LAND REFORMS ACT- The appellants claim to be the owners of lands in Sy. Nos. 33, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41 and 53 situated in village Halligeri, Dharward Taluk, Karnataka, having purchased the same in the year 1956. According to the appellants, the lands were in their personal cultivation since then. 3. The 2nd respondent, Gangappa (since deceased) filed an application before the Special Tahasildar, Land Reforms, Dharwad, contending therein that he had sent an application on 23rd June, 1975 in Form No.7 for registering him as an occupant of the lands belonging to the appellants.- whether in fact the 2nd respondent had filed an application in Form No.7, and if it was found that he had made such an application, then to consider it on merits in accordance with law. = the Tribunal admitted Form No.7 produced by the 2nd respondent and on an enquiry gave definite finding that the applicant-2nd respondent was not in occupation or cultivation of the suit land as a tenant as on 1st March, 1974 or prior thereto. In view of such finding of the Tribunal it was not open for the learned Single Judge to remand the matter again to the Tribunal to enquire whether Form No.7 is on record or Form No.7 was produced by the 2nd respondent which in fact rendered the order dated 2nd June, 1997 passed by the Tribunal ineffective for no reason. The Division Bench of the High Court also failed to notice the above-said fact and thereby erred in affirming the order passed by the learned Single Judge. 14. For the reasons aforesaid, we set aside the impugned order dated 2nd June, 2006 passed by the Division Bench in W.A.No.3836/2005(LR) and order dated 3rd June, 2005 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. No.15722/1997, order dated 2nd June, 1997 passed by the Land Tribunal, Dharwad is restored. The appeal is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.

        published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40793
                                                          REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8289  OF 2013
                   (arising out of SLP(C)No.14496 of 2006)

CHANNABASAPPA(DEAD) BY LR & ANR.        … APPELLANTS

                                   VERSUS

STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS.                    … RESPONDENTS

                               J U D G M E N T

SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.

     Leave granted.

1.    This appeal has been preferred by the appellants against the  judgment
and order dated 2nd June, 2006 passed by the  Division  Bench  of  the  High
Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in W.A. No.3836/2005(LR).  By  the  impugned
judgment  the  Division  Bench  dismissed  the  appeal  preferred   by   the
appellants herein and affirmed  the  order  passed  by  the  learned  Single
Judge, whereby the learned  Single  Judge  directed  the  Land  Tribunal  to
verify the aspect of filing of Form No.7 by the tenant.

