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Friday, March 25, 2022

whether an establishment employing about 8000 workers, which has been set up pursuant to Consent to Establish (CTE) and Consent to Operate (CTO) from the concerned statutory authority and has applied for ex post facto EC can be closed down pending issuance of EC, even though it 1 may not cause pollution and/or may be found to comply with the required pollution norms.

 whether an establishment employing about 8000 workers, which has been set up pursuant to Consent to Establish (CTE) and Consent to Operate (CTO) from the concerned statutory authority and has applied for ex post facto EC can be closed down pending issuance of EC, even though it 1 may not cause pollution and/or may be found to comply with the required pollution norms.



REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4795 OF 2021

M/S PAHWA PLASTICS PVT. LTD. AND ANR. …... Appellants

Versus

DASTAK NGO AND ORS. ….. Respondents

J U D G M E N T

INDIRA BANERJEE, J.

This appeal under Section 22 of the National Green Tribunal Act,

2010, is against an order dated 3rd June 2021 passed by the Principal

Bench of the National Green Tribunal (NGT) in O.A No.287/2020 at New

Delhi, inter alia, holding that establishments such as the

manufacturing units of the Appellants, which did not have prior

Environmental Clearance (EC) could not be allowed to operate.

2. The question of law involved in this appeal is, whether an

establishment employing about 8000 workers, which has been set up

pursuant to Consent to Establish (CTE) and Consent to Operate (CTO)

from the concerned statutory authority and has applied for ex post

facto EC can be closed down pending issuance of EC, even though it

1

may not cause pollution and/or may be found to comply with the

required pollution norms.

3. With increasing industrialization and the establishment of

factories which emitted smoke and other pollutants, there was

worldwide concern for protection of environment. In June 1972, the

United Nations Conference on the Human Environment was held in

Stockholm, where decisions were taken to take appropriate steps for

preservation of the natural resources of the earth, which, among other

things, included preservation of the quality of air and water by

controlling pollution.

4. In 1974, Parliament enacted the Water (Prevention and Control of

Pollution) Act, 1974, with a view to prevent and control water pollution

and to maintain and restore wholesomeness of water.

5. In furtherance of the decisions taken at Stockholm, Parliament

enacted the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981,

hereinafter referred to as “the Air Pollution Act”, to provide for

prevention, control and abatement of air pollution.

6. The Air Pollution Act provides for the constitution of a Central

Pollution Control Board (CPCB) and State Pollution Control Boards

(SPCB) to deal with the problem of air pollution. Section 16 of the Air

Pollution Act enables the Central Pollution Control Board to take steps

to improve the quality of air and to prevent, control or abate air

pollution in the country. Section 17 of the Air Pollution Act enables the

State Pollution Control Boards to plan comprehensive programmes for

2

the prevention, control or abatement of air pollution, inter alia, by

laying down standards for emission of air pollutants.

7. Section 18 of the Air Pollution Act enables the Central

Government to give directions by which the CPCB is to be bound.

Similarly, every SPCB is to be bound by directions in writing as might

be given by the CPCB or the State Government.

8. Where a notification is issued under the Air Pollution Act, placing

an area within the control area of air pollution, permission is necessary

to set up and operate any factory or plant thereat. No person

operating any factory or plant in any air pollution control area is to

discharge or cause or permit to be discharged the emission of any air

pollutants, in excess of the standards laid down by the SPCB under

Clause (g) of sub-Section (1) of Section 17.

9. The Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, hereinafter referred to

as “the EP Act” was also enacted pursuant to the decisions taken at

the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, held in

Stockholm in June, 1972. As per the Statement of Objects and Reasons

for enactment of the EP Act, the said Act has been prompted by

concern over the environment, that has grown all over the world since

the 60s.

10. Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the EP Act empowers the Central

Government to take all such measures as it might deem necessary or

expedient for the purpose of protecting and improving the quality of

3

the environment and preventing, controlling and reducing

environmental pollution.

11. Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the EP Act enables the Central

Government to take, inter alia, the following measures:

“(i) co-ordination of actions by the State Governments, officers and

other authorities—

(a) under this Act, or the rules made thereunder; or

(b) under any other law for the time being in force which is relatable

to the objects of this Act;

(ii) planning and execution of a nation-wide programme for the

prevention, control and abatement of environmental pollution;

(iii) laying down standards for the quality of environment in its

various aspects;

(iv) laying down standards for emission or discharge of

environmental pollutants from various sources whatsoever:

Provided that different standards for emission or discharge may be

laid down under this clause from different sources having regard to

the quality or composition of the emission or discharge of

environmental pollutants from such sources;

(v) restriction of areas in which any industries, operations or

processes or class of industries, operations or processes shall not be

carried out or shall be carried out subject to certain safeguards;

(vi) laying down procedures and safeguards for the prevention of

accidents which may cause environmental pollution and remedial

measures for such accidents;

(vii) laying down procedures and safeguards for the handling of

hazardous substances;

(viii) examination of such manufacturing processes, materials and

substances as are likely to cause environmental pollution;

(ix) carrying out and sponsoring investigations and research relating

to problems of environmental pollution;

(x) inspection of any premises, plant, equipment, machinery,

manufacturing or other processes, materials or substances and

giving, by order, of such directions to such authorities, officers or

4

persons as it may consider necessary to take steps for the

prevention, control and abatement of environmental pollution;

(xi) establishment or recognition of environmental laboratories and

institutes to carry out the functions entrusted to such environmental

laboratories and institutes under this Act;

(xii) collection and dissemination of information in respect of

matters relating to environmental pollution;

(xiii) preparation of manuals, codes or guides relating to the

prevention, control and abatement of environmental pollution;

(xiv) such other matters as the Central Government deems

necessary or expedient for the purpose of securing the effective

implementation of the provisions of this Act.”

12. Sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the EP Act provides as follows:

“3. Power of Central Government to take measures to protect and

improve environment.—

...

(3) The Central Government may, if it considers it necessary or

expedient so to do for the purposes of this Act, by order,

published in the Official Gazette, constitute an authority or

authorities by such name or names as may be specified in the

order for the purpose of exercising and performing such of the

powers and functions (including the power to issue directions

under Section 5) of the Central Government under this Act and

for taking measures with respect to such of the matters

referred to in sub-section (2) as may be mentioned in the order

and subject to the supervision and control of the Central

Government and the provisions of such order, such authority or

authorities may exercise the powers or perform the functions or

take the measures so mentioned in the order as if such

authority or authorities had been empowered by this Act to

exercise those powers or perform those functions or take such

measures.”

13. Subject to the provisions of the EP Act, the Central Government

has power under sub-Section (1) of Section 3, to take all such

measures, as it deems necessary or expedient, for the purpose of

5

protecting and improving the quality of environment and preventing,

controlling or reducing environmental pollution.

14. Section 5 of the EP Act provides that notwithstanding anything

contained in any other law, but subject to the provisions of the EP Act,

the Central Government may, in exercise of its powers and

performance of its functions under the EP Act, issue directions in

writing to any person, officer or any authority and such person, officer

or authority shall be bound to comply with such directions.

15. In exercise of powers conferred by Sections 6 and 25 of the EP

Act, the Central Government has made the Environment (Protection)

Rules, 1986, hereinafter referred to as “the EP Rules”.

16. The Central Government issued an Environmental Impact

Assessment Notification dated 27th January 1994 in exercise of powers

conferred by sub-section (1) and clause (v) of sub-section (2) of

Section 3 of the EP Act read with clause (d) of sub-rule (3) of Rule 5 of

the EP Rules, directing that on and from the date of publication of the

said notification in the Official Gazette, expansion or modernization of

any activity or a new project listed in Schedule I to the said notification

shall not be undertaken in any part of India, unless it has been

accorded EC by the Central Government in accordance with the

procedures specified in the said notification.

17. In exercise of powers conferred by sub-section (1) and clause (v)

of sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the EP Act read with clause (d) of subrule (3) of Rule 5 of the EP Rules and in supersession of notification

6

number S.O. 60 (E) dated 27th January 1994, except in respect of things

done or omitted to be done before such supersession, the Central

Government issued a notification dated 14th September 2006, being

Notification S.O. 1533 (E) requiring prior environmental clearance from

the Central Government or as the case may be, by the State-Level

Environment Assessment Authority, duly constituted by the Central

Government under sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the EP Act.

18. In terms of the said notification dated 14th September 2006, the

process of environmental clearance for new projects was to comprise

of a maximum of four stages, all of which might not apply to particular

cases. The stages were (1) Screening, (2) Scoping, (3) Public

Consultation and (4) Appraisal.

19. In the meanwhile, by a notification being S.O. 327 (E) dated 10th

April 2001, published in the Gazette of India on 12th April 2001, the

Central Government has delegated the powers vested in it under the

EP Act, to the Chairpersons of the respective State Pollution Control

Boards/Committees to issue directions to any industry or any local or

other authority to prevent violation of the Rules.

20. The Appellants carry on business, inter alia, of manufacture and

sale of basic organic chemicals, namely, Formaldehyde. The Appellant

No.1, M/s Pahwa Plastics Private Limited has two manufacturing units,

one at village Kharawar in Rohtak, hereinafter referred to as the

“Rohtak Unit” and the other at village Jathlana, Jagadhri in Yamuna

Nagar in Haryana, hereinafter referred to as the “Yamuna Nagar Unit”.

7

The Appellant No.2 has a manufacturing unit at village Ghespur in

Yamuna Nagar, Haryana which is hereinafter referred to as the

“Yamuna Nagar Unit”. The manufacturing units established, run and

operated by the respective Appellants fall in the category of Micro,

Small and Medium Enterprise (MSME) as defined under the Micro,

Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006, hereinafter

referred to as “the MSME Act”.

21. On or about 31st March 2014, the Appellant No.1, M/s Pahwa

Plastics Ltd. applied for Consent to Establish (CTE) its Yamuna Nagar

unit for manufacture of Formaldehyde.

