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Tuesday, September 20, 2011

As per Order XXV, Rule 9 of Original Side Rules, in any case where Probate or Letters of Administration is for first time applied for after the lapse of three years from the death of the deceased, the reason for the delay shall be explained in the Petition.


IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS


DATED:          14.09.2011


CORAM


THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI
and
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE B.RAJENDRAN


O.S.A.NO.324 OF 2010


Dr.R.A.Venkatesan ... Appellant


Vs.


1.D.Jenbagalakshmi
2.D.Uma Rani
3.D.Renuka Devi
4.T.Ramasamy Nadar
5.P.Jayapandian Nadar ... Respondents


Original Side Appeal is filed under Order XXXVI Rule 1 of the Original Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the order dated 20.08.2009 made in A.No.3268 of 2006 in O.P.No.549 of 2003 on the file of this Court.

For Appellant : Ms.A.V.Aruna Devi

For Respondents : Mr.K.Doraisamy
 Senior Counsel
for
 Ms.Muthumani Doraisamy








JUDGMENT


R.BANUMATHI,J

Being aggrieved by allowing A.No.3268 of 2006 in O.P.No.549 of 2003 revoking the Letters of Administration granted in O.P.No.549 of 2003 [20.08.2009], Appellant has preferred this appeal.

2. Case of the Appellant is that he is the adoptive son of late C.N.Rangabashyam Naidu and Perundevi Ammal @ R.Sakuntala Bai Ammal.  His adoptive mother Perundevi Ammal @ Sakuntala Bai Ammal and his natural mother Adhilakshmi Ammal @ Seethammal are blood related sisters and that Perundevi Ammal @ Sakuntala Bai Ammal orally adopted the Appellant as her son when he was six months old and he was brought up and educated by his adoptive parents.  His adoptive father  Rangabashyam Naidu's name finds place in his school and college records and that he joined the services under the control of District Veterinary Officer at Tirunelveli as Veterinary Assistant Surgeon.  His adoptive mother Perundevi Ammal had purchased the property situated at No.3, Prasanna Vinayagar Koil street, Mylapore, Chennai-4 under sale deed dated 19.11.1953.   Rangabashyam Naidu died on 19.11.1972 and Perundevi Ammal died on 15.11.1973 leaving behind the above said property at No.3, Prasanna Vinayagar Koil street, Mylapore, Chennai-4.  According to Appellant, he approached the authority for obtaining legal heirship certificate.  But the Tahsildar asked the Appellant to obtain Succession Certificate from the competent Court and hence he filed O.P.No.549 of 2003 for grant of Letters of Administration.  No Respondents were shown in O.P.No.549 of 2003.  By the order dated 16.12.2003, Letters of Administration was granted to the Appellant for administration of the property of late Perundevi Ammal.

3. After getting an exparte order in O.P.No.549 of 2003, Appellant has filed O.S.No.4995 of 2005 on the file of XV Assistant City Civil Court, Chennai for delivery of possession of the said property in No.3, Prasanna Vinayagar Koil street, Mylapore, Chennai-4.  On receiving notice in the said O.S.No.4995 of 2005, Respondents have filed A.No.3268 of 2006 for revoking the Letters of Administration.

4. Case of Respondents 1 to 3 is that 1st Respondent is the grand daughter of Lakshmidevi Ammal, one of the sister of Perundevi Ammal.  According to Respondents 1 to 3, Perundevi Ammal settled her property in No.3, Prasanna Vinayagar Koil street, Mylapore, Chennai-4 infavour of Dhanapal who is the husband of 1st Respondent under settlement deed dated 23.08.1973.  Case of Respondents is that Dhanapal is the adopted son of Perundevi Ammal and after the settlement, Dhanapal was in continuous possession and enjoyment of the same as absolute owner till his death on 08.11.1989.  After the death of Dhanapal, 1st Respondent and their daughters - Respondents 2 and 3 succeeded to the property as legal heirs of Dhanapal and that they were in an uninterrupted possession and enjoyment of the property.  Subsequently, Respondents 1 to 3 sold the property to Respondents 4 and 5 for valid consideration under sale deed dated 28.6.1993 and Respondents 4 and 5 are in absolute possession and enjoyment of the said property.  Respondents 1 to 5 prayed for revocation of Letters of Administration granted in O.P.No.549 of 2003 on the ground that Letters of Administration was obtained by misrepresentation and fraud and without impleading the Respondents 1 to 3 as Respondents and therefore, the Letters of Administration is liable to be revoked.

