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Showing posts with label 1963. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 1963. Show all posts

Friday, September 22, 2017

THE LIMITATION ACT, 1963

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THE LIMITATION ACT, 1963
_________
ARRANGEMENT OF SECTIONS
__________
PART I
PRELIMINARY
SECTIONS
1. Short title, extent and commencement.
2. Definitions.
PART II
LIMITATION OF SUITS, APPEALS AND APPLICATIONS
3. Bar of limitation.
4. Expiry of prescribed period when court is closed.
5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.
6. Legal disability.
7. Disability of one of several persons.
8. Special exceptions.
9. Continuous running of time.
10. Suits against trustees and their representatives.
11. Suits on contracts entered into outside the territories to which the Act extends.
PART III
COMPUTATION OF PERIOD OF LIMITATION
12. Exclusion of time in legal proceedings.
13. Exclusion of time in cases where leave to sue or appeal as a pauper is applied for.
14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction.
15. Exclusion of time in certain other cases.
16. Effect of death on or before the accrual of the right to sue.
17. Effect of fraud or mistake.
18. Effect of acknowledgment in writing.
19. Effect of payment on account of debt or of interest on legacy.
20. Effect of acknowledgment or payment by another person.
21. Effect of substituting or adding new plaintiff or defendant.
22. Continuing breaches and torts.
23. Suits for compensation for acts not actionable without special damage.
24. Computation of time mentioned in instruments.
PART IV
ACQUISITION OF OWNERSHIP BY POSSESSION
25. Acquisition of easements by prescription.
26. Exclusion in favour of reversioner of servient tenement.
27. Extinguishment of right to property.
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PART V
MISCELLANEOUS
SECTIONS
28. [Repealed.]
29. Savings.
30. Provision for suits, etc., for which the prescribed period is shorter than the period prescribed by
the Indian Limitation Act, 1908.
31. Provisions as to barred or pending suits, etc.
32. [Repealed.]
THE SCHEDULE.
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THE LIMITATION ACT, 1963
ACT NO. 36 OF 1963
[5th October, 1963.]
An Act to consolidate and amend the law for the limitation of suits and other proceedings and for
purposes connected therewith.
BE it enacted by Parliament in the Fourteenth Year of the Republic of India as follows:—
PART I
PRELIMINARY
1. Short title, extent and commencement.—(1) This Act may be called the Limitation Act, 1963.
(2) It extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
(3) It shall come into force on such date1
as the Central Government may, by notification in the
Official Gazette, appoint.
2. Definitions.—In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,—
(a) “applicant” includes—
(i) a petitioner;
(ii) any person from or through whom an applicant derives his right to apply;
(iii) any person whose estate is represented by the applicant as executor, administrator or
other representative;
(b) “application” includes a petition;
(c) “bill of exchange” includes a hundi and a cheque;
(d) “bond” includes any instrument whereby a person obliges himself to pay money to another,
on condition that the obligation shall be void if a specified act is performed, or is not performed, as
the case may be;
(e) “defendant” includes—
(i) any person from or through whom a defendant derives his liability to be sued;
(ii) any person whose estate is represented by the defendant as executor, administrator or
other representative;
(f) “easement” includes a right not arising from contract, by which one person is entitled to
remove and appropriate for his own profit any part of the soil belonging to another or anything
growing in, or attached to, or subsisting upon, the land of another;
(g) “foreign country” means any country other than India;
(h) “good faith”—nothing shall be deemed to be done in good faith which is not done with due
care and attention;
(i) “plaintiff” includes—
(i) any person from or through whom a plaintiff derives his right to sue;
(ii) any person whose estate is represented by the plaintiff as executor, administrator or other
representative;
(j) “period of limitation” means the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or
application by the Schedule, and “prescribed period” means the period of limitation computed in
accordance with the provisions of this Act;
1. 1st January, 1964, vide notification No. S.O. 3118, dated 29th October, 1963, see Gazette of India, Part II, sec. 3 (ii).
Amended in West Bengal by W.B. Act 18 of 1977.
1st September, 1984, vide notification No. S.O. 647(C), in respect of the State of Sikkim dated 24th August, 1984, see
Gazette of India, Part II, sec. 3(ii).
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(k) “promissory note” means any instrument whereby the maker engages absolutely to pay a
specified sum of money to another at a time therein limited, or on demand, or at sight;
(l) “suit” does not include an appeal or an application;
(m) “tort" means a civil wrong which is not exclusively the breach of a contract or the breach of a
trust;
(n) “trustee” does not include a benamidar, a mortgagee remaining in possession after the
mortgage has been satisfied or a person in wrongful possession without title.
PART II
LIMITATION OF SUITS, APPEALS AND APPLICATIONS
3. Bar of limitation.—(1) Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every
suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed,
although limitation has not been set up as a defence.
(2) For the purposes of this Act,—
(a) a suit is instituted,—
(i) in an ordinary case, when the plaint is presented to the proper officer;
(ii) in the case of a pauper, when his application for leave to sue as a pauper is made; and
(iii) in the case of a claim against a company which is being wound up by the court, when the
claimant first sends in his claim to the official liquidator;
(b) any claim by way of a set off or a counter claim, shall be treated as a separate suit and shall be
deemed to have been instituted—
(i) in the case of a set off, on the same date as the suit in which the set off is pleaded;
(ii) in the case of a counter claim, on the date on which the counter claim is made in court;
(c) an application by notice of motion in a High Court is made when the application is presented
to the proper officer of that court.
4. Expiry of prescribed period when court is closed.—Where the prescribed period for any suit,
appeal or application expires on a day when the court is closed, the suit, appeal or application may be
instituted, preferred or made on the day when the court re-opens.
Explanation.—A court shall be deemed to be closed on any day within the meaning of this section if
during any part of its normal working hours it remains closed on that day.
5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.—Any appeal or any application, other than an
application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908),
may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had
sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.
Explanation.—The fact that the appellant or the applicant was missed by any order, practice or
judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause
within the meaning of this section.
6. Legal disability.—(1) Where a person entitled to institute a suit or make an application for the
execution of a decree is, at the time from which the prescribed period is to be reckoned, a minor or insane,
or an idiot, he may institute the suit or make the application within the same period after the disability has
ceased, as would otherwise have been allowed from the time specified therefor in the third column of the
Schedule.
(2) Where such person is, at the time from which the prescribed period is to be reckoned, affected by
two such disabilities, or where, before his disability has ceased, he is affected by another disability, he
may institute the suit or make the application within the same period after both disabilities have ceased, as
would otherwise have been allowed from the time so specified.
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(3) Where the disability continues up to the death of that person, his legal representative may institute
the suit or make the application within the same period after the death, as would otherwise have been
allowed from the time so specified.
(4) Where the legal representative referred to in sub-section (3) is, at the date of the death of the
person whom he represents, affected by any such disability, the rules contained sub-sections (1) and (2)
shall apply.
(5) Where a person under disability dies after the disability ceases but within the period allowed to
him under this section, his legal representative may institute the suit or make the application within the
same period after the death, as would otherwise have been available to that person had he not died.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, „minor‟ includes a child in the womb.
7. Disability of one of several persons.—Where one of several persons jointly entitled to institute a
suit or make an application for the execution of a decree is under any such disability, and a discharge can
be given without the concurrence of such person, time will run against them all; but, where no such
discharge can be given, time will not run as against any of them until one of them becomes capable of
giving such discharge without the concurrence of the others or until the disability has ceased.
Explanation I.—This section applies to a discharge from every kind of liability, including a liability
in respect of any immovable property.
Explanation II.—For the purposes of this section, the Manager of a Hindu undivided family governed
by the Mitakshara law shall be deemed to be capable of giving a discharge without the concurrence of the
other members of the family only if he is in management of the joint family property.
8. Special exceptions.—Nothing in section 6 or in section 7 applies to suits to enforce rights of
pre-emption, or shall be deemed to extend, for more than three years from the cessation of the disability
or the death of the person affected thereby, the period of limitation for any suit or application.
9. Continuous running of time.—Where once time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or
inability to institute a suit or make an application stops it:
Provided that, where letters of administration to the estate of a creditor have been granted to his
debtor, the running of the period of limitation for a suit to recover the debt shall be suspended while the
administration continues.
10. Suits against trustees and their representatives.—Notwithstanding anything contained in the
foregoing provisions of this Act, no suit against a person in whom property has become vested in trust for
any specific purpose, or against his legal representatives or assigns (not being assigns for valuable
consideration), for the purpose of following in his or their hands such property, or the proceeds thereof, or
for an account of such property or proceeds, shall be barred by any length of time.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section any property comprised in a Hindu, Muslim or
Buddhist religious or charitable endowment shall be deemed to be property vested in trust for a specific
purpose and the manager of the property shall be deemed to be the trustee thereof.
11. Suits on contracts entered into outside the territories to which the Act extends.—(1) Suits
instituted in the territories to which this Act extends on contracts entered into in the State of Jammu and
Kashmir or in a foreign country shall be subject to the rules of limitation contained in this Act.
(2) No rule of limitation in force in the State of Jammu and Kashmir or in a foreign country shall be a
defence to a suit instituted in the said territories on a contract entered into in that State on in a foreign
country unless—
(a) the rule has extinguished the contract; and
(b) the parties were domiciled in that State or in the foreign country during the period prescribed
by such rule.
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PART III
COMPUTATION OF PERIOD OF LIMITATION
12. Exclusion of time in legal proceedings.—(1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit,
appeal or application, the day from which such period is to be reckoned, shall be excluded.
(2) In computing the period of limitation for an appeal or an application for leave to appeal or for
revision or for review of a judgment, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced and
the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be
revised or reviewed shall be excluded.
(3) Where a decree or order is appealed from or sought to be revised or reviewed, or where an
application is made for leave to appeal from a decree or order, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of
the judgment 1
*** shall also be excluded.
(4) In computing the period of limitation for an application to set aside an award, the time requisite
for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded.
Explanation.—In computing under this section the time requisite for obtaining a copy of a decree or
an order, any time taken by the court to prepare the decree or order before an application for a copy
thereof is made shall not be excluded.
13. Exclusion of time in cases where leave to sue or appeal as a pauper is applied for.—In
computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit or appeal in any case where an application for
leave to sue or appeal as a pauper has been made and rejected, the time during which the applicant has
been prosecuting in good faith his application for such leave shall be excluded, and the court may, on
payment of the court fees prescribed for such suit or appeal, treat the suit or appeal as having the same
force and effect as if the court fees had been paid in the first instance.
14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction.—(1) In computing the
period of limitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due
diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the
defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in
good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to
entertain it.
(2) In computing the period of limitation for any application, the time during which the applicant has
been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of
appeal or revision, against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is
prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is
unable to entertain it.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in rule 2 of Order XXIII of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), the provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply in relation to a fresh suit
instituted on permission granted by the court under rule 1 of that Order, where such permission is granted
on the ground that the first suit must fail by reason of a defect in the jurisdiction of the court or other
cause of a like nature.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,—