2.    The factual matrix of the case is as follows:
      The appellants claim to be the owners of lands in  Sy.  Nos.  33,  37,
38, 39, 40, 41  and  53  situated  in  village  Halligeri,  Dharward  Taluk,
Karnataka, having purchased the same in the  year  1956.  
According  to  the
appellants, the lands were in their personal cultivation since then.
3.    The 2nd respondent, Gangappa (since  deceased)  filed  an  application
before the Special Tahasildar, Land  Reforms,  Dharwad,  contending  therein
that he had sent an  application  on  23rd  June,  1975  in  Form  No.7  for
registering him as an occupant of the lands  belonging  to  the  appellants.
The Special Tahasildar, Land Reforms, on 31st  October,  1987  replied  that
there was no record of having received such  an  application  from  the  2nd
respondent in respect of the lands in question and no entry was made in  the
Register of Form No.7 maintained by the Land Tribunal.
4.    The 2nd respondent filed Writ Petition No.4165/1988 in the High  Court
of Karnataka at Bangalore with the prayer for a direction  to  the  Tribunal
to conduct enquiry under Section 48-A of the  Karnataka  Land  Reforms  Act,
1974 (hereinafter referred to as the “Land Reforms Act”) and  to  grant  him
occupancy rights. In support of his claim for having sent  the  application,
the 2nd respondent had produced  a  xerox  copy  of  a  postal  receipt  and
acknowledgment. The High Court by its order dated 5th August, 1991  remanded
the matter to the  Land  Tribunal  to  consider  whether  in  fact  the  2nd
respondent had filed an application in Form No.7, and if it was  found  that
he had  made  such  an  application,  then  to  consider  it  on  merits  in
accordance with law. The said  order  was  challenged  before  the  Division
Bench of the High Court as well as by way of Special Leave  Petition  before
this Court unsuccessfully.
5.    After a detailed enquiry, by the order dated 2nd June, 1997, the  Land
Tribunal found, on evidence produced before it, that the 2nd respondent  had
not proved that he had in fact sent an application to the Land  Tribunal  in
Form No.7.
      Before the Land Tribunal, the 2nd respondent produced  xerox  copy  of
the Form No.7 on 27th November, 1993, claiming to be the one sent by him  by
post.
      Although, the Land Tribunal came to the  conclusion that there was  no
proof of filing of Form No.7 by the 2nd respondent, unanimously  it  decided
to admit the copy produced by the 2nd respondent on 27th November, 1993  for
enquiry under Section 48-A of the Land Reforms Act and, upon evidence,  held
that the lands were in  self-cultivation  of  the  appellants  and  the  2nd
respondent was not a tenant of the lands in question as on 1st  March,  1974
or immediately prior  thereto  and  as  such  rejected  his  application  on
merits.
6.    The 2nd respondent being aggrieved filed a writ  petition  being  W.P.
No.15722/1987  challenging  the  correctness  of  the  order  of  the   Land
Tribunal. Though the learned Single Judge noticed  that  the  Land  Tribunal
had admitted the xerox copy of the Form No.7 produced by the 2nd  respondent
on 27th November, 1993 and had conducted an enquiry  thereon  under  Section
48-A of the Land Reforms Act, learned Single Judge, by  the  judgment  dated
3rd June, 2005 remitted the matter to the Tribunal to find out  whether  the
application existed in the records and whether in fact  the  2nd  respondent
had filed an application in Form No.7.
7.    The appellants thereafter filed a review petition before  the  learned
Single Judge bringing to the notice of the learned  Single  Judge  that  the
copy of the application found in  records  was  the  one  which  the  second
respondent had filed  on  27th  November,  1993  and  that  the  remand  was
unnecessary as the  application  was  admitted  and  enquiry  was  conducted
thereon. However, learned Single Judge did not appreciate  the  grounds  for
the review and dismissed the review petition on 1st July, 2005.
8.    The appellants being not happy preferred the writ appeal  in  question
before the Division Bench which dismissed the same by the impugned  judgment
on 2nd June, 2006.
9.    Notices were issued to respondents. The legal representatives  of  the
2nd respondent who are party respondents appeared.
10.   Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that  the  Land  Tribunal
having accepted the filing of the Form No.7 by the 2nd respondent, there  is
no question of remitting the matter  again  to  the  Tribunal  to  find  out
whether the Form No.7 is available on records and whether the Form No.7  was
filed by the 2nd respondent.
11.   Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the 2nd  respondent
had produced the copy of the Form No.7 and made it available on  records  to
the Land Tribunal and the case was  rightly  remanded  to  make  a  detailed
enquiry  under  Section  48-A  of  the  Land  Reforms  Act.  However,   such
submission cannot be accepted in view of the  finding  already  recorded  by
the Land Tribunal.
12.   On perusal of order dated 2nd June, 1997 passed by the Land  Tribunal,
we find that the Land Tribunal  admitted  Form  No.7  produced  by  the  2nd
respondent in view of the High Court’s  direction  dated  5th  August,  1991
passed in W.P.No.4165/1988 and on  enquiry made under Section 48-A, held  as
follows:


      “……In spite of this, in view of the directions dated 5-8-91  in  W.P.
      No.4165, the Form No.7 produced by  the  applicant  is  admitted  and
      enquiry upon the same is taken up by unanimous opinion  of  the  Land
      Tribunal.


