whether the provisions contained in Sections 21, 22 and other Sections of the MMDR Act operate as bar against prosecution of a person who has been charged with allegation which constitutes offences under Sections 379/414 and other provisions of the Penal Code (IPC). The question which arose was, whether the provisions of the MMDR Act explicitly or impliedly exclude the provisions of the Penal Code (IPC) when the act of an accused is an offence both under the Penal Code and under the provisions of the MMDR Act.

whether the provisions contained in Sections 21, 22 and  other  Sections  of  the MMDR Act  operate  as bar against prosecution of a person who has been charged with allegation which constitutes offences under Sections 379/414 and other provisions of the Penal Code (IPC).   The question which arose was,   whether   the   provisions   of   the   MMDR   Act   explicitly   or impliedly exclude the provisions of the Penal Code (IPC) when the act of an accused is an offence both under the Penal Code and under the provisions of the MMDR Act.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.824­825  OF 2020

(Arising from SLP(Criminal) Nos.2640­2641/2020)

Jayant Etc. …Appellants

Versus

The State of Madhya Pradesh …Respondent

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.826  OF 2020

      (Arising from SLP(Criminal) No.4549/2020)

State of Madhya Pradesh …Appellant

Versus

Jayant …Respondent

J U D G M E N T

M.R. SHAH, J.

Leave granted.

2. Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned

common judgment and order dated 11.05.2020 passed by the

1

High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Indore in M.Cr.C No.

49338/2019 and M.Cr.C. No. 49972/2019, the original petitioner

as   well   as   the   State   of   Madhya   Pradesh   have   preferred   the

present appeals.

By the impugned common judgment and order, the High

Court   has   dismissed   the   aforesaid   applications   filed   under

Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the respective FIRs for the offences

under Sections 379 and 414, IPC, Sections 4/21 of the Mines &

Minerals   (Development   &   Regulation)   Act,   1957   (hereinafter

referred to as the ‘MMDR Act’) and under Rule 18 of the M.P.

Minerals   (Prevention   of   illegal   Mining,   Transportation   and

Storage) Rules, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘2006 Rules’).

3. The facts in nutshell are as under:

On a surprise inspection, the respective Mining Inspectors

checked the tractor/trolleys of the private appellants along with

the minor mineral (sand/storage/yellow soil etc.) loaded in them.

They handed over the tractor/trolleys to the concerned police

stations   to   keep   them   in   safe   custody.     Finding   the   private

appellants   indulged   in   illegal   mining/transportation   of   minor

mineral, the mining Inspectors prepared their respective cases

under Rule 53 of the Madhya Pradesh Minor Mineral Rules, 1996

2

(hereinafter referred to as the ‘1996 Rules’) and submitted them

before the Mining Officers with a proposal of compounding the

same for the amount calculated according to the concerned 1996

Rules.   The concerned Mining Officers submitted those cases

before the Collector, who approved the proposal.   The violators

accepted the decision and deposited the amounts determined by

the Collector for compounding the cases.  Their tractor/trolleys

along   with   the   minerals,   which   were   illegally

excavated/transported, were released.

3.1 That   after   some   time,   a   news   was   published   in   a   daily

newspaper   –   Bhaskar   on   8.9.2019   with   respect   to   illegal

excavation/transportation of mineral sand from Chambal, Shivna

and   Retam   and   other   Tributary   rivers   flow   from   District

Mandsuar and in surrounding places.  It was revealed that due to

illegal transportation of the minerals and without payment of

royalty, revenue loss is occurring.   It was reported that illegal

mining, storage and transportation of mineral sand was being

carried out at large scale.  Similar kind of information was also

subsequently published on 3.10.2019 in the daily newspaper –

Bhaskar in Mandsuar edition.  It was also reported that despite

the offences under Sections 379 and 414, IPC and the offences

3

under the MMDR Act and the 2006 Rules were found attracted,

necessary legal action has not been taken and the violators were

permitted to go on compounding the offence under Rule 53 of the

1996   Rules.     The   learned   Judicial   Magistrate,   First   Class,

Mandsuar   took   note   of   the   aforesaid   information   and   having

taken note of the decision of this Court in the case of State (NCT

of Delhi) v. Sanjay, (2014) 9 SCC 772 taking the view that offences

under the IPC and offences under the MMDR Act are distinct and

different and it is permissible to lodge/initiate the proceedings for

the offences under the IPC as well as under the MMDR Act, the

learned Magistrate in exercise of powers conferred under Section

156(3),   Cr.P.C.   (suo   motu)   directed   to   register   criminal   case

under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. for initiation of investigation and for

submitting of report after due investigation is conducted.   The

learned Magistrate also directed the concerned In­charge/SHOs

of the concerned police stations to register the first information

report and a copy of the first information report be sent to the

learned Magistrate as per the provisions of Section 157, Cr.P.C. 

3.2 That   pursuant   to   the   order   passed   by   the   learned

Magistrate, the In­charge/SHOs of the concerned police stations

lodged   separate   FIRs   for   the   aforesaid   offences   for   illegal

4

mining/transportation   of   sand,   particulars   of   which   are   as

under:

Sr.No

.

MCRC NO. FIR NO/DATE POLICE

STATION

Date   of

Incident

1 49338/2019 234/16.11.2019 Nai Abadi 27.07.2019

2 49340/2019 554/16.11.2019 Y.D.

Nagar

16.11.2019

3 49847/2019 564/17.11.2019 Y.D.

Nagar

20.04.2019

4 49856/2019 280/16.11.2019 Afzalpur 30.08.2019

5 49859/2019 563/17.11.2019 Y.D.

Nagar

20.04.2019

6 49861/2019 588/18.11.2019 Y.D.

Nagar

24.08.2019

7 49963/2019 281/16.11.2019 Afzalpur 30.08.2019

8 49972/2019 238/18.11.2019 Nai Abadi 28.08.2019

9 50602/2019 137/17.11.2019 Daloda 25.05.2019

10 50610/2019 136/16.11.2019 Daloda 25.05.2019

11 50614/2019 139/17.11.2019 Daloda 10.06.2019

12 50627/2019 591/18.11.2019 Y.D.

Nagar

13.06.2019

13 50636/2019 551/16.11.2019 Y.D.

Nagar

02.04.2019

14 05648/2019 552/16.11.2019 Y.D.

Nagar

02.04.2019

3.3 That   thereafter   the   private   appellants   and   others

approached   the   High   Court   to   quash   the   aforesaid   FIRs

5

registered against them for illegal mining/transportation of sand

by submitting the applications under Section 482, Cr.P.C.  It was

mainly contended on behalf of the private appellants and other

violators that in view of Bar under Section 22 of the MMDR Act,

the order passed by the learned Magistrate directing to register

the FIRs is unsustainable and deserves to the quashed and set

aside.  It was also contended on behalf of the private appellants

and other violators that once there was compounding of offence

in exercise of powers under Rule 53 of the 1996 Rules and the

violators   paid   the   amount   determined   by   permitting   them   to

compound the offence, thereafter the Magistrate was not justified

in directing to initiate fresh proceedings which would be hit by

the   principle   of   “double   jeopardy”.     That   by   the   impugned

common judgment and order, the High Court has dismissed all

the aforesaid applications relying upon the decision of this Court

in the case of Sanjay (supra).

4. Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   common

impugned   judgment   and   order   passed   by   the   High   Court   in

refusing to quash the FIRs filed against the private appellants

and   other   violators,   the   original   petitioners   –   violators   have

preferred the present appeals.   Though, before the High Court,

6

the learned Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the State of

Madhya   Pradesh   supported   the   order   passed   by   the   learned

Magistrate   directing   to   register/lodge   FIRs,   the   State   has

preferred   a   separate   special   leave   petition   challenging   the

impugned   judgment   and   order   passed   by   the   High   Court

confirming the order passed by the learned Magistrate.  It is very

surprising   that   despite   supporting   the   order   passed   by   the

learned Magistrate before the High Court, the State of Madhya

Pradesh has preferred the special leave petition, which shall be

dealt with hereinbelow.

5. Shri Devadatt Kamat, learned Senior Advocate appearing on

behalf of the private appellants has made following submissions:

i) initiation of  criminal  proceedings and  filing of  respective

FIRs against the private appellants which have been filed/lodged

pursuant   to   the   order   passed   by   the   learned   Magistrate   in

exercise   of   powers   under   Section   156(3),   Cr.P.C.   are   hit   by

Section 22 and 23A of the MMDR Act, as well as, Rule 53 of the

1996 Rules;

ii) on a plain reading of Section 22, cognizance of the offence

can   be   taken   by   the   Magistrate   only   if   there   is   a   written

complaint in that regard by the Mining Officer/authorised officer.