22. By a communication No. HSPCB/Consent/:2846616YAMCTE

3087415 dated 2nd June 2016, the Haryana State Pollution Control

Board (HSPCB) granted Consent to Establish (CTE) to the Appellant

No.1 M/s Pahwa Plastics Private Limited in respect of its Yamuna Nagar

Unit. The CTE was to remain valid for 60 months from the date of its

issue, to be extended for another year at the discretion of the Board or

till the time the unit started its trial production, whichever was earlier.

23. Some of the terms and conditions on which CTE was granted are

set out hereinbelow:-

“3. The officer/official of the Board shall have the right to access and

inspection of the industry in connection with the various processes

and the treatment facilities being provided simultaneously with the

construction of building/machinery. The effluent should conform the

effluent standards as applicable.

4. That necessary arrangement shall be made by the industry for

the control of Air Pollution before commissioning the plant. The

8

emitted pollutants will meet the emission and other standards as

laid/will be prescribed by the Board from time to time.

5. The applicant will obtain consent under section 25/26 of the Water

(Prevention & Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 and under section

21/22 of the Air (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 as

amended to-date-even before starting trial production.

6. The above Consent to Establish is further subject to the conditions

that the unit complies with all the laws/rules/decisions and

competent directions of the Board/Government and its functionaries

in all respect before commissioning of the operation and during its

actual working strictly.

***

8. The Electricity Department will give only temporary connection

and permanent connection to the unit will be given after verifying

the consent granted by the Board, both under Water Act and Air Act.

***

12. That there is no discharge directly or indirectly from the unit or

the process into any interstate river or Yamuna River or River

Ghaggar.

13. That the industry or the unit concerned is not sited within any

prohibited distances according to the Environmental Laws and Rules,

Notification, Orders and Policies of Central Pollution Control Board

and Haryana State Pollution Control Board.

***

17. In case of change of name from previous Consent to Establish

granted, fresh Consent to Establish fee shall be levied.

18. Industry should adopt water conservation measures to ensure

minimum consumption of water in their Process. Ground water

based proposals of new industries should get clearance from Central

Ground Water Authority for scientific development of previous

resources.

19. That the unit will take all other clearances from concerned

agencies, whenever required.

20. That the unit will not change its process without the prior

permission of the Board.

21. That the Consent to Establish so granted will be invalid, if the

unit falls in Aravali Area or non conforming area.

22. That the unit will comply with the Hazardous Waste Management

Rules and will also make the non-leachate pit for storage of

Hazardous waste and will undertake not to dispose off the same

except for pit in their own premises or with the authorized disposal

authority.

23. That the unit will submit an undertaking that it will comply with

all the specific and general conditions as imposed in the above

9

Consent to Establish within 30 days failing which Consent to

Establish will be revoked.”

24. By another communication No.HSPCB/Consent/:

2846618YAMCTO3098246 dated 26th March 2018, HSPCB granted

consent to the Appellant No.1 to operate its Yamuna Nagar Unit from

8

th February 2018 to 31st March 2022.

25. By an order No.HSPCB/YMN/2242, dated 31st March 2010, the

Appellant No.2, M/s Apcolite Polymer Private Limited was granted CTE

to establish its Yamuna Nagar Unit for manufacture of Formaldehyde

with the manufacturing capacity of 80 tonnes per day.

26. By another communication Nos. HSPCB/Consent/:

HSPCB/YMN/DLC/2011/4027 & HSPCB/YMN/DLC/2011/4029 dated 16th

January 2012, HSPCB granted the Appellant No.2, M/s Apcolite

Polymers Private Limited, Consent to Operate (CTO) its Yamuna Nagar

Unit. The CTO has been extended from 1st April 2016 till 31st March

2026, by a letter dated 13th March 2016. The CTO is valid till March

2026.

27. By a communication No. HSPCB/Consent/: 2846616YAMCT

OHWM2630357 dated 13th March 2016, HSPCB granted consent for

emission of AIR to Appellant No.2, M/s Apcolite Polymers Private

Limited in respect of its Yamuna Nagar Unit on, inter alia, the terms

and conditions specified in the said letter, some of which are extracted

hereinbelow:-

10

“10. The air pollution control equipment of such specification which

shall keep the emissions within the emission standard as approved

by the State Board from time to time shall be installed and operated

in the premises where the industry is carrying on/proposed to carry

on its business.

11. The existing air pollution control equipment if required shall be

alerted or replaced in accordance with the direction on the Board.

12. All solid wastes arising in the factory premises shall be properly

graded and disposed of by:-

(i) In case of Land fill material, care should be taken to ensure that

the material does not give rise to leachate which may percolate in

ground water of carried away with storm run off.

(ii) Composting in case of bio degradable materials.

(iii) If the method of incineration is used for the disposal of solid

waste the consent application should be processed separately and it

should be taken up which consent is granted.

13. The industry shall submit an undertaking to the effect that the

above conditions shall be complied with by them.

14. The applicant shall submit its undertaking to the effect that the

above conditions shall be complied with by them.

15. The applicant shall make an application for grant of fresh

consent at least 90 days before the date of expiry of this consent.

***

18. There should not be any fugitive emission from the premises.

19. The liquid effluent arising out of the operation of the air pollution

control equipment shall also be treated in a manner and to the

standards stipulated in the consent granted under Water (Prevention

& Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 by this Board.

 ***

21. If the industry fails to adhere to any of the condition of this

consent order the consent so granted shall automatically lapse.


***

33. The industry shall submit Environment Audit report once in a

year.

 ***

38. In case of by passing the emissions, the consent shall be

deemed revoked.”

11

28. It is the case of the Appellants that at the time when CTE was

granted to the Appellants, it was thought that EC was not required for

units which manufactured Formaldehyde. Even HSPCB itself was not

sure of whether EC was required for such units.

29. Mr. Gupta argued that the Appellants were bona fide under the

impression that the Appellants were not required to obtain prior EC for

setting up this establishment to manufacture Formaldehyde. On the

basis of CTE granted by HSPCB, the Appellants set up their units taking

huge loans from banks for which repayments have to be paid in

installments.

30. In exercise of power under Section 3(1) and Section 3(2)(v) of

the EP Act read with Rule 5(3)(d) of the EP Rules, the Central

Government issued a notification being S.O. 804(E) dated 14th March

2017 which provides for grant of ex post facto EC for project

proponents who had commenced, continued or completed a project

without obtaining EC under the EP Act/ EP Rules or the Environmental

Impact Notification issued thereunder. Paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of the

said notification, read as hereunder:

“(3) In cases of violation, action will be taken against the project

proponent by the respective State or State Pollution Control Board

under the provisions of section 19 of the Environment (Protection) Act,

1986 and further, no consent to operate or occupancy certificate will

be issued till the project is granted the environmental clearance.

(4) The cases of violation will be appraised by respective sector

Expert Appraisal Committees constituted under sub-section (3) of

Section 3 of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 with a view to

assess that the project has been constructed at a site which under

12

prevailing laws is permissible and expansion has been done which

can be run sustainably under compliance of environmental norms

with adequate environmental safeguards; and in case, where the

finding of the Expert Appraisal Committee is negative, closure of the

project will be recommended along with other actions under the law.

(5) In case, where the findings of the Expert Appraisal Committee on

point at sub-para(4) above are affirmative, the projects under this

category will be prescribed the appropriate Terms of Reference for

undertaking Environment Impact Assessment and preparation of

Environment Management Plan. Further, the Expert Appraisal

Committee will prescribe a specific Terms of Reference for the

project on assessment of ecological damage, remediation plan and

natural and community resource augmentation plan and it shall be

prepared as an independent chapter in the environment impact

assessment report by the accredited consultants. The collection and

analysis of data for assessment of ecological damage, preparation of

remediation plan and natural and community resource

augmentation plan shall be done by an environmental laboratory

duly notified under Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, or a

environmental laboratory accredited by National Accreditation Board

for Testing and Calibration Laboratories, or a laboratory of a Council

of Scientific and Industrial Research institution working in the field of

environment.”

31. The Notification of 2017 is a valid statutory notification issued by

the Central Government in exercise of power under Sections 3(1) and

3(2)(v) of the EP Act read with Rule 5(3)(d) of the EP Rules in the same

manner as the EIA Notification dated 27th January 1994 and the

Notification dated 14th September 2006.

32. Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 provides that where

any Central Act or Regulations confer a power to issue notifications,

orders, rules or bye-laws, that power includes the power, exercisable in

13

like manner, and subject to like sanction and conditions, if any, to add

to, amend, vary or rescind any notification, order, rule or bye-law so

issued. The authority, which had the power to issue Notifications

dated 27th January 1994 and 14th September 2006 undoubtedly had,

and still has the power to rescind or modify or amend those

notifications in like manner. As held by this Court in Shree Sidhbali

Steels Ltd. & Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others

1

, power

under Section 21 to amend, vary or rescind notifications, orders, rules

or bye-laws can be exercised from time to time having regard to the

exigency.

33. Puducherry Environment Protection Association filed a Writ

Petition being W.P. No.11189 of 2017 in the High Court of Madras

assailing the said notification dated 14th March 2017. By a judgment

and order dated 13th October 2017, a Division Bench of the High Court

refused to interfere with the said notification, holding that the

impugned notification did not compromise with the need to preserve

environmental purity.

34. The Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEF

&CC) issued a draft notification dated 23rd March 2020 which was duly

published in the Gazette of India Extraordinary Part II. The Notification

was proposed to be issued in exercise of powers conferred by subsection (1) and clause (v) of sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the EP Act

for dealing with cases of violation of the notification with regard to EC.

1 (2011) 3 SCC 193

14

It was proposed that cases of violation would be appraised by the

Appraisal Committee with a view to assess whether the project had

been constructed or operated at a site which was permissible under

prevailing laws and could be run sustainably on compliance of

environmental norms with adequate environmental safeguards.

Closure was to be recommended if the findings of the Appraisal

Committee were in the negative. If the Appraisal Committee found

that such unit had been running sustainably upon compliance of

environmental norms with adequate environment safeguards, the unit

would be prescribed appropriate Terms of Reference (TOR) after which

the procedure for grant of EC would follow.

