Limitation Act, 1963 - s.5 - Condonation of delay - Appeal by Government Corporation against judgment and decree in civil suit - Also application under for condonation of delay of 4 years - Allowed by Division Bench - Justification of - Held: Not justified - Law Department of the Government Corporation did not approach High Court with clean hands - High Court committed grave error by condoning more than four years' delay in filing of appeal ignoring the judicially accepted parameters for exercise of discretion u/s. 5 - Thus, order of High Court set aside - Application for condonation of delay dismissed - Civil Procedure Code, 1908 - O 41 r. 3A. The question which arose for consideration was whether the Division Bench of High Court was justified in condoning more than four years' delay in filing of appeal by the respondents against judgment and decree passed by the Civil Judge in the Special Civil Suit.

Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1. The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The legislature does not prescribe limitation with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek remedy without delay. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the legislature. To put it differently, the law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. At the same time, the courts are bestowed with the power to condone the delay, if sufficient cause is shown for not availing the remedy within the stipulated time. The expression "sufficient cause" employed in section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and similar other statutes is elastic enough to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub serves the ends of justice. Although, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in dealing with the applications for condonation of delay, this Court has justifiably advocated adoption of a liberal approach in condoning the delay of short duration and a stricter approach where the delay is inordinate. [Para 8] [1184-c-e] Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji (1987) 2 SCC 107; N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy (1998) 7 SCC 123; Vedabai v. Shantaram Baburao Patil (2001) 9 SCC 106, relied on. 1.2. In dealing with the applications for condonation of delay filed on behalf of the State and its agencies/instrumentalities this Court has, while emphasizing that same yardstick should be applied for deciding the applications for condonation of delay filed by private individuals and the State, observed that certain amount of latitude is not impermissible in the latter case because the State represents collective cause of the community and the decisions are taken by the officers/agencies at a slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table consumes considerable time causing delay. [Para 8] [1184-f-h; 1185-a] G. Ramegowda v. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer (1988) 2 SCC 142; State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani (1996) 3 SCC 132; State of U.P. v. Harish Chandra (1996) 9 SCC 309; State of Bihar v. Ratan Lal Sahu (1996) 10 SCC 635; State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao (2005) 3 SCC 752; State (NCT of Delhi) v. Ahmed Jaan (2008) 14 SCC 582, relied on. 2.1. A reading of the impugned order makes it clear that the High Court did make a bald reference to the application for condonation of delay filed by the respondents but allowed the same without adverting to the averments contained therein and the reply filed on behalf of the appellant. The High Court erroneously assumed that the delay was of 1067 days, though, as a matter of fact, the appeal was filed after more than four years. Another erroneous assumption made by the High Court was that the appellant had not filed reply to controvert the averments contained in the application for condonation of delay. It may have been possible for this Court to ignore the first error in the impugned order because by deleting the figures and words "4 years and 28" in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the application and substituting the same with the figure 1067, the respondents misled the High Court in believing that the delay was of 1067 days only but it is not possible to fathom any reason why the Division Bench of the High Court omitted to consider the detailed reply which had been filed on behalf of the appellant to contest the prayer for condonation of delay. Notwithstanding this, the impugned order may have been set aside and remitted the case to the High Court for fresh disposal of the application filed by the respondents under section 5 of the Limitation Act but, it is not proper to adopt that course because the respondents did not approach the High Court with clean hands. [Para 10] [1185-a-h; 1186-a] 2.2. It is clear that the Law Department of respondent No.1 was very much aware of the proceedings of the first as well as the second suit. In the first case, RM was appointed as an advocate and in the second case BR was instructed to appear on behalf of the respondents, but none of the officers is shown to have personally contacted either of the advocates for the purpose of filing written statement and preparation of the case and none bothered to appear before the trial Court on any of the dates of hearing. It is a matter of surprise that even though an officer of the rank of General Manager (Law) had issued instructions to RM to appear and file vakalat as early as in May 2001 and Manager (Law) had given vakalat to BR Advocate in the month of May 2005, in the application filed for condonation of delay, the respondents boldly stated that the Law Department came to know about the ex parte decree only in the month of January/February 2008. The respondents went to the extent of suggesting that the parties may have arranged or joined hands with some employee of the corporation and that may be the reason why after engaging advocates, nobody contacted them for the purpose of giving instructions for filing written statement and giving appropriate instructions which resulted in passing of the ex parte decrees. The above statement is not only incorrect but is ex facie false and the High Court committed grave error by condoning more than four years' delay in filing of appeal ignoring the judicially accepted parameters for exercise of discretion under section 5 of the Limitation Act. [Para 13] [1187-g-h; 1188-a] 2.3. The impugned order of the High Court is set aside and the application for condonation of delay filed by the respondents is dismissed. As a corollary, the appeal filed by the respondents against judgment and decree dated 30.10.2004 shall stand dismissed as barred by time. However, it is made clear that the disposal of the instant appeal shall not absolve the higher functionaries of respondent No.1 from the responsibility of conducting a thorough probe into the matter so that accountability of the defaulting officers/officials may be fixed and the loss, if any, suffered by respondent No.1 recovered from them after complying with the rules of natural justice. [Para 14] [1188-b-c] State of Bihar and others v. Kamleshwar Prasad Singh and another 2000 AIR SC 2388; Spl. Tehsildars, Land Acquisition, Kerala v. K.V. Ayisumma AIR 1996 SC 2750; Punjab Small Industries and Export Corporation Ltd. and others v. Union of India and others 1995 Suppl. (4) SCC 681; P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala and another (1997) 7 SCC 566, referred to. Case Law Reference: 2000 AIR SC 2388 Referred to Para 5 AIR 1996 SC 2750 Referred to Para 5 1995 Suppl. (4) SCC 681 Referred to Para 5 (1997) 7 SCC 566 Referred to Para 5 (1987) 2 SCC 107 Relied on Para 8 (1998) 7 SCC 123 Relied on Para 8 (2001) 9 SCC 106 Relied on. Para 8 (1988) 2 SCC 142 Relied on Para 8 (1996) 3 SCC 132 Relied on Para 8 (1996) 9 SCC 309 Relied on Para 8 (1996) 10 SCC 635 Relied on Para 8 (2005) 3 SCC 752 Relied on Para 8 (2008) 14 SCC 582 Relied on. Para 8 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2075 of 2010. From the Judgment & Order dated 25.3.2009 of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Civil Application No. 14201 of 2008 in First Appeal No. 4180 of 2008. L.N. Rao, Nikhil Goel, Naveen Goel, Marsoak Bafaki, Sheela Goel for the Appellant. Anip Sachthey, Mohit Paul, Shagun Matta, Sherin Daniel for the Respondents. REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.2075 of 2010 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.10965 of 2009) Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. ...Appellant Versus Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation ...Respondents and another J U D G M E N T G.S. Singhvi, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. Whether the Division Bench of Gujarat High Court was justified in condoning more than four years' delay in filing of appeal by the respondents against judgment and decree dated 30.10.2004 passed by Civil Judge (Sr. Division) Gandhinagar (hereinafter referred to as "the trial Court") in Special Civil Suit No.32 of 2001 is the question which arises for consideration in this appeal. 2 3. The appellant was allotted a piece of land for setting up an industrial unit at Ankleshwar subject to the terms and conditions embodied in agreement of licence dated 2.4.1976 which, among other things, provided for consumption of specified quantity of water by the appellant. The agreement also provided for payment of 70% of the cost of agreed quantity of water irrespective of consumption. In 1982, respondent No.1 demanded non utilization charges amounting to Rs.4068/-, which were deposited by the appellant. After some time, respondent No.1 demanded Rs.2,69,895/- towards water charges. For next 10 years, the parties entered into long correspondence on the issue of levy of water charges, etc. Finally, respondent No.1 issued bill dated 13.1.1996 requiring the appellant to pay Rs.22,96,207/- towards water charges. The appellant challenged the same in Special Civil Suit No.32 of 2001. The summons issued by the trial Court were duly served upon the respondents but no written statement was filed on their behalf to controvert the averments contained in the plaint and none appeared on the dates of hearing despite the fact that the case was adjourned on more than one occasion. The suit was finally decreed on 30.10.2004 and it was declared that the appellant is not liable to pay Rs.22,96,207/- by way of minimum charges for water for the period between 1978 and 16.4.2001 and, thereafter, till the water was supplied by respondent No.1. After few months, the appellant filed another suit which was registered as Civil Suit No.222 of 2005 and prayed that respondent 3 No.1 be directed to issue no objection certificate in its favour. The summons of the second suit were also served upon the respondents, but neither the written statement was filed nor any one appeared on their behalf. The second suit was also decreed on 12.12.2007 and respondent No.1 was directed to issue no objection certificate to the appellant. In compliance of the decree passed in the second suit, the concerned authority of the Corporation issued no dues certificate dated 9.7.2008. 