7

In the present case, admittedly, there is no written complaint

made by the Mining Officer/authorised officer;

iii) MMDR Act does not contemplate the taking of suo motu

cognizance by the Magistrate.   The Magistrate does not have

jurisdiction   under   the   MMDR   Act   to   direct   the   Mining

Officer/police officer in­charge to register FIR under the penal

provisions of the MMDR Act.   Heavy reliance is placed on the

decision of this Court in the case of Sanjay (Supra), as well as, in

the case of Kanwar Pal Singh v. State of U.P., Criminal Appeal No.

1920 of 2019, decided on December 18, 2019;

iv) Section   23A   of   the   MMDR   Act   contemplates   the

compounding of offence under the MMDR Act.   Therefore, the

Rules   made   under   the   MMDR   Act   contain   provisions   for

compounding of offence.  Sub­section 2 of Section 23A places a

bar on proceedings or further proceedings, when the offences

have been compounded under sub­section (1).   Therefore, once

the proceedings have been compounded under the Act or Rules

made thereunder, no further proceedings can lie.  In the present

case, the offences under the MMDR Act as against the private

appellants were permitted to be compounded by the competent

authority.

8

5.1 Making   the   above   submissions   and   relying   upon   the

aforesaid decisions of this Court, it is prayed to allow the present

appals and quash the criminal proceedings initiated against the

private appellants for the offences under Sections 379 and 414,

IPC and Sections 4/21 of the MMDR Act.

6. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State of Madhya

Pradesh has supported the private appellants – violators and has

submitted   that   the   order   passed   by   the   learned   Magistrate

directing to lodge/register FIRs for the offences under Sections

379   and   414,   IPC   and   Sections   4/21   of   the   MMDR   Act   is

unsustainable, though and as observed hereinabove, the learned

Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the State of Madhya

Pradesh supported the order passed by the learned Magistrate

before the High Court.

One of the grounds stated in the memo of appeal is that the

order passed by the learned Magistrate, confirmed by the High

Court, impinges/affects the powers of the authorised person to

compound the offence under Rule 18 of the 2006 Rules.

7. Before submissions made on behalf of the respective parties

are considered, the decision of this Court in the case of Sanjay

(supra) dealing with the provisions of the MMDR Act in which this

9

Court considered in detail the policy and object of the MMDR Act

and the Rules made thereunder, is required to be referred to.

7.1 The   question   which   arose   for   consideration   before   this

Court was, whether the provisions contained in Sections 21, 22

and  other  Sections  of  the MMDR Act  operate  as bar against

prosecution of a person who has been charged with allegation

which constitutes offences under Sections 379/414 and other

provisions of the Penal Code (IPC).   The question which arose

was,   whether   the   provisions   of   the   MMDR   Act   explicitly   or

impliedly exclude the provisions of the Penal Code (IPC) when the

act of an accused is an offence both under the Penal Code and

under the provisions of the MMDR Act.  This Court considered in

detail   the   policy,   object   and   purpose   of   the   MMDR   Act   in

paragraphs 32 to 39, which read as under:

“32.  The policy and object of the Mines and Minerals Act and

Rules   have  a   long  history  and   are  the  result   of   an  increasing

awareness of the compelling need to restore the serious ecological

imbalance and to stop the damages being caused to the nature.

The Court cannot lose sight of the fact that adverse and destructive

environmental impact of sand mining has been discussed in the

UNEP   Global   Environmental   Alert   Service   Report.   As   per   the

contents of the Report, lack of proper scientific methodology for

river sand mining has led to indiscriminate sand mining, while

weak governance and corruption have led to widespread illegal

mining. While referring to the proposition in India, it was stated

that sand trading is a lucrative business, and there is evidence of

illegal trading such as the case of the influential mafias in our

country.

10

33. The mining of aggregates in rivers has led to severe damage to

rivers, including pollution and changes in levels of PH. Removing

sediment from rivers causes the river to cut its channel through

the bed of the valley floor, or channel incision, both upstream and

downstream of the extraction site. This leads to coarsening of bed

material and lateral channel instability. It can change the riverbed

itself. The removal of more than 12 million tonnes of sand a year

from Vembanad Lake catchment in India has led to the lowering of

the riverbed by 7 to 15 cm a year. Incision can also cause the

alluvial aquifer to drain to a lower level, resulting in a loss of

aquifer storage. It can also increase flood frequency and intensity

by reducing flood regulation capacity. However, lowering the water

table is most threatening to water supply exacerbating drought

occurrence and severity as tributaries of major rivers dry up when

sand mining reaches certain thresholds. Illegal sand mining also

causes   erosion.   Damming   and   mining   have   reduced   sediment

delivery from rivers to many coastal areas, leading to accelerated

beach erosion.

34.  The Report also dealt with the astonishing impact of sand

mining on the economy. It states that tourism may be affected

through beach erosion. Fishing, both traditional and commercial,

can be affected through destruction of benthic fauna. Agriculture

could   be   affected   through   loss   of   agricultural   land   from   river

erosion and the lowering of the water table. The insurance sector is

affected through exacerbation of the impact of extreme events such

as floods, droughts and storm surges through decreased protection

of beach fronts. The erosion of coastal areas and beaches affects

houses   and   infrastructure.   A   decrease   in   bed   load   or   channel

shortening can cause downstream erosion including bank erosion

and the undercutting or undermining of engineering structures

such as bridges, side protection walls and structures for water

supply.

35. Sand is often removed from beaches to build hotels, roads and

other tourism­related infrastructure. In some locations, continued

construction is likely to lead to an unsustainable situation and

destruction of the main natural attraction for visitors—beaches

themselves. Mining from, within or near a riverbed has a direct

impact on the stream’s physical characteristics, such as channel

geometry,   bed   elevation,   substratum   composition   and   stability,

instream roughness of the bed, flow velocity, discharge capacity,

sediment   transportation   capacity,   turbidity,   temperature,   etc.

Alteration   or   modification   of   the   above   attributes   may   cause

hazardous impact on ecological equilibrium of riverine regime. This

may also cause adverse impact on instream biota and riparian

habitats.  This  disturbance  may also  cause  changes  in  channel

configuration and flow paths.

11

36. In M. Palanisamy v. State of T.N(2012) 4 CTC 1, the amended

provisions   of   the   Tamil   Nadu   Mines   and   Minerals   Concession

Rules, 1959 was challenged on the ground that the said Rules for

the   purpose   of   preventing   and   restricting   illegal   mining,

transportation   and   storage   of   minerals   are   ultra   vires

constitutional   provisions   and   the   provisions   of   the   Mines   and

Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957. Upholding the

vires of the Rules, the Division Bench (one of us, Eqbal, J. as he

then was) of the Madras High Court, elaborately discussed the

object of restriction put in the illegal mining, transportation and

storage of minerals including sand and after considering various

reports observed thus: (CTC pp. 24­25, paras 21 & 23­24)

“21.   In   order   to   appreciate   the   issue   involved   in   these   writ

petitions, we may have to look at the larger picture — the impact

of indiscriminate, uninterrupted sand quarrying on the already

brittle ecological set­up of ours. According to expert reports, for

thousands of years, sand and gravel have been used in the

construction of roads and buildings. Today, demand for sand

and gravel continues to increase. Mining operators, instead of

working   in   conjunction   with   cognizant   resource   agencies   to

ensure that sand mining is conducted in a responsible manner,

are engaged in full­time profiteering. Excessive in­stream sand

and gravel mining from riverbeds and like resources causes the

degradation   of   rivers.   In­stream   mining   lowers   the   stream

bottom, which leads to bank erosion. Depletion of sand in the

stream­bed and along coastal areas causes the deepening of

rivers   and   estuaries   and   enlargement   of   river   mouths   and

coastal inlets. It also leads to saline water intrusion from the

nearby sea. The effect of mining is compounded by the effect of

sea level rise. Any volume of sand exported from stream­beds

and coastal areas is a loss to the system. Excessive in­stream

sand   mining   is   a   threat   to  bridges,   river  banks   and  nearby

structures. Sand mining also affects the adjoining groundwater

system and the uses that local people make of the river. Further,

according to researches, in­stream sand mining results in the

destruction of aquatic and riparian habitat through wholesale

changes in the channel morphology. The ill effects include bed

degradation,   bed   coarsening,   lowered   water   tables   near   the

stream­bed   and   channel   instability.   These   physical   impacts

cause degradation of riparian and aquatic biota and may lead to

the   undermining   of   bridges   and   other   structures.   Continued

extraction  of  sand  from  riverbeds  may also  cause the  entire

stream­bed to degrade to the depth of excavation.