35. On 10th November 2020, the Department of Environment and

Climate Change of the Government of Haryana issued an order which

is extracted hereinbelow for convenience:

“Whereas the process of manufacturing of Formaldehyde is covered

under the provisions of 5(f) of Schedule of Environment Impact

Assessment Notification (EIA), 2006 of Government of India, and

requires the prior Environmental Clearance (EC) from the competent

authority State Environment Impact Assessment Authority

(SEIAA)/Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change,

Government of India, before establishment and operation of such

units, besides other mandatory clearance, as applicable;

Whereas, it has come to the notice of Government that around

15 such units have been permitted to establish/operate in the State

of Haryana, without obtaining the necessary Prior Environmental

Clearances, but with the Consent of the Haryana State Pollution

Control Bureau (HSPCB), which misinterpreted the category of such

units and on realising the requirement of EC in these cases, has

revoked its consents issued earlier to these units recently;

Whereas, some of these units approached the Government

explaining their hardship due to such sudden revocation of their

consents and have sought time for obtaining the necessary EC from

the competent authority as the process is likely to take a minimum

of 6 months to one year period, and to allow them to operate with

15

all pollution control measures, following the pollution control norms

applicable, and,

Whereas, the Government has carefully considered their

request and the competent authority has decided that these units

shall be allowed to continue their operations for a period of six

months, without prejudice to any legal action taken against the

violations committed by them, by the competent authorities, with

the conditions that they will immediately apply for Environmental

Clearance from the competent authority and provide the proof of

such application within 60 days from the issuance of this

communication to Environment and Climate Change Department

and to Haryana State Pollution Control Board.

Therefore, it is ordered accordingly.”

36. Referring to the Counter Affidavit filed by HSPCB before the NGT,

Mr. Gupta pointed out that, since HSPCB itself was under the

misconception that prior EC was not necessary for units such as the

Yamunanagar units of the Appellants Nos. 1 and 2 respectively.

HSPCB took a policy decision to allow the units which did not have

prior EC to operate for six months, on condition that they would apply

for EC within sixty days.

37. The Appellants duly applied for EC in respect of their

manufacturing units. After scrutinizing their applications and after

finding the units suitable for grant of EC in terms of the prevailing

guidelines, the Expert Appraisal Committee constituted by the

MoEF&CC conducted a public hearing to finalize the cases of the

Appellants for issuance of Terms of Reference (TOR).

38. By an Office Memorandum, being F.No. 22-21/2020-1A III, dated

7

th July 2021, the MoEF&CC issued Standard Operating Procedure (SOP)

for identification and handling of violation cases under EIA Notification

2006.

16

39. The said Office Memorandum, inter alia, reads:

“The Ministry had issued a notification number S.O.804(E), dated

the 14

th

 March, 2017 detailing the process for grant of Terms of

Reference and Environmental Clearance in respect of projects or

activities which have started the work on site and/or expanded the

production beyond the limit of Prior EC or changed the product mix

without obtaining Prior EC under the EIA Notification, 2006.

2. This Notification was applicable for six months from the date of

publication i.e. 14.03.2017 to 13.09.2017 and further based on court

direction from 14.03.2018 to 13.04.2018.

3. Hon’ble NGT in Original Application No.287 of 2020 in the matter

of Dastak N.G.O. Vs Synochem Organics Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. and in

applications pertaining to same subject matter in Original

Application No. 298 of 2020 in Vineet Nagar vs. Central Ground

Water Authority & Ors., vide order dated 03.06.2021 held that “(...)

for past violations, the concerned authorities are free to take

appropriate action in accordance with polluter pays principle,

following due process”.

4. Further, the Hon’ble National Green Tribunal in O.A. No. 34/2020

WZ in the matter of Tanaji B. Gambhire vs. Chief Secretary,

Government of Maharashtra and Ors., vide order dated 24.05.2021

has directed that”.... a proper SoP be laid down for grant of EC

in such cases so as to address the gaps in binding law and

practice being currently followed. The MoEF may also

consider circulating such SoP to all SEIAAs in the country”.

5. Therefore, in compliance to the directions of the Hon’ble NGT a

Standard Operating Procedure (SoP) for dealing with violation cases

is required to be drawn. The Ministry is also seized of different

categories of ‘violation’ cases which have been pending for want of

an approved structural/procedural framework based on ‘Polluter

Pays Principle’ and ‘Principle of Proportionality’. It is undoubtedly

important that action under statutory provisions is taken against the

defaulters/violators and a decision on the closure of the project or

activity or otherwise is taken expeditiously.

6. In the light of the above directions of the Hon’ble Tribunal and the

issues involved, the matter has accordingly been examined in detail

in the Ministry. A detailed SoP has accordingly been framed and is

outlined herein. The SoP is also guided by the

observations/decisions of the Hon’ble Courts wherein principles of

proportionality and polluters pay have been outlined.”

40. The SOP formulated by the said Office Memorandum dated 7th

July 2021 refers to and gives effect to various judicial pronouncements

17

including the judgment of this Court in Alembic Pharmaceuticals

Ltd. v. Rohit Prajapati & Others

2

.

41. In terms of the SOP, the proposal for grant of EC in cases of

violation are to be considered on merits, with prospective effect,

applying principles of proportionality and the principle that the polluter

pays and is liable for costs of remedial measures.

42. By an order dated 9th July 2021, the MoEF&CC confirmed the

minutes of an earlier meeting of the Expert Appraisal Committee and

recommended issuance of terms of reference to the Appellant No.1,

M/s Pahwa Plastics Private Limited for expansion of its Formaldehyde

Manufacturing unit from 60 TPD to 150 TPD.

43. In the meanwhile, on or about 26th November 2020, the

Respondent No.1, a Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) hereinafter

referred to as “Dastak” filed an application being O.A. No./287/2020

before the NGT praying that the order dated 10th November 2020

passed by the State of Haryana be quashed and units which were

operating without EC be closed. The NGT disposed of the said

application of Dastak by the impugned order dated 3rd June 2021.

44. A Public Interest Litigation being W.P. (MD) No. 11757 of 2021

(Fatima v. Union of India) was filed before the Madurai Bench of the

Madras High Court challenging the said Memorandum dated 7th July

2021. By an interim order dated 15th July 2021 a Division Bench of the

2 2020 SCC Online SC 347

18

Madras High Court admitted the Writ Petition and stayed the said

memorandum.

45. The Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court observed and held:-

“This writ petition has been filed as a public interest

litigation challenging the validity of the office memorandum

dated 07.07.2021, issued by the respondent.

2. We have heard Mr.A.Yogeshwaran, learned counsel

appearing for the writ petitioner and Mr.L.Victoria Gowri,

learned Assistant Solicitor General of India, accepts notice for

the respondent.

3. The impugned office memorandum is challenged as being

wholly without jurisdiction, contrary to the Environment Impact

Assessment Notification, 2006, ultra vires the powers of the

respondent under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 and

violative of the various principles enunciated by the Hon'ble

Supreme Court, while interpreting Article 21 and Article 48-A of

the Constitution of India.

4. Further, it is submitted that the impugned notification is in

gross violation of the undertaking given before the Hon'ble Full

Bench of this Court in W.P.No.11189 of 2017, wherein, the Court

took note of the submissions made on behalf of the

Government of India, that the notification impugned therein is

only a one-time measure. Further, it is submitted that the

respondent failed to see that concept of ex-post facto approval

is alien to environment jurisprudence and it is anathema to the

Environment Impact Assessment Notification, 2006.

5. Further, it is submitted that the impugned notification is in

gross violation of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

the case of Alembic Pharmaceuticals Ltd. vs Rohit

Prajapati, 2020 SCC Online SC 347 and the orders passed by

the National Green Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi, in the

case of S.P.Muthuraman vs. Union of India & Another,

2015 SCC Online NGT 169.

6 .Identical grounds were considered by us in a challenge to an

office memorandum dated 19.02.2021, which provided a

procedure for granting post facto clearance under Coastal

Regulation Zone (CRZ) Notification 2011, on the ground that

despite no such provisions in the notification and being

contrary to the earlier judgments and undertaking. The said

writ petition in W.P(MD).No.8866 of 2021 was admitted and by

order dated 30.04.2021, the said office memorandum dated

19.02.2021 has been stayed.

7. The core issue in this writ petition is whether the

Government of India could have issued the office memorandum

and brought about the Standard Operating Procedure for

dealing with violators, who failed to comply with the mandatory

19

condition of obtaining prior environment clearance under the

Environment Impact Assessment Notification 2006, read with

the provisions of Environment (Protection) Act, 1986. This issue

was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Alembic

Pharmaceuticals Ltd (cited supra), and it was held that such

office memorandum in the nature of circular is without

jurisdiction. The operative portion of the judgment reads as

follows:

"...What is sought to be achieved by the administrative circular

dated 14 May 2002 is contrary to the statutory notification

dated 27 January 1994. The circular dated 14 May 2002 does

not stipulate how the detrimental effects on the environment

would be taken care of if the project proponent is granted an ex

post facto EC. The EIA notification of 1994 mandates a prior

environmental clearance. The circular substantially amends or

alters the application of the EIA notification of 1994. The

mandate of not commencing a new project or expanding or

modernising an existing one unless an environmental clearance

has been obtained stands diluted and is rendered ineffective by

the issuance of the administrative circular dated 14 May 2002.

This discussion leads us to the conclusion that the

administrative circular is not a measure protected by Section 3.

Hence there was no jurisdictional bar on the NGT to enquire

into its legitimacy or vires. Moreover, the administrative

circular is contrary to the EIA Notification 1994 which has a

statutory character. The circular is unsustainable in law."

8. Despite the above decision, once again the Government of

India, Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change have

chosen to adopt the route of issuing the office memorandum

and virtually setting at naught the provisions of the

Environment Impact Assessment Notification and the

Environment (Protection) Act.

9. Before the Hon'ble First Bench, a public interest litigation

was filed by the Puducherry Environment Protection

Association, challenging the notification dated 14.03.2017, on

identical grounds and the Hon'ble First Bench by judgment

dated 13.10.2017, recorded the submissions of the learned

Assistant Solicitor General of India that the said notification

was a one-time measure and accordingly, disposed of the writ

petition.