4. After four months and fifteen days of taking action in furtherance of the decree passed in the second suit, the respondents filed an appeal against judgment and decree dated 30.10.2004 passed in Special Civil Suit No.32 of 2001. They also filed an application under Order 41 Rule 3A of the Code of Civil Procedure read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay by making the following assertions: "1. That this appeal is preferred against the judgment and decree of the learned Civil Judge (SD), Gandhinagar passed on 30.10.2004. That the suit was filed for permanent injunction and declaration and on the ground that the advocate of the GIDC has appeared but no written statement was filed and, therefore, the learned Judge resorted to Order 8 Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code and granted the declaration as prayed for in the plaint. That after the decree being passed, the present plaintiff filed another suit being Civil Suit No.222 of 2005 and in which the decree was passed on 12.12.2007. That particular decree is to be challenged before this Honourable Court and, therefore, in 2008, after the second decree was passed, it was brought to the notice of the Legal Department as well as to the Executive Engineer at GIDC, Ankleshwar as to how this has happened and it seems that because of numerous transfers as well as it is also 4 possible that the party might have arranged or joined hands with some employee of the Corporation and thereby after engaging advocate, no body has gone to the advocate for the purpose of giving instruction or filing the written statement and as a result thereof, decree is passed and only in the month of January/February, the law department came to know and therefore, an inquiry was made into the matter but the GIDC could not trace out as to at whose hands the mistake or mischief was done, however, when after inquiry everything was noticed and, therefore, the application for certified copy was made on 17.11.2008 and on 18.11.2008, the copy was ready and the same was sent to the advocate and thereafter the present appeal is preferred. 2. That a long span from 30.10.2004 to 18.11.2008, practically four years time is passed and this has happened only because of some mistake or mischief on the part of the staff and, therefore, the appeal could not be preferred, otherwise it is a matter of substantial right of the GIDC where the water charges are leveled in spite of water being used or not and when the bills were already drawn, there was not intention on the part of the GIDC not to contest the suit. But it is difficult to trace out how this has happened and, therefore, when the inquiry was conducted in detail, the facts were brought to the notice and on that basis the cause has arisen to file this appeal and the delay of 1067 days cause in filing the appeal is required to be condoned in the interest of justice." On notice, a detailed reply was filed on behalf of the appellant in the form of an affidavit of its Director, Shri Sanjay Kantilal Shah, paragraphs 4.16, 5 and 6 whereof read as under: "4.16. That the First Appeal preferred by the appellant has been preferred with Civil Application No.14201 of 2008 and the said application for condonation of delay under Order 41 Rule (3A) read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act. As a matter of fact, the petitioner company being a Government Corporation is bound to follow the rules and regulations as it is and cannot deviate itself from the provisions of law. As a matter of fact in filing the present First Appeal there is a delay of more than 4 years. Moreover, in the second suit, the 5 decree and judgment is already passed and thereafter now the petitioner has no right to challenge the order of the Civil Suit No.32/2001. But for the reasons best known to the appellant the correct number of days has not been mentioned in the condonation of delay application. As a matter of fact, the petitioner being a Government Corporation has to follow the rules and regulations strictly and is required to give proper explanation as to why the Appeal has not been preferred within the time frame and if they were so, being aggrieved by the order passed by the Ld. Civil Judge (SD) Gandhinagar. If the condonation of delay is taken into consideration the said page is only a 4 pages wherein no proper explanation as to what the petitioner was doing for the past year has been given in the said and thereby also the said application is required to be dismissed in limine. 5. With regard to para -1 of the Civil Application, I most humbly and respectfully submit that it is true that the decree passed by the Ld. Civil Judge (S.D) Gandhinagar on 13.10.2004. It is also true that in the said Suit, the advocate for the GIDC had appeared but had not filed written statement and therefore, the Ld. Judge has passed the order under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and granted declaration as prayed for in the plaint. It is also true that after decree was passed, the present respondent filed another suit being Civil Suit No.222/2005 and the said decree was passed on 12.12.2007. It is not true that in the year 2008 after the second decree was passed it was brought to the knowledge of the Legal Department that the earlier decree was required to be challenged. Lack of legal knowledge cannot be said to be ground to condone the delay. If the facts had not been brought well in time then for the said it cannot be said that the respondent company is required to be punished. As a matter of fact nothing has been mentioned on Affidavit as to who did not give proper instructions or as to who had possibly played the mischief and as to who had joined the hand with the respondent company. It is only the blame game which is being played and allegations are being leveled in order to save its own skin but there is no truth behind the facts mentioned therein and thereby there is no way as to how the present application can ever be allowed. Moreover the respondent is not knowing any persons of the G.I.D.C. (as on today or at any time). 6 6. With regard to para-2 of the Civil Application, I most humbly and respectfully say and submit that it is true that more than 4 years time has been passed from the date of the decree but as to who has played the mischief or mistake or had it been intentionally filed within the time frame that is for the reasons best known to the appellant corporation and that is something on which the petitioner company would not like to comment at this juncture. No proper justification or explanation has been brought on record as to what was happening for the past 4 years, has also not given anything in detail and neither true and correct facts have been mentioned nor the calculation in respect of the days have been made properly and thereby also on all the said counts, the present application is required to be dismissed with exemplary cost." 5. The Division Bench of the High Court referred to the judgments of this Court in State of Bihar and others v. Kamleshwar Prasad Singh and another, 2000 AIR SC 2388, N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, JT 1998 (6) SC 242, State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and others AIR 1996 SC 1623, Spl. Tehsildars, Land Acquisition, Kerala v. K.V. Ayisumma AIR 1996 SC 2750, Punjab Small Industries and Export Corporation Ltd. and others v. Union of India and others 1995 Suppl. (4) SCC 681, P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala and another (1997) 7 SCC 566 and Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji AIR 1987 SC 1353 and condoned the delay by making a cryptic observation that the cause shown by the respondents is sufficient. The relevant portion of the High Court's order is reproduced below: "Applying the principles laid down by the Supreme Court to the facts of the present case, we are satisfied that sufficient cause 7 is made out by the applicant for condonation of delay. Over and above, in view of the fact that reasons mentioned in this application have not been controverted by the other side and also in view of the principles governing the discretionary exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, we are of the view that sufficient cause has been stated for not filing the appeal in time and hence, delay caused in filing appeal is to be condoned and the application is required to be allowed." (Emphasis supplied) 6. Shri L.N. Rao, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant argued that the impugned order is liable to be set aside because the High Court allowed the application for condonation of delay by erroneously assuming that the delay was of 1067 days only. Learned senior counsel pointed out that appeal against judgment and decree dated 30.10.2004 was filed on 24.11.2008 i.e., after more than four years, but by scoring out the figures and words "4 years and 28" in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the application and substituting the same with figure "1067", the respondents misled the High Court in believing that delay was of 1067 days. He then referred to affidavit dated 16.2.2009 of Shri Sanjay Kantilal Shah to show that substantial grounds had been put forward on behalf of the appellant for opposing the respondents' prayer for condonation of delay of more than four years and submitted that the Division Bench of the High Court committed serious error in condoning the delay by assuming that no reply had been filed by the appellant. Learned senior counsel also invited the Court's attention to affidavits dated 25.11.2009 and 4.2.2010 of Shri Pravin 8 Keshav Lal Modi and Shri Harishbhai Patel respectively filed in this Court on behalf of the respondents as also the list of events attached with the second affidavit to show that the functionaries of respondent No.1 were very much aware of the proceedings of Special Civil Suit No.32 of 2001 and Civil Suit No.222 of 2005 and submitted that the High Court should not have accepted patently incorrect assertions contained in the application for condonation of delay, which was supported by an affidavit of none else than the General Manager of respondent No.1, Shri R.B. Jadeja, that the Law Department came to know about the judgment of Special Civil Suit No.32/2001 only in January/February, 2008. 7. Shri Anip Sachthey, learned counsel for the respondents fairly admitted that the appeal was filed after lapse of more than four years of judgment dated 30.10.2004 but submitted that this Court should not interfere with the discretion exercised by the High Court to condone the delay and the respondents should not be penalized simply because the advocates appointed by the Corporation did not bother to file written statement and appear before the trial Court on the dates of hearing. Learned counsel emphasized that this Court has repeatedly taken cognizance of the lethargy and callousness with which litigation is conducted on behalf of the State and its agencies/instrumentalities at various levels and condoned the delay so as to enable them to contest the 9 matters on merit and submitted that similar approach may be adopted in the present case and the appellant may be compensated by award of adequate cost. 8. We have considered the respective submissions. The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The legislature does not prescribe limitation with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek remedy without delay. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the legislature. To put it differently, the law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. At the same time, the courts are bestowed with the power to condone the delay, if sufficient cause is shown for not availing the remedy within the stipulated time. The expression "sufficient cause" employed in Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 and similar other statutes is elastic enough to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub serves the ends of justice. Although, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in dealing with the applications for condonation of delay, this Court has justifiably advocated adoption of a liberal approach in condoning the delay of short duration and a stricter approach where the delay is inordinate - Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji (1987) 2 SCC 107, N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy (1998) 7 SCC 123 and 10 Vedabai v. Shantaram Baburao Patil (2001) 9 SCC 106. In dealing with the applications for condonation of delay filed on behalf of the State and its agencies/instrumentalities this Court has, while emphasizing that same yardstick should be applied for deciding the applications for condonation of delay filed by private individuals and the State, observed that certain amount of latitude is not impermissible in the latter case because the State represents collective cause of the community and the decisions are taken by the officers/agencies at a slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table consumes considerable time causing delay - G. Ramegowda v. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer (1988) 2 SCC 142, State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani (1996) 3 SCC 132, State of U.P. v. Harish Chandra (1996) 9 SCC 309, State of Bihar v. Ratan Lal Sahu (1996) 10 SCC 635, State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao (2005) 3 SCC 752, and State (NCT of Delhi) v. Ahmed Jaan (2008) 14 SCC 582. 9. In the light of the above, it is to be seen whether the respondents had offered any plausible/tangible explanation for the long delay of more than four years in filing of appeal and the High Court was justified in condoning the delay. 10. A reading of the impugned order makes it clear that the High Court did make a bald reference to the application for condonation of delay filed 11 by the respondents but allowed the same without adverting to the averments contained therein and the reply filed on behalf of the appellant. Not only this, the High Court erroneously assumed that the delay was of 1067 days, though, as a matter of fact, the appeal was filed after more than four years. Another erroneous assumption made by the High Court was that the appellant had not filed reply to controvert the averments contained in the application for condonation of delay. It may have been possible for this Court to ignore the first error in the impugned order because by deleting the figures and words "4 years and 28" in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the application and substituting the same with the figure 1067, the respondents misled the High Court in believing that the delay was of 1067 days only but it is not possible to fathom any reason why the Division Bench of the High Court omitted to consider the detailed reply which had been filed on behalf of the appellant to contest the prayer for condonation of delay. Notwithstanding this, we may have set aside the impugned order and remitted the case to the High Court for fresh disposal of the application filed by the respondents under Section 5 of the Limitation Act but, do not consider it proper to adopt that course, because as will be seen hereinafter, the respondents did not approach the High Court with clean hands. 12 11. The statement containing the list of events annexed with the affidavit of Shri Harishbhai Patel shows that before filing suit, the appellant had issued notice dated 5.2.2001 to which respondent No.1 sent reply dated 13.3.2001. The summons of Special Civil Suit No. 32/2001 instituted by the appellant were served upon the respondents sometime in the month of April/May 2001. On 16.5.2001, General Manager (Law) instructed Ms. Rekhaben M. Patel to appear on behalf of the respondents. Executive Engineer, Ankleshwar was also directed to contact the advocate for preparing the reply affidavit. On 23.5.2001, Deputy Executive Engineer, Ankleshwar forwarded the comments to Ms. Rekhaben M. Patel. On 18.4.2002, the appellant filed an application for ex parte proceedings against the respondents. On 30.11.2002, the trial Court directed the respondents to appear on 12.12.2002 with indication that if they fail to do so, ex parte proceedings will be held. Thereupon, General Manager (Law) wrote letter dated 10.12.2002 to Ms. Rekhaben to remain present on the next date of hearing i.e., 12.12.2002. On 30th December, 2002, Deputy Executive Engineer, Ankleshwar wrote to the advocate in the matter of submission of para-wise comments. On 2.1.2003, the Executive Engineer is said to have sent a letter to the advocate informing her about the next date of hearing i.e., 10.1.2003 and asked her to remain present. After almost one year and ten months, the trial Court pronounced the ex parte judgment and decreed the suit. The summons of the second suit were 13 received sometime in May, 2005. On 20.6.2005, Shri B.R. Sharma, Advocate was instructed to appear on behalf of the respondents. On 10.1.2006, Deputy Executive Engineer, Ankleshwar informed the new advocate about the next date of hearing which was 23.1.2006. The second suit was decreed on 12.12.2007. 12. During the course of hearing, learned counsel for the respondents fairly conceded that in the second suit filed by the appellant there was a specific mention of decree dated 30.10.2004 passed in Special Civil Suit No. 32/2001. He also conceded that even though the first suit remained pending before the trial Court for three years and five months and the second suit remained pending for more than two years, none of the officers of the Law Department or the Engineering Department of respondent No.1 appeared before the Court. 13. From what we have noted above, it is clear that the Law Department of respondent No.1 was very much aware of the proceedings of the first as well as the second suit. In the first case, Ms. Rekhaben M. Patel was appointed as an advocate and in the second case Shri B.R. Sharma was instructed to appear on behalf of the respondents, but none of the officers is shown to have personally contacted either of the advocates for the purpose of filing written statement and preparation of the case and none 14 bothered to appear before the trial Court on any of the dates of hearing. It is a matter of surprise that even though an officer of the rank of General Manager (Law) had issued instructions to Ms. Rekhaben M. Patel to appear and file vakalat as early as in May 2001 and Manager (Law) had given vakalat to Shri B.R. Sharma, Advocate in the month of May 2005, in the application filed for condonation of delay, the respondents boldly stated that the Law Department came to know about the ex parte decree only in the month of January/February 2008. The respondents went to the extent of suggesting that the parties may have arranged or joined hands with some employee of the corporation and that may be the reason why after engaging advocates, nobody contacted them for the purpose of giving instructions for filing written statement and giving appropriate instructions which resulted in passing of the ex parte decrees. In our view, the above statement contained in para 1 of the application is not only incorrect but is ex facie false and the High Court committed grave error by condoning more than four years' delay in filing of appeal ignoring the judicially accepted parameters for exercise of discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 14. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order of the High Court is set aside and the application for condonation of delay filed by the respondents is dismissed. As a corollary, the appeal filed by the 15 respondents against judgment and decree dated 30.10.2004 shall stand dismissed as barred by time. However, it is made clear that the disposal of this appeal shall not absolve the higher functionaries of respondent No.1 from the responsibility of conducting a thorough probe into the matter so that accountability of the defaulting officers/officials may be fixed and the loss, if any, suffered by respondent No.1 recovered from them after complying with the rules of natural justice. ......................................J. [G.S. Singhvi] ......................................J. [Asok Kumar Ganguly] New Delhi, Dated: February 26, 2010.

CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908: Or. 22,r.4 - Abatement of appeal -Inordinate delay in filing application for bringing legal heirs on record and for setting aside abatement - High Court passed a conditional order giving final opportunity to do the needful, failing which the appeal was to stand dismissed-Order not complied with-Subsequently, High Court allowed all applications condoning 3703 days delay in filing the application to bring the legal heirs on record and 883 days delay in filing petition to set aside the dismissal order-Held: Whilst considering applications for condonation of delay u/s 5 of the Limitation Act, the courts do not enjoy unlimited and unbridled discretionary powers- All discretionary powers, especially judicial powers, have to be exercised within reasonable bounds, known to the law-The discretion has to be exercised in a systematic manner informed by reason-Whims or fancies, prejudices or predilections can not and should not form the basis of exercising discretionary powers-High Court, having recorded its conclusions and findings on the unacceptable explanation for delay, should not have condoned unconscionable delay-Judgment of High Court is unsustainable either in law or in equity and is set aside-Limitation Act, 1963-s. 5. ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: Remarks in judgment of High Court on performance of government pleaders - Appeal filed by State Government, before High court-Inordinate delay on the part of Government pleaders in taking steps to bring heirs and legal representative of the respondent on record-Remarks made by High Court against Government pleaders-Held: High Court has, rather sarcastically, dubbed the government pleaders as without merit and ability-The approach adopted by the High Court tends to show the absence of judicial balance and restraint, which a Judge is required to maintain whilst adjudicating any lis between the parties-The High Court not being satisfied with the use of mere intemperate language, resorted to blatant sarcasms-The use of unduly strong intemperate or extravagant language in a judgment has been repeatedly disapproved by this Court in a number of cases-The order of the High Court is based purely on the personal perceptions and predilections of the Judges on the bench-The latent anger and hostility ingrained in the expressions employed in the judgment have denuded the judgment of impartiality-In its desire to castigate the government pleaders and the Court staff, the High Court has sacrificed the "justice oriented approach", the bedrock of which is fairness and impartiality-The caustic remarks made by the High Court, against the government pleaders and the Court staff clearly exhibit a departure from settled principles- The judgment of the High Court is unsustainable either in law or in equity and, as such, is set aside- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-Or. 22, r.4 - Strictures - Judicial restraint. During the pendency of the appeal before the High Court against judgment and decree in a suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction, the plaintiff-respondent died on 25.2.1990 and his counsel filed a memo before the High Court giving the said intimation after notice to the advocate for the appellants. When the appeal came up for hearing on 24.4.1997, the counsel for the plaintiff-respondent again brought to the notice of the High Court the factum of death of his client. Since, inspite of the directions of the High Court, no steps were taken to bring the legal heirs and representatives of the plaintiff-respondent on record, on 6.2.1998, it gave one week's time for compliance failing which the appeal would stand dismissed. As the order was not complied with, the appeal stood dismissed in terms of the order dated 6.2.1998. In the year 2000, an application was filed by the judgment-debtors before the High Court seeking condonation of 883 days delay in filing the petition to set aside the dismissal order dated 6.2.1998. On 17.8.2000 another application was filed seeking to condone 3703 days delay to bring the legal representatives on record. It was accompanied by an application under Order 22 , Rule 4, CPC. After several adjournments at the instance of the judgment- debtors, the appeal was listed for hearing on 19.8.2003 on which date the High Court allowed all the applications and restored the appeal and posted it for hearing. Aggrieved, the heirs and legal representatives of the plaintiff filed the appeals.