* * *

23. The most important effects of in­stream sand mining on

aquatic habitats are bed degradation and sedimentation, which

can have substantial negative effects on aquatic life. The stability

12

of   sand­bed   and   gravel­bed   streams   depends   on   a   delicate

balance between stream flow, the sediments supplied from the

watershed and the channel form. Mining­induced changes in

sediment supply and channel form disrupt the channel and the

habitat   development   processes.   Furthermore,   movement   of

unstable   substrates   results   in   downstream   sedimentation   of

habitats.   The   affected   distance   depends   on   the   intensity   of

mining, particle sizes, stream flows, and channel morphology.

24. Apart from threatening bridges, sand mining transforms the

riverbeds into large and deep pits; as a result, the groundwater

table   drops   leaving   the   drinking   water   wells   on   the

embankments   of   these   rivers   dry.   Bed   degradation   from   instream   mining   lowers   the   elevation   of   stream   flow   and   the

floodplain water table, which in turn, can eliminate water tabledependent   woody   vegetation   in   riparian   areas   and   decrease

wetted periods in riparian wetlands. So far as locations close to

the sea are concerned, saline water may intrude into the fresh

waterbody.”

37. In Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India (2012) 3

SCC 1, this Court, while observing that the natural resources are

the public property and national assets, held as under: (SCC p. 53,

para 75)

“75. The State is empowered to distribute natural resources.

However,   as   they   constitute   public   property/national   asset,

while distributing natural resources the State is bound to act in

consonance with the principles of equality and public trust and

ensure that no action is taken which may be detrimental to

public interest. Like any other State action, constitutionalism

must be reflected at every stage of the distribution of natural

resources.   In   Article   39(b)   of   the   Constitution   it   has   been

provided   that   the   ownership   and   control   of   the   material

resources of the community should be so distributed so as to

best   subserve   the   common   good,   but   no   comprehensive

legislation   has   been   enacted   to   generally   define   natural

resources   and   a   framework   for   their   protection.   Of   course,

environment laws enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures

deal with specific natural resources i.e. forest, air, water, coastal

zones, etc.”

38.  In  M.C. Mehta  v.  Kamal Nath (1997) 1 SCC 388, this Court

while considering the doctrine of public trust which extends to

natural resources observed as under: (SCC pp. 407­08 & 413,

paras 24­25 & 34)

“24. The ancient Roman Empire developed a legal theory known

as the ‘Doctrine of the Public Trust’. It was founded on the ideas

that certain common properties such as rivers, seashore, forests

and the air were held by Government in trusteeship for the free

13

and unimpeded use of the general public. Our contemporary

concern about ‘the environment’ bear a very close conceptual

relationship to this legal doctrine. Under the Roman law these

resources   were   either   owned   by   no   one   (res   nullius)   or   by

everyone   in   common   (res   communious).   Under   the   English

common law, however, the Sovereign could own these resources

but the ownership was limited in nature, the Crown could not

grant   these   properties  to  private  owners  if   the   effect   was  to

interfere   with   the   public   interests   in   navigation   or   fishing.

Resources that were suitable for these uses were deemed to be

held in trust by the Crown for the benefit of the public. Joseph

L. Sax, Professor of Law, University of Michigan—proponent of

the Modern Public Trust Doctrine—in an erudite article ‘Public

Trust   Doctrine   in   Natural   Resource   Law:   Effective   Judicial

Intervention’, Michigan Law Review, Vol. 68, Part 1, p. 473, has

given the historical background of the Public Trust Doctrine as

under:

‘The source of modern public trust law is found in a concept

that  received much attention in  Roman  and  English  law—the

nature of property rights in rivers, the sea, and the seashore.

That history has been given considerable attention in the legal

literature and need not be repeated in detail here. But two points

should be emphasised. First, certain interests, such as navigation

and fishing, were sought to be preserved for the benefit of the

public;   accordingly,   property   used   for   those   purposes   was

distinguished from general public property which the sovereign

could  routinely grant  to  private owners. Second, while it  was

understood   that   in   certain   common   properties—such   as   the

seashore,   highways   and   running   water—“perpetual   use   was

dedicated to the public”, it has never been clear whether the

public had an enforceable right to prevent infringement of those

interests. Although the State apparently did protect public uses,

no   evidence   is   available   that   public   rights   could   be   legally

asserted against a recalcitrant government.’

25. The Public Trust Doctrine primarily rests on the principle

that certain resources like air, sea, waters and the forests have

such a great importance to the people as a whole that it would

be   wholly   unjustified   to   make   them   a   subject   of   private

ownership. The said resources being a gift of nature, they should

be made freely available to everyone irrespective of the status in

life. The doctrine enjoins upon the Government to protect the

resources for the enjoyment of the general public rather than to

permit their use for private ownership or commercial purposes.

According to Professor Sax the Public Trust Doctrine imposes

the following restrictions on governmental authority:

‘Three types of restrictions on governmental authority are often

thought to be imposed by the public trust: first, the property

14

subject to the trust must not only be used for a public purpose,

but   it   must   be   held   available   for   use   by   the   general   public;

second,   the   property   may   not   be   sold,   even   for   a   fair   cash

equivalent;   and   third   the   property   must   be   maintained   for

particular types of uses.’

* * *

34. Our legal system—based on English common law—includes

the Public Trust Doctrine as part of its jurisprudence. The State

is the trustee of all natural resources which are by nature meant

for public use and enjoyment. Public at large is the beneficiary of

the seashore, running waters, air, forests and ecologically fragile

lands. The State as a trustee is under a legal duty to protect the

natural resources. These resources meant for public use cannot

be converted into private ownership.”

39.  In  Intellectuals Forum  v.  State of A.P (2006) 3 SCC 549, this

Court while balancing the conservation of natural resources vis­àvis urban development observed as under: (SCC p. 572, para 67)

“67. The responsibility of the State to protect the environment is

now a well­accepted notion in all countries. It is this notion that,

in   international   law,   gave   rise   to   the   principle   of   ‘State

responsibility’   for   pollution   emanating   within   one’s   own

territories (Corfu Channel case14). This responsibility is clearly

enunciated   in   the  United   Nations   Conference   on   the   Human

Environment, Stockholm 1972 (Stockholm Convention), to which

India was a party. The relevant clause of this declaration in the

present context is para 2, which states:

‘The natural resources of the earth, including the air, water,

land, flora and fauna and especially representative samples of

natural   ecosystems,   must   be   safeguarded   for   the   benefit   of

present   and   future   generations   through   careful   planning   or

management, as appropriate.’

Thus, there is no doubt about the fact that there is a responsibility

bestowed upon the Government to protect and preserve the tanks,

which are an important part of the environment of the area.”

7.2 This   Court   further   observed   in   paragraphs   60   &   69   as

under:

“60. There cannot be any two opinions that natural resources are

the assets of the nation and its citizens. It is the obligation of all

concerned, including the Central and the State Governments, to

conserve and not waste such valuable resources. Article 48­A of

15

the Constitution requires that the State shall endeavour to protect

and   improve   the   environment   and   safeguard   the   forests   and

wildlife of the country. Similarly, Article 51­A enjoins a duty upon

every   citizen   to   protect   and   improve   the   natural   environment

including   forests,   lakes,   rivers   and   wildlife,   and   to   have

compassion for all the living creatures. In view of the constitutional

provisions, the doctrine of public trust has become the law of the

land. The said doctrine rests on the principle that certain resources

like air, sea, water and forests are of such great importance to the

people as a whole that it would be highly unjustifiable to make

them a subject of private ownership.

69. Considering the principles of interpretation and the wordings

used in Section 22, in our considered opinion, the provision is not

a complete and absolute bar for taking action by the police for

illegal and dishonestly committing theft of minerals including sand

from the riverbed. The Court shall take judicial notice of the fact

that   over   the   years   rivers   in   India   have   been   affected   by   the

alarming rate of unrestricted sand mining which is damaging the

ecosystem   of   the   rivers   and   safety  of   bridges.   It   also   weakens

riverbeds, fish breeding and destroys the natural habitat of many

organisms. If these illegal activities are not stopped by the State

and   the   police   authorities   of   the   State,   it   will   cause   serious

repercussions as mentioned hereinabove. It will not only change

the river hydrology but also will deplete the groundwater levels.”