5. Upon consideration of rival contentions and materials, learned Judge held that Original Side Rules require notice to be given to the kith and kin of the deceased and that grant of probate binds all parties and the aggrieved person has right to question the probate.  Observing that in view of caveatable interest expressed by the Respondents 1 to 5, learned Judge revoked the Letters of Administration and directed the O.P.No.549 of 2003 to be converted into TOS.

6. Challenging the impugned order, Ms.Aruna Devi, learned counsel appearing for Appellant has contended that though there is no Will in this case, in the impugned order the learned Judge proceeded under wrong impression that there is a Will existing in this case.  It was further submitted that learned Judge did not comprehend that 1st Respondent is not claiming any caveatable interest on her own but she is claiming caveatable interest only as legal heirs of her husband Dhanapal by virtue of an alleged settlement deed dated 23.08.1973 which is a forged document.  It was further submitted that in the alleged settlement deed dated 23.08.1973, Dhanapal is stated as son of Rangarajulu Naidu who is a total outsider and not in any way connected with the Appellant's family which was not properly considered by the learned Judge.

7. Onbehalf of Respondents, Mr.K.Doraisamy, learned Senior Counsel has contended that Appellant is claiming right as an adopted son of Rangabashyam Naidu and Perundevi Ammal nearly 30 years after their death and has filed O.P.No.549 of 2003 with a false case of adoption and obtained an exparte order for grant of Letters of Administration by misrepresentation and fraud without impleading the Respondents 1 to 3 as party Respondents.  Learned Senior Counsel would further contend that the property was settled infavour of Dhanapal, husband of 1st Respondent way back in 1973 and the property was also sold to Respondents 4 and 5 and suppressing the same, Appellant has filed O.P.No.549 of 2003 for grant of Letters of Administration and the learned Judge has rightly revoked the Letters of Administration and directed the O.P.No.549 of 2003 to be converted as TOS.

8. Rangabashyam Naidu and Perundevi Ammal died intestate.  Appellant has filed O.P.No.549 of 2003 after 30 years of the death of Perundevi Ammal for grant of Letters of Administration claiming that he is the adopted son of C.N.Rangabashyam Naidu and Perundevi Ammal.   The parties are related as under:-                                  
















              Dr.Veerasami
                                                                    |
                       ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                       |                                            |                                                |
          Lakshmi Devi                            Seethammal                     Perundevi Ammal
         = Dorairaj                               @ Adhilakshmi ammal       @  Sakuntala Bai Ammal
                      |                                    = Alwar Naidu                  (died on 15.11.1973)
                      |                                             |                               = C.N.Rangabashyam Naidu
                      |                                             |                                 (died on 19.12.1972)
                      |                                             |                                              | 
        --------------------------------                   ?                                             ?
       |                   |                    |              Dr.R.A.Venkatesan               No issue
 Jenbaga-    Umda Devi   Renuga Devi    (Appellant)
 lakshmi[R1]   [R2]             [R3]
 =Dhanapal
 (died on
  08.11.1989)

9. Original Petition No.549 of 2003 has been filed under Sections 218 and 278 read with Order XXV, Rule 1 of Original Side Rules.  Under Section 218 of Indian Succession Act, Letters of Administration can be granted only when there has been an intestacy.  Admittedly, Perundevi Ammal died intestate.  But the learned Judge appears to have proceeded as if there was a Will.  In Paragraph (8) of the impugned order, the learned Judge observed that "Hence, Letters of Administration is filed on the basis of the Will".  Learned Judge has also observed that it is a probate proceeding.  The observation of the learned Judge that  ....... there is a Will existing .... is factual incorrect.   However, we are of the view that the said factual mistake shall not affect the correctness of the impugned order.
10. While considering the question to whom administration should be granted, as per Section 218 of Indian Succession Act, the right to a grant of administration follows the right of succession, and an heir entitled to a shares on the distribution of the deceased intestate's estate is entitled to grant of Letters.  In the present case, Appellant claims himself as an adopted son of Rangabashyam Naidu and Perundevi Ammal.  Claiming himself to be the adopted son of Rangabashyam Naidu and Perundevi Ammal, nearly 30 years after their death, raises doubts about his claim.  

11. 1st Respondent also claims that her husband Dhanapal is the adopted son of Rangabashyam Naidu and Perundevi Ammal.  It is to be pointed out that in the settlement deed dated 23.08.1973, 1st Respondent's husband Dhanapal has not been described as adopted son of Rangabashyam Naidu and Perundevi Ammal, but only described as son of "Rangarajulu Naidu".  Question whether either the Appellant-Dr.R.A.Venkatesan or Dhanapal were actually the adopted son of Rangabashyam Naidu and Perundevi Ammal is to be resolved only in the suit now converted as TOS.



