"27. Jurisdiction:- (1) The court of Judicial Magistrate of the first class or the Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, within the local limits of which- (a) the person aggrieved permanently or temporarily resides or carries on business or is employed; or (b) the respondent resides or carries on business or is employed; or (c) the cause of action has arisen, shall be the competent court to grant a protection order and other orders under this Act and to try offences under this Act. (2) Any order made under this Act shall be enforceable throughout India."= A close reading of the above provision would make it abundantly clear that for filing a petition seeking protection orders, it is not necessary that there should have arisen a cause of action or atleast a part of cause of action, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Judicial Magistrate concerned. It is enough if the aggrieved person permanently or temporarily resides or carries on business or is employed within the local limits of the said Judicial Magistrate.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

DATED 17.07.2012

CORAM

THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE S.NAGAMUTHU

Crl.OP No.14609 of 2012
and
M.P.Nos.1 and 2 of 2012



Yusuf Allabuksh .. Petitioner

Vs

1. Julakia Bee

2. Reshma .. Respondents





Prayer:- Criminal Original Petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C., to call for the records and quash the complaint in C.M.P.No.172/2012 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate, Kallakurichi.

For Petitioner : Mr.R.Rajarajan

For Respondent 1   : Mr.A.Abdul Lathif


- - - - -

O R D E R

The petitioner is the first respondent in C.M.P.No.172 of 2012 on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate, Kallakurichi.  The first respondent herein is the complainant and the second respondent herein is the second respondent before the lower Court as well.

2. The first respondent has filed the said petition under the provisions of The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, seeking maintenance, share in the household and other reliefs as provided in Section 18 of the said Act.
Seeking to quash the said proceedings, the petitioner has come up with this criminal original petition.

3. In this petition, the only ground raised by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner is that the learned Judicial Magistrate, Kallakurichi has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the said petition.  
According to the petitioner, the marriage between the petitioner and the first respondent was solemnized on 22.04.1984 in Mumbai.
After the said wedlock, they lived together as husband and wife in Mumbai and five children were also born to them in Mumbai.  Thus, according to the petitioner, they lived as husband and wife at Mumbai for about 27 years.
Unfortunately, difference of opinion between the petitioner and the first respondent arose on account of the love marriage of their daughter, which was against their wish.   
Thereafter, in the year 2008, the first respondent left her matrimonial home.

4. Thus, according to the petitioner, the entire cause of action for the petition arose only in Mumbai and therefore, a Magistrate Court in Maharashtra State alone has got jurisdiction to entertain the petition.  
In other words, there is no cause of action within the jurisdiction of the learned Judicial Magistrate, Kallakurichi.  Thus, the said Court has got no territorial jurisdiction and therefore the proceeding, is wholly without jurisdiction, he contended.

5. But the learned counsel appearing for the first respondent would firmly oppose this petition.  According to him, though it is true that the marriage was held in Mumbai, the matrimonial life was in Mumbai and all the children were born in Mumbai, however, the first respondent has now returned to Saraswathi Nagar, Thirukovilur Road, Thyagadurgam, where she has been living permanently with her sister under her care and custody.   The learned counsel would further contend that as per Section 27 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 the learned Judicial Magistrate, Kallakurichi has got territorial jurisdiction to entertain the complaint.

6. I have considered the above submissions and I have perused the records carefully.

7. Before going into the facts of the case, let me first refer to Section 27 of the Act, which reads as follows:
"27. Jurisdiction:- (1) The court of Judicial Magistrate of the first class or the Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, within the local limits of which-
(a) the person aggrieved permanently or temporarily resides or carries on business or is employed; or
(b) the respondent resides or carries on business or is employed; or
(c) the cause of action has arisen, 
shall be the competent court to grant a protection order and other orders under this Act and to try offences under this Act.
(2) Any order made under this Act shall be enforceable throughout India."
A close reading of the above provision would make it abundantly clear that for filing a petition seeking protection orders, it is not necessary that there should have arisen a cause of action or atleast a part of cause of action, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Judicial Magistrate concerned.  It is enough if the aggrieved person permanently or temporarily resides or carries on business or is employed within the local limits of the said Judicial Magistrate.  In this case, according to the first respondent, she temporarily resides in Saraswathi Nagar, Thirukovilur Road, Thyagadurgam, which falls within the jurisdiction of the learned Judicial Magistrate, Kallakurichi.  Thus, in my considered opinion, as per Section 27 of the Act, the learned Judicial Magistrate, Kallakurichi has got territorial jurisdiction to entertain the complaint.