7.3 That thereafter, after considering the relevant provisions of

the MMDR Act, this Court opined that there is no complete and

absolute bar in prosecuting persons under the Penal Code where

the   offences   committed   by   persons   are   penal   and   cognizable

offence.  Ultimately, this Court concluded in paragraphs 72 and

73 as under:

“72. From a close reading of the provisions of the MMDR Act and

the offence defined under Section 378 IPC, it is manifest that the

ingredients constituting the offence are different. The contravention

of terms and conditions of mining lease or doing mining activity in

violation of Section 4 of the Act is an offence punishable under

Section 21 of the MMDR Act, whereas dishonestly removing sand,

16

gravel and other minerals from the river, which is the property of

the   State,   out   of   the   State’s   possession   without   the   consent,

constitute an offence of theft. Hence, merely because initiation of

proceeding for commission of an offence under the MMDR Act on

the basis of complaint cannot and shall not debar the police from

taking action against persons for committing theft of sand and

minerals   in   the   manner   mentioned   above   by   exercising   power

under the Code of Criminal Procedure and submit a report before

the Magistrate for taking cognizance against such persons. In other

words, in a case where there is a theft of sand and gravel from the

government land, the police can register a case, investigate the

same and submit a final report under Section 173 CrPC before a

Magistrate having jurisdiction for the purpose of taking cognizance

as provided in Section 190(1)(d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

73. After giving our thoughtful consideration in the matter, in the

light of the relevant provisions of the Act vis­à­vis the Code of

Criminal Procedure and the Penal Code, we are of the definite

opinion  that  the  ingredients  constituting the offence  under the

MMDR Act and the ingredients of dishonestly removing sand and

gravel from the riverbeds without consent, which is the property of

the   State,   is   a   distinct   offence   under   IPC.   Hence,   for   the

commission of offence under Section 378 IPC, on receipt of the

police   report,   the   Magistrate   having   jurisdiction   can   take

cognizance   of   the   said   offence   without   awaiting   the   receipt   of

complaint that may be filed by the authorised officer for taking

cognizance   in   respect   of   violation   of   various   provisions   of   the

MMDR Act. Consequently, the contrary view taken by the different

High Courts cannot be sustained in law and, therefore, overruled.

Consequently,   these   criminal   appeals   are   disposed   of   with   a

direction to the Magistrates concerned to proceed accordingly.”

7.4 Thus, as held by this Court, the prohibition contained in

Section 22 of the MMDR Act against prosecution of a person

except on a written complaint made by the authorised officer in

this behalf would be attracted only when such person is sought

to be prosecuted for contraventions of Section 4 of the MMDR Act

17

and not for any act or omission which constitutes an offence

under the Penal Code.  

8. However,   it   is   required   to   be   noted   that   in   the   case   of

Sanjay   (supra),  this   Court   had   no   occasion   and/or   had   not

considered when and at what stage the bar under Section 22 of

the MMDR Act would be attracted.  The further question which is

required   to   be   considered   is,   when   and   at   what   stage   the

Magistrate can be said to have taken cognizance attracting the

bar under Section 22 of the MMDR Act?

8.1 While  considering the   aforesaid  issue, Section  22  of  the

MMDR Act is required to be referred to, which is as under:

“22. Cognizance of offences.—No court shall take cognizance of

any   offence   punishable   under   this   Act   or   any   Rules   made

thereunder except upon complaint in writing made by a person

authorised in this behalf by the Central Government or the State

Government.”

Reading the aforesaid provision would show that cognizance

of any offence punishable under the MMDR Act or the Rules

made thereunder shall be taken only upon a written complaint

made   by   a   person   authorised   in   this   behalf   by   the   Central

Government   or   the   State   Government.     Therefore,   on   a   fair

18

reading   of   Section   22   of   the   MMDR   Act,   the   bar   would   be

attracted when the Magistrate takes cognizance.

9. Let us now consider the question in the light of judicial

pronouncements on the point.

9.1. In the case of Krishna Pillai v. T.A. Rajendran, 1990 (Supp)

SCC 121, after considering a five Judge Bench judgment of this

Court in the case of  A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak,

(1984) 2 SCC 500, it is observed in paragraph 4 as under:

“4.  Taking   cognizance   has   assumed   a   special   meaning   in   our

criminal jurisprudence. We may refer to the view taken by a five

Judge bench of this Court in  A.R. Antulay  v.  Ramdas Sriniwas

Nayak   (supra)  at   p.   530   (para   31)   of   the   reports   this   Court

indicated:

“When a private complaint is filed, the court has to examine the

complainant on oath save in the cases set out in the proviso to

Section 200 CrPC After examining the complainant on oath and

examining the witnesses present, if any, meaning thereby that

the witnesses not present need not be examined, it would be

open to the court to judicially determine whether a case is made

out   for   issuing   process.   When   it   is   said   that   court   issued

process, it means the court has taken cognizance of the offence

and   has   decided   to   initiate   the   proceedings   and   a   visible

manifestation   of   taking   cognizance   process   is   issued   which

means that the accused is called upon to appear before the

court.”

The extract from the Constitution Bench judgment clearly indicates

that filing of a complaint in court is not taking cognizance and

what exactly constitutes taking cognizance is different from filing of

a complaint…..”

9.2 In the case of Manohar M. Galani v. Ashok N. Advani (1999)

8 SCC 737, when the bar under Section 195 Cr. P.C. was pressed

19

into   service   and   the   High   Court   quashed   the   complaint   and

enquiry on the basis of the FIR registered by the complainant,

while setting aside the order passed by the High Court, this

Court accepted the submission on behalf of the State that the bar

under Section 195 Cr.P.C. can be gone into at the stage when the

court takes cognizance of the offence and investigation on the

basis of the information received could not have been quashed

and an investigating agency cannot be throttled at this stage from

proceeding with the investigation particularly when the charges

are serious and grave.

9.3 In   the   case   of  S.K.   Sinha,   Chief   Enforcement   Officer   v.

Videocon International Limited, (2008) 2 SCC 492, in paragraphs

19 to 34, it is observed and held as under:

“19. The expression “cognizance” has not been defined in the

Code. But the word (cognizance) is of indefinite import. It has no

esoteric or mystic significance in criminal law. It merely means

“become aware of” and when used with reference to a court or a

Judge, it connotes “to take notice of judicially”. It indicates the

point when a court or a Magistrate takes judicial notice of an

offence with a view to initiating proceedings in respect of such

offence said to have been committed by someone.

20. “Taking cognizance” does not involve any formal action of

any kind. It occurs as soon as a Magistrate applies his mind to

the suspected commission of an offence. Cognizance is taken

prior to commencement of criminal proceedings. Taking of

cognizance is thus a sine qua non or condition precedent for

holding a valid trial. Cognizance is taken of an offence and not of

an offender. Whether or not a Magistrate has taken cognizance of

an offence depends on the facts and circumstances of each case

20

and no rule of universal application can be laid down as to when

a Magistrate can be said to have taken cognizance.

21. Chapter XIV (Sections 190-199) of the Code deals with

“Conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings”. Section 190

empowers a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence in

certain circumstances. Sub-section (1) thereof is material and

may be quoted in extenso:

“190. Cognizance of offences by Magistrates —(1) Subject to

the provisions of this Chapter, any Magistrate of the First Class,

and any Magistrate of the Second Class specially empowered

in this behalf under sub-section (2), may take cognizance of

any offence—

(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such

offence;

(b) upon a police report of such facts;

(c) upon information received from any person other than a

police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence

has been committed.”

22. Chapter XV (Sections 200-203) relates to “Complaints to

Magistrates” and covers cases before actual commencement of

proceedings in a court or before a Magistrate. Section 200 of the

Code requires a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence to

examine the complainant and his witnesses on oath. Section 202,

however, enacts that a Magistrate is not bound to issue process

against the accused as a matter of course. It enables him before

the issue of process either to inquire into the case himself or

direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or by such

other person as he thinks fit for the purpose of deciding whether

there is sufficient ground for proceeding further. The underlying

object of the inquiry under Section 202 is to ascertain whether

there is prima facie case against the accused. It thus allows a

Magistrate to form an opinion whether the process should or

should not be issued. The scope of inquiry under Section 202 is,

no doubt, extremely limited. At that stage, what a Magistrate is

called upon to see is whether there is sufficient ground for

proceeding with the matter and not whether there is sufficient

ground for conviction of the accused.

23. Then comes Chapter XVI (Commencement of proceedings

before Magistrates). This Chapter will apply only after cognizance

of an offence has been taken by a Magistrate under Chapter XIV.

Section 204, whereunder process can be issued, is another

material provision which reads as under:

“204. Issue of process.—(1) If in the opinion of a Magistrate

taking cognizance of an offence there is sufficient ground for

proceeding, and the case appears to be—

(a) a summons case, he shall issue his summons for the

attendance of the accused, or

21

(b) a warrant case, he may issue a warrant, or, if he thinks

fit, a summons, for causing the accused to be brought or to

appear at a certain time before such Magistrate or (if he has

no jurisdiction himself) some other Magistrate having

jurisdiction.

(2) No summons or warrant shall be issued against the

accused under sub-section (1) until a list of the prosecution

witnesses has been filed.

(3) In a proceeding instituted upon a complaint made in

writing, every summons or warrant issued under sub-section

(1) shall be accompanied by a copy of such complaint.

(4) When by any law for the time being in force any processfees or other fees are payable, no process shall be issued until

the fees are paid and, if such fees are not paid within a

reasonable time, the Magistrate may dismiss the complaint.