12. In this appeal, the points falling for consideration are:- (i) Dehors the plea of adoption by Dhanapal, whether the Respondents can seek for revocation of Letters of Administration granted in O.P.No.549 of 2003; and (ii) Whether the learned Judge was not right in revoking the Letters of Administration and converting the O.P.No.549 of 2003 into TOS.

13. A grant of administration does not decide any question of title.  It merely decides the right to administer.  When deciding the grant of Letters of Administration, the Court would not go into the question of title.  When a person seeks Letters of Administration, under Section 218 of Indian Succession Act, it is sufficient if the applicant for Letters of Administration alleges that there is a property to be distributed and that he is entitled to the whole or part of it.  Although it is not necessary for the Court to decide what assets are likely to come to the hands of the applicant for Letters of Administration.  Court is duty bound to consider whether there is any estate at all to be administered.  Court need to specify whether any property was left by the deceased.



14. As pointed out earlier, case of Respondents is that Perundevi Ammal settled her immovable property at No.3, Prasanna Vinayagar Koil street, Mylapore, Chennai-4 infavour of Dhanapal under settlement deed dated 23.08.1973 and after the settlement deed, Dhanapal was in continuous possession and enjoyment of the same as absolute owner till his death on 08.11.1989.  Further case of Respondents is that after the death of Dhanapal, Respondents 1 to 3 were in possession and enjoyment of the said property and that they sold the property to Respondents 4 and 5 under sale deed dated 28.06.1993 and Respondents 4 and 5 are in possession and enjoyment of the property.  No application of Letters of Administration can be entertained to an estate which was already disposed of even during the life time of the deceased.   When property was already disposed of even during the life time of deceased, Respondents have a right to show before the Court that the schedule property is not available to be administered.  

15. All persons who have "an interest in the estate of the deceased" and are entitled to enter caveat and oppose the grant of probate under Section 263 of the Act are also entitled to apply for revocation of the probate.  It is well established that any interest, however slight is sufficient to entitle a party to oppose Letters of Administration/Probate.

16. As seen from the genealogy, Perundevi Ammal had two sisters.  Under Order XXV, Rule 31 of Original Side Rules, where Letters of administration is applied for by one or some of the next-of-kin only, there being another or other next-of-kin equally entitled thereto, the applicant is required to file proof by affidavit that notice of such application has been given to such other next-of-kin.  Referring to non-compliance of Order XXV, Rule 31 of Original Side Rules, learned Judge  has referred (2008) 1 SCC 267 [Basanti Devi v. Ravi Prakash Ram Prasad Jaiswal] wherein while considering the similar rule framed by Bombay High Court, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that "non-issuance of notice to near relatives may be hit by Section 263 of Indian Succession Act".

17. As per Section 263, Explanation (b), Letters of Administration may be revoked where "the grant was obtained fraudulently by making false suggestion or by concealing from the Court something material to the case".  Section 263, Explanation (c) states that "just cause exist where the grant is obtained by means of untrue allegation of a fact essential in point of law to justify the grant, though such allegation was made in ignorance or inadvertently".  Since Perundevi Ammal is already is said to have settled the property even in 1973 and subsequently, sold by sale deed dated 28.03.1993, in all fairness the Appellant should have disclosed in the Petition about the said settlement deed and sale deed.  Only after the Respondents have filed the application for revocation of Letters of Administration, in his counter-affidavit, Appellant has alleged that the settlement deed is a fraudulent one only.  In our considered view, non-disclosure of the settlement deed and sale deed would squarely fall within the meaning of "concealing from the Court something material to the case" under Section 263 Explanation clause (b) of Indian Succession Act.