10. Once again, the Ministry of Environment, Forest and

Climate Change have issued the impugned office

memorandum. Thus, from what we have noted above, we are

of the clear view that the petitioner has made out a prima facie

case for entertaining the writ petition. Accordingly, the writ

petition is admitted and there shall be an order of interim

stay.”

20

46. It is true that in the case of Puducherry Environment

Protection Association v. Union of India

3

, the Division Bench of

Madras High Court took note of and recorded the submission made on

behalf of the Union of India that the relaxation was a one time

relaxation. In view of such submission, this Court held that a one time

relaxation was permissible.

47. It is, however, well settled that words and phrases and/or

sentences in a judgment cannot be read in the manner of a statute,

and that too out of context. The observation of the Division Bench that

a one time relaxation was permissible, is not to be construed as a

finding that relaxation cannot be made more than once. If power to

amend or modify or relax a notification and/or order exists, the

notification and/or order may be amended and/or modified as many

times, as may be necessary. A statement made by counsel in Court

would not prevent the authority concerned from making amendments

and/or modifications provided such amendments and/or modifications

were as per the procedure prescribed by law.

48. The Division Bench of Madras High Court fell in error in staying

the said office memorandum, by relying on observations made by this

Court in Alembic Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (supra), in the context of a

circular which was contrary to the statutory Environment Impact

Notification of 1994. The attention of the High Court was perhaps not

drawn to the fact that the notification of 7th July 2021 was in pursuance

of the statutory notification of 2017 which was valid. The judgment of

3 2017 SCC OnLine Mad 7056

21

this Court in Alembic Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (supra), was clearly

distinguishable and could have no application to the office

memorandum dated 7th July 2021 which was issued pursuant to the

notification dated 14th March 2017.

49. The Appellants have already applied for EC. The Expert

Appraisal Committee of the MoEF&CC has, after scrutinizing the

application of the Appellants and finding them eligible for grant of EC,

recommended their cases for grant of Terms of Reference (ToR). ToR

was granted to the Appellants and a public hearing had also been

conducted. Only last procedural step of issuance of EC is left.

50. It is claimed that the units of the Appellants are totally non-polluting

units having “Zero Trade discharge”. They have been in operation for

many years. In the reply affidavit filed by the State before the NGT, it was

mentioned that the units were operating in good faith with valid CTOs

granted by the HSPCB. It was stated that the units were not causing

pollution hazards. The only thing against the units was the procedural

lapse of not obtaining EC.

51. By a communication No. F. No. IA-J-110011/185/2020-IA-II(I) dated

20th July 2021 issued to the Appellant No.1, the MoEF&CC rejected the

proposal for terms of reference on the purported ground that the activity

of the Appellant No.1 was covered under category “A” of item 5(f)

“Synthetic Organic Chemicals” of the Schedule to the EIA Notification,

2006. A similar communication was issued in respect of M/s Apcolite

Polymers Pvt. Ltd. Significantly, by an order dated 9th July 2021, the

MoEF&CC had confirmed the minutes of an earlier meeting of the Expert

22

Appraisal Committee and recommended issuance of ToR to the Appellant

No.1, as observed above. The proposal for Terms of Reference has

obviously been rejected at the final stage after the public hearing, by

reason of the impugned order dated 3rd June 2021 passed by the NGT on

the application of Dastak, which is under appeal.

52. This appeal was listed for admission on 30th September 2021, along

with an application for interim relief being I.A. No.110064 of 2021 praying

for orders permitting the Appellants to operate their units during the

pendency of the appeal. The appeal was heard at length at the

admission stage and reserved for judgment along with the interim

application by an order dated 30th September 2021.

53. After receiving the communication dated 20th July 2021 rejecting the

proposal for Terms of Reference, the Appellants requested HSPCB to

forward to the Appellants the proceedings of public hearing in respect of

the manufacturing units of the Appellants. By a communication No.

HSPCB/YR/2021/2830 dated 15th February 2022, HSPCB forwarded

proceedings of the public hearing in respect of the Yamuna Nagar unit of

the Appellant No.1. By another Communication No.

HSPCB/YR/29021/2829 dated 15th February 2022 the HSPCB forwarded to

the Appellant No.2 the proceedings of the public hearing held on 3rd

February 2022 in connection with the Yamuna Nagar Unit of the Appellant

No.2.

54. The manufacturing units of the Appellants appoint about 8,000

employees and have a huge annual turnover. An establishment

contributing to the economy of the country and providing livelihood ought

23

not to be closed down only on the ground of the technical irregularity of

not obtaining prior Environmental Clearance irrespective of whether or not

the unit actually causes pollution.

55. In Electrosteel Steels Limited v. Union of India

4

, this Court

held:-

“82. The question is whether an establishment

contributing to the economy of the country and

providing livelihood to hundreds of people should be

closed down for the technical irregularity of shifting its

site without prior environmental clearance, without

opportunity to the establishment to regularize its

operation by obtaining the requisite clearances and

permissions, even though the establishment may not

otherwise be violating pollution laws, or the pollution, if

any, can conveniently and effectively be checked. The

answer has to be in the negative.

83. The Central Government is well within the scope of its

powers under Section 3 of the 1986 Act to issue directions to

control and/or prevent pollution including directions for prior

Environmental Clearance before a project is commenced. Such

prior Environmental Clearance is necessarily granted upon

examining the impact of the project on the environment. ExPost facto Environmental Clearance should not ordinarily be

granted, and certainly not for the asking. At the same time

ex post facto clearances and/or approvals and/or

removal of technical irregularities in terms of

Notifications under the 1986 Act cannot be declined

with pedantic rigidity, oblivious of the consequences of

stopping the operation of a running steel plant.

84. The 1986 Act does not prohibit ex post facto

Environmental Clearance. Some relaxations and even grant

of ex post facto EC in accordance with law, in strict compliance

with Rules, Regulations Notifications and/or applicable orders,

in appropriate cases, where the projects are in compliance

with, or can be made to comply with environment norms, is in

over view not impermissible. The Court cannot be oblivious to

the economy or the need to protect the livelihood of hundreds

of employees and others employed in the project and others

dependent on the project, if such projects comply with

environmental norms.

***

88. The Notification being SO 804(E) dated 14th March, 2017

was not an issue in Alembic Pharmaceuticals (supra). This

Court was examining the propriety and/or legality of a 2002

circular which was inconsistent with the EIA Notification dated

27th January, 1994, which was statutory. Ex post facto

4 2021 SCC online SC 1247

24

environmental clearance should not however be granted

routinely, but in exceptional circumstances taking into account

all relevant environmental factors. Where the adverse

consequences of ex post facto approval outweigh the

consequences of regularization of operation of an industry by

grant of ex post facto approval and the industry or

establishment concerned otherwise conforms to the requisite

pollution norms, ex post facto approval should be given in

accordance with law, in strict conformity with the applicable

Rules, Regulations and/or Notifications. Ex post facto

approval should not be withheld only as a penal

measure. The deviant industry may be penalised by an

imposition of heavy penalty on the principle of ‘polluter pays’

and the cost of restoration of environment may be recovered

from it.

***

96. The appeals are allowed. The impugned order is set aside.

The Respondent No. 1 shall take a decision on the

application of the Appellant for revised EC in

accordance with law, within three months from date.

Pending such decision, the operation of the steel plant

shall not be interfered with on the ground of want of EC,

FC, CTE or CTO.”

56. As held by this Court in Electrosteel Steels Limited (supra) ex

post facto Environmental Clearance should not ordinarily be granted,

and certainly not for the asking. At the same time ex post facto

clearances and/or approvals and/or removal of technical irregularities

in terms of a Notification under the EP Act cannot be declined with

pedantic rigidity, oblivious of the consequences of stopping the

operation of mines, running factories and plants.

57. The 1986 Act does not prohibit ex post facto Environmental

Clearance. Grant of ex post facto EC in accordance with law, in strict

compliance with Rules, Regulations, Notifications and/or applicable

orders, in appropriate cases, where the projects are in compliance

with, or can be made to comply with environment norms, is in our view

not impermissible. The Court cannot be oblivious to the economy or

25

the need to protect the livelihood of hundreds of employees and others

employed in the project and others dependent on the project, if such

projects comply with environmental norms.

58. As held by a three Judge Bench of this Court in Lafarge Umiam

Mining Private Limited v. Union of India

5

:-

“119. The time has come for us to apply the constitutional

“doctrine of proportionality” to the matters concerning

environment as a part of the process of judicial review in

contradistinction to merit review. It cannot be gainsaid that

utilization of the environment and its natural resources has to

be in a way that is consistent with principles of sustainable

development and intergenerational equity, but balancing of

these equities may entail policy choices. In the circumstances,

barring exceptions, decisions relating to utilisation of natural

resources have to be tested on the anvil of the well-recognized

principles of judicial review. Have all the relevant factors been

taken into account? Have any extraneous factors influenced

the decision? Is the decision strictly in accordance with the

legislative policy underlying the law (if any) that governs the

field? Is the decision consistent with the principles of

sustainable development in the sense that has the decisionmaker taken into account the said principle and, on the basis

of relevant considerations, arrived at a balanced decision?

Thus, the Court should review the decision-making process to

ensure that the decision of MoEF is fair and fully informed,

based on the correct principles, and free from any bias or

restraint. Once this is ensured, then the doctrine of “margin of

appreciation” in favour of the decision-maker would come into

play.”

59. In Alembic Pharmaceuticals Ltd.(supra), this Court observed:-

“27. The concept of an ex post facto EC is in derogation of the

fundamental principles of environmental jurisprudence and is

an anathema to the EIA notification dated 27 January 1994. It

is, as the judgment in Common Cause holds, detrimental to the

environment and could lead to irreparable degradation. The

reason why a retrospective EC or an ex post facto clearance is

alien to environmental jurisprudence is that before the issuance

of an EC, the statutory notification warrants a careful

application of mind, besides a study into the likely

consequences of a proposed activity on the environment. An

EC can be issued only after various stages of the decision5 (2011) 7 SCC 338

26

making process have been completed. Requirements such as

conducting a public hearing, screening, scoping and appraisal

are components of the decision-making process which ensure

that the likely impacts of the industrial activity or the

expansion of an existing industrial activity are considered in the

decision-making calculus. Allowing for an ex post facto

clearance would essentially condone the operation of industrial

activities without the grant of an EC. In the absence of an EC,

there would be no conditions that would safeguard the

environment. Moreover, if the EC was to be ultimately refused,

irreparable harm would have been caused to the environment.