(5) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect the

provisions of Section 87.”

24. From the above scheme of the Code, in our judgment, it is

clear that “Initiation of proceedings”, dealt with in Chapter XIV, is

different from “Commencement of proceedings” covered by

Chapter XVI. For commencement of proceedings, there must be

initiation of proceedings. In other words, initiation of proceedings

must precede commencement of proceedings. Without initiation

of proceedings under Chapter XIV, there cannot be

commencement of proceedings before a Magistrate under

Chapter XVI. The High Court, in our considered view, was not

right in equating initiation of proceedings under Chapter XIV with

commencement of proceedings under Chapter XVI.

25. Let us now consider the question in the light of judicial

pronouncements on the point.

26. In Supdt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Abani Kumar

Banerjee, AIR 1950 Cal. 437, the High Court of Calcutta had an

occasion to consider the ambit and scope of the phrase “taking

cognizance” under Section 190 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1898 which was in pari materia with Section 190 of

the present Code of 1973. Referring to various decisions, Das

Gupta, J. (as His Lordship then was) stated: (AIR p. 438, para 7)

“7. … What is ‘taking cognizance’ has not been defined in the

Criminal Procedure Code, and I have no desire now to attempt

to define it. It seems to me clear, however, that before it can

be said that any Magistrate has taken cognizance of any

offence under Section 190(1)(a) CrPC, he must not only have

applied his mind to the contents of the petition, but he must

have done so for the purpose of proceeding in a particular way

as indicated in the subsequent provisions of this Chapter,

proceeding under Section 200, and thereafter sending it for

enquiry and report under Section 202. When the Magistrate

applies his mind not for the purpose of proceeding under the

22

subsequent sections of this Chapter, but for taking action of

some other kind, e.g., ordering investigation under Section

156(3), or issuing a search warrant for the purpose of the

investigation, he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of

the offence.”

27. R.R. Chari v. State of U.P. AIR 1951 SC 207 was probably the

first leading decision of this Court on the point. There, the police,

having suspected the appellant-accused to be guilty of offences

punishable under Sections 161 and 165 of the Penal Code (IPC)

as also under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, applied to

the District Magistrate, Kanpur to issue warrant of arrest on 22-

10-1947. Warrant was issued on the next day and the accused

was arrested on 27-10-1947.

28. On 25-3-1949, the accused was produced before the

Magistrate to answer the charge-sheet submitted by the

prosecution. According to the accused, on 22-10-1947, when

warrant for his arrest was issued by the Magistrate, the

Magistrate was said to have taken cognizance of offence and

since no sanction of the Government had been obtained before

that date, initiation of proceedings against him was unlawful. The

question before the Court was as to when cognizance of the

offence could be said to have been taken by the Magistrate

under Section 190 of the Code. Considering the circumstances

under which “cognizance of offence” under sub-section (1) of

Section 190 of the Code can be taken by a Magistrate and

referring to Abani Kumar Banerjee (supra), the Court, speaking

through Kania, C.J. stated: (Chari case (supra), AIR p. 208, para 3)

“3. It is clear from the wording of the section that the initiation

of the proceedings against a person commences on the

cognizance of the offence by the Magistrate under one of the

three contingencies mentioned in the section. The first

contingency evidently is in respect of non-cognizable offences

as defined in CrPC on the complaint of an aggrieved person.

The second is on a police report, which evidently is the case of

a cognizable offence when the police have completed their

investigation and come to the Magistrate for the issue of a

process. The third is when the Magistrate himself takes notice

of an offence and issues the process. It is important to

remember that in respect of any cognizable offence, the police,

at the initial stage when they are investigating the matter, can

arrest a person without obtaining an order from the Magistrate.

Under Section 167(b) CrPC the police have of course to put up

the person so arrested before a Magistrate within 24 hours and

obtain an order of remand to police custody for the purpose of

further investigation, if they so desire. But they have the

power to arrest a person for the purpose of investigation

without approaching the Magistrate first. Therefore, in cases of

cognizable offence before proceedings are initiated and while

the matter is under investigation by the police the suspected

23

person is liable to be arrested by the police without an order

by the Magistrate.”

29. Approving the observations of Das Gupta, J. in Abani Kumar

Banerjee(supra), this Court held that it was on 25-3-1949 when

the Magistrate issued a notice under Section 190 of the Code

against the accused that he took “cognizance” of the offence.

Since before that day, sanction had been granted by the

Government, the proceedings could not be said to have been

initiated without authority of law.

30. Again in Narayandas Bhagwandas Madhavdas v. State of

W.B.AIR 1959 SC 1118, this Court observed that when

cognizance is taken of an offence depends upon the facts and

circumstances of each case and it is impossible to attempt to

define what is meant by taking cognizance. Issuance of a search

warrant for the purpose of an investigation or a warrant of arrest

of the accused cannot by itself be regarded as an act of taking

cognizance of an offence. It is only when a Magistrate applies his

mind for proceeding under Section 200 and subsequent sections

of Chapter XV or under Section 204 of Chapter XVI of the Code

that it can be positively stated that he had applied his mind and

thereby had taken cognizance of an offence (see also Ajit Kumar

Palit v. State of W.B. AIR 1963 SC 765 and Hareram Satpathy v.

Tikaram Agarwala, (1978) 4 SCC 58).

31. In Gopal Das Sindhi v. State of Assam, AIR 1961 SC 986,

referring to earlier judgments, this Court said: (AIR p. 989, para

7)

“7. … We cannot read the provisions of Section 190 to mean

that once a complaint is filed, a Magistrate is bound to take

cognizance if the facts stated in the complaint disclose the

commission of any offence. We are unable to construe the

word ‘may’ in Section 190 to mean ‘must’. The reason is

obvious. A complaint disclosing cognizable offences may well

justify a Magistrate in sending the complaint, under Section

156(3) to the police for investigation. There is no reason why

the time of the Magistrate should be wasted when primarily

the duty to investigate in cases involving cognizable offences

is with the police. On the other hand, there may be occasions

when the Magistrate may exercise his discretion and take

cognizance of a cognizable offence. If he does so then he

would have to proceed in the manner provided by Chapter XVI

of the Code.”

32. In Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. State of W.B., (1973) 3 SCC 753,

the Court stated that it is well settled that before a Magistrate

can be said to have taken cognizance of an offence under Section

190(1)(a) of the Code, he must have not only applied his mind to

the contents of the complaint presented before him, but must

have done so for the purpose of proceeding under Section 200

and the provisions following that section. Where, however, he

24

applies his mind only for ordering an investigation under Section

156(3) or issues a warrant for arrest of the accused, he cannot be

said to have taken cognizance of the offence.

33. In Darshan Singh Ram Kishan v. State of Maharashtra (1971)

2 SCC 654, speaking for the Court, Shelat, J. stated that under

Section 190 of the Code, a Magistrate may take cognizance of an

offence either (a) upon receiving a complaint, or (b) upon a

police report, or (c) upon information received from a person

other than a police officer or even upon his own information or

suspicion that such an offence has been committed. As has often

been said, taking cognizance does not involve any formal action

or indeed action of any kind. It occurs as soon as a Magistrate

applies his mind to the suspected commission of an offence.

Cognizance, thus, takes place at a point when a Magistrate first

takes judicial notice of an offence.

34. In Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy v. V. Narayana Reddy

(1976) 3 SCC 252, this Court said: (SCC p. 257, paras 13-14)

“13. It is well settled that when a Magistrate receives a

complaint, he is not bound to take cognizance if the facts

alleged in the complaint, disclose the commission of an

offence. This is clear from the use of the words ‘may take

cognizance’ which in the context in which they occur cannot be

equated with ‘must take cognizance’. The word ‘may’ gives a

discretion to the Magistrate in the matter. If on a reading of the

complaint he finds that the allegations therein disclose a

cognizable offence and the forwarding of the complaint to the

police for investigation under Section 156(3) will be conducive

to justice and save the valuable time of the Magistrate from

being wasted in enquiring into a matter which was primarily

the duty of the police to investigate, he will be justified in

adopting that course as an alternative to taking cognizance of

the offence, himself.

14. This raises the incidental question: What is meant by

‘taking cognizance of an offence’ by a Magistrate within the

contemplation of Section 190? This expression has not been

defined in the Code. But from the scheme of the Code, the

content and marginal heading of Section 190 and the caption

of Chapter XIV under which Sections 190 to 199 occur, it is

clear that a case can be said to be instituted in a court only

when the court takes cognizance of the offence alleged

therein. The ways in which such cognizance can be taken are

set out in Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 190(1). Whether

the Magistrate has or has not taken cognizance of the offence

will depend on the circumstances of the particular case

including the mode in which the case is sought to be instituted,

and the nature of the preliminary action, if any, taken by the

Magistrate. Broadly speaking, when on receiving a complaint,

the Magistrate applies his mind for the purposes of proceeding

under Section 200 and the succeeding sections in Chapter XV

25

of the Code of 1973, he is said to have taken cognizance of the

offence within the meaning of Section 190(1)(a). If, instead of

proceeding under Chapter XV, he has, in the judicial exercise

of his discretion, taken action of some other kind, such as

issuing a search warrant for the purpose of investigation, or

ordering investigation by the police under Section 156(3), he

cannot be said to have taken cognizance of any offence.”