18. Considering the scope of "locus standi" of the person seeking revocation and the test for determination of locus standi, referring to various decisions, in 1995-2 LW 852 [S.Panchanathan v. Elappan (died) and 5 others], it was held as under:-
"22. The question as to who is entitled to file an application under Section 263 of Indian Succession Act, has been the subject matter of several decisions of various High Courts.  In Sadananda Pyme v. Harinam Sha, AIR 1950 Cal. 179, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that a person holding an interest in the property in the event of intestacy is one, who Will have locus standi to file an application under Section 263 of the Indian Succession Act.  In Promode Kumar Roy v. Sephalika Dutta, AIR 1957 Cal 631, a Division Bench of that Court held that person who has acquired an interest in the testator's estate, though after his death, by reason of the mortgage transfer by the testator's son and who is undoubtedly also a creditor of the testator's said son, whom the alleged Will purports to disinherit has plainly locus standi to apply for revocation of the grant, particularly when his allegation is that the grant was obtained in fraud of the creditors.  In the Goods of Ganapati Sarkar, AIR 1959 Cal. 227, a single Judge of that Court held that a slightest interest in the estate Will entitled one to be a party to probate proceedings.  In another Bench decision the Calcutta High Court in Annapurna Kumar v. Subodh Chandra Kumar, AIR 1970 Cal. 433, has held that any interest, however, slight, and even a bare possibility of an interest, is sufficient to entitle a party to oppose a testamentary paper.  In Rao & Sons v. Chandamon del, AIR 1971 Orissa 95, a single Judge of that Court went to the extent of holding that creditors of the heirs at law of the testator were entitled to ask for revocation of probate and enter caveat during probate proceedings in response to a general citation.  In Sima Rani Mohanti v. Puspa Rani Pal, AIR 1978 Cal. 140, a Division Bench of that Court reiterated the proposition laid down in Annapurna Kumar's case, AIR 1970 Cal. 433 (supra).
23. Recently, a Division Bench of this Court, to which one of us was a party held in Gita @ Gita Ravi v. Mary Jenet James @ James (1995) 1 MLJ 467 : 1995 (2) LW 831 held that explanation (a) to (e) in Section 263 of the Indian Succession Act is not exhaustive and the Court is not fettered by the explanation while deciding whether there is just cause for revocation of a grant.  It is held that the explanation would only mean that in cases, where one of the circumstances set out in clauses (a) to (e) is present, a legal fiction comes into existence to the effect that in such cases, there is just cause for revocation.  If there are circumstances, which do not fall within the ambit of clauses (a) to (e), but which warrant or necessitate the revocation of the grant, the Court is entitled to revoke the grant or annul the same even though there is no legal fiction."

19. In the above said case, the respondent Ellappa Chettiar was a close relation standing in the same degree of relationship as the wife of the appellant and also a probable legal heir of the deceased.  Bench has pointed out that consideration of material fact and failure to specify in Form 58 close relations of deceased who would normally be entitled to claim heirship in the absence of a testament would be sufficient to revoke grant of Letters of Administration and explanation (a) to (e) in Section 263 is not exhaustive.

20. Referring to various decisions, in AIR 1972 Orissa 178 [Shanti Devi Agarwalla v. Kusum Kumari Sarkar], learned single Judge of Orissa High Court held that even bare possibility of a interest is sufficient to entitle a person to oppose testamentary instrument.  In the said case, part of property was purchased from one of the Legatees relying on second Will.  That purchaser would be affected if probate is granted through first Will.  The learned single Judge has held that vendor legatee is entitled to enter caveat in respect of first Will, the purchaser having stepped into the shoes of the vendor is also entitled to enter caveat.

21. Referring to the above judgments, in  (2007) 6 MLJ 290 [S.Bhaskaran and another v. R.Loganathan] (in which one of us was a member  RBIJ), the Appellant claimed to have purchased the property through Ranganayaki who is the Class I heir of Purushothaman.  Observing that any interest howsoever slight, is sufficient to entitle to oppose the grant, the Division Bench of this Court held as follows:-
"Purchasers of property from a Class I heir, have caveatable interest in the probate proceedings initiated in respect of the Will executed by the husband of the said Class I heir, especially when the said Class I heir is alleged to have only life interest over the property."

22. In the case on hand when the property was already said to have been disposed of by way of settlement deed infavour of Dhanapal and subsequently sold, the Respondents definitely have interest in the property to oppose the Letters of Administration.  More so, when the Letters of Administration was sought for nearly 30 years after the death of Perundevi Ammal.

23. As per Order XXV, Rule 9 of Original Side Rules, in any case where Probate or Letters of Administration is for first time applied for after the lapse of three years from the death of the deceased, the reason for the delay shall be explained in the Petition.   Letters of Administration/Probate can be granted only if the delay is explained.  In the instant case, Rangabashyam Naidu died on 19.12.1972 and Perundevi Ammal died on 15.11.1973.   Appellant has filed O.P.No.549 of 2003 for grant of Letters of Administration nearly 30 years after the death of the deceased.  In O.P.No.549 of 1993, Appellant has not convincingly explained the reason for the delay.    It is pertinent to note that immediately after getting Letters of Administration, Appellant had filed O.S.No.4995 of 2005 on the file of XV Assistant City Civil Court, Chennai for recovery of possession from the Respondents.  Reasonable doubts arise as to the bonafide of the Appellant.   In order to prevent misuse of the jurisdiction of the testamentary and intestate matters, we feel that whenever there is an inordinate delay in filing the Petition for Letters of Administration, it would be appropriate that the testamentary Court insist for production of legal heir ship certificate, encumbrance certificate and other relevant documents of the estate of the deceased.   Observing that notice ought to have been sent to the next-of-kin and that the aggrieved person has a right to question the Letters of Administration, the learned Judge has rightly revoked the Letters of Administration.  Notwithstanding the factual mistake crept in the impugned order, we do not find any reason warranting interference in the impugned order.

24. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.  Consequently, connected M.P. is closed.  No costs.  We request the learned Judge to proceed with the TOS.






















bbr


To


The Sub Assistant Registrar, 
Original Side, 
High Court, 
Madras

Thursday, September 15, 2011

The disciplinary authority placed the appellant under suspension and issued a charge-sheet dated 31.01.1989 against him for misconduct punishable under Regulation 30(1) of the Staff Service Regulations. In the charge-sheet, it was alleged that the appellant sanctioned and distributed loans to a large number of brick manufacturing units in a very short period of time, but had not in fact disbursed the entire loan amount to the borrowers and part of the loan amount was misappropriated by him. -.The grounds on which it is proposed to take action have to be reduced to the form of a definite charge or charges which have to be communicated to the person charged together with a statement of the allegations on which each charge is based and any other circumstance which it is proposed to be taken into consideration in passing orders has also to be stated. This rule embodies a principle which is one of the basic contents of a reasonable or adequate opportunity for defending oneself. If a person is not told clearly and definitely what the allegations are on which the charges preferred against him are founded he cannot possibly, by projecting his own imagination, discover all the facts and circumstances that may be in the « advocatemmmohan

The disciplinary authority placed the appellant under suspension and issued a charge-sheet dated 31.01.1989 against him for misconduct punishable under Regulation 30(1) of the Staff Service Regulations. In the charge-sheet, it was alleged that the appellant sanctioned and distributed loans to a large number of brick manufacturing units in a very short period of time, but had not in fact disbursed the entire loan amount to the borrowers and part of the loan amount was misappropriated by him. -.The grounds on which it is proposed to take action have to be reduced to the form of a definite charge or charges which have to be communicated to the person charged together with a statement of the allegations on which each charge is based and any other circumstance which it is proposed to be taken into consideration in passing orders has also to be stated. This rule embodies a principle which is one of the basic contents of a reasonable or adequate opportunity for defending oneself. If a person is not told clearly and definitely what the allegations are on which the charges preferred against him are founded he cannot possibly, by projecting his own imagination, discover all the facts and circumstances that may be in the « advocatemmmohan

whether the Notification dated 26th July, 2004 issued by the Central Government under Section 10 (1) of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (for short, `CLRAA’) prohibiting employment of contract labour of trolley retrievals in the establishment of the Airport Authority of India (for short, `AAI’) at the Indira Gandhi International Airport and Domestic Airport at Delhi would be applicable to the Delhi International Airport Private Limited (for short, `DIAL’) or not? « advocatemmmohan

whether the Notification dated 26th July, 2004 issued by the Central Government under Section 10 (1) of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (for short, `CLRAA’) prohibiting employment of contract labour of trolley retrievals in the establishment of the Airport Authority of India (for short, `AAI’) at the Indira Gandhi International Airport and Domestic Airport at Delhi would be applicable to the Delhi International Airport Private Limited (for short, `DIAL’) or not? « advocatemmmohan

LEGAL ISSUES A.P. Industrial Infrastucture Corporation- – In any event, after the award is passed no writ petition can be filed challenging the acquisition notice or against any proceeding thereunder. This has been the consistent view taken by this Court and in one of the recent cases


                                         1






                                                   NON-REPORTABLE     


                                                                         




               IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA




                CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION




               CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 304-305 OF 2005 










 A.P. Industrial Infrastructure                                .....Appellant.


   Corpn. Ltd.




                                   Versus




 Chinthamaneni Narasimha Rao & Ors.                          .....Respondents










                              J U D G M E N T  








    ANIL R. DAVE, J.








   1.     Being   aggrieved   by   the   Judgment   and   Order   dated   23rd  July, 




   2001 in Writ Appeal No. 1337 of 1999 and   Review W.A.M.P. No. 




   1822  of  2002  in  Writ  Appeal   No.  1337  of 1999  dated   01st  October, 




   2004   passed   by   the   High   Court   of   Judicature   of   Andhra   Pradesh   at 




   Hyderabad, these appeals have been filed by the original petitioners-




   respondents herein, whose lands have been acquired by the State for a 




   public purpose.