(a) in excluding the time during which a former civil proceeding was pending, the day on which
that proceeding was instituted and the day on which it ended shall both be counted;
(b) a plaintiff or an applicant resisting an appeal shall be deemed to be prosecuting a proceeding;
(c) misjoinder of parties or of causes of action shall be deemed to be a cause of a like nature with
defect of jurisdiction.
1. The words “on which the decree or order is founded” omitted by Act 46 of 1999, s. 33 (w.e.f. 1-7-2002).
7
15. Exclusion of time in certain other cases.—(1) In computing the period of limitation of any suit
or application for the execution of a decree, the institution or execution of which has been stayed by
injunction or order, the time of the continuance of the injunction or order, the day on which it was issued
or made, and the day on which it was withdrawn, shall be excluded.
(2) In computing the period of limitation for any suit of which notice has been given, or for which the
previous consent or sanction of the Government or any other authority is required, in accordance with the
requirements of any law for the time being in force, the period of such notice or, as the case may be, the
time required for obtaining such consent or sanction shall be excluded.
Explanation.—In excluding the time required for obtaining the consent or sanction of the
Government or any other authority, the date on which the application was made for obtaining the consent
or sanction and the date of receipt of the order of the Government or other authority shall both be
counted.
(3) In computing the period of limitation for any suit or application for execution of a decree by any
receiver or interim receiver appointed in proceedings for the adjudication of a person as an insolvent or by
any liquidator or provisional liquidator appointed in proceedings for the winding up of a company, the
period beginning with the date of institution of such proceeding and ending with the expiry of three
months from the date of appointment of such receiver or liquidator, as the case may be, shall be excluded.
(4) In computing the period of limitation for a suit for possession by a purchaser at a sale in execution
of a decree, the time during which a proceeding to set aside the sale has been prosecuted shall be
excluded.
(5) In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the defendant has been
absent from India and from the territories outside India under the administration of the Central
Government, shall be excluded.
16. Effect of death on or before the accrual of the right to sue.—(1) Where a person who would, if
he were living, have a right to institute a suit or make an application dies before the right accrues, or
where a right to institute a suit or make an application accrues only on the death of a person, the period of
limitation shall be computed from the time when there is a legal representative of the deceased capable of
instituting such suit or making such application.
(2) Where a person against whom, if he were living, a right to institute a suit or make an application
would have accrued dies before the right accrues, or where a right to institute a suit or make an
application against any person accrues on the death of such person, the period of limitation shall be
computed from the time when there is a legal representative of the deceased against whom the plaintiff
may institute such suit or make such application.
(3) Nothing in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) applies to suits to enforce rights of pre-emption or to
suits for the possession of immovable property or of a hereditary office.
17. Effect of fraud or mistake.—(1) Where, in the case of any suit or application for which a period
of limitation is prescribed by this Act,—
(a) the suit or application is based upon the fraud of the defendant or respondent or his agent; or
(b) the knowledge of the right or title on which a suit or application is founded is concealed by
the fraud of any such person as aforesaid; or
(c) the suit or application is for relief from the consequences of a mistake; or
(d) where any document necessary to establish the right of the plaintiff or applicant has been
fraudulently concealed from him,
the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the plaintiff or applicant has discovered the fraud or
the mistake or could, with reasonable diligence, have discovered it; or in the case of a concealed
document, until the plaintiff or the applicant first had the means of producing the concealed document or
compelling its production:
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Provided that nothing in this section shall enable any suit to be instituted or application to be made to
recover or enforce any charge against, or set aside any transaction affecting, any property which—
(i) in the case of fraud, has been purchased for valuable consideration by a person who was not a
party to the fraud and did not at the time of the purchase know, or have reason to believe, that any
fraud had been committed, or
(ii) in the case of mistake, has been purchased for valuable consideration subsequently to the
transaction in which the mistake was made, by a person who did not know, or have reason to believe,
that the mistake had been made, or
(iii) in the case of a concealed document, has been purchased for valuable consideration by a
person who was not a party to the concealment and, did not at the time of purchase know, or have
reason to believe, that the document had been concealed.
(2) Where a judgment-debtor has, by fraud or force, prevented the execution of a decree or order
within the period of limitation, the court may, on the application of the judgment-creditor made after the
expiry of the said period extend the period for execution of the decree or order:
Provided that such application is made within one year from the date of the discovery of the fraud or
the cessation of force, as the case may be.
18. Effect of acknowledgment in writing.—(1) Where, before the expiration of the prescribed
period for a suit or application in respect of any property or right, an acknowledgment of liability in
respect of such property or right has been made in writing signed by the party against whom such
property or right is claimed, or by any person through whom he derives his title or liability, a fresh period
of limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgment was so signed.
(2) Where the writing containing the acknowledgment is undated, oral evidence may be given of the
time when it was signed; but subject to the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), oral
evidence of its contents shall not be received.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,—
(a) an acknowledgment may be sufficient though it omits to specify the exact nature of the
property or right, or avers that the time for payment, delivery, performance or enjoyment has not yet
come or is accompanied by a refusal to pay, deliver, perform or permit to enjoy, or is coupled with a
claim to set off, or is addressed to a person other than a person entitled to the property or right,
(b) the word “signed” means signed either personally or by an agent duly authorised in this
behalf, and
(c) an application for the execution of a decree or order shall not be deemed to be an application
in respect of any property or right.
19. Effect of payment on account of debt or of interest on legacy.—Where payment on account of
a debt or of interest on a legacy is made before the expiration of the prescribed period by the person liable
to pay the debt or legacy or by his agent duly authorised in this behalf, a fresh period of limitation shall be
computed from the time when the payment was made:
Provided that, save in the case of payment of interest made before the 1st day of January, 1928, an
acknowledgment of the payment appears in the handwriting of, or in a writing signed by, the person
making the payment.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,—
(a) where mortgaged land is in the possession of the mortgagee, the receipt of the rent or produce
of such land shall be deemed to be a payment;
(b) “debt” does not include money payable under a decree or order of a court.
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20. Effect of acknowledgment or payment by another person.—(1) The expression “agent duly
authorised in this behalf” in sections 18 and 19 shall, in the case of a person under disability, include his
lawful guardian, committee or manager or an agent duly authorised by such guardian, committee or
manager to sign the acknowledgment or make the payment.
(2) Nothing in the said sections renders one of several joint contractors, partners, executors or
mortgagees chargeable by reason only of a written acknowledgment signed by, or of a payment made by,
or by the agent of, any other or others of them.
(3) For the purposes of the said sections,—
(a) an acknowledgment signed or a payment made in respect of any liability by, or by the duly
authorised agent of, any limited owner of property who is governed by Hindu law, shall be a
valid acknowledgment or payment, as the case may be, against a reversioner succeeding to such
liability; and
(b) where a liability has been incurred by, or on behalf of a Hindu undivided family as such, an
acknowledgment or payment made by, or by the duly authorised agent of, the manager of the family
for the time being shall be deemed to have been made on behalf of the whole family.
21. Effect of substituting or adding new plaintiff or defendant.—(1) Where after the institution of
a suit, a new plaintiff or defendant is substituted or added, the suit shall, as regards him, be deemed to
have been instituted when he was so made a party:
Provided that where the court is satisfied that the omission to include a new plaintiff or defendant was
due to a mistake made in good faith it may direct that the suit as regards such plaintiff or defendant shall
be deemed to have been instituted on any earlier date.
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply to a case where a party is added or substituted owing to
assignment or devolution of any interest during the pendency of a suit or where a plaintiff is made a
defendant or a defendant is made a plaintiff.
22. Continuing breaches and torts.—In the case of a continuing breach of contract or in the case of
a continuing tort, a fresh period of limitation begins to run at every moment of the time during which the
breach or the tort, as the case may be, continues.
23. Suits for compensation for acts not actionable without special damage.—In the case of a suit
for compensation for an act which does not give rise to a cause of action unless some specific injury
actually results therefrom, the period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the injury
results.
24. Computation of time mentioned in instruments.—All instruments shall for the purposes of this
Act be deemed to be made with reference to the Gregorian calendar.
PART IV
ACQUISITION OF OWNERSHIP BY POSSESSION
25. Acquisition of easements by prescription.—(1) Where the access and use of light or air to and
for any building have been peaceably enjoyed therewith as an easement, and as of right, without
interruption, and for twenty years, and where any way or watercourse or the use of any water or any other
easement (whether affirmative or negative) has been peaceably and openly enjoyed by any person
claiming title thereto as an easement and as of right without interruption and for twenty years, the right to
such access and use of light or air, way, watercourse, use of water, or other easement shall be absolute
and indefeasible.
(2) Each of the said periods of twenty years shall be taken to be a period ending within two years next
before the institution of the suit wherein the claim to which such period relates is contested.
(3) Where the property over which a right is claimed under sub-section (1) belongs to the
Government that sub-section shall be read as if for the words “twenty years” the words “thirty years”
were substituted.
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Explanation.—Nothing is an interruption within the meaning of this section, unless where there is an
actual discontinuance of the possession or enjoyment by reason of an obstruction by the act of some
person other than the claimant, and unless such obstruction is submitted to or acquiesced in for one year
after the claimant has notice thereof and of the person making or authorising the same to be made.
26. Exclusion in favour of reversioner of serivent tenement.—Where any land or water upon, over
or from, which any easement has been enjoyed or derived has been held under or by virtue of any interest
for life or in terms of years exceeding three years from the granting thereof, the time of the enjoyment of
such easement during the continuance of such interest or term shall be excluded in the computation of the
period twenty years in case the claim is, within three years next after the determination of such interest or
term resisted by the person entitled on such determination to the said land or water.
27. Extinguishment of right to property.—At the determination of the period hereby limited to any
person for instituting a suit for possession of any property, his right to such property shall be
extinguished.
PART V
MISCELLANEOUS
28. [Amendment of certain Acts.]—Rep. by Repealing and Amending Act, 1974 (56 of 1974), s. 2 and
the First Schedule (w.e.f. 20-12-1974).
29. Savings.—(1) Nothing in this Act shall affect section 25 of the Indian Contract
Act, 1872 (9 of 1872).
(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation
different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such
period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of
limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions
contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are
not expressly excluded by such special or local law.
(3) Save as otherwise provided in any law for the time being in force with respect to marriage and
divorce, nothing in this Act shall apply to any suit or other proceeding under any such law.
(4) Sections 25 and 26 and the definition of “easement” in section 2 shall not apply to cases arising in
the territories to which the Indian Easements Act, 1882 (5 of 1882), may for the time being extend.
30. Provision for suits, etc., for which the prescribed period is shorter than the period
prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908.—Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act,—
(a) any suit for which the period of limitation is shorter than the period of limitation prescribed by
the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (9 of 1908), may be instituted within a period of 1
[seven years] next
after the commencement of this Act or within the period prescribed for such suit by the Indian
Limitation Act, 1908 (9 of 1908), whichever period expires earlier:
2
[Provided that if in respect of any such suit, the said period of seven years expires earlier than
the period of limitation prescribed therefor under the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (9 of 1908) and the
said period of seven years together with so much of the period of limitation in respect of such suit