      Applicant has not produced any document  to  prove  that  he  was  in
      possession  and  cultivation  of  the  suit  lands  on  1-3-1974   or
      immediately prior thereto. Except his own  statement,  the  applicant
      has not produced any evidence to establish that he held the lands  on
      crop share basis. In this respect, he has not produced any acceptable
      evidence. But on the other hand, the opponents have  produced  pahani
      records for the years prior to 1974 as well as for subsequent  years,
      in which nowhere the name  of  the  applicant  is  appearing  in  the
      cultivator’s column. It is apparent that all the lands were  in  self
      cultivation.


      Apart from this, the opponents have produced  tax  paid  receipts  in
      respect  of  the  suit  lands.  The  opponents  have  also  given   a
      declaration regarding their holding under Section 86 of the Karnataka
      Land Reforms Act, claiming it to be under self cultivation  and  vide
      order NO.KLR:D:SR:752 dated 25-3-82, this Land Tribunal has  accepted
      the declaration holding that he is not in possession of excess lands.
      In the said order there is no mention  about  the  said  lands  being
      subject to tenancy.  For all these reasons, the  following  order  is
      passed by unanimous opinion of this Land Tribunal.










                                    ORDER


      It is decided unanimously that the applicant was  not  in  occupation
      and cultivation of  the  suit  lands  as  a  tenant  on  1-3-1974  or
      immediately prior thereto.
      This order is pronounced and read out in open Court on 2-6-97.


                                                                        Sd/-
                                                      Land Tribunal, Dharwad
      Members:
   1. Sd/-
   2. Sd/-
   3. Sd/-.”




13.   Thus, it is clear that
the Tribunal admitted  Form  No.7  produced  by
the 2nd respondent  and  on  an  enquiry  gave  definite  finding  that  the
applicant-2nd respondent was not in occupation or cultivation  of  the  suit
land as a tenant as on 1st March, 1974 or prior thereto.  
In  view  of  such
finding of the Tribunal it was not open for  the  learned  Single  Judge  to
remand the matter again to the Tribunal to enquire whether Form No.7  is  on
record or Form No.7 was  produced  by  the  2nd  respondent  which  in  fact
rendered the order dated 2nd June, 1997 passed by the  Tribunal  ineffective
for no reason. 
The Division Bench of the High Court also  failed  to  notice
the above-said fact and thereby erred in affirming the order passed  by  the
learned Single Judge.
14.   For the reasons aforesaid, we set aside the impugned order  dated  2nd
June, 2006 passed by the Division Bench in  W.A.No.3836/2005(LR)  and  order
dated  3rd  June,  2005  passed  by  the  learned  Single  Judge   in   W.P.
No.15722/1997, order dated 2nd June,  1997  passed  by  the  Land  Tribunal,
Dharwad is restored. The appeal is allowed. There shall be no  order  as  to
costs.




                                                      ………………………………………………….J.
                             (SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)




                                                       ……………………………………………….J.
                                      (RANJAN GOGOI)




NEW DELHI,
SEPTEMBER 17, 2013.

INAMS ABOLITION ACT, LAND REFORMS ACT= “1. Whether an Inamdar who has been granted occupancy rights under the Inam Abolition Act can invoke Section 41 to recover possession from a person who is not a tenant of the land in question? 2. Whether the order passed by the Tahsildar is sustainable on merits?”= ONCE OCCUPANCY RIGHTS HAS GIVEN , ALL MORTGAGES MADE BEFORE THE INAMS ABOLITION ACT WERE DEEMED TO BE DISCHARGED OR WIPED OFF. FOR IMPLEMENTING OCCUPANCY RIGHTS, THE TAHSILDAR HAS GOT JURISDICTION UNDER LAND REFORMS ACT TO EVICT THE UNAUTHORIZED PERSONS FROM THE LANDS=Since it was extensively pointed out by the learned Single Judge in the order dated 1.2.2005, as well as in the present impugned order highlighting the malpractices indulged in by the Tehsildar, while passing the order directing possession in favour of the appellant and while upholding the order of the learned Single Judge referred to above, the order of remand passed by the learned Single Judge stands restored. We, however, make it clear that the only issue which can be examined by the Tehsildar can be with regard to the claim of the appellant for restoring possession based on the grant of occupancy rights in its favour, by the proceeding dated 11.2.1993. It is further made clear that this order of remand to the Tehsildar, shall not entitle the respondents to raise any issue relating to the jurisdiction of the Tehsildar, in particular, based on the mortgages of the year 1955 and 1967. 19. The appeals stand allowed with the above directions. In light of the fact that the issue is pending for nearly two decades, we direct the Tehsildar to hear the parties and after giving due opportunity to put forth their submissions, pass final orders in accordance with law expeditiously, preferably within three months from the date of receipt of copy of this order.

