “A result flowing from
      a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore
      that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting  from
      its operation.”

       (See : The Martin Burn Ltd. v. The Corporation of Calcutta, AIR  1966
      SC 529; and Rohitas Kumar & Ors. v. Om Prakash Sharma & Ors., AIR 2013
      SC 30)

            In view of the above, we are of the candid view that none of the
      submissions advanced on behalf of the appellants is tenable.

      14.   As the matters are squarely covered by  the  above  referred  to
      judgments, these appeals are devoid of any merit.  The  cases  do  not
      warrant any interference. The appeals are, accordingly, dismissed.




                                       ….………………..........J.            (DR.
                                       B.S. CHAUHAN)



      …...................................J.
                                              (S.A. BOBDE)

      NEW DELHI;

      August 22, 2013

Delay of 5 1/2 years - denied = Aggrieved, the appellants filed appeals under Section 54 of the Act before the High Court on 16.8.2007 with applications for condonation of delay. The applications for condonation of delay stood rejected as the High Court did not find any sufficient cause to condone the delay. Hence, these appeals.= Admittedly, there was a delay of 5-1/2 years in filing the said appeals under Section 54 of the Act before the High Court. The only explanation offered for approaching the court at such a belated stage has been that one of the appellants had taken ill.= The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bonafide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature. 16. In view of above, no interference is required with impugned judgment and order of the High Court. The appeals lack merit and are, accordingly, dismissed.

                       published in   http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40680                                     
  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6974 of 2013




      Basawaraj & Anr.
      …Appellants

                                   Versus

      The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer                          …Respondent




                                    WITH

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6975 of 2013




      Basawaraj & Ors.
      …Appellants

                                   Versus

      The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer                          …Respondent







                               J U D G M E N T

      Dr. B. S. CHAUHAN, J.



      1.    These appeals have been preferred against  the  common  impugned
      judgment and order  dated  10.6.2011  passed  by  the  High  Court  of
      Karnataka at Gulbarga in MFA Nos.10765 and 10766 of 2007 by which  the
      appeals of the appellants under Section 54  of  the  Land  Acquisition
      Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as `the Act’) have  been  dismissed
      on the ground of limitation.


      2.    For the purpose of convenience, the facts of C.A.  No.  6974  of
      2013 are taken, which are as under:
      A.    The land of the appellants  in  Survey  No.417/2  admeasuring  4
      acres and Survey No.418 admeasuring 23 acres, 1 guntha; and  5  acres,
      23 gunthas of phut kharab situated in the revenue  estate  of  village
      Mahagaon, Tehsil and Distt. Gulbarga  was  acquired  in  pursuance  of
      notification dated 23.4.1994 under Section 4(1) of the Act.
      B.    After completing the formalities as required under the  Act,  an
      award under Section 11 of the Act was made on  23.10.1997  fixing  the
      market value of the land at the  rate  of  Rs.11,500/-  per  acre  and
      Rs.100/- per acre in respect of phut kharab land.
      C.    The appellants preferred references under Section 18(1)  of  the
      Act for enhancement of compensation and the reference court vide award
      dated 28.2.2002 fixed the market value of the land from Rs.31,500/- to
      Rs.70,000/- per acre  depending  upon  the  quality  and  geographical
      situation of the land.  For phut kharab land, assessment was  made  at
      the rate of Rs.1,000/- per acre.
      D.    Aggrieved, the appellants filed appeals under Section 54 of  the
      Act  before  the  High  Court  on  16.8.2007  with  applications   for
      condonation of delay.  The applications for condonation of delay stood
      rejected as the High Court  did  not  find  any  sufficient  cause  to
      condone the delay.
            Hence, these appeals.


      3.    Shri Basava Prabhu S. Patil, learned senior counsel appearing on
      behalf of the appellants, has submitted that the High Court  committed
      an error in not condoning the delay as there was sufficient cause  for
      not approaching the High Court within time.  One of the appellants was
      suffering from ailments and  it  was  in  itself  a  good  ground  for
      condonation of delay.  The High Court ought to have kept in view  that
      in a large number of identical matters, huge delays had been  condoned
      on the condition that the claimant would not be entitled for  interest
      of  the  delay  period,  thus,  the  High  Court  itself   has   given
      discriminatory and contradictory  verdicts  which  itself  is  a  good
      ground for interference by this Court.   The  appeals  deserve  to  be
      allowed.