under the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (9 of 1908), as has already expired before the commencement
of this Act is shorter than the period prescribed for such suit under this Act, then, the suit may be
instituted within the period of limitation prescribed therefor under this Act;]
(b) any appeal or application for which the period of limitation is shorter than the period of
limitation prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (9 of 1908), may be preferred or made within
a period of ninety days next after the commencement of this Act or within the period prescribed for
such appeal or application by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, whichever period expires earlier.
1. Subs. by Act 10 of 1969, s. 2, for “five years” (w.e.f. 26-3-1969).
2. Ins. by s. 2, ibid. (w.e.f. 26-3-1969).
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31. Provisions as to barred or pending suits, etc.—Nothing in this Act shall,—
(a) enable any suit, appeal or application to be instituted, preferred or made, for which the period
of limitation prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (9 of 1908), expired before the
commencement of this Act; or
(b) affect any suit, appeal or application instituted, preferred or made before, and pending at, such
commencement.
32. [Repeal.]—Rep. by Repealing and Amending Act, 1974 (56 of 1974), s. 2 and the First Schedule
(w.e.f. 20-12-1974).
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THE SCHEDULE
(PERIODS OF LIMITATION)
[See sections 2(j) and 3]
FIRST DIVISION—SUITS
Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run
PART I.—SUITS RELATING TO ACCOUNTS
1. For the balance due on a mutual,
open and current account, where
there have been reciprocal
demands between the parties.
Three years. The close of the year in which the last
item admitted or proved is entered in
the account; such year to be computed
as in the account.
2. Against a factor for an account. Three years. When the account is, during the
continuance of the agency, demanded
and refused or, where no such demand
is made, when the agency terminates.
3. By a principal against his agent for
movable property received by the
latter and not accounted for.
Three years. When the account is, during the
continuance of the agency, demanded
and refused or, where no such demand
is made, when the agency terminates.
4. Other suits by principals against
agents for neglect or misconduct.
Three years. When the neglect or misconduct becomes
known to the plaintiff.
5. For an account and a share of the
profits of a dissolved partnership.
Three years. The date of the dissolution.
PART II.—SUITS RELATING TO CONTRACTS
6. For a seaman‟s wages Three years. The end of the voyage during which the
wages are earned.
7. For wages in the case of any other
person.
Three years. When the wages accrue due.
8. For the price of food or drink sold
by the keeper of a hotel, tavern
or lodging-house.
Three years. When the food or drink is delivered.
9. For the price of lodging. Three years. When the price becomes payable.
10. Against a carrier for compensation
for losing or injuring goods.
Three years. When the loss or injury occurs.
11. Against a carrier for compensation
for non-delivery of, or delay in
delivering, goods.
Three years. When the goods ought to be delivered.
12. For the hire of animals, vehicles,
boats or household furniture.
Three years. When the hire becomes payable.
13. For the balance of money advanced
in payment of goods to be
delivered.
Three years. When the goods ought to be delivered.
14. For the price of goods sold and
delivered where no fixed period
of credit is agreed upon.
Three years. The date of the delivery of the goods.
15. For the price of goods sold and
delivered to be paid for after the
expiry of a fixed period of
credit.
Three years. When the period of credit expires.
13
Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run
16. For the price of goods sold and
delivered to be paid for by a bill
of exchange, no such bill being
given.
Three years. When the period of the proposed bill
elapses.
17. For the price of trees or growing
crops sold by the plaintiff to the
defendant where no fixed period
of credit is agreed upon.
Three years. The date of the sale.
18. For the price of work done by the
plaintiff for the defendant at his
request, where no time has been
fixed for payment.
Three years. When the work is done.
19. For money payable for money lent. Three years. When the loan is made.
20. Like suit when the lender has given
a cheque for the money.
Three years. When the cheque is paid.
21. For money lent under an agreement
that it shall be payable on
demand.
Three years. When the loan is made.
22. For money deposited under an
agreement that it shall be
payable on demand, including
money of a customer in the
hands of his banker so payable.
Three years. When the demand is made.
23. For money payable to the plaintiff
for money paid for the
defendant.
Three years. When the money is paid.
24. For money payable by the
defendant to the plaintiff for
money received by the
defendant, for the plaintiff's use.
Three years. When the money is received.
25. For money payable for interest
upon money due from the
defendant to the plaintiff.
Three years. When the interest becomes due.
26. For money payable to the plaintiff
for money found to be due from
the defendant to the plaintiff on
accounts stated between them.
Three years. When the accounts are stated in writing
signed by the defendant or his agent
duly authorised in this behalf, unless
where the debt is, by a simultaneous
agreement in writing signed as
aforesaid, made payable at a future
time, and then when that time arrives.
27. For compensation for breach of a
promise to do anything at a
specified time, or upon the
happening of a specified
contingency.
Three years. When the time specified arrives or the
contingency happens.
28. On a single bond, where a day is
specified for payment.
Three years. The day so specified.
29. On a single bond, where no such
day is specified.
Three years. The date of executing the bond.
30. On a bond subject to a condition. Three years. When the condition is broken.
14
Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run
31. On a bill of exchange or promissory
note payable at a fixed time after
date.
Three years. When the bill or note falls due.
32. On a bill of exchange payable at
sight, or after sight, but not at a
fixed time.
Three years. When the bill is presented.
33. On a bill of exchange accepted
payable at a particular place.
Three years. When the bill is presented at that place.
34. On a bill of exchange or promissory
note payable at a fixed time after
sight or after demand.
Three years. When the fixed time expires.
35. On a bill of exchange or promissory
note payable on demand and not
accompanied by any writing
restraining or postponing the
right to sue.
Three years. The date of the bill or note.
36. On a promissory note or bond
payable by instalments.
Three years. The expiration of the first term of
payment as to the part then payable;
and for the other parts, the expiration
of the respective terms of payment.
37. On a promissory note or bond
payable by instalments, which
provides that, if default be made
in payment of one or more
instalments, the whole shall be
due.
Three years. When the default is made, unless where
the payee or obligee waives the
benefit of the provision and then
when fresh default is made in respect
of which there is no such waiver.
38. On a promissory note given by the
maker to a third person to be
delivered to the payee after a
certain event should happen.
Three years. The date of the delivery to the payee.
39. On a dishonoured foreign bill
where protest has been made
and notice given.
Three years. When the notice is given.
40. By the payee against the drawer
of a bill of exchange, which
has been dishonoured by
non-acceptance.
Three years. The date of the refusal to accept.
41. By the acceptor of an
accommodation-bill against the
drawer.
Three years. When the acceptor pays the amount of the
bill.
42. By a surety against the principal
debtor.
Three years. When the surety pays the creditor.
43. By a surety against a co-surety. Three years. When the surety pays anything in excess
of his own share.
44. (a) On a policy of insurance when
the sum insured is payable after
proof of the death has been
given to or received by the
insurers.
Three years. The date of the death of the deceased, or
where the claim on the policy is
denied, either partly or wholly, the
date of such denial.
(b) On a policy of insurance when
the sum insured is payable after
proof of the loss has been given
to or received by the insurers.
Three years. The date of the occurrence causing the
loss, or where the claim on the policy
is denied, either partly or wholly, the
date of such denial.
15
Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run
45. By the assured to recover premia
paid under a policy voidable at
the election of the insurers.
Three years. When the insurers elect to avoid the
policy.
46. Under the Indian Succession
Act, 1925 (39 of 1925), section
360 or section 361, to compel a
refund by a person to whom an
executor or administrator has
paid a legacy or distributed
assets.
Three years. The date of the payment or distribution.
47. For money paid upon an existing
consideration which afterwards
fails.
Three years. The date of the failure.
48. For contribution by a party who has
paid the whole or more than his
share of the amount due under a
joint decree, or by a sharer in a
joint estate who has paid the
whole or more than his share of
the amount of revenue due from
himself and his co-sharers.
Three years. The date of the payment in excess of the
plaintiff‟s own share.
49. By a co-trustee to enforce against
the estate of a deceased trustee a
claim for contribution.
Three years. When the right to contribution accrues.
50. By the manager of a joint estate of
an undivided family for
contribution, in respect of a
payment made by him on
account of the estate.
Three years. The date of the payment.
51. For the profits of immovable
property belonging to the
plaintiff which have been
wrongfully received by the
defendant.
Three years. When the profits are received.
52. For arrears of rent. Three years. When the arrears become due.
53. By a vendor of immovable property
for personal payment of unpaid
purchase-money.
Three years. The time fixed for completing the sale,
or (where the title is accepted after
the time fixed for completion) the
date of the acceptance.
54. For specific performance of a
contract.
Three years. The date fixed for the performance, or, if
no such date is fixed, when the
plaintiff has notice that performance
is refused.
55. For compensation for the breach of
any contract, express or implied
not herein specially provided
for.
Three years. When the contract is broken or (where
there are successive breaches) when
the breach in respect of which the
suit is instituted occurs or (where the
breach is continuing) when it ceases.
16
Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run
PART III.—SUITS RELATING TO DECLARATIONS
56. To declare the forgery of an
instrument issued or registered.
Three years. When the issue or registration becomes
known to the plaintiff.
57. To obtain a declaration that an
alleged adoption is invalid, or
never, in fact, took place.
Three years. When the alleged adoption becomes
known to the plaintiff.
58. To obtain any other declaration. Three years. When the right to sue first accrues.
PART IV.—SUITS RELATING TO DECREES AND INSTRUMENTS
59. To cancel or set aside an instrument
or decree or for the rescission of
a contract.
Three years. When the facts entitling the plaintiff to
have the instrument or decree
cancelled or set aside or the contract
rescinded first become known to him.
60. To set aside a transfer of property
made by the guardian of a
ward—
(a) by the ward who has attained
majority;
Three years. When the ward attains majority.
(b) by the ward‟s legal
representative—
(i) when the ward dies within
three years from the date of
attaining majority.
Three years. When the ward attains majority.
(ii) when the ward dies before
attaining majority.
Three years. When the ward dies.
PART V.—SUITS RELATING TO IMMOVABLE PROPERTY
61. By a mortgagor—
(a) to redeem or recover
possession of immovable
property mortgaged;
Thirty years. When the right to redeem or to recover
possession accrues.
(b) to recover possession of
immovable property mortgaged
and afterwards transferred by
the mortgagee for a valuable
consideration;
Twelve years. When the transfer becomes known to the
plaintiff.
(c) to recover surplus collections
received by the mortgagee after
the mortgage has been
satisfied.
Three years. When the mortgagor re-enters on the
mortgaged property.
62. To enforce payment of money
secured by a mortgage or
otherwise charged upon
immovable property.
Twelve years. When the money sued for becomes due.
63. By a mortgagee—
(a) for foreclosure; Thirty years. When the money secured by the mortgage
becomes due.
(b) for possession of immovable
property mortgaged.
Twelve years. When the mortgagee becomes entitled to
possession.
17
Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run
64. For possession of immovable
property based on previous
possession and not on title, when
the plaintiff while in possession
of the property has been
dispossessed.
Twelve years. The date of dispossession.
65. For possession of immovable
property or any interest therein
based on title.
Explanation.—For the purposes of
this article—
(a) where the suit is by a
remainderman, a reversioner
(other than a landlord) or a
devisee, the possession of the
defendant shall be deemed to
become adverse only when the
estate of the remainderman,
reversioner or devisee, as the
case may be, falls into
possession;
(b) where the suit is by a Hindu
or Muslim entitled to the
possession of immovable
property on the death of a
Hindu or Muslim female, the
possession of the defendant
shall be deemed to become
adverse only when the female
dies;
(c) where the suit is by
a purchaser at a sale in
execution of a decree when the
judgment-debtor was out of
possession at the date of the
sale, the purchaser shall be
deemed to be a representative
of the judgment-debtor who
was out of possession.
Twelve years. When the possession of the defendant
becomes adverse to the plaintiff.
66. For possession of immovable
property when the plaintiff has
become entitled to possession by
reason of any forfeiture or breach
of condition.
Twelve years. When the forfeiture is incurred or the
condition is broken.
67. By a landlord to recover possession
from a tenant.
Twelve years. When the tenancy is determined.
PART VI.—SUITS RELATING TO MOVABLE PROPERTY
68. For specific movable property lost,
or acquired by theft, or dishonest
misappropriation or conversion.
Three years. When the person having the right to the
possession of the property first learns
in whose possession it is.
69. For other specific movable property. Three years. When the property is wrongfully taken.
70. To recover movable property
deposited or pawned from a
depositary or pawnee.
Three years. The date of refusal after demand.
18
Description of suit Period of
limitation
Time from which period begins to run