8. But, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that simply because a person, either permanently or temporarily, resides within the jurisdiction of the Court, the said Court cannot have jurisdiction unless there has arisen atleast a part of the cause of action within his jurisdiction.
 In order to support this argument, the learned counsel relied on a Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union Bank of India Vs. M/s.Seppo Rally Oy and Another reported in AIR 2000 SC 62.  I have gone through the said judgment.  That was a case decided under the Consumer Protection Act.  The question before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was as to whether a mere residence of the opposite party, in the absence of any part of cause of action, will give raise to the jurisdiction of the District Forum to entertain the complaint.
 In the said judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had to consider sub-section 2 to Section 11 of the Consumer Protection Act which reads as follows:
"11(2) A complaint shall be instituted in a District Forum, within the local limits of whose jurisdiction,-
(a) the opposite party or each of the opposite parties, where there are more than one, at the time of the institution of the complaint, actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or has a branch office or personally works for gain; or
(b) any of the opposite parties, where there are more than one at the time of the institution of the complaint, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business or have a branch office or personally works for gain, provided that in such case either the permission of the District Forum is given, or the opposite parties who do not reside, or carry on business or have a branch office or personally work for gain, as the case may be, acquiesce in such institution; or
(c) the cause of action, wholly or in part arises."
In paragraph 12 of the same judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:
"12. Under Section 17 of the Act a State Commission has jurisdiction to decide complaints of the value between rupees five and twenty lakhs but there is no such provision as contained in Sub-section (2) of Section 11 of the Act applicable to State Commission.  Section 18 of the Act does not make provision of Sub-section (2) of Section 11 applicable to the State Commission.  Each State has its own State Commission.  There is purpose for it.  First appeal of the District Forum situated within the State lies to the State Commission and then State Commission can take cognizance of the dispute arising within that State.  It cannot be the intention of the Legislature that dispute arising in one State could be taken congizance by State Commission of other State. We have to have purposive interpretation of the provisions and we have to hold that similar provisions as contained in Sub-section (2) of Section 11 with modifications as may be necessary, shall be applicable to the State Commission.  In fact these are the basic provisions conferring territorial jurisdiction on a tribunal otherwise it will lead to absurd situations......" (Emphasis added)
9. Referring to the above judgment, the learned counsel  would submit that in the case on hand also, if we have purposive interpretation of Section 27 of the Act, it will be obvious that for entertaining a complaint, the Magistrate should look for at least a part of cause of action within his territorial jurisdiction.

10. Though attractive, the said argument of the learned counsel does not persuade me at all.  There can be no doubt that while interpreting Section 27 of the Act, we should have regard for the purpose behind the Act.
In other words, purposive interpretation of the provisions of the Act alone will achieve the object of the Act.
With this in mind, let us see as to
what is the purpose behind the Act.  
There are as many as five objects enumerated in Clause 4 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the Act.
It is evident that the purpose of the Act is to provide for more effective protection of the rights of the women guaranteed under the Constitution who are victims of violence of any kind occurring within the family and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.  
Thus, it is obvious that the main purpose for which the Act has been brought into force is only to protect the rights of women and to protect the victims of domestic violence.  
If the rights of such victims are to be protected, then we have to liberally interpret Section 27 of the Act, in favour of the victims.  
That is the reason why, the Parliament itself, in Section 27(1)(a) of the Act, has envisaged that the aggrieved person can approach the Magistrate within whose territorial jurisdiction she, either permanently or temporarily, resides.  
Had it been the intention of the Legislature that such complaint should be entertained only by a Magistrate having jurisdiction over the whole or a part of the cause of action, then the Parliament would not have, in unequivocal terms, expressed so in Section 27(1)(a) of the Act.  
This clearly brings to light the intention of the Legislature to be liberal and considerate only towards the victims of domestic violence. If the interpretation which is sought to be made by the learned counsel for the petitioner is accepted, then in many cases, it may not be workable for the victims to go over to the Court situated at a far off place, within whose jurisdiction the cause of action has arisen.  
It will only cause unnecessary hardship to the victims to travel such a long distance spending money and time.  
Therefore, in my considered opinion, if  purposive interpretation is made to Section 27 of the Act, then it would emerge that the victim can approach the Magistrate within whose local jurisdiction, she either permanently or temporarily, resides at the time she seeks protection order, notwithstanding the fact that either whole or part of the cause of action has not arisen within the local limits of the said Magistrate.

11. In such view of the matter, in the case on hand, I hold that the learned Judicial Magistrate, Kallakurichi has got territorial jurisdiction to entertain the case.

12. In the result, I find no merit in this petition, the petition fails and the same is accordingly dismissed. Consequently the connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed.










kk

This court is not inclined to entertain the writ petition at the instance of the petitioner as she was neither a party to the proceedings before the learned Magistrate, Tambaram nor she has locus standi to file such a writ petition.The marriage between the second respondent and her husband was not dissolved so far.As against the said order, an appeal lies to the Sessions Court in terms of the Section 29 of the Act. Hence the petitioner if aggrieved she should file an appropriate application before the Sessions Court after getting the leave of the court to challenge the same. Section 17(2) itself says that an aggrieved person cannot be evicted or excluded from the shared household or any part of it by any person except the procedure established by law. Therefore, it is for the petitioner to establish her title before the appropriate court before seeking for any relief against the cancellation of the shared housedhold order given by the learned magistrate. There is no case made out by the petitioner. Accordingly, the writ petition will stand dismissed. No costs.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

DATED :  10.04.2012

CORAM

THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.CHANDRU

W.P.No.9665 of 2012


Rehana ..  Petitioner

Vs.

