* Author
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 76 : 2024 INSC 262
Union of India & Anr.
v.
Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) Through His LR
(Civil Appeal No. 4672 of 2024)
03 April 2024
[Aniruddha Bose and J.B. Pardiwala,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether the High Court committed any error in passing the
impugned order by which it declined to condone the delay of 12
years and 158 days in filing the restoration application by appellantsUnion of India for restoration of the Writ Petition.
Headnotes
Delay – Non-condonation of – Length of the delay, relevant
– Decree for possession of the suit premises was passed in
favour of respondent in 1987 – Appeal thereagainst filed by
appellants-Union of India, dismissed in 1992 – Said order of
the appellate court was challenged by the appellants by filing
Writ Petition in 1993 which was dismissed for non-prosecution
in 2006 – Respondent filed Execution Petition in 2013 – Later,
appellants filed application seeking restoration of the Writ
Petition filed in 1993 and for condonation of delay of 12 years
and 158 days in preferring such restoration application –
Impugned order passed by High Court declining to condone
the said delay – Correctness:
Held: Length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court
must take into consideration while considering whether the delay
should be condoned or not – Once it is held that a party has lost his
right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own
inaction for long, delay cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate
and thus, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice
deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations
– Further, while considering the plea for condonation of delay, the
court must not start with the merits of the main matter – Court
owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation
offered by the party seeking condonation – It is only if the sufficient
cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side
is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 77
Union of India & Anr. v.
Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) Through His LR
of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay – Question
of limitation is not merely a technical consideration – Rules of
limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and
principles of equity – It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private
party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning the
gross delay of more than 12 years – In the present case, litigation
between the parties started sometime in 1981 – Almost 43 years
have elapsed however, till date the respondent has not been able
to reap the fruits of his decree – Appellants failed to prove that
they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and this
vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied in this case – No
error committed by High Court in passing the impugned order.
[Paras 26, 27, 25, 34]
Case Law Cited
Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Limited v. Gujarat
Industrial Development Corporation [2010] 2 SCR 1172 :
(2010) 5 SCC 459; Postmaster General and others v.
Living Media India Limited [2012] 1 SCR 1045 : (2012)
3 SCC 563; Lanka Venkateswarlu (D) by LRs v. State of
Andhra Pradesh & others [2011] 3 SCR 217 : (2011) 4
SCC 363; Pundlik Jalam Patil (D) by LRs. v. Executive
Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project & others [2008] 15
SCR 135 : (2008) 17 SCC 448; Esha Bhattacharjee v.
Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy
& Others [2013] 9 SCR 782 : (2013) 12 SCC 649 –
relied on.
List of Keywords
Limitation; Gross delay; Delay condonation; Sufficient cause; Length
of the delay; Principles of equity.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.4672 of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 09.07.2019 of the High Court
of Judicature at Bombay in CA No. 1494 of 2019
Appearances for Parties
R.Venkataramani, AG, Vikramjit Banerjee, ASG, Col. R.
Balasubramanian, Sr. Adv., Chinmayee Chandra, Chitvan Singhal,
78 [2024] 4 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
Abhishek Kumar Pandey, Arvind Kumar Sharma, Advs. for the
Appellants.
Sudhanshu Chaudhari, Sr. Adv., Ms. Supreeta Sharanagouda,
Sharanagouda Patil, Mahesh P Shindhe, Ms. Rucha A Pande,
Veeraragavan M, C Sawant, Advs. for the Respondent.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
J.B. Pardiwala, J.
Leave granted.
2. This appeal arises from an order passed by a learned single Judge
of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay dated 09.07.2019 in Civil
Application No. 1494 of 2019 filed in Writ Petition No. 2307 of 1993
by which the High Court declined to condone the delay of 12 years
and 158 days in filing the application for restoration of the Writ Petition
No. 2307 of 1993 referred to above which came to be dismissed for
non-prosecution vide order dated 10.10.2006.
3. The facts giving rise to this appeal may be summarized as under.
4. The suit property bearing S. No. 402, Bungalow No. 15A, situated
at Staveley Road, Pune Cantonment, Pune–1 was leased by the
respondent in favour of the appellants on 09.03.1951.