71. To recover movable property
deposited or pawned, and
afterwards bought from the
depository or pawnee for a
valuable consideration.
Three years. When the sale becomes known to the
plaintiff.
PART VII.—SUITS RELATING TO TORT
72. For compensation for doing or for
omitting to do an act alleged to
be in pursuance of any enactment
in force for the time being in the
territories to which this Act
extends.
One year. When the act or omission takes place.
73. For compensation for false
imprisonment.
One year. When the imprisonment ends.
74. For compensation for a malicious
prosecution.
One year. When the plaintiff is acquitted or the
prosecution is otherwise terminated.
75. For compensation for libel. One year. When the libel is published.
76. For compensation for slander. One year. When the words are spoken, or, if the
words are not actionable in
themselves, when the special damage
complained of results.
77. For compensation for loss of service
occasioned by the seduction of
the plaintiff‟s servant or
daughter.
One year. When the loss occurs.
78. For compensation for inducing a
person to break a contract with
the plaintiff.
One year. The date of the breach.
79. For compensation for an illegal,
irregular or excessive distress.
One year. The date of the distress.
80. For compensation for wrongful
seizure of movable property
under legal process.
One year. The date of the seizure.
81. By executors, administrators or
representatives under the Legal
Representatives‟ Suits Act, 1855
(12 of 1855).
One year. The date of the death of the person
wronged.
82. By executors, administrators or
representatives under the Indian
Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 (13 of
1855).
Two years. The date of the death of the person killed.
83. Under the Legal Representatives‟
Suits Act, 1855 (12 of 1855),
against an executor, an
administrator or any other
representative.
Two years. When the wrong complained of is done.
84. Against one who, having a right to
use property for specific
purposes, perverts it to other
purposes.
Two years. When the perversion first becomes known
to the person injured thereby.
19
Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run
85. For compensation for obstructing a
way or a water-course.
Three years. The date of the obstruction.
86. For compensation for diverting a
water-course.
Three years. The date of the diversion.
87. For compensation for trespass upon
immovable property.
Three years. The date of the trespass.
88. For compensation for infringing
copyright or any other exclusive
privilege.
Three years. The date of the infringement.
89. To restrain waste. Three years. When the waste begins.
90. For compensation for injury caused
by an injunction wrongfully
obtained.
Three years. When the injunction ceases.
91. For compensation,—
(a) for wrongfully taking
or detaining any specific
movable property lost, or
acquired by theft, or dishonest
misappropriation, or conversion;
Three years. When the person having the right to the
possession of the property first learns
in whose possession it is.
(b) for wrongfully taking or injuring
or wrongfully detaining any other
specific movable property.
Three years. When the property is wrongfully taken or
injured, or when the detainer‟s
possession becomes unlawful.
PART VIII.—SUITS RELATING TO TRUSTS AND TRUST PROPERTY
92. To recover possession of immovable
property conveyed or bequeathed
in trust and afterwards transferred
by the trustee for a valuable
consideration.
Twelve years. When the transfer becomes known to the
plaintiff.
93. To recover possession of movable
property conveyed or bequeathed
in trust and afterwards transferred
by the trustee for a valuable
consideration.
Three years. When the transfer becomes known to the
plaintiff.
94. To set aside a transfer of immovable
property comprised in a Hindu,
Muslim or Buddhist religious or
charitable endowment, made by a
manager thereof for a valuable
consideration.
Twelve years. When the transfer becomes known to the
plaintiff.
95. To set aside a transfer of movable
property comprised in a Hindu,
Muslim or Buddhist religious or
charitable endowment, made by a
manager thereof for a valuable
consideration.
Three years. When the transfer becomes known to the
plaintiff.
96. By the manager of Hindu, Muslim or
Buddhist religious or charitable
endowment to recover possession
of movable or immovable
properly comprised in the
endowment which has been
transferred by a previous
manager for a valuable
consideration.
Twelve years. The date of death, resignation or removal
of the transferor or the date of
appointment of the plaintiff as
manager of the endowment,
whichever is later.
20
1. Subs. by Act 52 of 1964, s. 3 and the Second Schedule, for “an order under rule 63 or rule 103,” (w.e.f. 29-12-1964).
Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run
PART IX.—SUITS RELATING TO MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS
97. To enforce a right of pre-emption
whether the right is founded on
law or general usage or on
special contract.
One year. When the purchaser take under the
sale sought to be impeached,
physical possession of the whole or part
of the property sold, or, where the
subject matter of the sale does not admit
of physical possession of the whole or
part of the property, when the
instrument of sale is registered.
98. By a person against whom
1
[an order referred to in rule 63
or in rule 103] of Order XXI of
the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 (5 of 1908), or an order
under section 28 of the
Presidency Small Cause Courts
Act, 1882 (15 of 1882), has
been made, to establish the
right which he claims to the
property comprised in the
order.
One year. The date of the final order.
99. To set aside a sale by a civil or
revenue court or a sale for
arrears of Government revenue
or for any demand recoverable
as such arrears.
One year. When the sale is confirmed or would
otherwise have become final and
conclusive had no such suit been
brought.
100. To alter or set aside any decision
or order of a civil court in any
proceeding other than a suit or
any act or order of an officer of
Government in his official
capacity.
One year. The date of the final decision or order by the
court or the date of the act or order of
the officer, as the case may be.
101. Upon a judgment, including a
foreign judgment, or a
recognisance.
Three years. The date of the judgment or recognisance.
102. For property which the plaintiff has
conveyed while insane.
Three years. When the plaintiff is restored to sanity
and has knowledge of the conveyance.
103. To make good out of the general
estate of a deceased trustee the
loss occasioned by a breach of
trust.
Three years. The date of the trustee's death or if the
loss has not then resulted, the date of
the loss.
104. To establish a periodically
recurring right.
Three years. When the plaintiff is first refused the
enjoyment of the right.
105. By a Hindu for arrears of
maintenance.
Three years. When the arrears are payable.
106. For a legacy or for a share of a
residur bequeathed by a testator
or for a distributive share of the
property of an intestate against
an executor or an administrator
or some other person legally
charged with the duty of
distributing the estate.
Twelve years. When the legacy or share becomes
payable or deliverable.
21
Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run
107. For possession of a hereditary
office.
Explanation.—A hereditary office
is possessed when the properties
thereof are usually received, or
(if there are no properties) when
the duties thereof are usually
performed.
Twelve years. When the defendant takes possession of
the office adversely to the plaintiff.
108. Suit during the life of a Hindu or
Muslim female by a Hindu or
Muslim who, if the female died
at the date of instituting the suit,
would be entitled to the
possession of land, to have an
alienation of such land made by
the female declared to be void
except for her life or until her
re-marriage.
Twelve years. The date of the alienation.
109. By a Hindu governed by
Mitakshara law to set aside his
father‟s alienation of ancestral
property.
Twelve years. When the alienee takes possession of the
property.
110. By a person excluded from a joint
family property to enforce a
right to share therein.
Twelve years. When the exclusion becomes known to
the plaintiff.
111. By or on behalf of any local
authority for possession of any
public street or road or any part
thereof from which it has been
dispossessed or of which it has
discontinued the possession.
Thirty years. The date of the dispossession or
discontinuance.
112. Any suit (except a suit before the
Supreme Court in the exercise of
its original jurisdiction) by or on
behalf of the Central
Government or any State
Government, including the
Government of the State of
Jammu and Kashmir.
Thirty years. When the period of limitation would
begin to run under this Act against a
like suit by a private person.
PART X.—SUITS FOR WHICH THERE IS NO PRESCRIBED PERIOD
113. Any suit for which no period of
limitation is provided elsewhere
in this Schedule.
Three years. When the right to sue accrues.
SECOND DIVISION—APPEALS
114. Appeal from an order of
acquittal,—
(a) under sub-section (1) or subsection
(2) of section 417 of
the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898);
Ninety days. The date of the order appealed from.
(b) under sub-section (3) of
section 417 of that Code.
Thirty days. The date of the grant of special leave.
22
Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run
115. Under the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898)—
(a) from a sentence of death
passed by a court of session or
by a High Court in the
exercise of its original
criminal jurisdiction;
Thirty days. The date of the sentence.
(b) from any other sentence or
any order not being an order
of acquittal—
(i) to the High Court Sixty days. The date of the sentence or order.
(ii) to any other court Thirty days. The date of the sentence or order.
116. Under the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 (5 of 1908)—
(a) to a High Court from any
decree or order.
Ninety days. The date of the decree or order.
(b) to any other court from any
decree or order.
Thirty days. The date of the decree or order.
117. From a decree or order of any High
Court to the same Court.
Thirty days. The date of the decree or order.
THIRD DIVISION—APPLICATIONS
PART I.—APPLICATIONS IN SPECIFIED CASES
118. For leave to appear and defend a
suit under summary
procedure.
Ten days. When the summons is served.
119. Under the Arbitration Act, 1940
(10 of 1940),—
(a) for the filing in court of an
award;
Thirty days. The date of service of the notice of the
making of the award;
(b) for setting aside an award
or getting an award remitted
for reconsideration.
Thirty days. The date of service of the notice of the
filing of the award.
120. Under the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908),
to have the legal
representative of a deceased
plaintiff or appellant or of a
deceased defendant or
respondent, made a party.
Ninety days. The date of death of the plaintiff,
appellant, defendant or respondent, as
the case may be.
121. Under the same Code for an order
to set aside an abatement.
Sixty days. The date of abatement.
122. To restore a suit or appeal or
application for review or
revision dismissed for default
of appearance or for want of
prosecution or for failure to
pay costs of service of process
or to furnish security for costs.
Thirty days. The date of dismissal.
23
1. Subs. by Act 104 of 1976, s. 98, for “Thirty days” (w.e.f. 9-9-1976).
Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run
123. To set aside a decree passed ex
parte or to rehear an appeal
decreed or heard ex parte.
Explanation.—For the purpose of
this article, substituted service
under rule 20 of Order V of
the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 (5 of 1908) shall not be
deemed to be due service.
Thirty days. The date of the decree or where the
summons or notice was not duly
served, when the applicant had
knowledge of the decree.
124. For a review of judgment by a
court other than the Supreme
Court.
Thirty days. The date of the decree or order.
125. To record an adjustment or
satisfaction of a decree.
Thirty days. When the payment or adjustment is made.
126. For the payment of the amount of
a decree by instalments.
Thirty days. The date of the decree.
127. To set aside a sale in execution
of a decree, including any
such application by a
judgment-debtor.
1
[Sixty days]. The date of the sale.
128. For possession by one
dispossessed of immovable
property and disputing the
right of the decree-holder or
purchaser at a sale in
execution of a decree.
Thirty days. The date of the dispossession.
129. For possession after removing
resistance or obstruction to
delivery of possession of
immovable property decreed
or sold in execution of a
decree.
Thirty days. The date of resistance or obstruction.
130. For leave to appeal as a pauper—
(a) to the High Court; Sixty days. The date of decree appealed from.
(b) to any other court. Thirty days. The date of decree appealed from.
131. To any court for the exercise of
its powers of revision under
the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 (5 of 1908), or the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1898
(5 of 1898).
Ninety days. The date of the decree or order or
sentence sought to be revised.
132. To the High Court for a
certificate of fitness to appeal
to the Supreme Court under
clause (1) of article 132,
article 133 or sub-clause (c) of
clause (1) of article 134 of the
Constitution or under any
other law for the time being in
force.
Sixty days. The date of the decree, order or sentence.
24
1. Subs. by Act 53 of 1964, s. 3 and the Second Schedule, for “Where” (w.e.f. 12-12-1964.)
Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run
133. To the Supreme Court for special
leave to appeal,—
(a) in a case involving death
sentence;
Sixty days. The date of the judgment final order or
sentence.
(b) in a case where leave to
appeal was refused by the
High Court;
Sixty days. The date of the order of refusal.
(c) in any other case. Ninety days. The date of the judgment or order.
134. For delivery of possession by a
purchaser of immovable
property at a sale in execution
of a decree.
One year. When the sale becomes absolute.
135. For the enforcement of a decree
granting a mandatory
injunction.
Three years. The date of the decree or where a date is
fixed for performance, such date.
136. For the execution of any decree
(other than a decree granting a
mandatory injunction) or
order of any civil court.
Twelve years.
1
[When] the decree or order becomes
enforceable or where the decree or any
subsequent order directs any payment
of money or the delivery of any
property to be made at a certain date or
at recurring periods, when default in
making the payment or delivery in
respect of which execution is sought,
takes place:
Provided that an application for the
enforcement or execution of a decree
granting a perpetual injunction shall
not be subject to any period of
limitation.
PART II—OTHER APPLICATION
137. Any other application for which
no period of limitation is
provided elsewhere in this
Division.
Three years. When the right to apply accrues.