(see also M.L. Sethi v. R.P. Kapur, AIR 1967 SC 528).

9.4 In the case of  Fakhruddin Ahmad v. State of Uttaranchal,

(2008) 17 SCC 157, in paragraphs 9 to 17, it is observed and held

as under:

“9. Before examining the rival contentions, we may briefly refer to

some of the relevant provisions in the Code. Chapter XIV of the

Code, containing Sections 190 to 199 deals with the statutory

conditions requisite for initiation of criminal proceedings and as to

the powers of cognizance of a Magistrate. Sub­section (1) of Section

190 of the Code empowers a Magistrate to take cognizance of an

offence in the manner laid therein. It provides that a Magistrate

may   take   cognizance   of   an   offence   either   (a)   upon   receiving   a

complaint of facts which constitute such offence; or (b) upon a

police report of such facts; or (c) upon information received from

any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge

that such offence has been committed.

10.  Chapter   XV   containing   Sections   200   to   203   deals   with

“Complaints to Magistrates” and lays down the procedure which is

required to be followed by the Magistrate taking cognizance of an

offence   on   complaint.   Similarly,   Chapter   XVI   deals   with

“Commencement   of   Proceedings   before   Magistrates”.   Since

admittedly,   in   the   present   case,   the   Magistrate   has   taken

cognizance of the complaint in terms of Section 190 of the Code,

we shall confine our discussion only to the said provision. We may,

however, note that on receipt of a complaint, the Magistrate has

more than one course open to him to determine the procedure and

the manner to be adopted for taking cognizance of the offence.

11.  One of the courses open to the Magistrate is that instead of

exercising his  discretion and taking  cognizance of a cognizable

offence and following the procedure laid down under Section 200

or Section 202 of the Code, he may order an investigation to be

made by the police under Section 156(3) of the Code, which the

learned Magistrate did in the instant case. When such an order is

26

made, the police is obliged to investigate the case and submit a

report under Section 173(2) of the Code. On receiving the police

report, if the Magistrate is satisfied that on the facts discovered or

unearthed by the police there is sufficient material for him to take

cognizance of the offence, he may take cognizance of the offence

under Section 190(1)(b) of the Code and issue process straightaway

to the accused. However, Section 190(1)(b) of the Code does not lay

down that a Magistrate can take cognizance of an offence only if

the   investigating   officer   gives   an   opinion   that   the   investigation

makes   out   a   case   against   the   accused.   Undoubtedly,   the

Magistrate   can   ignore   the   conclusion(s)   arrived   at   by   the

investigating officer.

12. Thus, it is trite that the Magistrate is not bound by the opinion

of the investigating officer and he is competent to exercise his

discretion in this behalf, irrespective of the view expressed by the

police in their report and decide whether an offence has been made

out or not. This is because the purpose of the police report under

Section 173(2) of the Code, which will contain the facts discovered

or unearthed by the police as well as the conclusion drawn by the

police therefrom is primarily to enable the Magistrate to satisfy

himself whether on the basis of the report and the material referred

therein, a case for cognizance is made out or not.

13.  The next incidental question is as to what is meant by the

expression “taking cognizance of an offence” by a Magistrate within

the contemplation of Section 190 of the Code?

14. The expression “cognizance” is not defined in the Code but is a

word of indefinite import. As observed by this Court in Ajit Kumar

Palit v. State of W.B., AIR 1963 SC 765 (AIR p. 770, para 19)

“19.   …   The   word   ‘cognizance’   has   no   esoteric   or   mystic

significance in criminal law  or procedure. It merely means—

become aware of and when used with reference to a court or

Judge, to take notice of judicially.”

Approving the observations of the Calcutta High Court in Emperor

v. Sourindra Mohan Chuckerbutty, ILR (1910) 37 Cal. 412 (at ILR p.

416), the Court said that

“taking cognizance does not involve any formal action, or indeed

action of any kind, but occurs as soon as a Magistrate, as such,

applies his mind to the suspected commission of an offence.”

(emphasis supplied)

15.  Recently, this Court in  Chief Enforcement Officer  v.  Videocon

International   Ltd.4  speaking   through   C.K.   Thakker,   J.,   while

considering the ambit and scope of the phrase “taking cognizance”

under   Section   190   of   the   Code,   has   highlighted   some   of   the

observations of the Calcutta High Court in Supdt. & Remembrancer

of Legal Affairs v. Abani Kumar Banerjee, AIR 1950 Cal. 437 which

27

were approved by this Court in R.R. Chari v. State of U.P., AIR 1951

SC 207.  The observations are: (Abani Kumar Banerjee case(supra),

AIR p. 438, para 7)

“7. … What is ‘taking cognizance’ has not been defined in the

Criminal Procedure Code, and I have no desire now to attempt to

define it. It seems to me clear, however, that before it can be said

that any Magistrate has taken cognizance of any offence under

Section 190(1)(a) CrPC, he must not only have applied his mind

to the contents of the petition, but he must have done so for the

purpose of proceeding in a particular way as indicated in the

subsequent provisions of this Chapter, proceeding under Section

200,   and  thereafter   sending   it   for   enquiry   and   report   under

Section 202. When the Magistrate applies his mind not for the

purpose of proceeding under the subsequent sections of this

Chapter, but for taking action of some other kind e.g. ordering

investigation under Section 156(3), or issuing a search warrant

for the purpose of the investigation, he cannot be said to have

taken cognizance of the offence.”

16. From the aforenoted judicial pronouncements, it is clear that

being an expression of indefinite import, it is neither practicable

nor desirable to precisely define as to what is meant by “taking

cognizance”.   Whether   the   Magistrate   has   or   has   not   taken

cognizance of the offence will depend upon the circumstances of

the particular case, including the mode in which the case is sought

to be instituted and the nature of the preliminary action.

17. Nevertheless, it is well settled that before a Magistrate can be

said to have taken cognizance of an offence, it is imperative that he

must have taken notice of the accusations and applied his mind to

the allegations made in the complaint or in the police report or the

information received from a source other than a police report, as

the case may be, and the material filed therewith. It needs little

emphasis that it is only when the Magistrate applies his mind and

is  satisfied  that   the  allegations,  if   proved,   would  constitute  an

offence   and   decides   to   initiate   proceedings   against   the   alleged

offender,   that   it   can   be   positively   stated   that   he   has   taken

cognizance of the offence. Cognizance is in regard to the offence

and not the offender.”

9.5 In the case of  Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh,

(2012) 3 SCC 64, it is observed in paragraphs 34 to 37 as under:

“34.  The   argument   of   the   learned   Attorney   General   that   the

question of granting sanction for prosecution of a public servant

charged with an offence under the 1988 Act arises only at the stage

28

of taking cognizance and not before that is neither supported by

the plain language of the section nor the judicial precedents relied

upon by him. Though, the term “cognizance” has not been defined

either in the 1988 Act or CrPC, the same has acquired a definite

meaning and connotation from various judicial precedents. In legal

parlance cognizance is “taking judicial notice by the court of law,

possessing jurisdiction, on a cause or matter presented before it so

as to decide whether there is any basis for initiating proceedings

and determination of the cause or matter judicially”.

35. In R.R. Chari v. State of U.P AIR 1951 SC 207, the three­Judge

Bench approved the following observations made by the Calcutta

High Court in  Supt. and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs  v.  Abani

Kumar Banerjee AIR 1950 Cal. 437,: (AIR p. 438, para 7)

“7. … What is ‘taking cognizance’ has not been defined in the

Criminal Procedure Code, and I have no desire now to attempt to

define it. It seems to me clear, however, that before it can be said

that any Magistrate has taken cognizance of any offence under

Section 190(1)(a), Criminal Procedure Code, he must not only have

applied his mind to the contents of the petition, but he must have

done   so   for   the   purpose   of   proceeding   in   a   particular   way   as

indicated   in   the   subsequent   provisions   of   this   Chapter,—

proceeding under Section 200, and thereafter sending it for inquiry

and report under Section 202. When the Magistrate applies his

mind  not   for  the  purpose   of  proceeding  under  the  subsequent

sections of this Chapter, but for taking action of some other kind

e.g.   ordering   investigation   under   Section   156(3),   or   issuing   a

search warrant for the purpose of the investigation, he cannot be

said to have taken cognizance of the offence.”