In either view of the matter, environment law cannot

countenance the notion of an ex post facto clearance. This

would be contrary to both the precautionary principle as well as

the need for sustainable development.”

60. Even though this Court deprecated ex post facto clearances, in

Alembic Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (supra), this Court did not direct

closure of the units concerned but explored measures to control the

damage caused by the industrial units. This Court held:-

 “However, since the expansion has been undertaken and the

industry has been functioning, we do not deem it appropriate

to order closure of the entire plant as directed by the High

Court.”

61. The Notification being SO. 804(E) dated 14th March 2017 was not

in issue in Alembic Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (supra). In Alembic

Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (supra) this Court was examining the propriety

and/or legality of a 2002 circular which was inconsistent with the EIA

Notification dated 27th January 1994, which was statutory. The EIA

Notification dated 27th January 1994 has, as stated above, been

superseded by the Notification dated 14th September 2006.

62. There can be no doubt that the need to comply with the

requirement to obtain EC is non-negotiable. A unit can be set up or

allowed to expand subject to compliance of the requisite

27

environmental norms. EC is granted on condition of the suitability of

the site to set up the unit, from the environmental angle, and also

existence of necessary infrastructural facilities and equipment for

compliance of environmental norms. To protect future generations and

to ensure sustainable development, it is imperative that pollution laws

be strictly enforced. Under no circumstances can industries, which

pollute, be allowed to operate unchecked and degrade the

environment.

63. Ex post facto environmental clearance should not be granted

routinely, but in exceptional circumstances taking into account all

relevant environmental factors. Where the adverse consequences of

denial of ex post facto approval outweigh the consequences of

regularization of operations by grant of ex post facto approval, and the

establishment concerned otherwise conforms to the requisite pollution

norms, ex post facto approval should be given in accordance with law,

in strict conformity with the applicable Rules, Regulations and/or

Notifications. The deviant industry may be penalised by an imposition

of heavy penalty on the principle of ‘polluter pays’ and the cost of

restoration of environment may be recovered from it.

64. The question in this case is, whether a unit contributing to the

economy of the country and providing livelihood to hundreds of

people, which has been set up pursuant to requisite approvals from the

concerned statutory authorities, and has applied for ex post facto EC,

should be closed down for the technical irregularity of want of prior

28

environmental clearance, pending the issuance of EC, even though it

may not cause pollution and/or may be found to comply with the

required norms. The answer to the aforesaid question has to be in the

negative, more so when the HSPCB was itself under the misconception

that no environment clearance was required for the units in question.

HSPCB has in its counter affidavit before the NGT clearly stated that a

decision was taken to regularize units such as the Apcolite Yamuna

Nagar and Pahwa Yamuna Nagar Units, since requisite approvals had

been granted to those units, by the concerned authorities on the

misconception that no EC was required.

65. It is reiterated that the 1986 Act does not prohibit ex post facto

EC. Some relaxations and even grant of ex post facto EC in

accordance with law, in strict compliance with Rules, Regulations,

Notifications and/or applicable orders, in appropriate cases, where the

projects are in compliance with environment norms, is not

impermissible. As observed by this Court in Electrosteel Steels

Limited (supra), this Court cannot be oblivious to the economy or the

need to protect the livelihood of hundreds of employees and others

employed in the units and dependent on the units in their survival.

66. Ex post facto EC should not ordinarily be granted, and certainly

not for the asking. At the same time ex post facto clearances and/or

approvals cannot be declined with pedantic rigidity, regardless of the

consequences of stopping the operations. This Court is of the view

29

that the NGT erred in law in directing that the units cannot be allowed

to function till compliance of the statutory mandate.

67. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order is set

aside in so far as the same is applicable to the units of the Appellants

established and operated pursuant to CTE and CTO from the HSPCB in

respect of which applications for ex post facto EC have been filed.

The Respondent shall take a decision on the applications of the

Appellants for EC in accordance with law within one month from date.

Pending decision, the operation of the Pahwa Yamuna Nagar Unit and

the Apcolite Yamuna Nagar Unit, in respect of which consents have

been granted and even public hearing held in connection with grant of

EC, shall not be interfered with.

68. The Appellants will be allowed to operate the units. Electricity, if

disconnected, shall be restored subject to payment of charges, if any. If

the application for EC is rejected on the ground of any contravention

on the part of the Appellants, it will be open to the Respondents to

disconnect the supply of electricity.

69. The Union of India had proceeded with the application for EC and

even public hearing had been held. Counsel appearing on behalf of

the Union of India contended that the Appellant had not submitted its

final application for EC, after public hearing. It is not clear what more

was required of the Appellants. Be that as it may, the Union of India

shall, within three working days from the date of receipt of a copy of

this judgment and order, inform the Appellants in writing of whether

30

anything further is required to be done by the Appellants, and if so

what is required to be done. The Appellants shall, within a week

thereafter do the needful. The final decision on the application of the

Appellants for EC shall be taken within three weeks thereafter.

70. The application being I.A. No.110064/2021 and other pending

applications, if any, in this appeal are disposed of accordingly.


 …..............................J.

 [INDIRA BANERJEE]

 ................................J.

 [J.K. MAHESHWARI]

NEW DELHI

MARCH 25, 2022

31

corporate laws - Unfair Trade Practice - . The attention of the share market regulator, SEBI, was drawn to the unusual price movement of the scrip of the Company between January 2005 to September 2005. The Company's shares traded between Rs. 4.25/- to Rs. 43.85/-. This upward spurt resulted in an increase in the average monthly volume of shares to 1,56,22,583 shares.- After hearing the objections, the interim orders were confirmed, and a show-cause notice for violation of Regulations 3(a), (b), (c)&(d) and 4(1), 4(2)(k) & 4(2)(r) of the SEBI (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices Relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 20034 was issued on 10.10.2007.

 corporate laws - Unfair Trade Practice  - . The attention of the share market regulator, SEBI, was drawn to the unusual price movement of the scrip of the Company between January 2005 to September 2005. The Company's shares traded between Rs. 4.25/- to Rs. 43.85/-. This upward spurt resulted in an increase in the average monthly volume of shares to 1,56,22,583 shares.-  After hearing the objections, the interim orders were confirmed, and a show-cause notice for violation of Regulations 3(a), (b), (c)&(d) and 4(1), 4(2)(k) & 4(2)(r) of the SEBI (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices Relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 20034 was issued on 10.10.2007.

Held that  we have noticed that the Tribunal has arrived at its conclusions based on independent facts concerning

(a) the allegations under Regulation 4 relating to the issuance of misleading

advertisements dated 07.04.2005 and 20.04.2005 as well as 

(b) allegations relating to manipulation of scrip prices and profits to lure investors. As

indicated earlier, the Tribunal concluded that the allegations could be proved.

-------------------

(i) The appellant has a right to disclosure of the material relevant to the proceedings initiated against him. A deviation from the general rule of disclosure of relevant information was made in Natwar Singh (supra) based on the stage of the proceedings. It is sufficient to disclose the materials relied on if it is for the purpose of issuing a show cause notice for deciding whether to initiate an inquiry. However, all information that is relevant to the proceedings must be disclosed in adjudication proceedings; (ii) The Board under Regulation 10 considers the investigation report submitted by the Investigating Authority under Regulation 9, and if it is satisfied with the allegations, it could issue punitive measures under Regulations 11 and 12. Therefore, the investigation report is not merely an internal document. In any event, the language of Regulation 10 makes it clear that the Board forms an opinion regarding the violation of Regulations after considering the investigation report prepared under Regulation 9; (iii) The disclosure of material serves a three-fold purpose of decreasing the error in the verdict, protecting the fairness of the proceedings, and enhancing the transparency of the investigatory bodies and judicial institutions; (iv) A focus on the institutional impact of suppression of material prioritises the process as opposed to the outcome. The direction of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Karunakar (supra) that the non-disclosure of relevant information would render the order of punishment void only if the aggrieved person is able to prove that prejudice has been caused to him due to non-disclosure is founded both on the outcome and the process; (v) The right to disclosure is not absolute. The disclosure of information may affect other third-party interests and the stability and orderly functioning of the securities market. The Page 23 of 24 respondent should prima facie establish that the disclosure of the report would affect third-party rights and the stability and orderly functioning of the securities market. The onus then shifts to the appellant to prove that the information is necessary to defend his case appropriately; and (vi) Where some portions of the enquiry report involve information on third-parties or confidential information on the securities market, the respondent cannot for that reason assert a privilege against disclosing any part of the report. The respondents can withhold disclosure of those sections of the report which deal with third-party personal information and strategic information bearing upon the stable and orderly functioning of the securities market.” 35. As per the principles laid down in the above referred case, there is a right of disclosure of the relevant material. However, such a right is not absolute and is subject to other considerations as indicated under paragraph 62(v) of the judgment above referred. In this judgment, there is no specific discussion on the issue of a right to cross-examination but the broad principles laid down therein are sufficient guidance for the Tribunal to follow. There is no need for us to elaborate on this point any further.

Page 1 of 24

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2104 of 2009

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE BOARD OF INDIA ....APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

MEGA CORPORATION LIMITED .…RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.

1. This is a statutory appeal under Section 15Z of the Securities and

Exchange Board of India Act, 19921

against the final order of the Securities

Appellate Tribunal2

, by which the Tribunal has set aside the order passed by

the Securities and Exchange Board of India3

restricting the respondentcompany from accessing the capital market for one year and further restraining

the promoter directors from buying, selling or otherwise dealing with securities

for India. While dismissing the appeal, we have explained that the jurisdiction

of the Supreme Court under Section 15Z is confined to question of law.