Allowing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1.1. This Court while issuing notice in the SLP had directed proceedings in the appeal pending in the High Court to remain stayed meanwhile. Therefore, it is evident that the situation as on date is as it was when the order was passed on 06.02.1998 i.e. , appeal filed by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 stood abated and, as such, dismissed. [Para 16] [229-C] 1.2. Generally speaking, the courts including this Court, adopt a liberal approach in considering the application for condonation of delay on the ground of sufficient cause u/s 5 of the Limitation Act. [para 19] [230-C] Balwant Singh (dead) Vs. Jagdish Singh, 2010 (8) SCR597= (2010) 8 SCC 685; N. Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy 1998 (1) Suppl. SCR 403= (1998) 7 SCC 123; Mithailal Dalsangar Singh & Ors. Vs. Annabai Devram Kini & Ors. (2003) 10 SCC 691; and Sardar Amarjit Singh Kalra (dead) by LRs Vs. Pramod Gupta (dead) by LRs. 2002 (5) Suppl. SCR350= (2003) 3 SCC 272; and Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Ors. Vs. Katiji & Ors. 1987 (2) SCR 387= (1987) 2 SCC 107 - referred to. 1.3. Whilst considering applications for condonation of delay u/s 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the courts do not enjoy unlimited and unbridled discretionary powers. All discretionary powers, especially judicial powers, have to be exercised within reasonable bounds, known to the law. The discretion has to be exercised in a systematic manner informed by reason. Whims or fancies, prejudices or predilections can not and should not form the basis of exercising discretionary powers. [para 26] [234-G-H; 235-A] 1.4. The High Court, in the instant case, graphically narrated the clear dereliction of duty by the government pleaders concerned in not pursuing the appeal before it diligently, and set out the different stages at which the government pleaders had exhibited almost culpable negligence in performance of their duties. It found the justification given by the government pleaders to be unacceptable. Having recorded such conclusions, inexplicably, the High Court proceeds to condone the unconscionable delay. Such a course was not open to the High Court, given the pathetic explanation offered by the respondents in the application seeking condonation of delay. There does not seem to be any logic or rationale, which could have impelled the High Court to condone the delay after holding the same to be unjustifiable. The concepts such as "liberal approach", "justice oriented approach", "substantial justice" cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. Especially, in cases where the court concludes that there is no justification for the delay. [para 24, 25-26] [234-B-C; 235-F; 234-D] 2.1. In the opening paragraph of the impugned order the High Court has, rather sarcastically, dubbed the government pleaders as without merit and ability. The approach adopted by the High Court tends to show the absence of judicial balance and restraint, which a Judge is required to maintain whilst adjudicating any lis between the parties. The High Court, not being satisfied with the use of mere intemperate language, resorted to blatant sarcasms. The use of unduly strong intemperate or extravagant language in a judgment has been repeatedly disapproved by this Court in a number of cases. [para 25-26] [233-G; 234-F] 2.2. The order of the High Court is based purely on the personal perceptions and predilections of the Judges on the bench. The latent anger and hostility ingrained in the expressions employed in the judgment have denuded the judgment of impartiality. In its desire to castigate the government pleaders and the Court staff, the High Court has sacrificed the "justice oriented approach", the bedrock of which is fairness and impartiality. It is also well known that anger deprives a human being of his ability to reason. Judges being human are not immune to such disability. It is of utmost importance that in expressing their opinions, Judges and Magistrates be guided only by the considerations of doing justice. The caustic remarks made by the High Court, against the government pleaders and the Court staff clearly exhibit a departure from the well established principles. [para 27-28] [235-B-D; 236-D] State of U.P. Vs. Mohammad Naim (1964)2 SCR 363 - relied on. 3. The judgment of the High Court is unsustainable either in law or in equity and, as such, is set aside. [para 29] [236-E] Case Law Reference: 2010 (8) SCR597 referred to para 18 1998 ( 1 ) Suppl. SCR 403 referred to para 18 (2003) 10 SCC 691 referred to para 18 2002 (5 ) Suppl. SCR350 referred to para 18 1987 ( 2 ) SCR 387 referred to para 19 (1964)2 SCR 363 relied on para 27 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2909-2913 of 2005. From the Judgment & Order dated 19.08.2003 of the High Court Judicature Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in CMP Nos. 21114-21118 of 2003. P.S. Narasimha and R. Sundaravardan, M. Srinivas R. Rao, K. Parameshwar, Sudhu Gupta, G.N. Reddy, V. Pattabhi Ram, C.K. Sucharita and V. Mohana for the appearing parties. REPORTABL E IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2909-2913 OF 2005 Lanka Venkateswarlu (D) by LRs. .. Appellants VERSUS State of A.P. & Ors ..Respondents J U D G M E N T SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J. 1. These appeals are directed against the order passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in CMP Nos. 21114, 21115, 21116, 21117 and 21118 of 2003 dated 19th August, 2003. By the aforesaid order, the High Court has allowed all the petitions/applications. 2. In the applications/petitions, respondent No.3, herein, had sought the following directions:- " CMP No. 21114/2003: Petition under Order 22 Rule 4 of the CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit titled therewith, the High Court will be pleased to permit the petitioners to bring the above stated persons as legal representatives of the deceased sole respondent in Appeal No. 8 of 1985 on the file of the High Court. CMP No. 21115/2003: Petition U/s praying that the High Court may be pleased to set aside the dismissal Order dated 6.2.98 in AS No.8 of 1985 and to restore the appeal to file. CMP No. 21116/2003: Petition Under Order 9 Rule 9 read with section 151 CPC, praying that the High Court may be pleased to set aside the abatement caused due to the death of sole respondent i.e. Lanka Venkateswarlu. CMP No. 21117/2003: Between Sri D.E.V Apparao ...Petitioner/impleaded Petitioner in AS No.8 of 1985 on the file of High Court And: 1. The State of A.P. rep. by District Collector, Visakhapatnam. 2. The Tahsildar, Visakhpatnam ...Respondent/Appellants 3. Lanka Venkateswarlu (died) ...Respondent 2 Petition under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC, prays this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to permit the petitioners society to be impleaded as appellant No.3 along with the appellants No. 1 and 2 in AS. 8 of 1985 on the file of the Hon'ble Court to prosecute the appeal. CMP No. 21118/2003: Petition U/s 5 of Limitation Act praying the High Court may be pleased to condone the delay of 883 days in filing the petition seeking to set aside the dismissal order dated 6.2.1998. These petitions coming on for hearing, upon perusing the petition and the affidavit filed in support thereof and upon hearing the arguments of Govt. pleader for Appeal for Petitioners in CMP Nos. 21114, 21115, 21116, 21118 of 2003 and of Mr. K. Sarva Bhouma Rao, Advocate for petitioner in CMP No. 21117 of 2003 and of Mr. M.S.R. Subramanyam, Advocate for the respondents in CMP Nos. 21114, 21115, 21116, 21118 of 2003 and G.P. for Appeal for the respondents in CMP No. 21117 of 2003." 3. We may now briefly notice the relevant facts as stated in the pleadings of the parties and the impugned order of the High Court. The predecessor of the appellants, i.e., Shri Lanka Venkateswarlu, (hereinafter referred to as `original plaintiff'), brought a suit O.S. No. 72 of 1979 before the subordinate judge Visakhapatnam 3 for the declaration of his title as the absolute owner of the suit schedule property and for permanent injunction restraining respondents Nos. 1 and 2 from interfering with his peaceful possession. The suit schedule property, to the extent of 2 acres was, according to the original plaintiff, covered by survey No. 73/12 in Thokada village. He had purchased the suit schedule property by a registered sale deed dated 15th July, 1961 from one Gonna Appanna son of Venkataswamy of China Gantyda village. The original plaintiff was constrained to file the aforesaid suit on coming to know that respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were claiming the suit schedule land to be "banjar land" which vested in the Government. He had also learned that the land was in imminent danger of being illegally alienated by the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. They were claiming that the land was required to issue Pattas to weaker sections of society. 4. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were impleaded as the defendants to the suit. Subsequently, the suit was 4 transferred to the Court of IVth Additional District Judge, Visakhapatnam and renumbered as O.S. No. 83 of 1981. 5. The aforesaid averments of the original plaintiffs were controverted by the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. It was claimed that the plaint schedule property was not covered by old survey No. 73/12 of the original village of Thokada. The boundaries as well as survey number were stated to be fictitious, forged and imaginary. Even the ownership of the ancestors of the vendor of the original plaintiff of the suit schedule land was denied. Further, the alleged sale deed dated 15th July, 1961 between the original plaintiff and the vendor was denied. It was also stated that the original plaintiff was not in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property. 6. On the pleadings of the parties, the trial court framed six issues. Issue No. 1 pertains to the title of the original plaintiff to the schedule property. Issues No.2 & 3 were with regard to, whether the original plaintiff was 5 entitled to relief of declaration and injunction as prayed for. Issue No.4 was whether the suit is not maintainable. A perusal of the judgment of the trial court shows that the suit was hotly contested on each and every issue. Issues 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 were decided in favour of the original plaintiff and against the defendants, i.e., respondent Nos. 1 and 2. Issue No.5 with regard to valuation of the suit was not pressed by the government pleader. The suit was decreed by judgment dated 24th September, 1982. 