36. In State of W.B. v. Mohd. Khalid (1995) 1 SCC 684, the Court

referred to Section 190 CrPC and observed: (SCC p. 696, para 43)

“43. … In its broad and literal sense, it means taking notice of

an offence. This would include the intention of initiating judicial

proceedings against the offender in respect of that offence or taking

steps   to   see   whether   there   is   any   basis   for   initiating   judicial

proceedings or for other purposes. The word ‘cognizance’ indicates

the point when a Magistrate or a Judge first takes judicial notice of

an   offence.   It   is   entirely   a   different   thing   from   initiation   of

proceedings; rather it is the condition precedent to the initiation of

proceedings by the Magistrate or the Judge. Cognizance is taken of

cases and not of persons.”

37. In State of Karnataka v. Pastor P. Raju (2006) 6 SCC 728, this

Court referred to the provisions of Chapter XIV and Sections 190

and 196(1­A) CrPC and observed: (SCC p. 732, para 8)

“8. … There is no bar against registration of a criminal case or

investigation by the police agency or submission of a report by the

29

police on completion of investigation, as contemplated by Section

173 CrPC. If a  criminal  case is  registered, investigation of the

offence is done and the police submits a report as a result of such

investigation before a Magistrate without the previous sanction of

the  Central   Government   or   of   the   State  Government   or  of   the

District Magistrate, there will be no violation of Section 196(1­A)

CrPC and no illegality of any kind would be committed.”

9.6 In the case of  Anil Kumar v. M.K. Aiyappa (2013) 10 SCC

705, it is observed and held in paragraphs 12 to 15 as under:

“12.  We will now examine whether the order directing

investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC would amount to

taking cognizance of the offence, since a contention was

raised   that   the   expression   “cognizance”   appearing   in

Section 19(1) of the PC Act will have to be construed as

post­cognizance   stage,   not   pre­cognizance   stage   and,

therefore,   the   requirement   of   sanction   does   not   arise

prior   to   taking   cognizance   of   the   offences   punishable

under the provisions of the PC Act.

13.  The   expression   “cognizance”   which   appears   in

Section 197 CrPC came up for consideration before a

three­Judge Bench of this Court in State of U.P. v. Paras

Nath Singh (2009) 6 SCC 372, and this Court expressed

the following view: (SCC pp. 375, para 6)

“6. … ‘10. … And the jurisdiction of a Magistrate to

take cognizance of any offence is provided by Section

190 of the Code, either on receipt of a complaint, or

upon a police report or upon information received from

any person other than a police officer, or upon his

knowledge that such offence has been committed. So

far as public servants are concerned, the cognizance of

any offence, by any court, is barred by Section 197 of

the   Code   unless   sanction   is   obtained   from   the

appropriate authority, if the offence, alleged to have

been committed, was in discharge of the official duty.

The section not only specifies the persons to whom the

protection   is   afforded   but   it   also   specifies   the

30

conditions   and   circumstances   in   which   it   shall   be

available and the effect in law if the conditions are

satisfied. The  mandatory character of  the protection

afforded   to   a   public   servant   is   brought   out   by   the

expression,   ‘no   court   shall   take   cognizance   of   such

offence except with the previous sanction’. Use of the

words ‘no’ and ‘shall’ makes it abundantly clear that

the bar on the exercise of power of the court to take

cognizance of any offence is absolute and complete. The

very   cognizance   is   barred.   That   is,   the   complaint

cannot be taken notice of. According to  Black’s Law

Dictionary the word ‘cognizance’ means ‘jurisdiction’ or

‘the   exercise   of   jurisdiction’   or   ‘power   to   try   and

determine   causes’.   In   common   parlance,   it   means

taking notice of. A court, therefore, is precluded from

entertaining   a   complaint   or   taking   notice   of   it   or

exercising  jurisdiction  if  it  is in   respect  of  a  public

servant who is accused of an offence alleged to have

been committed during discharge of his official duty.”

14.  In State of W.B.  v.  Mohd. Khalid (1995) 1 SCC 684,

this Court has observed as follows:

“13.   It   is   necessary   to   mention   here   that   taking

cognizance   of   an   offence   is   not   the   same   thing   as

issuance of process. Cognizance is taken at the initial

stage when the Magistrate applies his judicial mind to

the facts mentioned in a complaint or to a police report

or upon information received from any other person

that an offence has been committed. The issuance of

process   is   at   a   subsequent   stage   when   after

considering   the   material   placed   before   it   the   court

decides to proceed against the offenders against whom

a prima facie case is made out.

The meaning of the said expression was also considered

by this Court in Subramanian Swamy case (2012) 3 SCC

64.

15.  The   judgments   referred   to   hereinabove   clearly

indicate   that   the   word   “cognizance”   has   a   wider

connotation and is not merely confined to the stage of

taking cognizance of the offence. When a Special Judge

refers a complaint for investigation under Section 156(3)

31

CrPC,   obviously,   he   has   not   taken   cognizance   of   the

offence and, therefore, it is a pre­cognizance stage and

cannot be equated with post­cognizance stage. When a

Special   Judge   takes   cognizance   of   the   offence   on   a

complaint presented under Section 200 CrPC and the

next step to be taken is to follow up under Section 202

CrPC. Consequently, a Special Judge referring the case

for   investigation   under   Section   156(3)   is   at   precognizance stage.”

10. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having

perused the relevant provisions of the law as also the judicial

pronouncements, we are of the view that the High Court has not

committed any error in not quashing the order passed by the

learned Magistrate and not quashing the criminal proceedings for

the offences under Sections 379 and 414.   It is required to be

noted that the learned Magistrate in exercise of the suo motu

powers   conferred   under   Section   156(3),   Cr.P.C.   directed   the

concerned In­charge/SHO of the police station to lodge/register

the crime case/FIR and directed initiation of investigation and

directed the concerned In­charge/SHO of the police station to

submit a report after due investigation.

Applying   the   law   laid   down   by   this   Court   in   the   cases

referred to hereinabove, it cannot be said that at this stage the

learned   Magistrate   had   taken   any   cognizance   of   the   alleged

32

offences attracting bar under Section 22 of the MMDR Act.  On

considering the relevant provisions of the MMDR Act and the

Rules made thereunder, it cannot be said that there is a bar

against registration of a criminal case or investigation by the

police   agency   or   submission   of   a   report   by   the   police   on

completion   of   investigation,   as   contemplated   by   Section   173,

Cr.P.C.  

10.1 At this stage, it is required to be noted that as per Section

21 of the MMDR Act, the offences under the MMDR Act are

cognizable.  10.2 As specifically observed by this Court in the

case   of  Anil   Kumar   (supra),   ‘when   a   Special   Judge   refers   a

complaint   for   investigation   under   Section   156(3)   Cr.P.C.,

obviously,   he   has   not   taken   cognizance   of   the   offence   and,

therefore, it is a pre­cognizance stage and cannot be equated with

post­cognizance stage’.

10.3 Even as observed by this Court in the case of  R.R. Chari

(supra),   even   the   order   passed   by   the   Magistrate   ordering

investigation under Section 156(3), or issuing a search warrant

for the purpose of the investigation, he cannot be said to have

taken cognizance of the offence.  As observed by the Constitution

33

Bench of this Court in the case of A.R. Antulay(supra), filing of a

complaint in court is not taking cognizance and what exactly

constitutes   taking   cognizance   is   different   from   filing   of   a

complaint.  Therefore, when an order is passed by the Magistrate

for investigation to be made by the police under Section 156(3) of

the Code, which the learned Magistrate did in the instant case,

when such an order is made the police is obliged to investigate

the case and submit a report under Section 173(2) of the Code.

That thereafter the investigating officer is required to send report

to   the   authorised   officer   and   thereafter   as   envisaged   under

Section 22 of the MMDR Act the authorised officer as mentioned

in Section 22 of the MMDR Act may file the complaint before the

learned   Magistrate   along   with   the   report   submitted   by   the

investigating officer and at that stage the question with respect to

taking cognizance by the learned Magistrate would arise.