      4.    Per contra, Shri Naveen R. Nath, learned  counsel  appearing  on
      behalf of the respondent, has opposed the appeal contending  that  the
      delay can be condoned keeping in  mind  the  provisions  contained  in
      Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as  the
      ‘Act 1963’).  The order of condonation of delay  is  to  be  based  on
      sound legal parameters laid down by this Court.  No condition  can  be
      imposed while condoning the delay.  The question  whether  a  claimant
      should be awarded interest or not would arise at  the  time  of  final
      hearing of the  appeal  and  such  condition  cannot  be  imposed  for
      admitting a time barred appeal. If the High Court has committed such a
      grave error in other cases, that cannot be a ground  for  interference
      by this Court as it is a settled legal proposition  that  doctrine  of
      equality does not apply for  perpetuating  an  illegal  and  erroneous
      order.  The appeals before the High Court were hopelessly time  barred
      as the same  had  been  preferred  after  about  5-1/2  years  and  no
      satisfactory explanation could be furnished in  the  applications  for
      condonation of delay for not approaching the court in time.  Thus, the
      appeals lack merit and are liable to be dismissed.


      5.    We have considered the rival submissions  made  by  the  learned
      counsel for the parties and perused the record.


      6.    Admittedly, there was a delay of 5-1/2 years in filing the  said
      appeals under Section 54 of the Act before the High  Court.  The  only
      explanation offered for approaching the court at such a belated  stage
      has been that one of the appellants had taken ill.


      7.    Shri Patil, learned senior counsel, has taken us through a large
      number of judgments of the High Court wherein delay had been  condoned
      without considering the most relevant factor i.e.  “sufficient  cause”
      only on the condition that applicants would be  deprived  of  interest
      for the delay period.  These kinds of judgments  cannot  be  approved.
      The High Court while passing such unwarranted and uncalled for orders,
      failed to appreciate that it was deciding the appeals  under  the  Act
      and not a writ petition  where  this  kind  of  order  in  exceptional
      circumstances perhaps could be justified.


      8.    It is a  settled  legal  proposition  that  Article  14  of  the
      Constitution is not meant to perpetuate illegality or fraud,  even  by
      extending the wrong decisions made in other cases.  The said provision
      does not envisage negative equality but has only  a  positive  aspect.
      Thus, if some other similarly situated persons have been granted  some
      relief/ benefit inadvertently or by mistake, such an  order  does  not
      confer any legal right on others to get the same relief as well.  If a
      wrong is committed in an  earlier  case,  it  cannot  be  perpetuated.
      Equality is a  trite,  which  cannot  be  claimed  in  illegality  and
      therefore, cannot be enforced by a citizen  or  court  in  a  negative
      manner.  If an illegality  and  irregularity  has  been  committed  in
      favour of an individual or a group of individuals or a wrong order has
      been passed by a Judicial forum, others cannot invoke the jurisdiction
      of the higher or superior court for repeating or multiplying the  same
      irregularity or illegality or for passing a similarly wrong order.   A
      wrong order/decision in  favour  of  any  particular  party  does  not
      entitle any other party to claim benefits on the basis  of  the  wrong
      decision.  Even otherwise, Article 14 cannot be stretched too far  for
      otherwise it would make functioning of administration impossible.
      (Vide: Chandigarh Administration & Anr. v. Jagjit Singh  &  Anr.,  AIR
      1995 SC 705, M/s. Anand Button Ltd. v. State of Haryana  &  Ors.,  AIR
      2005 SC 565; K.K. Bhalla v. State of M.P. & Ors., AIR 2006 SC 898; and
      Fuljit Kaur v. State of Punjab, AIR 2010 SC 1937).