7. The respondents challenged the aforesaid judgment and decree by filing an appeal before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh being A.S. No. 8 of 1985. The sole respondent, i.e., original plaintiff died on 25th February, 1990. Therefore, the Advocate appearing for the deceased original plaintiff being the `sole respondent' in the appeal filed a memo before the High Court giving intimation about the death of his client. The memo was filed after giving notice to the advocate for respondent 6 Nos. 1 and 2, who were appellants in the aforesaid appeals. In spite of such intimation, respondent Nos. 1 and 2 failed to bring the legal representatives of the deceased original plaintiff on record. 8. From the judgment of the High Court it is apparent that the appeal came up for hearing on 24th April, 1997. At that stage, the counsel for the appellants again brought to the notice of the Court that his client has passed away on 25th February, 1990. The High Court directed the government pleader to take steps to bring on the record the legal representatives of the original plaintiff and posted the matter for hearing on 16th June, 1997. It appears that no actions were taken by the respondents to comply with the order passed by the High Court on 24th April, 1997. Therefore, on 6th February, 1998, Justice V. Rajagopala Reddy, J. passed the following order:- "Appeal under Section 96 CPC against the order of the Court of the IV Addl. District Judge, Visakhapatnam dt.24.09.1982 in O.S. No. 83/81. 7 This appeal coming on for orders under Rule 64 of the Appellate Side Rules of the High Court on the failure of the Appellant herein. 1. To take steps to bring on record the LRs. of the deceased sole respondent. In the presence of G./P. for Excise for the Appellant and of Mr. M.S.R. Subramanyam, Advocate for the respondent No.1. It is ordered as follows: 1. That the Appellant do within one week from the date of this order comply with the requisitions of the Office referred to above and; 2. That in default of compliance with the said requisitions within the time prescribed in clause 1 supra, the Appeal shall stand dismissed as against the sole respondent herein." 9. The aforesaid order was admittedly not complied with. Consequently, the appeal stood abated in terms of the order dated 6th February, 1998. It appears that thereafter CMPSR No. 49656 of 2000 was moved by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 seeking condonation of 883 days delay in filing the petition to set aside the dismissal order dated 6th February, 1998. The application was 8 accompanied by an affidavit where it is candidly admitted by respondent No.2 that the order dated 6th February, 1998 was not complied with. It was further admitted that as the order dated 6th February, 1998 was not complied with, the default order came into force and the appeal stood dismissed. 10. In this affidavit, the explanation given is that the predecessors of the officer, who affirmed the affidavit dated 11th July, 2000 came to know about the dismissal of the appeal during the course of investigation in original O.S. No. 6 of 2000 which had been filed by the widow and the children of the deceased original plaintiff, i.e., sole respondent in the appeal. It is also admitted that thereafter, an application was filed for setting aside the order of abatement dated 6th February, 1998, but, without any application seeking condonation of delay of 883 days in filing the petition. To cover the foresaid lapse, CMP No. 21118 of 2003 was filed seeking condonation of delay of 883 days in filing the petition. 9 11. Thereafter CMPSR No. 58644 of 2000 was filed on 17th August, 2000 with a prayer to condone the delay of 3703 days to bring the legal representatives on record. CMPSR No. 58646 of 2000 was filed to bring the legal representatives of the deceased original plaintiff on record and CMPSR No. 58645 of 2000 to set aside the order of dismissal in AS No. 8 of 1985 dated 6th February, 1998 was filed. These applications were subsequently numbered as noted in the heading of the impugned judgment. 12. It appears from the impugned order of the High Court and CMPSR No. 58644 of 2000 was numbered as CMP no. 17186 of 2000 on 17th August, 2000 and listed before the Court on 27th September, 2000. The High Court granted two weeks time for filing the counter. The aforesaid CMP was posted for hearing before the bench on 16th October, 2000 (Venkatanarayan,J.). At that time, counsel for the deceased original plaintiff submitted that 1 his client had died in 1990 and he had no instructions. Therefore, the Court directed to issue notice to the parties on the petition. Even at that stage the government pleader did not bring to the notice of the Court that the applications filed by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 to set aside the order of dismissal and to bring the legal representatives on record were pending consideration. 13. Thereafter it appears the matter was adjourned on a number of occasions from 27th June, 2001 to 9th April, 2002. Surprisingly, on 3rd June, 2002 the government pleader again took time from the Court to verify whether any separate application was filed for restoration of the appeal and whether any such application was pending or not. Thereafter the matter was not pursued by the government pleader. 14. In the meantime, the alleged beneficiaries to whom Pattas had been granted by the Government Poramboke 1 in the year 1979 filed CMP No. 21705 of 2000, seeking permission of the Court to come on record as the third appellant in the appeal. In the impugned order, it is also pointed out that the pendency of the applications had come to the notice of the Court intermittently. It appears that the application to condone the delay in filing the petition for setting aside the order of dismissal was filed, when the lapse was pointed by the Court. 15. Thereafter, it seems that without the adjudication of any of the applications on merits, the appeal was listed for hearing before the Bench, which culminated into passing the judgment and order dated 19th August, 2003, subject matter of the present appeal. By the aforesaid judgment, the High Court has allowed all the applications restored the appeal posted it for hearing on 25th August, 2003. 16. This Court while issuing notice in the SLP on 15th December, 2003 directed that "in the meantime, 1 proceedings in the appeal pending in the High Court shall remain stayed". Therefore, it is evident that the situation today is as it was when the order was passed on 6th February, 1998, i.e., appeal filed by the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 stood abated and hence dismissed. 17. We have heard the learned counsel for parties. Mr. P.S. Narasimha, senior advocate, appearing for the appellant submitted that the impugned order of the High Court cannot be justified on any legal ground. He submits that the High Court having itself recorded the utter negligence of the respondents in pursuing the appeal at every stage, without any justification, condoned the delay. The learned senior counsel pointed out that there was no explanation, much less any plausible explanation to justify the delay of 3703 days in filing the application for bringing on record the LRs. of the sole respondent or for the delay in filing the application for setting aside the order dated 6th February, 1998. It was further submitted that there was no justification to 1 permit the respondent No.3 to be impleaded as a party in the appeal. Learned counsel relied on the judgment of this Court in the case of Balwant Singh (dead) Vs. Jagdish Singh1 in support of the submission that the law of limitation has to be enforced in its proper prospective. Even though the Courts have power to condone the delay, it can not be condoned without any justification. Such an approach would result in rendering the provisions contained in the Limitation Act redundant and inoperative. 18. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents relied on the judgments of this Court in the case of N. Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy2 , Mithailal Dalsangar Singh & Ors. Vs. Annabai Devram Kini & Ors.3 and Sardar Amarjit Singh Kalra (dead) by LRs Vs. Pramod Gupta (dead) by LRs.4 and submitted 1 (2010)8 SCC 685 2 (1998) 7 SCC 123 3 (2003) 10 SCC 691 4 (2003) 3 SCC 272 1 that the High Court in condoning the delay has merely advanced the cause of substantial justice. 19. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel. At the outset, it needs to be stated that generally speaking, the courts in this country, including this Court, adopt a liberal approach in considering the application for condonation of delay on the ground of sufficient cause under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. This principle is well settled and has been set out succinctly in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Ors. Vs. Katiji & Ors.5 20. In the case of M. Balakrishnan (supra), this Court again reiterated the principle that rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. 5 (1987) 2 SCC 107 1 21. In the case of Sardar Amarjit Singh Kalra (supra), this Court again emphasized that provisions contained in the Order 22 CPC were devised to ensure continuation and culmination in an effective adjudication and not to retard further progress of the proceedings. The provisions contained in the Order 22 are not to be construed as a rigid matter of principle, but must ever be viewed as a flexible tool of convenience in the administration of justice. It was further observed that laws of procedure are meant to regulate effectively, assist and aid the object of doing a substantial and real justice and not to foreclose even adjudication on merits of substantial rights of citizen under personal, property and other laws. In the case of Mithailal Dalsangar Singh and Ors. Vs. Annabai Devram Kini & Ors, (Supra), this Court again reiterated that in as much as abatement results in denial of hearing on the merits of the case, the provision of an abatement has to be construed strictly. On the other hand, the prayer of setting aside abatement and the 1 dismissal consequent upon abatement had to be considered liberally. It was further observed as follows:- "The Courts have to adopt a justice oriented approach dictated by the uppermost consideration that ordinarily a litigant ought not to be denied an opportunity of having a lis determined on merits unless he has, by gross negligence, deliberate inaction or something akin to misconduct, disentitled himself from seeking the indulgence of the court." 