Page 1
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.4150-4163 OF 2013
NI PRA CHANNABASAVA DESHIKENDRA …APPELLANT
SWAMIGALU MATADHIPATHIGALU KANNADA
MUTT
VERSUS
C.P. KAVEERAMMA & ORS. …RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla, J.
1. Unsuccessful appellant in the Writ Appeal before the
Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore
is the appellant before us.
This appeal is directed against
the common judgment in W.A. Nos. 1936/2005 (LR) along
with W.A. Nos. 1941/2005, 1946/2005 and 2202 of
2005(LR).
The appellant is a religious Mutt called ‘Kannada
Mutt’. Land of 197 acres was granted as Jagir to the Mutt in
Survey Nos. 9, 10, 12 and 13 of Bettegeri village, Ammathy
Hobli, Virajpet Taluk, Coorg District in the year 1809 by the
then Ruler of Kodagu, Sri Veerarajendra Wodeyar. 
By a
mortgage deed dated 1.3.1955, the predecessor of present
Mathadhipathi stated to have mortgaged possession of
Civil Appeal Nos.4150-4163 of 2013 1 of 19Page 2
175.60 acres out of 197 acres of lands in favour of the
predecessor-in-title of the present contesting respondents.

By yet another mortgage deed dated 5.4.1967, a second
mortgage deed in favour of the very same parties in
respect of 17 acres of land was stated to have been made.
The mortgages were made for a period of 99 years.
2. Be that as it may, on 18.5.1978, Karnataka Certain
Inams Abolition Act, 1977 (hereinafter called as the “1977
Act”) came into force and the effective date was
01.03.1974.
By virtue of Section 4(2)(b) of the 1977 Act all
Inams that were existing on that date stood abolished with
effect from 01.03.1974, namely, the effective date. 
After
the coming into force of the 1977 Act, the Mutt filed an
application on 25.6.1987 for grant of occupancy rights in
respect of the entire lands. 
By order dated 11.02.1993, the
appellant’s application was allowed by the Land Tribunal.