1.Protection Officer,
   (Protection of Women from
    Domestic Violence Act, 2008)
   Kancheepuram District,
   Kancheepuram.

2.A.Malika Begum ..  Respondent


This writ petition is preferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for the issue of a writ of certiorarified mandamus to call for the records in CMP No.118 of 2009 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate, Tambaram and quash the "residence order" made therein on 14.7.2009 and directing the first respondent to remove the second respondent from the "shared household" i.e. No.7, First Cross Street, 2nd Main Road, Lakshmipuram Extension-II, West Tambaram, Chennai-600 045.

For Petitioner  : Mr.O.R.Abul Kalaam


- - - -

ORDER

The petitioner is the second wife of one Mohammed Aslam. 
The second respondent is the first wife of the said Mohammed Aslam. 
In this writ petition, the petitioner has come forward to challenge an order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Tambaram in Crl.M.P.No.118 of 2009, dated 14.7.2009. 
The petitioner seeks to set aside the said order and also for a direction to remove the second respondent from the household i.e. No.7, First Cross Street, 2nd Main Road, Lakshmipuram Extension-II, West Tambaram, Chennai.
2.This court is not inclined to entertain the writ petition at the instance of the petitioner as she was neither a party to the proceedings before the learned Magistrate, Tambaram nor she has locus standi to file such a writ petition.
3.The contention of the petitioner was that the premises in question belonged to her. 
Therefore, the learned Magistrate cannot pass an order in terms of Section 17 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (PWDV Act). 
It is seen from the records that the second respondent who was married to Mohammed Aslam both under the Special Marriage Act as well as as per the Islamic Rites, was neglected by her husband. 
She also moved the Family Court for maintenance.
The marriage between the second respondent and her husband was not dissolved so far. 
Even as per the admission made by the second respondent's husband in the counter statement, dated 9.3.2009 filed before the learned Judicial Magistrate, Tambaram, he had categorically stated that he did not seek for any divorce in the interest of the children though he claimed that the complaint was the false complaint. 
4.On the other hand, the stand of the second respondent before the learned Magistrate was that 
after their marriage,  Mohammed Aslam had clandestinely transferred some properties in favour of the petitioner and she was pushed out of the place  along with her disabled child. 
This necessitated her to move the learned Judicial Magistrate under the provisions of the PWDV Act. 
The learned Magistrate after going through the rival contentions had granted the relief. 
As against the said order, an appeal lies to the Sessions Court in terms of the Section 29 of the Act. 
Hence the petitioner if aggrieved she should file an appropriate application before the Sessions Court after getting the leave of the court to challenge the same. 
On the other hand, the stand taken by the husband of the second respondent before the learned Magistrate was very evasive and correctly the learned Magistrate, Tambaram had granted the relief in favour of the second respondent. 
Such an order is always subjected to further order. 
Section 17(2) itself says that an aggrieved person cannot be evicted or excluded from the shared household or any part of it by any person except the procedure established by law.  
Therefore, it is for the petitioner to establish her title before the appropriate court before seeking for any relief against the cancellation of the shared housedhold order given by the learned magistrate. There is no case made out by the petitioner. Accordingly, the writ petition will stand dismissed. No costs.










vvk

To

Protection Officer,
(Protection of Women from
 Domestic Violence Act, 2008)
Kancheepuram District,
Kancheepuram

The revision petitioner (V.Krishnaveni) is the mother of Rajkumar, the first respondent herein.-Claiming that she was living in the residential house bearing door No.6, Nagalingam Pillai Street, Thiruchuli Road, Aruppukkottai, Virudhunagar District which was purchased by her husband in 1991; that her husband died on 22.02.2008 and that the first respondent, who got the property by virtue of a gift deed executed by her husband failed to maintain the revision petitioner and on the other hand, has driven her out of the said house, preferred a complaint with the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Aruppukottai to give her police protection to stay in the above said house. = the revision petitioner had not made out any prima facie case for any of the reliefs sought for under sections 18, 19 and 23 of the protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act 2005.=subsequent to the death of the husband of the revision petitioner and also referred to the fact that the revision petitioner chose to reside with her first son at Madurai, who got a sum of Rs.17,25,000/- from the first respondent for not claiming any right in the property mentioned above and that the said property had been never a house shared by the petitioner and the first respondent.

BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT

DATED: 22/02/2012

CORAM
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P.R.SHIVAKUMAR

Crl.R.C.(MD)No.553 of 2011
and
M.P.(MD)No.1 of 2011

V.Krishnaveni      ... Petitioner/Complainant

Vs.

1.V.Rajkumar
2.A.Gopalakrishnan  ... Respondents/Respondents

Criminal Revision Case is filed under Section 397 r/w 401 Cr.P.C praying
to call for the records and set aside the order passed by the learned Judicial
Magistrate No.V, Madurai, in Cr.M.P.No.120 of 2010, dated 15.06.2010, confirmed
by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, (Fast Track Court No.1), Madurai in
C.A.No.57 of 2010 dated 07.03.2011 and consequently direct the respondents to
permit the petitioner to reside in the shared household situated at No.6,
Nagalingampillai Street, Thiruchuli Road, Aruppukkottai, Virudhunagar District.