5. As the appellants committed breach of the terms of the lease deed,
the respondent herein instituted civil suit bearing No. 2599 of 1981
before the Court of the 4th Additional Small Causes Judge, Pune
for the recovery of the possession of the suit property & arrears
towards the rent.
6. On 02.05.1987, the suit came to be allowed and the final decree
came to be passed in the following terms:
“ORDER
1) The plaintiffs are entitled to possession of the suit
premises.
2) The defendant shall deliver vacant and peaceful
possession of the suit premises to the plaintiffs or
before 30.6.1987.
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 79
Union of India & Anr. v.
Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) Through His LR
3) The defendants do pay by way of damages and
mesne profits and notice charges Rs. 17,383/- to
the plaintiffs.
4) The defendant shall also pay future mesne profits
at the rate of Rs. 316/- per month from the date of
filing of the suit till recovery of possession of the suit
premises under order 20 rule 12(1) of CPC.
5) The defendant shall pay costs of this suit to the
plaintiffs and shall bear their own.”
7. The appellants herein challenged the judgment and decree referred
to above by preferring Civil Appeal bearing No. 850 of 1987 in the
Court of the District Judge, Pune. The appeal filed by the appellants
herein came to be dismissed vide the judgment and order dated
29.08.1992 passed by the 8th Additional District Judge, Pune.
8. The judgment and order passed by the first appellate court dismissing
the appeal referred to above came to be challenged by the appellants
herein by filing the Petition No. 2307 of 1993 before the High Court
of Bombay invoking its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of
the Constitution of India.
9. On 10.10.2006, the Petition No. 2307 of 1993 referred to above
came to be dismissed for non-prosecution. The order reads thus:
“Coram : D.G. Deshpande – J.) on 10.10.06
AND UPON hearing Shri. D.S. Mhaispurkar for Respondent
Nos. 1A to 1C and 2 this Court has passed the following
order:-
“None for the Petitioners. Mr. D.S. Mhaispurkar for the
Respondents 1A to C and 2.
Petition is dismissed. Rule discharged. Interim order is
vacated.
IT IS ACCORDINGLY ordered that this writ petition is
disposed of as per the accompanying court’s order. The
directions given in the court’s order hereinabove shall be
carried out and complied with scrupulously.
It is accordingly ordered that this order be punctually
observed and carried into execution by concerned.”
80 [2024] 4 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
10. On 26.11.2013 the respondent herein filed Execution Petition bearing
No. 16 of 2014. The appellants herein were served with the notice
in the execution proceedings on 18.03.2016 by the Executing Court.
11. On 20.08.2018, the appellants herein filed an application seeking to
set aside the order passed by the Executing Court. On 30.10.2018
the Executing Court set aside the said order referred to above.
12. On 12.04.2019, the appellants herein filed Civil Application No. 1294
of 2019 seeking restoration of the Petition No. 2307 of 1993 referred
to above and for condonation of delay of 12 years and 158 days in
preferring such restoration application.
13. On 09.07.2019, a learned single Judge of the High Court vide the
impugned order declined to condone the delay of 12 years and 158
days in filing the restoration application.
14. In view of the aforesaid, the appellants are here before this Court
with the present appeal.
Submissions on behalf of the appellants
15. Mr. R. Venkataramani, the learned Attorney General for India
appearing for the appellants vehemently submitted that he has a
very good case on merits and considering the merits alone, the
delay of 12 years and 158 days deserves to be condoned. The
learned Attorney General laid much emphasis on the fact that the
suit property is situated within the Pune cantonment which is under
the ownership of the Union of India and the same was held by the
respondent herein on old grant lease and in such circumstances,
according to the learned Attorney General, the respondent in his
capacity as a private party should not be permitted to deprive
the Government of its land after having admitted that the super
structure alone belongs to him and that the land belongs to the
Government.
16. On the aspect of delay of 12 years and 158 days in filing the restoration
application before the High Court, the learned Attorney General has
no explanation worth to offer.