The respondents, based on the rights flowing from the
mortgage deeds, also claimed occupancy rights on the
ground that they were the tenants of the land in question.
Their application was rejected.
There was a challenge at
Civil Appeal Nos.4150-4163 of 2013 2 of 19
Page 3
the instance of the respondents to the grant of occupancy
rights in favour of the appellant, as well as, the rejection of
their rights in W.P.No.6379/1993. 
The Writ petition was
allowed by the learned Single Judge and the grant of
occupancy rights in favour of the appellant was set aside.
The appellant filed Writ Appeal No. 5689/1997 and the
respondent also challenged the very same order by filing
Writ Appeal No. 5816/1997.
3. The appeal filed by the appellant was allowed and the
order of the Learned Single Judge was set aside and the
order of the learned Tribunal granting occupancy rights in
favour of the appellant was restored. The respondents’
Writ Appeal was dismissed.
It is relevant to note that the
said order of the Division Bench was not challenged further
by the respondents and, thereby, grant of occupancy rights
in favour of the appellant was confirmed.
Subsequently,
Form No.2 - Certificate was also issued in favour of the
appellant on 15.4.2000 representing the Mutt.
Civil Appeal Nos.4150-4163 of 2013 3 of 19Page 4
4. By virtue of Section 3(2) of the 1977 Act, the words
and expressions used, but not defined in the 1977 Act, shall
have the meaning assigned to them under the Act or the
Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961. 
Under Section 11, the
procedure for registration as an occupant has been set out,
which states that every person entitled to be registered as
an occupant under the 1977 Act, 
should make an
application to the Tribunal constituted under the Karnataka
Land Reforms Act, 1961 on or before 31st day of March,
1991 
and that the said application should be disposed of by
the Tribunal as if it is an application made under that Act.
Under Section 41(2) of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act,
1961,
 the procedure has been prescribed as to how a
landlord should obtain the possession of any land, dwelling
house or site held by a tenant, 
except under the order of
the Tehsildar by making application under the prescribed
format. 
Under Section 126 of the 1961 Act, it is specified
that for the removal of doubts, it was declared that
provisions of the 1961 Act, insofar as they confer any rights
or impose obligations on tenants and landlords, shall be
applicable to tenants holding lands in the Inam and other
Civil Appeal Nos.4150-4163 of 2013 4 of 19Page 5
alienated villages or lands including tenants referred to in
Section 8 of the Village offices’ Abolition Act, 1961, subject
to the provisions of the 1977 Act and to landlords and
Inamdar holding in such villages or lands. 
Section 130 of
the 1961 Act empowers the Tehsildar concerned to
summarily evict any person unauthorizedly occupying or
wrongfully in possession of any land and also to make such
orders as regards to the disposal of such land, as it deems
fit. 
Section 132 of the 1961 Act bars the jurisdiction of
other Courts to settle, decide or deal with any question,
which is by or under the 1961 Act required to be settled,
decided or dealt with by the authorities concerned.
5. The appellant approached the Tehsildar of Virajpet
Taluk alleging that the respondents were in unauthorised
possession and having regard to the coming into force of
1977 Act w.e.f. 1.3.1974 and the order of the Land Tribunal
dated 11.2.1993, they are liable to be evicted and the
possession to be handed over to the appellant. 
By order
dated 28.8.2004, the Tehsildar allowed the appellant’s
application and directed eviction of the respondents. 
Based
on the said order, the appellant was put in possession by
Civil Appeal Nos.4150-4163 of 2013 5 of 19Page 6
the Mahazar, drawn by Revenue Inspector of Ammathy
Hobli on 31.8.2004. 
The handing over of the possession of
the lands in question was effected in the presence of the
Tehsildar Virajpet Taluk, Hosur circle and the
Panchayatdars. 
6. The respondents challenged the said order of the
Tehsildar in Writ Petition No.36175/2004 & 36529-32/2004.
The Single Judge among other issues, considered the
question about the jurisdiction of the Tehsildar and held
that the Tribunal under the Land Revenue Act had
jurisdiction over the lands in question and that the
Tehsildar was entitled to consider the application of the
appellant filed in Form No.5. 
However, the Learned Judge
found that there were serious irregularities in the matter of
passing of the order by the Tehsildar and consequently,
while setting aside the order of the Tehsildar, directed 
redelivery of possession to the respondents pending final
orders 
and further directed the Tehsildar to consider the
case afresh on merits and take an independent decision in
accordance with law after hearing the parties and pass
Civil Appeal Nos.4150-4163 of 2013 6 of 19Page 7
orders within four months from the date of the order of the
Learned Judge, which was dated 1.2.2005.
7. The appellant preferred appeals against the said order
in Writ Appeal Nos.1946-48/2005, which were considered
by the Division Bench along with Writ Appeal Nos.1936-
40/2005 and 1941-45/2005.
The Division Bench passed
orders on 12.9.2007 holding that the provisions of the Land
Reforms Act were not applicable to the case on hand and,
therefore, exercise of jurisdiction by the Tehsildar under
the provisions of Land Reforms Act, was bad in law and
without jurisdiction. 
The order of the Tehsildar was set
aside and consequently the order of the Learned Single
Judge was also set aside. 
The appellant preferred Civil
Appeal Nos.1040-53/2009 against the said common order
of the Division Bench dated 12.9.2007. 
The Civil Appeals
were allowed by this Court by order dated 13.2.2009. 
8. In the said Civil Appeals, contentions were raised on
behalf of the respondents by relying upon Section 43 of the
Transfer of Property Act, apart from contending that the
Civil Appeal Nos.4150-4163 of 2013 7 of 19Page 8
respondents were entitled to rely upon the mortgage
executed in their favour in the year 1955 and 1967. It was
also contended that by virtue of Section 10 of 1977 Act, the
respondents were entitled to rely upon the mortgage
granted in their favour by the appellant Mutt. 
While
allowing the Civil Appeals and setting aside the order of the
Division Bench, this Court considered all the above
submissions raised on behalf of the respondents and
rejected them. 
It was lastly pleaded before this Court that
apart from Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act and
Section 4(2)(b) of the 1977 Act, there were other
submissions made by the respondents, which were not
considered by the High Court. 
Taking note of the above
submissions made on behalf of the respondents, even while
allowing the Civil Appeals and without expressing any
opinion about the acceptability of any such stand, the
judgment of the Division Bench was set aside and 
the
matter was remitted back to the High Court for fresh
consideration making it clear that the issue relating to the
applicability of Section 43 stood closed by virtue of the
judgment. 
Civil Appeal Nos.4150-4163 of 2013 8 of 19Page 9
9. It is in the abovesaid background, the present
impugned order of the Division Bench dated 15.6.2009, has
been passed wherein, the Division Bench proceeded to
examine the following two issues, namely:

“1. Whether an Inamdar who has been
granted occupancy rights under the Inam
Abolition Act can invoke Section 41 to
recover possession from a person who is
not a tenant of the land in question?
2. Whether the order passed by the
Tahsildar is sustainable on merits?”

10. While dealing with the above issues, the Division
Bench proceeded to hold that Section 41 of the Karnataka
Land Reforms Act, which prescribed the procedure for
taking possession, was not applicable, inasmuch as, the
jural relationship of landlord and tenant between the
appellant and respondents did not exist. 
While dealing with
Section 126 of the Land Reforms Act, the Division Bench
took the view that the said provision can have no
application to a case where rights of a mortgagee in
possession were prevailing. 
In the light of the above
conclusion, the Division Bench held that Section 130 of the
Civil Appeal Nos.4150-4163 of 2013 9 of 19Page 10
Land Reforms Act for summary eviction of any person in
unauthorised occupation, cannot also be invoked.

Ultimately, on Point No.2, the Division Bench taking note of
the serious irregularities committed by the Tehsildar in
passing the order took the view that such order came to be
passed by the Tehsildar by manipulating proceedings and,
therefore, set aside the order of the Tehsildar and also held
that no remand was called for. 
The appeals filed by the
appellant were dismissed and the appeal filed by the
respondent was allowed. 
The application of the appellant
filed in Form No.5 under the Land Reforms Act, was
rejected as not maintainable. 
The Division Bench also
imposed costs to be paid by the Tehsildar in the sum of Rs.
10,000/- to the respondents.
11. We heard Mr. S.M. Chandrashekhar, learned senior
counsel for the appellant and Mr. P. Vishwanatha Shetty,
learned senior counsel for the respondents.
We also
perused the earlier orders passed by this Court by which
the matter was remitted back to the Division Bench to
consider some of the submissions other than what were
earlier made and covered by the orders of this Court.
Civil Appeal Nos.4150-4163 of 2013 10 of 19Page 11