!For Petitioners   ... P.Senthurpandian
                       (No appearance)
^For Respondent    ... Mr.Babu Rajendran

:ORDER

There is no representation for the petitioner.   It is not the first time
the revision petitioner has left the matter without representation. As such,
this court deems it appropriate to pass an order after going through the records
and after hearing the submissions made on behalf of the respondent.

2.The revision petitioner (V.Krishnaveni) is the mother of Rajkumar, the
first respondent herein.
A.Gopalakrishnan, the 2nd respondent is the father-in-law of Rajkumar.
The revision petitioner is a widow.
Claiming that she was
living in the residential house bearing door No.6, Nagalingam Pillai Street,
Thiruchuli Road, Aruppukkottai, Virudhunagar District which was purchased by her
husband in 1991; that her husband died on 22.02.2008 and that the first
respondent, who got the property by virtue of a gift deed executed by her
husband failed to maintain the revision petitioner
and on the other hand, has
driven her out of the said house, preferred a complaint with the Deputy
Superintendent of Police, Aruppukottai to give her police protection to stay in
the above said house.
Of course after the failure on the part of the police to
take action on her complaint, Crl.O.P(MD)No.8835 of 2009 came to be filed and
this court by order dated 20.10.2009 directed the police to take necessary
action pursuant to the complaint of the petitioner dated 11.08.2009. 
As she
could not enter the said house and reside therein even thereafter she preferred
a complaint against the first respondent, as if he had committed an offence of
domestic violence at the instigation of the 2nd respondent, who is none other
than the father-in-law of the first respondent.
3.Based on the above mentioned allegation, the revision petitioner filed a
petition under sections 18, 19 and 23 of the Protection of Women from Domestic
Violence Act 2005 for the following reliefs:-
(i)Protection order under section 18 of the said Act, prohibiting the
respondent No.1 and 2 from committing any act of domestic violence on the
revision petitioner and prohibiting the respondent No.1 from alienating the
property bearing door No.6 Nagalingam Pillai Street, Thiruchuli Road,
Arupukkottai, Virudhunagar District, which the petitioner claims to be a shared
household;

(ii)Restraining the respondents 1 and 2 from dispossessing or in any other
manner disturbing the possession of the petitioner of the above said shared
household at bearing door No.6, Nagalingam Pillai Street, Thiruchuli Road,
Aruppukkottai, Virudhunagar District after she would begin her stay in the said
shared house and for giving protection to her through police; and

(iii)For an interim direction, directing the first respondent to permit
the revision petitioner to reside in the said house.

4.The said petition, taken on file by the learned Judicial Magistrate
No.V, Madurai as Cr.M.P.No.120 of 2010, was resisted by the first respondent on
the ground that the said court did not have the jurisdiction to entertain the
complaint. On merits also, the said petition was resisted. The learned Judicial
Magistrate, after hearing, passed an order on 16.06.2010 dismissing the said
petition.

5.As against the said order, the revision petitioner filed an appeal
before the Sessions Court in C.A.No.57 of 2010 which came to be disposed of by
the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No.1, Madurai by
judgment dated 07.03.2011. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track
Court No.1, Madurai, upon hearing the appeal, concurred with the findings of the
trial court that the revision petitioner had not made out any prima facie case
for any of the reliefs sought for under sections 18, 19 and 23 of the protection
of Women from Domestic Violence Act 2005.
6.The learned appellate Judge has adverted to 
the transactions that took
place subsequent to the death of the husband of the revision petitioner and also
referred to the fact that the revision petitioner chose to reside with her first
son at Madurai, who got a sum of Rs.17,25,000/- from the first respondent for
not claiming any right in the property mentioned above and that the said
property had been never a house shared by the petitioner and the first
respondent.
Accordingly,  the learned appellate Judge dismissed the appeal by
judgment dated 07.03.2011 which is sought to be impugned in the present criminal
revision case.
7.Upon perusing the records, this court does not find any defect or
infirmity in the said order passed by the learned appellate Judge warranting
interference by this court. There is no merit in the criminal revision case and
the same deserves to be dismissed.

8.Accordingly, this criminal revision case is dismissed.  Consequently,
connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed.

er

To,

1.The Judicial Magistrate No.V,
  Madurai.

2.The Additional Sessions Judge,
  Fast Track Court No.1,
  Madurai.