                                        2






2.        The facts giving rise to the present litigation in a nutshell  are as 




under:






          A notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 




1894   (in   short   the   `Act')   was   issued   on   27th  August,   1993   for 




acquisition of land admeasuring 101 acres and 33 cents in and around 




Eluru town for a public purpose for setting up an Auto Nagar so as to 




develop the said land for industrial purpose.  On  20th September, 1993 




and 21st  September, 1993, the said notification was published in two 




daily newspapers whereas  on 29th  September, 1993 the substance  of 




the said notification was published in the locality where the land was 




situated.  Looking into the urgency, under the provisions of Section 17 




of   the   Act,   an   inquiry   under   Section   5   A   of   the   Act   was   dispensed 




with.     Thereafter   notification   with   regard   to   the   declaration   under 




Section   6   of   the   Act   was   published   on   8th  October,   1993.     A   Writ 




Petition   No.   5036   of   1994   was   filed   on   18th  September,   1995 




challenging   the   validity   of   the   proceedings   on   the   ground   that   the 




provision of Section 17 of the Act could not have been invoked for 




dispensing  with the enquiry under Section  5A of the Act and in the 




said petition, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh had passed an interim 




order whereby the authorities were restrained from taking possession 



                                       3






of   the   land   in   question.     Ultimately   the   said   petition   was   finally 




disposed   of  on   18th  September,   1995   whereby   the   declaration   under 




Section   6   had   been   quashed   and   it   was   directed   to   hold   an   enquiry 




under Section 5A of the Act.






        In   pursuance   to   the   above   order   passed   by   the   High   Court, 




necessary enquiry under Section 5A of the Act was made, objections 




were   invited   and   ultimately   it   was  decided   to  acquire   only   54   acres 




and 54 cents land out of the land in question admeasuring 101 acres 




and 33 cents.   Declaration under Section 6 of the Act was thereafter 




published on 7th August, 1996.






        After   making   declaration   under   Section   6   of   the   Act,   Award 




was made on 7th January, 1998 and possession of the land in question 




was   taken   on   9th  March,   1998.   After   possession   of   land   in   question 




was   taken   by   the   Land   Acquisition   Officer   from   the   owners   of   the 




land,   on   16th  July,   1998,   the   Land   Acquisition   Officer   handed   over 




possession of the land in question to the present appellant-Corporation 




for a public purpose, for which the land in question had been acquired.






        It is pertinent to note that after declaration under Section 6 of 




the Act made on 7th  August, 1996 and after taking possession of the 



                                      4






land in question on 9th  March, 1998, writ petition No. 32806 of 1998 




was   filed   in   the   High   Court   of   Andhra   Pradesh   challenging   the 




validity of declaration under Section 6 of the Act on the ground that 




the   declaration   was   not   made   within   the   period   prescribed   under 




Section 6 of the Act. 






        By an order dated 27th  August, 1999, the learned Single Judge 




dismissed   the   aforesaid   writ   petition   after   recording   the   fact   that 




award was made  on 7th  January, 1998 and possession of the land in 




question had been handed over to the present appellant on 9th  March, 




1998.     Moreover,   the   learned   Single   Judge   also   held   that   the 




declaration   under   Section   6   was   made   within   the   period   stipulated 




under Section 6  of the Act.






        Being   aggrieved   by   the   dismissal   of   the   petition,   the   land 




owners-the present respondents filed Writ Appeal no. 1337 of 1999. 




The said Writ Appeal was allowed by an order dated 23rd  July, 2001 




whereby   the   order   passed   by   the   learned   Single   Judge   dated   27th 




August, 1999 was quashed and set aside as it was held by the Division 




Bench of the High Court that the declaration under Section 6 of the 




Act   was   made   beyond   the   period   prescribed   under   Section   6  of   the 




Act.



                                         5






        Being   aggrieved   by   the   said   Judgment   and   Order,   A.P. 




Industrial   Infrastucture   Corporation-   the   present   appellant   filed   a 




Review   petition   being   Review   WAMP   No.   1822   of   2002   in   Writ 




Appeal   No.   1337   of   1999   on   29th  August,   2001   which   was   also 




dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court by the impugned 




judgment and order on 01st October, 2004.








3.      Being aggrieved  by the above judgment and orders passed by 




the Division Bench of the High Court these appeals have been filed by 




the   A.P.   Industrial   Infrastructure   Corporation   Ltd.,   which   is   an 




undertaking owned by the Government of Andhra Pradesh for whose 




benefit the land in question had been acquired.