12. The main grievance of the appellant was that after
securing occupancy rights under the provisions of the 1977
Act, 
since by virtue of Section 4(2)(b), all encumbrances
created prior to coming into force of the Act having been
extinguished statutorily, and the lands having been vested
with the State, free from all encumbrances before the grant
of occupancy rights in favour of the appellant, no further
right could have existed in favour of the respondents, in
order to make a claim based on the mortgages of the year
1955 and 1967. 
Apart from the said claim in all other
respects, 
there was no right in the respondents since their
claim for occupancy right was rejected as early as on
11.2.1993, when the said rights of the appellant came to be
crystallized by the said date under the provisions of the
1977 Act. 
Though the said order was challenged by the
respondents, the challenge was not accepted and thereby,
the issue became concluded once and for all. 
Thereafter,
the only other question to be considered was as to how the
said crystallized rights of the appellant under the provisions
of the 1977 Act, is to be worked out for restoring its
possession in the lands in question. 
Though the appellant
Civil Appeal Nos.4150-4163 of 2013 11 of 19Page 12
stated to have invoked Section 41 of the Land Reforms Act
to work out its remedy for getting possession, when it came
to the question of ascertaining the jurisdiction of the
Tehsildar to examine the claim of the appellant for
restoring possession, the respondents once again projected
their claim based on the mortgages of the year 1955 and
1967 and further stated that the respondents were neither
a tenant, nor can they be held to be in unauthorised
possession, in order to invoke Section 130 of the Land
Reforms Act.
13. In the earlier round of litigation, these very issues
were examined by both the Learned Single Judge as well as
by the Division Bench of the High Court. As noted by us
earlier, the learned single Judge rejected the stand of the
respondents about the lack of jurisdiction of the Tehsildar
but nonetheless, set aside the order of the Tehsildar on the
sole ground that there was serious malpractice in the
passing of the ultimate order, directing handing over of the
possession. The learned Judge, therefore, set aside that
part of the order and remitted the matter back for passing
Civil Appeal Nos.4150-4163 of 2013 12 of 19Page 13
fresh orders. However, the Division Bench proceeded to
hold that the Tehsildar lacked jurisdiction since the rights of
the respondents as mortgagee, prescribed a different
status for the respondents and consequently the invocation
of Section 41 or Section 130 of the Land Reforms Act, could
not have been invoked.
 It was at that stage, the issue
came to be considered by this Court in Civil Appeal
Nos.1040-1053/2009 in the order dated 13.2.2009.
14. The substantial issues dealt with by the Division Bench
in its earlier order dated 12.9.2007, which examined the
question of jurisdiction of the Tehsildar, while considering
the claim of the respondents based on Section 43 of the
Transfer of Property Act; based on concept ‘feeding the
grant by estoppel’, accepted the stand of the respondents.
At that junction, this Court found that by virtue of Section
4(2)(b) of the 1977 Act, the said submission based on
Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, by relying upon
the mortgages of the year 1955 and 1967, cannot survive.
Even the submission based on Section 10 of the 1977 Act
was also rejected.
 Though what exactly were the other
Civil Appeal Nos.4150-4163 of 2013 13 of 19Page 14
submissions which were not considered by the Division
Bench were not specifically noted, in our considered view,
there could not have been any submission relating to the
jurisdiction of the Tehsildar’ for working out or
implementing the grant of occupancy rights granted in
favour of the appellant, by order dated 11.2.1993.
 In that
context, the power of the Tehsildar to invoke Section 130 of
the Land Reforms Act for granting the relief cannot be held
to be not sustainable.
Unfortunately, after the remand, we
find that by framing the two issues in the order impugned
in these appeals, which have been extracted in the earlier
part of our order, the Division Bench proceeded to reopen
the very same questions, which were already dealt with in
substratum in the earlier judgment of this Court dated
13.2.2009. 
When once this Court held that Section 43 of
the Transfer of Property Act could not come to the aid of
the respondents, any right based on the mortgages of the
year 1955 and 1967 no longer survived for consideration.
Since Section 10 of the 1977 Act was also held to be not
applicable to the case of the respondents, the only other
question which could have been examined in all
Civil Appeal Nos.4150-4163 of 2013 14 of 19Page 15
probabilities was one relating to the manner in which the
earlier order came to be passed by the Tehsildar, which
was found to be not properly done as held by the Learned