Tuesday, August 2, 2016

whether the suit filed by the appellant Madina Begum was barred by limitation in terms of the first part of Article 54 of Schedule 1 of the Limitation Act, 1963 = the agreement between Gulab Bai and Madina Begum did not specify a calendar date as the date fixed for the performance of the agreement. Consequently, the view expressed in Ahmadsahab Abdul Mulla and Rathnavathi on the first part of Article 54 clearly applies to the facts of the case. In taking a contrary view, ignoring the absence of a specified date for the performance of the agreement and reversing the Trial Court, the High Court has fallen in error.; whether the High Court was right in merely deciding the issue of limitation in a first appeal filed under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure without going into the merits of the case. Quite recently, in Vinod Kumar v. Gangadhar[3] this Court had occasion to consider the issue whether, under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the first appellate court ought to decide all the issues before it or not.

                                                                  REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6687 OF 2016

Madina Begum & Anr.                           .…Appellants
  versus
Shiv Murti Prasad Pandey & Ors.                   .…Respondents

                               J U D G M E N T
Madan B. Lokur, J.
1.     The two questions for our consideration are whether  the  suit  filed
by the appellant Madina Begum was barred  by  limitation  in  terms  of  the
first part of Article 54 of Schedule 1  of  the  Limitation  Act,  1963  and
whether the High Court ought to have  decided  the  first  appeal  filed  by
Madina Begum not only on the preliminary issue of  limitation  but  also  on
all other issues.  As far as the first question is concerned our  answer  is
in the negative and as far as the  second  question  is  concerned,  in  our
opinion, the High Court ought to have  considered  all  the  issues  in  the
first appeal rather than only the preliminary issue of limitation.
2.     The land in dispute in this appeal  is  1.63  acres  of  agricultural
land bearing khasra nos. 438, 439,  440  and  456  (total  area  being  2.13
acres) in Patwari Halka No. 26 Gram Amkhera, Tehsil and District Jabalpur.
3.     There was a dispute about the title of the entire aforesaid land  and
to resolve that  dispute,  Gulab  Bai  claiming  to  be  the  owner  and  in
possession of the entire land, filed Suit No. 479A of 1994 in the  Court  of
the Additional District Judge in Jabalpur.  The defendants in the suit  were
Amar Singh and Jaswant Singh.  The prayer made by Gulab Bai  in  her  plaint
was for a declaration with regard to her title  and  possession.   She  also
prayed for an injunction restraining the defendants Amar Singh  and  Jaswant
Singh from interfering with her possession.
4.     On 2nd August, 2001 the suit was decreed in favour of Gulab  Bai  and
thereafter on 3rd September, 2001 she entered  into  an  agreement  to  sell
1.63 acres of agricultural  land  being  the  disputed  property  to  Madina
Begum.  The consideration for the sale was Rs. 4,89,000/- out  of  which  an
advance of Rs. 1,25,000/- was paid by Madina Begum to Gulab Bai.  This  fact
is recorded in the agreement to sell.
5.     What we are concerned with in this appeal is  the  interpretation  of
Clause 3 of the agreement to sell which reads as follows:-

“3 That Party no. 1 has sold 1.63 acres land at the rate of  Rs.  3,00,000/-
(Rs. Three lakh) per acre and  Party  no.  1  Gulab  Bai  has  obtained  Rs.
1,25,000/- (One lakh twenty five thousand) as  advance.   The  rest  of  the
amount of Rs. 3,64,000/- (Rs. Three lakh sixty four thousand) would be  paid
by Party no. 2 to Party no. 1 within the period  of  six  months  from  this
date and having received it the party no. 1 will execute Benama Registry  in
favour of Party no. 2 or any such person specified by party  no.  2  in  one
part or many parts.”

6.     Apparently on coming to know that Gulab Bai had agreed  to  sell  the
disputed land to Madina Begum an appeal being F.A. No.399 of 2001 was  filed
by Amar Singh and  Jaswant  Singh  in  the  High  Court  of  Madhya  Pradesh
challenging the decree dated  2nd  August,  2001.   An  interim  application
under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of  Civil  Procedure  was  filed
along with the appeal. The application was taken  up  for  consideration  on
22nd September, 2001 and while issuing notice  in  the  application  it  was
directed as follows:-
“In the meanwhile till the disposal of M(C) P.  No.  3231/2001,  status  quo
regarding possession over the suit property  shall  be  maintained  and  the
respondent shall not alienate the suit property.”