DVC retrospective - None of the reliefs claimed in D.V.C. No.8 of 2011 by the 2nd respondent can be called crimes. Though, the Act empowers a Magistrate to entertain the complaint of an aggrieved person under Section 12 of the Act and makes it incumbent on the Magistrate to make enquiry of the same under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, reliefs under Sections 18 to 22 of the Act are in the nature of civil reliefs only. It is only violation of order of the Magistrate which becomes an offence under Section 31 of the Act and which attracts penalty for breach of protection order by any of the respondents. Similarly Section 33 of the Act provides for penalty for discharging duty by Protection Officer. Except under Sections 31 and 33 of the Act which occur in Chapter V, all the reliefs claimed under Chapter IV of the Act are not offences and enquiry of rights of the aggrieved person under Sections 18 to 22 of the Act cannot be termed as trial of a criminal case.Further, this Court in Sikakollu Chandra Mohan v Sikakollu Saraswati Devi by order dated 06.07.2010 in Crl.R.C.No.1093 of 2010 held that it cannot be said that provisions of the Act cannot be invoked in case separation between the parties was prior to the Act coming into force. Therefore, contention of the petitioners fails. 3. In the result, the Criminal Petition is dismissed.

HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE SAMUDRALA GOVINDARAJULU            

CRIMINAL PETITION No.5921 of 2012  

13.08.2012

Gundu Chandrasekhar and others

1. The State of A.P., rep by Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P.,And another

Counsel for the Petitioners: Sri Gaddam Srinivas

Counsel  for the Respondents:  Additional Public Prosecutor

<Gist :

>Head Note:

? Cases referred:

  2009(1) ALT (Cri)-285

ORDER:

       
The petitioners 1 to 3 are husband and parents-in-law of the 2nd
respondent/aggrieved person in D.V.C.No.8 of 2011 of the lower Court.  The 2nd
respondent filed D.V.C. claiming several reliefs including reliefs of protection
order under Section 18, residence order under Section 19, monetary relief under
Section 20 and compensation under Section 22 of the Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (in short, the Act).  The petitioners' counsel
contended that even as per allegations in the complaint, disputes for the
aggrieved person with the petitioners were in the year 2002 and there was
separation between the parties in the year 2003 and that since all the said
incidents happened prior to passing of the Act in the year 2005 and coming into
force of the Act in the year 2006, D.V.C. filed in the lower Court in the year
2011 is not maintainable under the Act.  He placed reliance on U.U.Thimmanna v
U.U.Santhya1 of this in this regard.  This Court observed:
        "There is no dispute that the Act came into effect when the Central
Government appoints 26.10.2006 as the date on which the Act was came into force.
For acts of violence, certain penal provisions are incorporated.  Therefore, it
is a fundamental principle of law that any penal provision has no retrospective
operation, only prospective.  There is no allegation either in the report or in
the statement or in the complaint of the 1st respondent with regard to the acts
of domestic violence that took place on or after 26.10.2006.  Therefore,
continuation of proceedings against the petitioners is nothing but abuse of
process of Court."

2. None of the reliefs claimed in D.V.C. No.8 of 2011 by the 2nd respondent can
be called crimes.  Though, the Act empowers a Magistrate to entertain the
complaint of an aggrieved person under Section 12 of the Act and makes it
incumbent on the Magistrate to make enquiry of the same under the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973, reliefs under Sections 18 to 22 of the Act are in the
nature of civil reliefs only.  It is only violation of order of the Magistrate
which becomes an offence under Section 31 of the Act and which attracts penalty
for breach of protection order by any of the respondents.  Similarly Section 33
of the Act provides for penalty for discharging duty by Protection Officer.
Except under Sections 31 and 33 of the Act which occur in Chapter V, all the
reliefs claimed under Chapter IV of the Act are not offences and enquiry of
rights of the aggrieved person under Sections 18 to 22 of the Act cannot be
termed as trial of a criminal case.  Therefore, it is only in respect of
allegations under Sections 31 and 33 of the Act which are penal provisions, the
Act has no retrospective operation.  Even if it is held that reliefs under
Sections 18 to 22 of the Act have no retrospective operation, the Magistrate can
grant the reliefs in prospective manner and cannot grant the said reliefs with
reference to a date anterior to the date of commencement of the Act.  The 2nd
respondent/aggrieved person is also not claiming reliefs in retrospective manner
inasmuch as she is claiming all the reliefs prospectively, in the sense,
subsequent to date of filing of the case in the lower Court and not with effect
from any back date retrospectively.  Further, this Court in Sikakollu Chandra
Mohan v Sikakollu Saraswati Devi by order dated 06.07.2010 in Crl.R.C.No.1093 of
2010 held that it cannot be said that provisions of the Act cannot be invoked in
case separation between the parties was prior to the Act coming into force.
Therefore, contention of the petitioners fails.

3.  In the result, the Criminal Petition is dismissed.


_____________________________    
SAMUDRALA GOVINDARAJULU,J        
Dt.13th August, 2012

the daughter of the respondent i.e the first wife of the husband of the complainant died, thereby the first marriage of the husband of the complainant does not exist now. Thus, the complainant is altogether a different person, who got no relationship with the respondent by virtue of any marriage otherwise or by consanguinity or by being a member of a joint family within the meaning of section 2(f). What is envisaged under the proviso in Section 2(q), which section defines what is meant by 'respondent' that an aggrieved wife or female living in a relationship in the nature of a marriage may file a complaint against a relative of the husband or male person is well within the ambit of the definition of domestic relationship only. In other words, when domestic relationship as defined in Section 2(q) is one of the conditions to file an application under the Act, a relative of the husband or male person must be one who comes within the ambit of that definition which excludes a relative like the respondent in this case.