      9.   Sufficient cause is the cause for which defendant could  not  be
      blamed for his absence.  The  meaning  of  the  word  "sufficient"  is
      "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be  necessary  to  answer  the
      purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient"  embraces  no  more
      than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices
      to accomplish the purpose intended  in  the  facts  and  circumstances
      existing in a case, duly examined from the view point of a  reasonable
      standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause"  means
      that the party should not have acted in a negligent  manner  or  there
      was a want of bona  fide  on  its  part  in  view  of  the  facts  and
      circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged  that  the  party  has
      "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive". However, the facts  and
      circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the
      Court concerned to exercise discretion for the  reason  that  whenever
      the Court exercises discretion, it has to  be  exercised  judiciously.
      The applicant must satisfy the Court that  he  was  prevented  by  any
      “sufficient  cause”  from  prosecuting  his   case,   and   unless   a
      satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow  the
      application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether
      the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover  an  ulterior
      purpose.  (See:  Manindra  Land  and  Building  Corporation  Ltd.   v.
      Bhootnath Banerjee & Ors., AIR  1964  SC  1336;  Lala  Matadin  v.  A.
      Narayanan, AIR 1970 SC 1953; Parimal v.Veena  @  Bharti  AIR  2011  SC
      1150; and Maniben Devraj  Shah  v.  Municipal  Corporation  of  Brihan
      Mumbai AIR 2012 SC 1629.)



      10.    In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar, AIR 1964 SC  993  this  Court
      explained the difference between a  “good  cause”  and  a  “sufficient
      cause” and observed that every “sufficient cause” is a good cause  and
      vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that  the
      requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof
      that that of “sufficient cause”.


      11. The expression  “sufficient  cause”  should  be  given  a  liberal
      interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so
      long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot  be  imputed
      to the party concerned, whether  or  not  sufficient  cause  has  been
      furnished, can be decided on the facts of a  particular  case  and  no
      straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide:  Madanlal  v.  Shyamlal,  AIR
      2002 SC 100; and Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu & Ors. v. Gobardhan  Sao
      & Ors., AIR 2002 SC 1201.)


      12.    It is a settled legal proposition that law  of  limitation  may
      harshly affect a particular party but it has to be  applied  with  all
      its rigour when the statute so prescribes.  The Court has no power  to
      extend the period  of  limitation  on  equitable  grounds.  “A  result
      flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A  Court  has  no
      power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress
      resulting from its  operation.”  The  statutory  provision  may  cause
      hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court  has  no
      choice but to enforce it giving full effect to  the  same.  The  legal
      maxim “dura lex sed lex” which means “the law is hard but  it  is  the
      law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has  consistently  been
      held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to  be  considered
      while interpreting a statute.




      13. The Statute of Limitation is founded on  public  policy,  its  aim
      being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury,
      to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to  bury  all
      acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably  and  have
      from lapse of time become stale.

           According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 24, p. 181:

           "330. Policy of Limitation Acts. The courts  have  expressed  at
           least  three  differing  reasons  supporting  the  existence  of
           statutes of limitations namely, (1)  that  long  dormant  claims
           have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a  defendant
           might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and  (3)
           that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with
           reasonable diligence".




           An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity  and
      uncertainty,  and  therefore,  limitation  prevents   disturbance   or
      deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity  and  justice  by
      long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's  own  inaction,
      negligence' or laches.

      (See: Popat and Kotecha Property v. State Bank of  India  Staff  Assn.
      (2005) 7 SCC 510; Rajendar Singh & Ors. v. Santa  Singh  &  Ors.,  AIR
      1973 SC 2537; and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Executive  Engineer,  Jalgaon
      Medium Project, (2008) 17 SCC 448).



      14.    In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2002 SC  1856,
      this Court held that judicially engrafting  principles  of  limitation
      amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid  down  by
      the Constitution Bench in A. R. Antulay v. R.S.  Nayak,  AIR  1992  SC
      1701.


      15.   The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that  where
      a case  has  been  presented  in  the  court  beyond  limitation,  the
      applicant has to explain the court as  to  what  was  the  “sufficient
      cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which  prevented  him
      to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is  found  to
      be negligent, or for want of bonafide on his part  in  the  facts  and
      circumstances of the case, or found to have not  acted  diligently  or
      remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to  condone  the
      delay. No court could be justified in  condoning  such  an  inordinate
      delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is  to  be
      decided only within the parameters laid down by this court  in  regard
      to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause  to
      prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning  the  delay
      without any justification, putting any condition  whatsoever,  amounts
      to passing an order in violation of the statutory  provisions  and  it
      tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.

      16.   In view of above, no  interference  is  required  with  impugned
      judgment and order of the High Court.  The appeals lack merit and are,
      accordingly, dismissed.

                                       ….………………..........J.            (DR.
                                       B.S. CHAUHAN)



                                      …...................................J.

        (S.A. BOBDE)

      NEWDELHI;

      August 22, 2013

















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