Single Judge in order dated 01.02.2005 in the Writ
Petitions, which disclosed that there were certain serious
irregularities or malpractices in the passing of the order by
the Tehsildar dated 28.8.2004 and the consequential
Mahazar dated 31.8.2004. In fact, the Learned Single Judge
rightly set aside the above orders of the Tehsildar on that
ground and remitted the matter back to the Tehsildar for
passing fresh orders in accordance with law.
15. We are convinced that in the light of our above
conclusions, it will have to be held that the continued
possession of the respondents after the grant of occupancy
rights in favour of the appellant in the order dated
11.2.1993, should be construed as unauthorized and there
was every right in the appellant to invoke the protection of
the Land Reforms Act for the purpose of working out its
remedy by taking recourse to law for implementing the
order dated 11.2.1993. 
Civil Appeal Nos.4150-4163 of 2013 15 of 19Page 16
16. In this context, it will be worthwhile to refer to the
decision of this Court reported in Mohammad Swalleh &
Ors. V. IIIrd Addl. District Judge, Meerut & Anr. -AIR
1988 SC 94.
In paragraph 7 while dealing with a converse
case, this court held as under:
“7. It was contended before the High Court
that no appeal lay from the decision of the
Prescribed Authority to the District Judge. 
The
High Court accepted this contention. 
The High
Court finally held that though the appeal laid
before the District Judge, the order of the
Prescribed Authority was invalid and was rightly
set aside by the District Judge.
 On that ground
the High Court declined to interfere with the
order of the learned District Judge.
 It is true
that there has been some technical breach
because if there is no appeal maintainable
before the learned District Judge, in the appeal
before the learned District Judge, the same
could not be set aside. 
But the High Court was
exercising its jurisdiction under Art.226 of the
Constitution. 
The High Court had come to the
conclusion that the order of the Prescribed
Authority was invalid and improper. 
The High
Court itself could have set it aside. 
Therefore,
in the facts and circumstances of the case
justice has been done though, as mentioned
hereinbefore, technically the appellant had a
point that the order of the District Judge was
illegal and improper. 
If we reiterate the order of
the High Court as it is setting aside the order of
the Prescribed Authority in exercise of the
jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution
then no exception can be taken. 
As mentioned
hereinbefore, justice has been done and as the
improper order of the Prescribed Authority has
been set aside, no objection can be taken.”
Civil Appeal Nos.4150-4163 of 2013 16 of 19
Page 17
17. Applying the above said principle, we are also
convinced that the appellant by invoking the extraordinary
jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 can seek for
passing a justiciable order.
18. Having regard to our above conclusion based on the
earlier order dated 13.2.2009 and the limited scope of
consideration directed to be made, while remitting the
matter back to the Division Bench, the present order of the
Division Bench cannot be sustained.
We also hold that the
Tehsildar, had every jurisdiction to deal with application of
the appellant for working out its remedy based on the grant
of occupancy rights in its favour in the proceeding dated
11.2.1993, which has become final and conclusive.
Since it
was extensively pointed out by the learned Single Judge in
the order dated 1.2.2005, as well as in the present
impugned order highlighting the malpractices indulged in
by the Tehsildar, while passing the order directing
possession in favour of the appellant and while upholding
the order of the learned Single Judge referred to above, the
order of remand passed by the learned Single Judge stands
Civil Appeal Nos.4150-4163 of 2013 17 of 19Page 18
restored. 
We, however, make it clear that the only issue
which can be examined by the Tehsildar can be with regard
to the claim of the appellant for restoring possession based
on the grant of occupancy rights in its favour, by the
proceeding dated 11.2.1993. 
It is further made clear that
this order of remand to the Tehsildar, shall not entitle the
respondents to raise any issue relating to the jurisdiction of
the Tehsildar, in particular, based on the mortgages of the
year 1955 and 1967.
19. The appeals stand allowed with the above directions.
In light of the fact that the issue is pending for nearly two
decades, we direct the Tehsildar to hear the parties and
after giving due opportunity to put forth their submissions,
pass final orders in accordance with law expeditiously,
preferably within three months from the date of receipt of
copy of this order.
……….……….…………………………...J.
[Dr. B.S. Chauhan]
Civil Appeal Nos.4150-4163 of 2013 18 of 19Page 19
……….…….………………………………J.
 [Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim
Kalifulla]
New Delhi;
May 06, 2013
Civil Appeal Nos.4150-4163 of 2013 19 of 19