22. The concepts of liberal approach and reasonableness in exercise of the discretion by the Courts in condoning delay, have been again stated by this Court in the case of Balwant Singh (supra), as follows:- "25. We may state that even if the term "sufficient cause" has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of "reasonableness" as it is understood in its general connotation." "26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient 1 cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly." 23. Let us now examine as to whether the High Court was justified in condoning the delay in the peculiar facts of the presence case. The High Court in its judgment records the following conclusions:- "(1) The Government Pleader having filed the appeal on 18.2.1983 has taken three long years to get the appeal numbered. (2) The sole respondent died in 1990. The learned counsel for the respondent submits that he served a letter on the learned Government Pleader bringing to his notice about the death of his client in 1990 itself. Since the letter is not traced we are not giving much importance to that fact. But at the same time this fact was brought to the notice of the Government Pleader on 24.2.1997 when the appeal was listed for hearing. (3) Even though the Court gave sufficient time the Government Pleader has not taken any steps to bring LRs. on record. 1 (4) After one year the Court passed a Conditional Order on 6.2.1998 and the appeal was dismissed for not bringing the LRs. on record. (5) After two more years the concerned officials of the Government and the Government Pleader in office at the relevant point of time, filed some applications, which are not in order. (6) Even then they have not bestowed any attention either to comply with the defects in filing the application or in getting the orders are passed on these applications. But at the same time they went on taking time without knowing for what purpose they were taking time. In the result an appeal which would have been disposed of in 1997 remained pending all these years mainly due to the negligence on the part of the Government Pleader in office. Thereafter at the two stages, the High Court records that:- "In the normal course we would have thrown out these applications without having second thought in the matter.............." "We have already observed that in the normal course we would have dismissed the applications for severe latches on the part of the appellants and their counsel." 1 24. Having recorded the aforesaid conclusions, the High Court proceeded to condone the delay. In our opinion, such a course was not open to the High Court, given the pathetic explanation offered by the respondents in the application seeking condonation of delay. 25. This is especially so in view of the remarks made by the High Court about the delay being caused by the inefficiency and ineptitude of the government pleaders. The displeasure of the Court is patently apparent from the impugned order itself. In the opening paragraph of the impugned order the High Court has, rather sarcastically, dubbed the government pleaders as without merit and ability. Such an insinuation is clearly discernable from the observation that "This is a classic case, how the learned government pleaders appointed on the basis of merit and ability (emphasis supplied) are discharging their function protecting the interest of their clients". Having said so, the High Court, graphically narrated the clear dereliction of duty by the concerned 2 government pleaders in not pursuing the appeal before the High Court diligently. The High Court has set out the different stages at which the government pleaders had exhibited almost culpable negligence in performance of their duties. The High Court found the justification given by the government pleaders to be unacceptable. Twice in the impugned order, it was recorded that in the normal course, the applications would have been thrown out without having a second thought in the matter. Having recorded such conclusions, inexplicably, the High Court proceeds to condone the unconscionable delay. 26. We are at a loss to fathom any logic or rationale, which could have impelled the High Court to condone the delay after holding the same to be unjustifiable. The concepts such as "liberal approach", "justice oriented approach", "substantial justice" can not be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. Especially, in cases where the Court concludes that there is no justification for the delay. In our opinion, the approach 2 adopted by the High Court tends to show the absence of judicial balance and restraint, which a Judge is required to maintain whilst adjudicating any lis between the parties. We are rather pained to notice that in this case, not being satisfied with the use of mere intemperate language, the High Court resorted to blatant sarcasms. The use of unduly strong intemperate or extravagant language in a judgment has been repeatedly disapproved by this Court in a number of cases. Whilst considering applications for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Courts do not enjoy unlimited and unbridled discretionary powers. All discretionary powers, especially judicial powers, have to be exercised within reasonable bounds, known to the law. The discretion has to be exercised in a systematic manner informed by reason. Whims or fancies; prejudices or predilections can not and should not form the basis of exercising discretionary powers. 2 27. The order of the High Court, in our opinion, is based purely on the personal perceptions and predilections of the Judges on the bench. The latent anger and hostility ingrained in the expressions employed in the judgment have denuded the judgment of impartiality. In its desire to castigate the government pleaders and the Court staff, the High Court has sacrificed the "justice oriented approach", the bedrock of which is fairness and impartiality. Judges at all levels in this country subscribe to an oath when entering upon office of Judgeship, to do justice without fear or favour, ill will or malice. This commitment in form of a solemn oath is to ensure that Judges base their opinions on objectivity and impartiality. The first casualty of prejudice is objectivity and impartiality. It is also well known that anger deprives a human being of his ability to reason. Judges being human are not immune to such disability. It is of utmost importance that in expressing their opinions, Judges and Magistrates be guided only by the considerations of doing justice. We may notice here 2 the observations made by a Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of State of U.P. Vs. Mohammad Naim 6 , which are of some relevance in the present context. In Paragraph 11 of the judgment, it was observed as follows:- "If there is one principle of cardinal importance in the administration of justice, it is this: the proper freedom and independence of Judges and Magistrates must be maintained and they must be allowed to perform their functions freely and fearlessly and without undue interference by any body, even by this Court. At the same time it is equally necessary that in expressing their opinions Judges and Magistrates must be guided by considerations of justice, fair-play and restraint. It is not infrequent that sweeping generalisations defeat the very purpose for which they are made. It has been judicially recognised that in the matter of making disparaging remarks against persons or authorities whose conduct comes into consideration before courts of law in cases to be decided by them, it is relevant to consider (a) whether the party whose conduct is in question is before the court or has an opportunity of explaining or defending himself; (b) whether there is evidence on record bearing on that conduct, justifying the remarks; and (c) whether it is necessary for the decision of the case, as an integral part thereof, to animadvert on that conduct. It has also been recognised that judicial pronouncements must be judicial in nature, and should not normally depart from sobriety, moderation and reserve." 6 (1964) 2 SCR 363 2 28. We are of the considered opinion that the caustic remarks made by the High Court, against the government pleaders and the Court staff clearly exhibits a departure from the principles quoted above. 29. We are of the considered opinion that the judgment of the High Court is unsustainable either in law or in equity. Consequently, the appeals are allowed. The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside with no order as to costs. ...................................J. [B.Sudershan Reddy] ...................................J. [Surinder Singh Nijjar] New Delhi; February 24, 2011. 2

Delay -6500- On the part of Government litigant - Condonation of - Land ceiling proceeding - Land Tribunal holding that declarants were holding lands in excess of the ceiling limit - Writ petitions challenging the order of Tribunal by declarants and also by State - Writ by declarants withdrawn - State's writ dismissed - Review filed by State alleging fraud on the part of declarant and the Secretary of Land Tribunal - Delay of 14 years in filing the Review - Dismissal of Review Petition - Special Leave Petition - Delay in filing of 6500 days against original order and 300 days against order in Review