7.     On  16th  November,  2001  Gulab  Bai  executed  a  Will  (which  was
registered) in which she categorically mentioned  that  she  had  negotiated
the sale of 1.63 acres of land to Madina  Begum  and  had  given  possession
thereof to her but  the  remaining  amount  and  registration  of  the  sale
remained to be completed.  In her  Will,  Gulab  Bai  appointed  Shiv  Murti
Prasad Pandey  and  Devendra  Prasad  Pandey  (respondents  herein)  as  her
executors.  The Will mentioned that upon her demise, her  agricultural  land
except 1.63 acres will devolve on Shiv  Murti  Prasad  Pandey  and  Devendra
Prasad Pandey and in the event of her death before the registration  of  the
sale deed it would be their responsibility to execute and register the  sale
deed in favour of Madina Begum. Unfortunately, Gulab Bai passed away on  2nd
January, 2002.
8.     Thereafter, F.A. No. 399 of 2001 filed  by  Amar  Singh  and  Jaswant
Singh was heard by  the  High  Court  and  came  to  be  dismissed  on  28th
September, 2006.  We are told that the decree passed by the High  Court  has
attained finality.
9.     Upon the dismissal of the aforesaid appeal, it  appears  that  Madina
Begum required Shiv Murti  Prasad  Pandey  and  Devendra  Prasad  Pandey  to
execute the sale deed but apparently they did not take  any  steps  in  this
regard.  On the contrary, it appears that on or about 2nd August,  2008  the
land in dispute was mutated in the name of Anita Jain  pursuant  to  a  sale
made in her favour by Shiv Murti Prasad Pandey and Devendra Prasad Pandey.
10. When Madina Begum came to know of the transfer  of  the  disputed  land,
she sent a notice to Shiv Murti Prasad Pandey and Devendra Prasad Pandey  on
13th August, 2008 calling upon them to execute the sale  deed  in  terms  of
the agreement to sell dated 3rd September, 2001 and  the  Will  executed  by
Gulab Bai on 16th November, 2001.  The notice was replied to by  Shiv  Murti
Prasad Pandey and Devendra Prasad Pandey and we are told that they  declined
to execute the sale deed.  This led to Madina Begum  filing  a  suit,  inter
alia, for specific performance of the agreement being Suit No. 17A  of  2008
(perhaps renumbered later as 41A of 2010) in the  Court  of  the  Additional
District Judge, Jabalpur.
11. The defendants in the suit namely Shiv Murti Prasad Pandey and  Devendra
Prasad Pandey and Anita Jain filed their written statement and  one  of  the
contentions raised was that the suit was barred by  limitation  having  been
instituted more than three years beyond the date specified in the  agreement
to sell dated 3rd September, 2001. It was also submitted that  Madina  Begum
had given an advance of only Rs. 90,000/- which had since been  returned  to
her and that on 19th November, 2001 the agreement to sell between Gulab  Bai
and Madina Begum was cancelled.
12. On the pleadings, one of the issues framed by the Trial Court was  issue
No. 8: Whether the suit is time barred?
13. The Trial Court considered the issue whether the suit  filed  by  Madina
Begum was barred by time and answered it in the negative.  It  was  held  in
paragraph 38 of the decision rendered on 1st February, 2011 as follows:-

“38. On perusal of the record it is gathered  that  agreement  Ex.  P-1  was
executed on 03.09.2001 and thereafter stay has been granted by Hon’ble  High
Court in first appeal  on  22.09.2001  but  the  first  appeal  was  finally
decided on 28.09.2006 vide Ex. P-5  since  it  was  dismissed  and  in  this
manner, the stay order had become ineffective  on  28.09.2006.   Thereafter,
the plaintiffs have sent notice to the defendants in August 2008 i.e.  after
two years from the date of decision in the first appeal which was  dismissed
on 28.09.2006 which was  done  within  prescribed  period  of  three  years.
Therefore, it cannot be said that the plaintiffs had filed the  suit  beyond
the period of limitation with  a  view  to  harass  the  defendants.   Thus,
issues No. 8 and 9 are being answered against the defendants.”

14. Even though the issue of limitation was decided in her favour, the  suit
filed by Madina Begum was dismissed on  merits.  Feeling  aggrieved  by  the
dismissal of the suit on merits Madina Begum preferred First Appeal No.  175
of 2011 in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh and that  led  to  the  impugned
judgment and order dated 16th August, 2013.  The Division Bench hearing  the
appeal did not go into the merits of the dispute  between  the  parties  but
only adverted to the issue of limitation and since it  was  found  that  the
institution of the suit was barred by time (contrary to  the  conclusion  of
the Trial Court) there was no necessity of considering  the  merits  of  the
case.
15. In coming to the conclusion that the suit was barred by time,  the  High
Court considered Article 54 of Schedule 1 of the Limitation Act,  1963  (for
short, “the Act”).  The  discussion  thereon  was  brief  and  it  reads  as
follows:-

    “Under Article 54 of  the  Limitation  Act,  the  prescribed  period  of
limitation for filing a suit of specific performance of a contract is  three
years and the period of three years  has  to  be  calculated  based  on  two
contingencies i.e. the date fixed for performance of the contract or  if  no
such date is fixed, the date when the plaintiffs had  notice  about  refusal
of the performance by the defendants.  In this case, admittedly, a date  for
performance is fixed i.e. six months from  the  date  of  execution  of  the
contract and, therefore, as a specific period for performance is fixed,  the
period of limitation would be three years w.e.f.  3.03.2002  i.e.  the  date
when the period of six months for execution of the sale-deed lapsed.”

16. The High Court held that since the suit was barred  by  limitation,  the
Trial Court committed a grave error in recording a  finding  that  the  suit
was within limitation.
17. The interpretation of the first part of Article 54 of Schedule 1 of  the
Act is no longer res-integra. Article 54 reads as follows:-
|“54. |For specific performance of |Three years|The date fixed for the |
|     |a                           |           |performance, or, if no |
|     |contract                    |           |such date is fixed,    |
|     |                            |           |when the plaintiff has |
|     |                            |           |notice that performance|
|     |                            |           |is refused.”           |


18. In Ahmadsahab  Abdul  Mulla  (2)  (Dead)  v.  Bibijan  and  Ors.[1]  the
following question was considered by a three  judge  Bench  of  this  Court:
“Whether the use of  the  expression  “date”  used  in  Article  54  of  the
Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 (in short “the Act”) is  suggestive  of
a specific date in the calendar?”
19. While answering this question on a reference made  to  the  three  judge
Bench, this Court considered the meaning of  the  word  “date”  and  “fixed”
appearing in Article 54.  Upon such consideration, this Court held that  the
expression “date fixed for the performance” is a crystallized notion.   When
a date is fixed it means  there  is  a  definite  date  fixed  for  doing  a
particular act.   Therefore,  there  is  no  question  of  finding  out  the
intention from other circumstances.  It was reiterated that  the  expression
“date” is definitely  suggestive  of  a  specified  date  in  the  calendar.
Paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Report in this  regard  are  of  importance  and
they read as follows:-

“11. The inevitable conclusion is that the expression “date  fixed  for  the
performance” is a crystallized notion.  This is clear  from  the  fact  that
the second part “time from which period begins to  run”  refers  to  a  case
where no such date is fixed.  To put it differently, when date is  fixed  it
means that there is a definite date fixed for doing a particular act.   Even
in the second part the stress is on “when  the  plaintiff  has  notice  that
performance is refused”.  Here again, there is a  definite  point  of  time,
when the plaintiff notices the refusal.  In that sense both the parts  refer
to definite dates.  So, there is no question of  finding  out  an  intention
from other circumstances.

12. Whether the date  was  fixed  or  not  the  plaintiff  had  notice  that
performance is refused and the date  thereof  are  to  be  established  with
reference  to  materials  and  evidence  to  be  brought  on  record.    The
expression “date” used in Article 54 of the Schedule to the  Act  definitely
is suggestive of a specified date in the calendar.  We answer the  reference
accordingly.  The matter shall now be placed before the Division  Bench  for
deciding the issue on merits.”

20.    Quite independently and without reference to the aforesaid  decision,
another  Bench  of  this  Court  in  Rathnavathi  and  Another   v.   Kavita
Ganashamdas[2] came to the same conclusion.  It was held in paragraph 42  of
the Report that a mere reading of Article 54 would show that if the date  is
fixed for the performance of an  agreement,  then  non-compliance  with  the
agreement on the date would give a cause  of  action  to  file  a  suit  for
specific performance within three years from the date so  fixed.   But  when
no such date is fixed, the limitation of three years would  begin  when  the
plaintiff has notice that the defendant has refused the performance  of  the
agreement.  It was further held, on the facts of the case that  it  did  not
fall in the first category of Article 54 since no  date  was  fixed  in  the
agreement for its performance.
21.    The Clauses of the agreement for consideration  in  Rathnavathi  were
Clauses 2 and 3 and they read as follows:-

 “2. The purchaser shall pay a sum of  Rs.  50,000  (Rupees  fifty  thousand
only) as advance to the seller at the time of signing  this  agreement,  the
receipt of which  the  seller  hereby  acknowledges  and  the  balance  sale
consideration amount shall be paid within 60 days from the  date  of  expiry
of lease period.
3.  The seller covenants with the purchaser that efforts will be  made  with
the Bangalore  Development  Authority  for  the  transfer  of  the  schedule
property in favour of the purchaser after paying penalty.   In  case  it  is
not possible then the time stipulated herein for  the  balance  payment  and
completion of the sale transaction  will  be  agreed  mutually  between  the
parties.”

22.    As far as the present appeal  is  concerned,  the  agreement  between
Gulab Bai and Madina Begum did not specify  a  calendar  date  as  the  date
fixed  for  the  performance  of  the  agreement.  Consequently,  the   view
expressed in Ahmadsahab Abdul Mulla and Rathnavathi on  the  first  part  of
Article 54 clearly applies to the facts of the case. In  taking  a  contrary
view, ignoring the absence of a specified date for the  performance  of  the
agreement and reversing the Trial  Court,  the  High  Court  has  fallen  in
error.
23. It is not necessary for  us  to  multiply  authorities  on  the  subject
particularly when the issue has been conclusively  settled  by  a  Bench  of
three learned judges of this Court in Ahmadsahab Abdul Mulla and we  see  no
reason to take a different view.
24. The second question that requires  consideration  is  whether  the  High
Court was right in merely deciding  the  issue  of  limitation  in  a  first
appeal filed under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure  without  going
into  the  merits  of  the  case.   Quite  recently,  in  Vinod   Kumar   v.
Gangadhar[3] this Court had occasion to consider the  issue  whether,  under
Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the first appellate  court  ought
to decide all the issues before it or not.  Reference was  made  to  a  very
large number of decisions rendered by  this  Court  and  it  was  concluded,
particularly relying upon Madhukar v.  Sangram[4]  decided  by  a  Bench  of
three learned judges of this Court that sitting as a court of  first  appeal
it is the duty of the High Court to deal with all the  issues  and  evidence
led by the parties before recording its findings.
25. In so far as the present  appeal  is  concerned,  the  High  Court  only
considered the issue of limitation and did not consider the other issues  in
the appeal. This was impermissible. The result  is  that  since  we  do  not
agree with the view taken by the High Court  on  the  issue  of  limitation,
there is no option but to set aside the view expressed  by  the  High  Court
and following the decisions of this Court, remand the  matter  to  the  High
Court to decide the  remaining  issues  in  the  first  appeal  filed  under
Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
26. It is a little unfortunate that the  parties  have  to  undergo  another
round of litigation which could easily have  been  avoided  if  the  settled
legal principles laid down by this Court from time to time were followed  in
regard to the requirements of Section 96 of the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure.
This is quite apart from the delay caused in the resolution of  the  dispute
between the parties.
27. In view of our discussion,  the  appeal  is  allowed  and  the  impugned
judgment and order of the High Court dated 16th August, 2013  is  set  aside
and the matter is remanded to the High  Court  for  deciding  the  remaining
issues in the appeal on merits.