Submissions on behalf of the respondent
17. Mr. Sudhanshu Chaudhari, the learned senior counsel appearing for
the respondent, on the other hand, vehemently opposed the present
appeal and submitted that no error not to speak of any error of law
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 81
Union of India & Anr. v.
Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) Through His LR
could be said to have been committed by the High Court in passing
the impugned order.
18. He submitted that no sufficient case worth the name has been
assigned by the appellants for the purpose of getting such a long
and inordinate delay of more than 12 years condoned for filing the
restoration application.
19. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned counsel prayed
that there being no merit worth the name in the present appeal, the
same may be dismissed.
Analysis
20. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and
having gone through the materials on record, the only question that
falls for our consideration is whether the High Court committed any
error in passing the impugned order?
21. When this matter was heard for the first time by this Bench, we
brought to the notice of the learned Attorney General something very
relevant as observed by the High Court in para 18 of its impugned
order. Para 18 of the impugned order reads thus:
“18. During the course of hearing, I suggested Mr. Singh that
in case the defendants are ready and willing to handover
possession of the suit property to the respondents, the
Court will consider restoring the Petition to its original
position. The respondents in turn will give undertaking to the
effect that in case the defendants succeed in the Petition,
before approaching the Apex Court, they will handover
possession of the suit property to the defendants. Upon
taking instructions, Mr. Singh submitted that defendants
are not ready and willing to handover possession of the
suit property. In view of the aforesaid discussion, no case
is made out for condoning the delay.”
22. Thus, it appears that the High Court made a reasonable suggestion
to the appellants that if the possession of the suit property is handed
over to the respondent, then probably the Court may consider
restoring the Petition No. 2307 of 1993 which came to be dismissed
for default on 10.10.2006. The High Court noted as above that the
learned counsel appearing for the appellants declined to hand over
the possession of the suit property to the respondent herein. We
82 [2024] 4 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
reiterated the very same suggestion before the learned Attorney
General that if the appellants are ready and willing to hand over the
suit property to the respondent, then, despite there being a long and
inordinate delay, we may consider condoning the same and remanding
the matter back to the High Court so that the High Court may be in
a position to hear the matter on its own merits. However, the learned
Attorney General, after taking instructions from his clients, regretted
his inability to persuade the appellants to hand over the possession
of the suit property to the respondent.
23. In such circumstances referred to above, we were left with no
other option but to call upon the learned Attorney General to make
submissions as to why we should look into only the merits of the
matter and condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days.
24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we made it very clear that we are
not going to look into the merits of the matter as long as we are not
convinced that sufficient cause has been made out for condonation
of such a long and inordinate delay.
25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or
Union of India when it comes to condoning the gross delay of more
than 12 years. If the litigant chooses to approach the court long after
the lapse of the time prescribed under the relevant provisions of the
law, then he cannot turn around and say that no prejudice would be
caused to either side by the delay being condoned. This litigation
between the parties started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024.
Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent
has not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. It would be a
mockery of justice if we condone the delay of 12 years and 158
days and once again ask the respondent to undergo the rigmarole
of the legal proceedings.
26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must
take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be
condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the appellants,
it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for
instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period
of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have
the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a
long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such
circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 83
Union of India & Anr. v.
Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) Through His LR
substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical
considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay,
the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The
court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation
offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient
cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side
is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of
the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.
27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a
technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the
principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should
not keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of the
respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the
whims and fancies of the appellants.
28. At this stage, we would like to quote few observations made by the
High Court in its impugned order pointing towards lack of bona fides
on the part of the appellants. The observations are as under:-
“9. A perusal of paragraph 4 extracted hereinabove shows
that on oath, solemn statement is made that notice of
Darkhast No.16 of 2014 for execution of the decree issued
by the executing Court was received by the Department
on 25.02.2019. As against this, in paragraph 3 of the
additional affidavit dated 04.07.2019 made by Rajendra
Rajaram Pawar, it is stated that the averments made in
paragraph 4 as regards service of Darkhast on 25.02.2019
is factually incorrect. Notice of Darkhast No. 16 of 2014
was received by the defendants on 18.03.2016. The error
in the application is out of inadvertence for which he
tendered unconditional apology. It is further stated that
inadvertent mistake on facts as to knowledge of execution
proceedings was purely because of oversight in the light
of possibilities of issuance of possession warrant by the
executing court and requirement of expeditious urgency
of moving before this Court to save the proceeding in
litigation since 1981 which otherwise would have got
frustrated. He stated that the same is nothing beyond
human error.