Held: Delay, specially in cases where large tracts of land and large sums of revenue involved, is done to protect unscrupulous litigants at the cost of public interest/public exchequer - Courts though take liberal attitude in delay by Government, yet such attitude can be extended upto a certain limit - s.5 of Limitation Act must receive liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice - In the instant case, in order to protect public justice, delay condoned, subject to payment of exemplary cost of Rs.10 Lakhs - SLP to be admitted subject to payment of the cost - Limitation Act, 1963 - s.5 - Cost - Imposition of as a condition for condonation of delay - Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 136 - Admission of SLP, subject to payment of cost - Practice and Procedure - Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 - s.66(4) - Administration of justice. G. Ramegowda, Major etc. v. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore AIR 1988 SC 897 - relied on. State (NCT of Delhi) v. Ahmed Jaan 2008 (11) SCALE 455; Nand Kishore v. State of Punjab 1995(6) SCC 614 - referred to. Case Law Reference 2008(11)SCALE 455 Referred to. Para 15 1995 (6) SCC 614 Referred to. Para 16 AIR 1988 SC 897 Relined on. Para 19 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Special Leave Petiton (C ) Nos. 11398-11400 of 2009 From the Judgement and Order dated 07.11.1990 of the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in W.P. No. 40425 of 1982, W.P. No. 10920 of 1983 and order dated 26.09.2007 in R.P. 817 of 2004 in WP No. 40425 of 1982, C/W WP No. 10920 of 1983 Sanjay R. Hegde, for the Appellant(s). REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION SPECIAL LEAVE PETITON (C ) NOS. OF 2009 (Arising out of CC Nos. 3324-3326 OF 2009) State of Karnataka ...Petitioner Versus Y. Moideen Kunhi( dead) by Lrs. And Ors. ...respondents JUDGMENT Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J 1. The special leave petitions are directed against the judgment and order dated 7.11.1990 in Writ Petition No.40425 of 1982 and Writ Petition No.10920 of 1983 and order dated 26.9.2007 in Review Petition No.817 of 2004 passed by a learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court. It appears that there is a delay of more than nearly 6500 days against the original order and about 300 days so far as the review petition is concerned. 2. Before dealing with the question of delay it is necessary to take note of the State's case before the High Court. 3. The records disclose that the agricultural lands to the extent of 50.89 acres, 30.00 acres, 462.00 acres, 3485.83 were purchased through registered partnership firm M/s Y. Moideen Kunhi & Company. All the lands are sub- divisions of Sy. No.146 of Neriya Village, Puttur Taluk. 4. The declaration under Section 66 (4) of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961(hereinafter referred to as the `Act') was filed by the three partners of the firm i.e.. respondent Nos. 1,2 and 3 herein for determination of the excess holding. In the very declaration it is stated that the lands being the plantation lands, are exempted under Section 104 of the Act. It is further mentioned therein that all the declarants are the partners of the firm, having 1/3rd share in the properties purchased and that the declarants have furnished the declaration without prejudice to their contentions that the provision of the Act and the provisions of the Karnataka Ordinance No. 11 of 1975 are not applicable to the aforesaid lands. The Land Tribunal, Belthangady by the 2 order dated 27.9.1982, held that the declarants are holding the lands to an extent of 368.16 acres in excess of the ceiling limit. The tribunal opined that 2820 acres are exempted lands. After deducting the tenanted lands and exempted lands, the Tribunal ultimately held that an area of 530.16 acres has to be taken into consideration for the purpose of determining excess holding. After deducting 10 units for each of the declarants, the Tribunal held that an area of 368.16 acres is the excess land. Thereafter the Land Tribunal suo motu initiated review proceedings under Section 122 A of the Act for reviewing its order dated 27.9.1982. The review proceedings were also dropped on 10.11.1982. 5. The order of the Land Tribunal was questioned before the High Court by the three declarants in W.P. no. 40425/1982. So also the State of Karnataka challenged the order of the Land Tribunal by filing W.P. No. 10920 of 1983. During the course of hearing, the three declarants withdrew W.P. No, 40425/1982. However, W.P. No. 10920/1983 filed by the State of Karnataka was dismissed by the High Court on 7.11.1990 on merits holding that there is no error in the order passed by the Land Tribunal. 3 6. It was contended on behalf of the State that the Tahsildar being the Secretary of the Land Tribunal should have sent the declaration filed under Section 66 of the Act by the three declarants, to the Deputy Commissioner to be dealt with under the provision of Section 79B of the Act, to consider the question by the registered partnership firm is valid or not; instead he proceeded to submit the report to the Land Tribunal which has no jurisdiction to decide the question about the lands purchased by the firm, the Tahsildar should not have been merely dependant upon the certificates of the Cardamom Board and Rubber Board to conclude that the lands in question are plantation lands, the Tahsildar has fraudulently prepared the inspection report according to which he visited the lands in question within a day and that he could not visit every nook and corner of the lands in question, that the Land Tribunal should also not have entertained the declaration filed under Section 66 of the Act as the lands have been purchased and held by the registered firm, that the Tribunal also says that the members of the Land Tribunal inspected the lands within one day, which is a make believe affair; that the statement made before the High Court in W.P. No. 42774/1982 that the excess lands have been surrendered, is also a fraud practiced on the Court inasmuch as the declarants have not actually surrendered the excess lands; that the learned Judge who decided W.P. No. 10920/1983 has opined 4 that the Tahsildar being the Government official, there was no need to send notice to the State or other officials, that when the Tahsildar who is directly concerned with the case has practiced fraud, learned Judge should have issued notice to the Deputy Commissioner or Revenue Secretary; that the learned Judge while disposing of W.P. No. 10920/1983 has opined that the declarants claim the lands not as partners but in their personal capacity which is an error apparent on the face of the record as the declaration itself has been filed as the partners of firm; that fraud vitiates everything and therefore the order passed by the Tribunal as well as by the High Court in W.P. No. 10920/1983 are null and void as they are obtained by the declarants by practicing fraud. Therefore the review petition was filed. 7. Stand of the respondents on the other hand was that no fraud was committed by the respondents or by the Secretary of the Land Tribunal. Error of judgment cannot be equated to fraud and since there was a delay of 14 years in filing the review petition even after the Deputy Commissioner allegedly discovered the alleged fraud on 10.2.2003 the delay in filing the review petition which was in fact filed on 8.10.2004 has not been explained. It was their stand that non filing of the appeal by the State will not amount to fraud by the officials of the State. 5 8. The High Court found that there was no element of fraud and, therefore, the review petition was dismissed. However, liberty was given to the State or the Tribunal to get the land to the extent of 368.16 acres surrendered in accordance with law. 9. The State found that the allegation of fraud related to non surrender of the land. Stand of the respondents was that lands were surrendered by the declarants before the surveyor of the State who had accepted the possession. The High Court accepted that the land was surrendered before the Tribunal as is required under law. It was further observed that if the State felt that the lands surrendered by the respondents are not suitable, it is open to the State to initiate action under Section 67 (3A) of the Act. Liberty was given to the Tribunal or the State to initiate steps for getting the land surrendered in accordance with Section 67 by initiating necessary proceedings. 10. It is submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that this Court while dealing with an application for condonation of delay especially those filed by governments, has held that adoption of strict standard of proof sometimes fails to protect public justice, and it would result in public mischief by skilful management of delay in the process of filing an appeal. 6 11. It is submitted that many government matters are delayed by either the nature of the bureaucratic process or by deliberate manipulation of the same by taking advantage of loopholes in the conduct of litigation. 12. By way of an example only reference is invited to Chapter 3 of a report for the year 2003 of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India. The chapter entitled REVIEW ON HANDLING OF APPEAL CASES IN THE CENTRAL EXCISE DEPARTMENT reads in pertinent part as under: 3.5 Analysis of adverse decisions due to departmental lapses 3.5.1 Dismissal of Appeals on account of delay in filing of appeals 13. As per instructions issued by the Board in October 1991, the Commissioner of Central Excise, must ensure that all the documents including the original certified copy of the CEGAT order, photocopies of the order-in-original & order-in-appeal alongwith application for condonation of delay are enclosed with the proposal sent to the Board for filing civil appeal before the this court. The time limit prescribed for review by the Commissionerate is 10 days from the date of receipt of certified copy of the order. The processing of case at the Board's office includes drafting, vetting and finalisation of appeal. The jurisdictional 7 Commissioner within 60 days may file the appeal from the date of receipt of the CEGAT orders in the Commissionerate of Central Excise. 