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE G.KRISHNA MOHAN REDDY          

CRIMINAL PETITION No.4140 of 2010  

2-8-2012

Nagamuthula Kondaiah

State of A.P., rep. by P.P. & another.

Counsel for the Petitioner: Sri P.SRIDHAR REDDY

Counsel for the Respondent No.1: The Public Prosecutor

< Gist:

> Head Note:

 ? Cases referred:

ORDER:
1.      This petition is filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking to quash
proceedings in D.V.C.No.1 of 2010 (D.V.C.) on the file of the Court of II
Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Kothagudem.
 2.     The petitioner is the respondent and the second respondent is the
complainant in the DVC case.  The respondent filed the complaint under Sections
12, 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act,
2005 (for short 'the Act') against the petitioner herein with a plea to restrain
him from dispossessing her from shared household and also to pay compensation.
3.      For the sake of convenience, I refer the parties as arrayed in the DVC.
It is pleaded and alleged in the complaint as follows.
4.      (a)     The complainant is the legally wedded wife of Chembeti Chinna
Koteshwar Rao, whereas their marriage took place as per Hindu Rites and Customs
on 15.11.2008.  In fact, her husband was first married to one Uma Maheshwari,
daughter of the respondent on 11.8.2000 and a girl by name Keerthi who is aged 7
years was born to them.   On 7.3.2008 Uma Maheshwari died.  The respondent used
to reside in their house as family member.  In fact he was looking after the
affairs of the house.  Her husband reposed implicit confidence on the respondent
in all respects.  Factually, the husband of the petitioner married her as she
was a relative of him and also for taking necessary care of the minor.
According to the complainant, further she and her husband have been taking care
of the minor.  The respondent got no interest in the welfare of the minor.  On
the other hand, he made several efforts to grab the amounts kept in the name of
the minor girl.
(b)     She alleges that apart from that, the respondent has also been making
efforts to subject her to domestic violence one way or the other for the purpose
of ruining the matrimonial house.  The petitioner is always under threat and
danger in the hands of the respondent.   While such circumstances existed, on
30.6.2009 the respondent along with some anti-social elements entered the house
and threatened her with dire consequences and expressed his intention to kidnap
the minor.  Apart from that on 1.7.2009, the respondent attempted to kidnap the
minor and in that context, criminally intimidated her again threatening her with
dire consequences.  Later, she informed about the incident to her husband,
following which they gave a report in Palvancha Police Station, which was
registered in Cr.No.170 of 2009  under Sections 363, 511, 506 read with Section
34 IPC and then the respondent was arrested by the police. She claims that
because of the conduct of the respondent, her health is endangered.   It is also
stated that the respondent left the sharing roof of the petitioner's matrimonial
house, but he is continuously making an onslaught to wreck vengeance against the
family.
5.      It is to be examined whether there are grounds to quash the proceedings in
the DVC as prayed.
6.      Here Sections 2(a), 2(f), 2(g), 2(q), 2(s) and 3 coupled with Sections 18
to 22 of the Act' are important.
(a)     By virtue of Section 2(a) of the Act, "aggrieved person" means any woman
who is, or has been in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who
alleges to have been subjected to any act to domestic violence by the
respondent. So existence of domestic relationship and living in shared house as
defined in Sections 2(f) and 2(s) of the Act are the conditions precedent for
the aggrieved party to initiate proceedings under the Act.    
(b)     By virtue of Section 2(q) "Respondent" means any adult male person who is,
or has been, in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person and against
whom the aggrieved person has sought any relief under this Act: Provided that an
aggrieved wife or female living in a relationship in the nature of a marriage
may also file a complaint against a relative of the husband or the male partner.
The meaning of the proviso can be better understood while analyzing what is
meant by domestic relationship.
(c)     By virtue of Section 2(f) of the Act, "Domestic relationship" means a
relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived
together in a shred household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage,
or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family
members living together as a joint family.  Thereby to constitute domestic
relationship in between two parties, they should have lived in a shared house
and they are related by consanguinity marriage or through a relationship in the
nature of marriage, adoption or as members of a joint family.  The person
aggrieved, covered by the proviso under Section 2(q) falls within the ambit of
the definition of domestic relationship being a relative of the respondent by
marriage.
(d)     By virtue of Section 2(g)  "Domestic violence" has the same meaning as
assigned to it in Section 3.  Section 3 of the Act contemplates "Definition of
domestic violence".  For the purpose of this Act, any act, omission or
commission or conduct of the respondent shall  constitute domestic violence in
case if-
        (a) harms or injures or endangers the health, safety, life, limb or well-
being, whether mental or physical, of the aggrieved person or tends to do so and
includes causing physical abuse, sexual abuse, verbal and emotional abuse and
economic abuse; or

(b) harasses, harms, injures or endangers the aggrieved person with a view to
coerce her or any other person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for
any dowry or other property or valuable security; or

(c) has the effect of threatening the aggrieved person or any person related to
her by any conduct mentioned in clause (a) or clause (b);
or
(d) otherwise injures or causes harm, whether physical or mental to the
aggrieved person."