      ...………………….J                                                 (Madan B.
                                                                      Lokur)



                                                                 ..………………….J

New     Delhi;                                                         (R.K.
Agrawal)
August 1, 2016
-----------------------
[1]  (2009) 5 SCC 462
[2]  (2015) 5 SCC 223
[3]  (2015) 1 SCC 391
[4]  (2001) 4 SCC 756

Saturday, July 2, 2016

Sections 17 and 52 of the Marine Insurance Act, 1963=When the delivery was taken at Moscow, it was found short of 142 and 139 cartons respectively. The matter was then reported to the Insurance Company who, in turn, appointed M/s Ingostarkh Insurance Company Ltd., Moscow as the surveyors to investigate into the matter and assess the loss. The surveyors confirmed the short delivery of the cartons. In terms of policy, the claim for the loss sustained by the consignee was lodged with M/s Ingostrakh Insurance Company in the first instance. They did not settle it and hence the consignee authorized the respondent to file the claim against the appellant for recovery of the loss sustained by them due to loss of their goods.= whether the complaint petition filed by the respondent under the Consumer Protection Act against the appellant (Insurer) was maintainable or not or in other words whether the respondent had the locus to file the complaint on the strength of contract of Insurance Policy in question for claiming compensation for the loss sustained in the transaction? = Sections 17 and 52 of the Marine Insurance Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) are relevant for deciding the abovesaid question. They read as under : “Section 17. Assignment of interest.—Where the assured assigns or otherwise parts with his interest in the subject-matter insured, he does not thereby transfer to the assignee his rights under the contract of insurance, unless there be an express or implied agreement with the assignee to that effect. But the provisions of this section do not affect transmission of interest by operation of law. “Section 52. When and how policy is assignable.— (1) A marine policy may be transferred by assignment unless it contains terms expressly prohibiting assignment. It may be assigned either before or after loss. (2) Where a marine policy has been assigned so as to pass the beneficial interest in such policy, the assignee of the policy is entitled to sue thereon in his own name; and the defendant is entitled to make any defence arising out of the contract which he would have been entitled to make if the suit had been brought in the name of the person by or on behalf of whom the policy was effected. (3) A marine policy may be assigned by endorsement thereon or in other customary manner.”Section 52 provides as to when and how the marine policy may be transferred. It says that a marine policy may be transferred by assignment unless it contains express terms, which prohibits any assignment of the policy. It also provides that such assignment can be made before or after the loss has occasioned.Sub-Section(2)of Section 52 provides that once the assignment is made then the assignee is entitled to sue in his name whereas the insurer/defendant is also entitled to raise all such defences against the assignee, which are available to him against the original insured i.e. assigner.-Under these circumstances, by virtue of Section 17, the respondent is legally entitled to retain, enjoy and exercise all those rights, which are available to them under the contract of insurance, which they have entered into with the appellant despite making the assignment of their policy in favour of the assignee.Section 17, in terms, recognizes and permits the insured to make assignment of their contract of insurance policy in favour of an assignee and at the same time allows the insured even after making an assignment to retain all those rights which are available to them under the contract of insurance with the Insurer (appellant). In other words, in terms of Section 17, even after making an assignment by the insured of their contract of insurance policy, the rights of insured under the contract of insurance policy are not assigned in favour of assignee by the deed of assignment but they are continued to remain with the insured. We are, therefore, of the considered view that firstly, we do not find that the respondent (insured) assigned the contract of insurance policy in favour of their consignee as contended by the appellant. Secondly, even assuming that the respondent (insured) assigned the contract of insurance policy in favour of their consignee, yet the assignment so made did not have any adverse effect on the rights of the insured under the contract of insurance policy as the rights continued to remain with them by virtue of Section 17 of the Act.The respondent was, therefore, legally entitled and had the locus to file a complaint against the appellant on the strength of contract of insurance policy for enforcement of their all contractual rights available to them under the insurance policy for claiming compensation for the loss caused from the appellant and the complaint so filed by the respondent could not be dismissed as not maintainable on the ground of locus. It was thus rightly held as maintainable.In our considered opinion, even if we accept, for the sake of argument, that the respondent had assigned their rights under the contract of Insurance policy in favour of their consignee by way of endorsement as contended by the appellant, yet in the light of authorization letter dated 04.07.1997 duly issued by the consignee in favour of the respondent authorizing the respondent to file a complaint petition before the Consumer forum for recovery of the compensation, the respondent was entitled and had the locus to file a complaint against the appellant for realization of compensation amount towards the loss sustained due to short delivery of the goods on the strength of the authorization letter for enforcement of contract of insurance policy. In view of foregoing discussion, we are of the considered opinion that in any event, the complaint filed by the respondent (insured) was maintainable and that the respondent had the locus to file the complaint against the appellant. It was, in our view, saved by Section 17 of the Act and by the authorization letter dated 04.07.1997, issued by the consignee in respondent’s favour. Both the Authorities, i.e., State forum and National forum (as the first appellate authority) were, therefore, justified in overruling the objection of the appellant and were justified in holding that the complaint filed by the respondent was maintainable and the respondent was legally competent to file such complaint.- New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. G.N. Sainani, 1997 (6) SCC 383 and Oberai Forwarding Agency vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. & Anr. [2000(2) SCC 407]. We have perused these decisions and find that these are distinguishable on facts. In the latter decision, the question of locus was not expressly examined in the context of Section 17 but was examined in the context of Section 79 of the Act on different set of facts. Likewise, in the former case, the facts were different and again Section 17 of the Act did not fall for consideration. In any event, in the light of findings which we have recorded on the facts of this case against the appellant, the case law relied upon by the appellant is of no help to them.



                                                                  Reportable
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1004 OF 2006


      United India Insurance Co. Ltd.              Appellant(s)


                             VERSUS


      Leisure Wear Exports Ltd.                    Respondent(s)

                                    WITH

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1016 OF 2006

      United India Insurance Co. Ltd.              Appellant(s)


                             VERSUS


      Leisure Wear Exports Ltd. Etc. Etc.          Respondent(s)


                       J U D G M E N T



     Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
      1)    These appeals are filed by the United  India  Insurance  Company
      Ltd. against  the  common  final  judgment  dated  05.07.2004  of  the
      National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New  Delhi  in  First
      Appeal Nos. 30-33 of 2000 by  which  the  National  Consumer  Disputes
      Redressal Commission dismissed their appeals and upheld the  order  of
      the State Consumer Commission.
      2)    These appeals involve a short point. However, to appreciate  the
      point, few facts need mention infra.
      3)    The appellant - United India Insurance Company Ltd. is the  non-
      applicant whereas the respondent - Leisure Wear Exports  Ltd.  is  the
      complainant  in  the  complaint  filed  before  the   State   Consumer
      Commission, Punjab out of which these appeals arise.
      4)    The respondent/complainant is engaged in the business of sale of
      various kinds of hosiery goods and ready-made  garments  at  Ludhiana.
      They also import  and  export  the  goods  in  which  they  trade.  On
      13.06.1996, the respondent obtained from the appellant one Open Marine
      Policy (Cargo) bearing No. 201002-21-99-042-96.  The  respondent  also
      paid necessary premium.   The policy covered the risk of all kinds  of
      hosiery goods and ready-made garments kept  in  wooden  and  cardboard
      cases sent from any part of India  to  any  friendly  country  in  the
      world.  The policy covered the risk under Institute Cargo Clause  ‘A’,
      Inland Transit Clause ‘A’ and risk of war, SRCC, Riots,  Strike  valid
      for “Warehouse to  warehouse  at  final  destination”.  The  insurance
      covered the risk of the insured goods to the extent of Rs.  2  crores.
      It was subject to terms and conditions as were mutually  agreed  upon.
      The policy was for the period from 13.06.1996 to 12.06.1997.
      5)    The respondent received  one  order  from  one  party-M/s  Magna
      Overseas, Moscow for supply of hosiery goods and  ready-made  garments
      to them at Moscow. The respondent accordingly dispatched 320 cardboard
      cartons in two separate consignments - one was under  cover  note  No.
      LDRO/26948 dated 20.06.1996 worth Rs.49,63,200/- and another was under
      cover note No. LDRO/28051 dated 28.06.1996 worth Rs.31,68,000/.    The
      respondent duly notified these transactions to the appellant(insurer).
       The export was to be made from Ex. Ludhiana to Moscow.
      6)    The consignments reached Mumbai Port  and  from  there,  it  was
      loaded in the ship for its final destination-Moscow. The  consignments
      landed at port Odessa in Ukraine and from there, the  consignment  was
      moved by road to Moscow. When the delivery was taken at Moscow, it was
      found short of 142 and 139 cartons respectively.
      7)    The matter was then reported to the Insurance  Company  who,  in
      turn, appointed M/s Ingostarkh Insurance Company Ltd., Moscow  as  the
      surveyors to investigate into the matter  and  assess  the  loss.  The
      surveyors confirmed the short delivery of the  cartons.  In  terms  of
      policy, the claim for the loss sustained by the consignee  was  lodged
      with M/s Ingostrakh Insurance Company in the first instance. They  did
      not settle it and hence the consignee  authorized  the  respondent  to
      file the  claim  against  the  appellant  for  recovery  of  the  loss
      sustained by them due to loss of their goods.
      8)    The respondent then filed two separate complaint petitions under
      the Consumer Protection Act  before  the  State  Consumer  Commission,
      Punjab against the appellant (Insurance Company) on  the  strength  of
      the  policy  issued  by  the  appellant  in  their   favour   claiming
      compensation for the loss of their goods while in  transit  and  which
      were duly insured by the respondent under the policy dated 13.06.1996.
      In substance, the case of the respondent in their complaint  was  that
      since the goods, which were lost, were admittedly got insured  by  the
      respondent with the  appellant  and,  therefore,  the  respondent  are
      entitled to claim compensation for the loss sustained by them from the
      appellant on the strength of the policy which covered  such  loss.  It
      was alleged that the policy was admittedly  in  force  when  the  loss
      occurred and hence  the  appellant  cannot  deny  their  liability  to
      compensate the respondent for the loss caused  to  the  goods  of  the
      respondent.
      9)    The appellant filed their written  statement  and  admitted  the
      factum of issuance of policy in respondent's favour so also the factum
      of the loss of goods sustained by the respondent while the goods  were
      in transit. Their main objection was that the respondent had no  right
      to file the complaint and claim compensation from the appellant on the
      strength of policy  in  question.   It  was  alleged  that  since  the
      respondent had already assigned the policy in question  in  favour  of
      their consignee, i.e., M/s Magna Overseas to whom the goods were  sent
      by them and, therefore, it was for the consignee/assignee to file  the
      complaint for realization  of  the  loss  amount  from  the  appellant
      (insurer) on the strength of the assignment of  the  policy.  It  was,
      therefore, alleged that once the respondent made the assignment of the
      policy in favour of the consignee then in such event,  they  lost  all
      their rights and interest in the policy qua the insurer and hence  had
      no locus to file the complaint against the  appellant.  The  complaint
      was, therefore, liable to be dismissed on this ground  alone.  Parties
      filed their evidence.
      10)   The State Consumer forum vide  order  dated  31.12.1999  allowed
      both  the  complaints  and  awarded  Rs.19,90,000/-  in  all  to   the
      complainant/respondent by way of compensation in each  complaint.  The
      compensation awarded to the respondent comprises of the reported value
      of the loss of the goods, 10% towards moral loss, 15% towards loss  of
      earning and  interest at the rate of 12% payable from 07.11.1996  till
      realization.
      11)   Felt aggrieved, the  appellant  filed  the  appeals  before  the
      National Consumer Disputes Redressal  Commission,  New  Delhi  out  of
      which this appeal arises.
      12)   By impugned order,  the  National  Consumer  Disputes  Redressal
      Commission dismissed the appeals and upheld the  order  of  the  State
      Consumer Commission.
      13)   Felt aggrieved, the Insurance Company has filed these appeals by
      way of special leave before this Court.
      14)   Heard Mr. Vishnu Mehra, learned counsel for  the  appellant  and
      Mr. Ashwani Kumar, learned counsel for the respondent.
      15)   Learned counsel for the  appellant  reiterated  the  submissions
      here, which they had urged before the two forums  unsuccessfully.  The
      submission  was  that  both  the  forums  erred  in  entertaining  the
      complaint filed by the respondent, which  deserved  dismissal  at  the
      threshold.
      16)   According to learned counsel, since the respondent assigned  the
      policy in question in favour of consignee (M/S Magna  Overseas),  they
      (respondent) ceased to have any subsisting  interest  in  the  policy,
      which they could enforce against the appellant. Learned counsel  urged
      that in these circumstances, a right to  file  the  complaint  on  the
      strength of policy and to seek its enforcement against  the  appellant
      was with the consignee and not with the respondent. It was, therefore,
      urged that the respondent had no locus to file the  complaint  against
      the appellant and seek enforcement of the  terms  of  the  policy  for
      realization of any claim arising out of the policy.
      17)   In reply, learned  counsel  for  the  respondent  supported  the
      reasoning and the conclusion  arrived  at  by  the  National  Consumer
      Redressal Commission and contended that  it  does  not  call  for  any
      interference and deserves to be upheld.
      18)   Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on  perusal
      of the record of the case, we find no merit in the appeal.
      19)   The short question which arises for consideration in this appeal
      is whether the complaint petition filed by the  respondent  under  the
      Consumer  Protection  Act  against   the   appellant   (Insurer)   was
      maintainable or not or in other words whether the respondent  had  the
      locus to file the complaint on the strength of contract  of  Insurance
      Policy in question for claiming compensation for the loss sustained in
      the transaction?
      20)    Sections  17  and  52  of  the  Marine  Insurance   Act,   1963
      (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) are relevant for  deciding  the
      abovesaid question.  They read as under :
           “Section 17. Assignment of interest.—Where the  assured  assigns
           or otherwise parts  with  his  interest  in  the  subject-matter
           insured, he does not thereby transfer to the assignee his rights
           under the contract of insurance, unless there be an  express  or
           implied agreement with the assignee to that effect.
                      But the provisions of  this  section  do  not  affect
           transmission of interest by operation of law.