14. Test check of the records, in 16 Commissionerates of Central Excise, revealed that 32 appeals filed by the department involving revenue of Rs.50.41 crore were dismissed by this Court and 3 cases involving Rs.2.00 crore by CEGAT on account of abnormal delays in filing of the appeals. Audit scrutiny revealed that delays had occurred at all the stages viz. receipt of certified copy, submission of papers to the Board, examination of papers at Board's office, drafting of appeal by the Panel Counsel; and filing of appeal by the CCE. The total period of delay varied. from 119 to 691 days. Some of the illustrative cases are discussed below: - (i) Delay by Panel Counsel The CEGAT set aside (March 1997) an order issued by CCE in April 1992 confirming demand of Rs.29.13 crore and penalty of Rs.2 crore, against M/s. National Organic Chemicals. India Limited, in Mumbai VI Commissionerate of Central Excise, for invoking Section 11A without adequate evidence of intention to evade duty. This Court on 15 January, 1999 dismissed the appeal filed by the department against the CEGAT order dated 5 March 1997, on account of delay in filing of appeal by seven 8 months. The period of delay included four months taken by the Panel Counsel in drafting the appeal. (ii) Delay by the Board In the case of M/s. Time Pharma, involving revenue of Rs.1.83 crore , the Commissionerate of Central Excise Mumbai II (now Mumbai III) received certified copy of the CEGAT's order after 14 days on 4 February 1997 and sent comments to the Board after 23 days as against prescribed period of 10 days. Although the Board decided before 17 April 1997 to go in appeal, the appeal was filed only on 5 June 1998. This court dismissed the appeal on the ground that there was an inordinate delay of about 360 days in filing the appeal without giving any satisfactory explanation. The Commmissionerate of Central Excise attributed the delay to the Board. (iii) Supplementary appeal filed after six years Mumbai II Commissionerate of Central Excise, filed an appeal in CEGAT on 14 June, 1993 against an order of the Commissioner dated 31 March 1992 regarding irregular availment of SSI exemption and consequent availment of Modvat credit at higher rates by a group of six assessees (M/s. Azo Dye Chem and five others). The appeal was, however, filed in respect of only one assessee 9 whereas the case was against all the six manufacturing units and fourteen others being Directors and Managers of the said units. After six years, on the instructions from Junior Departmental Representative, the supplementary appeals alongwith application for condonation of delay in filing appeals against the others were filed in CEGAT on 11 October 1999 under section 35 E (4) of the Act. However, CEGAT dismissed these appeals on 21 July, 2000 borrowing a Larger Bench decision dated 12 July, 2000 in the same case where it was held that CEGAT has no power to condone the delay. The main appeal filed in time (14 June 1993) was also dismissed by CEGAT on 21 July, 2000 on the ground that no appeal had been filed against the other noticee. The revenue involved in this case was Rs.1.18 crore. (iv) Frivolous reasons for condonation In Hyderabad I Commissionerate of Central Excise, two appeals filed by the department against order of Commissioner (Appeals) on whether certain products manufactured by the assessees (M/s.Neyland Laboratories Limited and M/s. Aurbindo Pharma Ltd.) are bulk drugs under `Drugs and Cosmetics Act', were dismissed (17 August 2002) by CEGAT as time barred as there was a delay of 48 days in filing the appeals. The reasons put forth by the department that the new Collector of Central Excise needed time to familiarize to the work were not accepted. Failure to file an appeal before 10 CEGAT in time resulted in dismissal of the appeal involving revenue of Rs.81.81 lakh. 15. It is submitted that even with the introduction of safeguards against delay in the process, in an occasional case delay occurs which is inexplicable in normal circumstances. The question is whether such delay, should result in the negation of the state's claim and at the cost of the interest of the members of the public whose cause has not been carefully espoused. It is submitted by the appellant-State that in such cases, delay must be visited with consequences but the interest of the inhabitants of the State must be protected. In State (NCT of Delhi) v. Ahmed Jaan 2008 (11) SCALE 455 it was held as follows: ....It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/ agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay - intentional or otherwise - is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red-tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. .....In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally 11 responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants" Further at para 15 this court held that: "... The above position was highlighted in State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and Ors. 1996 (3) SCC 132; Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition, Kerala v. K V.Ayisumma (1996 (10) SCC 634) and State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO and Ors. (2005 (3) SCC 752). It was noted that adoption of strict standard of proof sometimes fail to protract public justice, and, it would result in public mischief by skilful management of delay in the process of filing an appeal." 16. This Court has in appropriate cases even condoned delays of over 30 years in filing of SLPs. In Nand Kishore v. State of Punjab 1995 (6) SCC 614 this court held: ".........13. The step of the three-member Bench so taken reveal its mind as reflected in the above proceedings. Their Lordships wanted to do substantial justice. It was thought better to advise the petitioner to file special leave petition. As we view this order, having invited the petitioner to file the special leave petition, it is no longer advisable or appropriate for us to retrace back the step put forward by the three- member Bench. It is significant to recall that the writ application was dismissed on 5-2-1962 and the moment Moti Ram Deka case appeared on the scene, the appellant or 24-2-1964, within limitation, brought forward his suit which got strengthened by Gurdev Singh case appearing within a couple of months of its filing. The appellant-special leave petitioner was thus bona fide pursuing an appropriate remedy for all these years. In these circumstances, we think that an appropriate case for 12 condonation of delay of the intervening period has been made out. We, therefore, allow CC 11644 of 1991 and condone the long durated delay in these exceptional circumstances. On doing so, we grant leave to appeal. The appeal thus arising and the Civil Appeal No. 632 of 1975 may now be disposed of together...." 17. On perusal of the explanation offered it is clear that the officials who were dealing with the matter have either deliberately or without understanding the implications dealt with the matter in a very casual and lethargic manner. It is a matter of concern that in very serious matters action is not taken as required under law and the appeals/petitions are filed after long lapse of time. It is a common grievance that it is so done to protect unscrupulous litigants at the cost of public interest or public exchequer. This stand is more noticeable where vast tracts of lands or large sums of revenue are involved. Even though the courts are liberal in dealing with the belated presentation of appeals/applications, yet there is a limit upto which such liberal attitude can be extended. Many matters concerning the State Government and the Central Government are delayed either by the nature of bureaucratic process or by deliberate manipulation of the same by taking advantage of loopholes in the conduct of litigation. Several instances have come to the notice of this Court where as noted above appeals have been filed where the revenue involved runs to several crores of rupees. It is true 13 that occasionally delay occurs which is inexplicable in normal circumstances. 18. The case at hand is a classic example where the circumstances are the same. More than 4000 acres of land are involved out of which, according to the State, nearly 3500 acres constitute forest land. Ultimately, the Court has to protect the public justice. The same cannot be rendered ineffective by skillful management of delay in the process of making challenge to the order which prima facie does not appear to be legally sustainable. 19. The expression `sufficient cause' as appearing in Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 (in short the `Limitation Act') must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice as was noted by this Court in G. Ramegowda, Major etc. v. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore (AIR 1988 SC 897). Para 8 of the judgment reads as follows: "8. .......The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for a private citizen as for governmental authorities. Government, like any other litigant must take responsibility for the acts or omissions of its officers. But a somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross-purposes with it. 14 Therefore, in assessing what, in a particular case, constitutes "sufficient cause" for purposes of Section 5, it might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the considerations that go into the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the government. Governmental decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process of their making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear responsibility of Government must have "a little play at the joints". Due recognition of these limitations on governmental functioning -- of course, within reasonable limits -- is necessary if the judicial approach is not to be rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit in the very nature of governmental functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision-making process. In the opinion of the High Court, the conduct of the law officers of the Government placed the Government in a predicament and that it was one of those cases where the mala fides of the officers should not be imputed to Government. It relied upon and trusted its law officers. Lindley, M.R., in the In re National Bank of Wales Ltd. (1899) 2 Ch. 629 at p.673 observed, though in a different context: "Business cannot be carried on upon principles of distrust. Men in responsible positions must be trusted by those above them, as well as by those below them, until there is reason to distrust them." 20. Keeping in view the importance of questions of law which are involved we are inclined to condone the delay subject to payment of exemplary costs which we fix at rupees ten lakhs to be paid within a period 15 of 8 weeks to the respondents. The delay is condoned subject to the payment of the aforesaid amount as costs. After making the payment the receipt thereof shall be filed before this Court alongwith an affidavit. Only after the payment is made the special leave petitions shall be listed for admission. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case. 21. It is imperative that the State shall immediately initiate action as available in law against every person responsible for the alleged fraud and delay in persuing the remedies, fix responsibility and recover the amount paid as costs from them. Needless to say orders shall be passed in this regard by the competent authority after grant of opportunity to the concerned person(s). If any, action under criminal law(s) is to be taken, same shall be taken. ..........................................J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT) ..........................................J. (ASOK KUMAR GANGULY) New Delhi, May 04, 2009 16