(e)     By virtue of Section 2(s) of the Act "Shared household" means a household
where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic
relationship either singly or along with the respondent and includes such a
household whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person and
the respondent, or owned or tenanted by either of them in respect of which
either the aggrieved person or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any
right, title, interest or equity and includes such a household which may belong
to the joint family of which the respondent is a member irrespective of whether
the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the
shared household.  Significantly, it is emphasized that to constitute a shared
household, it must be a household where the aggrieved person lives or lived in a
domestic relationship subject to the other formalities incorporated therein.
7.      Thereby the main requirements here are as to whether the complainant and
the respondent lived together in a shared house and whether the complainant is
related to the respondent by consanguinity, marriage or through a relationship
in the nature of marriage, adoption or being a member of a joint family who
lived together as envisaged in Section 2(f) with regards to domestic violence.
Pertinently, the daughter of the respondent i.e the first wife of the husband of
the complainant died, thereby the first marriage of the husband of the
complainant does not exist now.  Thus, the complainant is altogether a different
person, who got no relationship with the respondent by virtue of any marriage
otherwise or by consanguinity or by being a member of a joint family within the
meaning of section 2(f).  What is envisaged under the proviso in Section 2(q),
which section defines what is meant by 'respondent' that an aggrieved wife or
female living in a relationship in the nature of a marriage may  file a
complaint against a relative of the husband or male person is well within the
ambit of the definition of domestic relationship only.  In other words, when
domestic relationship as defined in Section 2(q) is one of the conditions to
file an application under the Act, a relative of the husband or male person must
be one who comes within the ambit of that definition which excludes a relative
like the respondent in this case.
8.      With regards to the question of living in a shared house as defined in
Section 2(s), the respondent must have a right to live in the house or allowed
to live in the house under an obligation having domestic relationship as
contemplated in Section 2(f) with the other inmates of the house which is one of
the conditions to initiate the proceedings under the Act.  Importantly in the
definition of shared house also it is emphasized that the person aggrieved must
have lived in a shared house having got domestic relationship which in fact does
not include a person like the respondent herein subject to the formalities
mentioned.  That apart, neither the complainant nor her husband got any
obligation to allow him to reside in the house.  It is not a case of husband
keeping the respondent in the house aiding the respondent to harass the
complainant, rather it is admittedly a case of both the complainant and her
husband living together harmoniously and both of them facing the alleged conduct
of the respondent.  If he is residing in the house unwantedly, they can take
measures to send him out.  Thus, as the respondent cannot be brought within the
purview of the provisions enumerated that debars the complainant to file the
complaint.
9.      In addition to the discussion made above, the complaint is based only  on
surmises and conjectures.  There are no specific allegations, in other words,
there are only bald allegations against the respondent.  It clearly appear that
false allegations were made against the respondent for some purpose.  It is
something unbelievable in view of the circumstances of the case that the
respondent preferred to stay in the house of the complainant and her husband
after the death of his daughter, who was the first wife of the husband of the
complainant.  It is claimed by the respondent that the husband of the
complainant has filed D.W.O.P.No.777 of 2009 on the file of the Court of
Principal District Judge, Khammam for appointing him as the Guardian of the
minor and he has also filed O.S.No.169 of 2009 on the file of the Court of
Principal Senior Civil Judge, Kothagudem for damages against him on the ground
that he made derogatory allegations against him in another legal proceedings and
he also gave report to the Station House Officer, Palvancha Police Station and
got him arrested, which establish that the complainant and her husband are bent
upon to harass him to force him to accept their terms.
10.     Hence good grounds are made out to quash the proceedings in the DVC.  No  
body should be tried or enquired into unnecessarily in any proceeding.  If it is
done, it is nothing but abusing the process of law and harassing him or her.
11.     In the result, the criminal petition is allowed and the impugned
proceedings in the D.V.C.No.1 of 2010 are quashed.


IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF ANDHRA PRADESH            
AT HYDERABAD    


THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE G.KRISHNA MOHAN REDDY          

Criminal Petition No.4140 of 2010


Date: 2.8.2012

Between:

Nagamuthula Kondaiah
.. Petitioner/Accused
And


The State of A.P., rep. by its
Public Prosecutor and another.
.. Respondents

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE G.KRISHNA MOHAN REDDY          
Criminal Petition No.5558 of 2009
ORDER:
1.      This petition is filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking to quash
proceedings in D.V.C.No.1 of 2010 (D.V.C.) on the file of the Court of
Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Armoor, Nizamabad district.
 2.     The petitioners are the respondents 1 to 3 and the second respondent
herein is the complainant in the DVC case.  For the sake of convenience, I refer
the parties as arrayed in the DVC.
3.      The complainant filed the complaint under Sections 12, 18, 19, 20, 21 and
22 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (for short 'the
Act') against the petitioners herein to pass protection orders, residence order,
maintenance order, custody order and to pay monetary relief compensation order
and any other reasonable order respectively.
4.      The claim of the complainant is as follows.
        Her marriage with the first respondent was performed on 14.7.2008 at
Tirupati.  Before the marriage, the first respondent was engaged to another girl
belonging to Ramadugu, by reason of which, he expressed his unwillingness to
marry her and therefore the engagement was cancelled subject to paying damages.
For two days after the marriage, the first respondent was cordial with her.
Later, the parents of the first respondent i.e. respondents 2 and 3 started
harassing her expressing that she was not suited to the first respondent and if
another girl was married to the first respondent, they would have got a dowry of
Rs.20.00 lakhs with the help of which, the husband of their daughter i.e. the
fourth respondent could have been sent to foreign countries for getting better
jobs.  Further it is alleged that the respondents 1 to 4 harassed her asking her
to leave the house voluntarily and also suggested her to marry another male
person.  Further, she was not allowed to take coffee, breakfast and launch by
the respondents and she was also not allowed to speak to the first respondent
and lead marital life with him.  It is further alleged that whenever she was
wearing good clothes, they used to irritate her saying where you were going.  It
is also alleged that the fourth respondent pushed the complainant out of the
house while asking her to leave the house expressing that they would conduct
another marriage to the first respondent after getting rid of her.   It is
further alleged unable to bear the torture of the respondents, the complainant
left the house and has been staying with her parents house.
5.      Learned counsel for the respondents would contend that the marriage
between first respondent and the complainant is in dispute, by reason of which
alone, the domestic violence case is not maintainable.  Further the complainant
and the first respondent never lived together and there was no consummation of
marriage.
6.      It is to be examined whether there are grounds to quash the proceedings in
the DVC as prayed.
7.      Here Sections 2(a), 2(f), 2(g), 2(q), 2(s) and 3 coupled with Sections 18
to 22 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (for short
'the Act')  are to be considered.
(a)     By virtue of Section 2(a) of the Act, "aggrieved person" means any woman
who is, or has been in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who
alleges to have been subjected to any act to domestic violence by the
respondent. Thereby the main criteria to file the case is that there should be
domestic relationship between the person aggrieved and the respondent.  It
necessitates to understand what is domestic relationship in this context.

(b)     By virtue of Section 2(q) "Respondent" means any adult male person who is,
or has been, in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person and against
whom the aggrieved person has sought any relief under this Act: Provided that an
aggrieved wife or female living in a relationship in the nature of a marriage
may also file a complaint against a relative of the husband or the male partner;
(c)     By virtue of Section 2(f) of the Act, "Domestic relationship" means a
relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived
together in a shred household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage,
or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family
members living together as a joint family.  So, to satisfy this definition both
should have lived or live in a shared house and they are related by
consanguinity marriage etc.
(d)     By virtue of Section 2(s) of the Act "Shared household" means a household
where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic
relationship either singly or along with the respondent and includes such a
household whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person and
the respondent, or owned or tenanted by either of them in respect of which
either the aggrieved person or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any
right, title, interest or equity and includes such a household which may belong
to the joint family of which the respondent is a member irrespective of whether
the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the
shared household.
(e)     By virtue of Section 2(g)  "Domestic violence" has the same meaning as
assigned to it in Section 3. This is the criteria in fact to grant the reliefs
under the Sections 18 to 22.
(f)     Section 3 of the Act reads - "Definition of domestic violence".  For the
purpose of this Act, any act, omission or commission or conduct of the
respondent shall  constitute domestic violence in case if-
        (a) harms or injures or endangers the health, safety, life, limb or well-
being, whether mental or physical, of the aggrieved person or tends to do so and
includes causing physical abuse, sexual abuse, verbal and emotional abuse and
economic abuse; or

(b) harasses, harms, injures or endangers the aggrieved person with a view to
coerce her or any other person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for
any dowry or other property or valuable security; or

(c) has the effect of threatening the aggrieved person or any person related to
her by any conduct mentioned in clause (a) or clause (b);
or
(d) otherwise injures or causes harm, whether physical or mental to the
aggrieved person."

8.      From the pleas taken, it appears that after the marriage, the first
respondent and the complainant lived together.  There is no basis to say that
the respondents 2 and 3 and the complainant lived together in a shared house as
defined though no doubt the other ingredients are satisfied.  On this ground,
the complaint is not tenable and hence ultimately the proceedings are to be
quashed so far as the respondents 2 and 3 are concerned.
        In the result, the petition is dismissed so far as the first respondent is
concerned and is allowed so far as the other respondents are concerned.




______________________  
G. Krishna Mohan Reddy, J
Date: 2.8.2012
Note:
L.R. copy be marked.
        B/o
DA




THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE G.KRISHNA MOHAN REDDY          










Criminal Petition No.4140 of 2010




2.8.2012

















______________________  
G. Krishna Mohan Reddy, J
Date: 9.8.2012