1 hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’.

2 hereinafter referred to as the ‘Tribunal’.

3 hereinafter referred to as ‘SEBI’ or ‘the Board’.

Page 2 of 24

2. M/s Mega Corporation Limited, listed in the Bombay Stock Exchange in

1996, is engaged in the business of radio taxi service, coupled with trading of

shares in a small measure till 2004. The attention of the share market regulator,

SEBI, was drawn to the unusual price movement of the scrip of the Company

between January 2005 to September 2005. The Company's shares traded

between Rs. 4.25/- to Rs. 43.85/-. This upward spurt resulted in an increase in

the average monthly volume of shares to 1,56,22,583 shares. Having observed

this activity, the SEBI directed investigation while passing an ex parte ad

interim order under Section 11B, 11(4) (b) and 11(D) of the Act against 56

entities, being the Company, its promoter-directors, some of its clients,

stockbrokers and depositors. After hearing the objections, the interim orders

were confirmed, and a show-cause notice for violation of Regulations 3(a), (b),

(c)&(d) and 4(1), 4(2)(k) & 4(2)(r) of the SEBI (Prohibition of Fraudulent and

Unfair Trade Practices Relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 20034 was

issued on 10.10.2007.

3. The show cause notice was premised on the information obtained after

investigation on the following:

3.1 The Company made huge profits from undeclared business and

sale of scrips and there is uncertainty about the source of income.

It is not known whether the Company had amended its

4 hereinafter referred to as ‘PFUTP Regulations’.

Page 3 of 24

Memorandum and Articles for undertaking the activity of trading.

The surge in the profits is unusual, and there is no reasonable

explanation for the same. This is violative of Regulation 3 of the

PFUTP Regulations.

3.2 Between April 2005 to September 2005, the Company and other

noticees issued public statements in the form of advertisements

and other notifications to lure the public in investing in the

Company. This activity was undertaken to create an artificial

demand knowing fully well that this is not the truth of the matter.

This is in violation of Regulation 4(2)(k) and 4(2)(r) of the PFUTP

Regulations.

3.3 The Company manipulated its profits by selling shares through

orchestrated deals which were detected in the investigation. The

manipulations led to an artificial increase of the scrip to a

phenomenal extent sub-serving the fraudulent intention of the

Company, and this is again violative of Regulation 3 of the PFUTP

Regulations.

4. The Company and other noticees filed their responses. After hearing all

parties, the SEBI passed the final order dated 28.02.2008 holding that the

Company has violated the provisions of the Act and the PFUTP Regulations.

In the exercise of its powers under Sections 11 and 11B read with Section 19

Page 4 of 24

of the Act and the PFUTP Regulations, SEBI restrained the Company from

accessing the capital market in any manner and its directors from dealing in

securities for one year. The operative portion of the order is as follows:

“4.1 Now, therefore, I in exercise of powers conferred

upon me under Section 11 and 11B read with Section 19 of

the SEBI Act, 1992 further read with PFUTP Regulations

2003, hereby restrain Mega Corporation Limited (PANAAC-CM-9506-E) from accessing the capital market in any

manner whatsoever for a of period of one year (1 year) and

Shri Kunal Lalani (PAN-AAG-OPL-0992-C), Shri Himanshu

Mehta (PAN-AAL-PM-5750-F) and Shri Surendra Chhalani

(PAN-ACI-PC2863-K) Directors of the company are hereby

restrained from buying, selling or otherwise dealing in

securities, in any manner, for a period of one year

(1 year).”

5. The Company filed an appeal under Section 15T of the Act being Appeal

No. 60 of 2008 before the Tribunal. The Tribunal re-examined the three

circumstances which became the basis of SEBI decision and finally allowed the

appeal, by its judgment dated 15.10.2008. The Tribunal held:

5.1 The unusual profits, if any, made during the year 2004-05 by itself

cannot constitute any transgression of law. The powers vested in

the Board are only to ensure that investors are not misled in

making investments based on fraud and allurement and that there

is nothing unusual about investors being attracted when the

Company comes with positive annual reports. The Tribunal held

that extraordinary profits in itself cannot be the basis for

Page 5 of 24

concluding that the Company's accounts are manipulated with a

specific objective to mislead the investors.

5.2 On the issue of public statements in the form of advertisements

and notifications dated 07.04.2005 and 20.04.2005, the Tribunal

concluded that there is nothing wrong in the advertisements issued

for entering into the business of foreign exchange with the launch

of ‘Mega Forex Brand’ and also the announcement relating to tour

services based on the agreement with Gems Tours and Travels

Private Limited. The Tribunal found that these announcements

were in the ordinary course of business, and there was sufficient

evidence to that effect. Having considered facts in detail, the

Tribunal reversed the findings of the SEBI.

5.3 Finally, the Tribunal also examined the allegation relating to

manipulation. It considered the findings of the SEBI that the

transactions were orchestrated through entities that had links with

the Company. On reappreciation the Tribunal found that the

alleged links were not established and that the Board had

unnecessarily read into certain activities, a meaning which could

not be inferred in the ordinary course of events.

It is in this context that the Tribunal proceeded to accept the

submission made on behalf of the Company that the Board could

Page 6 of 24

not have relied on the letter of the stockbroker contradicting the

stand taken by it without giving an opportunity of crossexamination. Because such an opportunity was not granted, the

Tribunal held that the principles of natural justice stood violated.

6. The present appeal under Section 15Z of the Act is against this judgment

of the Tribunal. We heard Shri C.U. Singh, Senior Advocate, assisted by Shri

Pratap Venugopal for SEBI and Shri Vaibhav Gaggar, appearing on behalf of

the Company.

7. On behalf of the Board, Shri C.U. Singh, Senior Advocate, submitted

that:

7.1 The Tribunal examined the order passed by SEBI in a disjointed

manner by taking each incident as a standalone event and gave its

finding as if they were separate events. In its approach to examine

the events as independent episodes, the Tribunal misled itself in

coming to the wrong conclusions. Shri Singh took us through the

orders passed by SEBI and the final judgment of the Tribunal and

submitted that the findings of SEBI are correct and that the

Tribunal is wrong in each of its conclusions. He also submitted

that the events depicting manipulation are correctly identified, and

they are based on the evidence available on record and, therefore,

Page 7 of 24

the Tribunal was not justified in interfering with findings of

manipulation.

7.2 Disapproving the principle adopted by the Tribunal about the right

of cross-examination, he submitted that such an approach would

virtually disable SEBI from performing its functions. Reliance was

placed on the judgments of this Court in K.L Tripathi5

, Tara

Chand Vyas6

and Jah Developers7

.

8. Shri Vaibhav Gaggar, in his reply, submitted that:

8.1 The appeal has to be dismissed as there is no question of law

involved in the case.

8.2 The approach adopted by SEBI in focusing on the sudden spurt in

profit of the Company, is itself, is wrong approach. He sought to

demonstrate that there is no unusual income in the profit of the

Company.

8.3 On the issuance of advertisements, Shri Gaggar showed us the

factual background leading to the advertisements and stated that

there is no indication of any intention to mislead the public or lure

the investors on the statements made therein. He submitted that the

findings of the Tribunal that the advertisements were not in

5 K.L. Tripathi v. State Bank of India and Ors. (1984) 1 SCC 43.

6 Tara Chand Vyas v. Chairman & Disciplinary Authority and Ors. (1997) 4 SCC 565.

7 State Bank of India v. Jah Developers Private Limited and Ors. (2019) 6 SCC 787.

Page 8 of 24

violation of the Regulations are based on the correct facts as

evidenced by the material placed before the Board. Reliance was

placed on the judgment of the Tribunal in M/s Vijay Textile.8

8.4 Shri Gaggar submitted that the conclusions drawn by the Board on

the assumption that the sales were orchestrated through artificial

purchase and sale are incorrect. He endeavoured to establish that

the assumed link between the parties is non-existent and only

imaginary. Reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in

Rakhi Trading9

and Kishore Ajmera10

.

8.5 A final submission was made on the ground that principles of

natural justice would be violated if an opportunity to crossexamine is not granted in a case where a material adverse to the

party is taken cognisance by SEBI. In support of this, decisions of

this Court in the judgments in Meenglas11

, Bareilly

Electricity12and Swadeshi Cotton Mills13 were relied on.

9. In his rejoinder, Shri Singh has distinguished the cases cited by

Shri Gaggar and referred to precedents to establish that there is no right to

8 M/s Vijay Textile v. Securities and Exchange Board of India (2011) SCC Online SAT 50.

9 Securities and Exchange Board of India v. Rakhi Trading Private Limited (2018) 13 SCC 753.

10 Securities and Exchange Board of India v. Kishore R. Ajmera (2016) 6 SCC 368.

11 Meenglas Tea Estate v. Workmen (1964) 2 SCR 165.

12 Bareilly Electricity Supply Co. Ltd v. Workmen and Ors. (1971) 2 SCC 617.

13 Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India (1981) 1 SCC 664.

Page 9 of 24

cross-examination of a witness and the principles of natural justice would not

require granting a right of cross-examination. He reiterated that the functioning

of the SEBI will be hampered if this formality is to be followed in every case.

10. The following issues arise for consideration:

10.1 What is the scope and ambit of statutory appeal to the Supreme

Court under Section 15Z of the Act against an order passed by

the Securities Appellate Tribunal?

10.2 Whether the advertisements dated 07.04.2005 and 20.04.2005,

are in violation of Regulations 3 (a), (b), (c), (d) read with

Regulation 4 (1), (2) (k) and (r) as amounting to misleading and

defrauding the investors?

10.3 Whether the Company has violated Regulations 3(a), (b), (c) and

(d) and Regulation 4(1), 4(2)(k) and 4(2) (r) of the SEBI (PFUTP)

Regulations, 2003 by manipulating the share prices and

accounts?

10.4 Whether there is a right to cross-examine the author of a

document if SEBI seeks to rely on that document which is against

the interest of the company?

11. Before we consider the rival contentions based on the issues, as

formulated above, it is necessary to take note of certain statutory provisions.