x x x x
84 [2024] 4 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
12. The assertions made in paragraph 4 are bereft of
any particulars and are totally vague. In fact the solemn
statement made in paragraph 4 that notice of Darkhast
for execution of the decree issued by the executing Court
was received by the Department on 25.02.2019, to put it
mildly, is incorrect statement. In view of paragraph 3 of the
additional affidavit dated 04.07.2019 made by Rajendra
Rajaram Pawar, it is evident that notice of Darkhast
was received by the defendants on 18.03.2016. It is
material to note that no particulars are given as to when
the Department sought legal opinion. There is also no
explanation as to why Department did not instruct lawyer
in the High Court to apply for restoration of the Petition
and why the Department defended execution proceedings.
It is worthwhile to note that execution proceedings were
filed by the respondents only because Writ Petition was
dismissed. If the Writ Petition was restored, automatically
the execution proceedings would have been stayed by
the executing Court. Instead of adopting appropriate
proceedings, the defendants unnecessarily went on
defending the execution proceedings. In paragraph 4(b)
though it is stated that Department was regularly following
up with its panel lawyer till 2003, this statement is also
not substantiated by producing any document. Even if I
accept that the Department was regularly following up
with its panel lawyer till 2003, there is no explanation
worth the name as to why the Department did not follow
up the matter between 2003 and 2006 when the Petition
was dismissed in default. That apart, equally, there is no
explanation as to why no follow up action was taken by
the officers between 2006 and 2016 when Department
acquired knowledge about dismissal of Writ Petition on
18.03.2016.
13. It is no doubt true that while considering the application
for condonation of delay, the expression ‘sufficient cause’
has to be liberally construed. It, however, does not mean
that without making any sufficient cause, the Court will
condone the delay regardless of the length of the delay. In
the present case, the delay is of 12 years and 158 days.
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 85
Union of India & Anr. v.
Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) Through His LR
A perusal of the application as also the additional affidavit
hardly indicates any sufficient cause for condoning the
unpardonable delay of 12 years and 158 days.”
29. In Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Limited v. Gujarat
Industrial Development Corporation, (2010) 5 SCC 459, this
Court rejected the application for condonation of delay of 4 years in
filing an application to set aside an exparte decree on the ground
that the explanation offered for condonation of delay is found to be
not satisfied.
30. In Postmaster General and others v. Living Media India
Limited, (2012) 3 SCC 563, this Court, while dismissing the
application for condonation of delay of 427 days in filing the
Special Leave Petition, held that condonation of delay is not an
exception and it should not be used as an anticipated benefit for
the government departments. In that case, this Court held that
unless the Department has reasonable and acceptable reason
for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to
accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for
several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural
red tape in the process cannot be accepted. In Para Nos. 25,
26, 27, 28, and 29 respectively, this Court dealt with the scope
of ‘sufficient cause’ and held as follows:
“25. We have already extracted the reasons as mentioned
in the “better affidavit” sworn by Mr. Aparajeet Pattanayak,
SSRM, Air Mail Sorting Division, New Delhi. It is relevant
to note that in the said affidavit, the Department has itself
mentioned and is aware of the date of the judgment of
the Division Bench of the High Court in Office of the Chief
Postmaster v. Living Media India Ltd. [(2009) 8 AD 201
(Del)] as 11-9-2009. Even according to the deponent,
their counsel had applied for the certified copy of the said
judgment only on 8-1-2010 and the same was received
by the Department on the very same day. There is no
explanation for not applying for the certified copy of the
impugned judgment on 11-9-2009 or at least within a
reasonable time. The fact remains that the certified copy
was applied for only on 8-1-2010 i.e. after a period of
nearly four months.