4.      The   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the   appellant   mainly   made 




two submissions: the first is with regard to the delay caused in filing 




the   petition   or   initiation   of   litigation   challenging   the   validity   of   the 




acquisition proceedings and the Second is with regard to delay caused 




in making the declaration under Section 6 of the Act.   According to 




him   the   declaration   was   made   within   the   period   prescribed   under 




Section 6 of the Act.



                                        6






5.      On the other  hand, the learned counsel  appearing for the land 




owners   supported   the   reasons   given   by   the   Division   Bench   of   the 




Andhra Pradesh High Court and submitted  that the declaration under 




Section 6 was made beyond the period prescribed under Section 6 of 




the Act.








6.      We   have   heard   the   learned   counsel   at   great   length.     Several 




judgments were cited by the learned counsel so as to substantiate their 




cases.     In   our   view   there   was   substantial   delay   caused   in   filing   the 




petition   before   the   Andhra   Pradesh   High   Court   whereby   the   land 




acquisition proceedings had been challenged by the land owners and, 




therefore,   we   would   not   like   to   go   into   other   reasons   and   other 




submissions which pertain to delay causing making declaration under 




Section 6 of the Act.








7.      It is not in dispute that Notification under Section 4 of the Act 




was   issued   on   27th  August,   1993   and   it   was   lastly   published,   in   the 




locality where the land is situated, on 29th September, 1993.  We have 




already referred to the earlier litigation and the objections filed by the 




land owners  and decision  with regard  to the land acquisition  officer 




and   the   Government   Authorities   for   not   acquiring   the   entire   land, 



                                          7






which was sought to be acquired at an earlier stage.   Ultimately the 




land admeasuring 54 acres and 54 cents had been acquired out of the 




land   in   question   admeasuring   101   acres   and   33   cents   .     It   is   not   in 




dispute that the Declaration under Section 6 was made on 7th August, 




1996 and an award was made on 7th January, 1998.   Though there is 




some dispute with regard to the fact of taking possession of the land, it 




is an admitted fact that atleast paper possession of the land in question 




was taken on 9th March, 1998 and possession was handed over to the 




appellant on 16th July, 1998.








8.      Thus, it is an admitted fact that declaration under Section 6 of 




the Act was made on 7th August, 1996 and the Award was made on 7th 




January, 1998.   A petition challenging the validity of the declaration 




under Section 6 of the Act on the ground that it was declared beyond 




the   period   specified   under   Section   6   of   the   Act   was   filed   in 




November,   1998.     In   our   opinion,   the   petition   had   been   filed   at   a 




belated   stage.     If   the   land   owners   were   really   aggrieved   by   the 




declaration under Section 6 of the Act, they ought to have challenged 




the same immediately after the declaration under Section 6 was made. 




For the reasons best known to them, they waited for more than two 




years.  Award was made on 7th January, 1998 and even possession was 



                                     8






taken on 9th  March, 1998 and   on 16th  July, 1998, the possession was 




also handed over to the present appellant so that it can use the land in 




question for a public purpose for which it had been acquired. 








9.       The learned Single Judge duly recorded the fact that possession 




of the land in question was taken from the land owners on 9th March, 




1998.








10.      We see no reason for the land owners to wait for a few years for 




challenging   the   declaration   made   under  Section   6  of  the   Act  on   the 




ground of delay.   If the land owners had been really aggrieved, they 




ought   to   have   challenged   the   proceedings   immediately   after 




declaration made under Section 6 of the Act.








11.      This Court has held in several judgments that if the land owners 




are aggrieved by the acquisition proceedings, they must challenge the 




same atleast before an award is made and the possession of the land in 




question is taken by the government authorities. 








          It has been held in Swaika Propeties (P) Ltd. & Another vs. 




State of Rajasthan & Others [(2008) 4 SCC 695] as under:



                                      9






       "6.  This   Court   has   repeatedly   held   that   a   writ   petition 




       challenging the notification for acquisition of land, if filed 




       after the possession having been taken, is not maintainable. 




       In  Municipal   Corpn.   of   Greater   Bombay  v.  Industrial 




       Development Investment Co. (P) Ltd. (1996) 11 SCC 501 




       where K. Ramaswamy, J. speaking for a Bench consisting 




       of His Lordship and S.B. Majmudar, J. held: (SCC p. 520, 




       para 29)




               "29. It is thus well-settled law that when there 


               is inordinate delay in filing the writ petition and 


               when   all   steps   taken   in   the   acquisition 


               proceedings   have   become   final,   the   Court 


               should be loath to quash the notifications. The 


               High Court has, no doubt, discretionary powers 


               under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash 


               the   notification   under   Section   4(1)   and 


               declaration   under   Section   6.   But   it   should   be 


               exercised   taking   all   relevant   factors   into 


               pragmatic   consideration.   When   the   award   was 


               passed   and   possession   was   taken,   the   Court 


               should   not   have   exercised   its   power   to   quash 


               the award which is a material factor to be taken 


               into   consideration   before   exercising   the   power 


               under Article  226. The fact  that no third-party 


               rights   were   created   in   the   case   is   hardly   a 


               ground for interference. The Division Bench of 


               the High Court was not right in interfering with 


               the   discretion   exercised   by   the   learned   Single 


               Judge   dismissing   the   writ   petition   on   the 


               ground of laches."