11. Now   so   far   as   the   submission   on   behalf   of   the   private

appellants­violators that in view of the fact that violators were

permitted to compound the violation in exercise of powers under

Rule 53 of the 1996 Rules or Rule 18 of the 2006 Rules and the

violators   accepted   the   decision   and   deposited   the   amount   of

34

penalty   determined   by   the   appropriate   authority   for

compounding   the   offences/violations,   there   cannot   be   any

further criminal proceedings for the offences under Sections 379

and 414 IPC and Sections 4/21 of the MMDR Act   and the

reliance placed on Section 23A of the MMDR Act is concerned, it

is   true   that   in   the   present   case   the   appropriate   authority

determined the penalty under Rule 53 of the 1996 Rules/Rule 18

of the 2006 Rules, which the private appellants­violators paid

and therefore the bar contained in sub­section 2 of Section 23A

of the MMDR Act will be attracted.   Section 23A as it stands

today has been brought on the Statute in the year 1972 on the

recommendations of the Mineral Advisory Board which provides

that any offence punishable under the MMDR Act or any rule

made thereunder may, either before or after the institution of the

prosecution,  be  compounded  by  the  person  authorised under

section 22 to make a complaint to the court with respect to that

offence, on payment to that person, for credit to the Government,

of   such   sum   as   that   person   may   specify.     Sub­section   2   of

Section   23A   further   provides   that   where   an   offence   is

compounded   under   sub­section   (1),   no   proceeding   or   further

proceeding,   as   the   case   may   be,   shall   be   taken   against   the

35

offender   in   respect   of   the   offence   so   compounded,   and   the

offender, if in custody, shall be released forthwith. Thus, the bar

under   sub­section   2   of   Section   23A   shall   be   applicable   with

respect   to   offences   under   the   MMDR   Act   or   any   rule   made

thereunder.     However,   the   bar   contained   in   sub­section   2   of

Section 23A shall not be applicable for the offences under the

IPC, such as, Section 379 and 414 IPC.  In the present case, as

observed and held hereinabove, the offences under the MMDR

Act or any rule made thereunder and the offences under the IPC

are different and distinct offences.  Therefore, as in the present

case, the mining inspectors prepared the cases under Rule 53 of

the 1996 Rules and submitted them before the mining officers

with the proposals of compounding the same for the amount

calculated according to the concerned rules and the Collector

approved the said proposal and thereafter the private appellantsviolators   accepted   the   decision   and   deposited   the   amount   of

penalty determined by the Collector for compounding the cases in

view of sub­section 2 of Section 23A of the MMDR Act and the

1996 rules and even the 2006 rules are framed in exercise of the

powers   under   Section   15   of   the   MMDR   Act,   criminal

complaints/proceedings for the offences under Sections 4/21 of

36

the MMDR Act are not permissible and are not required to be

proceeded further in view of the bar contained in sub­section 2 of

Section 23A of the MMDR Act.   At the same time, as observed

hereinabove,   the   criminal   complaints/proceedings   for   the

offences under the IPC – Sections 379/414 IPC which are held to

be distinct and different can be proceeded further, subject to the

observations made hereinabove.

However,   our   above   conclusions   are   considering   the

provisions of Section 23A of the MMDR Act, as it stands today.  It

might be true that by permitting the violators to compound the

offences under the MMDR Act or the rules made thereunder, the

State may get the revenue and the same shall be on the principle

of person who causes the damage shall have to compensate the

damage and shall have to pay the penalty like the principle of

polluters to pay in case of damage to the environment.  However,

in view of the large scale damages being caused to the nature and

as observed and held by this Court in the case of Sanjay (supra),

the policy and object of MMDR Act and Rules are the result of an

increasing   awareness   of   the   compelling   need   to   restore   the

serious   ecological   imbalance   and   to   stop   the   damages   being

37

caused to the nature and considering the observations made by

this Court in the aforesaid decision, reproduced hereinabove, and

when   the   violations   like   this   are   increasing   and   the   serious

damage is caused to the nature and the earth and it also affects

the ground water levels etc. and it causes severe damage as

observed by this Court in the case of Sanjay (supra), reproduced

hereinabove, we are of the opinion that the violators cannot be

permitted to go scot free on payment of penalty only.  There must

be some stringent provisions which may have deterrent effect so

that   the   violators   may   think   twice   before   committing   such

offences and before causing damage to the earth and the nature. 

It is the duty cast upon the State to restore the ecological

imbalance and to stop damages being caused to the nature.  As

observed by this Court in the case of Sanjay (supra), excessive instream sand­and­gravel mining from river beds and like resources

causes the degradation of rivers.  It is further observed that apart

from threatening bridges, sand mining transforms the riverbeds

into large and deep pits, as a result, the groundwater table drops

leaving the drinking water wells on the embankments of these

rivers dry.  Even otherwise, sand/mines is a public property and

38

the   State   is   the   custodian   of   the   said   public   property   and

therefore   the   State   should   be   more   sensitive     to   protect   the

environment  and ecological balance and to  protect the  public

property the State should always be in favour of taking very stern

action against the violators who are creating serious ecological

imbalance and causing damages to the nature in any form.   As

the provisions of Section 23A are not under challenge and Section

23A of the MMDR Act so long as it stands, we leave the matter

there   and   leave   it   to   the   wisdom   of   the   legislatures   and   the

concerned States.

12. Now so  far as the appeal preferred by the  State on the

premise   that   the   order   passed   by   the   learned   Magistrate,

confirmed by the High Court, affects the powers of the authorised

person to compound the offence, in exercise of powers under Rule

53 of the 1996 Rules and Rule 18 of the 2006 Rules is concerned,

the same is absolutely misconceived.  By the order passed by the

learned Magistrate, confirmed by the High Court, by no stretch of

imagination,   it   can   be   said   that   directing   to   file   the   first

information report/crime case for the offences under the IPC and

even for the offences under the MMDR Act and the rules made

39

thereunder, it affects any of the powers of the authorised person

to compound the offence.  In fact, in view of the decision of this

Court in the case of  Sanjay (supra), in which this Court has

specifically observed and held that so far as the offence under the

IPC is concerned, there shall not be any bar under Section 22 of

the   MMDR   Act   and   when   before   the   High   Court   the   State

supported the order passed by the learned Magistrate and rightly

so and when the impugned judgment and order passed by the

High Court is in favour of the State, as such, the State ought not

to have filed the special leave petition/appeal.  

13. After giving our thoughtful consideration in the matter, in

the light of the relevant provisions of the MMDR Act and the

Rules made thereunder vis­à­vis the Code of Criminal Procedure

and the Penal Code, and the law laid down by this Court in the

cases   referred   to   hereinabove   and   for   the   reasons   stated

hereinabove, our conclusions are as under:

i) that the learned Magistrate can in exercise of powers under

Section   156(3)   of   the   Code   order/direct   the   concerned   Incharge/SHO of the police station to lodge/register crime case/FIR

even for the offences under the MMDR Act and the Rules made

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thereunder and at this stage the bar under Section 22 of the

MMDR Act shall not be attracted;

ii) the   bar   under   Section   22   of   the   MMDR   Act   shall   be

attracted only when the learned Magistrate takes cognizance of

the offences under the MMDR Act and Rules made thereunder

and orders issuance of process/summons for the offences under

the MMDR Act and Rules made thereunder;

iii) for commission of the offence under the IPC, on receipt of

the   police  report, the   Magistrate  having  jurisdiction  can  take

cognizance of the said offence without awaiting the receipt of

complaint that may be filed by the authorised officer for taking

cognizance in respect of violation of various provisions of the

MMDR Act and Rules made thereunder; and

iv) that   in   respect   of   violation   of   various   provisions   of   the

MMDR Act and the Rules made thereunder, when a Magistrate

passes an order under Section 156(3) of the Code and directs the

concerned In­charge/SHO of the police station to register/lodge

the   crime   case/FIR   in   respect   of   the   violation   of   various

provisions of the Act and Rules made thereunder and thereafter

after   investigation   the   concerned   In­charge   of   the   police

station/investigating officer submits a report, the same can be

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sent to the concerned Magistrate as well as to the concerned

authorised officer as mentioned in Section 22 of the MMDR Act

and   thereafter   the   concerned   authorised   officer   may   file   the

complaint before the learned Magistrate along with the report

submitted by the concerned investigating officer and thereafter it

will be open for the learned Magistrate to take cognizance after

following due procedure, issue process/summons in respect of

the violations of the various provisions of the MMDR Act and

Rules made thereunder and at that stage it can be said that

cognizance has been taken by the learned Magistrate.

v) in a case where the violator is permitted to compound the

offences on payment of penalty as per sub­section1 of Section

23A, considering sub­section 2 of Section 23A of the MMDR Act,

there shall not be any proceedings or further proceedings against

the   offender   in   respect   of   the   offences   punishable   under   the

MMDR   Act   or   any   rule   made   thereunder   so   compounded.

However, the bar under sub­section 2 of Section 23A shall not

affect any proceedings for the offences under the IPC, such as,

Sections 379 and 414 IPC and the same shall be proceeded with

further.

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14. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the

appeals   filed   by   the   violators/private   appellants   are   partly

allowed, to the extent quashing the proceedings for the offences

under the MMDR Act – Sections 4/21 of the MMDR Act only. The

appeal   preferred   by   the   State   of   Madhya   Pradesh   stands

dismissed.

…………………………………..J.

[ASHOK BHUSHAN]

NEW DELHI; …………………………………..J.

DECEMBER 03, 2020 [M.R. SHAH]

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