86 [2024] 4 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
26. In spite of affording another opportunity to file
better affidavit by placing adequate material, neither
the Department nor the person-in-charge has filed any
explanation for not applying the certified copy within
the prescribed period. The other dates mentioned in the
affidavit which we have already extracted, clearly show that
there was delay at every stage and except mentioning the
dates of receipt of the file and the decision taken, there
is no explanation as to why such delay had occasioned.
Though it was stated by the Department that the delay was
due to unavoidable circumstances and genuine difficulties,
the fact remains that from day one the Department or the
person/persons concerned have not evinced diligence in
prosecuting the matter to this Court by taking appropriate
steps.
27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned
were well aware or conversant with the issues involved
including the prescribed period of limitation for taking
up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition
in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a
separate period of limitation when the Department was
possessed with competent persons familiar with court
proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable
explanation, we are posing a question why the delay
is to be condoned mechanically merely because the
Government or a wing of the Government is a party
before us.
28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a
matter of condonation of delay when there was no
gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of
bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to
advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in
the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot
take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim
on account of impersonal machinery and inherited
bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot
be accepted in view of the modern technologies being
used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly
binds everybody, including the Government.
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 87
Union of India & Anr. v.
Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) Through His LR
29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government
bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless
they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the
delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to
accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending
for several months/years due to considerable degree
of procedural red tape in the process. The government
departments are under a special obligation to ensure that
they perform their duties with diligence and commitment.
Condonation of delay is an exception and should not
be used as an anticipated benefit for the government
departments. The law shelters everyone under the same
light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.”
31. In the case of Lanka Venkateswarlu (D) by LRs v. State of Andhra
Pradesh & others, (2011) 4 SCC 363, this Court made the following
observations:
“20. In N. Balakrishnan, [(1998) 7 SCC 123] this Court
again reiterated the principle that: (SCC p. 127, para 11)
“11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy
the rights of parties. They are meant to see that
[the] parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but
seek their remedy promptly.”
21 to 27.........
28. We are at a loss to fathom any logic or rationale, which
could have impelled the High Court to condone the delay
after holding the same to be unjustifiable. The concepts
such as “liberal approach”, “justice oriented approach”,
“substantial justice” cannot be employed to jettison the
substantial law of limitation. Especially, in cases where
the court concludes that there is no justification for the
delay. In our opinion, the approach adopted by the High
Court tends to show the absence of judicial balance and
restraint, which a Judge is required to maintain whilst
adjudicating any lis between the parties. We are rather
pained to notice that in this case, not being satisfied with
the use of mere intemperate language, the High Court
resorted to blatant sarcasms.
88 [2024] 4 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
29. The use of unduly strong intemperate or extravagant
language in a judgment has been repeatedly disapproved
by this Court in a number of cases. Whilst considering
applications for condonation of delay under Section 5 of
the Limitation Act, the courts do not enjoy unlimited and
unbridled discretionary powers. All discretionary powers,
especially judicial powers, have to be exercised within
reasonable bounds, known to the law. The discretion has to
be exercised in a systematic manner informed by reason.
Whims or fancies; prejudices or predilections cannot and
should not form the basis of exercising discretionary
powers.”
32. In the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil (D) by LRs. v. Executive
Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project & others, (2008) 17 SCC 448,
this Court held as follows:
“19. In Ajit Singh Thakur Singh v. State of Gujarat [(1981)
1 SCC 495 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 184] this Court observed:
(SCC p. 497, para 6)
“6. … it is true that a party is entitled to wait until
the last day of limitation for filing an appeal. But
when it allows limitation to expire and pleads
sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier,
the sufficient cause must establish that because
of some event or circumstance arising before
limitation expired it was not possible to file the
appeal within time. No event or circumstance
arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute
sufficient cause.”
(emphasis supplied)
This judgment squarely applies to the facts in hand.
x x x x
21. Shri Mohta, learned Senior Counsel relying on
the decision of this Court in N. Balakrishnan v. M.