       Similarly, in the case of  State of Rajasthan & Ors.  vs.  D.R. 




Laxmi   &   Ors.   [(1996)   6   SCC   445]   following   the   decision   of   this 



                                             10






       Court   in   the   case   of     Municipal   Corporation   of   Greater   Bombay 




       (supra) it was held :








               ".... When the award was passed and possession was taken, 




               the Court should not have exercised its power to quash the 




               award   which   is   a   material   factor   to   be   taken   into 




               consideration   before   exercising   the   power   under   Article 




               226. The fact that no third party rights were created in the 




               case,   is   hardly   a   ground   for   interference.     The   Division 




               Bench of the High Court was not right in interfering with 




               the   discretion   exercised   by   the   learned   Single   Judge 




               dismissing the writ petition on the ground of laches. ...."










       To   the   similar   effect   is   the   judgment   of   this   Court   in  Municipal 




Council, Ahmednagar & Another  vs. Shah Hyder Beig & Ors. [(2000) 2 




SCC   48]  wherein   this   Court,   following   the   decision   of   this   Court   in  C. 




Padma     and   Others    vs.  Dy.   Secy.   to   the   Govt.   of   T.N.   and   Others 




[(1997)2 SCC 627]  held: (Shah Hyder case SCC p. 55, para 17)






               "17. In any event, after the award is passed no writ petition 




               can   be   filed   challenging   the   acquisition   notice   or   against 




               any   proceeding   thereunder.   This   has   been   the   consistent 




               view taken by this Court and in one of the recent cases (C. 




               Padma  v.  Dy.   Secy.   to   the   Govt.   of   T.N.   [(1997)   2   SCC 




               627]...."



                                           11






12.             Therefore,   we   are   not   referring   to   the   other   judgments, 




which have been cited by the learned counsel on the subject of validity of 




declaration made under Section 6 of he Act for the reasons that we are 




convinced   that   there   was  gross   delay   in   challenging   the   validity   of   the 




acquisition proceedings.






13.                 It is also pertinent to note that according to the appellant, 




possession of the land in question had been handed over to the appellant-




Corporation on 16th July, 1998 and in view of the said fact, this Court had 




granted interim stay in favour of the appellant on 10th January, 2005 and 




an   application   made   by   the   land   owners   for   vacating   the   said   stay   had 




been rejected and it was directed to maintain status quo.  






14.           Looking to the facts of the present case and in the light of the 




law laid down by this Court, which has been referred to hereinabove, we 




firmly believe that the petition filed by the land owners was at a belated 




stage.   For   the   said   reason,   we   do   not   desire   to   interfere   with   the 




acquisition  proceedings, which had been challenged after more than two 




years of declaration under Section 6 of the Act  and on that ground alone 




we feel that appeals deserve to be allowed.



                                   12






15.           The impugned judgment and orders passed by the Division 




Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh is quashed and set aside. The 




appeals are allowed with no order as to costs. 










                                         ...............................................J.


                                        (Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA)




                                                        




                                         ..............................................J.


                                     (ANIL R. DAVE)




New Delhi


September 15, 2011. 


professional misconduct of an advocate – we uphold the order of the Disciplinary Committee holding that the respondent no. 2 and 3 are not guilty of the charges and allegations of misconduct made against them. So far as respondent no. 1 is concerned, we modify the order passed by the – counsel’s paramount duty is to the client and accordingly where he forms an opinion that a conflict of interest exists, his duty is to advise the client that he should engage some other lawyer. It was further held that it is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent given by all concerned after a full disclosure of the facts. « advocatemmmohan

professional misconduct of an advocate – we uphold the order of the Disciplinary Committee holding that the respondent no. 2 and 3 are not guilty of the charges and allegations of misconduct made against them. So far as respondent no. 1 is concerned, we modify the order passed by the – counsel’s paramount duty is to the client and accordingly where he forms an opinion that a conflict of interest exists, his duty is to advise the client that he should engage some other lawyer. It was further held that it is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent given by all concerned after a full disclosure of the facts. « advocatemmmohan