Page 10 of 24

Section 11 of the Act enumerates the functions of the SEBI and empowers it to

take measures for protecting the interests of investors in securities.

Section 11B empowers SEBI to issue necessary directions. In exercise of its

powers under Section 30 the SEBI made the PFUTP Regulations, of which, we

are concerned with Regulations 3(a), (b), (c), (d) and Regulations 4(1), 4(2)(k)

and 4(2)(r).

ISSUE 1: What is the scope and ambit of statutory appeal to the Supreme Court

under Section 15Z of the Act against an order passed by the Securities

Appellate Tribunal?

12. The power and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to consider the

decisions of the Tribunal is provided in Section 15Z of the Act. The said

provision is as under:

15Z. Appeal to Supreme Court. Any person aggrieved by any

decision or order of the Securities Appellate Tribunal may

file an appeal to the Supreme Court within sixty days from

the date of communication of the decision or order of the

Securities Appellate Tribunal to him on any question of law

arising out of such order;

Provided that the Supreme Court may, if it is satisfied that

the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing

the appeal within the said period, allow it to be filed within a

further period not exceeding sixty days.

In Videocon International14 this Court had an occasion to deal with

Section 15Z. Having considered the amendment to the Section, the Court

observed as under:

14 Videocon International Ltd. v. Securities Exchange Board of India (2015) 4 SCC 33.

Page 11 of 24

“38. …..A right of appeal may be absolute, i.e., without any

limitations. Or, it may be a limited right. The above position

is understandable, from a perusal of the unamended and

amended Section 15-Z of the SEBI Act. Under the unamended

Section 15-Z, the appellate remedy to the High Court, against

an order passed by the Securities Appellate Tribunal, was

circumscribed by the words “...on any question of fact or law

arising out of such order”. The amended Section 15-Z, while

altering the appellate forum from the High Court to the

Supreme Court, curtailed and restricted the scope of the

appeal, against an order passed by the Securities Appellate

Tribunal, by expressing that the remedy could be availed of

"...on any question of law arising out of such order.". It is,

therefore apparent, that the right to appeal, is available in

different packages, and that, the amendment to Section 15-Z,

varied the scope of the second appeal provided under the

SEBI Act.”

13. Though the Court observed that the appellate jurisdiction is curtailed to

determining only a question of law, the question still remains as to which issues

qualify as questions of law and which issue do not. We will examine this.

14. On a ‘textual’ interpretation, the expression ‘question of law’ is defined

in the Black’s Law Dictionary as follows:

“1. An issue to be decided by the judge, concerning the

application or interpretation of the law;

2. A question that the law itself has authoritatively answered,

so that the Court may not answer it as a matter of discretion;

3. An issue about what the law is on a particular point; an

issue in which parties argue about, and the court must decide

what the true rule of law is;

4. An issue that, although it may turn on a factual point, is

reserved for the court and excluded from the jury; an issue

that is exclusively within the province of the judge and not the

jury”15

15 Black’s Law Dictionary, 10th Edition p. 1442.

Page 12 of 24

15. Reference to Law Dictionary for the meaning of the expression ‘question

of law’ is not to overlook the difficulty in drawing boundaries between

questions of law and fact. Under the subject, the malleable boundaries between

law and fact, H.W.R Wade has commented:

“Much of the discussions of this chapter proceeds on the

basis that the distinction between a question of law and a

question of fact is self-evident. But this is not so; the

boundary is often elusive.”16

16. Phrases such as, ‘question of law’, are open textual expressions, used in

statutes to convey a certain meaning which the legislature would not have

intended to be read in a pedantic manner. When words of the Sections allow

narrow as well as wide interpretations, courts of law have developed the art and

technique of finding the correct meaning by looking at the words in their

context. In Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance Investment

Company Ltd. & Ors.

17

, Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy, observed:

“33. Interpretation must depend on the text and the context.

They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say if the

text is the texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither

can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is

best which makes the textual interpretation match the

contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it

was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be read,

first as a whole and then section by section, clause by clause,

phrase by phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked at,

in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute16 H.R.W. Wade & C.F Forsyth, Administrative Law, Chapter 8 (Oxford University

Publication, United Kingdom, 11th Edn, 2014).

17 Reserve Bank of India vs. Peerless General Finance Investment Company Ltd. &

Ors. (1987) 1 SCC 424

Page 13 of 24

maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the sections,

clauses, phrases and words may take colour and appear

different than when the stature is looked at without the

glasses provided by the context. With these glasses we must

look at the Act as a whole and discover what each section,

each clause, each phrase and each word is meant and

designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act. No

part of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in

isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that every word

has a place and everything is in its place……”

17. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Section 15Z to consider

any question of law arising from the orders of the Tribunal should therefore be

seen in the ‘context’ of the powers and jurisdiction of the Tribunal under

Sections 15K, 15L, 15M, 15T, 15U and 15Y of the Act. It is in the functioning

of the Tribunal to re-examine all questions of fact at the appellate stage while

exercising jurisdiction under Section 15T of the Act. In Clariant18 and National

Securities Depository19

, this Court had an occasion to examine the jurisdiction

of the Tribunal and explain that the Tribunal has wide powers. Being a

permanent body, apart from acting as an appellate Tribunal on fact, the Tribunal

routinely interprets the Act, Rules and Regulations made thereunder and

evolves a legal regime, systematically developed over a period of time. The

advantage and benefit of this process is consistency and structural evolution of

the sectorial laws.

18

 Clariant International Ltd. and Anr. v. Securities and Exchange Board of India

(2004) 8 SCC 524, para 73, 74

19

 National Securities Depository Ltd. v. Securities Exchange Board of India

(2017) 5 SCC 517, para 9.

Page 14 of 24

18. It is in the above-referred context that the Supreme Court while

exercising appellate jurisdiction under Section 15Z of the Act would be

measured in its approach while entertaining any appeal from the decision of the

Tribunal. This freedom to evolve and interpret laws must belong to the

Tribunals to subserve the regulatory regime for clarity and consistency and it is

with this perspective that the Supreme Court will consider appeals against

judgment of the Tribunals on questions of law arising from its orders.

19. It is in this very context that the UK Supreme Court in the case of Jones

v. First Tier Tribunal,

20 formulated certain principles for appellate courts to

interfere against the orders of Tribunals on the ground of existence of questions

of law. The Court held as under:

“16 … It is primarily for the tribunals, not the appellate

courts, to develop a consistent approach to these issues [of

law and fact], bearing in mind that they are peculiarly well

fitted to determine them. A pragmatic approach should be

taken to the dividing line between law and fact, so that the

expertise of tribunals at the first tier and that of the Upper

Tribunal can be used to best effect. An appeal court should

not venture too readily into this area by classifying issues as

issues of law which are really best left for determination by

the specialist appellate tribunals.”

20 Jones v. First Tier Tribunal [2013] UKSC 19. Para 16; followed in Regina (Privacy

International) v. Investigatory Powers Tribunal [2019] UKSC 22, para 134; See also,

Administrative Law by Paul Craig (8th Ed. 2016 at p.492 and H.R.W. Wade & C.F

Forsyth, Administrative Law, Chapter 8 (Oxford University Publication, United

Kingdom, 11th Edn, 2014).

Page 15 of 24

20. The scope of appeal under Section 15Z may be formulated as under:

20.1 The Supreme Court will exercise jurisdiction only when there is

a question of law arising for consideration from the decision of

the Tribunal. A question of law may arise when there is an

erroneous construction of the legal provisions of the statute or the

general principles of law. In such cases, the Supreme Court in

exercise of its jurisdiction of Section 15Z may substitute its

decision on any question of law that it considers appropriate.

20.2 However, not every interpretation of the law would amount to a

question of law warranting exercise of jurisdiction under Section

15Z. The Tribunal while exercising jurisdiction under Section

15T, apart from acting as an appellate authority on fact, also

interprets the Act, Rules and Regulations made thereunder and

systematically evolves a legal regime. These very principles are

applied consistently for structural evolution of the sectorial laws.

This freedom to evolve and interpret laws must belong to the

Tribunal to subserve the Regulatory regime for clarity and

consistency. These are policy and functional considerations

which the Supreme Court will keep in mind while exercising its

jurisdiction under Section 15Z.

Page 16 of 24

21. We will now examine the other issues in the context of the scope and

ambit of the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Section 15Z as

discussed herein above.

ISSUE 2: Whether the advertisements dated 07.04.2005, 20.04.2005, are in

violation of Regulations 3 (a), (b), (c), (d) read with Regulation 4 (1), (2) (k)

and (r) as amounting to misleading and defrauding the investors?

22. This issue should not detain us for long, as the facts involved in this issue

are relating to the merits of the case and, as such, do not qualify as a question

of law. We will however refer to the two instances as Shri C.U. Singh has made

detailed submissions before us.

23. As per the first advertisement dated 07.04.2005, it was alleged by SEBI

that in violation of Regulation 4 (2) (k) and 4 (r) of the PFUTP Regulations, the

Company proceeded to announce on 07.04.2005 the launch of the worldwide

outbound package tour services. These services were intended to operate across

25 cities in India and were expected to achieve a revenue of Rs. 1000 million

with a net profit of Rs.200 million in its first year. SEBI alleges that this

announcement was made for the sole purpose of misleading the investors. This

finding is reversed by the Tribunal based on an agreement between the

Company and M/s Gem Tours and Travels Private Limited to establish a

subsidiary company called ‘Mega Holidays Ltd.’ to handle the tour services.

The Tribunal also noted the bank statement supporting the Company's

transaction with M/s Gem Tours and Travels Private Limited.

Page 17 of 24

24. We are mentioning these facts only to indicate that the Tribunal has

reversed the findings of SEBI on the basis of its own inferences drawn from the

documents on record. The decision of the Tribunal is fact-based and does not

give rise to any question of law for invoking the jurisdiction of the Supreme

Court under Section 15Z. For this reason, we are not inclined to interfere with

the finding of fact, which must rest with the conclusions drawn by the Tribunal.