           “Section 52. When and how policy is assignable.—


           (1)   A marine policy may be transferred by assignment unless it
           contains terms  expressly  prohibiting  assignment.  It  may  be
           assigned either before or after loss.


           (2)   Where a marine policy has been assigned so as to pass  the
           beneficial interest in such policy, the assignee of  the  policy
           is entitled to sue thereon in his own name; and the defendant is
           entitled to make any defence arising out of the  contract  which
           he would have been entitled to make if the suit had been brought
           in the name of the person by or on behalf of whom the policy was
           effected.


           (3)   A marine policy may be assigned by endorsement thereon  or
           in other customary manner.”


      21)   Section 52 provides as to when and how the marine policy may  be
      transferred. It says that  a  marine  policy  may  be  transferred  by
      assignment unless it  contains  express  terms,  which  prohibits  any
      assignment of the policy. It also provides that such assignment can be
      made before or after the loss has occasioned.
      22)   Sub-Section(2)of Section 52 provides that once the assignment is
      made then the assignee is entitled to sue  in  his  name  whereas  the
      insurer/defendant is also entitled to raise all such defences  against
      the assignee, which are available to him against the original  insured
      i.e. assigner.
      23)   Section 17 deals with "assignment  of  interest".   It  provides
      that where the assured assigns or otherwise parts with his interest in
      the subject-matter insured, he (insured) does not thereby transfer  to
      the assignee his rights under the contract of insurance  unless  there
      is an express or implied agreement with the assignee to  that  effect.
      This Section, however, does not affect  transmission  of  interest  by
      operation of law.
      24)   When we examine the undisputed facts of the case in the light of
      aforementioned two provisions, then in our considered opinion, Section
      17 has full application to the facts of the case.  In fact,  it  is  a
      complete answer to the submission urged by the learned counsel for the
      appellant.
      25)   It is not in dispute that there is no express agreement  between
      the respondent (insured) and M/s Magna Overseas  (consignee)  agreeing
      to transfer insured’s rights under the contract of insurance in favour
      of M/S Magna  Overseas  (consignee).  Under  these  circumstances,  by
      virtue of Section 17, the respondent is legally  entitled  to  retain,
      enjoy and exercise all those rights, which are available to them under
      the contract of insurance, which  they  have  entered  into  with  the
      appellant despite making the assignment of their policy in  favour  of
      the assignee.
      26)   Section 17, in terms, recognizes and permits the insured to make
      assignment of their contract of  insurance  policy  in  favour  of  an
      assignee and at the same time allows the insured even after making  an
      assignment to retain all those rights  which  are  available  to  them
      under the contract of insurance with the Insurer (appellant). In other
      words, in terms of Section 17, even after making an assignment by  the
      insured of their contract of insurance policy, the rights  of  insured
      under the contract of insurance policy are not assigned in  favour  of
      assignee by the deed of assignment but they are  continued  to  remain
      with the insured.
      27)   We are, therefore, of the considered view that  firstly,  we  do
      not find that  the  respondent  (insured)  assigned  the  contract  of
      insurance policy in favour of their  consignee  as  contended  by  the
      appellant. Secondly,  even  assuming  that  the  respondent  (insured)
      assigned  the  contract  of  insurance  policy  in  favour  of   their
      consignee, yet the assignment so made did not have any adverse  effect
      on the rights of the insured under the contract of insurance policy as
      the rights  continued to remain with them by virtue of Section  17  of
      the Act.
      28)   The respondent was, therefore,  legally  entitled  and  had  the
      locus to file a complaint against the appellant  on  the  strength  of
      contract of insurance policy for enforcement of their all  contractual
      rights available to them  under  the  insurance  policy  for  claiming
      compensation for the loss caused from the appellant and the  complaint
      so filed by the respondent could not be dismissed as not  maintainable
      on the ground of locus. It was thus rightly held as maintainable.
      29)   This takes us to the next argument of learned  counsel  for  the
      appellant. It was his submission  that  there  was  implied  agreement
      between the respondent and the consignee whereby  the  respondent  had
      transferred  all  their  rights  in  favour  of  the  consignee   and,
      therefore, the respondent  had  no  locus  to  file  a  complaint  for
      enforcement of those rights,  which  were  no  longer  with  them.  In
      support of his submission, learned counsel referred to  letters  dated
      30.06.1997, 08.07.1997, 04.07.1997 and some Paras from the  pleadings.
      We find no merit in this submission.
      30)   In our considered opinion, even if we accept, for  the  sake  of
      argument, that the respondent had  assigned  their  rights  under  the
      contract of Insurance policy in favour of their consignee  by  way  of
      endorsement as contended  by  the  appellant,  yet  in  the  light  of
      authorization letter dated 04.07.1997 duly issued by the consignee  in
      favour  of  the  respondent  authorizing  the  respondent  to  file  a
      complaint petition before the  Consumer  forum  for  recovery  of  the
      compensation, the respondent was entitled and had the locus to file  a
      complaint against the appellant for realization of compensation amount
      towards the loss sustained due to short delivery of the goods  on  the
      strength of the authorization letter for enforcement  of  contract  of
      insurance policy.
      31)   In view of  foregoing  discussion,  we  are  of  the  considered
      opinion that in any event,  the  complaint  filed  by  the  respondent
      (insured) was maintainable and that the respondent had  the  locus  to
      file the complaint against the appellant. It was, in our  view,  saved
      by Section 17 of  the  Act  and  by  the  authorization  letter  dated
      04.07.1997, issued by the consignee in respondent’s favour.
      32)   Both the Authorities, i.e., State forum and National  forum  (as
      the  first  appellate  authority)  were,   therefore,   justified   in
      overruling the objection  of  the  appellant  and  were  justified  in
      holding that the complaint filed by the  respondent  was  maintainable
      and the respondent was legally competent to file such complaint.
      33)   Learned counsel for the appellant then by referring  to  Section
      79 of the Act contended that the complaint filed by the respondent was
      not maintainable. We find absolutely no merit in this  submission.  In
      our view, Section 79 which deals with sabrogation does  not  apply  to
      the case at hand but  it is Section 17  read  with  Section  52  which
      governs the case in question.
      34)   Learned counsel for the appellant then placed  reliance  on  the
      decisions reported in  New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. G.N.  Sainani,
      1997 (6) SCC 383 and Oberai Forwarding Agency vs. New India  Assurance
      Co. Ltd. & Anr. [2000(2) SCC 407].  We have  perused  these  decisions
      and find that these  are  distinguishable  on  facts.  In  the  latter
      decision, the question of locus was  not  expressly  examined  in  the
      context of Section 17 but was examined in the context of Section 79 of
      the Act on different set of facts.  Likewise, in the former case,  the
      facts were different and again Section 17 of the Act did not fall  for
      consideration.  In any event, in the light of findings which  we  have
      recorded on the facts of this case against the appellant, the case law
      relied upon by the appellant is of no help to them.
      35)   So far as the findings relating to the merits of  the  case  are
      concerned, learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge any  of
      the findings in this appeal and in our opinion rightly. We, therefore,
      need not go into any of them.
      36)   In the light of aforesaid discussion, we find no merit in  these
      appeals which fail and are hereby dismissed.

     .……...................................J.
                                     [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]





                 ………..................................J.
                                      [ASHOK BHUSHAN]
      New Delhi,
      June 29, 2016.