Krishnamurthy [(1998) 7 SCC 123] submitted that length
of delay is no matter and acceptability of explanation is
the only criterion. It was submitted that if the explanation
offered does not smack of mala fides or it is not put
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 89
Union of India & Anr. v.
Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) Through His LR
forth as a part of dilatory tactics, the court must show
utmost consideration to the suitor. The very said
decision upon which reliance has been placed holds
that the law of limitation fixes a lifespan for every legal
remedy for the redress of the legal injury suffered.
Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to
unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The
law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. The
decision does not lay down that a lethargic litigant can
leisurely choose his own time in preferring appeal or
application as the case may be. On the other hand,
in the said judgment it is said that court should not
forget the opposite party altogether. It was observed:
(SCC p. 128, para 11)
“11. … It is enshrined in the maxim interest
reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is for the general
welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules
of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights
of the parties. They are meant to see that parties
do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their
remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal
remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively
fixed period of time.”
22. In Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. [AIR 1962 SC 361]
this Court held that: (AIR pp. 363-65)
“In construing Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
it is relevant to bear in mind two important
considerations. The first consideration is that
the expiration of period of limitation prescribed
for making an appeal gives rise to right in
favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree
as binding between the parties and this legal
right which has accrued to the decree-holder
by lapse of time should not be light-heartedly
disturbed. The other consideration which
cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause
of excusing delay is shown discretion is
given to the court to condone the delay and
admit the appeal. It is further necessary to
90 [2024] 4 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
emphasise that even if the sufficient cause
has been shown a party is not entitled to the
condonation of delay in question as a matter
of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a
condition precedent for the exercise of the
discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by
Section 5. This aspect of the matter naturally
introduces the consideration of all relevant
facts and it is at this stage the diligence
of the party or its bona fides may fall for
consideration.”
(emphasis supplied)
23. On the facts and in the circumstances, we are of
the opinion that the respondent beneficiary was not
diligent in availing the remedy of appeal. The averments
made in the application seeking condonation of delay in
filing appeals do not show any acceptable cause much
less sufficient cause to exercise courts’ discretion in its
favour.”
33. In the case of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of
Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Others, (2013) 12 SCC 649,
this Court made the following observations:
“21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can
broadly be culled out are:
21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justiceoriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an
application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not
supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove
injustice.
21.2. (ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood
in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being
had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and
are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining
fact-situation.
21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal
the technical considerations should not be given undue
and uncalled for emphasis.
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 91
Union of India & Anr. v.
Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) Through His LR
21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate
causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of
the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.
21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking
condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict
proof should not affect public justice and cause public
mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant
so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure
of justice.
21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to
encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it
cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.
21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay
and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former
doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it
may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants
strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal
delineation.
21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party
relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors
to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental
principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale
of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the
said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name
of liberal approach.
21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or
the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the
courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side
unnecessarily to face such a litigation.
21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away
with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking
recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation.
21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully
scrutinised and the approach should be based on the
paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective
92 [2024] 4 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
reasoning and not on individual perception.
21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity
representing a collective cause should be given some
acceptable latitude.
22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more
guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They
are:
22.1. (a) An application for condonation of delay should
be drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard
manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required
to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that
adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice
dispensation system.
22.2. (b) An application for condonation of delay should not
be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual
philosophy which is basically subjective.
22.3. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down
regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet
a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality
of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the
ultimate institutional motto.
22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a
non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity
can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be
curbed, of course, within legal parameters.”
34. In view of the aforesaid, we have reached to the conclusion that
the High Court committed no error much less any error of law
in passing the impugned order. Even otherwise, the High Court
was exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India.
35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been said that delay
should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial
justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants
have failed to prove that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting
the matter and this vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied
in this case.
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 93
Union of India & Anr. v.
Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) Through His LR
36. For all the foregoing reasons, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.
There shall be no order as to costs.
37. Pending application, if any, shall also stand disposed of accordingly.
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey Result of the case:
Appeal dismissed.