25. So far as the second announcement dated 20.04.2005 is concerned, it

relates to the allegation of announcing the commencement of business in

foreign exchange with the launch of ‘Mega Forex Brand’. It was alleged that

the Company made false statements such as that it is expected to grab 5-10%

of the market share in the forex market, “which is at 5-6 billion dollars” in a

span of one or two years. Here again, the Tribunal concluded that the

application for a license to deal with foreign exchange which is alleged to have

been made in September 2005 was only a revised application. The revised

application is said to have been made in as a reply to the queries of the Reserve

Bank of India on their original application, which was in fact made on

14.04.2005, that is even before the announcement. The Tribunal, therefore, was

of the opinion that the announcement is not imaginary but is based on specific

steps taken before the date of announcement, lending credence to the said

activity.

Page 18 of 24

26. The conclusion is drawn by the Tribunal, being factual, not giving rise

to any question of law, the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 15Z cannot

be invoked. For this reason, we affirm the finding of the Tribunal and there is

no occasion for this court to interfere with the decision of the Tribunal. The

issue is answered against the appellant.

ISSUE 3: Whether the company has violated Regulations 3(a), (b), (c) and (d)

and Regulation 4(1), 4(2)(k) and 4(2) (r) of the SEBI (PFUTP) Regulations,

2003 by manipulating the share prices and accounts?

27. The next submission relates to the allegation that the accounts are

manipulated for the year 2004-05 to show inflated profits to lure investors into

buying shares of the company. SEBI has referred to the efforts made by it to

trace the devise by which the shares of the Company were bought and sold in

the market. It was alleged that more than 2 crores shares were purchased by

certain entities in the physical form in ‘off-market’ deals and then transferred

those shares in subsequent ‘off-market’ deals to certain other outside entities

connected to the company. These allegations necessitated proof of such ‘offmarket’ transactions and the connectivity of the ‘outside entitles’ with the

Company.

28. The Tribunal in its appellate jurisdiction came to the conclusion that the

connectivity could not be established and that the conclusions drawn by the

Page 19 of 24

Board were insufficient. On the basis of the inferences drawn from the facts,

the Tribunal rendered the following findings:

“There is no evidence in support of any definite sustainable

link between the appellant company and any of the traders

who allegedly traded in the appellant company's scrip with

the purpose of generating volumes and thereby raising its

price. The charge of manipulative trading in its own shares

by the appellant company, therefore, fails.

….

But it is another matter to say that a company has manipulated its

accounts with that specific object in view because there can be a

multitude of reasons why an unscrupulous management may want

to show inflated financial results in its accounts. In the present

case, no material has been produced by the Respondent to

establish that the manipulation is the annual accounts of the

appellant for the year 2004-05, if any, had been resorted to with

the objective of luring investors to buy the scrip of the company.

Given the lack of any definite evidence, this charge against the

appellant also fails.”

29. It is evident from the above that the findings are based on the Tribunal's

inferences drawn from the material available on record. The conclusions drawn

by the Tribunal do not give rise to any question of law warranting interference

of this court under Section 15Z of the Act. This issue is answered against the

appellant.

ISSUE 4: Whether there is a right to cross-examine the author of a letter if the

SEBI seeks to rely on that letter, adverse to the company?

30. The Board has, in its investigation, secured a letter from one of the

directors of M/S DPS Shares and Stock Brokers Pvt. Ltd., the stockbrokers of

the company. This letter contradicts the stand taken by the company in its

Page 20 of 24

defence. This happened in the following factual background. When asked to

explain the transaction relating to purchase and sale of scrip in somewhat

suspicious circumstances, the Company took refuge by stating that the

transactions were in the exclusive knowledge of the stockbroker company. The

Board, in its investigation, secured a letter from a stockbroker stating that their

two directors, one Shri Pratik Shah and one Shri Sujal Shah, had handled the

transactions in the alleged scrip by opening a current account by using dummy

resolutions without the knowledge of Shri Dinesh Masalia, the third director of

the stockbroker company. On this basis, it was concluded that the transaction

was fictitious. In defence, the Company sought permission to cross-examine

the said Shri Dinesh Masalia, but no permission was granted. SEBI proceeded

and gave its final orders on 07.01.2008. It is in this context that the Company

made its submission before the Tribunal that principles of natural justice were

violated because an opportunity to cross-examine is not presented.

31. There is no dispute that the Company and the directors were informed

about the letter elicited from Shri Dinesh Masalia. The show-cause notice

explicitly mentions it. The Company’s reply to the show-cause notice

evidences objections raised by the Company with respect to the stand taken by

Shri Dinesh Masalia. To this extent, opportunity was given to the Company, in

the sense that SEBI was relying on a document which was disclosed to the

Company. The only question is whether there is a right to cross-examine the

Page 21 of 24

author of a letter while SEBI is performing its regulatory role and deciding

upon the allegation of manipulation under Regulations 3 and 4 of the PFUTP

Regulations.

32. Shri C.U Singh arguing for the Board has denied any right to crossexamine while SEBI exercises its jurisdiction. In support of his submissions,

he has referred to the cases as indicated earlier. He has also argued that there is

no prejudice caused to the Company as an opportunity was given by handing

over the material relied on by the Board against which the Company gave its

reply. He also referred to judgments of this Court in Aligarh Muslim

University21 and A.S Motors22 to press the point that the Court will not insist on

examination of witnesses merely as an empty formality.

33. On the other hand, Shri Gaggar submitted that the ground that principles

of natural justice would clearly be violated if opportunity to cross-examine is

not granted.

34. Immediately after the parties were heard, and the judgment was reserved

on 17.02.2022, on the very next day, another Bench of this Court delivered its

judgment in T. Takano23

. The case relates to proceedings that arose under this

very same Act and in fact concerning allegations of fraudulent and unfair trade

21 Aligarh Muslim University v. Mansoon Ali Khan (2000) 7 SCC 529.

22 A.S Motors Private Limited v. Union of India (2013) 10 SCC 114.

23 T. Takano v. Securities and Exchange Board of India (2022) SCC OnLine SC 210

Page 22 of 24

practices adopted by the appellants therein under the PFUTP regulations. This

Court considered the issue as to the statutory obligation of SEBI to follow the

principles of natural justice. Having reviewed the entire case law on the subject,

this Court formulated the following principles:

“62. The conclusions are summarised below:

(i) The appellant has a right to disclosure of the material

relevant to the proceedings initiated against him. A deviation

from the general rule of disclosure of relevant information

was made in Natwar Singh (supra) based on the stage of the

proceedings. It is sufficient to disclose the materials relied on

if it is for the purpose of issuing a show cause notice for

deciding whether to initiate an inquiry. However, all

information that is relevant to the proceedings must be

disclosed in adjudication proceedings;

(ii) The Board under Regulation 10 considers the

investigation report submitted by the Investigating Authority

under Regulation 9, and if it is satisfied with the allegations,

it could issue punitive measures under Regulations 11 and

12. Therefore, the investigation report is not merely an

internal document. In any event, the language of Regulation

10 makes it clear that the Board forms an opinion regarding

the violation of Regulations after considering the

investigation report prepared under Regulation 9;

(iii) The disclosure of material serves a three-fold purpose of

decreasing the error in the verdict, protecting the fairness of

the proceedings, and enhancing the transparency of the

investigatory bodies and judicial institutions;

(iv) A focus on the institutional impact of suppression of

material prioritises the process as opposed to the outcome.

The direction of the Constitution Bench of this Court in

Karunakar (supra) that the non-disclosure of relevant

information would render the order of punishment void only

if the aggrieved person is able to prove that prejudice has

been caused to him due to non-disclosure is founded both on

the outcome and the process;

(v) The right to disclosure is not absolute. The disclosure of

information may affect other third-party interests and the

stability and orderly functioning of the securities market. The

Page 23 of 24

respondent should prima facie establish that the disclosure of

the report would affect third-party rights and the stability and

orderly functioning of the securities market. The onus then

shifts to the appellant to prove that the information is

necessary to defend his case appropriately; and

(vi) Where some portions of the enquiry report involve

information on third-parties or confidential information on

the securities market, the respondent cannot for that reason

assert a privilege against disclosing any part of the report.

The respondents can withhold disclosure of those sections of

the report which deal with third-party personal information

and strategic information bearing upon the stable and

orderly functioning of the securities market.”

35. As per the principles laid down in the above referred case, there is a right

of disclosure of the relevant material. However, such a right is not absolute and

is subject to other considerations as indicated under paragraph 62(v) of the

judgment above referred. In this judgment, there is no specific discussion on

the issue of a right to cross-examination but the broad principles laid down

therein are sufficient guidance for the Tribunal to follow. There is no need for

us to elaborate on this point any further.

36. Coming back to the facts of the present case, we have noticed that the

Tribunal has arrived at its conclusions based on independent facts concerning

(a) the allegations under Regulation 4 relating to the issuance of misleading

advertisements dated 07.04.2005 and 20.04.2005 as well as (b) allegations

relating to manipulation of scrip prices and profits to lure investors. As

indicated earlier, the Tribunal concluded that the allegations could be proved.

Page 24 of 24

As we are not interfering in the findings of fact arrived at by the Tribunal the

Company’s claim for cross-examining would pale into insignificance. This

question presents itself merely as an academic issue.

37. We are also of the opinion that, there was no necessity for the Tribunal

to lay down as an inviolable principle that there is a right of cross-examination

in all cases. In fact, the conclusion of the Tribunal based on evidence on record

did not require such a finding. We, therefore, set aside the findings of the

Tribunal to this extent while upholding its decision on all other grounds. We

would also leave the question of law relating to the right of cross-examination

open and to be decided in an appropriate case by this Court.

38. For the reasons stated above, while we dismiss Civil Appeal No. 2104 of

2009 against the judgment of the Securities Appellate Tribunal in Appeal

No. 60 of 2008 dated 15.10.2008, the general observations of the Tribunal that

there is a right of cross-examination is hereby set aside.

39. Parties to bear their own costs.

 ……………………J.

 [L. NAGESWARA RAO]


……………………J.

 [PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA]

NEW DELHI.

MARCH 25, 2022